

THE
ENGLISH
IN
SPAIN

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
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MORELIA IN 1838.

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THE ENGLISH IN SPAIN;

OR,

THE STORY OF THE WAR OF SUCCESSION

BETWEEN 1834 AND 1840.



COMPILED FROM THE LETTERS, JOURNALS, AND REPORTS OF

GENERALS W. WYLDE, SIR COLLINGWOOD DICKSON,
W. H. ASKWITH;

COLONELS LACY, COLQUHOUN, MICHELL, AND MAJOR TURNER, R.A.;

AND

COLONELS ALDERSON, DU PLAT, AND LYNN, R.E.,

Commissioners with Queen Isabella's Armies.

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WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

By LIEUT.-GENERAL W. H. ASKWITH, R.A.;

AND MAP.

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TO

HIS MAJESTY ALFONSO XII.,

KING OF SPAIN,


THIS NARRATIVE OF A LONG AND DESOLATING WAR IN THE COUNTRY

OVER WHICH HE REIGNS

IS RESPECTFULLY AND BY PERMISSION

Dedicated

By THE AUTHOR.





ESPARTERO.

P R E F A C E.

THE Author in the course of his researches into the history of the Royal Artillery during the years subsequent to 1815,—the date at which his published record of the services of that great corps terminates, found many interesting letters and journals written by some of the most distinguished of his brother officers, who had been employed under the English Foreign Office as Commissioners with Queen Isabella's armies during the Civil War in Spain between 1834 and 1840.

Although, perhaps, to many English readers this war may not present features of special interest equal to those of the great Peninsular War, yet there must be to the student of history matter for congratulation, when from an impartial source information is obtained about a time during which our countrymen contributed to the pacification and union of a great and—until lately—a divided people.

To artillery officers in England it is hoped that this contribution to the history of their corps may be valuable and welcome. The men whose industry has virtually built up this work lived in a time of regimental stagnation, which made them hunger for any loop-hole beyond their own immediate duties. It was a cruel time for testing a man's

real merits,—a merciless time for exposing those who had no merits to be tested. But the test was successfully encountered by the officers who were employed as Commissioners by the English Government, and the more their conduct is revealed, the more certain is it to excite the pride of their countrymen. Now,—when the air is rife with tales of unprecedented horror, and while a war is going on almost unparalleled in atrocity and loss of life, the reader will especially commend the labours of those who did so much in Spain to lessen the sufferings of the sick and wounded, and to minimize the miseries of the non-combatant population. The terms of the Eliot Convention would have been but empty platitudes, had it not been for the ceaseless labours of those English officers, who for the first time in Spanish history organized that which reads like a paradox—philanthropy in war.

Of all these Commissioners, the late General Wylde was *facile princeps*. He lived to see some of these pages, but died ere they were in type. Such was the modesty which characterised him, that the Author dared not show him the chapters which attempted to describe his special powers. In publishing them now, the Author feels that he is giving to the world an inadequate “In Memoriam” of one who was as generous in his views as he was astute in his action. To his astuteness and generosity he added that courtesy and tact which have so large a share in commanding and influencing men.

One of the chief difficulties to be encountered by the student of Spanish history lies in the absence of maps of sufficient accuracy and detail to enable the frequent movements of the opposing armies to be traced and understood. The accompanying Map demands the reader's indulgence.

The Author of “England's Artillerymen,” Mr. James Browne, has with his usual enthusiasm and industry in all matters connected with his Regiment, devoted himself to the compilation of an Index to this work. The thanks of the Author are for a third time his due, and are cheerfully—gratefully—rendered.

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INTRODUCTION.

MADRID, during the continuance of that war, the course of which it is attempted to trace in the following pages, presented a succession of phases which it is almost painful to contemplate. The anarchy and confusion foretold by the dying Ferdinand had made their appearance. Around the baby-Queen, politicians of every shade, schemers and earnest men, place-holders and place-hunters, and generals who preferred the quill to the sword, crowded with real or affected anxiety, and with very real mutual suspicion. Political dreamers made that young life the centre of their visions; in it was to be fulfilled the widely-different hopes of men who agreed only in their sincerity; and in it the greedy and the ambitious office-seekers fondly hoped to realise the attainment of their selfish ends.

Nor was it only in Court and Cortes that this feverish restlessness was apparent. Daily in the Puerta del Sol, "*le siège inofficiel du Gouvernement*,"* excited speculators shouted or moaned over battles, not on account of the victories or the defeats, but according as the consequent rise or fall in securities swelled or diminished their individual gains. Knowing this full well, there were at times weak generals in the field, such as Cordova, who fought untimely battles, rather than offend the impatience of the Puerta.

* Martignac.

'L'Espa-
paigno: par
J. Tanski.
Paris, 1844.

Ibid.

The streets were crowded by the class so bitterly criticised by a contemporary writer. This most powerful class consisted of public functionaries, and *employés* of various ranks and titles. Successive ministers had given office to personal friends and supporters, until at last they approached the strength of an army. These were quaintly classified as "*ilimitados*, en non-activité, avec un tiers de traitement; "*cesantes*, suspendus, gardant le titre de leurs emplois, sans solde; "*retirados*, en retraite honorifique; "*jubilados*, jouissant d'une pension de l'État:" and it was well said that "cette armée administrative était une plaie dévorante pour le Trésor public." At the end of the war there were some five-and-twenty thousand of these locusts.

The bewildered stranger found also to his amazement that even the bankers—a class generally interested in the maintenance of order and in the absence of radical change—greedily welcomed political revolutions and changes of ministry. It was only on inquiry that he learnt that these bankers were as a rule merely the agents of foreign houses,—each having more or less dealings with the Treasury; and as the first want of every new government was money, on almost any terms,—the prospects of high commission, and of well-paid agency, made these gentry hungrily welcome changes which might be disastrous to Spain.

So depressing was the superficial aspect of society in Madrid, that the despairing writer above quoted exclaimed: "Ici l'esprit-de parti ne ménage rien; conviction, honneur, mérite, expérience, longs services—tout est sacrifié aux exigences du moment. . . . Le patriotisme, le sentiment du devoir, les convictions politiques, ont fait place à la

“ cupidité et à un vil calcul. Je n’hésite pas à dire que les
“ choses sont arrivées à ce point que les places, les fonctions
“ de l’État, les grades militaires, si respectables ailleurs par
“ leur abnégation, leur dévouement au service public, sont
“ devenus ici une simple affaire, une marchandise sur laquelle
“ on spéculé, comme on fait à la Bourse sur les nouvelles du
“ jour, pour la hausse et la baisse des fonds.”

A ghastly picture this, and painted with no feeble hand ; and as one remembers how hushed became the noisy patriotism of many, when the wave of war surged on one occasion from the North to the arid plains in the neighbourhood of Madrid, one fears at first that the picture is not overdrawn.

But, happily, a corrupt even if dominant class is no more a nation than is a diseased limb a man. The same strong pen which immolates the official locusts goes on to say : “ Le
“ peuple est à Madrid spectateur impassible de toutes les
“ insurrections.” And it was in the quiet patriotism of the patient people of Spain that the hopes of the country and the future of the young Queen lay sheltered. The army possessed the same patience, and was most amenable to discipline ; and war was sure to develop a fit leader. As, too, time went on, impracticable reformers in the Cortes, intoxicated at first by the novel opportunities of airing their crotchets, would postpone even their cherished ideas to their country’s present weal ; and would, for a time at least, abandon the pet rôle of the reformer—the attitude of impracticability.

It was, indeed, a painful time, but it was not one for despair. The pent-up feelings of generations do not find vent in soft words or lovers’ sighs. The long-wished cry of Constitutional Liberty which came in with Isabella, had in

Spain, as elsewhere, the effect of almost hysterical excitement on even strong and noble men whose life-dream seemed now about to be realised ; but, although the weaker among the enthusiasts spent time and eloquence in an almost feminine scolding of a past which they hated, many would soon settle down to the nobler and manly task of regenerating the present.

It was a painful time, but a hopeful. And as the waves of party surged to the foot of the throne, and a babel of noble and ignoble sounds echoed on the ear of its unconscious occupant, there stood—like some sentinel at his post—one who has been bitterly maligned and wilfully misunderstood, one who was fiercely able and thirstily ambitious, but who conquered herself in her loyalty to her child,—who accepted ungrateful tasks, and practised unwelcome self-denial in nourishing the idea which that child embodied to Spain—the Queen-Dowager, Christina!

* * * * *

Civil war may be a sad spectacle: but the war to be treated in these pages had many bright and almost fascinating features. The Basque peasant may have been but a tool in the hands of intriguers, but his heart was filled with fondly-cherished memories and far from ignoble aspirations:—and for these he was ready to suffer and to die. The Christino rank and file may have been marched and counter-marched fruitlessly for years, but in no army since wars began on earth was more patience displayed, or a more self-denying sense of duty entertained. Civil war may indeed be a sad spectacle: but self-denial, and patience, and belief, atone for many of its more distressing attributes.

ERRATA.

THE SKETCH at the end of Chap. XXV. should have been placed at the end of Chap. XX., as it shows the breach in the walls of Morella, which was made during the *first* siege.

Page 222, 5th line from the bottom, for "San Miguel *Everisto*," read "*Don Santos* San Miguel."

300, for "Castle of ALCALA" read "ALIAGA."



THE ENGLISH IN SPAIN.

CHAPTER I.

THE ENGLISH COMMISSIONER.

IN September, 1834, Lord Palmerston, who then presided at the Foreign Office of England, decided on sending "an officer of rank and experience to the head-quarters of the Army of Her Catholic Majesty employed in suppressing the rebellion in the Northern Provinces of Spain." It was a happy resolution for the students of this period of Spanish history: and it was a wise resolution, as far as concerned the suffering inhabitants of a distracted country, and the wounded and prisoners of the opposing armies.

It really appears to be impossible for any one, a party to a struggle, to give an accurate account of what takes place. The desire — one might almost say the necessity — of inspiring troops to renewed efforts, leads an interested and contemporary chronicler to give undue prominence to successes, and to forget reverses: if indeed his imagination does not carry him beyond the region of facts altogether. Special circumstances intensified this tendency in the War of Succession in Spain, which is to be discussed in these pages. Each party desired to stand high in the eyes of Europe, because each desired eagerly to obtain money from foreign lenders. The greater and more numerous the victories which each could claim, the easier would be the terms on which the capitalists of London, Paris, or Amsterdam would part with their hoards. Nor were the means of speedy contradiction so available as they

are forty years later. Again, as success in the field rendered the position of ministers in either Court more secure, and as these ministers were practically the fountain of military promotion, the temptation to shed a roseate hue over their own movements, and to paint in the darkest colours the necessities of their opponents, was more than the average Spanish general could resist. Yet again, the credulity of the Spanish peasantry was omnivorous: and as from their ranks each army drew its patient and long-suffering soldiery, it behoved the Christino and Carlist leaders to sing in rival strains the bravery, the comfort, and the successes of their respective forces.

The historian, who would attempt to write the Spanish War of 1834-40 from purely Spanish sources, would be baffled by the clouds of exaggeration and contradiction incessantly surrounding him. Happily the Spanish accounts can be sifted and tested in comparison with those of the English Commissioners, the first of whom was appointed in the autumn of 1834. These had no motive for concealing the real facts: it was their duty, and their instinct, to report the exact state of affairs; and any opinions which they might express would be founded on special experience, with a view, indeed, to the ultimate success of the cause in which England was interested,—a success, however, not to be attained by closing their eyes to actual reverses, or by revelling in accounts of imaginary victories.

Able and conscientious as were all the commissioners successively attached by England to the armies of the child-Queen Isabella, none of them surpassed—if, indeed, any of them equalled—him who was appointed in 1834, and who acted during the years of his appointment as Chief Commissioner with the main Christino army, the Army of the North. Colonel W. Wylde, of the Royal Artillery, had already distinguished himself in the troubles attending the dispute as to the Portuguese Succession between Dom Pedro and Dom Miguel. His tact had been tried, and not found wanting, under circumstances of special gravity and difficulty in Portugal: it was now to have a wider field in more trying

situations in Spain. The orders which he received were too detailed. It is not the fashion of English Government departments to allow much liberty of action to their agents; they prefer so to trammel them with instructions on even the minutest details, that in no possible contingency can their representatives forget that they are dependent. Colonel Wylde was directed in the first instance to proceed to the headquarters of the Queen's army under General Rodil, and to make full reports of all that he might see or hear. He was especially to note "the disposition of the inhabitants of the districts through which he might pass, the motives which might have induced any of them to join in the insurrection, and how far their resistance to the Queen's authority might be attributed to attachment to Don Carlos, how far to political causes." He was to maintain the most intimate relations with the British Ambassador at Madrid, Sir George Villiers, afterwards Lord Clarendon; and his despatches were to be transmitted through the British Ambassador in Paris, who was to make himself acquainted with them. He was to be cordial in his relations with any French officer who might be similarly employed with the Queen's armies; but he was always to remember that he was *not* charged with any political or diplomatic mission. He was also forbidden to accept the surrender of Don Carlos' person, "should His Royal Highness, under critical circumstances, prefer to give himself up to him instead of to the Queen's generals."

Wylde
MSS.

Thus strangled, Colonel Wylde started on his mission. That the instructions under which he was to act would in all probability stultify his position with the Christino armies must have been apparent to him from the first. A commissioner without power, an officer of rank delegated by the British Government to communicate "notes by the way," and to cheer the idle hours of Foreign Office clerks with his speculations as to the inner consciousness of rebels, would be a characteristic British conception, but would be wholly unintelligible to men engaged in earnest warfare. This warfare, too, was conducted under the patronage of a quadruple alliance, under the benediction of Western Europe

with Louis Philippe on one hand bidding for the support of democracy by a lukewarm support of Constitutionalism against Carlism, and with Lord Palmerston on the other, hungering to see some energetic, automatic rule among the Spanish people drive out of the field a priest-blighted despotism, possessing all the evils of tyranny, and yet emasculated as to the good which in anxious and exceptional times a wise despot is able to perform.

The conditions and surroundings which were meant by officialism to dwarf the English Commissioner were conducive, by a righteous retribution, to his elevation. It is the old, old story. The Delilah of routine and red-tape may bind the Samson of genius; but the bonds are snapped when the time arrives for original and opportune action. Delilah weaves new bonds; but while Samson's power is undoubted, she can only whine over the rupture within her office walls. Her policy is to wait. To most men comes the danger of error, the certainty of some shortcoming. Then on the shorn head Delilah drops not even an official tear; and the venturesome genius is bound hand and foot, and cast into the limbo of departmental oblivion.

Happily, in the case of the Chief Commissioner sent by England to the Army of the North, there was no failure. Colonel Wylde's influence increased month by month, and year by year, with both parties to the war. He was enabled by his advice to enhance the successes of the Queen's troops, and to diminish the horrors concomitant in an especial degree with civil and irregular warfare. His letters, journals, and despatches record, also, in statesman-like perspicuity and historic calmness, the events which transpired before him. Honoured by his Sovereign for the performance of his difficult task, Colonel Wylde was also long remembered in Spain with singular respect and affection.

Col. Wylde,
October 4,
1834.

Colonel Wylde reached Bayonne in the beginning of October, 1834, and was enabled to get more than a glance at the situation, both military and political. Although the political aspect of this war will be allowed to develop in these pages, as the narrative progresses,—it may be well to

take a bird's-eye view of the military situation at the date of the arrival of the English Commissioner. While Don Carlos remained in Portugal, his movements had to be carefully watched by the Christino troops under General Rodil, so that the Pretender was able unconsciously to effect some strategic service, which left his sympathizers in the north of Spain to organize themselves with comparative ease. This was notably the case with Zumalacarreguy, who had assumed command of a Carlist force of 800 men in October, 1833, and by the following spring had converted it into a tolerably efficient army, which by its powers of rapid movement had wearied most of Queen Isabella's generals. So assured was this Carlist leader of his ultimate success, that he appealed to Don Carlos so early as May, 1834, to come from Portugal and ascend the throne of his fathers. Bollaert.

Don Carlos found the advice more palatable than practicable. The frontier was too closely watched for him to traverse it, except at the head of a large force. A tolerably large Portuguese force was attached to the now hopeless cause of Dom Miguel in that country, and that unsuccessful candidate for a throne was requested to lend to Don Carlos, as a body-guard, a force which was no longer useful to himself. He had to reply that even if he complied with the request, the valuable force in question would not obey his orders.

The only alternative for the Pretender was to adopt the circuitous route of reaching the Basque Provinces *viâ* London and Paris. This was rendered more easy since the signing of the quadruple alliance, under which Don Carlos secured a passage to England, with almost regal state, from the government of that country. Within a few days of one another, Dom Miguel and Don Carlos sailed under the English flag for Italy and England respectively. The names of Maria II. and Isabella II. were at once those favoured by the Western Powers, and also the emblems in Portugal and Spain of constitutional liberty as opposed to a second-hand tyranny—a despotism masking priestcraft.

Don Carlos quitted England in disguise on the 1st July,

1834, and reached Spain through France. In the latter country there was considerable sympathy with his cause; and among the numerous tradesmen who supplied contraband of war across the frontier to the Carlists, there would be nothing but satisfaction at the arrival of a Prince who would by his mere presence intensify the rebel spirit and prolong the hostilities. The attempts made by Don Carlos to elude pursuit in France were indeed more affectation than necessity.

In the month of September, he and his generals swore—under the historical oak-tree of Guernica—to preserve the Fueros of the Basque Provinces. In the same place, in 1476, Ferdinand and Isabella had sworn the same oath. But the motive of Don Carlos was a different one from theirs. By this oath he hoped to secure the support of many in Spain to whom his personal claims and dynasty were utterly indifferent. The Fueros were to the north of Spain a sacred creed: *he* hoped—as the story will prove—by expressing his adhesion to them, to secure for his own ambitious ends the active sympathy of believers more earnest and single-eyed than himself. So, in every land and in every age, are the aspirations of the people made stepping-stones for designing and ambitious men.

When the English Commissioner reached Bayonne, the presence of Don Carlos with the rebels, and the military ability of Zumalacarreguy, had placed the Carlist cause in a position not to be assailed too rashly. Away in Aragon and Valencia a man was also making himself felt, Ramon Cabrera, who was to inspire the Carlists with the fire of his own revengeful feelings, his influence and energy. And, as yet, above all other agents in crystallizing the floating discontent in the minds of men who were only *half* rebels, the system of massacring wounded and prisoners had been inaugurated by the leaders on both sides—by none more than Zumalacarreguy and Rodil. Each fresh butchery drove into the ranks of open partizans many halting and peaceable men, and filled the air with exaggerations and rumours which deepened the horrors of the war.

There had been many small engagements, the results of

which had varied with the political creed of the narrator; but, on the whole, the Carlist cause had had the advantage for two reasons. First, Zumalacarreguy could bewilder as well as vanquish the detached armies of the Queen, and was infinitely superior to Rodil in the art of war; and secondly, the Carlists, who were merely organizing their forces, were genuinely thankful for the smallest successes, whereas the Christinos, who started with all the boasting and display of trained armies, became irritated and depressed at finding a hydra-headed enemy, whose method of warfare was *unfavourable* to success, and was *prohibitory* of any complete victory being gained over them.

The system in the Christino army—then practically commanded by politicians at Madrid—was to visit want of success upon the general in command, by removing him. This line of conduct had the result either of making the general rash, or of making his ambitious subordinates disloyal to him. In no country—in Spain, perhaps, less than any other—is it wise to make a political body, with political prejudices and party emergencies, the fountain of military honour, or the umpire in military criticism. And yet on no question—except perhaps theology—are men more fond of dogmatizing without previous study than on the conduct of military operations. In Madrid, the situation was complicated by the infancy of the Queen, and the supposed ambition of the Queen-mother, Christina. The incessantly changing governments were constant in quoting these as reasons why all patronage should be left in their own virtuous hands.

The general, who had received notice to quit, when Colonel Wylde reached Bayonne, was Rodil. He had been loyal under trying circumstances while Don Carlos was in Portugal; he had done his best in the field while surrounded by many difficulties; but he had not been so successful as was desired, and it was therefore decided to sacrifice him, and in an unmistakeable manner. “He had to resign the command
“of the army by order of the Government, without waiting
“for his successor, and also the viceroyship of Estremadura
“and other appointments, and went to Galicia, his native

Col. Wylde,
October 7,
1834.

“province, in disgust.” The generals of the early days of the French Revolution did not fight more thoroughly under the orders of their masters in Paris, than did the Christino generals under equally peremptory and more ignoble requisitions from Madrid.

The successor who had been decided upon was General Mina, a mere guerilla chief, but one whose name was associated with service in former campaigns, and who was expected to terrify the peasantry who might meditate revolt, by the cruel reprisals he had threatened to inflict. He was at Bayonne when Colonel Wylde arrived, and was in wretched health. He cordially welcomed the English Commissioner, and promised him all the information in his power; but as yet he knew little, and was in hopes that Rodil would retain the command for some time, until his own health should be restored. He had already gathered that his appointment to the command of the Army of the North had been by no means palatable to the French Government. Whether it was feared that more decided measures would follow his taking the field, and that the system of smuggling contraband, so advantageous to French trade, might be put an end to, or whether some other motive, such as secret Carlist propensities, influenced the policy of France, it is difficult to say. The French policy remained doubtful during the whole war,—a policy of diverse words and actions. Isabella’s governments had frequently just reason of complaint against France for an unfriendliness which was sometimes more than passive, and Colonel Wylde found in Bayonne a horde of Carlist conspirators engaged in open and unchecked machinations against the power which was ostensibly an ally of France.

Col. Wylde,
Bayonne,
October 7,
1834.

A very few days after Colonel Wylde’s arrival, intelligence arrived of the resignation of Rodil, and of the appointment to the command of the army, *ad interim*, of General Amildez, then at Pamplona. General Amildez was at the point of death, and Mina was as yet unable to travel. The latter, therefore, wrote directing the next senior to take command until he himself should arrive; and—a grim satire on the

political wire-pullers at Madrid—gave explicit orders that, for the present, General Rodil's plan of operations should be strictly adhered to. He also directed General Jauregui to move his force towards Irun to meet himself and to escort him to Pamplona as soon as he should be able to travel.

Colonel Wylde would fain have pressed on to the headquarters of the Queen's army, without waiting for Mina's convalescence, and could easily have obtained a pass through the Carlist lines. But he was restrained by fear of misunderstanding, for the Carlists had got an impression that he had been sent out in the interests of Don Carlos, who was known to have many sympathizers in England; and they had, like the Christinos, an exaggerated idea of the powers entrusted to him by his government. Lest this estimate should prove too much for him, a little wholesome discipline was being at this very time administered to him by the military authorities of his own country. Colonel Wylde was merely a captain of artillery, and his higher rank was local and temporary. It was true that he had been already over thirty years in the army, and that so long ago as 1814 he had been selected for special service. But these were the days of stagnation in a general and most depressing form,—the stagnation inevitable when armies are reduced at the end of long wars, and when promotion is slow. His services in Portugal, and the recognition of them implied in his selection for this new appointment, encouraged Colonel Wylde to apply that his local rank might be confirmed, and that *brevet* rank corresponding to it might be assigned to him in his own service. Although his application was refused, there is no reason to believe that the military authorities were reluctant to grant it; the reply simply showed—what was apparent every day and every hour—that the system was too strong for its administrators. There was *no precedent* for such a step, was the reply he received, penned doubtless in all good faith, and in the belief that the answer would be deemed as final to the whole world, as to those who lived within their office walls and had no thought beyond. No precedent! and to create one, unless *proprio motu*, would

Col. Wylde,
October 20,
1834.

be an official crime. Precedents existed merely to trip up suitors, to stifle argument, to shelter blunderers. The creation of a precedent which might aid future claimants, which might strengthen their appeals, and justify their arguments, would be an act of *gaucherie* worthy only of some office tyro about whom still lingered the old-fashioned notions of gratitude for honest service. If Carlist exaggeration and Christino praise were likely to prove too much for the English Commissioner, there were those in London who, with the skill of long practice, would moderate his transports.

News of unsuccessful engagements on a small scale, but somewhat frequent, and a fear that, in the hands of General Lourenço, who was acting for Amildez and Mina, the Queen's cause would suffer, drove Mina to take the field sooner than was wise, as far as his own health was concerned. He was accompanied by Colonel Wylde, and escorted from the frontier by some of Lourenço's troops to Pamplona, where he arrived on 30th October, and was received with enthusiasm. He began wisely. Refusing to occupy the palace, or to surround himself with any state which would involve any expense to the country, he announced his intention of refraining from extensive operations until he had disciplined and clothed his army. Discipline comes naturally to the patient and temperate Spanish soldier; clothing was difficult to procure from a government already impecunious. A convoy of stores from Madrid, escorted by 3000 men under General O'Doyle, had been captured only three days before by Zumalacarreguy between Salvatierra and Vittoria, with a loss to the Christinos of the general commanding, and at least 900 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The material as well as moral injury inflicted by this reverse was very great, and the encouragement to the enemy was in proportion.

As Mina looked round, he saw open assistance being daily rendered to the Carlists by the French, in the transmission of stores across the frontier; he found a worse spirit among the peasantry of the Basque Provinces than he had anticipated. The guerilla bands, dispersed on all sides, insulated

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
October 30,
1834.

Bollaert.

the stations of the Queen's troops, rendering communication between them almost impossible, except with strong escorts. The country swarmed with *aduaneros*, self-constituted watchmen, who conveyed to pre-arranged spots intelligence of the slightest movements among the Queen's troops; and friendly peasants were prevented by extravagant tolls or actual violence from bringing provisions to the Christino garrisons. The rumours from the Eastern Provinces spoke of increasing disaffection. Those from Madrid told of unfriendly diplomacy, of national poverty, of departmental incapacity, and of selfish ministers; while away in Northern Europe a dark cloud was in the sky, betokening powerful and jealous despotisms hostile to an infant monarch whose name was associated with liberty and constitutional government.

It was an ugly landscape for a sick general, and needed all his innate courage to ensure a calm contemplation. It was a dreary prospect for the English Commissioner, hungering to produce in Spain the liberty which is the parent of true greatness.

In the battle before them, what weapons were in their armoury? There were in Navarre 23,000 of the Queen's troops,—14,000 available for service in the field, and arranged in columns under Generals Cordova, Lopez, and Oraa, and the remainder locked up in garrisons. Against this force, Don Carlos and Zumalacarreguy had not more than 8000 men, but these were all in a state of activity and motion. At first sight the advantage in numbers would appear to be decisive in favour of the Queen; but there were other provinces besides Navarre from which Zumalacarreguy drew additional forces for the time as he required them. He also had no need of a complicated supply department in a country where every peasant's store was open to him, and every peasant's mule was at his service. He reserved his men for fighting, not for escorting convoys; and he had his spies in every Christino camp or village to advise him of his enemy's movements or designs. Mina was indeed sorely handicapped, nor was there any sign of his position becoming less desperate.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Nov. 15,
1834.

It is only when one remembers the situation, that one understands a remark made by Colonel Wylde soon after his arrival at Pamplona. "General Mina commanded, *himself*, "in two trifling but successful occasions lately, which I "regretted, thinking it extremely desirable that his first "appearance in the field should have been on some more "important occasion, as in the present state of affairs it is "desirable that his name should lose none of the terror "attached to it in the opinion of the enemy's soldiers."

This reference to the individual efforts of the old guerilla chief is almost plaintive. Like some hunted animal at bay, he strove with his own hand to solve his difficulties. He was no statesman; he was no scientific leader; he was overwhelmed by a sense of his difficulties; and he could find for the moment no rest save in action.

Better to lead a few men in combat than to unravel his complications in his tent. He got wiser by degrees; his successors became wiser still; and this narrative will show how much of the steadying influence came from him who was always unobtrusively at the side and service of the Christino commander,—the Commissioner sent to observe and to report to the Government of England.

CHAPTER II.

MINA.

NOTWITHSTANDING the courage, and, in a certain degree, the experience of Mina, his brief career in command of the Army of the North was by no means a brilliant one. The terror attached to his name, and deservedly inspired both by his proclamations and his cruelties, had only the effect of driving an exasperated peasantry into the Carlist ranks. His attempts at organisation were thwarted by the jealousy of his enemy at Madrid, Lauder, who was Minister of War for the first few weeks of Mina's command; and his authority in Biscay and Navarre was not complete, a considerable part of the force not having been placed under his orders. As instances of this may be quoted the force under General Latré at Viana, and that under General Bedoya at Logroño.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Dec. 24,
1834.

The state of the army at the end of the year was graphically described in a letter from Colonel Flinter, an able staff-officer, and chief of the staff to one of the Christino generals of division. "I have been for some time," he wrote, "chief of the staff, and have been for seven months without any rest. I have traversed Navarre in every direction, and have been particularly attentive in order to make myself thoroughly acquainted with the state of public opinion, and I have closely observed the measures taken by government for the purpose of putting down the rebellion, which rages in every part of the province with increased violence. The arrival of Mina, much as I respect him, has *not* produced the effect which was expected.

Colonel
Flinter,
Estella,
Dec. 31,
1834.

“ The inhabitants seem more incensed against him than
“ against any former leader ; very few have gone over to
“ him from the enemy. We can scarcely, even with our
“ united forces, undertake any offensive operations in certain
“ districts. We are often three or four days without being
“ able to get rations, while the Carlists are well supplied.
“ The government has not taken care to furnish stores of
“ provisions, nor ammunition, nor clothing for the troops ;
“ therefore our operations are paralyzed for days together,
“ and we cannot take advantage of any favourable moment
“ to follow up a victory. Our soldiers have been for months
“ together sleeping on the ground, without ever taking off
“ their clothes, and suffering continual marches and priva-
“ tions without a murmur. Their patience is exhausted ;
“ there is no *esprit de corps*, no enthusiasm ; nor do they
“ wish to come into contact with an enemy over whom they
“ have scarcely gained an advantage. If they happen to be
“ wounded, they are taken little care of in the hospitals ; if
“ disabled, they are reduced to mendicity. We have *no* gene-
“ rals and few good officers. The former are continually
“ at war with one another, and good officers are discontented
“ . . . because others who are beyond the reach of danger,
“ or who on the field basely desert their post, meet the
“ recompense which is due to merit. Very few officers are
“ present with their regiments in the field ; they are loung-
“ ing in the coffee-houses of the large towns or in Madrid.
“ There are regiments commanded by captains, and com-
“ panies by sergeants. Few do their duty in the field, and
“ these few fall victims, certain victims, on a day of action.
“ The officers generally keep back, and the general, myself,
“ and a few others, have been obliged in every action even to
“ push forward the guerillas, and to lead every attack. . . .
“ You and others can scarcely form an idea of the state of
“ affairs, and the organisation of the Carlist army. It is
“ not a faction. They move forward and retreat in perfect
“ order, either in close column or line. Their light infantry
“ is far better than ours, and our men know it. In fact,
“ their officers are men covered with scars in the War of

"Independence, and have at least personal bravery and
 "practical knowledge. The inhabitants of the provinces
 "are enthusiastic, and nothing but reinforcements of
 "30,000 men will beat them. . . . There is another misfor-
 "tune which I have to lament, that is, the *civil war* which
 "exists among the generals. Some of them detract Mina
 "and are anxious that he should fail, and they all hate each
 "other and take every opportunity of injuring one another's
 "reputation. The officers take part in these petty disputes;
 "and the soldiers, hearing their commanders abused con-
 "tinually, soon lose confidence in their honour and talent.
 ". . . My opinion is that the game is equal. If immediate
 "reinforcements do not come, the Carlists will remain in
 "possession of the field, and Mina can do nothing. The
 "inhabitants of Navarre cannot be intimidated, and pro-
 "mises are of no avail. Force and energetic measures,
 "union among the generals, and impartial justice towards
 "the officers and soldiers who defend the cause of the young
 "Queen, are necessary in order to ensure success."

These may read like the words of a pessimist, or at least
 of a disappointed man. But they are supported by collateral
 evidence, and they are the key to the delay which attended
 the efforts of the Queen's party, the party of constitutional
 liberty, to put down the rebellion. A few words from a cold, Annual
Register,
1835. unbiassed witness show how the political exigencies of
 Madrid must have interfered with military operations. They
 speak, as the student will find, of a divided Cortes, of a
 War Minister distrusted by the people and indulgent to
 mutineers, of a government retaining office in face of
 defeat, of a Regent embarrassed by the almost insolent
 addresses of the Assembly, of insurrections in more than
 one city, of empty exchequers, and of idle dreamers playing
 at framing constitutions while the enemy was at the gate.
 The Queen-regent, who alone had the consistent energy to
 face the insurrection, albeit the consistency may have been
 merely a mother's laudable ambition, was thwarted, dis-
 trusted, and defied by every one in turn. There was more
 exultation over victories in the Senate, victories of vitupera-

tion, than over any successes which attended the Queen's armies in Navarre. One does not require even to have read history to see at once that here were not the conditions of successful operations. The heart was diseased, and the pulsations were therefore irregular, nor was the blood vivifying which traversed the system.

To this unhappy state of affairs at Madrid must be added special causes of exhilaration among the Carlists. In Zumalacarreguy they had an able and energetic chief; in Don Carlos they had the *prestige* of one who was no mere usurper, but who was of the royal blood of Spain. Every pulpit, every priest, was an advocate of Carlism; an ignorant peasantry had identified that cause with their worshipped *Fueros*, and the union had as yet been sanctified by singular military success. France was practically friendly to the Pretender; and among the Great Powers of Europe there were several outspoken opponents of Isabella's cause. During Mina's command, a change of ministry occurred in England; and the Tory Government which came into office was assumed to have a leaning towards Carlism. There were no grounds for the assumption, nor was the policy of England towards Spain changed one *iota*. But the idea was fostered by the opposition press in England, and the Basque peasantry—being unacquainted with the ways of party government—concluded naturally that England would now be an ally of the cause of Don Carlos. There is to the student of English history a consistent inconsistency in the action of the Whigs in opposition. They reserve to themselves the right of developing into Radicals, and they spread their sails to catch every breath of new political doctrine or discontent; but they wave the Tory back to the position his party held in the days when politics and education alike were young. A progressive Conservative, a Conservative other than deaf and blind, they decline to recognise. Laying down as a general axiom that a Tory must of necessity revel in foreign despotisms and domestic tyranny, they always assume, when a Conservative Government has the reins of power, that its machinations are *against* struggling peoples abroad, and that

its domestic legislation, however beneficial, must have somewhere concealed the cloven hoof of an oligarchy which loves to trample on the masses. With advancing education, a policy which succeeded so well for forty years will be exposed in all its nakedness; and it will be apparent abroad, as well as at home, that no party in England has a monopoly of sympathy for the oppressed.

There were two unfortunate occurrences in the field which unfavourably introduced Mina's command, although in neither case was he personally concerned. Towards the end of November, 1834, Zumalacarreguy, at a place a few leagues north of Logroño, offered battle for the first time to a considerable Christino force. He himself had some 7000 men under him, which accounted for the change in his mode of fighting. The Queen's force, which consisted of the divisions of Generals Cordova and Oraa, under the command of the former, numbered some 6000 men. Although the odds were slightly in favour of the Carlists, it was believed that Cordova would greedily seize the opportunity—unprecedented—of an engagement on some scale with Zumalacarreguy. But he contented himself with watching his opponent for the space of five days, making no attempt to join issue. This event created a great sensation in the army, and tended to dispirit the Queen's troops exceedingly. Nor were matters improved by Cordova's success, two days later, over a Carlist force posted in the Pass of Argayas. The success was over inferior numbers, and was only obtained after two actions, in the first of which Cordova had to admit with bitterness that his troops, especially his officers, behaved badly. The improved discipline and steadiness of the Carlist troops were very apparent on this occasion, and secured Cordova's emphatic notice.

The next untoward event commenced with a distinct and creditable Christino victory on the 12th December, in which the divisions of Cordova, Oraa, and Lopez—a force of some 10,000 men—defeated at Sorlada the whole available Carlist force which Zumalacarreguy had been able to collect, and which was certainly not inferior in numbers to that opposed

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Dec. 2,
1834.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Dec. 15,
1834.

to it. The Carlists were posted with judgment, and fought stubbornly for over two hours, but were ultimately driven back with a loss of 900 men, and, it was rumoured, in a state of fury with their leader. The rumour was worthless and deceiving. Zumalacarreguy only retreated to the Pass of Arginjós, where he took a strong position and again offered battle to Cordova. On the 15th December the latter general arranged a combined attack; detaching Oraa with some eight battalions to turn the Carlist left, he himself intending to attack the centre as soon as he should hear Oraa's guns in action. Oraa, as will be seen later in this narrative, was not a good general; on this occasion his movements were most dilatory, and it was dark before he reached the ground agreed upon. Cordova had become impatient, and had attacked the enemy at the pass, which he secured; but being afraid to advance without Oraa into the plain beyond, he withdrew as night approached to Los Arcos. Oraa, ignorant of what had occurred, was then attacked in force and unexpectedly by Zumalacarreguy, and his division was literally cut to pieces. Cordova, who had naturally a warm discussion with Oraa after this misadventure, was relieved by Lorenzo, and retired first to Pamplona and then to Madrid, irritated beyond measure that his victory of the 12th had not been more appreciated.

His successor, Lorenzo, was by no means a fortunate lieutenant to Mina. In studying the records of this period of the war, his name is always associated with defeat; and Mina must have breathed freely when this feeble officer was appointed Captain-General of Cuba, and disappeared from the Army of the North. Before leaving, a spirit of insubordination had appeared in his division, due to unnecessary toil and privation occasioned through Lorenzo's vacillation and ignorance.

One or two further instances, on a smaller scale, of disasters to the Queen's cause, during the few months of Mina's command, may be quoted to show how badly he was served. At Segura, his subordinate, Jauregui, always a favourite with the English Legion, and better known as El Pastor, was

Col. Wyld,
Pamplona,
Feb. 27,
1835.

Bollaert.

defeated with great slaughter; and only a few days before, a Christino regiment, that of Granada, had been destroyed by the Carlist chief, Eraso. In the end of February, Los Arcos was captured by the Carlists. It was a grave loss, both material and moral; and was followed by the usual shrieks of "Treachery," which are used to bolster up a sinking cause. The commandant of the garrison was ordered to be tried, as soon as he should be exchanged, on the charges of evacuating his post, and not destroying the stores. To the student this siege and capture of Los Arcos has a special interest, for now for the first time did the dictates of humanity or interest prompt the Carlists to spare the lives of their enemy's wounded and prisoners. A few weeks later, another of Mina's brigadiers, General Aldama, allowed himself to be trapped by Zumalacarreguy at Arroniz. In the words of the English Commissioner, "Dire was the confusion, and the division was only saved by the return of Carrera from being cut to pieces. Its loss was very great; and the effect will be very bad on the *morale* of the newly-arrived troops, as well as on the Queen's cause in general."

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
March 9,
1835.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
April 4,
1835.

Enough has been said to show how great were the difficulties with which Mina in his brief career had to contend. Only two things need now be discussed, in the interests of history, before alluding to the circumstances under which with health utterly broken the ill-fated general disappeared from this command. These two points are, first, the number and distribution of Mina's and Zumalacarreguy's troops at the most critical part of the time under consideration in this chapter; and second, the personal ability of Mina as compared with his subordinates.

The date assumed for the consideration of the first point is February 1, 1835. The following is the return of the Queen's troops in Navarre on that day. It does not include those in Biscay, or those, if any, *en route* from Madrid; and the many casualties which had occurred since Mina assumed the command had sorely reduced the numbers which Colonel Wylde considered available when he first arrived at Pamplona. But the return represents the force on that date

which Mina could readily control for his own operations, although those shown in garrisons were not available for *field* service. For the reader's information the numbers are also appended of troops belonging to the Queen in the Provinces of Alava, Biscaya, and Guipuscoa, and also of a few other garrisons than those actually in Navarre; but, in reckoning Mina's resources, these factors must be cautiously eliminated:—

1. DISTRIBUTION OF QUEEN'S TROOPS IN NAVARRE.

1st Feb., 1835.

(a) *The divisions of Brigadiers Oraa and Scoane.*

	Of all Ranks.
$\frac{1}{2}$ Battalion Grenadiers of the Guard, 1st Regt. ..	800
1 " " " " 2nd Regt. ..	500
1 " " " " " " ..	600
1 " Regt. of Siguenza	400
2 " " of Zaragoza	900
3 " " of Princessa	1600
2 " " of the Line	1000
1 " 3rd Regt. of Girona	490
$\frac{1}{2}$ " Tiradores	200
	6190

(b) *Brigade of Brigadier Ocaña.*

1 Battalion 4th Regt. of the Guards	600
2 " 6th Regt. of the Line	1000
	1600

(c) *Brigade of Brigadier Lopez.*

2 Battalions Regts. of the Line	1000
1 Battalion Regt. of Africa	490
Cavalry of the Guard	400
	1890

(d) *Brigade of Brigadier Gurrea.*

1 Battalion Regt. of Estremadura	490
Cavalry of the Line	336
	826

(e) *Brigade of Brigadier Linares.*

Infantry	2600
Cavalry	650
	3250

Grand Total Field Force in Navarre, from
(a) to (e), all ranks 14,056

In the Province of Alava there was a column of 2400
In Biscaya there were the columns of Espartero and Yuarde .. 2200
And in Guipuscoa the column of Jauregui 1400

Total 6000

This force of 6,000 men, to a certain extent useful to Mina, was to a greater extent embarrassing. His movements were complicated sadly by these columns.

In the garrisons the force was partly of regular troops and partly of militia or *urbanos*. A considerable proportion, 2000 men, seem to have been held ready for occupying depôts and villages on the communications of the Queen's columns, for it soon became evident that no cordiality to her cause existed among the peasantry. This special force was constituted as follows:—

						Of all Ranks.
1 Battalion of Castile	600
1 " " Valladolid	400
½ " " Cordova	200
Detachments	600
Urbanos	200
Total	<u>2000</u>

The more permanent garrisons were as follows:—

Logroño	{	3rd Regt. of Cordova	} Infantry	2400		
		1st Battalion Regt. Bourbon				
		1st Battalion Provincials			} Cavalry	400
		Cavalry				

						Of all Ranks.
Tudela	500 Regulars and 150 Urbanos	650
Estella	200 " " "	200
Los Arcos	160 " " "	160
Lodosa	50 Urbanos	50
Viana	250 Regulars and 150 Urbanos	400
Lerui	70 Carabineers	70
Tajalla	250 Carabineers	250
Peralta	50 Carabineers and 30 Urbanos	80
Caparso	80 Carabineers	80
Tuarzun	90 Carabineers	90
Echarni-Aranaz	200 Regulars	200
Olazagutea	60 " " "	60
Villa Franca	200 " " "	200
Toloso	350 " " "	350
Bergara	220 " " "	220
Ochaudiana	150 " " "	150
Puente la Reyna	150 " " "	150
Elizondo	500 Regulars and 80 Urbanos	580
Leconbier	400 " " "	400
Valtiezia	50 " " "	50
Cadreita	11 Urbanos	11
Total in Garrisons	<u>7201</u>

It will be interesting now to see what force Don Carlos had to oppose to Mina and his brigadiers. The following estimate is based upon the official Carlist returns of the 1st January, 1835, but it would be wise to deduct at least 2500 from the total on account of sick, wounded, and incomplete battalions, in order to arrive at the real Carlist force.

The Carlist force in Navarre was as follows :—

			Of all Ranks.	
Infantry	{	10 Battalions Infantry	8000	
		2 Companies of Guides	150	
		Escort of Don Carlos	720	8870
			<hr/>	
Cavalry	{	Lancers and Carabineers	450	
		Don Carlos' Escort	80	530
			<hr/>	
Grand total of all ranks				<hr/> <hr/> 9400
In Alava, the Carlists had a force of			1620 men	
in Guipuscoa " " " " "			1380 "	
in Biscaya " " " " "			3800 "	
And the escorts of the Juntas of Navarre, Biscaya, Alava, and Guipuscoa were about			498	
			<hr/>	
Total				<hr/> <hr/> 7298

Vide p. 11, supra. From this it will be seen that the Carlist numbers were increasing, while those of the Christinos were diminishing, during Mina's term of command. With these figures, with the knowledge of the difficulties which Mina had to encounter at the hands of the Madrid Government and the Basque peasantry, and with the fact before us that his lieutenants were certainly unlucky and apparently incapable, the question next arises—and this is the second point to be considered,—How did Mina by his personal efforts endeavour to justify the expectations entertained of him and to maintain the Queen's cause?

The investigation of this point is the only pleasing task to the student of this part of the Christino campaign. Mina was brave, was active, was loyal to his Sovereign and to his own reputation. Finding himself indifferently served, he watched and reinforced his hesitating columns. Early in

February he had despatched Oran to raise the siege of Elisondo. Oran immediately got into difficulties, from which Mina himself had to extricate him. The Carlists retiring, Mina in person escorted a valuable convoy from the French frontier, and had hardly reached Pamplona before he had again to march to the relief of Elisondo, an operation in which he succeeded, but in which he was wounded. His personal energy and courage on these and other occasions were remarkable, and his success in most was complete. The narrative is refreshing, save in one respect. Mina's cruelties, especially at Lecaroz, will be alluded to in the next chapter; but it may be said here that they proved injurious instead of helpful to the Queen's cause. The utmost success which cruel measures can attain in civil war is sullen submission, and that only while the coercive measures are at hand. Adherents are never won by fear, nor is enthusiasm. Silence may be secured or apparent inaction, but sympathy may be afforded in many ways that are practical without being public. Cruelty is so often the mask of an unjust cause that an ignorant peasantry may be forgiven for imagining that it is its natural expression. Loyalty which is enforced at the point of the bayonet is at the best a mere lip-service. After the massacre of Lecaroz, Mina issued a proclamation in which he said, "From this day will date the real war of Navarre. . . . This afternoon I delivered over this village to the flames, and its inhabitants have been shot, one out of every five, for their crimes. The very same end is reserved for all masses of inhabitants as well as for every individual who shall follow the example of Lecaroz. I am resolved to put an end to this obstinate and shameful rebellion by all ways and means, unless you shall come to me who am always disposed to pardon you. Navarrese! remember that I know how to keep my promise." Is it to be wondered at that a cause which professed to be that of liberty and patriotism failed to thrive on such arguments as these, emphatically the arguments of brute force? At the best a reluctant assistance might be extracted in the presence of superior numbers, but it was

certain to be followed by a reaction of indignation, remonstrance, and systematic hostility.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Dec. 24,
1834.

This truth dawned at last on Mina, who was no *a priori* reasoner, but, like most soldiers who are nothing else, a most slavish and dogmatic pupil of the *a posteriori* school of argument. That a momentary doubt as to the policy he ultimately decided upon had occurred to him before is apparent from some words which he used in a conversation with Colonel Wylde so early as December, 1834. He then said that it was his fixed determination to endeavour to change the character of the war by giving quarter and treating his prisoners with kindness, unless they were officers. His good resolutions were but ephemeral; it was not until experience had taught him that civil war was only embittered and prolonged by cruelty that he took any serious steps to make the campaigns in the north more civilized. And then it was too late for his own reputation. Some say that his failing health compelled him to tender his resignation; others maintain that his want of success was more than Madrid politicians could stand, as it endangered their own tenure of office. Be this as it may, he was virtually replaced by Valdez, the successor of Lauder as Minister of War, and now appointed to the command in Navarre, before any practical steps were taken towards the negotiation of that measure so honourable to England, which was intended to humanize the war, and which to a great extent succeeded—the Eliot Convention. On the 9th April, 1835, Mina received information that Lord Eliot had arrived at Bayonne on his humane mission, and was requested to afford him every facility. He complied at once, and expressed a strong desire for a personal interview. This never appears to have taken place; and with the appearance of Lord Eliot on the stage, Mina's name vanishes from the narrative of the war in the Basque Country. It is a strange instance—more than once repeated in this civil war—of historical justice. With the disappearance to a great extent of an utterly inhuman conduct of the war in Navarre comes the retirement of a general to whose mind such inhumanity meant

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
April 13,
1835.

cunning and strategy. The inhumanity remained for years in Valencia and Aragon, beyond the soothing influence of the Convention; but in the Basque Provinces the relief of Mina by Valdez was contemporary with the change introduced under that which is now to be described—the Eliot Convention.

CHAPTER III.

THE ELIOT CONVENTION.

THE wholesale massacres of wounded and prisoners which had been perpetrated by both Christino and Carlist generals during the war, had awakened the indignation of every civilized community. Nowhere were the feelings of humanity more outraged than in England, where an uneasy sense of responsibility for the atrocities which were committed was natural in view of the fact that the English Government had taken a slightly official part in the war, and that English—albeit mercenary—regiments were soon to be exposed to the cruelties against which the whole of Europe protested.

The pressure of public opinion in England is always strong on a government; and when the question is one of humanity, even if much clouded with vague sentiment, the pressure is irresistible. Lord Eliot was despatched to Spain to negotiate the terms of a Convention between the belligerents, which would ensure the ordinary laws of civilized warfare being obeyed. It was a difficult task. Each party had from the first branded its opponents as rebels, and yet both were asked to meet one another on equal terms, and to discuss matters with all the formality of *recognized* belligerents. There was also another reason, which it was difficult to state, for retaining the brutal system which it was sought to abolish. Men who were not deeply interested in the cause for which they fought, yet fought bravely enough with a halter round their necks, in the certain knowledge that death awaited them as surely if taken prisoner as if they faced it on the battle-field. With the disappearance of this certainty might

perhaps come a lack of ardour—a reluctance to fight. That this uneasiness among the leaders on either side was not groundless was soon apparent. The Convention had barely been signed ere one of the English Commissioners, in describing one or two instances of cowardly surrender of large bodies of troops, and desertion *en masse*, was obliged to say: “I fear this shameful behaviour on the part of the troops may in some measure be attributed to the effect of the recent Convention.”

Col. Wyldé,
Pamplona,
June 23,
1835.

Still, although the reasons for objecting to the Convention were strong, the arguments for concealing their objections were—with both Christinos and Carlists—ininitely stronger. In the first place, it is a hazardous experiment for any leader to defy public opinion, and to deliberately alienate public sympathy. In the second place, had such an idea existed, the time was unfavourable for its expression. Both in England and France very strong efforts were being made to secure armed intervention in Spain on behalf of the constitutional cause; any reluctance on the Convention question at Madrid would therefore be dangerous to the fulfilment of their wishes; and a refusal at Don Carlos's head-quarters to take part in a movement so humane would give his enemies, both in London and Paris, a cry which would almost inevitably precipitate the very intervention which he dreaded. Lord Palmerston had read the situation, like a book; his views remain yet in the Foreign Office; and on the 9th of April, 1835, as stated above, General Mina, who was then at Pamplona with his head-quarters, learnt that Lord Eliot had arrived at Bayonne; and he was at the same time requested, in firm language, to give the necessary orders to the civil and military authorities under his command, to ensure that his Lordship should meet with no obstructions from them on his route to the head-quarters of Don Carlos. There could be but one answer. Mina at once complied, and wrote himself—although in wretched health—a letter of welcome to Lord Eliot, in which he requested him to see Colonel Wyldé before visiting Don Carlos. Lord Eliot consenting, Colonel Wyldé met him at Trurzun, and they agreed to go together on the

Letter from
Col. Gur-
wood at
Bayonne,
April,
1835.

Vittoria road, until it should be necessary for Colonel Wylde to quit it in order to reach General Valdez's headquarters, that officer having now officially assumed command of the Christino army of operations, *vice* Mina, superseded on the plea of ill-health at his own request, or by order of the government.

Colonel Wylde's knowledge of the state of affairs displayed itself so clearly during the journey to Lord Eliot, that he decided on taking him the whole way. It was found, however, that for the present this would be impossible, Colonel Wylde's name not being mentioned in the "*safe conduct*" brought to Echarri Aranaz from Don Carlos, by an officer who was to conduct Lord Eliot to the Carlist headquarters. The difficulty was a happy one, in one sense, for it has afforded a most interesting glimpse of the relations of the Carlist generals to one another and to Don Carlos. They proceeded until they encountered the first Carlist troops, under Ituralde; and as they went, were met by a deputation from the Junta of Navarre, welcoming with plaintive eloquence the prospect of a returning humanity to the regions which it had so long abandoned. Colonel Wylde remained with Ituralde, while Lord Eliot proceeded to Segura, where the Carlist head-quarters now were, whence he hoped to send without delay a passport for his late companion; and where, at all events, he would be safe until permission could be obtained for him to proceed to Valdez's head-quarters.

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
April 29,
1835.

No sooner, however, had Lord Eliot left, than a change came over Ituralde. Flushed by the excitement of a sort of diplomatic importance which had been unexpectedly forced upon him, he had undertaken more than in his cooler moments he felt justified in performing. After all he was but a general of division; there was a Commander-in-chief who had to be consulted, and Zumalacarreguy was not the least tenacious of men. Above him, also, was Don Carlos, uncertain of mood, jealous of interference, and now sore under the dictation of his successful lieutenant. What if the ambassador, whom he himself had treated with such courtesy,

and whose assistant he had too hastily undertaken to protect, should represent a cause not favoured at Court? The more he speculated, the less did he like the prospect; and he decided on a safe, if somewhat humble course. It is not for an English writer to criticise Ituralde severely; in his eagerness to avoid responsibility, that officer merely acted in a manner which it is the apparent purpose of English military education to encourage. That men have even in England succeeded in spite of this system, and by greedily courting responsibility, is no answer. Had they not succeeded, woe and recrimination would have tracked their steps into a prompt obscurity; but, as success is an excuse which the British public hungrily welcomes, so also it is one which the discreet official is good enough to accept with a sulky silence. Ituralde sent for Colonel Wylde, told him that without Zumalacarreguy's consent he could allow him neither the alternative of proceeding to Vittoria, nor of remaining where he was: that the Commander-in-chief was very jealous of his authority; and that on the whole he had better go at once, under his own escort, to Zumalacarreguy's head-quarters. Naturally construing this advice as an order, Colonel Wylde at once accompanied Ituralde to Enlati, and spent a long time in solitude while the two generals consulted. In his anxiety to justify himself, Ituralde seems to have failed in explaining the state of the larger question; and Wylde was received by Zumalacarreguy with dark looks and evident mistrust. But Colonel Wylde's inborn tact had received considerable polish and practice, both in Portugal and since his appointment as Commissioner in Spain. Passing by all mere matters of detail, he at once explained to Zumalacarreguy that the sole object of the mission was to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood consequent upon the present barbarous system of carrying on the war. The confidence in himself which was implied in this candid statement softened Zumalacarreguy at once, and inviting the English Commissioner to supper, he assured him that, as far as he himself was concerned, no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the Convention.

Supper came; but Colonel Wylde soon saw that the critical moment had only now arrived. In the presence of resentful officers, angry with the memories of Christine atrocities, it would have been idle to babble philanthropic platitudes. Such a course would have only afforded an easy text for too ready preachers; and in the fierce history of their own grievances, he might as well have beaten the air as have uttered humanitarian axioms. During the early part of the meal, therefore, he did not lead the conversation beyond general subjects; and, being recognised by several officers present as one who, in the recent War of Succession in Portugal, had been able in his official capacity to show them no small kindness, he found a subject which gave him a fortunate platform from which to urge presently his new purpose. He commenced wisely, not forcing the others' hands, but judiciously alluding to the main events of the war, as yet undoubtedly in favour of the Carlists. The impatient Zumalacarreguy rose at the bait; and in all the glow of conquest dragged forward the subject nearest Colonel Wylde's heart, by protesting his own readiness to spare the lives of *his* prisoners, if the Queen's generals would agree to do so. Had he said no more, Colonel Wylde would have attained his purpose; but Zumalacarreguy went on to assert that any slaughter of wounded or prisoners, of which he had as yet been guilty, had been merely by way of reprisals. It was an awkward moment. Had the Englishman let the assertion pass unnoticed, the haughty Christinos would certainly have resented it, and unforeseen complications might have strangled the young Convention in its birth. On the other hand, to argue the point, he being one against so many, would have been hazardous in the extreme; for the success of his argument might have meant the defeat of his cause, while his own defeat would have implied the acceptance of the first alternative. The frankness of his nature saved him. He ventured courageously to say that a similar protest to that just made by Zumalacarreguy had been made to him by General Mina, on his assuming the command; and that he believed this intention had only

been violated on account of the massacre of certain Urbanos at Villa Franca. It was a bold card which the Englishman played, and had he played it with the Carlist general in private, it would have lost him the game. The massacre in question was cruel and indefensible: face to face, and alone, Zumalacarreguy, conscious of his weakness, would have blustered and raged and lashed himself into a self-righteous fury. But there were keen-eyed men at that table who knew the true story, who would have detected the admitted crime under all the angry froth, and who would—with Spanish jealousy—have rejoiced at the flaw in their idol. Zumalacarreguy knew it; he commenced to excuse and defend it in halting terms; he went on to strengthen his case by recounting similar atrocities on the part of his opponents, and he endeavoured to cover his retreat in the argument by boastfully quoting instances where he had given quarter to his prisoners, and not the sword. But the game was won. Colonel Wylde had placed him upon his defence, instead of driving him into fury, and he pressed his advantage no further. After supper he received his reward by being called by Zumalacarreguy into his private room, and authorized to give to Lord Eliot his consent on certain conditions to a *cartel* for a general exchange of prisoners. Being still in the excusing, defensive, and half-satisfied mood, the Carlist general went on to urge that he required no conditions, and that he was ready in future to set all prisoners at liberty at once, on their promise not to serve against Don Carlos—notwithstanding the disparity in numbers existing between the prisoners on either side—as all he really wanted was their arms.

With this an anxious day and night came to an end; the formalities had, it is true, to be carried out at Segura, but it was at the supper-table at Enlati that the Eliot Convention was virtually concluded.

Next morning Colonel Wylde started for Segura, and after many misadventures reached Alzazua, where he found the required passport from Don Carlos. Immediately after seeing Lord Eliot, he was presented to the Pretender, and was

guilty of his first and very natural blunder. Don Carlos received him so cordially that he was tempted, in his innocence, to tell him of his success with Zumalacarreguy. At once there was a change; a change which subsequent consultation with his ministers only intensified. Resenting the presumption of his successful general in daring to take any prominent part in the transaction, he muttered gloomily, "He must obey *my* orders, whatever they may be." It was an undignified, a foolish expression of jealousy; he dared not differ from Zumalacarreguy; he knew that the Convention was now virtually arranged, and that he himself might object or not without the slightest effect. With a childish attempt to make the mission forget his real powerlessness in some show of kingly state, he ordered a parade of the troops at his head-quarters. It was a sorry sight; the etiquette of a court, which he kept up with all solemnity, could not conceal the fact that he had only four weak battalions at Segura, belonging to Eraso's division, most of them clad in peasant clothing. The farce was looked at without comment, but on the 23rd April Lord Eliot and Colonel Wylde started for the real head-quarters, the camp of Zumalacarreguy, the Warwick of the Carlists.

Much fighting, which now occurred between the hostile armies, and which is alluded to elsewhere, separated the two missionaries; but their purpose was fulfilled, and after some oscillation between the camps of the two generals, Zumalacarreguy and Valdez, Lord Eliot concluded his humane Convention on the 27th and 28th April, 1835.

Col. Wylde,
Vittoria,
May 15,
1835.

To the very last there were difficulties, which even to the end of the war seemed likely to defeat all the efforts of the English Government. On the 1st May, 1835, the Carlist general Serrosa put to death the prisoners he had taken at Guernica, and the excuse given by Zumalacarreguy that he had only on that very day received the Convention signed by Valdez was simply disgraceful, he himself having signed it some days before, and being therefore morally bound by its provisions. A few days later, with arch cunning, Zumalacarreguy wrote to Colonel Wylde, pointing out that *as yet*

May 7,
1835.

the Convention only extended to Navarre and the three Basque Provinces, and urging him to get the generous wish of the British nation extended to Catalonia and the rest of Spain. How sincere was this Carlist wish, let the coming story of Cabrera's butcheries in the North-east Provinces bear hideous witness! Yet later, on ascertaining that English and French mercenaries were to be enlisted against him, Don Carlos issued a decree that "all such as shall fall into our hands shall, after time being given them to perform their religious duties, be instantly shot." Lord Palmerston sent immediate orders to Colonel Wylde to proceed to Don Carlos's head-quarters, to demand an interview, and to lodge a written protest against such conduct, adding that, "The British Government will not permit the Convention, which was negotiated and signed under the mediation of Great Britain, to be violated with impunity." Complying with these instructions, Colonel Wylde obtained access again to Don Carlos, and, in the same letter in which he reported the murder of some men of the English Legion in cold blood by the Carlists, he described his interview with Don Carlos, who distinctly stated that he had issued the objectionable decree after mature reflection, and that he considered the Convention of Lord Eliot as not contemplating *foreign* troops, which were therefore beyond its pale.

Durango,
June 20,
1835.

Foreign
Office,
July 13,
1835.

Estella,
August 2,
1835.

There was, it would thus seem, a certain *policy of conciliation* on the part of the Carlists in their ready acceptance of the humane advice of England, and a determination to violate the Convention where a loophole, real or fancied, gave an opening. It cannot be stated with truth that this policy was unknown at Madrid, or that the Christino generals were free from a similar determination. But the action of the British people and their government was nevertheless beneficial and humanizing; it may indeed have prolonged a short war of extirpation into one of treachery and procrastination, but it saved the pages of recent Spanish history from being blurred and stained with many tales which would have outraged Christianity and called for the execration of the civilized world.

History—difficult though be the task—must, to be worthy of the name, strive after impartiality. There is a danger of visiting on *one* side in a war all the sins of provocation. To the believer in the rights of the Christinos there is a risk of assuming that the butcheries which called forth the Eliot Convention were in the main the acts of the Carlists. Justice compels the student to proportion the crimes not unequally, although perhaps the earliest of them lay at Carlist doors. A single anecdote, from an unbiassed pen, will show that the method of carrying on war by the Christino generals was not unlikely to call for reprisals, and to horrify civilization. It was in the month of March, 1835. General Mina had marched from Elisondo to St. Estevan, in search of two mortars and two howitzers with which the Carlists had annoyed his outposts and store depots, and which he had reason to believe they had concealed during their retreat before his main body. He halted the first day at a Carlist village, Lecaroz, and, having surrounded it with his troops, he collected all the male peasants he found in it in front of the church, drew by lot four of them out of twenty-two, shot them, and then burnt the whole village. Marching forward to other villages, he threatened them with the same fate if the guns were not found within forty-eight hours. As a matter of course, they were found; peasant reticence could not resist the cries of women and children fearing to be widows and orphans, nor the entreaties of the sick and the aged, who seemed already to feel the smoke of the incendiary stifling them, and to see the walls that had been so long their home crumbling away. But such warfare as this not merely called for reprisals—not merely led to Conventions; it has perpetuated between the Pyrenees and the Ebro an enmity and a hatred which seem deathless, and, as parent tells his child such tales as that of Lecaroz, he stamps into its young soul his own wild but distinct nationality, which it is the hope of wise and benevolent legislation some day to obliterate! So is it that the evil that men do lives after them.

Col. Wylie,
Saint
Estevan,
March 16,
1835.

CHAPTER IV.

VALDEZ.

THE system of selection, which was destined after many failures to find in Espartero a Commander-in-chief worthy of his cause, brought to the front, as successor to Mina, General Valdez, then Minister of War. Valdez was as superior to Mina in knowledge of the science of war as he was his inferior in nerve. His scientific knowledge failed, partly because he was pitted against an enemy who did not understand it, and partly because he had to give proof of it under circumstances which were singularly favourable to his motives being misunderstood. Civil war is not a happy arena for the display of strategy, although in no war is a determined and impressive system of tactics more necessary and important. Valdez saw at once, on assuming the command, that a source of weakness and of not unfrequent defeat to the Queen's armies was the number of posts and villages occupied by handfuls of troops, defenceless against artillery fire, and very difficult in the midst of an unfriendly population to provision even to a moderate extent. He decided on abandoning such; and in an *enemy's* country his course would have been the only wise one. But in a *civil* war, with a peasantry watching the ebb and flow of military success in order to decide with which side they can most safely throw in their lot, the abandonment of a single village may produce incalculable injury. The disappearance of the Queen's troops from any post, and the substitution of a Carlist garrison, may have been sound strategy, but to the ignorant and unreasoning peasant it looked like defeat.

Valdez carried this crotchet of abandoning places which were difficult to defend, to an extent which was almost fatal. The maxim he laid down to himself was to concentrate his troops for more decided action by removing them from all posts which were unable to resist artillery fire. As, however, the fortune of war also compelled him to evacuate Elisondo, Urdache, Irun, Tolosa, Bergara and Durango, it was only natural that the Basque peasantry should class the places which were abandoned on strategical grounds with those which were surrendered to the victorious troops of Zumalacarreguy. After the Queen's armies had retreated behind the Ebro, leaving in the beginning of June the whole of the Bastan in the hands of the enemy, it was of little practical consequence what had been the motives of Valdez in abandoning certain places. His strategy, also, had been displayed under such a cloud of defeat that on-lookers might be reasonably excused for having failed to detect it. His campaign commenced with a grave defeat at Guernica, followed by a brutal massacre of prisoners; this was succeeded by the surrender of the garrison of Trevino before Valdez could relieve it. Bilbao and even Vittoria were threatened; and Oras, the incapable or the unlucky, was attacked on the 29th May at the Puerto of Doña Maria, when on the way to co-operate with Valdez, by a very inferior force, and was defeated utterly, his troops behaving in a very dastardly manner, and threatening their own officers as they tried to rally them. Then, in the words of a contemporary writer, "Villa Franca, which forms one of the most important positions in the mountain passes, was next attacked, and surrendered after a siege of a few days. . . . In the beginning of June the whole of the Bastan was now cleared of the royal troops." When Valdez commenced his operations, he had a column under his immediate command of some 7000 infantry and 400 cavalry, with which he united at Pamplona 3000 available men belonging to the divisions of Mendez, Vigo and Gurra. His intention was at first to assume the offensive, and to hang on Zumalacarreguy's own force; but he soon found that he would be fortunate if he could act

Annual
Register,
1835.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
June 1,
1835.

Annual
Register,
1835.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
May 3,
1835.

with even moderate success on the bare defensive. He was reduced ultimately to a policy of inaction on the south side of the Ebro, while the Carlist leader was menacing Bilbao and at the same time threatening Castile.

As early as May it had become apparent to Valdez that his force in the disturbed provinces was wholly inadequate, and that there was no possibility of putting an end to the war without foreign aid. On this point a change of opinion had come over the whole army; and foreign intervention, which would have been scouted two months before, was now looked forward to with satisfaction. The only qualification lay in the strongly-expressed desire that the co-operating force should be composed of British and Portuguese rather than French troops. The national jealousy of the French which is innate in Spaniards was increased by a very natural doubt of the sincerity of the professions made by France. On the 14th May, Valdez assembled his officers and invited their frank opinion on this question of foreign aid; and all, with the exception of two, stated their confidence that without it the war could not be brought to a conclusion.

This was a serious political as well as military consideration. The Eliot Convention, which the Conservative Government in England had, in the interests of humanity, succeeded in establishing, had caused much jealousy and indignation among unreasoning patriots and interested politicians at Madrid. But while the latter used it as merely another fulcrum for their ever-ready lever of attack against the government, the former resented the voice of foreign interference in the way even of philanthropy, and dreaded lest *any* convention on *any* subject might seem to give a recognition to the Carlists as belligerents instead of mere rebels. So strong was the feeling on the subject in Madrid that riots and disturbances were frequent; the aid of the troops was required by the Chambers, and the life of one of the Ministers, Martinez de la Rosa, was threatened by the mob. The anxieties of the weary but faithful Queen-regent were increased daily by such political difficulties and jealousies. But if mere philanthropic intervention from

Col. Wyld,
Vittoria,
May 15,
1835.

abroad excited such indignation, what would be the result of active military assistance from other Powers? Such aid would imply a confession that the rebellion was on too great a scale to be encountered by the government of the country; in other words, that it was no mere rebellion at all, but almost a national movement. Spanish pride would be intolerant of such intervention; and in the provinces of Catalonia and Aragon, the waverers who had been prevented from joining the Carlists by the exaggerated reports of Christino victories and the noisy contempt for the rebels, would be precipitated wholesale into the arms of the enemy by an action which would virtually recognise their superiority, and proclaim the failure of the government to assert its power. That such foreign aid would be readily granted, does not seem to have been for a moment doubted. A change of government had again occurred in England; the Whigs were again in office; and Lord Palmerston, with his strong Christino proclivities, was again Foreign Secretary.

The articles in the Quadruple Treaty which affected England limited, it was true, her obligations "to supplying her Catholic Majesty with such arms and munitions of war as she might stand in need of, and, if necessary, to assisting her with a naval force." But, with the characteristic pride of Spaniards, it was believed, both in Madrid and in the army, that England, France, and Portugal, were thirsting to share in the glories of stamping out the insurrection, and would not be too literal in interpreting the obligations laid upon them. Portugal had, under the Quadruple Alliance, accepted an obligation to send assistance *in any form*, should her Catholic Majesty desire it; and it may be said here, in passing, that the Portuguese Government *did* now consent to send a body of troops to cooperate with the Christino armies, and kept their promise before the year expired. But England and France had given no such pledge, although, as stated above, the Spanish Government did not doubt that these countries would travel beyond the actual letter of their contract.

They were, however, mistaken. Intelligence reached the army on the 22nd June, 1835, that England and France had refused to interfere. A feeling of blank dismay came over the English Commissioner. He was no pessimist, but he knew the state of the Queen's army. He felt that the success of the Queen's cause, unaided, in the disturbed provinces was now hopeless; that at the best it might be possible to preserve the line of the Ebro, and to retain possession of Pamplona and that more level part of Navarre known as the Ribera. The communications with Logrõno by Puente la Reyna, and Lerin, would thus be kept open; but the remainder of the provinces had already been vacated by the Queen's troops, with the exception of Vittoria, San Sebastian, Santander and Bilbao, and of these four, Vittoria required strengthening, and Bilbao was now in a state of siege. "Mat- Pamplona, June 22, 1835.
ters," exclaimed Colonel Wylde, "will, however, be much worse, if there is any change in the opinions of the inhabitants of Castile or the other provinces, or if the distinctly Carlist and ultra-Radical elements in the army develope."

But the Spanish Minister in London, on finding that the English Government declined to furnish a contingent, had fortunately the presence of mind to ask that at all events the Foreign Enlistment Act might be suspended, and that authority might be given to the Spanish Government to raise in England a mercenary force of 10,000 men. Authority was granted by an order in Council, dated 10th June; and a similar arrangement was come to in Paris. The intelligence reached the Queen's army in the beginning of July, and although far short of what had been hoped, the concession created much delight. The English Commissioner did not, however, overcome all his doubts and fears, for he wrote: "Even if both the English and French forces together amount to 20,000 men, it is doubtful if they will be enough, as the Queen's armies have lost so much during the past two months by the disgraceful surrenders of the garrisons." Annual Register, 1835.
Col. Wylde, Pamplona, July 2, 1835.

The promised assistance was, however, cheering to the Queen's armies, and annoying to Don Carlos. It was, there

can be no doubt, humiliating to the Spaniards, and damaging to the government which had to perform so unpopular an act; and in the treatment of the English Legion in Spain, which will be discussed in the next chapter, there was always a coldness, a jealousy, and an injustice on the part of successive governments at Madrid, traceable to the fact that the necessity for calling in foreign assistance to quell a rebellion was felt to be injurious to the national *prestige*, and most unpalatable to the national pride.

Before passing to the story of the English Legion in Spain, it may be mentioned that Valdez, whose command had been even more disastrous than Mina's, applied on the 24th June to be relieved. His post, combined with the viceroyship of Navarre, was offered to General Sarsfield, but was declined by him on the plea of ill-health; and the command was then offered to and accepted by one who has already appeared in these pages as a general of division—Cordova.

The state of the army which he was called upon to command, and the disposition of the provinces which he was to reclaim for the Queen, were not such as to afford much encouragement to Cordova. The promised troops from England and France might do much to aid him in his operations, although it was hardly to be expected that the wandering affections of Spaniards would be brought back to their Queen by foreign bayonets. But more useful than hired legions for his purpose was the death before Bilbao of the man who had been the soul of the rebellion, and who disappeared just as Cordova assumed the place of the unsuccessful Valdez—Zumalacarreguy.

There were mysterious circumstances attending his death, which will be discussed after consideration has been given to the force which was raised while the Queen's armies were yet commanded by the general from whom this chapter takes its name.

CHAPTER V.

THE TRUE STORY OF THE BRITISH LEGION.

THE somewhat inglorious, not very protracted, and decidedly broken career of the auxiliary force under De Lacy Evans, which was permitted to be raised in England for service with the Constitutionalist party in Spain, presented so little that was attractive to the superficial student of the war, that, as is usually the case, it was deliberately condemned to oblivion. The course of this narrative will show so many occasions on which the services of the Legion formed painful contrast to what is generally expected and obtained from British troops, that it may be as well to state here, at the point in the story where the Legion first appears, certain facts which may palliate shortcomings and even invite admiration.

It may be admitted at the commencement that the circumstances under which the Legion sprang into existence were very unfavourable. The force was very emphatically a *mercenary* force, not in the mere sense of one serving for *pay*, but also of one serving for *pay only*. All the nobler feelings of patriotism, of anxiety for the approbation of his countrymen, which enable the British soldier to face danger and to endure hardship, were wanting to the legionary. His government had distinctly refused to supply a land contingent of the *regular* forces, and his engagement was a mere commercial transaction, the noblest feature in which was, as a rule, the characteristic love of adventure. In a degree unsurpassed in any other nation, a consciousness of such a position would emasculate a British soldier.

This special disadvantage would have been enough to account for much that was unsatisfactory in the conduct of the Legion, but it was aggravated by the circumstances, *locally*, under which it was raised. De Lacy Evans was politically connected with Westminster; and the force was raised mainly in that part of the metropolis. As far as the private soldiers were concerned, this fact was comparatively immaterial, although even in their case a considerable mixture of agricultural recruits would have been very beneficial. But that part of a hastily-organized force which is the most important—the officers and non-commissioned officers—came to far too great an extent from the commandant's political friends. Those were the days of open voting—that backbone of borough Radicalism; and there were many wavering supporters whom a little patronage to their families would confirm in their political creed. It was marvellous, too, to behold the confidence with which they hastened to entrust to the general all their scapegrace relatives, would he but dub them captain or major. The result was that, although among the officers of the Legion there were some real soldiers, and some who in Brazil, Portugal, and elsewhere had seen a similar mercenary service, by far the greater part possessed, it may be, courage and even enthusiasm, but little discipline or military knowledge. When, as afterwards in Spain, weather is bad and rations scanty, enthusiasm is not unlikely to vanish; and if in such a case there is not in a military force the backbone of *discipline*, then woe be to that force and to the general who leans on it.

To meet these serious drawbacks, two things were necessary. First, strict fulfilment of the contract by which the Spanish Government and the Legion were bound; and secondly, some preparatory training before the force commenced operations.

Had the terms of his engagement been rigidly adhered to, the legionary, with his blunt English respect for a bargain, would have done everything in his power to fulfil his share of the agreement. What was, however, the case? The whole correspondence connected with the Legion is a wear-

some reiteration of grievances: pay, months in arrears; clothing unissued, rations wanting, unjust interpretation of the agreement, cruel disregard of sick and wounded, and stony deafness to the appeals of the families of those who had fallen. Nor was this list the full catalogue of irritations; they were aggravated to a shameful extent by evasive answers and specious promises not meant to be fulfilled. Three times did the English Commissioner travel from the north of Spain to urge on the Government that the men were starving, in rags, in arrears, and on the point of dissolution. Three times did he return from Madrid with assurances which were, at the best, but in small part fulfilled. With an empty treasury, the *promises to pay* of such ministers as Mendizabal were lavish, and as apparently sincere as they were absolutely worthless. In the meantime, the men of the Legion were selling their uniforms and necessaries to get bread; and were dying like sheep in the hospitals of San Sebastian and on the bare convent floors of Vittoria. The officers, who were living on credit where they could obtain it, could not say a word to the men in the way of reproof; nay, it was the common remark that the loudest remonstrances, uttered with little discretion, and in presence of their discontented men, came from the officers themselves; and that the expressions used above with reference to the casualties from sickness are not too strong, is proved from the following figures. Out of a total force of 9600 non-commissioned officers and men disembarked in Spain during twenty-three months, there were no fewer than 3407 admissions into hospital from various causes, and no less than 1588 deaths among the patients!

Colquhoun
MSS.

To prove also that sickness and discontent did not prevent the men of the Legion from doing their duty in the field when called upon, the following summary of the losses *Ibid.* between August, 1835, and May, 1837, affords ample evidence:—

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.
Killed ..	21	29	413
Wounded ..	187	129	1753
Total ..	<u>208</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>2166</u>

The consequences of illiberal interpretation of the terms of the agreement as regarded duration of service and pensions for wounds will be considered in discussing the collapse of the Legion.

The second step to meet the disadvantages of the original organization would have been a deliberate preliminary training. This, for many reasons, was impossible. The heat of a civil war, when each side was fighting for life as well as supremacy, was not conducive to deliberation in any form. Preliminary training of 10,000 men *in England*, defrayed by a starving treasury *in Spain*, was of course out of the question; and, however desired by Sir De Lacy Evans, the same training was impossible after arrival at San Sebastian. There was young blood in the ranks, and hot blood among the officers; there were not a few to whom war meant plunder, and a great proportion to whom the monotony of garrison life was intolerable. There were Spanish troops in San Sebastian who made invidious allusions to the last British troops who had served in Spain and made it one great field of glory; there were daily rumours in the air of victories in which the English were not sharing, and of defeats which the English felt they were paid to avenge; in a word, the second step to meet the disadvantages of the original organization was impossible, and the first was wanting. The result of the absence of the preliminary training was seen in the unsuccessful sally from San Sebastian with raw troops, which is mentioned elsewhere; and the results of the broken contract have now to be narrated.

Perhaps the readiest way of appreciating these results will be by reference to the diaries and letters of the Chief English Commissioner. In the summer of 1836 we find him saying,

“ Unless the government pay more attention to the wants of
 “ the Legion than they seem disposed to do, there is not the
 “ smallest doubt but that a very large portion will claim
 “ their discharge at the end of their first year’s service—the
 “ officers being now *six*, and the staff *nine* months in arrear.
 “ . . . General Cordova writes to General Evans, praying for
 “ indulgence, promising everything, and saying that if minis-
 “ ters had a good majority in the new Cortes, respectable

Col. Wylde,
 San
 Sebastian,
 June 30,
 1836.

“bankers would give them a good loan. . . . General Evans
 “is ill with fever brought on by over-fatigue, or, I fear,
 “still more by vexation in consequence of the treatment
 “he has experienced at the hands of the Spanish Government,
 “no notice having as yet been taken of any of his recom-
 “mendations for decorations or rank, or of his remonstrances
 “on the subject; so much so that he has returned the Grand
 “Cross of St. Ferdinand, not choosing to receive any honours
 “himself until the claims of his officers were attended to.”

With a half-disciplined force, premises such as these were likely to produce but one conclusion. Accordingly, we find without surprise that some weeks later decided symptoms of insubordination and discontent were exhibited by the Legion; that one entire regiment refused to move off parade until settled with; that a great part insisted on their discharge on the completion of their first year's service; that in this last particular the officers showed a decided example of insubordination, excited by the intelligence that the bills on England which had been given them for pay had been dishonoured; and that those officers who had not gone the whole length of insisting on returning to England, had been very loud in their murmurs in presence of the men, and had thereby still further unsettled them. The serious indisposition of General Evans, in whom alone the men had any confidence, and the rumours that he intended returning to England next session to assume his Parliamentary duties, made matters all the more difficult. To the feelings of irritation caused by neglect in the matter of pay, and the belief that contrary to their own reading of their engagement they were to be kept reserving to the end of the war without fresh bounty or enlistment, supervened an absolute horror among the men of having to pass another such winter as that of 1835-36 in Vittoria, where the discomfort, sickness, and other neglect from which they suffered had swept them off by hundreds.

The story would be monotonous were one to recount the continued acts of insubordination on a more or less extended scale which occurred, and which were only stifled for a time by payments on account and by fresh promises. It

Col. Wyld,
 Son
 Sebastian,
 July 16,
 1836.

Col. Wyld,
 Son
 Sebastian,
 July 28,
 1836.

was soon apparent that General Evans was regarded very coldly by all the Spanish generals, including Espartero, but with the exception of the one who knew him best—the amiable Jauregui. It was also evident that the sense of injustice, which is very keen among English soldiers, and not very easily borne, was not to be allayed any longer by vain words; and that, in a manner quite respectful to their own officers, of whose sympathy they felt assured, the men of the Legion were determined to quit a service which had become intolerable, and to demand passage to England. There were pauses in the movement towards collapse when real work had to be done and there was any prospect of service in the field, but the movement was nevertheless distinct. By degrees the recusants were shipped to England, and a new Legion, of much smaller dimensions, was formed, under somewhat amended conditions, out of those who chose to remain. On the 1st July, 1837, the strength of the new Legion was as follows:—

Colquhoun MSS.	Corps.	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.
	Rifles ..	26 ..	32 ..	341
	Scotch ..	25 ..	25 ..	289
	Irish ..	21 ..	26 ..	294
	Lancers ..	22 ..	26 ..	267
	Artillery ..	25 ..	4 ..	209
	Sappers ..	2 ..	4 ..	52
	Ambulance ..	1 ..	4 ..	51
	Total ..	122	121	1503
			Grand Total ..	1746

So unsuccessful, however, were the new arrangements, that on the 8th December, 1837, the *new* Legion was also dissolved,* and, with the exceptions to be mentioned hereafter,

* GENERAL ORDER.

FELLOW SOLDIERS,—

San Sebastian, 10th December, 1837.

I cannot allow the relationship which has existed between us to cease without offering to you in as strong terms as I can express, my unqualified admiration of the unparalleled devotion with which you have

was shipped to England. But in the few intervening months no fewer than 389 of the above total had become non-effective from various causes, and of that number no

endured the no common share of privation and hardship which has fallen to your lot.

I congratulate you that you have shown not alone that daring courage in the field which is the marked characteristic of the British soldier, but that you have shown even more than his wonted patience under suffering.

The conflict in which we have been engaged, has been to you more murderous than to the allies in whose ranks you have fought; you were aware that wounded or helpless, should you fall into the hands of the enemy you had no mercy to expect;—You knew that no barbarity would be wanting to heighten the sufferings of your last moments;—You knew that many of your comrades had been treated with the ferocity, only to be expected from the Indian Savage.—But your fearless step was ever quicker when it led to the enemy, and your shout the most heartfelt when called to the battle. Your privations I cannot call to mind without a thrill of indignation in reflecting that many were imposed upon you, not by unavoidable necessity, but by the culpable neglect or the wilful malevolence of the individuals appointed by the Spanish Government to superintend your equipment.

To their eternal infamy be it recorded that they allowed you to meet the inclemency of this season, exposed in the lines, most of you barefooted, and many without other covering to their nakedness than their great coats. This cruelty I repeat was inflicted on you when the slightest exertion or good feeling might have remedied the evil. Your pay has been allowed to run into a long arrear. This was unavoidable from the financial embarrassments of the Spanish Government, and would, I feel confident, have been cheerfully borne by you; but when accompanied by other acts of injustice and ill treatment, it has given me an opportunity of dissolving the Legion, and of declaring your engagement with Spain at an end.

Three months have elapsed since I claimed from the Minister of War the fulfilment of the 12th clause of your contract, and since then you have performed with exactness all the duties required from you. No determination from the government, in answer to my application, has been communicated to me. I undertake to demand redress for an injustice offered to you—I am met with an arbitrary order that a part of the force should lay down its arms. No assumption of illegal authority, no matter by what temporary power it may be backed, shall induce me to desert your interests, and I will confidently appeal to our own government for such redress as the justness of your claims demands. No exertion of mine shall be wanting to advocate your rights; and

fewer than 52 were officers. The state of discipline may be inferred from a note on the official returns to the effect that many of the officers' services had been dispensed with, and that among the men the casualties were not merely from losses in action and from sickness, but also—an ugly word with regard to Englishmen before an enemy—from *desertion*.

A third experiment was now tried, and volunteers were called for from the dissolved Legion to serve in Spain under totally different circumstances, such as if in existence at the commencement of the campaign would have removed all

as I am aware that threats have been held out to the corps of cavalry and artillery, that in the event of their discontinuing to serve they will forfeit their claim to gratuity, I boldly affirm that such is not the case; on the contrary, you are entitled, by the 12th article of the contract of service, to all the advantages which would have accrued to you had your period of service extended to the 10th of June next. This clause was framed by me for your protection, and now for that purpose will I enforce its fulfilment.

It now remains to me to add my warmest thanks to all the officers who served under my command. I cannot express (in terms sufficiently strong to please myself) my feelings in regard to those whose generous assistance has materially contributed to enable me to support the difficulties which have surrounded my situation. To Colonel Ross, Asst.-Adjutant-General; to the officers of my personal staff, Lieut.-Colonels Hermann and Freeston; to Lieut.-Colonel Clarke, Asst.-Quartermaster-General, and to the Inspector-General of Hospitals, Dr. Alcock, whose exertions have been unwearied,—I feel deeply indebted. To Colonel Wooldridge commanding the infantry battalion I must particularly address my thanks, as also to Major Brennan, my extra aide-de-camp, whose devotion I have on several occasions admired; to each and all of these officers I reiterate my obligations, and in the peculiar circumstances which have preceded the dissolution of the Legion, I have doubly experienced their manly and unflinching support. To the officers commanding the corps of cavalry and artillery—although in many instances their services have been amongst the most valuable—I regret I cannot in this instance offer my thanks.

Having thus promulgated in General Orders the dissolution of the Legion, I avail myself of the same opportunity to exhort the officers and men to be guarded in their conduct, and until the means of conveyance to their own country shall be furnished for them, to give no opportunity to persecutions.

M. C. O'CONNELL, *Brigadier-General.*

difficulties. The new regulations recognised two things especially dear to an English soldier, and which should never be overlooked in English army legislation—*certainty* in duration of service, and *compensation* in some form or other for injuries received in action. The conditions were briefly as follows:—

- (1) The period of service to be until the *termination of the war.*
- (2) The pay * to be a fixed sum, *exclusive of rations.*
- (3) Pensions to be given to the wounded, and to the widows of all killed in action, or who might die of infirmities contracted during the campaign. Official Extract, San Sebastian, March 1, 1838.
- (4) A gratuity of three months' pay and a free passage to England to be granted to every man at the conclusion of the war.
- (5) The discipline and interior economy to be that of the *British regular forces.*
- (6) Dismissal from the Legion for bad conduct to involve forfeiture of all advantages and compensation.

Under the above conditions the following British Auxiliary Brigade, as it was now termed, was enrolled on the 1st March, 1838, and served with distinction until the end of the war:—

Corps.	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Total.
Staff ..	3	3
Artillery ..	12	..	9	207
Lancers ..	15	..	22	192
Total ..	<u>30</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>341</u>	<u>402</u>

Colquhoun MSS.

As an illustration of the method of equipping this new Brigade the following Table may be useful. The artillery portion had been ordered to leave San Sebastian on active

* The pay of the Artillery under the new system was to be as follows:—

	Pay per diem.	
	s. d.	
Staff Sergeant ..	3 10½	} A fixed charge of 6d. per diem was to be deducted from these rates for rations.
Sergeant ..	2 5½	
Corporal ..	2 2	
Trumpeter ..	2 1½	
Bombardier ..	2 0	
Gunner ..	1 3½	

service in January, 1839. The armament consisted of four light brass 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers. The ammunition carried was as follows:—

Celquhoun MSS.	6-pr. Guns.	Round shot	1864
	" "	Common Case	214
				Total	.. 2048
					<hr/>
	12-pr. Howitzers.	Shell	957
	" "	Common Case	83
				Total	.. 1040
					<hr/>

This proportion of ammunition was in excess of that issued to service batteries of regular artillery, and was calculated, after all possible contingencies, to suffice for three general actions.

Commencing with a well-meaning but half-disciplined mob, the British Contingent ended in four hundred picked soldiers. The method of elimination was harsh, but it was thorough. The harshness might have been avoided by the precautions pronounced above to be necessary with such a force, but the bargain entered into by the Spanish Government was impossible of fulfilment.

It may be urged that the English were not the only Christino troops who were paid and fed badly; but the most indifferent Spaniard had an interest in the war to which a purely mercenary soldier was a stranger. With every desire to make allowance for the impecunious governments which succeeded one another at Madrid, it must be pleaded on behalf of the legionary that he could not be expected to forget his contract in *sentiment*. He willingly risked his life; he underwent great hardship; he showed, until thoroughly exasperated, an admirable and soldier-like spirit; and it is possible that if the governments had pleaded poverty and implored indulgence, instead of deceiving with empty promises, the Legion might have survived until the end of the war. But such speculations are idle. The whole story is a sorry one, lit up by acts of

self-denial, endurance, and conscientious duty; but still innocent of all those nobler features which illumine a genuinely national warfare.

The blunder lay with the English Government, which, with all the desire, had not the courage to take an official part in the Spanish contest by land. Like most blunders, it carried its own retribution. An official share had ultimately, in a somewhat irregular manner, to be taken in the war, both by land and sea; and the collapse of the Legion was not the less injurious to England's military reputation because it was a mercenary instead of a regular national force. Like most half-hearted actions, both in nations and individuals, it produced unsatisfactory results.



GRAVES OF THE LEGION.
(From a Sketch by Colonel Yumley.)

CHAPTER VI.

THE DEATH OF ZUMALACARREGUY.

BEFORE the diversion to the subject of the English Legion in Spain, allusion was made to a fact which gave to General Cordova great advantages over his predecessors in the command of the Queen's armies—the important and hardly to be overrated fact of Zumalacarreguy's death, the general who had awakened among his men an almost superstitious reverence. This greatest of the Carlist leaders had been born at Ormastegui, in Guipuscoa, in December, 1788. He entered the Spanish army as a cadet in 1808, and in 1820, being then a Captain, he was marked and denounced for his Absolute opinions. In June, 1831, when in command of a regiment, he was arrested on the plea of disloyalty, and was permitted to retire on leave to Pamplona. After the death of Ferdinand in 1833, he openly joined the Carlists; and such was his energy that it was stated that although he commenced his campaign with 800 infantry, 14 cavalry, and an officer of artillery, he had within a year 35,000 Carlists of various descriptions in the field. He was robust and active, of imposing stature, rather taciturn, and although cruel, was not often unjust.

Bollaert,
Vol. II.
p. 13.

Henning-
sen.

It has been seen how futile were the endeavours of such generals as Rodil, Mina, and Valdez to check the influence or to imitate the activity of Zumalacarreguy in the field, which was equal to his mastery over all the details of supply and interior economy connected with his troops. He had, however, enemies on his own side, at the

Court of Don Carlos, who were more successful in checking and thwarting him. His success brought him a power over the army and among the peasantry, which excited the jealousy and suspicion of the priests, the courtiers, and the women who had the ear of Don Carlos. They received his frequent victories coldly, attributing them to the sanctity of the cause and the protection of heaven. To this hostile influence was his death indirectly due. After the Carlist capture of Bergara, the Queen's armies, as has been seen *Vide p. 36.* above, were in a state of depression almost amounting to panic; and Zumalacarréguy saw that the time had arrived *Bollaert.* to make a bold forward movement by Vittoria and Burgos, which would either force the Christinos to give him battle, or open the door to Madrid. A delay would be fatal, as it would give time for the expected foreign legions to arrive from England, France and Portugal. The Carlist leader and his troops, who were full of alacrity, and fought together cordially and contentedly, without jealousy or murmur, were sanguine of success, and arrangements for this advance were actually being rapidly made, when intelligence was brought to Zumalacarréguy that Don Carlos had determined to postpone crossing the Ebro until he had taken the wealthy city of Bilbao, an operation which he hoped would fill his empty purse. In vain did Zumalacarréguy plead the immense sacrifice of men and precious time which would follow such a change of plan. The courtiers and priests had persuaded Don Carlos to the contrary, and had excited him with the hopes of plunder and of easy victory. The change was carried out, and the Carlist troops marched on Bilbao.

An eye-witness describes Zumalacarréguy's face as clouded *Henning-* with gloomy presentiment when he started on what proved *sen.* to be his death journey. Biographers are apt, with the wisdom which follows the fact, to see omens and presentiments which would have escaped notice had no event of importance followed. But, apart from the question of personal presentiment, although such is to be found in hourly and daily life, there were ample reasons why depres-

sion should penetrate the hard and stern nature of the Carlist leader. His belief in the Divine Right of Don Carlos was thorough; his loyal devotion to his person was great; and if in so cruel and fierce a heart there was room for any soft emotion, an affection, tender as a woman's, existed in Zumalacarreguy towards his chief.

And now he had received practical demonstration that the counsel of others was preferred by that chief to his own; that his services and successes, without which Don Carlos had yet been a wanderer in a foreign land, had been forgotten; and that the men who enjoyed that confidence from their leader which gives power, were those who made no secret of their jealousy of the successful soldier. Well might Zumalacarreguy look gloomy; well might the cry rise to his lips, "*Cui bono?* for what end my labour? for what good my "toil?" Unfortunately, Don Carlos was a man deficient in talent and in education—had no political knowledge or tact in governing—was weak and irresolute, and was easily flattered by those around him. Being also a religious fanatic, he was greatly under the priests at his Court. The siege had not proceeded far when the Carlists discovered that they had not sufficient ammunition, and that the inhabitants of Bilbao had received valuable assistance from two English men-of-war, which had arrived under the command of Lord John Hay. It was decided to attempt to storm the place on the 16th June, but on the day previous, Zumalacarreguy—who had rashly exposed himself on a balcony, in spite of the warnings of his staff—was wounded. He was by degrees removed to Segama, a distance of about thirty miles, and died on the 25th June.

H.M.S.
Castor and
H.M.S.
Ringdove.

This narrative of his wound and death seems simple and natural; nor would it awaken any suspicion in the reader's mind. But in the diary of the English Commissioner, when on a visit to the Court of Don Carlos on a matter raised subsequently under the Eliot Convention, a startling passage occurs. "There are," he writes, "pretty good reasons for "believing that Zumalacarreguy was *poisoned*, and did not "die of his wound. He was hated by Don Carlos' advisers,

Col. Wyldo,
Estella,
August 8,
1835.

"but his loss will be bitterly felt." There evidently were more than suspicions on the subject, before these words would have been written; and when one's attention has once been called to the circumstances of the death of the Carlist general, they are found to be painfully confirmatory of the theory of foul play.

It might naturally be asked in the first place, Why was a wounded man carried thirty miles over Spanish roads, away from the army which he had commanded with such distinction, and which would have been glad to welcome his recovery, or to do all honour to his burial? But when the further circumstance comes to light, that this brave and almost unconquered leader was buried hurriedly and secretly, within twenty-four hours of his death, by night; that even the guard had been dismissed, and only four private soldiers kept to huddle the body into its grave; and that no examination to ascertain the cause of death was either courted or allowed, the most unsuspecting person would begin to doubt. His doubts would carry him into further inquiries, and he would learn that Dr. Burgess, Zumalacarréguy's own physician, "would at once have undertaken the case, but was not allowed to have it under his management. . . . It was the general opinion that, had Mr. Burgess been allowed to have extracted the ball at once, Zumalacarréguy would have been saved." The doubter would also learn that the Spanish surgeons who performed the operation of extracting the bullet, which had been so cruelly delayed, blundered so shamefully that under their barbarous treatment the patient fainted. Then comes the following bewildering sentence: "To lull this, they gave him opium, it appears, in too great a dose, and shortly after the bullet was extracted he died of *delirium*." It is quite possible, of course, to blunder without *malice prepense*; an unlucky surgeon is not always a murderer: but one has a right to expect the narrative of the failure to be at all events consistent. In the case of General Zumalacarréguy, it was not so. When his own physician, who had been prevented from treating the case, heard of his death, he inquired the

Journal
of Dr.
Burgess.

Ibid.

Bollaert,
p. 148.

Dr. Bur-
gess' Jour-
nal.

immediate cause, and was then assured by the surgeon that "he died of fever, which they had not regarded, three hours after they had extracted the ball." To say more seems like piling Pelion upon Ossa, but the same authority goes on to say, without comment, "The said surgeon *deserted* from the Carlists a short time afterwards."

It would almost seem—although too much importance should not be attached to the words of dying men—as if Zumalacarreguy himself suspected unfair treatment. Among his last words, before his final confession to the priest, were the following: "Is a man to die of a single ball?" His inconvenience from the wound had—up to three days before his death—been slight; his astonishment at the sudden and fatal result announced as imminent was therefore extreme. His brother-in-law, who saw him on the 22nd, wrote of him: "Tomas continues to do well; *his fever has ceased*, the wound is no longer inflamed, and one of these days they will extract the ball."

Cirilio.

If to these suspicious circumstances could be added any *motive* to induce the committal of so atrocious a crime, the case of circumstantial evidence would surely be complete. But here there is a difficulty. The death of Zumalacarreguy would so clearly be injurious to the cause of Don Carlos, that it seems incredible that any loyal Carlist would deliberately compass it. On the other hand, it has to be borne in mind that crime is never far-sighted; and that the enemies of Zumalacarreguy were many. Success does more to alienate friends and create enemies than even direct injury. The same jealousy which induced the courtiers to urge the siege of Bilbao must have been intensified by the imminent failure of that siege, which would have been a triumph to Zumalacarreguy in one sense, although a defeat in the other.

It has been said above, that mystery attended the death of the Carlist general. This bare narrative of facts confirms the statement, although it fails to place the crime on any individual. That the motive was not lust for the dead man's wealth is evident from the fact that his last

words—when urged to make a will—were: “I leave my wife and daughter; they are all I have.” These words, uttered truthfully by a man who had exceptional opportunities of plunder, were proof of a loyalty and unselfishness which should modify the terms in which his cruelty almost demands that his epitaph be written.



HOUSE WHERE ZUMALACARRÉGUÉ WAS SHOT.

(From a Sketch by Colonel Toucalcy.)

CHAPTER VII.

CORDOVA.

THE successor of Valdez, another link in that chain of development which was to result in a general equal to the task of subduing the Carlists, was a man who possessed much in his character to command respect. As a general of division, he had been above the average; as a Spaniard, he was loyal to the Queen's cause; and at a time when that cause was in a far from hopeful state he resisted flattering overtures from Don Carlos, who offered to give him the command of his troops, vacant by the death of Zumalacarreguy and the illness of Eraso. But he was weak in a point where it was very necessary that a Spanish general should be strong. He feared and courted public opinion; he fought battles to meet the expectations of the Puerto at Madrid; and he was cold, almost insolent to the foreign legionaries, whose presence in Spain was an eyesore to the proud inhabitants. His command, the story of which will be found in this chapter, extended from July 1835, to August 1836, and during this period the impecuniosity of the government at Madrid led to much suffering and embarrassment among the troops. Had Zumalacarreguy been yet alive, there is little doubt that the situation of the Queen's armies would have been very grave, and the Queen's cause would have been in great peril.

Col. Wylde,
Vittoria,
Jan. 13,
1836.

There was little originality in Cordova, nor was he a man to retrace his steps when in error, nor to originate schemes differing from those of his predecessors either in method or in purpose. To him the words, which, professing to be those of

reformers, are really those of bigots—*vestigia nulla retrorsum*,—were a creed, a sign-post, almost a postulate. And this was a dangerous characteristic in a leader whose subordinates were too often so jealous that they strove to drag him down by their own deliberate blunders. The competition was very keen among the generals serving under him for promotion at one another's expense, or even at the cost of their leader's reputation. They were not as a rule so free from selfish motives as to devote the whole of their energies to the successful execution of the subordinate share of their leader's scheme which might have been entrusted to them. They acted, so to speak, to an audience at Madrid, from which they courted comparison with their chief; they were not content to strengthen the cord of the national cause by the insertion of any unobtrusive thread of their own exertion; all they did must be in the blaze of public observation. There were, also, some who considered that they had been slighted by the appointment of Cordova, and who rendered to him a hesitating, half-hearted obedience. He therefore had to encounter from his own subordinates a criticism, a jealousy, a sullenness, which had a most serious effect on his movements, and a stifling effect on his schemes. Patient and obedient as were the rank and file of the Spanish armies, their senior officers had yet too often to learn that "authority is not given to any man for his own use, or pleasure, or profit, but for the good of the whole body;" and that "obedience implies inferiority of *position*, not of *character*." This *indiscipline*—to coin a word—was a sore obstacle in the way of Cordova's success, and he had not the energy nor the individuality of character to overcome it.

Troubles were clouding up above the political horizon in other parts of Spain besides the Basque Provinces. "By the end of August Spain was in a state of political anarchy. Various provinces had set up each a government for itself, which set at defiance the general government, and usurped the powers of the executive. . . . The government at Madrid was helpless." Decrees were issued, but "in the provinces there were no means of enforcing these decrees."

General
Eardley-
Wilmot,
R.A.

Annual
Register,
1835.

Disturbance spread from the provinces to the capital; in August the urban militia mutinied in Madrid; martial law was proclaimed, and a curb placed on the licence of the press. The hopes of all interested in order and in the success of the Queen's arms turned towards M. Mendizabal, the Minister of Finance, then absent on an expedition connected with a desired and much-needed loan. On his return in September, he was entrusted with the Premiership in fact, although not actually in name, his official position being still that of Finance Minister. His claims were not so much based on proved ability as on his enthusiasm, his belief in the ultimate success of the Queen's cause,—his supposed sympathies with the masses,—his knowledge—in the sense of cunning—in matters connected with accounts, and his powers as a debater. Enthusiasm was his most infectious and most useful characteristic, but his statesmanship was more suited to a vestry than an empire. He loved to concentrate his attention on the party politics of Madrid, putting off with vain excuses and empty promises those burning questions from the seat of war on which the very existence of his government depended. He closed his eyes to the matters beyond the capital; he deluded himself as well as others by hopes that victories might be won, armies clothed, soldiers fed and comforted, without ammunition, stores, and money. But his enthusiasm was undoubtedly a tonic at the time; and the presence of a man who did not despair of the State was a boon for which it was right that anxious men should be grateful. To this enthusiasm, and to the noble example of the Queen Dowager, was it due that levies were made right and left without opposition, and taxes were submitted to with comparative docility. Before the end of 1835 some 47,000 additional troops had been raised, and £150,000 had, besides, been paid by way of exemption from service. Mendizabal also was able for a time to bridge over the gulf between the Court and the mass of the people, which had been created by interested politicians; and he was able for a time to make all understand what politicians often forget, that there is something more important than class or party, something which it

is the first duty of all to consider before gratifying individual desires—the questions affecting *the country* as a whole. During 1835 the number of foreign legionaries in Spain became considerable. In addition to General Evans' force, discussed elsewhere, 1000 French troops crossed the frontier, and the French Algerine Legion of 3000 men entered Catalonia about the end of October. The Portuguese division, numbering some 8000 men, entered Spain in November, but not in time to take any share in the events of the year.

Cordova's assumption of the command had been preceded by a well-earned victory by him and his own force over the Carlists under Eraso and Moreno, known generally as the Battle of Mendigorria. The engagement lasted seven hours; and the force under Cordova consisted of 15,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, while the Carlists numbered in all about 14,000 men. The Carlists lost 1500 men, and there was such confusion during their retreat that Don Carlos was nearly captured by the Christino cavalry, and the Carlist general Moreno was on the point of being murdered by his own men.

After this engagement, Cordova moved his head-quarters by Logroño to Vittoria; but at this time Don Carlos having announced by a proclamation, known as the Durango Decree, that he did not consider foreign legionaries entitled to the benefits of the Eliot Convention, the English Commissioner proceeded to the Carlist head-quarters at Estella to remonstrate. He was unsuccessful at the time; but he ultimately succeeded, supported by the unmistakable determination of Lord Palmerston to prevent a continuance of the murders of Englishmen, even if legionaries, such as had already taken place in cold blood.

The position of the opposing armies in the middle of August was as follows: Cordova had a force of about 14,000 men, in excellent spirits, but disposed so as to defend a line of about forty leagues in length, against the extremities of which the Carlists were operating. Ituralde, with the Navarrese, was at Puente la Reyna; and Don Carlos, with Moreno, was at Orduna, meditating, it was believed, an

Bollaert.

Bollaert.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
July 21,
1835.Vide supra,
p. 33.Col. Wylde,
Estella,
August 2,
1835.Col. Wylde,
Vittoria,
August 15,
1835.

advance on Bilbao. Pending the development of his plans, Cordova decided on remaining at Vittoria, but the English Commissioner proceeded to San Sebastian to assist in rendering the English Legion available for early duty, and to remove the friction which already existed between Cordova and General Evans.

Col. Wyld
Logroño,
August 24,
1835.

The state of affairs in Arragon and Catalonia was such as to create anxiety. A body of Carlists under Elio had proceeded towards these provinces to rouse the people, who were known to be greatly under the influence of the priests; and a Christino force under General Gurrea was sent in pursuit. So ready, however, were the peasantry in Catalonia to espouse the cause of Don Carlos, especially, as will be seen, when led by such men as Cabrera, that before October, 1835, it was found necessary to appoint Mina Captain-General of the Queen's forces in Catalonia, and between that date and the end of the war, except in the cities and large towns, the Queen's troops in that province were practically besieged in small outposts in the midst of a hostile population. The condition of the North-east of Spain will, however, be discussed at some length in a subsequent chapter.

Sir C. Dick-
son MSS.

The arrival of the English Commissioner in San Sebastian took place immediately after the Legion had received its baptism of fire and had failed to distinguish itself during the ceremony. It was evident that they were not wanting in courage, but they were deficient in every other requisite of a soldier. Some men had never loaded a musket in their lives, and no battalion had as yet had more than six days' drill. The skirmish in question, at Ernani on the 29th August, 1835, had been undertaken against General Evans' better reason; and its result justified him in the resolution he soon after came to,—to discipline his men for a couple of months before allowing them again to take the field. Although, as has been said, the professions of arms and of theology are assumed by many to be capable of practice without previous study, the test of real service proves that in one of them at least there is no prospect of success with-

out some more solid acquirements than *à priori* arguments, or an inner consciousness. There is no royal road to discipline. The student may have his path made easier and shorter by the sympathy of numbers or by a sense of the necessity of discipline; but its perfection is only attainable by the *practice*, not the *theory* of obedience—by the *habit* of united action, not by a sense of its value.

While Colonel Wylde was at San Sebastian, intelligence arrived that the Carlists who had undertaken the siege of Bilbao—a place which was to derive great honour from its defence on more than one occasion during this war—had abruptly raised it, and that their detached Navarrese force under Ituralde had been defeated at Los Arcos. It was at once decided to strengthen Bilbao against the renewal of the siege, by concentrating in it the English Legion, a covering force under General Iriarte, and part of the reserve under General Espeleta. The total of this force would exceed 11,000 men.

Col. Wylde,
Portaga-
lete,
Sept. 7,
1835.

The movement was effected, and an interesting council of war was held at Bilbao on the 9th September, whose decision, if it had proved possible of execution, would have made a marked change in Cordova's operations. At the council meeting there were present Generals Evans, Espeleta, and Espartero, all men of ability and energy, and Alava, who was at the time being urgently pressed by the government and the Queen-regent to accept the office of Minister at War. The movements decided upon were, as might be expected, of an offensive description. It was proposed to press forward the head-quarters of the reserve to Ordūna, while Espartero and Evans, the latter with three or four only of his best battalions, should advance towards Durango. An offensive campaign, with such a base from which to draw reinforcements and supplies, would have engrossed the opposing Carlists so as to free Cordova for a corresponding offensive from another quarter; and it was politically as well as strategically important at this moment that it should be apparent to all Spain that the Queen's troops were in a position to attack. Inaction at this time would injure the government,

Col. Wylde,
Bilbao,
Sept. 10,
1835.

encourage the Carlists, and confirm any waverers in the East in a determination to espouse the rebel cause. But the scheme fell through, owing to the same defect as attended all the Christino armies—insufficient precautions to ensure full information as to the enemy's strength and movements. The Carlist troops in the neighbourhood of Bilbao were far more numerous than had been assumed; and Espartero's division, in attempting to carry out its share of the programme, was completely defeated and driven back into Bilbao. Espartero, brave and rash, always endeavouring to retrieve a loss or a blunder by personal effort and courage, was wounded during the engagement.

Col. Wylde,
Santander,
October 31,
1835.

It was after this misadventure that General Evans finally decided on giving his men a little more training before sending them into action. As the Carlists gave no quarter to legionaries, it was the more necessary to ensure their being able to defend themselves against untimely fate by being able to *win* battles. But circumstances were against the unfortunate Legion from the beginning. It had been arranged that Vittoria should be the head-quarters of the English force during the winter of 1835-36. Orders had been given from Madrid, which had received General Evans' approval, directing that the Legion should march to Vittoria by way of Balmaseda and Villa Cayo; but Cordova, either in ignorance of the enemy's disposition, or in resentment at the interference from Madrid, altered the route to that known as the Durango road. The change was unfortunate, and 5000 of the Legion barely escaped capture. General Evans was exceedingly angry, and it required many interventions on the part of the English Commissioner between him and Cordova, before even a truce was established between them. Cordova had, in the meantime, suffered from troubles in his own force. During a temporary absence of their leader, a mutiny occurred in his army, fomented by the *Sargentos primeros* of two or three battalions—men who, as a rule, were intelligent, entrusted with the interior economy of the companies, discontented from the fact that they rarely obtained promotion to the grade of officer, and without ex-

Col. Wylde,
Bilbao,
October 3,
1835.

ception *exaltados*, or ultra-liberals. It speaks volumes for Cordova's justice, and his popularity among the men, to find it recorded that immediately on his return the mutiny disappeared.

The year 1835 finished somewhat dismally. Colonel Wylde, after restoring peace between General Evans and Cordova, was implored by the latter to proceed to Madrid to impress on Mendizabal the desperate state of the army as to supplies, and the really serious state of the Queen's cause in the provinces. General Evans at the same time desired that the government should be reminded that *he* also had only a few days' supply of money and provisions. During Colonel Wylde's absence, the Legion and Espartero's division entered Vittoria amid the rejoicings of the inhabitants; but the only Christmas offering brought by the English Commissioner from Madrid was a collection of promises, fair and false, from M. Mendizabal.

Col. Wylde,
Madrid,
Nov. 16,
1835.

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
Dec. 11,
1835.

The year 1836 commenced no less gloomily. The headquarters of Cordova's army and of the Legion remained at Vittoria, unable from want of money, artillery, means of transport, and provisions, to take the offensive against the Carlists, who occupied the castle of Guebarra and the country round Salvatierra with a force of some twenty battalions. Owing to the inadequate accommodation in Vittoria, three brigades of the Legion had been pushed forward towards Salvatierra, and established in the surrounding villages; but this had not been done until great mortality had occurred, the Legion being decimated by typhus induced by exposure and want of food. The men had now been two months without pay, notwithstanding the promises of M. Mendizabal; they had been compelled to sleep on the stone floors of convents, used as temporary barracks, without bedding or even straw; to obtain food they sold their clothing and necessaries; and although improved in drill they certainly had fallen off in conduct and organization. As the English Commissioner well said, it was a dangerous experiment to keep young troops without pay, before they had acquired confidence in their officers or in the government they had come to serve. And

Col. Wylde,
Vittoria,
Jan. 13,
1836.

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as the Carlist troops at Guebarra and Salvatierra were well clad and abundantly fed, it is, perhaps, natural to find that from this time desertions were not infrequent from the ranks of the starving legionaries, an additional inducement being offered by Don Carlos in the form of £30 to every mounted soldier of the Legion who should come over with his horse. The irritation among the officers and men of the English force was intensified by the knowledge that their Spanish comrades were receiving greater attention and somewhat more regular supplies, and by the recollection that Cordova had promised General Evans when he brought the Legion from the coast to Vittoria, that they should want for nothing, and should be well lodged. To have 23 officers and 400 men die in less than six weeks from fever and mortification of the extremities, brought on by sleeping on stone floors without covering, and often in wet garments with no means of changing them, in a winter of exceptional severity, with the snow lying deep on the ground, was a bitter fulfilment of the roseate promises held out to tempt General Evans from his comparatively comfortable quarters on the coast.

The only attempt made by Cordova in the beginning of the year to break through the Carlist lines in his front was made on the 16th, and deserves mention for more reasons than one. By all authorities it is agreed that he acted under pressure from Madrid, and by all it is admitted that it was one of those attempts which led to nothing, which caused the loss of the most valuable lives, and which depressed rather than elevated the spirits of the men, after the first flush of asserted victory; because, as the armies at once resumed their former positions, it was evident to every one that nothing had been gained. But there is not the same unanimity of opinion as to details. Cordova made the attack, as will be seen, in three columns, he himself commanding the centre, Espartero the right, and Evans the left. According to some accounts, Cordova was guilty of precipitation in commencing the engagement a day before he had arranged with his colleagues to do so. According to others he retired hurriedly, leaving General Evans uninformed as to his move-

ments, and with his left flank exposed, in the deliberate hope that the English general might suffer a defeat. In other words, he was accused by some of rashness and incapacity, by others of dishonour and treachery. The former accusation sprang doubtless from the jealousy prevailing among the Queen's generals. The latter was suggested by the well-known fact that the relations between Cordova and Evans had been strained to the utmost. It is very fortunate that an account of the affair by an impartial witness has been preserved, as follows:

On the 16th January Cordova advanced his head-quarters on the high road to France, intending to take up a position about two leagues north of Vittoria. Espartero was at the same time directed to move with his division towards Luco, sending a brigade in advance to Villa Real on the Durango road. The English were to move at the same hour from their cantonments on the Salvatierra road to their left, to occupy Arbulo. This disposition was made with the view of a combined attack on the following day, in three columns, on the enemy's position on the heights of Arlaban, a range of mountains on the Guipuscoan frontier, where the Carlists were supposed to have concentrated their forces. Unfortunately, on the advanced guard of Cordova's column arriving at a place called Ulibarri Gamboa, a detachment of the enemy was seen posted in a *venta* some half a mile to the front, from which it was considered desirable to dislodge them. The force sent to do so at first was inadequate; and the Carlists, instead of retiring, continued to reinforce the position. Cordova strengthened the attacking party in turn, and part of it being composed of men from the French Legion, with all their national impetuosity, the enemy was ultimately dislodged, but was pursued with indiscretion too far up the hill until the Christinos found themselves surrounded by superior numbers, and in danger of being cut to pieces. This rendered necessary the advance of more troops in support, and so, without intending it, Cordova found himself early in the afternoon engaged in a serious affair, with only one brigade of Spanish and two French battalions at hand.

Col. Wylde,
Vittoria,
Jan. 18,
1838.

The Carlists were strongly posted on a succession of steep wooded ridges, admirably suited for their mode of fighting; but such was the impetuous gallantry of the Christinos that ridge after ridge was carried, and before dark the highest point had been gained, and the victorious five battalions prepared to bivouac for the night. The conduct of the troops was all that could be desired, but the movement was fatal to the harmony of the concerted action of the three columns; and Cordova erred in not checking the pursuit at its commencement. Early next morning, favoured by a fog, and the ground from the other side sloping more gently up to the crest than from the side towards Vittoria, the Carlists, who had been strongly reinforced during the night, commenced an attack in the hope of recovering their lost ground before Espartero's column could come up. They failed, however; Espartero arrived about one o'clock on the 17th, and the Carlists, as evening approached, commenced retiring towards Onãte. During the night Cordova withdrew his troops to Vittoria and the adjoining villages, having first sent a messenger to advise General Evans of his movements. The message was, however, never delivered, the orderly being unable to penetrate through the bands of Carlists in the interval, and much confusion and subsequent acrimony was the result. The English Legion, especially a battalion of rifles and a Scotch regiment, had fought well, but the losses on either side were not great, not exceeding 300 killed and wounded.

Col. Wylde,
Pamplona,
Feb. 9,
1836.

This engagement was practically a defeat, and Cordova felt it as such. He abandoned any idea which he might have hitherto entertained of occupying the line of the Borunda, of fortifying Salvatierra, or taking Guebarra, and contented himself with strengthening his line of blockade, especially between Miranda and Logroño. He accordingly detached General Evans to Trurino and Espartero to Pena Cerrada, so as to stop the two main roads by which the Carlists in Alava obtained supplies; and on the 29th January Cordova moved his own head-quarters, with the French Legion, from Vittoria to Pamplona, which he reached on the 4th February,

and whence he hoped to open a road to the French frontier, while at the same time by fortifying Zubiri and some adjoining villages he might check Carlist incursions into Aragon.

In the meantime the Carlist activity in the north, especially on the coast, was very great, and it cannot be too frequently repeated that in the eyes of a hesitating peasantry and of most foreign governments activity was always associated with the cause which was *gaining*. From this point of view, the chronic siege of San Sebastian, which was now being carried on by the Carlists under Segastibelza, was politic, although known to be futile; and the capture of numerous small places between San Sebastian and Bilbao, which were incapable of defence, and yet were foolishly garrisoned by Cordova, shed a halo of success over the Carlist cause which was hardly justified by analysis. So grave was the situation, indeed, after the fall of Balmaseda, Mercadillo, Plencia, and Lequitio, that the British Government, more alive than that at Madrid, gave orders to their commodore, Lord John Hay, to lend every assistance with his squadron "for the purpose of protecting from capture those seaports which were still held by the authorities of the Queen, and also with a view to assist in recovering from the rebels any places on the sea-coast which might have fallen into their hands." Balmaseda was useful to the Queen's troops as a magazine and as a *point d'appui* for columns marching to or from Bilbao: and although the other places had no military importance and were merely of use as affording refuge in bad weather to small coasting vessels driven in on their way between Passages and Santander or Bilbao, yet the moral effect of their capture was great, as proving the ability of the Carlists to maintain the offensive. They were able to be active while the Christinos found operations difficult, because the climate near the coast was much milder than on the high ground in the interior. The friendly disposition of the inhabitants also enabled them to transport their artillery leisurely and without escort, all the roads and passes being

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Col. Wyld,
Vittoria,
Feb. 28,
1836.

watched by their own outposts, and the peasantry being ready in case of alarm to afford the means of concealment. Cordova seemed blind to the importance of the Carlist movements on the coast, and devoted himself mainly to covering the line he had taken up between Pamplona and the French frontier, and to affording the people in the Bastan an opportunity of declaring themselves in favour of the Queen. And during all this time the troubles in the North-east were increasing, and pillaging expeditions into Castile were not infrequent. The only bright spot in the picture at the close of February was an apparent improvement in the relations between Cordova and General Evans. The latter had been appointed to the command of the left wing of the army of operations, a force consisting of Espartero's division of fourteen battalions, four battalions of the reserve under Espeleta, and the Legion, making in all about 12,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. This recognition of the English general was wise, and, it is to be hoped, was spontaneous. But the truce was short-lived. Encouraged by the change, General Evans persuaded the English Commissioner to proceed a second time to Madrid with a view to obtaining something better than promises from M. Mendizabal, who was then overwhelmed with political matters which were more to his taste. Colonel Wylde was supported by the English Minister, and obtained a renewal of the old promises. On this occasion he waited to see the fulfilment of the promises, at least in part; and it was well that he did so, for upwards of ten days passed before even half a month's pay was forwarded to the Legion, and it was sent in the form of bills, which were not easy to negotiate at Vittoria. When the second instalment was ultimately sent off it was also in paper, and was short of the proper amount by about £2000. The irritation caused by these proceedings led to complaints from General Evans, which vexed Cordova and caused a renewal of the coldness between him and the English general. Fortunately, at this time, the English commodore, Lord John Hay, a man who was devoured by egotism, incapable of seeing more than one

thing at a time, but a good sailor and a determined man, applied that the English Legion should be sent to the coast to assist in the operations which he himself had undertaken. The request was eagerly granted, and before the beginning of May the English Legion was again established at San Sebastian. During the stay of Colonel Wylde at Madrid, Cordova had again, with no apparent object, concentrated his whole army in and around Vittoria; but not until some affairs on a small scale had given the Legion and the force under Espartero and Espeleta respectively opportunities of displaying considerable gallantry. Espartero's abilities were becoming more prominent, and his courage was securing for him a reputation which was to obtain for him in due time the command-in-chief of the army. Intelligence from the Carlists proved that they were still murdering every foreign mercenary who might fall into their hands, and openly announcing their determination to exclude all such from the benefits of the Eliot Convention.

It was ascertained also that all Cordova's attempts to blockade the insurgent provinces had failed, and that many quite recent incursions had been made into the Queen's loyal territory in search of provisions, and with success.

Col. Wylde,
Madrid,
April 5,
1836.

Before following the movements of General Evans after his arrival in San Sebastian, it may be as well to give in a few words an account of the subsequent doings of Cordova at Vittoria, prior to his resignation of the command. It may be premised that the battalions under his command had attained to a great strength, owing to the arrival of recruits in considerable numbers, obtained under the new laws which had been passed since Mendizabal took office. It would appear that, including the men in garrisons, and the force at San Sebastian, there were no fewer than 110,000 men under Cordova's control during the month of June. With the spring, some decisive action was therefore to be expected of him. Had he taken permanent possession of the valley of the Borunda from Vittoria to Pamplona, with the French Legion occupying the Bastan from Pamplona to Irun, and the English in command of the coast, the war might have

Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
June 30,
1836.

been greatly circumscribed in the northern provinces. The change of ministry which had occurred at Madrid need not have affected the army; and the French Government had shown an exceptional indulgence, which had greatly disheartened the Carlists, in allowing some Christino troops to pass between Pamplona and San Sebastian by way of France. General Evans and the English commodore had commenced their united action with spirit, and were imploring Cordova to co-operate with them, so as to enable Passages, Fuentarabia, and Irun to be taken possession of. How did Cordova avail himself of the boons the gods thus gave him? He first wrote empty promises to General Evans, and then quarrelled with him; he became indignant because Rodil was made Minister of War; he alienated the peasantry still further by directing the crops in and near the Carlist districts to be burnt; he fought one severe and utterly useless engagement, to be mentioned hereafter; he then issued an order to his army, as if inviting attack, telling them that they had need of rest; leaving them under Espartero he himself then went off to Madrid to dabble for a time in politics; returning, he continued his masterly inactivity until August, when his resignation was accepted; and then he left for France, only remaining long enough *en route* at Bayonne to sign the new Constitution, which had been adopted at Madrid, the non-acceptance of which would have possibly *endangered his pension!*

Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
May 19,
1836.

Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
August 8,
1836.

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Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
June 5,
1836.

The one serious engagement referred to was spread over the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of May. He intended to move as on a former occasion from Vittoria on the heights of Arlaban with thirty-two battalions, and if he should succeed in capturing the Carlist position he would then move on Onãte. As this place was untenable in a military point of view, and as he would be unable to obtain more than a few days' provisions, he must have known that he would have to retire again to Vittoria. He was certain in such a case to be harassed by the Carlist leader, Eguia, and to have his retrograde movement described as a flight; and he could not expect to produce any permanent effect on the enemy. The

result quite justified these premises. He succeeded after very severe fighting in repulsing the enemy on the heights of Arlaban, and in destroying their lines both there and in front of Villa Real. He inflicted and he sustained heavy loss: the gallantry of his troops was all that could be desired; but he was obliged to return to Vittoria, the spirits of his troops were not raised, and the Carlists claimed the victory. Nor was it difficult in the face of the facts of the situation to persuade the peasantry that the Carlist claim was a just one.

It only remains in this part of the story to turn to the North-east, and to gather a crumb of comfort from the narrative of the movements of General Evans and the charming Spanish general, Jauregui. The movements were not very startling, but *action* of any sort comes to the student of this epoch in the war's history with a refreshing result. The reader has to imagine a besieged city and a general who felt many calls to break through the surrounding barriers. His plans were many; his hopes were more numerous even than his plans. History is, however, a mosaic of events rather than intentions. General Evans passed the Irumœa river on the morning of the 28th of May, and took possession of Passages. The English commodore with the *Phoenix*, *Salamander*, and *Comet*, co-operated with him in the port of Passages, and the success was attained with little loss and with almost no resistance. The position the victors had secured was retained without difficulty, and owing mainly to the confidence inspired by the presence of Jauregui, the peasants gradually commenced to re-occupy the ground from which they had been driven. The Carlists, however, made more than one attempt to recover the ground they had lost. One was made on the 6th, another on the 9th June; and although these efforts were unsuccessful, they were not deterred from strengthening the positions they then held, with a view to further exertions. The courage and perseverance displayed on both sides were very great; and the endurance and privations were on a *par*. The Carlist force in the immediate front of General Evans was only seven

Col. Wyldo,
San
Sebastian,
May 28,
1836.

Ibid,
June 6,
1836.

Ibid,
June 9,
1836.

Ibid,
June 30,
1836.

battalions, and six companies of Don Carlos's guards. But there were many more available troops at hand. Villa Real was within a day's march with the reserve; and the available force of the Carlists against General Evans was as follows:—41½ battalions, or 21,000 effective men, divided into three divisions, with a reserve; one operating in Navarre under Garcia, the second moving by Estella towards Puente la Reyna, the third under Gomez pursuing a victorious career over the richest of the loyal provinces, and the reserve at Salinas. The disposition of the Carlist forces was favourable to the successful interference of Cordova, but he had not the requisite ability or foresight. Remaining idle himself, he allowed one of his subordinates, Tello, to be defeated by Gomez, while General Evans had to act without any of Cordova's co-operation against a large *enceinture* of Carlist entrenchments round San Sebastian. The force under General Evans in June, 1836, consisted of the following troops:—

9	regiments of the British Legion, numbering	4500
1	battalion Chapel Gorris	400
3	battalions of Zaragoza	1880
2	Light Infantry	1250
1	Oviedo	650
1	Segovia	650
1	Jaen (at Guetaria)	670
Total				<u>10,000</u>

He was always able, also, to reckon on the assistance of 400 men of the Royal Marines, who were borne on the books of Lord John Hay's squadron. As, however, he required at least 5500 of the above for the defence of the lines, his only available troops for active employment amounted to 4900 men, and a regiment of cavalry.

With this force, he did during the summer of 1836 a good deal to enlarge the territory round San Sebastian in the possession of the Queen's troops, and to destroy the nearest of the enemy's works. He probably, by his activity, deterred some of the Carlist forces from acting in other parts of the

North; but it cannot be said that any practical results were very apparent. The Duke of Wellington said with a sneer, that all that Evans had done was to extend the evening promenades of the inhabitants of San Sebastian!

Up to the 12th July, the advantage, although not very great, in the almost incessant fighting round San Sebastian, had been with General Evans; but on that day he made an ill-advised attempt on Fuentarabia, which completely failed, and which produced a very bad effect on the men of the Legion. The retreat was executed with good order, and under somewhat trying circumstances, the heat being excessive; but the failure was keenly felt. It was only ascertained for the first time on arriving before Fuentarabia, that artillery would be required to make a breach, and no guns had accompanied the force. This was one of the usual instances of want of ordinary precaution, which were so common during this war, and it seems quite inexcusable. In his report of the failure to Cordova, General Evans admitted his ignorance of the strength of the place, complaining that the first intimation he received that the enemy had been for two months working at its defences, was on his arrival before its walls. Such an admission speaks volumes for the utter absence of any systematic arrangements for securing information of the enemy's movements. The failure was followed by the appearance of mutiny and disaffection in the Legion, already treated in the special chapter devoted to that body. Before, however, continuing the narrative of San Sebastian, it will be well to allude to the force of *regular* English troops which was gradually drawn into the operations.

And, at the conclusion of this chapter, let the reader pause and consider what was the state of Spain during the period of Cordova's command in the North. It seems incredible, although true, that at a time when rebellion was nearly victorious—when foreign aid was at work to vindicate the claims of the government on the Spanish people—when provinces hitherto loyal were uttering threats of *self-government* and of menace against the parent executive—and when

mutiny, murder, and massacre stalked the land,—the statesmen at Madrid were discussing forms of representation, electoral districts, qualifications of members, and such problems as are suited for the consideration of a nation at peace and with leisure. And with a strange irony, at the very moment when the Cortes was endeavouring to evolve out of its wisdom some new Constitution of 1836, which should salve all the wounds of sensitive reformers, mobs were shouting for the Constitution of 1812, with humorous disbelief in their present statesmen; and half-drunken soldiers were threatening the Queen-regent, unless she would support that form of government, which they admitted that they did not understand, but which they believed would ensure them regular pay and abundant food! Yet it is not for an Englishman, who has studied the same decade in the history of his own country, to scoff at the Spaniards who sought in parliamentary reform the *panacea* for all evils, social and political. During the excitement attending the passing of the English Reform Bill of 1832, it was said by Sydney Smith, that “all young ladies imagined that as soon as it was passed, they would be instantly married; school-boys believed that gerunds and supines would be abolished, and that currant tarts would come down in price; the corporal and the sergeant thought themselves sure of double pay; and bad poets expected a demand for their epics.” There are several classes in a community to whom constitutional reform is especially attractive. The mere office-hunters, the theorists, the thoughtful poor, and the resentful. Madrid abounded in office-hunters; political theorists were not unknown among the middle classes, where a man might venture to play with fire without being consumed; and there were thoughtful men among the Spanish poor, but they either confided their doubts to the priests, or they were satisfied to trust unto the day the evil thereof, and—on rare occasions—to exclaim, “Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!” But the last-named class—the resentful—was more numerous and almost as dangerous as the place-seekers. Centuries of oppression had

made the iron eat into the souls of men, who under a good government would have been law-abiding and law-supporting citizens. With the advent of the young Queen, these men thought the hour had come when they might shriek out their accusations against the past, and sob out their aspirations for the future. The wheels of routine government—like the hours of youthful days—revolved too slowly for such men as these; they felt that they owed to their suffering fathers a great debt, which could only be paid in the form of sweeping, even of reckless change; they looked on the suppression of rebellion as a duty second to the establishment of free government; and they remembered that some half century before, in France, military grandeur followed instead of preceding the awaking of a nation from its sleep of slavery.

This class—the resentful—made Spain re-echo in 1836 with their ignorant cry for the Constitution of 1812, which was their shibboleth for liberty. This class—the resentful—furnished the ready dupes for office-seekers, for rival chiefs, for selfish priests and rabid atheists. The years pass away, but the traditions of old wrongs, and the belief in living ones, linger. This class—the resentful—is the motive power which leads to justice and liberty, but it is also the favourite *pabulum* for demagogues, and the easiest of all classes for place-hunters to manipulate.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY CONTINGENT.

Colquhoun
MSS.
MSS. by
Sir Colling-
wood Dick-
son, K.C.B.,
V.C.

MENTION has been made in the previous chapter of the services on shore at San Sebastian of some Royal Marines belonging to the squadron commanded by Lord John Hay, and allusion also was made to the absence—on one important occasion—of artillery. By the terms of the treaty arranging the Quadruple Alliance, England only undertook to assist the Queen's cause *by sea*, but the government was easily persuaded to allow any aid to be rendered on shore which Lord John Hay could furnish from his ships. The credit of the English arms being once allowed to be at stake by this concession, it was an easy and natural step for the English Government to render further assistance both in the way of men and *matériel*; the only reservation made being that the letter of the treaty, if not its spirit, should be respected by mustering on the books of the squadron the men of the military contingent who were serving on shore. This was done; and Lord John Hay retained, during the war, complete control over the movements and discipline of the few officers and men of the English regular forces who were allowed to take part in the operations on the north coast of Spain.

Although somewhat anticipating matters, the reference to the employment of the English Royal Marines made in the last chapter, makes this a convenient place to describe the additional assistance rendered on land by the English Government, which, although numerically small, yet gives a special interest in this war to the Royal Artillery of England.

It was in November, 1836, that a detachment of two subaltern officers (Lieutenants Bassett and Dupuis*) and thirty-six non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Artillery, under the command of Second Captain J. N. Colquhoun, was sent from England to San Sebastian, and placed under the orders of Lord John Hay for co-operation with the Christino army and the British Auxiliary Legion. Captain Colquhoun was an officer of considerable experience and energy, a good linguist, and possessed of great ingenuity, as evinced by him in a marked manner later in life, when he held an important post in the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. Shortly after the arrival of this detachment, part of it, under Captain Colquhoun and Lieutenant Bassett, was transferred to Portugalete, in the neighbourhood of Bilbao, to assist in the operations for the relief of that city by Espartero, which will form the subject of a subsequent chapter. For his services on this occasion, Captain Colquhoun (who would appear to have already received the local rank of Major) was gazetted Brevet-Major, and received the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In January, 1837, the detachment was increased by a reinforcement from Woolwich, consisting of 60 non-commissioned officers and men under Lieutenants G. Warburton† and Collingwood Dickson.‡ Lient.-Colonel Colquhoun now assumed the command of the whole artillery force serving under Lord John Hay, which, in addition to that mentioned above, included 100 men of the Royal Marine Artillery, officered by Captain Castieau, Lieutenants Clapperton and Parke, and Second Lieutenant Savage.

The arrangement of this little force was as follows: A field battery was formed under the command of Captain Castieau; Lieutenants Dupuis, R.A., and Savage, R.M.A., being in command of half-batteries, the officers and non-commissioned officers being mounted, and the guns (two

* Afterwards General Sir John Dupuis, K.C.B.

† Afterwards Major, and M.P. for Harwich.

‡ Now Lieut.-General Sir Collingwood Dickson, K.C.B., V.C.

light 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers) and waggons being drawn by mules; a mountain battery of four 12-pounder (2 cwt.) mountain howitzers was also organized, manned entirely by the Royal Artillery, (now) Captain Bassett in command, assisted by Lieutenants Warburton and Dickson. Some 12-pounder rockets were supplied to this battery; and a considerable number of the same weapons were supplied to a detachment of Royal Artillerymen under Lieutenant Clapperton, the means of transport being mules. The Reserve Artillery—a small force—manned two 18-pounder guns, under Lieutenant Parke, R.M.A.—the same weight and number of guns as earned, nearly twenty years later, in the Crimea, on the hard-fought field of Inkermann, a great glory for the Lieutenant Dickson whose courage near San Sebastian on more than one occasion was the grateful theme of Colonel Colquhoun's despatches.

These field artillery arrangements did not absolve the officers and men from service, when required, in the garrison batteries. They were detailed for duty on emergency in the various forts which formed the line of defence in front of San Sebastian, in conjunction with the Spanish Artillery and that of the Legion. It may here be mentioned that the Artillery of the Legion had also a field battery of two light 6-pounders, and two 12-pounder howitzers; that the Spanish Artillery had a mountain battery of four guns, and that some guns of position (drawn by bullocks) were kept, as a rule, in the more advanced works of the lines for defensive purposes, and never appeared on any purely field service.

In its due place in this work, reference will be made to the activity of the San Sebastian garrison in March, 1837; but it may be here stated that the conduct of Colonel Colquhoun's force received most favourable mention both from Sir De Lacy Evans and Lord John Hay. In May of the same year, the same force gained much distinction in connection with Espartero's movements; but in the subsequent operations up to the end of 1837, it took but little

share: and after General Evans returned home, and was relieved in the command at San Sebastian by General O'Donnell, the re-organisation of the Spanish troops occupied the latter for a long time before he ventured on some offensive but not brilliant action.

During the year 1838 several minor operations were undertaken from San Sebastian against the Carlists from time to time, in which the Royal and Royal Marine Artillery took part; but they were of no great importance, and were directed principally against the small Carlist towns on the coast in the vicinity of San Sebastian, in order to harass the enemy and intercept supplies coming into these small ports from France. These operations were naval expeditions in which the steamers of Lord John Hay's squadron conveyed troops and mountain artillery, which landed and occupied these places for a short time, capturing and destroying any stores which the enemy had been unable to carry away. In fact, by this time the whole interest of the war was concentrated on Espartero, and the Christino force in and around San Sebastian had been reduced until it was merely sufficient to garrison the places which had been occupied in the Queen's name, and to undertake with the assistance of the British squadron any small operations which might harass the enemy.

This state of affairs continued until the war in the Basque Provinces was put an end to—as will be seen—by the Convention of Bergara in 1839; and in the summer of 1840 the detachments of Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Marine Artillery, and the battalion of Marines, were ordered to England. The following officers of the Royal Artillery were present at various times with the detachment, viz:

Lieut.-Colonel J. N. Colquhoun, in command.	
2nd Captains, Bassett.	Lieutenants, F. Cleaveland.
" Weller.	" C. C. Young.
" Berners.	" J. F. Cator.
" Garstin.	" H. G. Ross.
Lieutenants, J. Dupuis.	" C. Dickson.
" G. D. Warburton.	" F. B. Ward.

Of these, the following received decorations from the Spanish Government, in acknowledgment of their services, viz. :

Lieut.-Colonel Colquhoun	..	Orders of 2nd Class of San Fernando and Commander of Isabella the Catholic.
Captain Bassett	Orders of 1st Class of San Fernando and Knight of Isabella the Catholic.
Captain Berners	Knight of Carlos III.
Lieutenant Warburton	1st Class of San Fernando.

The detachment of Royal Engineers which went from England was under the command of Lieutenants Vicars and Burmester, and did excellent service. Under the designs of these officers nearly all the important field works and redoubts for the defences of the lines of San Sebastian, and of the towns of Hernani, Oyarzun and Irun were planned and constructed, and the thanks of the Spanish Government were more than once conveyed to them. On Lieutenant Vicars' promotion to the rank of Captain, he was made Brevet-Major, and he received from the Spanish Government the knighthood of Isabella the Catholic, and the First Class of San Fernando. Lieutenant Burmester, on attaining the rank of Captain, also was made Brevet-Major for his services in Spain.

The services of the detachment of the Royal Marine Artillery also received frequent acknowledgment from the Spanish Government. Captain Castieau, who had been in immediate command, received promotion to the rank of Brevet-Major, the decoration of the First Class of San Fernando, and the knighthood of Isabella the Catholic. His subalterns, Lieutenants Clapperton and Savage, received the decoration of the First Class of San Fernando.

The connection between the scientific branches of the army of England and the Christino cause in Spain was not, however, confined to the detachments just mentioned. The services of Artillery and Engineer officers extended to delicate diplomatic duties. The reader has already learnt how

much was due to Colonel Wylde, the senior English Commissioner with the Queen's armies, from a diplomatic, historical, and humanitarian point of view. There were many who made him their model—in relations and circumstances which were as delicate and embarrassing, even if not as prominent, as his; and although perhaps chronologically irregular, it may be well now to particularise the officers of Artillery and Engineers whom the British Government sent to the Christiano armies at various times during the war, to perform analogous duties to those imposed so early on Colonel Wylde.

There were three military commissioners, all of them officers of the Royal Artillery, sent by Lord Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary, to keep the English Government well informed as to the transactions in Spain. Colonel Wylde's appointment was the first. His duties were intended at first to be confined to the army in the Basque Provinces; and with him were associated, as assistant commissioners, Lieutenant Lynn, R.E.,* and Lieutenant G. Turner, R.A.† The second commissioner was Colonel Lacy, R.A., who was appointed to the army in Valencia, when Cabrera's movements in that direction began to assume a formidable appearance. He was a very laborious man in details, very conscientious, brave, and, like all brave men, humane; but he lacked statesmanship and liberal views of matters submitted to him. He suffered from the school in which he had been brought up, and which is still open in England to court unwary pupils—the school which teaches that red tape is god and that clerks are his prophets. Colonel Lacy's private correspondence displays a vigour and clear-sightedness which is absent from his official reports. In these latter he evidently strove to reach the standard which long training had taught him was most acceptable to War Office officials; and it is just to his memory to say that he succeeded. The Foreign Office might desire information—the financial authorities demanded

* Now Retired Lieut.-Colonel Lynn.

† Died in Ireland a Brevet-Major.

vouchers. Urgency might at times interfere with the supply of the former; nothing was allowed by the gallant commissioner to prevent the rendering, in as copious a form as clerkdom could desire, of the latter. Colonel Lacy had done gallant service in his long and honourable career. He possessed marked ability and sterling integrity, and he lived to display these qualities after the Spanish War of Succession had come to an end. But he had accepted clerkdom at its own price; he sought to propitiate it by multiplied documents; and when too late he found that the feet of his idol were of clay, and that there was a grander object of worship which had been hid from him by the officious entity which had demanded his reverence. Colonel Lacy was not singular; nor have the circumstances to which in short-sighted loyalty he succumbed, failed forty years later to surround men who gasp for breathing-room, and who resent the stamping out of their individuality. When Colonel Lacy was first appointed, he took with him as assistant commissioners Captain M. Williams, R.E.,* and Lieutenant E. Crofton, R.A.; † but having been taken prisoners by the Carlists on their way to Madrid, and compelled to promise not to serve against Don Carlos, they were ordered home and replaced by Captain Alderson, R.E., ‡ and Lieutenant Askwith, R.A. § The former of these was invaluable as an engineer adviser, accurate as a describer, brave as a soldier, and never idle in his labours. Of Lieutenant Askwith it has been said by a contemporary, || who was well able to judge, that "he played a distinguished part in the war. . . . He was much distinguished for his gallantry and ability, and was wounded in 1840 by a musket ball in the shoulder." It may be added that he also had a horse shot under him. In addition to recognition of his services by the Spanish Government, Lieutenant Askwith, on reaching the rank of Captain was made Brevet-

* Afterwards General and Colonel-Commandant.

† Died at Malta, Colonel on the Staff.

‡ Afterwards Colonel.

§ Now Lieut.-General W. H. Askwith, R.A.

|| Sir Collingwood Dickson, V.C., K.C.B.

Major, and in due course of time received, as general officer, the much-coveted reward for distinguished services. The third commissioner was Colonel Edward Michell, R.A.,* an officer of Peninsular experience, of marvellous genius and of winning disposition, who was appointed to the Army of Catalonia in August, 1839, with Major G. Du Plat, R.E.,† and Lieutenant Collingwood Dickson‡ (from Colonel Colquhoun's force), R.A., as assistant commissioners. The abilities of these assistants, and the daring courage of the latter on more than one occasion, are matters of history.

The duties performed by these military commissioners were not done *au pied de la lettre* of their instructions. They exceeded them when they could aid the cause of humanity. They used the sword as well as the pen, when it could aid the cause of their country's allies. They were proof of the value of straightforwardness and single-mindedness in diplomacy; for they were always believed. But to the historian, these commissioners have a special value. The writing between the lines in the story of this war comes from them; and in civil war such supplementary information is most valuable. Men who write history have a bad habit of only discussing proper names, and events written in capital letters. This is not so much owing to hero-worship or idolatry, as to the necessity of producing a vertebrate instead of an invertebrate book. And yet in civil war how little of the heroism and suffering is written in capitals; what pages upon pages of endurance and courage will be found in the smallest of type, in cottages, villages, and in back streets, where hunger and cold have hardly left room for the conception of other evils! One is obliged to attach the story of the war to such men as Mina, Espartero, and Cabrera: and yet not one tithe of the *practical* story of the war will be gleaned thus, that will speak from one of

* Died in Jaffa as Brigadier-General in command of British Forces in 1841.

† Died at Vienna in 1855, Brigadier-General and Military Commissioner during the Crimean War.

‡ Now Sir Collingwood Dickson, K.C.B., V.C.

the many faded letters yet extant that were written by commissioners who had eyes but no bias—who had sympathy but no prejudice. From the many tales thus learned let the reader be told one.

A considerable exchange of prisoners had been arranged between the Army of the Centre and part of Cabrera's force. Knowing well that the Carlists were but indifferent hosts to their prisoners, one of the English Commissioners* purchased some food and wine, and, proceeding to the place where the exchange was to be effected, spread on the fair hill-side, in the fulness of his heart, a tempting banquet to await the released prisoners. Presently as he stood, there appeared a long column of prisoners. And what a sight it was! Dead men galvanised into unreal life would have been a cheerful picture compared with these starved wretches. Their skin, almost black, was tightened across their faces until these looked like painted skulls; their forms were crouching in apathy, and yet at times quickened on the rough road with pain; they were silent and seemingly listless, but their eyes had the appearance of looking into the distance, as if in search of the country where suffering is unknown. As they drew near, the commissioner hurried forward to the ghastly groups, and invited them to partake of the repast he had spread. Some Spanish *punctilio* forbids the acceptance of a stranger's invitation in such a way, and with hungry eyes and quivering lips, the poor starved creatures bowed their acknowledgments, and murmured a stately refusal, although they had fifteen weary miles yet to travel. Bewildered, he repeated his invitation, but with like result; then appreciating their motives, he mounted and rode away. He had not ridden many yards ere, turning round, he saw the famished crowd fling themselves on the ground, gnawing and worrying the food like starved dogs, each man as he tore at his own morsel glaring ravenously also at that of his neighbour.

The gaoler and the captive had been Spaniards alike; it was civil war; and the Gospel of Christ had been preached for 1800 years.

* Lieutenant Askwith, R.A.

For such incidents as these, as well as the main events of the war, are we indebted to the narratives of the English Commissioners. It is true that the main events constitute the framework or skeleton of history; but one requires the flesh and blood, the features and expression, to clothe the skeleton of a man, before one can guess even approximately at his true character.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MOCKING MARCH OF GOMEZ.

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THE expedition of Gomez from the provinces towards Madrid in the summer of 1836, makes a suitable link between the command of the Queen's armies by Cordova and the assumption of that office by Espartero. Gomez had been chief of Zumalacarreguy's staff in the Carlist army, and was an able and gallant general. The expedition he commanded and controlled was dictated, it is said, by Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia, and by these powers the sinews of war are said to have been found. Gomez performed his task admirably. In the language of a contemporary and impartial historian, "He marched twice across the kingdom, "pursued and surrounded by armies greater than his own; "and, although encumbered by prisoners and plunder, he "disappointed all their combinations, and found safety in "the most desperate circumstances by his vigilance and "activity, bringing back with him almost the whole of his "troops, and by far the greater part of his booty." It was in the end of June that he commenced his operations, bearing a likeness to the more recent movements of General Sherman during the American Civil War. He commenced with a force of 7000 men, and his marvellous activity can be judged by the following skeleton account of his campaign. Leaving Orduna on the 26th June, he marched first westwards to the Asturias, encountering the first opposition at Reynosa, in the Santander mountains. The force which he encountered was, however, inferior in numbers, being about 3000 strong, and was easily routed. As soon as Cordova had heard of

Gomez' movements, he had despatched Espartero with a considerably larger force in pursuit. The latter general was, however, quite unable to keep pace with Gomez, who reached Oviedo on the 7th July, obtaining easy possession, and thence proceeded across the Minho to Galicia, entering Santiago, its capital, in the middle of July, followed at an interval generally of a day or two's march by Espartero. The Christino general was confident that he would overtake Gomez if he attempted to re-cross the Minho, but was disappointed. He had a skirmish with his rear-guard, which was exaggerated into a victory at Madrid, but Gomez got back in perfect safety and with all his booty into the Asturias. Encouraged by his success in this first march, the Carlist leader commenced a second in a very few days, and in the middle of August he entered Castile, moving in the direction of Aragon. There was great alarm in the capital, and many defensive precautions were taken by the new Minister of War, General Rodil. In the course of arranging a force to cover Madrid against the advance of Gomez, a force of some 1200 Christinos, under a general called Lopez, was caught by Gomez, completely routed, and the leader captured. This occurred within a day's march of Madrid, and shows the daring of the Carlist chief, and the confidence he entertained in the presence of sympathisers in the metropolis. After this combat Gomez proceeded through Cuenca to the borders of Lower Aragon, and was reinforced *en route* by various roving bands, including some under the now famous Catalonian chief, Cabrera, whose character and exploits will receive detailed study hereafter. Cordova had in the meantime been succeeded in the command of the Army of the North by Espartero, who was therefore under the necessity of entrusting to another, Alaix, the task of following the swift-footed Gomez. The movements of this rash but successful Carlist were bewildering. He seemed to despise all the ordinary laws of warfare, to wander away from his base of communications to distant places whither chance or the prospect of booty led him, and to be utterly indifferent to the fact that hostile columns were moving in between him

and his base, and that fresh enemies were rising round him every mile he marched through a country where the Carlist cause was believed to have no hold. The audacity of his movements contributed to his success; it was believed by trembling citizens, at whose gates he stood, that he must have behind him some other force on whose co-operation he could depend; and, as they trembled, they opened their gates and their purses, and swelled the long train of plunder which followed in the wake of the ever-victorious Gomez. On the 7th September we find him plundering in Utiel; in a few days he is before Reguena, just keeping ahead of Alaix with his greater numbers; on the 16th, still marching on boldly towards Murcia and Andalusia, he took the town of Alvacete; on the 18th he turned towards Castile, which he entered at Roda, but carefully avoided a general action with the superior force pursuing him; on the 20th his rear-guard was overtaken by the advanced cavalry of Alaix on the frontiers of La Mancha, and a trifling engagement which took place was magnified as usual at Madrid into a wonderful victory, in the hope of luring foreign capitalists to lend money yet once again to the government. Gomez then marched openly, and for a time unpursued, into the heart of Andalusia, crossed the Sierra de Segura, and entered the Province of Jaen on the 23rd of September. Nor was he in any way opposed by the national guards, "those valiant "setters-up and pullers-down of constitutions." On the 27th he crossed the Guadalquivir at Anduyar, and took possession of the city of Cordova on the 1st October. He had distanced his pursuers at this time by a week, and had leisure to secure in Cordova plunder to the amount of £200,000. The alarm was universal by this time in the part of Spain which was threatened with a taste of what was almost chronic in the North; and the reproaches hurled by the Madrid press at the War Department were loud and fierce. Arrangements were hurriedly made to seal the fate of Gomez, which seemed certain to succeed. Rodil himself advanced against the Carlists from the North; Alaix pressed on from the East; the Captain-General of Andalusia was posted

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between Seville and Cordova ; and from the South, Escalante was advancing with the national guards of Malaga. The last-named was the first to encounter Gomez, but the issue was speedily decided against the Christinos, who were utterly routed. Gomez now returned to Cordova, pursued by Alaix, and thence continued in a northern direction, hoping to cross the Tagus in spite of Rodil. On his way he took the rich city of Almaden with ease, and enriched his force with arms and ammunition. With rapid movements he anticipated Rodil, crossed the Guadiana on the 26th October, and on the following day took possession of Guadalupe, a small town. Marvellous as was the success of Gomez as yet, the way of his escape was not yet apparent. The crossing of the Tagus was forbidden by the forces under Rodil and Alaix. These generals were quarrelling, but they were there. Another Christino general, Narvaez, with some 5000 men, had also taken the field, and was displaying the energy and activity of a new candidate for power. The situation of Gomez, hemmed in by some 15,000 or 20,000 men, was perilous. Annual Register. "He was cut off from the Tagus on the North, Portugal "hemmed him in on one side, and the Guadiana, defended "by superior forces, on the other. He adopted the only "alternative which remained to him, and resolved to return "to Andalusia, while all the three armies pursued him." Crossing rapidly the Guadiana and Guadalquivir, he reached on the 13th November, now with a four days' start over Rodil, Eciija, a point between Seville and Cordova. The direction of the armies in pursuit was now taken, at the dictation of public opinion, from Rodil, and given to Ribero. As if courting disaster, Gomez still pressed to the South, almost to Gibraltar, pursued by Ribero, Alaix, and Narvaez ; but he was watching his opportunity, and by admirable strategy he succeeded in evading Ribero, and in forcing the line near Narvaez' position, with considerable loss, but in so thorough a manner that from the moment he turned to retrace his steps to the North, his movements were practically unfettered. He was much assisted by the dissensions among the Christino generals ; and "on the 17th December he

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“crossed the Ebro near Ona, and reached the head-quarters
“of Don Carlos.”

So much for the bare narrative of this brilliant, if irregular, expedition. How was its fitful career viewed by the dispassionate mind of the English Commissioner with the Queen's army in the North?

For some time even Colonel Wylde was misled by the fictions generated by Madrid politicians, and believed that a natural destiny was dogging the heels of the rash Gomez. His mind was also so concentrated on matters connected with the Legion, that it was not until the autumn was well advanced that he attached any importance to the meteor-like movements of the apparently insane Carlist general. So thoroughly was the loyalty of the district in the neighbourhood of Madrid believed in by the English Government, that it seemed to be madness for a Carlist leader to appear there, unless in very superior force. The dissensions in Madrid which reached such a pitch in 1836, were expected to disappear in presence of the national enemy; and the appearance of Gomez at the gates of Madrid would, it was believed, weld all classes into a harmony of action and thought before which he would be swept away. Spain, is alas! not the only country in which, on emergencies, party has proved stronger than patriotism; but not the less must the fact be chronicled that in Madrid, in the autumn of 1836, conflicting politicians lost in the shrillness of their own scolding the sound of national danger, and merely raked in all the crumbs of official comfort which they could find. They failed to regard the cloud which was threatening the very existence of that government beneath whose table they were gathering these crumbs.

Faith supports an individual in his troubles; without faith in its rulers, a nation faces danger with a consciousness of weakness which has already sounded the note of surrender. But in Spain there was something worse than this absence of faith. Faith may to some natures be impossible, especially to natures which are devoured by egotism. But honesty and loyalty are qualities which can be enforced by men on them-

selves, even where they are not spontaneous; and which in times of great danger are practised from considerations of policy. The policy which would induce men to strengthen the hands of their representatives in critical times was unknown in Madrid at the time now discussed; and while the enemy was at the gate, there were politicians in Madrid who were studying *not* how to meet and defy him, but how best to make capital out of his presence—even out of his successes.

The truth reached the English in San Sebastian at length, and like all evil intelligence which has been kept back or tortured into good, it fell all the more severely when concealment was impossible. The same pen which gladly related how Gomez had plunged into a bottomless quagmire of difficulty, had to record that he succeeded in making a *promenade* of victory and plunder through Spain, and had laughed at all the generals who had been sent in pursuit of him. Worse even than this was the task imposed on that pen of narrating the dissensions among the leaders who should have shown to those under them an example of unselfishness, harmony, and obedience. Conceive a soldier full of all true soldierlike feeling having to pen such words as these, of men occupying high positions in the army to which he was attached, and with whose labours he was in sympathy. “Alaix is in Vittoria; Narvaez is still far off; and from what has occurred between these two chiefs, it is in vain to look for any union of their forces. . . . It is totally impossible in the present state of the Spanish army to calculate upon military operations. . . . Espartero intends bringing Alaix before a council of war; and, if he refuses to appear, will shoot him—he says—through the head on the spot, let the risk be to himself what it may; and he is perfectly capable of putting his threat into execution.”

Col. Wyld,
Bilbao,
Dec. 29,
1836.

Ibid.
San
Sebastian,
Sept. 18,
1836.

There were, however, distracting events at the headquarters of the Army of the North, which made the English Commissioner less alive to the march of Gomez. It was difficult for him to ascertain who was the responsible

Commander-in-chief; and yet it was very necessary for him to have some responsible man to consult in reference to the Legion, and to cases coming under the Eliot Convention. After Cordova, Saarsfield was supposed to be the General-in-chief, and he acted as such; but his known political opinions prevented the confirmation of his appointment. His loyalty was not doubted, and he continued to hold a responsible although subordinate command. But if political opinions are once admitted as an ingredient in the selection of a general, no shade can be too fine to form an excuse for acceptance or rejection. In fact, so ignorant were most men as to the niceties of political opinion—the exact points of political *creeds*, which in Spain rejoiced in the sounding name of *constitutions*—that had the colour of a man's hair been believed to be associated with the views of another party, it would have been sufficient to ensure for him from his political opponents a professional ostracism. The bud of the same bigotry, which has blossomed in America into an unblushing recognition of political over professional merit, exists in not a few countries in Europe. When a man is in danger of his life, he does not ask the politics of his physician: and, happily, when a nation is in peril, it turns its back on political generals, and kneels—often with too blind a faith—before those who can claim to have made war a profession. The vice which recognizes political over professional claims, is the rust which grows on a form of government during the piping times of peace. In the friction of a nation's agony, the rust disappears. But in Spain the political and the professional generals were one and the same. The professional experiences had not been very great; and the nation had as yet had no opportunity of comparing one with another. At the commencement of the war, all the candidates had about equal professional claims; the way to promotion lay therefore through the school of experience or that of politics. To an impatient man the former is somewhat slow; to all men who have once sat on however humble a form, the latter school is beyond measure fascinating. The Spanish generals before Espartero found

this to be so; even Espartero, after his work was done, found himself infected with the familiar Spanish fever. Rodil might have had the place denied to Saarsfield, had his politics not been so pronounced. Cordova might have had another opportunity, had his political creed been a virgin page. To his having as yet shown no violent political feeling, combined with the fact that the list of eligible candidates had been reduced considerably by the mocking march of Gomez, did Espartero owe the promotion he now obtained to the command of that Army of the North with which he was to terminate the war.

It is easy to be wise after the fact; and the selection of Espartero proved certainly wise and happy. But what were his *à priori* claims? Was he a heaven-born genius, or did he grow in ability with his opportunities and trials? It is no disparagement, but rather an honour, to say that the latter is a more correct description of the victorious Espartero, Count of Luchana and Duke of Vittoria. His appointment was viewed at first with concern and regret by the English Commissioner, who was ultimately his admirer and friend. "Espartero," he wrote, "has been named Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the North—a most unfortunate choice for the Queen's cause, and for the Legion, to which he is by no means well disposed." And later, he wrote: "Espartero is brave, but he is vacillating." The reader will have an opportunity of seeing how this general conquered the good opinions of those who at first were somewhat prejudiced against him.

In the meantime, in Madrid, Mendizabal was proving himself as much the superior of his rival, Isturitz, in political strategy, as he was of most of his contemporaries in bodily stature.

Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
Sept. 29,
1836.

CHAPTER X.

RAISING THE SIEGE OF BILBAO.

A CHAPTER of accidents, a chapter of courage—a time of vacillation, and yet a time of marvellous fortune in a brave general's life—a ray of light in a dull sky—an ambitious wave rising out of a grey sea, and courting the brightness of the lighthouse of public interest;—all these are fit similes by which to illustrate the successful raising by Espartero of the Carlist siege of Bilbao. It was not merely the first great milestone on the road of ultimate Christino success, but it also determined beyond question the man who was to make that success certain. From this time the public eye looked on a general whose growing influence and rapidly-developing military skill checkmated even the intriguers of Madrid, whom he treated with scorn. With the dash and chivalry of a Rupert, Espartero possessed also Cromwell's scorn for political charlatans, and the great Roundhead's contemptuous treatment of a silly and moribund Parliament found a parallel in many of Espartero's communications with the successive governments at Madrid. Perhaps his power was most apparent in his daring on one occasion to defy the unreasonable impatience of the politicians to whom a success in the field might mean a fresh lease of office, in order that he might give to his crude army some months of training for its final efforts, much as General MacLellan did with the American troops after the disaster of Bull's Run. Inconsistent as this hesitation in the field or this painstaking discipline with raw troops may have been with his own fiery nature, they were doubtless

made endurable to him by the reflection that he was not merely acting prudently, but was also filling with confusion those place-seekers in Madrid to whom generals and soldiers and battles were only so many figures in a calculation, not for saving Spain, but for swelling their incomes.

At the date of this chapter—as has been shown—Espartero had come to the surface, not so much by his own merits—certainly not so much by any brilliant successes—as by something analogous to the process of exhaustion. On the 21st October, 1836, he was at Haro, and obtained two or three days later intelligence that the Carlists had laid siege to Bilbao with some eighteen pieces of artillery. He at once pressed forward to Villa Cayo, where he halted on the 28th to enable the troops scattered about the adjoining valleys to assemble and be formed into a reserve for the force with which he proposed to advance to the relief of Bilbao. His united force would then amount to no more than 9000 men, and to obtain this he had left the *whole line of the Ebro, from Lodosa to Miranda, without a single battalion for its defence.* The urgency of the situation in Espartero's mind must therefore have been very great. He directed his force to occupy the villages between Villa Santa and Villa Lazara, on that high road to Balmaseda by which he intended to advance on Bilbao. But his plans received a speedy change. On his arrival at Villa Lazara he learnt that Don Carlos had held a council of war at Durango on the 24th October, when it was arranged that Villa Real should lead another expedition into Castile, accompanied by a plenipotentiary, if not by Don Carlos himself; and that if the siege of Bilbao should induce Espartero to march to its relief, his arrival at Balmaseda should be the signal for the departure of the expedition. It was a wise strategical act; but, instead of falling into the trap, Espartero delayed his march and sent word to General Evans at San Sebastian explaining the situation and urging him to take individual measures for the relief of Bilbao. This unexpected action of Espartero led the Carlists to raise the siege for a time, and this concluded what may be called the first act in the drama. But there

Col. Wylde,
San
Sebastian,
Nov. 6,
1836.

Fifteen
battalions
and two
squadrons.

Off San-
tona :
Col. Wyldc,
Nov. 19,
1836.

was great cause for anxiety. In the North at this season there was a bad climate, and the forces of the Christinos had been weakened by detaching into Castile and Aragon no less than forty-two battalions and eight squadrons during the past seven months. The theatre of active operations which it had been hoped would have been with Rodil in the former province, soon drifted back to the North with the retreating forces of Sanz, which, in one sense, *happily* released six other battalions for Espartero. On the 9th November news arrived that the siege of Bilbao was renewed, and Espartero moved forward at once to raise it, marching towards Balmaseda and Portugalete, to the latter of which places a stock of provisions had been sent for the army by the merchants of Santander, in reply to an urgent appeal by Espartero. The weather at this time was violent and most unfavourable, the arrival of succour and provisions by sea, even as far as Portugalete, seemed almost impossible, the anchorage of the brigs along the coast and in the Bay of Bilbao was most unsafe, and the besieged city—with only a few days' provisions on hand—was more completely cut off than ever by a number of small Carlist successes at the outposts. Espartero's army had, it is true, increased to nearly 18,000 men, but Villa Real, having abandoned his Castile expedition for the time, was strongly posted at Somorostro with eighteen battalions, prepared to dispute the Christino advance on Portugalete.

On the 20th November Espartero reached Castro with 14,000 men; but finding that Villa Real had destroyed the bridge at Somorostro and thrown up intrenchments on the opposite bank, he did not feel warranted in attempting to force the position, and saw no way to relieving Bilbao unless he were able to transport his troops to Portugalete by sea. With much difficulty and with the assistance of boats from the English men-of-war he succeeded in landing at Portugalete some 4000 men on the night of the 23rd, and by degrees during the succeeding three days he transported the whole force, and to his great surprise did so without firing a shot.

ON the 27th November he commenced his first advance on Bilbao from Portugalete. He decided on moving by the left or west bank of the Bilbao river, which is intersected by the rivers Galindo and Salcedon. Over the first his passage was effected without opposition by means of a bridge of boats, and the enemy was quickly dislodged from the heights intervening between the two rivers; but as he retired he burnt the convent of Barcena and destroyed the chain-bridge over the Salcedon. The only way now left for crossing the latter river was over a narrow bridge higher up at Castrejuna, and by a bad ford near it, where the opposite bank was steep and wooded to the water's edge. The Carlists had made a *tête-du-pont*, and had filled the wood with skirmishers, but there was no reason to doubt that the Christinos, flushed with success, would have carried all before them and probably marched straight into Bilbao.

Col. Wylde,
Portu-
galete,
Nov. 29,
1836.

But the second act of the drama met with an abrupt and disappointing ending. One of those strange moments of hesitation to which Espartero was subject now occurred. It may possibly have been owing to a sudden spasm of that painful illness from which he suffered at times exquisite, although passing torture, but the result for the time was fatal to a most promising operation. His first excuse—so unlike him in his better hours!—was the lateness of the evening; but next morning, without any excuse at all, he withdrew his forces back to Portugalete, destroying the bridge over the Galindo as he passed. The English Commissioner, Colonel Wylde, was sorely exercised when this movement commenced. He endeavoured by every argument in his power to dissuade Espartero: he even offered to bring up the carronades of H.M.S. *Saracen* to cover the passage of the Salcedon, but without success. A vexed, semi-mutinous army took the place of the gallant troops of the previous day, and they were allowed without reproof wantonly to plunder and destroy, as they retreated, the village of Baracalda, much of which belonged to the Queen's supporters in Bilbao. With the Carlists yelling after and harassing them as they retired to Portugalete, they ended the second act of

the drama in a way which boded the imminent demoralization of the whole force.*

The theory that a sudden spasm of his illness caused this painful retreat is borne out by the fact that Espartero had barely reached Portugalete before a sudden reaction set in, and he could hardly be prevented from at once commencing to have a bridge thrown that very night across the main Bilbao river, abreast of the Desierto, where it is over 300 yards wide, in order that he might advance on Bilbao by the right or east bank.

Col. Wyld,
Bilbao
river,
Dec. 1,
1836.

The endeavour to carry out this last-mentioned scheme constituted the third act of the drama. At daylight on the 1st December, 1836, Espartero, having crossed from Portugalete to Algorta, a village immediately opposite, by a bridge of boats on the previous day, moved forward with his whole force by the right bank. The weather had become even more unfavourable than before, and the Carlists were crowding across the Banderas mountains in front, with the evident intention of disputing the passage of the Asna, the only stream which intersected the right bank between Algorta and Bilbao. The only cheering fact was the news of a successful sally from Bilbao on the previous day, by means of which the suburb of St. Augustin and the Convent of La Concepcion had been recovered from the enemy. The advance of the Christino forces had not got beyond the village of Erandio, when symptoms of wavering again became apparent in Espartero's mind, and the night of the 2nd December found his army cantoned in Erandio and the neighbouring villages. Rumours had reached him that the Carlists had withdrawn their heavy artillery from before Bilbao; and, fearing that it might be intended for use in disputing his advance, he resolved to wait for the arrival of part of the reserve from Villa Cayo. Should the advance ever take place, there were two ways by which it might be effected: either by turning the head of the Asna, and moving forward by the Plencia road—the method secretly

* Espartero's losses on the 27th and 28th amounted to 300 men.

favoured by Espartero himself; or by crossing the Asna at its mouth, and proceeding along the heights of San Domingo, which run almost parallel to the river. The latter plan was strongly urged by the English Commissioner, who was consulted by Espartero, and it was approved by a council of war; the main objection (want of artillery to cover the making of a bridge under the enemy's fire) having been removed by Colonel Wyld undertaking, with the consent of the English naval officer in command of the *Saracen*, to land all the ship's guns for the purpose.

At last, then, the relief of Bilbao seemed at hand. On the night of the 3rd December, 10 out of 13 heavy guns of the *Saracen* had been transported on sledges by English seamen and a battalion of Spanish guards, and concealed close to the spot where on the following night the battery was to be erected which was to command the passage of the river. The reserve was expected within a few hours; all arrangements had been thoroughly completed; there was an admirable spirit among the Spaniards, and the English were excited by the prospect of combat. Captain (locally Lieut.-Colonel) Colquhoun, of the Royal Artillery, had been despatched to San Sebastian to obtain from Lord John Hay guns and artillerymen; and Lieutenant Vicars, of the Royal Engineers, was on the spot to afford technical assistance during the construction of the bridge across the Asna. If certainty can ever be assumed in military operations, it might have been with regard to the events which were to follow the 4th December, 1836, in front of Bilbao. But about twilight on that day ominous whispers began to be heard, and ugly rumours reached the advanced posts of the Christinos on the Asna. Espartero, it was said, had again changed his mind. Some miserable captain of infantry had deserted, and it was feared had carried information to the enemy, which would divulge the secret of the hidden guns and stultify all the cherished plans. Positively with no other ostensible reason than this, Espartero on the 5th retired all his troops from the villages in the plain, and bivouacked them during the 6th and 7th on the heights of

Aspe, abreast of the *Saracen*, while another bridge of boats was being thrown across the Bilbao river about a quarter of a mile below the Desierto. The bridge at Portugalete, by which they had crossed on the 30th November, had been dashed to pieces by the wind and the swell. On the evening of the 7th the whole army recrossed without molestation, the bridge was broken up, and the east side of the river left in undisputed possession of the Carlists.

There was much muttering by the camp-fires, much discontent expressed even by the patient Spanish soldier, much marvel at the apparent timidity of the general, who was known to have the courage of a lion. The most feasible solution was that the same sense of responsibility which had crushed so many other brave soldiers, had proved too much for the general who had yet to earn his spurs as a strategist, or even as a tactician on any extended scale. Away in the beleaguered city, where information was scant, speculation was rife and despair imminent. Were they to be abandoned to their fate? Had some other Carlist force cut Espartero's communications and left him between two fires? There were dismal hours during these operations both before and after, but depression reached its greatest point on the evening of the 7th, when in the camp there was no confidence in the general, and in the city there was a haunting fear.

The fourth and penultimate act of the drama resembled in most respects the second. Espartero resolved again to advance by the left or west bank of the Bilbao river, but his attempt was foiled by a series of misadventures. On the 8th December the bridge which he had again thrown across the Galindo was destroyed during the night by the wind and the land flood; and it was not until the 12th that he was able to cross, driving the Carlists before him and across the Salcedon with the same ease as on the former occasion. On the 13th and 14th, over a country almost impassable, owing to incessant rain, it was attempted to bring up the guns of the *Saracen* to place in battery at Barcena, and to transport pontoons and boats to form a bridge across the

Salcedon under cover of the artillery fire. The attempt failed; first, owing to an effective play of two Carlist guns on the spot where the battery was to be constructed, completely preventing the sappers from working; and secondly, owing to an insufficient supply of sound pontoons being forthcoming, and the utter impossibility of bringing up the heavy country boats over the sodden roads. While the propriety of taking ground to the right, and again attempting to cross by the small bridge and ford at Castrejána, was under consideration, alarm was caused by a reconnaissance in force made by the Carlists, which was mistaken for an attempt to turn Espartero's right. The Carlists were easily repulsed, but at a hasty council of war which was summoned, it was decided by a majority of 9 out of 13 to fall back again upon Portugalete. The retreat was effected, the Carlists following in hot pursuit; on the 16th the rear guard crossed the Galindo, and the bridge was again broken up. The army bivouacked under the guns of the Desierto, and so ended the fourth act.

It seems impossible to over-estimate the quiet courage and discipline of the Spanish troops under circumstances so depressing as those above stated. There were hours of irritation, of discontent, of almost open murmuring; but the duties were performed with readiness, with punctuality, and in a true soldier-like spirit. The troops of hardly any other nation would have endured such a test. The circumstances, it must be remembered, included more than defeat, more than discomfort not unlike that of the French after Moscow, or in the trenches in the Crimea, or of the Germans round Paris; for it must not be forgotten that the Spanish commissariat was the worst conceivable, and the climate in the north of Spain most trying; but all these were difficulties such as soldiers have surmounted in other armies. The crucial test was the growing distrust in their general, and such a test is one which neither French nor English soldiers could have stood so well. That this patience and this quiet discipline had their reward will be apparent from the study of the fifth and last act of the drama.

Col. Wylde,
off Desi-
erto,
Dec. 22,
1836.

On the 17th December Espartero, meditating a new method of attack by moving round by Balmaseda, signalled to Bilbao, asking whether it could hold out for the ten or twelve days requisite for this new movement, and received the spirited reply: "Bring your army to the Asna, and you shall know our answer." Happily, on the same day, Colquhoun with eight howitzers, a detachment of Royal and Royal Marine Artillery, and a considerable supply of money and stores, arrived from Santander and San Sebastian; so, encouraged by these reinforcements, and fired by the challenge from Bilbao, Espartero, declaring that he would rather perish than not raise the siege, issued a stirring address to his army, and commenced determined preparations for his final efforts. Before the 23rd another pontoon bridge had been made across the river near the Desierto; Luchana bridge was to be fortified, and a pontoon bridge prepared for laying between Luchana and the village of Asna; and the cheering intelligence had arrived that on the 17th Alaix had arrived at Oña with 5000 men, that Narvaez with an equal number was expected at Vittoria on the 19th, and that three battalions of the reserve had probably reached Portugaleta on the night of the 22nd. Colquhoun had also opened fire from his howitzers against the most advanced of the enemy's batteries near the old and ruined bridge of Luchana, and had met with marked success. The moment had arrived for the final attack; any further delay might enable fresh troops to arrive and to share—perhaps to claim—the victory.

Col. Wylde,
Bilbao,
Dec. 25,
1836.

It was Christmas Eve, and the snow was falling thickly. Favoured by the storm, at about 4 p.m., eight picked companies were embarked in launches and rafts opposite the Desierto, and were towed up the main river by the crews of the English men-of-war *Saracen* and *Ringdove*, under Captain Lapidge and Lieutenant le Hardy. Protected by the fire of four Spanish gun-boats and of Colquhoun's howitzers, and almost concealed by the falling snow, they pushed on past the enemy's most advanced battery, and landed in its rear. The Carlists at once abandoned both the battery and their intrenchment on the broken bridge of

Luchana, being completely taken by surprise. While the engineers were repairing the bridge, the rafts were moored alongside, to enable the battalions of the main body to press forward. On crossing, they at once deployed, and advancing to the heights leading to the Banderas, captured them before the Carlists could gather sufficient force to prevent it. The position was, however, too important to lose quietly. At 9 p.m. a desperate attempt was made to recapture them, which was very nearly successful. It was repeated several times during the night, and there were hours of hard fighting, but they were unavailing, and there was a moment of sullen Carlist quiescence.

Then, with all the latent fire of his nature blazing forth, throwing off all the considerations of strategy and responsibility, and policy, which had been for weeks stifling and binding him, Espartero, in the old light in which his men knew and worshipped him, came forward. Placing himself at the head of two battalions, and pointing to a three-gun battery of the enemy's, and to the heights and fort of Banderas, he said that they must be taken at the point of the bayonet. It required no burning words to cheer them, no eloquent appeals to coax them to the combat; it was enough to look at Espartero, and ten times the number of Carlists would not have made them hesitate. Revelling in the prospect before him, his eyes sparkling and his colour heightened as he found himself in a place and character which he understood, he *inspired* the men whom he led. The enemy broke before the resistless onset, and from this moment the flight commenced to be general.

The main body retreated by the Durango road, and the remainder (who had been left to observe Bilbao) over two bridges of boats which they had constructed opposite the village of Olaviaga. Such was the precipitate nature of their retreat, that they had not time to destroy these bridges.

Espartero was reluctant to push his troops into the lanes of Olaviaga and Duesto while it was dark; and he also expected a sally from Bilbao. He therefore remained on the

Col. Wylde,
Bilbao,
Dec. 29,
1836.

heights of Banderas until nearly dawn, and then, early on Christmas morning, entered Bilbao at the head of the advanced guard, leaving the main body to be cantoned round the city. Had the expected sally taken place, several thousand prisoners must have been taken; for Villa Real, the Carlist commander, had made no arrangements for retreat, and up to daybreak the confusion among the enemy's troops was indescribable. As a matter of fact only 120 prisoners were taken; but this included the commanding officers of artillery and engineers. The whole of the enemy's artillery on the field and in battery was captured, amounting (with nine iron 4-pounders found at Luchana) to twenty-five pieces.

The success was not gained without severe loss to the Queen's troops. As far as could be accurately ascertained, it amounted to 87 killed, 697 wounded, and 30 missing. But the loss was as nothing compared to the glory shed on the Christiano arms, to the *impetus* given to the constitutional cause, and the relief brought to the besieged city. Never were troops more boldly led, never did they more gallantly follow than before Bilbao on that Christmas Eve. No instance is on record more honourable to the Spanish arms; and had the Queen always been as nobly served, the war would have been brought more speedily to an end.

The reader has seen Espartero *at home* again on the battle-field, instead of wavering at the council table. He will now see him again in another of his noblest, as his most natural, moods—that of generous and disinterested acknowledgment of the services of others. While yet in all the excitement of victory, he sent for the English Commissioner, who wrote as follows: “I had the gratification of being
“ requested by General Espartero to convey to the officers
“ and crews of the *Ringdove*, *Saracen*, and *Comet*, and to
“ Major Colquhoun and Lieutenant Vicars, and all the
“ officers under them, his warmest thanks, *the moment he*
“ *entered Bilbao*, and his assurances that without the British
“ aid he could not have succeeded.”

The conduct of the garrison of Bilbao had been admirable; they lost no fewer than 1200 men by the enemy or by

sickness; and there was a great scarcity of flour and fresh provisions when the siege was raised. The merchants greedily availed themselves of the presence of an English Commissioner to importune him for the assistance in a direct form, such as a garrison, of the English Government. They urged that if some such step were not taken, all the citizens who could afford it would leave the country, and those who remained would have to appeal to France. Limited as the commissioner's powers were, it may be merely stated that he did not deceive them with vain hopes.

Espartero was prevented by continued falls of snow from further movements, but Alaix had reached Vittoria. Dissension between the latter and Narvaez had become serious, and threatened serious injury to the Queen's cause. While these generals were showing this bad example, Espartero occupied himself in rewarding those who had helped him to his victory. He applied for the Queen's permission for the British officers of both arms, who had been employed, to accept and wear the *insignia* of the order of Isabella la Catolica, and the non-commissioned officers that of Isabella the Second. This application he enforced by the following letter to the Minister of War.

"In all my despatches relative to the military operations
 "undertaken for the raising of the siege of Bilbao, your
 "Excellency will have been informed of the courage, ability,
 "and activity of His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner in
 "this head-quarters, Don Guillermo Wylde, and the officers,
 "troops, and marine of the same nation employed on this
 "station both on the coast and in the river, who have so
 "much aided the termination of this operation. Some
 "of these generous strangers have shed their blood de-
 "fending our cause, and all have lent me their disin-
 "terested services with a good will and energy which does
 "not yield in the least to that of the Spaniards themselves.
 "Making use of the powers conferred on me by Her
 "Majesty, I have rewarded on the field of battle the be-
 "haviour of those individuals who most distinguished them-
 "selves; but as they did not extend to granting decorations,

Head-
 quarters,
 Bilbao,
 Dec. 29,
 1836.
 Espartero
 to Minister
 of War,
 Madrid.

“ it has not been possible for me to manifest my gratitude
“ to Colonel Wylde and his compatriots as I should have
“ wished. This motive it is that impels me to present to
“ Her Majesty the adjoining request, and I earnestly entreat
“ your Excellency to incline her royal mind that it may be
“ approved of as quickly as possible, and that, at the cost of
“ the government, you will remit me the insignia of the
“ orders, that I myself may place them on their breasts:
“ demanding at the same time permission of the English
“ Government that they may wear these decorations, which
“ by means of their ambassador in this court may be easily
“ obtained. . . . These public demonstrations will make
“ evident to the English nation the grateful services which
“ have been rendered to us by her sons, and will incline them
“ more and more in defence of the throne of our Queen, and
“ will be an acknowledgment of the new debt which on
“ this occasion Spain has contracted with her ally.

* * * * *

The reader must now turn to the East of Spain, and realize the work which was being carried out there, before he proceeds further with the general story of the war. The work which the Carlists were maturing was great and lasting, and their leader was Cabrera.

CHAPTER XI.

CABRERA.

THE man who was the soul of the Carlist rebellion in the East of Spain, who stood at bay after his cause had collapsed in the North, who caused to the Queen's victorious armies months of prolonged exertion and combat, and who excited the devotion of his friends and the abhorrence of his enemies to an almost unparalleled extent, deserves special and detailed notice. In tracing his career, the reader will have an opportunity of observing the gradual development of the rebellion in Aragon and Valencia, a development which was disregarded at Madrid until it had reached a point which called for the use of large armies in its repression.

Ramon Cabrera, who still lived when the author commenced this narrative, was born at Tortosa on the 27th December, 1806. His father, Jose Cabrera, the master of a small bark, died in 1812, leaving a moderate fortune, and four years later his mother, Maria Greñó, married again one Caldero, the patron of a register-office. Some of his relatives having the presentation of benefices in the cathedral of Tortosa, he, at the desire of his mother, studied theology for three years, and received his first tonsure in 1825. His heart was not in his work; he had undertaken the profession merely to please his mother, and he made but little progress in his studies. His animal spirits were high, and his sense of the ridiculous keen. In the hope that he might be led to study with some perseverance, he was sent to the Convent of Trinitarios Colzados, of Tortosa; but the discipline was not

Vida
military
politica de
Cabrera,
Don B. de
Cordoba.
Vida y
Hechos de
Ramon
Cabrera,
Valencia,
1839; and
Askwith
MSS.

Letters
from Col.
Lacy, R.A.

sufficient to restrain an inmate possessing the activity, cunning, and courage which characterized Cabrera. His pranks and general levity soon became known; and although his disposition was generous to a fault, yet his other characteristics were such as induced the Bishop, who appears to have been a sensible man, to refuse to ordain him, saying that he was more fitted to be a soldier than a priest.

In October, 1833, the standard of rebellion had been raised at Morella, and some 3000 men had flocked to it. Cabrera's Carlist proclivities were known at Tortosa, and he with some other young men received passports and orders to proceed to Barcelona on the 13th November. He refused, and announced boldly his intention of proceeding to Morella; and with the proud consciousness of innate talent, and the grand confidence of youth, he boasted that his name would yet be famous in the world.

Like some other great men, he made but an indifferent beginning. At a date very soon after his open avowal of Carlism, he was engaged in a small action in which the rebels were defeated. It is said that he was terrified, and lay down. On being reproached for cowardice, so the story goes, he frankly admitted what he had done, but, pleading that the whirr of bullets had been new to him, he said: "In future you shall see what Cabrera is!"

Cabrera's early experience of the leaders of the Carlists in the East was not encouraging. He found the same jealousy as prevailed in the Queen's armies, but it was more rudely and openly expressed. Before the end of the year 1833 he had the humiliation of learning that, in spite of the rebel boasting, the Queen's troops were allowed to occupy Morella without resistance. Anything like organization was wanting among the Carlists; any real leader with military genius was unknown. It was a depressing commencement for a young man full of hope, and energy, and ability.

He had been in the ranks but a few weeks when he took the first step on the ladder of promotion. He was appointed sergeant in a *partido*, a very irregular force of some 256 men, commanded by a leader named Bojar. It may be well to

follow at once the road of advancement which he so rapidly traversed, in spite of the contempt and opposition which he at first encountered from the Court of Don Carlos. On the 20th December, 1833, he was made sub-lieutenant; on the 12th January, 1834, lieutenant; on the 27th July, 1834, captain; and at the same time he got command of a small but separate force. He also got the special rank and title of first commandant of infantry; and his movements had attracted sufficient notice to ensure for him a special mention in the Gazette of his opponents at Madrid. In November, 1834, he was made colonel; in the same month of the following year he was named by Don Carlos, Commandant-General of Lower Aragon; and on the 8th February, 1836, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier of infantry. On the 15th August, 1836, less than three years from the date of his joining the Carlist force as a simple volunteer, Cabrera was appointed by Don Carlos to the highest military grade, that of *mariscal de campo*.

Rapid promotion like this, even in a service where honours were scattered with ungrudging hand, was a very remarkable thing. Cabrera commenced his career heavily handicapped. He was guilty of the great sin of being unknown. The Court of Don Carlos could forgive many things, but this was an offence which was almost unpardonable;—that a rude, base-born peasant should have genius was irritating and anomalous; but that the dainty feet of royalty should have to use this genius as a stepping-stone in crossing the troubled waters which separated the crown from its claimant, was simply humiliating. All this was an obstacle in the way of the young Carlist.

But there were others than the difficulties from above. If a man would carefully analyze the sources of his misery, he would find that for every one that comes from his social superiors, except in savage countries of unlimited despotism, at least a hundred come from his social equals and inferiors. His equals grudge his merits; his inferiors try to share their fruits, and to claim them as their own. There is a sort of sleepy happiness connected with mediocrity; but genius has

to fight hard for every success, to hold it against odds and against envy, and as a rule to enjoy the incense in a dreary solitude. And with success comes to genius a chronic suspicion. In the upward struggle, so much of the envy and jealousy of the world is visible, that when the haven of success is reached at last, genius doubts the very calm of the waters, the reality of the sun's rays, the sleep of the restless winds. This is the poison of worldly honour. In the agony of the combat, each momentary victory is a pleasure,—each defeated rival is a milestone on the grand road, and cheers the traveller with a sense of progress; but when the goal is reached, and all competitors are outstripped, *then* comes the terrible sense of solitude, and of startling idleness. Genius sighs, like Alexander, for more worlds to conquer; it sighs for sympathy, for some one to discuss the past; it finds a desert where an unearthly garden was expected to bloom with never-ending colours and immortal fragrance. Only one thing is wanting to complete the misery of the solitude, and it never fails to come. A train of slimy flatterers, who never were companions, swarm over the desert. They offer to the lonely victor not sympathy, but adulation. They mouth to him sentiments as to a past which they never knew, and a present which they cannot understand. Ah! better for genius the untenanted wilderness, with memory at least to move the pictures again and again through the mind, of that struggle which was thought to be a means but is now known to be an end;—better *that* than the false incense of sham friends; the attempts under the name of sympathy to share a past which is unintelligible and unreal to those who profess an interest in it; the flattery which clings, and yet offends!

There is but one way, and Cabrera knew it, of reaching the goal, and finding a garden. If a man has the art of enlisting in his work others who will both *share* and *follow*; if those who follow recognize that they are not leaders, but that they perceptibly aid the advance of the cause; if the real leader can crush down his own pride, and with self-denial can share his success and its credit among those who

have shared his labour;—then, when the goal is reached, the men who sympathise will be those who shared the work; the men who offer incense will be those who have a sense of pride in the work which has succeeded, and in which they have shared; and in the companionship of those who have carried out its suggestions, genius will find a reward which will almost make inactivity endurable.

Cabrera's ambition was not for himself, but for his cause, his energy never led him to over-distance his comrades, his self-esteem never led him to underrate their assistance; he was frank, not reticent; his tastes were simple, and their gratification never suggested contrast with those of his subordinates. He was ever ready to credit in more than adequate terms those who fought under him, with their full share of merit; he was not above inquiring into the grievances or desires of those he commanded, nor did he ask of any one to undergo toils, or to perform tasks, which he himself was not also ready to undertake. These were the characteristics which accelerated the promotion of Cabrera; these were the qualities which won for him the affection of his men.

The leading events in his earlier career were as follows. In March, 1834, his impatience at beholding the quarrels and jealousies of the Carlist leaders was such as to make him for a time quit their ranks. He returned to Tortosa, and there all the sweet and powerful influences of home and kindred were brought to bear upon him, in the hope that he might be persuaded to quit the rude and dangerous life of a rebel, and enter on the duties and profits of a citizen's career. He resisted the allurements, and soon returned to the field.

Early in 1835, the Carlist cause having suffered severely from internal dissensions, Cabrera decided on visiting the Court of Don Carlos, and explaining in person the serious state of affairs. He travelled, disguised as an *arriero*, and frequently destitute and in danger,* and succeeded in obtaining audiences of the Count de Villemar, who was Carlist

* On his return, at a *venta* near Belchite, Cabrera was recognised, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner.

Minister of War, and of Don Carlos himself. These interviews were satisfactory; and he returned, bearing letters which directed the chief under whom he had been serving, Carnicer, to proceed to Navarre, and to hand over his command to Cabrera. As Carnicer was unfortunately captured and shot, near Miranda, on his way to Don Carlos, an accusation has been made, but utterly without foundation, against Cabrera, of a conspiracy to supplant Carnicer at any hazard. Carnicer had always been on the most friendly terms with Cabrera, and had from the first recognised his merits; he was also the best and most active of the Carlist chiefs in the East; and there is only one instance of Cabrera criticising his dispositions with any anger or impatience, viz., when he allowed himself to be shamefully defeated in April, 1834, by a Christino force under Breton, at Mayal.

Shortly after assuming the command of Carnicer's force, Cabrera took advantage of some quarrels among the other leaders to call them all together, and to address them in words of remonstrance and appeal. He was not, strictly speaking, an orator; his thoughts crowded on him too rapidly to admit of clear and connected utterance: but his sentiments were, at times, expressed in incisive language, his manner was impassioned and earnest, his motives were single and loyal, and his reasoning—if not always correct—was rapid and final. He succeeded in making a great impression on both the chiefs and their followers: and from the date of this first appeal he became the centre of Carlist aspirations in Aragon and Valencia. This was practically exhibited in the fact that while on the 8th March, 1835, the force under his immediate command was only 29 men, he commanded in December no fewer than 3416 infantry and 218 cavalry. In after days he was fond of reminding his armies that he had commenced with a handful of men armed with sticks; and thus he inferred the justice of his cause and the success of his arms. His command over the scattered *partidos*, which, in the summer of 1835, represented the Carlist forces in the East, was ratified by the other chiefs, whom Don Carlos had not dared to super-

sede, but who thus voluntarily submitted to a leader whose ability had already become conspicuous.

The next event of special note in his career was his appointment in the winter of 1835 as Commandant-General of Lower Aragon. On this occasion, the rejoicings of his troops were swelled by the congratulatory addresses of deputations from towns and villages. He was no longer a mere wandering and *guerilla* chief; he commenced to organize hospitals, to manufacture cartridges, to purchase and issue arms, to draw up a military code, to establish an authoritative military commission, to buy the ingredients of gunpowder and to mix them in a rude fashion, and to arrange a system by which his troops should receive regular instead of spasmodic payment. With increasing power, he readily recognised and cheerfully accepted increasing responsibilities.

In the beginning of 1836, Cabrera's abilities and resources were sorely tested. Crowds of women and children attached themselves to his force for protection and food, and he was opposed by an astute, active and determined general—Palarea. As the year advanced, however, he obtained one or two victories, the moral effect of which was very great: and a circumstance occurred in February, which hardened his heart and intensified his desire for vengeance to an extent which can hardly be realised. His mother, Maria Greño, was shot by order of the Christino chief, Mina, who had commanded in Navarre, and who now was Commandant of the Queen's forces in Catalonia. The atrocious act created the utmost indignation both in Spain and in other countries, and the Christino generals who were connected with its perpetration sought to shift the responsibility from one to the other. The order was given to the Governor of Tortosa* by General Noguêras, who commanded the Queen's troops in Lower Aragon; but the latter pleaded the authority of Mina, for which he had applied before directing

* The Governor of Tortosa, Don Antonio Gaspar Blanco, and the Alcalde, Don Miguel de Cordoba, protested in vain, and tried to persuade Noguêras to defer the execution, at least.

the execution. Mina, on the other hand, stated he had so much to occupy him in the field that Noguêras' application had escaped his notice, and that he had sanctioned it as matter of routine, without investigation.

Be this as it may, all the southern thirst for revenge was awakened in Cabrera; and Maria Greño was avenged by a succession of reprisals which made the name of her son a terror in the land. He commenced by announcing that thirty female lives should be forfeited to avenge his mother's murder, and four female prisoners whom he happened to have in custody were made immediate victims. Thirty other prisoners were also shot at the same time in reprisal at Valderrobres; and this was the commencement of a horrible system of massacre pursued by Cabrera towards prisoners during the rest of the war, which tarnished his military reputation and earned for him the detestation of all who were opposed to him. His policy was not only cruel in this respect and unmanly, but it was also short-sighted. In vain did the leaders of the Christino Army of the Centre endeavour to return good for evil by treating the prisoners who fell into their hands with humanity;—in vain did the English Commissioners, who were subsequently attached to that Army, endeavour to civilize the war. The exasperated inhabitants of the towns and districts which had been ravaged by Cabrera, demanded reprisals and revenge with a determination which the Christino leaders were unable to resist. Sometimes these reprisals were immediate; sometimes postponed; sometimes they were induced by the wild cry of an outraged public; sometimes as an act of deliberate military strategy. Of the former class of reprisals, the following is an instance: In October, 1838, after Orma's failure before Morella, which will be discussed in detail hereafter, Cabrera—now Condé de Morella—defeated a Christino force near Maella, under Pardiñas. Of the prisoners whom he took, he immediately shot ninety-six sergeants; and, according to another authority, he butchered eight young children at the same time. This brought matters to a climax. "Alicant, Murcia, and other cities "rose *en masse* at this fearful reprisal, and for a time the

Bellaert.

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"war was more that of wild beasts than of men." It was hopeless for the Christino generals to attempt to stem the tide of popular indignation; and many of the reprisals with which the names of some of them—such as Van Halen, at Murviedro, are associated—were involuntary on their part, and were carried out in deference to an outburst of opinion which was simply incontrollable.

Horrible as Cabrera's atrocities were, it is the duty of a historian to remind his readers that the provocation came in the first instance from the Christino side. The conduct of Mina and Noguêras in their treatment of the Carlists in the East of Spain has been appropriately compared with that of the English in suppressing the Indian Mutiny. These leaders in their proclamations and in their treatment of the Carlists evidently regarded them as rebels associated with a movement which was to be stamped out with an iron heel. Cabrera's proclamations in reply aggravated the situation; and the murder of his mother—for it was nothing less—decided the character of the war in the East. Zumalacarguy had informed Cabrera of the Eliot Convention, but he warned him not to carry out its provisions in his district unless the Christinos showed the example. Cabrera's nature under the circumstances was indisposed to the practice of philanthropy in war; so that practically the Eliot Convention remained a dead letter in the districts where his troops were, although it will be seen hereafter that the English Commissioner with the Christino Army of the Centre, Colonel Lacy, made many attempts to induce Cabrera to humanise the war.

The next event of special importance in the early career of Cabrera was his capture—aided by treachery—of the important fortress of Morella, in January, 1838. Don Carlos' cause was in a very unpromising state at the time, and the possession of a place like Morella, in the mountains and almost impregnable, was of immense importance, as it afforded a head-quarters for an army which had to wander about in the Maestrazso, broken up into columns, in search of food. The armies on both sides, especially in Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia, had a good deal of the marching and

countermarching which was once so common with the English in Flanders, but it was from a different cause. In Flanders the bewildering movements were due to the imbecility of *parade* generals: in Spain it was caused by the somewhat natural desire on the part of even the patient and temperate Spanish troops to get something to eat. In the military theory of most nations the Commissariat Department has to furnish the soldier's food on ground fixed by strategical considerations; but in Spain the movements of a general were decided by the probability of finding rations. This is one of the difficulties of civil war as compared with war in an enemy's country. The blunt system of *requisitions*, which can be employed in the latter case, has to be modified and toned down in the former. In Spain this was done through the intermediate employment of the *alcaldé* of any district in which fat beeves and yellow corn were to be found. And hereby hangs the tale of decentralisation which has in one sense enabled Spain almost to laugh at civil war.

It has been said that during this war, "The Christinos were in possession of the seat of government, and had the command of the national army; they were in an immense majority in the large towns, and in great strength in almost every province; but the Carlists—backed by the power of the Church, and by a superstitious and fanatical peasantry—proved themselves stubborn and dangerous foes." In moving about, the Queen's armies would have greatly irritated the peasantry, and would have made innumerable Carlists had their only means of obtaining food been *direct force*. Fortunately, however, for them, every town or even village in Spain is a species of *dépôt centre* of civil government. The *alcaldé*, or mayor, could make his requisitions in all legal formality, when requested to do so by the general of the occupying troops, and he could issue *cheques* in payment to the people supplying the required provisions or transport. These *cheques* were a charge upon the local taxes, the levying of which is in the hands of the *alcaldé* and corporation. By this method any *individual* irritation was avoided; *individual* gain seemed indeed to be assisted; cultivation of the soil was not hindered by the dread of

pillage; an invading army became to a district almost a market for produce; and although the *cheques* would, like all paper currency, be depreciated by large issue, and although the loss did ultimately of course fall upon the people, yet it was so distributed and filtered, and so many forms were employed, that the irritation was hardly felt which is natural on beholding a direct breach of the eighth commandment perpetrated on oneself.

Cabrera at once saw the advantage of this system to his enemies, and took his usual harsh way of putting a stop to it. Early in 1836 he shot the Alcaldés of Valdecalgorfa and Torricella, merely for giving information to the Christinos, and undoubtedly with a view to preventing any assistance being rendered by similar officials elsewhere. It is only by being made aware of the importance to the army of the system above described, that one can understand the sensation created throughout the country by this act of Cabrera's.

The importance of such an asylum or rallying point as Morella to a force organized so loosely as Cabrera's, will be more apparent when it is remembered that nothing was more common than for him to dissolve his forces, generally for fifteen days at a time, when provisions were difficult to obtain. The expression he generally employed was—giving them leave of absence to return to their homes "*to change their shirts.*" This circumstance explains a statement which often occurs in Christino despatches, and which one is at first disposed to class with the superlatives which distort the narratives of this war: "The Carlists have utterly dispersed."

Among the minor actions prior to the capture of Morella, which consolidated the reputation of Cabrera, and established the hold over his troops which was never relaxed, may be mentioned the following:

1. In the beginning of 1834 he surprised the new Governor of Morella on his way with a considerable escort to take up his command; and then, disguising his men in the uniform of his prisoners, he surprised Villafranca.

2. In March, 1834, he, in union with Carnicer, surprised the important garrison of Daroca, and defeated a considerable

Christino force commanded by the Governor of Catalayud, near Castejoucillo de Alarba, making many prisoners.

3. In April, 1834, in a similar victory over the Christinos near Ariño, he distinguished himself by his great personal bravery; and shortly afterwards he surprised the garrison of Alfara.

4. In May, 1835, he attacked and pillaged Maella.

5. In August, 1835, he defeated a Christino column under Decriff.

6. In August, 1835, he gained a victory near Vineroz.

7. In December, 1835, he was successful near Catalayud.

8. In January, 1836, he defeated the Christinos with great slaughter, surprising them near Tortosa; and defeated the same force a second time a few days later.

9. In March, 1836, taking advantage of the concentration of the attention of the Madrid Government on the war in Navarre, he entered Liria, pillaged many towns, and invaded the Valley of Turia; and shortly afterwards personally superintended the fortification of Santa Vieja.

10. In May, 1836, after the defeat of the Christinos under Valdez, by Quilez, near Bañon, the officers who had been made prisoners were shot, and the men, over 1500 in number, joined Cabrera.


11. In June, 1836, Cabrera surprised Iriarte, and killed and wounded 600 of all ranks.

12. In July, 1836, he invaded the Province of Valencia, and returned with much booty.

After this time, in addition to sharing in the fruitless and silly promenade of Don Carlos towards Madrid, which is discussed elsewhere, he employed himself in besieging, often with success, the many small fortified posts in the North-east of Spain which belonged to the Christinos.

He was frequently defeated; he was twice severely wounded. But in his mountain fastnesses he soon recovered from his defeats and reorganized his men; while his wounds still further endeared him to his men, who found, while he was incapacitated from command, how unequal the other chiefs were to the task of replacing him.

One way of thoroughly appreciating the exertions of



CANTA VIEJA.

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Cabrera is to study the gradually increasing Carlist force in Aragon under his command. In December, 1836, this force was as follows:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Askwith MSS. and Cordoba's Life of Cabrera.
Field and Staff Officers	.. 41	.. 12	.. 0	
Chaplains and Surgeons	.. 5	.. 0	.. 0	
Armourers, &c.	.. 21	.. 5	.. 0	
Company Officers	.. 292	.. 34	.. 3	
Sergeants	.. 400	.. 44	.. 5	
Corporals	.. 781	.. 80	.. 11	
Drummers and Trumpeters	.. 90	.. 10	.. 0	
Rank and File	.. 5366	.. 463	.. 43	
	<u>6996</u>	<u>649</u>	<u>62</u>	
Detached with the Expedition of Gomez	.. 2158	460	0	
Total	.. 9154	1109	62	<u>10,325</u>

Taking the corresponding months in 1837, 1838, and 1839, the strength was as follows:—

	INFANTRY.		
	1837.	1838.	1839.
Field and Staff Officers	.. 106	.. 153	.. 150
Chaplains and Surgeons	.. 47	.. 44	.. 58
Armourers, &c.	.. 49	.. 61	.. 88
Company Officers	.. 616	.. 714	.. 841
Sergeants	.. 698	.. 896	.. 1061
Corporals	.. 1393	.. 1472	.. 1707
Drummers and Trumpeters	.. 225	.. 242	.. 315
Rank and File	.. 9093	.. 12,620	.. 16,485
	<u>12,227</u>	<u>15,302</u>	<u>20,705</u>

	CAVALRY.		
	1837.	1838.	1839.
Field and Staff Officers	.. 67	.. 87	.. 86
Chaplains and Surgeons	.. 13	.. 17	.. 23
Armourers, &c.	.. 29	.. 27	.. 43
Company Officers	.. 96	.. 169	.. 181
Sergeants	.. 121	.. 168	.. 192
Corporals	.. 244	.. *287	.. 311
Drummers and Trumpeters	.. 31	.. 37	.. 42
Rank and File	.. 1511	.. 1501	.. 2022
	<u>2112</u>	<u>2293</u>	<u>2900</u>

ARTILLERY.

	1837.		1838.		1839.	
Field and Staff Officers ..	4	..	2	..	5	
Chaplains and Surgeons ..	2	..	2	..	2	
Armourers, &c. ..	3	..	6	..	4	
Company Officers ..	24	..	32	..	29	
Sergeants ..	24	..	38	..	30	
Corporals ..	48	..	64	..	48	
Drummers and Trumpeters ..	6	..	2	..	10	
Rank and File ..	297	..	345	..	400	
	<u>398</u>		<u>491</u>		<u>528</u>	

In December, 1838, there were, in addition to the above, 327 sappers; and in December, 1839, this number had further increased to 418.

The grand total of what was called by the Carlists the *Royal Army of Aragon, Valencia, and Murcia*, or in other words the organized rebel force in these provinces in 1837, 1838, and 1839 was as follows:—

	Grand Total.	Officers and Men.	Cavalry Horses.
Year 1837 ..	14,727	..	1282
„ 1838 ..	18,413	..	1246
„ 1839 ..	25,541	..	1574

Cabrera conquered for himself not merely military but also social distinctions. In June, 1837, he received the Grand Cross of S. Fernando, and for his gallant defence of Morella against Oraa he was appointed by Don Carlos Condé de Morella. It may be said, however, with truth of this stern, earnest, and able leader, that he found his chief reward in the loyalty and affection of his followers, whom he treated invariably with frankness and consideration. His appeals to them—of which the following is a sample—were successful because he reminded them of the dangers they had shared and surmounted together, and of the glories which were certain to reward united and determined action. “Our situation,” he said on one occasion when addressing his troops, “is sad, but not so serious as to damp our enthusiasm. At other times we have been in equal if not even greater dangers, dangers which are frequent in war. We have suffered hunger, thirst, cold, and all imaginable privations,

At Baceite,
Jan., 1836.

“and by our constancy, our love of religion, of our King
 “and our country, we have overcome them all. The defence
 “of our cause, and the military glory which we are beginning
 “to acquire, should stimulate us to continue with the same
 “ardour in front of our valiant and suffering volunteers. If
 “some of our number have deserted our ranks, it is a proof
 “that they have but little courage. Those who have re-
 “mained loyal will follow us to death. Let us therefore
 “be undismayed, and march at once in concert and in
 “harmony.”

Although he was no orator, Cabrera could touch the hearts of his men and rouse their spirits by words which they could understand, and by an enthusiasm which was contagious.

* * * * *

Cabrera reappeared on the Spanish stage during the struggle which ended in the accession to the throne of the son of Queen Isabella, the present King of Spain, Alfonso XII. He appeared after a long absence from Spanish politics in the unaccustomed character of a peace-maker. His appearance was hardly a success; the fire of his youth had gone out, and with it had disappeared most of his talent and all his influence. He may have been prudent now, cautious, even patriotic, but he was no longer in the Catalonian's eye Cabrera. He was emphatically one of those men whose silence would have been golden, now that the furnace of his youth had gone out and left but ashes. He had been so long an *ideal* to the peasantry of Northern Spain, so long a terrible figure in the memory of the more luxuriant South,—an emblem of battle and murder, that his recent appearance as a mediator seemed an outrage on the reason of both North and South. A hero often gains by an early death; he loses *all* by a resurrection into a world which is not the world of his old life.

NOTE.—The early life and character of Cabrera have been described since his death with extraordinary contradictions by various writers. It is impossible to conceive two more opposite accounts than those given by C. L. Gruncisen in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of June 2, 1877, and that given in the *Echo* of May 29, 1877. Truth lies in the middle, and the facts given in the preceding chapter may be relied upon. They are based upon the personal inquiries of the English Commissioners.

CHAPTER XII.

HERNANI.

THE reader must now turn again to the North of Spain. He will see that there were many reasons why General Evans should not remain inactive in St. Sebastian. The Legion had not done very much as yet, and the *prestige* of English arms had suffered in consequence. The time was approaching also when the men could claim their discharge, and unless some success could be attained in the field before the end of their service, it would be hopeless to induce many to re-enlist; and on strategical grounds it was very desirable to display some activity in the North, in order to check the too-evident determination of the Carlists to make incursions into Castile.

But Evans' force was wholly inadequate at the commencement of the year 1837 for any single-handed operations. Even in conjunction with Saarsfield's force from Pamplona, he could do little without reinforcements from Espartero's army — reinforcements which to be useful must not be under 6000 to 8000 men. Espartero himself was ready to strengthen the San Sebastian force to this extent, but he was checked in every way by the chief of his staff, General Oraa, who had great influence over him. The energy of the English Commissioner was, however, rewarded; in the beginning of February, 5000 men embarked at Portugalete for San Sebastian,* and these were followed by 1500 additional on the 2nd March.

Col. Wyld,
St. Sebastian,
Jan. 10,
1837.

* Chiefly men belonging to (formerly) Narvaez' division, the 2nd Regiment of Castile, and the Provincial battalion of Ciudad Rodrigo: the whole under General Reudon.

In securing these reinforcements, General Evans was much strengthened by the co-operation of Lord John Hay, who found the necessary transports.

Had the measures which were thus taken been employed in the month of January, it is possible that the French frontier might have been closed against the Carlists, and a very heavy blow dealt upon them in consequence. No more can be said of such a contingency than that it might have been possible. In the light of the subsequent hesitation of Saarsfield, whose co-operation would have been necessary, it cannot be said that it would have been probable.

Nevertheless, the operations would have been carried out in January under advantages which diminished as weeks went on. The Carlists were disorganized owing to the unexpected relief of Bilbao; and a change of ministry had been made by Don Carlos, which gave increased prominence and power to the Bishop of Leon, and excited great indignation among the Navarrese.* *Au contraire*, the Christino troops were flushed with satisfaction at the honours and praise showered upon them on account of their recent success; and the jealousies which were only too certain to re-appear among their generals, were for the moment suspended.

Col. Wylde,
Bilbao,
Jan. 27,
1837.

The first scheme was sound and thoughtful. The Carlist lines in Guipuscoa—which were fairly fortified and strengthened by redoubts—extended along a chain of hills from Irun into Biscay, through Oyarzun, Hernani, Tolosa, and Villafranca. If General Evans should make an attack on the centre of these lines (which came very near to San Sebastian), and if, at the same time, the right and left were attacked respectively by Espartero, say from Durango, and by Saarsfield somewhere near Tolosa, there was a great probability of a success on a very thorough and extended scale. But co-operation was rare among Spanish generals, as rare as jealousy was common. Saarsfield shone in excuses,

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* Villa Real was superseded in the command of the Carlist forces, which Bollaert was given to Don Sebastian.

Gen. Saars-
field to
Gen. Evans,
Feb. 21,
1837.

but their quality was inferior to their number. Writing from Pamplona, he pleaded as an excuse for not moving into the Bastan that he had no money! The marvel would have been if he had had that article, and he would have occupied a unique position among the Christino armies. He next urged the disorganized state of the French Auxiliary Legion; and this in the face of the well-known fact that, however disorganized the French and English mercenaries might be in camp or garrison, they were readily welded into homogeneity by the hammer of actual combat and service in front of the enemy. Yet again, in almost whining tones, he represented that Espartero, and not he, should take the initiative; and that the former should in fact be established in Durango before he himself should quit Pamplona. It would seem as if this excuse had been urged in grim irony: a *joint* attack of *three* divisions, which would admit of *one* remaining, while the *others* showed the enemy the part which they were to play in the coming operations, would be a novel and not very hopeful military scheme.

Col. Wylde,
San Sebastian,
Feb. 27,
1837.

Lastly, with a bold defiance of the truth, he asserted that the enemy in his immediate front outnumbered him, and that therefore he dared not move. What were the real facts? He had under his command at least 15,000 men; after garrisoning the necessary points, he would still have 8000 available; and he could certainly with these march through the Bastan, where the enemy had only *three* battalions. These excuses and delays were not merely irritating, but most baneful. They allowed the Carlists to strengthen and intrench their positions still further, especially Hernani—the place which, for various reasons, would be the object of any attack on the lines made from San Sebastian. They also led the Carlist Commander, Don Sebastian, to detach additional troops from the neighbourhood of Bilbao towards the centre of the lines, it being apparent that the only real attack was likely to be that meditated by General Evans. The result was that in the end of February that officer found a force of no fewer than 17,000 in his immediate front, strongly intrenched, and without a symptom of movement

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on the part of either Espartero or Saarsfield to create a diversion. Add to this that the snow was a foot deep round San Sebastian, and the reader will see how unpromising were General Evans' prospects. General Oraa had as yet succeeded in preventing Espartero's forward movements by taking advantage of his almost habitual indecision at this time, and his reluctance to endanger his recently-acquired laurels; and all the entreaties of the English Commissioner seem at this time to have failed. Evans had therefore to act alone, trusting that his example might succeed where his petitions had failed.

On the 10th March, General Evans advanced his line to the same position which he held on the right of the Urumcea previous to his movement on Fuentarabia in June, 1836. This involved the capture of the heights of Ametzagama, which had been strongly fortified; and the capture was not effected without considerable loss. The left was then pushed forward to some rocky heights near the high road between Astigarraga and Irun, and these were held by him against vigorous Carlist efforts, and in spite of a loss of 600 killed and wounded, until night, when he withdrew the troops from this point to the neighbourhood of Alza. The whole attack was conducted with great spirit, and although it was said that General Evans contemplated nothing but a *reconnaissance*, it resulted in an action highly creditable to the troops under his command. The British Legion, under Generals Chichester and Fitzgerald, behaved admirably; and the capture of San Marco was effected by General Jauregui's Spanish brigade, covered by the fire of the small force of (English) Royal Artillery which accompanied the expedition. The fire of these guns was universally commended, and did much to ensure success.

Col. Wyde,
San Sebastian,
March 11,
1837.

Bollaert.

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On the whole, the results of the 10th of March may be said to have exceeded expectation; and as rumours arrived next morning that Espartero was on his way to Durango with 28 battalions, and that even Saarsfield had promised to move if the provincial authorities would give him a few days' rations, there was a feeling of cheerful confidence

pervading the San Sebastian army, which spoke well for further operations.

With the exception of the capture of the village of Loyola, General Evans did little more until the 15th March, hoping thereby to ensure the more immediate co-operation of the two generals whom he believed to be marching to his assistance. On the morning of that day he concentrated the whole of his forces at Loyola with a view to a general attack. Placing his Spanish troops on the right, the Legion on the left, and the English artillery and marines in the centre, on the Hernani road, he attacked a powerfully-defended hill, called the Venta, which commanded Hernani, and after five hours' fighting compelled the enemy to abandon it. The gallantry displayed on both sides was great; the weather was unfavourable, and the troops wet and half-famished; and the obstinacy of the defenders seemed for a time more than a match for the eagerness and dash of the attacking columns. But when in addition to the direct attack of the British troops in front, the enemy found their flanks being turned, there was no alternative but retreat, to avoid capture.

There seemed now no doubt that Hernani would be entered on the following day. It is true that as yet no authentic intelligence of the co-operation or movements of Espartero and Saarsfield had been received, but the chief difficulties had already been overcome by Evans, unassisted, and it was felt that the morrow would witness the easy crowning of his successes in a triumphant entry into Hernani.

The fates were, however, no longer propitious. The English Commissioner, who at midnight on the 15th penned jubilant and hopeful sentences from San Sebastian, had to record within twenty-four hours a story of complete and even shameful failure. The attack on the 16th commenced at 10 a.m. The enemy made but feeble resistance, retiring into the town at once; and the bombardment commenced. Suddenly, strong reinforcements were observed coming up behind Hernani. Part of these occupied at once the cover in the neighbourhood of the bridge of Astigarraga, while

the remainder deployed with the intention of outflanking the Queen's troops on both sides. An unaccountable panic seized two battalions on the left of Evans' force, one Spanish and one belonging to the Legion; they broke and fled almost before they were attacked, and confusion spread along the whole left of the line. The right and centre stood firm; but towards evening the general found it necessary to withdraw his whole force to the position which he had occupied after the action of the 10th. The retreat was prevented from degenerating into a rout, by the admirable steadiness of the English Marines in the centre, and by the efficient fire of the Royal and Royal Marine Artillery. Of these, Colonel Wylde was able to write with pride that they behaved with the utmost gallantry, and that the guns were brought to the rear with the utmost deliberation and order. Annual Register.

The whole of the successes of the previous days were literally undone by this defeat, and the *prestige* of Evans' force irretrievably injured—a thing which it could ill afford. It is true that acts of brilliant courage and daring characterised the Queen's troops, especially the cavalry; it is also true that some excuse was to be found in the fact that the men had been for days exposed to great discomfort, exposure, cold, and hardship, and that many of them had actually gone into action famishing, having had no food that day. But these facts do not atone for the defeat suffered in the cheerless neighbourhood of Hernani. The Carlist force which appeared so opportunely under Don Sebastian, had suffered similar privations, and was weary with the fatigues of a forced march; and the Christino forces had immeasurably the advantage of position. Ibid.

The true explanation of the defeat, apart from the unpardonable cowardice of the two battalions on the left, is to be found in the old, old story of want of harmony and co-operation between the Queen's generals. Saarsfield knew Evans' intentions on the 9th March; he left Pamplona on the 11th, and after one night's absence returned to his barracks because the weather was unfavourable. As was Col. Wylde, San Sebastian, March 16, 1837.

Annual
Register.

tersely said—he returned to Pamplona, having encountered nothing worse than a severe wetting!

His conduct gave Don Sebastian or his advisers an opportunity of displaying a very brilliant and successful piece of strategy. The Carlists had the advantage of working on the inner circle of operations. Their leader, with one column, marched in the direction of Estella, to lead Saarsfield to imagine that he meditated an incursion into Castile; while another column watched the movements of the Christino general when he issued from Pamplona on the 11th. Hardly crediting the good fortune involved in Saarsfield's prompt return to Pamplona when he should have advanced to Tolosa, the latter column, being thus set free, proceeded to Hernani by rapid marches, while Don Sebastian's division returned in the same direction, making a forced night march of twelve leagues to Hernani on the night of the 15th. These columns were the reinforcements which appeared behind Hernani on the 16th and did such execution. They amounted to at least ten or twelve battalions, viz., four or six under Villa Real, who had returned to his duty, and who reached Hernani about 9 a.m., and six or eight, with cavalry and artillery, which arrived about 11 a.m., under Don Sebastian and Moreno. Had Saarsfield shown the slightest energy, had he even made use of the simplest precautions with a view of watching the enemy's movements, the reinforcements would never have reached Hernani, and the place must have fallen. As for Espartero, he never advanced beyond Durango, and returned to Bilbao on the 21st, much harassed as he retired by the enemy's cavalry and guerillas.*

Col. Wyld,
San Sebastian,
March 21,
1837.

The whole affair had a most disheartening effect on the army and on public opinion; and it became evident that some immediate and more concentrated action must at once

* The losses of the Queen's troops on the 16th amounted to 200 killed and missing, and 600 wounded. The number of men in hospital for wounds received between the 9th and 17th amounted to 653 Spanish and 473 English.

be taken. Thanks to the correct instinct of General Evans and the thorough co-operation on this occasion of Espartero, the plan decided upon proved in time completely successful. The latter was urged to make the Bidasoa the base of his future operations, and to remove the whole of his available force, with his own head-quarters, to San Sebastian. It was calculated that after sufficiently garrisoning Bilbao and the Incartaciones, some 20,000 men might be spared for the new service. In the meantime, General Saarsfield having fortunately been obliged through illness to hand over his command to Irribarren, an honest and zealous officer, it was considered safe to entrust to that division the duty of preventing any Carlist expedition into Castile. Irribarren was therefore on the Ebro before the end of April, near Lodosa, watching the signs of any attempt to cross the river. Two battalions were also sent to Santander to be employed as occasion might require, in strengthening either the corps on the Upper Ebro, or Vittoria.

It took much time and many journeys of the English Commissioner between Bilbao and San Sebastian, before the difficulties raised by Espartero's staff were overcome. But that general had been taught by the recent failure at Hernani that his staff-officers were not infallible, and he began from this time to assert his own opinions more freely, and to act upon them with less hesitation. It is a characteristic of staff officers, even in these more enlightened days, to be somewhat self-opinionated, and to be fussy in an inverse ratio to the amount of work which they perform. As a general's operations go on, however, and he realizes day by day that the responsibility of failure will be visited not upon his staff, but upon himself, he listens with less humility to the volunteered advice they give him, and even ventures to adopt his own views instead of theirs. It was so now with Espartero, and the result was that in the middle of May there were collected in San Sebastian thirty-nine battalions; sufficient after garrisoning the lines to allow a force of 24,000 men to take the field. Against this number the Carlists could only bring about 14,000, including armed peasants.

Col. Wyld,
San Sebastian,
March 23,
1837.

Lieutenant
Turner,
R.A.,
Lodosa,
April 24,
1837.

Col. Wyld,
San Sebastian,
May 12,
1837.

Annual
Register.

Bollaert.

Col. Wylde,
Hernani,
May 14,
1837.

Espartero showed his consideration and chivalry by adopting General Evans' plans, and by allowing him the practical conduct of the operations. That officer, owing to the crowded state of the barracks in San Sebastian as the reinforcements arrived from Bilbao, took possession of the village of Loyola and some large houses in the neighbourhood, and occupied them, notwithstanding some smart fighting, with part of his division. The Carlist general was not blind to what was going on, nor to the dangers of a decisive engagement with superior force. He resolved to withdraw his artillery from the lines, and a large portion of his force; and by making a feint of an expedition into Castile, he hoped to draw away a large part of the San Sebastian army. He was much opposed by some of his advisers on account of this decision; but the alternative would have been much more likely to injure, and perhaps fatally, the cause of Don Carlos in the North-east of Spain. It simplified, of course, the work of the Queen's troops. At daybreak on the 14th May, 1837, in the midst of wet and stormy weather, Espartero advanced in force against Hernani. The principal heights, the Venta and others, were yielded by the enemy after a nominal resistance; and these being really the keys of the position, the abandonment of the redoubts and lines followed very soon. General Gurrea, who was stationed on the Ametza, then crossed the Uramea at Loyola, and advancing along its left bank, carried Astigarraga without opposition, while on the right the English Legion and a Spanish division carried Hernani in a very spirited manner. Advancing in the direction of Tolosa, they next carried the village of Urrieta, where they bivouacked for the night.

So rapidly did the enemy * retreat that very few prisoners were taken: and the losses of the Queen's troops were very small.

Anxious to give General Evans all the glory which could be obtained from the campaign, Espartero resolved to

* The Carlists appeared to have 13 battalions, a squadron of cavalry, but no artillery.

remain himself near the Tolosa road, with a view to placing Hernani and some other points in a state of defence, so as to secure the communication between them and San Sebastian. General Evans, with the *corps d'armée* under his immediate command, proceeded to invest Irun and Fuentarabia.

The force under General Evans amounted now to about 10,000 men in fourteen battalions, together with some English seamen and marines under Lord John Hay. He had also eight pieces of artillery.* Of the infantry, nine battalions were Spanish, and the remainder belonged to the English Legion. He marched at daybreak on the 16th May, and first met the enemy, two battalions of Navarre, at Oyarzun. They retreated, pursued by General Jauregui, by the mountains towards Navarre. Irun was invested at noon, the artillery opening fire on the detached fort, El Parqui, the virtual citadel of the place. During the afternoon three companies of Rifles got on the road between Irun and the Fort of Behovia, on the Bidasona, and in spite of a heavy fire, penetrated the suburbs, and established themselves in a church and some houses near one of the gates. Two 12-pounders were then brought up from the Fort of Behovia, in order to destroy the gate of the town opening towards the French frontier; and El Parqui was summoned to surrender on terms, but without success.

Annual
Register;
and
Col. Wylde,
Irun,
May 17,
1837.

Night had now come on; and at last one of the outer gates was breached, and all the fire of the few Christino guns was brought to bear on the inner town defences. A second barrier existed before the entrance to the heart of the town could be attained.

It was night; and a struggle commenced between determination and a hunger to wipe out past defeat on one side, and a terror of death on the other. Of late there had been little or no mercy shown by Carlists to Christino prisoners. Even under circumstances which appealed most eloquently to the captor's feelings, no mercy had been shown to the wounded or prisoners of the English

* Four iron 12-pounders and 4 mountain guns.

Legion. And now, to every quaking heart in Irun came the terrible consciousness that the English general himself at the head of his Legion was at their gates, outnumbering their own garrison, and to their guilty consciences seeming to ask for vengeance. They fought with a halter round their necks; they fought desperately, for it was for life.

In the darkness, the 1st Regiment of the Legion and the Rifles had been fighting from house to house in the suburbs. Reaching the outer barrier, a number of the men escalated the windows of a house adjoining the Fuentarabia gate, and dropping within the wall drove back the defenders at the point of the bayonet. At the same time, as some twenty years later at Delhi, the assailants endeavoured to destroy the gate by affixing a bag of powder to it, and igniting the charge. The gate proved too strong; but the men who had already entered through the house speedily opened it, and admitted the tide of assault. About this time El Parqui and the Town-house, which was strongly fortified, surrendered at discretion; and by 11 p.m. the whole town was in possession of the Queen's troops.

According to Carlist precedent, the surrender of the town ought to have been the signal for massacre. Most of the women and children had escaped to France, it is true, on the previous evening; but there were some 500 prisoners, who certainly expected death. The recollections of very brutal atrocities practised on English prisoners and wounded during the attack on Hernani in March were still fresh in the minds of the garrison, and they awaited what they felt would be a just retaliation. Their amazement was great when they heard General Evans and his officers pleading with their men and enjoining them to shed no more blood. It seemed incredible; were they to be reserved for some lingering doom or hideous torture?

But ere morning they realised that the English general had determined not to sully the national honour by murder, even under the name of just vengeance, more especially in a country where England had culled the brightest flowers of her military glory; and the news of this unexpected mercy

travelled far and rapidly. It speedily reached Fuentarabia, where General Evans appeared next morning with his army demanding capitulation. With a not unnatural doubt, the garrison asked permission for an officer to go to Irun and see whether the prisoners taken the day before were really still alive. Permission was granted. What had been rumoured was found to be correct, and Fuentarabia surrendered without further parley. The confidence of the garrison was not misplaced. Not a life was taken.

To the English reader it must be gratifying to find that so great an impression was made on the garrisons of Irun and Fuentarabia by the unexpected leniency of General Evans' force, that the Carlist governor, Soroa, begged Don Carlos to issue such orders as would save any prisoners belonging to the Legion from ever suffering any inhuman treatment. Bollaert.

These successes were followed by two circumstances which demand special notice. In the first place, General Evans, having retrieved to a certain extent the tarnished honour of his troops, returned to England to assume his Parliamentary duties.

In the second place, Espartero ventured without reference to Madrid to issue a proclamation to the Carlists, offering the retention of their Fueros if they would lay down their arms. This independent conduct was repudiated by the Spanish Government, which wished to treat its generals after the manner of the politicians in the early part of the great French Revolution. But it is interesting as showing the gradual development and education of a man who had as yet been somewhat deficient in individuality.

The departure of General Evans seems an appropriate time to think again of the true story of the English Legion. In doing so, it is only fair to remember that the difficulties under which he laboured were almost unprecedented; that in spite of his failure to procure justice for his men, he never was otherwise than wholly trusted by them; that he was not merely brave as a soldier, fairly good as a strategist, unselfish as a man, and sensitive to the

honour of England, but was so sympathetic with those serving under him that his health repeatedly broke down under disappointment at being unable to secure for them the rewards and rights to which he considered them entitled.

This is the secret of much of the discipline of the English Army. The men feel that their officers have a single eye to even their most trifling interests. When they have to suffer for military offences, they look on the officer merely as a channel of punishment, not as its source; and anything like revengeful or malicious feeling is practically unknown. An officer who is indolent as to his own interests is often litigiously anxious as to those of his men. This was to a certain extent true of the late Sir De Lacy Evans.

CHAPTER XIII.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH LEGION, AND THE ACTION
OF HUESCA.

THE events related in the last chapter seem to have had some effect on the mind of Espartero, and to have considerably modified the opinion he had entertained of the British Legion. It is not impossible that the possession of the chief command, with its consequent responsibility, had also made him less reckless in his criticism, and more conservative of the means in his power. He was not the first, nor the last, whom the responsibilities of office and power have rendered tolerant and modest. Among the many wise sayings of a great living politician, none are more true and striking than that in which he said that it is easier to criticise than to construct. Unfortunately for the world, criticism is much more natural than construction.

Espartero wrote to the English Commissioner, asking him to endeavour to re-organize the Legion, which was now in the act of dissolution; and a fortunate argument accompanied the appeal in the shape of money to pay some of the arrears due to the men, but not as yet anything for the officers. In England at this time pressure was being brought to bear upon the government with a view to preventing any assistance of any description whatever being given to the Christinos. Colonel Wylde did not despair of being able to retain 1000 or 2000 of the best men, and he was the more anxious to do so because those of the Legion who had accompanied Espartero on his march to Pamplona on the 29th May had behaved exceedingly well. "The

Hernani,
May 26,
1837.

Col. Wylde,
San Sebastian,
May 31,
1837.

“ Legion was not engaged on this occasion,” Colonel Wylde wrote, “ except the Artillery and Rockets, which as usual distinguished themselves so much that Espartero wishes that they should be induced to remain on any terms; and I hope that sufficient to form two or three efficient field batteries will be induced to do so.” Before the 17th June about 500 had re-engaged, and more would certainly have done so had it not been for the discontent—not unnatural—of their officers, many of whom had been at this time *fifteen months* without pay. The carelessness and want of faith which characterised the Spanish Governments in their dealings with the Legion now met with their merited punishment.

Ibid.,
June 17,
1837.

To succeed General Evans a Colonel O’Connell was found; but he had not the same influence over the men, and he encountered great difficulties from the beginning. Some of these have been already alluded to, others will be treated in the next chapter; suffice it to say here that after the new Legion was formed and, indeed, within a few weeks of its formation, Colonel Wylde was compelled to describe its state as one of “ disgraceful slackness and discontent.” Nor is this much to be wondered at, for at the same time he had to admit that the men were receiving no pay, and their officers were paying for their men’s food out of their own resources. It is hardly matter of surprise that Colonel Wylde determined on going at once to Espartero, who was now near Madrid, and who alone of Spanish officials seemed trustworthy and determined; nor that this new Legion, as shown in a former chapter, had but a brief existence.

Col. Wylde,
San Sebastian,
July 19,
1837.

Vide supra,
p. 46.

While this attempt at re-organization was in progress, the following brief summary will show the general course of this desultory war between the operations at Hernani and the painful circumstances in connection with the Christino forces which will form the subject of the next chapter.

Towards the end of May, 1837, the Christino general, Irrebarren, was at Tausté, a short distance from the left bank of the Ebro, and Buerens was in communication with him on the right bank between Tudela and Zaragoza. Irrebarren had as yet conducted his operations with great

judgment, marching in a parallel direction with the opposing force of Carlists, and keeping between them and the Ebro. He thus forced the enemy into such a position that he could only enter Catalonia through the most mountainous part of Aragon—a district believed at that time to be inhabited by a Christino peasantry, and known to be inadequate to the subsistence of any large force, and unsuited for the passage of cavalry and artillery. Espartero was anxious to follow up the operations at Hernani and Irun by moving on Pamplona, with a view to co-operating with Irribarren, and, if necessary, interposing his army between the Carlists and Castile. It was known that the Carlists were about 20,000 in number, and were under the command of Don Carlos himself and Don Sebastian; and it was believed that their aim was subsistence in Upper Aragon and Catalonia. Events proved that a much higher purpose animated them; and that, fired by the successful march of Gomez, Don Carlos meditated a union with the forces of Cabrera, and an advance on Madrid. Espartero marched to Pamplona on the 29th May, but by this time an action had taken place between Irribarren and the Carlists, resulting in the death of the former. On the afternoon of the 23rd May, Irribarren had heard that the enemy was crossing the river Gallijos, near Murillo. He immediately started in pursuit with his cavalry, reaching a village called Alcala at nightfall. Next morning he learnt that the enemy was entering Huesca, and at 5 p.m. on that day he himself arrived within three-quarters of a league of that place, and made ready for battle. His troops were as follows: on the right, the 6th Light Infantry of the Legion, the Regiment of Avila, and the Companies of Guides and Sappers, supported by some cavalry and artillery of the Legion; in the centre, the regiment of Africa, and two battalions of Guards, with artillery; and on the left, one battalion of Almanza and two of Cordova.

His main force of cavalry was on the extreme left. The action commenced by the Christino Chasseurs and Carabincers driving in the advanced cavalry of the Carlists. As the Carlist masses began gradually to form up outside the

Col. Wylde,
May 27,
1837.

Lieutenant
Turner,
R.A.,
Almodovar,
May 25,
1837.

town, Irribarren's artillery came into action, but with little precision or effect. He then threw forward his light companies in skirmishing order, supported by some cavalry under Brigadier Don Diego Leon; and these were driving back the enemy's skirmishers somewhat leisurely on their supports, when, unfortunately, Leon charged prematurely at the head of a squadron of the Royal Guard, and was met by a heavy fire, which proved fatal to himself and to many of his men. The cavalry was greatly demoralised by the fall of Leon; that of the enemy behaved well, and was handled with considerable skill; the Legion behaved badly, and Irribarren had no alternative but to order a retreat, which would have degenerated into a rout had it not been for the steadiness of the Guards under Van Halen. During the retreat, Irribarren headed, with praiseworthy rashness, a cavalry charge against his pursuers, and received a mortal wound. Many similar instances of gallantry on the part of the Christinos were displayed; one—a lieutenant-colonel of the Grenadiers-à-Cheval—had three horses killed under him, and was himself wounded. The Legion lost 27 officers and 250 men, killed and wounded; and the entire loss of Irribarren's force was over 1000 of all ranks. The position of the enemy was a strong one, and their numbers were double those opposed to them; but they also suffered severe losses. After the action, the Carlists returned to Huesca, where Don Carlos himself had taken up his station.

The misfortune to Irribarren's force found a companion in connection with the Christino army under the incompetent General Oraa, at this time Captain-General of Aragon. He had marched on the 2nd June to make a *reconnaissance* of Barbastro, and, if possible, to drive the enemy out of the town. His dispositions had not been badly made, but were upset by the bad behaviour of the troops in the centre, and by the refusal at first of the French Legion on his right to go into action. Taking advantage of the confusion, the Carlists pressed in between Oraa's right, which was commanded by Brigadier Conrad (who was killed), and his left under General Buerens.

Lieutenant
Turner,
R.A.,
Berbegal,
June 3,
1837.

With difficulty the troops were sufficiently disengaged to admit of the flanks retiring in tolerable order to the old cantonments, under incessant charges of the enemy's cavalry; but the centre remained, during the retreat, in hopeless confusion. The Christino loss exceeded 600 men. The troops were completely demoralised, and the men of the Legion claimed their discharge immediately after the action, and obtained permission to march to the coast. This force, ultimately restored to order, rallied and pursued the Carlists (who evacuated Barbastro on the 5th June), reaching Tamarite on the 7th, and Almenasa, in Catalonia, on the 8th. At this place, General Baron de Meer assumed command, and the force moved forward to Balaguer on the 9th, in the hope of preventing the Carlists from crossing the Segre.

The activity displayed by the Carlists in the North-east found imitation elsewhere. On the 21st and 22nd July two Carlist columns entered Castile by different ways, intending to unite at Monasterio. The reserve of the Army of the North under Escala was detailed to march in pursuit. At the same time, a Carlist force under Castor was occupying the attention of General Scoane, who had to draw on the garrison of Bilbao and appeal for assistance from Lord John Hay in order to maintain his ascendancy. The Carlist, Guergue, had in the meantime taken Segovia, and occupied the Sierra between Burgos and Soria, following up these operations by driving almost to the gates of Madrid the Christino force under Mendez Vigo.

Col. Wylde,
Santander,
July 27,
1837.

Alarmed for the safety of the capital, Espartero had hurried south, reaching Madrid from Guadalaxara on the 12th August. There he remained until the 16th, when he moved his head-quarters to Arabaca, two leagues off, under circumstances which deserve special consideration.

Col. Wylde,
Madrid,
Aug. 12,
1837.

CHAPTER XIV.

CLOUDS.

PREVIOUS to detailing the mutinous conduct among the Christino armies which darkens the narrative of their operations in 1837, it is well to remind the reader yet again that such conduct was singularly rare. "The soldier of Spain is one of the best when placed under an experienced general, and brave, intelligent officers. He is possessed of cool and steady valour; he long resists fatigue, and readily inures himself to labour; he lives on little, endures hunger without complaining, executes the orders of his superiors without hesitation, and never suffers a murmur to escape him." These words represent the opinions, also, not merely of the writer who uses them, but of the whole of the English Commissioners who were with the Queen's armies in this war. They are almost literally confirmed by the Commissioner who, in this very year, 1837, accompanied the Army of the Centre under General Oraa.

M. de la
Borde.

Col. Lacy,
Dec. 31,
1837.

To what, then, can the committal of such atrocities as those of Segovia, Vittoria and Pamplona, be attributed? What was it that developed among the patient Spanish soldiery that insubordination and violence which, in 1837, found expression at Hernani, Bilbao and Arabaca? One writer attributes it to "want of pay, the inaction of some of the chiefs, the reverses of others, and the toleration of insubordination." But these were merely *additional* irritants, not the prime cause. Want of pay was far from peculiar to 1837, in a country where the treasury was generally empty; and the Christinos bore inaction and

Bollaert.

reverses with a patience and philosophy which other nations might envy. The toleration of insubordination might *increase* the evil, but is an eccentric reason to give for its *origin*. The true reason was known to Espartero, and cannot be too urgently insisted upon both in justice to the troops and as a warning for the future.

It has already been stated that the curse which blighted the operations in the field was political exigency in Madrid. Parties were ready to win a petty victory in the Cortes, even at the cost of a defeat of the army in the field. And then, instead of expressing regret for their short-sightedness, they would endeavour to transfer popular indignation from themselves to the army, by a wholesale detraction of the officers and men, who were not present to defend themselves. The Calatrava Ministry had made itself especially unpopular in this way with the army, for it not merely allowed the troops to be maligned without offering to defend them, but actually—by the voice of one of its leading members, M. Mendizabal—uttered the grossest calumnies against those in positions of command and responsibility.

On one occasion, in replying to a criticism on his administration, which left the army penniless and starving, he, the Minister of Finance, had the effrontery to say that money enough had been sent to the army to fill their waist-belts with gold ounces, and that rations had been at all times abundantly supplied also. Even men like Espartero, who had high views of discipline and patriotic self-denial, were indignant beyond control. What, then, could be expected of the mass of suffering soldiers? Statements like these, on such authority, awakened in their minds doubts of the chiefs under whom they served, and through whom their pay and rations would naturally come. From doubt it was but an easy step to a belief that their generals retained for their own use the pay which they now heard officially had been so lavishly issued. And soon in every camp and garrison were seen dark looks, and were heard more than muttered imprecations. Their generals were now in their eyes nothing but traitors, and the junior officers were afraid to

Col. Wylde,
Torre
Laguna,
Aug. 21,
1837.

Ibid.,
Aug. 20,
1837.

exercise their authority in many cases, lest they should precipitate the mutiny that was imminent.

Col. Wylde,
San Sebastian,
July 5,
1837.

Things came to a crisis first at Hernani and Santander—in the division which had been commanded by General Evans, and was now under Count Mirasol. The former's continual struggles to obtain pay and rations for his men were so well known, that when the mutiny broke out, the cry was, that since the English general left, there had only been traitors left to command them. In attempting to pacify the troops, Count Mirasol was knocked down, his aide-de-camp killed, and his house injured. In a slight re-action which followed, the troops expressed regret; but Count Mirasol considered that the hint to himself had been sufficiently broad, and handed the command over to General Jauregui. The new Auxiliary Legion refused at the same time to obey Colonel O'Connell unless they received their pay, and the atmosphere was kept at fever-heat by the presence in San Sebastian of some fifty officers of the old Legion, who refused with national caution to accept a passage to England unless their arrears of pay were given to them. The endurance of the troops under their many privations, previous to this *émeute*, may be guessed from a complaint made during the mutiny by the Princessa Regiment of what it is to be hoped was exceptional conduct, viz., that their adjutant had beaten and ill-treated them on parade for not being clean, although he knew they had not a maravedi to buy soap or blacking with!

Lieutenant
Lynn, R.E.,
Miranda de
Ebro,
Aug. 19,
1837.

The discontent showed itself again at Miranda de Ebro in the following manner. On the night of the 17th August, 1837, the Provincial Regiment of Segovia, which had been for some time in a state of insubordination, marched in from Santander. Having been guilty of mutinous acts the previous day at Suzana, General Escalera, who commanded at Miranda, determined to make an example by punishing the ringleaders. He therefore drew up the garrison * out-

* The garrison consisted of two battalions of Estremadura, two companies of the Regiment of Almanza, with some artillery and cavalry.

side the town, and on the arrival of the regiment, he made sixteen of the ringleaders prisoners, and had intended to shoot them at once, but was persuaded to postpone the execution until the day following. About 8 p.m., a great part of the regiment of Segovia appeared in the streets, shouting for the release of the prisoners, and accusing their chiefs of keeping their pay for their own use. They took possession of the bridge and entrances to the streets, and were soon joined by many men belonging to the other regiments, the artillery and cavalry alone taking no part in the disturbance. About 9 p.m., the prisoners were given up to them, and then 150 men went to the square in front of the general's house, and after calling to him to come out, forced the entrance. He appeared on the staircase with his staff, and endeavoured to pacify them, but many more of the mutineers entering the house, he was dragged to the door and barbarously murdered. A number of officers were then cruelly beaten, and the crowd quietly dispersed. No attempt was made to dispute with the mutineers or to check them; the regular guards did not interfere, nor was it believed that the other regiments would have fired on that of Segovia, had they been ordered.

Anticipating matters here a little, it may be interesting to tell how this base assassination of a brave officer, who refused to seek safety in flight, although strongly urged, was avenged by Espartero, who was deeply affected when the intelligence reached him at Torre Laguna. Returning with his army to the north in the beginning of winter, Espartero reached Miranda de Ebro on the 25th October, 1837, where he remained for a few days. This place is the frontier town of Navarre, and is now important as the junction of several lines of railway. The Ebro flows through the town, and is the boundary between Castile and Navarre. Espartero confided his intentions to no one; but on the 30th October he paraded the whole army without the limits of the town, the regiment of Segovia being drawn up in a prominent place, flanked by others and by artillery. The general, to the surprise of his staff, appeared in full dress with all his orders and decorations, and at once summoning the senior and

Communicated by
W. H. Wylde,
Esq., an eye-witness.
Col. Wylde,
Miranda de Ebro,
Nov. 1, 1837.
Byrne.

staff officers to accompany him, he rode up to the regiment of Segovia. He then addressed them somewhat as follows:—

“I come to ask you for my old friend, my comrade in battle, your chief, Escalera? Where is he?”

Then pointing to the ground where he had been buried, he went on:—

“He is there—foully murdered; and I call upon all of you who are true soldiers, to give up the names of his assassins.”

There was a dead silence. He again appealed to them, but still without effect. He then ordered the regiment to be numbered off from the right, and every twentieth man to be marched to the front, and prepared for immediate execution. This had hardly been done, when a sergeant reluctantly came forward and said that he had a list of the actual murderers, some ten in number. They were accordingly placed where the others had stood, only one of those drawn at first happening to have been really guilty. Of the ten, one protested most vehemently that he had taken no part in the disturbance, and his struggles were great as he was dragged to a broken wall, against which the others had already been placed for execution. He was placed on the left of the others, but before the fatal volley was fired he started nimbly round the corner of the wall, and ran along the front of the troops in such a way that it would have been dangerous to fire at him. Being re-captured, he was dragged back to the wall, when a voice was heard in the ranks of the regiment, saying that the real murderer was a man of the same name, who was now in hospital at Burgos; and this proving on inquiry to be correct, the other was brought from hospital and shot, while the innocent and fortunate protesting one escaped. Many of the other ring-leaders were also severely punished, some twenty or thirty being sent to the galleys for life.

Col. Wyld,
and
Bollaert.

Annual
Register,
and
Bollaert.

Similar atrocities to that committed at Miranda were witnessed at Vittoria and Pamplona. In the latter place, a large body of mutineers headed by Brigadier Don Leon Iriarte, but, as he said, against his will, created a disturbance

in the city, clamouring for their pay, and murdered General Saarsfield and Colonel Mendevél, on the plea that they had intercepted the money for their own purposes. The same vengeance was dealt out at Pamplona by Espartero, when he reached that city; General Iriarte and four other officers being executed, notwithstanding their previous gallant and valuable services. At the court-martial it was proved that the general had sufficient influence over the mutineers to save the life of a friend. Espartero said, if he could save a friend he had sufficient influence to save his general; and it was the first duty of a soldier to protect his general. Iriarte was accordingly shot. This was not, however, till long after.

No one but Espartero could have ventured on these stern measures of reprisal in the discontented state of the army; but his popularity with the troops was very great.

In Vittoria, the governor and many public officials were assassinated by mutineers, besides Colonel Lopez, chief of the staff, a colonel commanding the 1st Regiment, and two deputies of the Provincial Junta.

In the end of August, 1837, Espartero had seen not a little of this mutinous feeling even in the force under his immediate command. As mentioned elsewhere, he moved his troops from Madrid on the 16th, to Arabaca, a place about two leagues distant. A very resentful feeling prevailed among the officers against the ministry, more especially against M. Mendizabal. The tact and popularity of Espartero, combined with the knowledge that he quite sympathised with their almost righteous indignation, tided matters over for a time; but on the 17th one of his brigadiers, Van Halen, reported that the officers of his brigade quartered at Pozuelo, had refused to do duty. The non-commissioned officers and men had, however, obeyed his orders. The situation was awkward; Espartero had only too many jealous enemies in Madrid who would have rejoiced over his discomfiture, even if it involved their country's peril; and with fury in his heart he himself knew this well. While he brooded, the discontented officers arrived, and sought an interview. Sick at heart now, he made one more unreal attempt at conciliation.

Col. Wyldé,
Torre
Laguna,
August 20,
1837.

It failed—of course it failed; play-acting and soft words have a *way* of failing, when they are used by a hesitating man to others who are very seriously in earnest. The sneers of politicians had touched the officers as keenly as had the newly-awakened doubts of their generals roused the men. The halting discussion soon ceased, and with a purely military view of the offence Espartero ordered the malcontents to return to their quarters, and await orders. The regiments in which this feeling was manifested were four battalions of the guards, one of the provincial guards, forming Brigadier Main's command, and four battalions of the guards commanded by Brigadier Van Halen.

Espartero was not, however, the man to be baffled without another effort. He sent for the sergeants of these regiments, and reasoned with them. With a true soldier's patriotism, and with an eloquence all his own, he appealed to them not to let their own grievances, just though they were, stand in the light of their country's interest; and he implored them not to play into the hands of those who had proved themselves the army's most malicious critics. He did not plead in vain. The officers had certain lofty, sentimental grievances which were harder to bear than any mere personal injustice. The non-commissioned officers and men, while equally capable of a high *esprit-de-corps*, had as yet been fretting under a sense of mere personal hardship, which vanished before the earnest appeal of a leader whom they loved, and in whose courage and honour they believed with an implicit faith. The result was satisfactory; the army moved forward to its fresh work with zeal; the disaffected officers were left behind, and the sergeants received appointments to the vacant commissions.

A man's worst enemies are indeed those of his own household. Was it not enough for Espartero and his men to have to wrestle, in the agony of civil war, with those who sought to demolish all that represented their national creed and liberty, but must selfish place-hunters also burrow under the foundations, and bark at their success, lest it should hide their miserable selves from public observation? The lesson

taught by the clouds which darkened the loyalty of the Christino troops in 1837 is not for Spain only, nor is it to be studied alone in time of war. Party spirit, transferred to military operations, paralysed the arm of England in the American War of Independence, and will numb the energy of any country's army, even in the most righteous cause. And there have been ugly symptoms of late years in England of the army being made the arena of party warfare, which cannot be too quickly or too thoroughly stamped out. The heart of an army becomes as water, when it feels that it no longer is the executive of a nation, but only of a party; and the discipline of an army ceases to be noble, and is at the best a sullen servitude, when egotistical partisans or vain quacks bid for a hollow popularity, by throwing doubts on the honour, the capacity, or the courage of those whom that army has to follow.

CHAPTER XV.

THE ADVANCE OF DON CARLOS ON MADRID.

HAD Don Carlos carried out his intention of co-operating with Cabrera, and then advancing on the metropolis with some determination; had his Court been free from jealousies; and had his sympathisers in Madrid possessed the courage of their opinions, there seems little doubt that he would have established such a hold there as would in time have paralysed the country against further resistance to his authority. The possession of the metropolis decides, as a rule, the form of government. There are generally, indeed, rival cities which resent the authority of the capital; but the vast majority of the country's inhabitants accept as inevitable the rule which is exercised from the metropolis, and which has the command of the offices from which springs the control of administrative national work. This is an exception to ordinary political precedent. As a rule agitations are urban, and the resistance is from the provinces. But if the metropolis is once carried, the change is generally accepted in the country districts, and resented only in those towns which are sufficiently large to feel a right to be consulted. For example, the change of government at Paris, which would be accepted in Brittany with philosophy, would sorely exercise the citizens of Marseilles.

Don Carlos was deficient in energy, and his Court was not harmonious. The result was the failure of an expedition which had in it the elements of success. Had he seriously laid siege to Madrid, he would have required no wooden horse to convey his soldiers within the walls. Had the sun of

Carlism been in the ascendant, there would have been no lack of worshippers in the Puerta. The politics of many so-called patriots changed several times a day with the conflicting rumours which distracted brokers, and which should have nerved statesmen. How many of these would have become demonstrative Carlists had the Pretender succeeded in occupying Madrid it is difficult to say, but they would have been many.

According to the account of a partial writer, which will be amplified from the correspondence of the English Commissioners, the following is a summary of Don Carlos' movements. He took with him Don Sebastian, Moreno (chief of the staff), 16 battalions, 10 squadrons of cavalry, and 2 guns, and marched from the vicinity of Arga by Lumbier towards Aragon on the 16th May, 1837. On the 24th he fought the action of Huesca, followed by that of Barbastro, against the Christinos under Irribarren and Oraa. On the 12th June, in the neighbourhood of Grá, he again engaged the Christinos under the Baron de Meer, and was defeated after an obstinate battle. In spite of this disaster, Don Carlos succeeded in effecting a junction with Cabrera at Cherta on the Ebro, not far from Tortosa; and he treated the Catalonian chief with a warmth and courtesy which soon awakened jealousy in that most jealous Court. The united force then marched towards Valencia, pursued very lamely by the Baron de Meer, and conducted at first with considerable skill. On the 15th July, Don Carlos was attacked by Oraa near Buñol and Chiva, and after an engagement which lasted a whole day he was compelled to retreat. He then retired to Canta Vieja to recruit his shattered forces. Canta Vieja, a fortified place in Lower Aragon, was a stronghold of Cabrera's, with considerable natural advantages. There was not, however, food for so large a force; and Cabrera adopted his usual tactics, scattering his forces through the surrounding districts, and keeping a network of outposts all over the country. Oraa—deliberate to a degree which under such circumstances was a crime—

Bollaert.

Vide supra,
pp. 139,
140.

was arranging a joint attack with Espartero and Buerens against Don Carlos, when his scheme was destroyed by a diversion of great importance and excellent arrangement. A Carlist chief, Zariatogui, the old friend and comrade of Zumalacarreguy, at the head of an active column, marched



BUÑOL, VALENCIA.

(From sketch by Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson, R.E.)

unexpectedly from Navarre, crossed the Ebro, and traversed Castile in the direction of Madrid, within five leagues of which place his advanced columns had arrived on the 11th August. The terror-stricken Government summoned Espartero to their assistance, and so put an end to the plans of Oraa. An unintentional act of strategy aided Zariatogui, a Carlist movement in Navarre having prevented his pursuers from following him with energy.

Don Carlos, having escaped the concerted attack which had been meditated, was soon able to take the initiative; and on the 23rd August, at Herrera and Villar, defeated General Buerens—who had been forbidden by Oraa to act independently—completely, inflicting on him a loss of 92 officers and 2600 killed, wounded, and prisoners. This victory he gained without the aid of Cabrera's division; and

the merit was attributed to Moreno, the chief of Don Sebastian's staff.*

Espartero's presence and energy led soon to the retreat of Zariatogui from before Madrid; and he then hastened to rejoin Oraa in the hope of inflicting a blow on Don Carlos which should avenge Buerens' defeat. He commanded at this date the whole of the Christino forces in Spain; but the number which he could muster for the special service on which he was now engaged does not seem to have much exceeded 20,000 men. The marvellous activity and omnipresence of the Carlists neutralised to a great extent the numerical superiority of the Christinos. Don Carlos on this occasion affected to retreat before Espartero, but really, in conjunction with Cabrera, merely evaded him, and marched rapidly on Madrid. On the 12th September he was within four leagues of the metropolis, and Cabrera's cavalry were actually engaged within five hundred yards of the walls. At this moment Madrid might have been captured with comparative ease; its garrison consisted mainly of Urbanos; and there were many of the inhabitants who would have been in sympathy with the besiegers. But the prize was so great as to bewilder Don Carlos; he could not believe in the possibility of its easy attainment, and while he hesitated the opportunity was lost. The eager Espartero was on his trail; and after showing the metropolis to his army Don Carlos immediately commenced to retire northwards. Pursued by Espartero, he was also deserted by Cabrera, who left him, indignant at the apathy and vacillation which he had displayed. As is common with retreating armies, discipline became lax; one general quarrelled with another; one favourite at Court carried his jealousy of another beyond the usual backbiting, and made of it a public scandal; even the rank and file began to murmur at having been brought on a

* Previous to the defeat of Buerens, the Carlists (in order to get food) had been dispersed in Camarilla, Miravete, Aliaga, Alcala, and Segura,—observing Oraa. Oraa, anxious to hem them in, had caused Buerens to advance to Visiedo,—Iriarte and Borso to Parales, and Noguerras to Alframba.

fool's errand from their native provinces. Don Carlos' march on Madrid was very similar to the march on Derby of the Pretender, Charles Stuart. Boastful and even successful at the outset, it collapsed at the very moment when fruition might have been predicted. The coldness between the Carlist army of the Basque Provinces and that of Cabrera was never afterwards removed; the two fought nominally for the same cause, but there was no longer anything like genuine sympathy between them. Honours were heaped upon Cabrera by his chief for subsequent successes; but in conferring them Don Carlos acted in atonement for the past, and with a shrewd eye to possible services in the future, rather than in a frank and uncalculating recognition of present exploits and deserts. Viewed with a professional eye, the collapse of Don Carlos in his march on Madrid is to be regretted as robbing the war of many interesting episodes; viewed, however, as a blow, never to be recovered from, to a cause the success of which would have involved putting back the clock of Spanish life for a century, the collapse is a matter for congratulation and joy.

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The collapse cannot be described better than in the dispassionate words of a contemporary: "The Basques and Navarrese were desirous of returning home, being utterly weary of expeditionary warfare. . . . Many of his (Don Carlos') principal chiefs, and Moreno in particular, insisted upon an immediate termination of the expedition. . . . Don Carlos found himself once more at Durango; and here it is reported he made no secret of his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the latter part of the campaign. He removed Moreno from his command, and went so far as to put certain officers of rank under arrest, besides disgracing several others." From another writer, a Carlist, it appears that "when too late, Don Carlos had requested Cabrera to take the command, which he refused to do."

Bollaert.

Askwith
MSS.

The story would be somewhat bald without some details from other writers. From the biographers of Cabrera and from other sources, especially from Lieutenant Askwith, R.A., it appears that the defeat of Don Carlos at Chiva on

15th July was of considerable importance. Don Carlos courted this encounter against the advice of Cabrera, who strongly urged him to march on Madrid at once; and who had learnt that Oraa had been reinforced by the transport



CASTILLÓN DE LA PLANA.
(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.N.)

from Castellon to Valencia of Borso's division on board two English men-of-war.* His advice was however disregarded; and the Carlist force advancing against Valencia occupied various small places, including Buñol and Chiva, in *échelon*. When the action, which was deliberately planned on both sides, commenced, Borso was on the right of the Christino army, Iriarte on the left, Amor in command of the cavalry,

Borso de Carminate, in command of Portuguese Legion.



CHIVA.
(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.N.)

and Noguerras of the reserve. The Carlists commenced with their lines at right angles to the road leading to Valencia. Oraa changed front on his left, throwing forward his right and altering his dispositions. The attack then commenced; Iriarte attacking the Carlist left, Borso the centre, and

* H.M.S. *Hurlequin*, Captain Erskine, and H.M.S. *Brabham*.

Nogueras the right. The resistance was stubborn but ineffectual; Buñol was taken, and the Carlists driven back upon Chiva. Both armies at this time suffered sorely from thirst and fatigue, no water being within reach. At Chiva the battle continued; and the Carlists' loss was placed by Oraa at 1000 men and 200 prisoners, his own loss being only 400. Either this estimate was found to be inaccurate, or it was necessary to submit larger figures to Madrid, for some days later Oraa declared the loss of the Carlists to have been 2000 in prisoners alone, and 400 in deserters. On this occasion he admitted his own loss to have been 853 killed and wounded. Cabrera in his diary stated the loss of Oraa to have been 700 men; and that of the Carlists to have been 117 killed, 218 wounded, and 281 prisoners. At times one despairs of finding accuracy in military history; the temptations to exaggerate are so very great; but there can be little doubt that this battle of Chiva was a grave check to Don Carlos, and it was hardly alluded to by him in any despatch or gazette from his shelter in Canta Vieja. Only one anecdote in connection with it survives worthy of preserving. It appears that Cabrera in a fit of despair exposed himself frequently with great rashness, charging at times at the head of his own escort of 20 men. So foolish in its recklessness was his courting of danger, that the old General Moreno remonstrated with him, begging him not to forget his duty as a general in command. It is a pleasing story: on the one side the fire and rashness of one who was a thorough soldier in all but training, on the other the calm shrewdness of the veteran who objected to kings and knights playing at being mere pawns on the chess-board of war.

The country round Canta Vieja to which the Carlists now retired was mountainous; and the want of provisions in the district saved them from much molestation from Oraa's force. But the same want exposed the Carlists to great distress, and led to that disintegration which was a preliminary step to the collapse of the expedition. Their division "of Navarre," and that of Sanz went in one direction; that of Quilez in another. A little coolness sprang up between Cabrera and the court, and he who shortly before had thirsted

to accompany his royal leader on a march of conquest had actually to be *ordered* to hand over his command to Llangostera and accompany Don Carlos during the remainder of the expedition.

That Oraa *meant* to follow up the success at Chiva is matter of no doubt; but circumstances were too strong for him. The country through which he hoped to manœuvre was literally destitute of provisions; his men were without clothing and sandals, as well as bread; they became relaxed in discipline, and began to dissolve in search of food; so he had no alternative, and had to fall back on a base including Villafranca and Monreal. It was immediately after this that the Carlists, quitting their stronghold, succeeded in defeating Buerens so thoroughly at Herrera; and by so doing utterly discomfited the plans of the Christinos, and were enabled to march on Madrid. There was much in this success that was accidental. In the first place Don Carlos did not quit the neighbourhood of Santa Vieja save because all the provisions were exhausted; and in the second place, Buerens was under the impression that he was in co-operation with Oraa, and little thought that his messengers had been intercepted, and his plans been made known to the enemy. Oraa's forces were now indignant at the disaster of Herrera, and were hungry to gather laurels again such as they had obtained at Chiva. They started towards Madrid in pursuit of Don Carlos, leaving the plains of Valencia and Castillon with an insignificant force for their protection. Cabrera—ever alive to such opportunities—at once took advantage of the circumstance, and ordered one of his customary raids.

It was in September that a stronger mind than Oraa's was brought to bear against the Carlist expedition; but even Espartero was baffled by the rapid movements of his opponents. The disaster to Buerens, which called for Oraa's special exertions in pursuit, led to Espartero's *corps d'armée* also making a series of forced marches in the hope of coming up with Don Carlos from another point. The two Christino armies united on the 3rd September at Daroca, that of Oraa now assuming the duties of the advanced portion of the

Vide supra,
P. 152.

Col. Wyld,
Cuenca,
Sept. 9,
1837.

column. The pursuit was rapid and earnest; and the Carlists were baffled in their attempts to get supplies at Albarracui or Noguera, and in their hopes of capturing such places as Cuença with the same intention. Some of the marches made were as much as thirteen leagues, and both pursuers and pursued were in a state of great exhaustion. The pursuit was of a peculiar character; the Carlists having so exhausted the miserable villages through which they passed as to render it necessary for the Christinos to march by other, but parallel, roads. The most severe of all the efforts made by Espartero's troops was that made for the relief of Cuença. Expresses had been sent to the governor urging him to hold out for twenty-four hours, and the resistance was successful. Espartero on his arrival at Cuença found himself in such a position that, in the event of Don Carlos effecting a junction with Zariatogui, he himself could get to Madrid before them and checkmate their attempts. Should they prefer going towards Murcia, he could follow them, marching on the inner circle next Madrid. The state of the Christino troops at this time was all that could be wished; the fire and enthusiasm of Espartero had permeated the whole force, and yet he had been sorely tried. The miserable Oraa, with six battalions and 500 cavalry, standing upon his dignity, had left Espartero at Albarracui, on the plea that as captain-general of Aragon he could not quit that province. Espartero, as by royal order commander-in-chief of the whole of the Queen's armies, could have compelled obedience, but was unwilling to run the risk of an open rupture; and preferred to carry on the campaign by himself with a diminished force. He now had under his immediate command on this expedition only the divisions of Generals Ribiero and Iriarte, and the remains of that of General Buerens; in all twenty-one battalions, 700 cavalry, and four mountain guns. The total could hardly have exceeded 11,000 men; and the force opposed to him must have been fully 16,000 men. Of this number, however, it had been ascertained that Cabrera's division, unaccustomed to regular warfare, and impatient of suffering, was already

becoming very undisciplined, and would be more formidable as guerillas after a defeat than as soldiers in battle; and the presence of Espartero, like that of Napoleon or Wellington, was equal to many battalions.

But here comes a singular story, illustrative to a remarkable extent of the absence of any system of obtaining information, and very suggestive of the state of the peasantry even in the neighbourhood of the metropolis. That Madrid was the aim of the Carlists was soon quite evident, and was endorsed by the boastings of the North, and the murmurs of the alarmed citizens. Espartero decided on swelling the garrison; and his decision was influenced by the panic of the Government. He resolved on reaching Madrid by an indirect but perhaps more speedy route, by Villas del Rey, Tendella, and Alcala, crossing the Tagus at the bridge of Annon. Unfortunately, the circuit made by Espartero enabled the advanced guard of the Carlists, under Forcadell, some 3000 strong, to threaten Madrid on the 12th September with impunity. On that day, the main body of the Carlists was only crossing the Tagus at another point, nor did it advance beyond Arganda, where it heard of the movements of Espartero. The retreat was then determined upon; but, it will scarcely be credited that up to the night of the 13th September, neither the Queen's general nor the Queen's Government had the least idea where the enemy's headquarters, with Don Carlos and Don Sebastian, were stationed, or whence they were likely to make their appearance!

It was now as necessary to pursue Don Carlos on his retreat from Madrid as it had been to follow him on his advance. Espartero having calmed the terror of the metropolis, and having marched past the Queen Regent with much pomp and ceremony, went into quarters in the suburbs to refit. He strongly urged the formation of another *corps d'armée* from the armies of the north and centre, to be devoted entirely to the pursuit of Don Carlos, who was evidently shirking an engagement. With two columns in pursuit, it would be possible either to force the enemy to fight, or to drive him into the mountains, whence he would

Col. Wylde,
Madrid,
Sept. 14,
1837.

be compelled by want of provisions to return. He strongly urged this, but he might just as well have spoken to the winds. He was obliged to trust to himself.

Col. Wylde,
Hercule,
Sept. 23,
1837.

Leaving Madrid, therefore, on the 17th September, Espartero marched to Alcala, to Guadalaxara (evacuated by Don Carlos on his approach), and back again to Alcala. During this march, on more than one occasion, the Christino advanced guard came into conflict with the rear-guard of the Carlists, and the cheering intelligence was received that Cabrera, in disgust, had gone off with his division to

Col. Wylde,
Campos-
bulos,
Sept. 25,
1837.

Aragon. On the 21st, the Christino force, still pursuing, reached Torrija (a place on the high road between Madrid and Zaragoza), and found that the whole of Don Carlos' force was at Brihuega, only three leagues in advance, and was engaged in baking and washing, under the impression that the whole of Espartero's force had gone back to Guadalaxara, instead of a part merely, which had taken that direction by mistake during a heavy fog. Brihuega* was in a deep hollow, surrounded on the side of Espartero's approach by steep heights, with only a narrow zigzag road leading into the town, and with no exit on the other side save a steep narrow defile, commanded by the few small guns which accompanied the Christinos. Unfortunately, Espartero was utterly ignorant of the enemy's position and the nature of the country. Had it been otherwise, his natural daring would have led him gladly to an attack, which, if vigorous, would have been irresistible, and might have resulted in the capture of the Pretender. The opportunity was, however, lost; and the Carlists, observing their danger, made a hurried escape. It was at this time and near this place, at Alcolea, that the three English Commissioners were found who had been sent out to the Army of the Centre in the same capacity as Colonel Wylde and Lieutenant Lynn to that of the North. The three, Colonel Lacy, R.A., Captain Williams, R.E., and Lieutenant Crofton, R.A., had fallen

* This place was associated with another episode of the English in Spain in the former century.

into the hands of the Carlists, who had declined to recognise their right to diplomatic privileges. A *parole* was exacted; and the result was that Colonel Lacy—who had a right by international precedent to immunity—remained in Spain in the capacity for which he was intended, while the other two officers were replaced by Captain Alderson, R.E., and Lieutenant Askwith, R.A.

The pursuit continued; and it was found that on the 28th September Don Carlos had effected a junction with Zariatogui at Aranda de Duero, and at once proceeded to take advantage of the depôts of provisions which had been established by the latter general in the district between Burgos and Burgo de Osma, called the Pinares. At this time Espartero, already strengthened since Oraa had left him, was again reinforced by the Baron de Carandolet's division, and divided his army into two *corps*, the divisions of General Lorenzo and the Baron de Carandolet forming one of fourteen battalions under the former officer, and the other, of 31 battalions, remaining under himself. This had hardly been done ere the Carlists, turning on Lorenzo with a force of 24 battalions, were with difficulty kept at bay until Espartero came to the rescue, and, attacking their left and centre in two columns, sent them flying in the utmost disorder towards St. Domingo de Silos. He failed, however, to turn the victory to sufficient account, as he was unwilling to pursue until some convoys of clothing and provisions should reach him, which he knew were then on their way from Madrid.

Col. Wyldé,
Covarrubias,
Oct. 4,
1837.

Ibid.,
Oct. 5,
1837.

Resuming the pursuit on the 7th October, the Christinos learnt from many deserters that there was great discord among the Carlists, and that the Navarrese and Basques had announced their determination to return to the provinces, whether Don Carlos should do so or not. The result was soon apparent: on the 19th October Zariatogui crossed the Ebro at one point in full retreat, and on the 24th Don Carlos crossed it at another point, having failed to carry out his intention of proceeding himself to Aragon, where owing to Cabrera's energy there was more hope for his cause than in the now weary provinces of the north. Such was the

Col. Wyldé,
Barbadillo,
del
Mercado,
Oct. 7,
1837.

demoralisation of his forces at the last, that after a final skirmish with Lorenzo, he himself with the Cura Merino had to fly in one direction, while each subordinate chief led such of his men as would follow him in another.*

This was the end of the boasted royal expedition which was to consist of a triumphal march terminating in the occupation of the capital. No fiction could conceal the fact of its collapse; the inhabitants of the Basque provinces, who had seen it start and now witnessed the return of its fragments, could judge for themselves; and from this time they began to speculate on any means by which they could secure their cherished *Fueros*, irrespective of Don Carlos and his cause, with which they had been educated by the priests to believe that their *Fueros* were indissolubly connected. It seems, therefore, a suitable time to pause and consider the nature of those privileges and customs which were dearer to the Basques than even their nationality.

Before doing so, it may be mentioned that after driving the enemy across the Ebro, Espartero devoted himself at Miranda de Ebro, Pamplona, and Logroño, for the remaining weeks of the year 1837, to the punishment of the ringleaders in the disturbances mentioned in the last chapter, to the disciplining of his armies, and to the organisation of his means of transport and supply.

* During all military operations Don Carlos was a cipher, and was ungrateful to those who served him. He was seldom seen by the troops (disliking even to put on uniform), and regarded them with indifference, rarely speaking even to his most distinguished officers. However great the hardships suffered by his army, his Court always fared luxuriously.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FUEROS.

NO one can understand the tenacity of the Carlists in their various wars without first mastering the somewhat complicated question of the Fuegos. It is well also that they should be thoroughly understood before entering on the Munagorri episode of the war under consideration in these pages.

First,—let the historical side of the Fuegos be studied. Here, fortunately, a rich mine of information has been provided by the industry of two of the officers attached to the Christino armies during the war. Their researches having been made on the spot, their labours were naturally lighter; but even they had to confess that, owing to the complicated nature of the Fuegos, the number of royal decrees and provincial laws affecting them, and the dim allusions to ancient customs and traditional rights, the whole subject was involved in mystery even to the Spaniards themselves. This mystery, however, did not diminish the faith of the sturdy native of the Basque Provinces. Where there was any doubt, he gave it in his own favour; where there was anything that he did not know, he unconsciously accepted the *ignotum pro magnifico*, and interpreted it by the dictionary of his own wishes. Nor did he ever allow any imperial rather than provincial patriotism to cloud his beliefs. He knew the Basque Provinces first; Spain came next; but the interval was wide. There was, too, a delicious conceit about these Fuegos, which the student cannot but admire, even while he condemns. The inhabitants of the provinces

MSS. by
Lieutenant
W. H. Ask-
with, R.A.,
and Lieut.
Lynn, R.E.,
Madrid,
Dec. 17,
1841.

concerned always have maintained that these privileges were enjoyed by them from time immemorial,—that they were granted to them for ever, and that the kings and princes, who at various times confirmed them, only granted them what was their own by right and inheritance. Careful inquiry will not bear out this theory.

The truth is, that the privileges claimed were once enjoyed by the whole of Spain ; and that they were preserved and even augmented in these northern provinces, while they were reduced and abolished in the rest of the kingdom. It is also beyond a doubt that the augmentation referred to was in spite of the efforts made by the Crown to curtail them. The hardy men of the north were crafty and shrewd, and invariably made their demands for increased privileges when the country was weakened by war, or weary with internal disorders. To the watchful opportunities ever come ; and in this case they were increased by the inert tolerance of many Spanish kings, by the impecuniosity of others, and by the vigilant fretfulness of foreign Powers, who knew where a sore was, and how it could best be irritated.

The principal *Fueros*, as they existed during the last century, were as follows :—

1. That the provinces paid no contributions to the Crown. The contributions in Navarre under the title of “*Subsidio voluntario*,” and in the Basque provinces, “*Donativo*,” collected by the municipal authorities, had been gradually alienated from the Crown.

2. Next came the fact that the custom-houses being placed upon the frontiers of Castile and Aragon admitted of the introduction into the northern provinces of foreign produce and all the principal articles of consumption, subject only to small local duties. Other articles, which elsewhere in Spain were forbidden, or subject to heavy duties, such as cotton and woollen goods, silks, &c., were permitted in the north to enter in like manner, and in an unlimited quantity.

3. Then came another very important privilege. Each of the northern provinces was governed by its own patrimonial laws, and the appointment of the judges and civil authorities

lay with the people. The last-named functionaries were entrusted with the collection of taxes to meet the expenses of the interior administration of the provincial Government.

4. Of all the Fueros, however, the most important was the exemption from the Quinta or conscription for the army; and this was coupled with the exemption from the use of the *papel sellado*, or stamped paper.

5. The remaining Fueros were of minor importance; but there were distinctions—often very marked—between those of Navarre and the other provinces.

There can be no doubt that the privilege of enjoying an almost completely free trade with foreign countries was most valuable to the inhabitants of the north, especially at times when the commerce of Spain was nearly ruined by prohibitory duties, and by oppressive restrictions on the industry of the people. The northern provinces became frequently a great depôt for contraband goods to the rest of Spain. The official literature of Madrid bristles at such times with innumerable royal decrees, protesting against the great abuses which in this way defrauded the public revenue, and reminding the people of the north that their Fueros never had contemplated more than the introduction without duty of a sufficient quantity of foreign goods for *the use and consumption of the inhabitants*. There was a charming simplicity about this definition: as if *any* limit could be defined to the wants of a Basque lady for silks and lace!

But of all the Fueros alluded to above, the one which, in the too general state of Spain, appealed most clearly to the northern interests and intensified their love for Home Rule, was that giving to the natives the power of appointing magistrates and other civil authorities by election, while the rest of Spain was devoured by swarms of locust-like *empleados*. Not merely in the large towns, but also in every small village, did this much-valued privilege exist.

It must be admitted by any impartial student of the question, that, viewed in a historical light, the men of the north had a good *primâ facie* case for the maintenance of their

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Fueros. Writing with an unconscious bias in the opposite direction, the officers above-mentioned yet give sufficient evidence of this. When first conferred, in the 11th and 12th centuries, the Fueros were almost necessary to the existence of the northern communities, on account of the sterility and depopulated state of the country. The towns in these provinces which were most frequently mentioned in the original decrees, were Bilbao, San Sebastian, Irun, Fuentarabia, Tolosa, Durango, and Vittoria.

The Fueros of Biscay were emphatically confirmed by Charles V. in 1527, and those of Guipuzcoa by the same monarch in 1529. These confirmations are quoted always as the Magna Charta of the North; certain somewhat important words being forgotten with which the confirmations were qualified, "*During my will and pleasure.*" The Basque Provinces also cherish the recollection of decrees *given to each* in 1722 by Charles V., stating that "he would not alter "or augment the duties then existing." In the same year, yielding to the clamour and disturbances in the north, he replaced on the line of the Ebro the custom-houses which in 1717 he had advanced to the frontier at Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Irun. Interpreting this withdrawal as a recognition of their boasted rights, the inhabitants of the provinces soon after abolished the custom of paying the "general duties" lately enforced at the ports of Guipuzcoa and Biscay; and their interpretation received plausibility from subsequent confirmatory royal decrees in 1727, 1728, 1729, and 1748. Lastly, in 1814, on his restoration, Ferdinand VII. stated in a decree that he, "wishing to imitate the example of his "august predecessors, has been pleased to confirm, ratify, "and approve the Fueros, good customs, privileges, and "liberties of the foresaid Provinces, in the same form that "his august father had approved and confirmed them." This last-mentioned confirmation was, and is, of a specially important nature, because it is urged frequently by the national party that during the allied occupation of the North, in 1812-13, the Fueros were ignored without remonstrance. This fact speaks rather for the patriotism of the North; and

when the occasion passed, there was no lack of remonstrance to call for Ferdinand's decree.

There was another confirmation in 1824, in exchange for an annual payment to the king by the provinces of Biscay and Navarre; but as this was contemporaneous with the restoration of despotic power, and the payments were for the king's personal necessities, not for the national treasury, the decree has not the same value as a precedent.

It is hardly to be wondered at that, among a rude and not over-critical people, the decrees above quoted seemed, and still seem, a sufficient charter for the maintenance of their much-loved Fueros. That, however, there is another view, and one which is quite unanswerable, even apart from the general question of policy, will be apparent after examining the report drawn up in Madrid in 1815 by a Junta, which was assembled to inquire into "the abuses of the royal revenues in the Basque Provinces." The report commences "as follows: "The adoration in which the privileges and Fueros of the Basque Provinces are held by the inhabitants is well known, by which for many years the royal authority, as well as the high tribunals of the kingdom, have experienced great disrespect. It would appear as if the permanent deputations of these provinces had been established to oppose the measures of government. There is nothing in common with the rest of the provinces in Spain; the laws are distinct; the commerce free; the contributions almost nothing; the custom-houses profitless; the officers*—opposed in the execution of their duty—are maintained at great expence, and are almost useless; the nobility has become universal and self-created; and in fact they have taken the government into their own hands.

"The Peninsula appears open to all their commerce, and negotiations; and without doubt they enjoy greater advantages than the rest of the kingdom, being exempt from the contributions of Castile, and the general tax of

Madrid,
Nov. 8,
1815.
Report of
Junta.

* There were officers of the National Government at the northern ports, ostensibly to prevent over-importation of goods into the provinces.

“ the Crown of Aragon, from ordinary services, from general
 “ contributions, from provincial rents, and from the contri-
 “ butions and donations which have been so heavy since the
 “ French Revolution. And, even in the tithes and ecclesias-
 “ tical contributions, they have paid almost nothing to the
 “ State from which they receive protection. They have been
 “ free from conscription, militia, from providing military
 “ stores, barracks, baggage, enlistment for the marine
 “ service, and in fact from every other tax or service for war.
 “ And yet the king and nation defend their territory and
 “ coasts from the incursions of enemies ! ”

The report goes on to state that no documents can be found to prove the independence of these northern provinces; on the contrary, that they all prove their subjection to the kings of Navarre, Leon and Castile; and, lastly, to the monarchy of the United Kingdom :

That—never having been independent—the Provinces could not *contract for* their Fueros and privileges, but that the counts and kings, who governed them, gave and consented to such freely and of their own good-will :

That no *written* Fuero existed before the 12th century, and that these privileges were granted to cities, towns, villages and hamlets *only*, and under such conditions as the payment of a fixed revenue, or the provision of a certain number of armed men for the king's service in war, &c. :

That the Province of Guipuzcoa confessed this in the preface to the compilation of their Fueros in 1696 :

That Alava also had no peculiar legislation previous to the same century :

And, that it can be proved from authentic official records that all the Fueros proceeded from the same source, the *central* government or king, which *alone* could give them the character of being legal and valid.

The report goes on to make another very important point in the dispute. In 1526, the *old* Fueros were pronounced defective, as *having been made in seditious times*, and new ones were compiled, which were confirmed in 1527 by Charles

Vide supra,
 p. 166.

V., who did not mention the original *Fueros* in his royal decree, nor even alluded to the changes as reforms.

“ From such beginnings proceed the exemptions, so ^{Report of Junta.}
 “ absolute and universal, now enjoyed by the Basque Pro-
 “ vinces; and it certainly appears an inconsiderate demand
 “ that they should be exempt in future from *all* tribute, as a
 “ *perpetual* gift of the Crown of Castile, *secured to them at*
 “ *the time they were incorporated with it.* . . . The exemptions
 “ they enjoy with respect to *commerce* owe their origin,
 “ also, to the free good pleasure of the monarch. It is a
 “ false idea to give them the force of *laws*, for, although
 “ they obtained a general confirmation, they were never
 “ more than a *privilege*; and for this reason your Majesty is
 “ not obliged to observe the agreement of 1727, *as the*
 “ *Basques have not observed the obligations to which they*
 “ *themselves agreed.* . . . One of the most grave and preju-
 “ dicial abuses consists in the fact that the passports given
 “ by the judge of contraband at Bilbao offer facilities for
 “ falsifying the quality and quantity of goods, and introduce
 “ with a passport of small importance cargoes of great
 “ value. Another of the abuses authorised by the judge is
 “ the giving of passports to the wealthy merchants of Bilbao
 “ for larger quantities of goods than can possibly be con-
 “ sumed by the inhabitants of the Provinces, the surplus
 “ being introduced fraudulently into Castile and Aragon.
 “ There is a third abuse: the facility with which the judge
 “ gives passports for foreign produce and goods, which are
 “ forbidden in the province of Alava. Words cannot express
 “ the great harm done by this abuse. Yet again, a great
 “ quantity of merchandise is sent from San Sebastian and
 “ Bilbao to the province of Navarre, where the duties are
 “ light, and through which great quantities filter into
 “ Aragon. Fifthly.—It is ordered in the regulations of
 “ commerce, dated 1778, that all the vessels employed in the
 “ northern trade shall be Spanish, and that no foreign ships
 “ shall enter Bilbao, San Sebastian, and other ports on that
 “ coast. What is *now* the case? In spite of these rules, they
 “ admit foreign ships which have not even *touched* at other

“ports, and they give passports without limits for any
 “goods that may be invoiced. Sixthly.—The deputations
 “and municipal authorities are guilty of covering in the
 “three Provinces a much greater quantity of goods with
 “their passports than can possibly be consumed by the
 “inhabitants. Seventhly.—The sale of inhibited goods both
 “to inhabitants and to smugglers is openly permitted.
 “Eighthly.—There is a gross abuse at Bilbao of the great
 “manufacture of tobacco and snuff. And, lastly, there is a
 “wholesale forgery of passports for goods, and the authorities
 “display but little zeal in endeavouring to prevent it. It
 “is astonishing how indifferent the deputations and au-
 “thorities are to such frauds, committed before their eyes.
 “The smugglers appear to be even protected, and are
 “certainly never obstructed in their infamous traffic. . . .
 “The Junta . . . begs to assure your Majesty that the
 “independence of these provinces, to which they pretend to
 “attribute their privileges, never existed; and they owe the
 “Fueros to the liberality of your august ancestors, who
 “always governed them by right of succession, and by other
 “legitimate titles as a part of the Spanish monarchy.”

Galignani,
 Paris,
 October 20,
 1839.

The indulgences granted to the northern provinces had, therefore, been abused, and grossly. The attention of the Central Government having been called to the abuses, it was an easy step to go further, and to inquire into the policy of continuing privileges which affected so seriously the unity and the revenues of the Empire. And even the warmest defenders of the provincial home rule could not but admit that the right of any portion of a kingdom united under one head, and affected by the same interests, to claim privileges distinct from and superior to those of the others, may be called in question by those who think that the obligations of the governed and governing are reciprocal. Had the question been dispassionately discussed, it is probable that some reasonable compromise would have been arrived at, paving the way in Spain for an ultimate commercial and legislative union between the various provinces. Unfortunately, as is too frequently the case in other countries besides Spain,

wholesome legislation has been deferred by want of tact, by clumsy menace, unstatesmanlike threats, and active rumours circulated by designing men. The question had been simmering between 1815 and 1833, and towards the end of Ferdinand's reign had been almost removed from the region of sentiment into the cold arena of political economy. Treating it purely as a matter of unjust differential duties, and more unjust exemptions, the thinkers and statesmen of Madrid despised a policy of conciliation, and hungered for sweeping instead of gradual changes. Had they decided on the gentler treatment, there can be little doubt, to use the words of a writer favourable to the Basques, that in time a wider experience would have taught the provincials to appreciate a larger and more imperial system; and a constant intercourse with European civilisation and European policy would have enabled them to understand those institutions, whose superior utility was destined to supersede their own.

There were many special reasons for the gradual treatment of this question. Not merely in sentiment and in privileges, but even in language, did the Basque nationality assert itself. Difficult to learn, bewildering in its idioms, harsh in its utterance, uncouth in its construction, the Basques yet reflected with pride that it was the ancient language of the country, and had survived in its purity the many vicissitudes which had afflicted the Peninsula. Even the wave of Vandal occupation, which had left its mark in the name of the fair province of Andalusia, had been unable to tarnish the dialect of the more sterile north. With playful pride the Basque peasant would boast that the devil himself spent seven years in their country in a futile endeavour to master the intricacies of their language.

*Espagne,
Lavaléc
and
Gueroult,
Paris, 1844.*

To such a people conservatism of their institutions was at once an instinct and a poetry. Their Fueros might be inconvenient to the rest of the Empire; they might be attended by details sapping the strength of the country and dissipating much of its energy; but to them they were local self-government of almost a patriarchal order; they were the vine and the fig-tree under which generation after generation of their

simple race had lived and died, and a special halo surrounded them in the fact that to preserve them the bravest of their fathers had willingly shed their blood. To tell such a people as this, in the cold words of political economy, that their privileges were a loan, and that the day had gone by for their continuance, was like arguing with the east wind or beating the air. Even with less excuse, indulgences soon become rights in the eyes of the recipients. The logic of the anecdote may be feeble, but it is essentially human, which tells how an old pauper in an English village had for years received from the parish clergyman a daily gift of a quart of milk, and how, after his death, he was found to have made a will, bequeathing to his brother the daily quart to which he had been so long accustomed!

If *maxima reverentia debetur pueris*, so, surely, to a simple people consideration is due in meddling with their cherished institutions. And when, as was the case, even the more educated provincials—the Constitutional Liberals of the large northern cities—regarded these same Fueros with a firm and plaintive affection, the statesman must indeed have been blind who sought to ride roughshod over them.

But if these cherished institutions of the Basques were the development of self-government, and the *antipodes* of an absolute monarchy, how is it that the Basques have been found so often fighting under the colours of men whose success would have involved the establishment of a despotic government?

The circumstances attending the opening of the war under discussion in these pages will afford an answer to this question. The Carlist rebellion owed its rise to the so-called Apostolical Junta; who, foreseeing that on King Ferdinand's death the Liberal party in Spain would, under the protection of Queen Christina, insist on introducing many wholesome and necessary reforms in the kingdom, had for some years previous to 1833 been preparing the lower classes for an insurrection against Isabella II. In Don Carlos the leaders of the fanatical conspiracy saw the fittest instrument for their purposes, and by means of numerous agencies and

affiliated clubs they intrigued deeply in the Basque Provinces, the inhabitants of which they well knew to be martial in spirit, and to be opposed to being placed on a level with the rest of Spain. The Madrid Government neglected in 1833 to send forces to the north to prevent the meditated insurrection, and at the time of the king's death there was actually not a single soldier in Bilbao or in Biscay. After the rising took place, the ministry, with strange want of tact, insisted on appointing anti-fuerist authorities in the north; and this, combined with other like errors, gave the leaders of the Carlist faction a handle with which to work on the Basques' imagination, and to suggest the imminent abolition of their *fueros*.

F. Ga-
minde,
Bilbao,
May 18,
1858.
Colquhoun
MSS.

The rebellion, which was commenced in the interests of fanaticism, was thus purposely complicated, and was adroitly construed into a sacred war in defence of the Fueros. A clear confirmation of the accuracy of this view is found in the fact that in 1833, previous to the rebellion, and while Ferdinand was yet alive, Biscay acknowledged solemnly in Guernica through its representatives *the rights of Isabella II. to the throne of Spain and to the lordship of Biscay.*

Ibid.

The Fueros formed an admirable cry for the Carlist leaders in the Basque provinces; but that *pure Carlism* was the idea for which the Basques fought would be about as reasonable a statement as to say that a man struggling with a pick-pocket is actuated not so much by a desire to save his own purse as by a theoretical affection for the eighth commandment!

The heat of war is unfavourable to a deliberate analysis of motives or interests; but as the war under consideration progressed, the Basques began to distinguish between their own interests and that of the Pretender. From this moment the result was inevitable, and was easily foreshadowed. Munagorri saw the situation, but his ambition made him—as the sequel will show—precipitate in his action. The most important among the earlier movements, which showed the Basques the real as compared with the false issue, was the signing, in 1837, of a petition by all the principal and

loyal inhabitants of Bilbao, and by its National Guard, urging on the Madrid government the preservation under Isabella of the old *Fueros*. This cleared the air of much misconception, and paved the way for coming Carlist dissensions. The English Government was also shrewd enough to see that the main point was the defeat of Don Carlos, not the question of the *Fueros*; and the influence of England was therefore used with a view to postponing the latter subject to a more favourable season. Let Spain be first freed from civil war, was her argument, and then let internal legislation and consolidation proceed, in a less heated atmosphere, and with some regard for the sensibilities of a people who have shown in so gallant a way the earnestness of their political faith.

The question of the Basque *Fueros* has been discussed at considerable length in this place, and must frequently recur in the course of the narrative. Its importance, if the war is to be thoroughly understood, will be sufficient excuse. But if any other were needed by an English reader it would be found in the historical parallel afforded by Ireland in its relations to the British Empire. The *Fueros* of Ireland are not, it is true, based on freedom from conscription, or advantageous differential duties. They are, alas! more difficult to treat, for they are to a great extent sentimental; and yet it must be confessed that the sentiment is not unworthy. The thoughtful Englishman, as he listens to the complaints and appeals of the Irish, must feel that in their most unreasonable utterances there is reason. The shadow of the cruel penal code, which a mistaken discipline forced on a mercurial people, still clouds the arguments of a generation to which that code is but tradition. The memories of a cruel and unjust time have survived the disappearance of cruelty before an almost anxiously righteous form of government, and liberty itself seems rendered insipid by the recollections of the injustice for which it appears that no English penitence can ever atone. One political party in the State held out hopefully an olive branch; but the feelings of Ireland are as keenly resentful as when the Irish Church yet retained its

predominance, and the Irish Land Act had not been conceived. Another party, in its turn, while diminishing the restraints of a Coercion Act, allowed with generous courtesy to the Irish representatives a licence of debate unparalleled in parliamentary history; and the return was loudly-expressed indignation at one of their own number who had ventured to acknowledge the Government's kindness. After many years devoted in no small degree to the consideration of subjects which might have been expected to interest Ireland, she remains as unsettled as in the days of the war treated in these pages, when the burning eloquence of an O'Connell was stirring the hearts of a too-willing people.

The tendency of the English in studying the history of another people is towards complacency, and a thankfulness that they are not as other men are. It may be as well for us to remember that we have our domestic difficulty as well as Spain; that the grievances which haunt the Wicklow hills may be more shadowy and unintelligible than those for which men died among the mountains of Biscay and Navarre, but that they are not the less real in their demand for discussion and, if need be, legislation.

It may be that arguments for temperate and courteous inquiry into Ireland's persistent appeals—an inquiry which may lead to plucking from the nettle danger, the flower safety—may be found, even by the complacent English, on the southern slopes of the Pyrenees.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE MUNAGORRI EPISODE.

IT is unfortunate for a man who has the ability and the cause, to mistake his opportunity, and to be premature in his action. This mistake was committed by Munagorri. He possessed energy, talent of a sort, courage, and he was liked by those few who knew him; but he had not earned his spurs; and he died, as to his cause, a victim to the question, "Who is he?" Even among ignorant Basques, *some* title to obedience is required in a man claiming to command. And when an unknown man appeared, thundering forth platitudes on the subject of peace, and independence, and Fueros, and liberty, and the usual stock-purse of political coins which the demagogue shakes in the ears of those whom he seeks to influence, he was met with cold looks, with haughty indifference, with contemptuous resentment. To be unknown is almost as great a crime in the world as to be young; and Munagorri appeared guilty of both.

He might have passed off the stage unnoticed, and lapsed into an oblivion as complete as his failure, had it not been for Lord John Hay, the English commodore. That officer was an excellent sailor; but he was not satisfied with the *rôle* for which nature and education had trained him. He *would* be a diplomatist; not now merely, but also later, at the time of the defection of Maroto. There are not a few pestilent guises in which man struts this world's stage; but few are so utterly objectionable as that of an amateur diplomatist. The *professional* diplomatist is bad enough; but the recollection of the long list of failures which has

probably constituted his professional education has on him the effect at all events of generating modesty and self-distrust. He has also learnt the value of silence and discretion. The *amateur* diplomatist has had no such training; he is a mass of self-assurance and conceit; so far from keeping his mission a secret, it oozes out of every pore; even his silence is eloquent, for it is accompanied by an air of importance and mystery, which courts inquiry; and, when he does speak, he says more than he means, while he intends to convey the impression that he means more than he says. The most transparent of men,—were it not that he is prevented from knowing anything of moment, he would be capable of incalculable mischief.

Munagorri dropped into Lord John Hay's lap, like a gift from heaven. His first step was to raise a cloud of mystery round the enterprise, in which he was about as successful as if he had advertised every word and movement in the gazette of either army. His new importance intensified a natural haughtiness and bombast, which seem to be aggravated by the social naval code of England. He made the life of Colonel Colquhoun from this moment a burden. That ill-fated officer was under his authority, being borne, with the men under his command, on the books of her Britannic Majesty's squadron. He was admitted into the confidence of the commodore; he was saturated with the hopes and beliefs and marvellous schemes which chased one another in wild confusion through the gallant sailor's mind; and he was graciously allowed a subordinate part in maturing the plans of this marine Machiavel. Poor Colonel Colquhoun! he was an excellent man, an able artilleryman, a good linguist, a fair mathematician, an ingenious inventor, but he knew no more of diplomacy than of Confucius or of the Vedas. And now he was plunged into duties which were a happy mixture of a detective's and a clerk's; he had even at times to disguise his body as well as to attempt ineffectually to disguise his mind; he found the vacillations of his employer vibrating in the form of contradictory, explanatory, and expostulatory notes, which darkened the horizon of his once simple life; and in his new character as a man of mystery, he went

about with his days embittered by a horrible sense of undetected crime. Of all the occurrences in this war, none come to the surface with such a sense of ineffable humour as this picture of the blundering sailor and the transparent soldier playing in verdant innocence at the grave game of diplomacy.

‘Pall-Mall
Gazette,’
April 16,
1875.

This episode was aptly spoken of by a recent writer as “A comedy enacted by a Basque called Munagorri. . . .” “He distributed regular pay to all the peasants who, indisposed to fight, had emigrated across the frontier. They were intended to re-enter as an anti-Carlist force, and scrupulously received their pay until £20,000 of Government money was exhausted. Basque opinion is divided as to whether Munagorri was a patriot or a common swindler; those who know most of him think he acted half sincerely, half from a love of notoriety and sense of his own importance.” His objects were sketched in the following appeal to the Basques: “During the last five years desolation and death have been hovering over our country. The blood shed in our fields is that of our brave brethren, who seduced and deceived by intriguers are fighting for a prince whose rights to the crown of Spain are extremely doubtful. What do you require? What are you contending for? for whom? ‘Peace and our Fueros’—such ought to be our sole desire. Let the ambitious who covet the throne conquer it themselves! Navarre and the Basque provinces, united by so many ties of friendship, blood, habits, and liberal institutions, are from this day independent. From this moment we shall no longer be the slaves of wretches, accustomed to command as masters, and to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor. To arms! Independence for ever! Peace! Liberty! Obedience to the new authorities!”

So unsuccessful was his appeal that within a few days he had to fly to Bayonne, and to occupy himself in gathering stragglers to his standard on the French side of the frontier, while he endeavoured by communications with the French, English, and Madrid Governments to secure co-

operation which would strengthen his cause. From the very first, the French Government scouted at the diversion proposed. They declined taking any part in a mediation which Munagorri proposed between himself and the Government and Madrid, lest any direct intercourse with the Carlists might subject them to misrepresentation, and lest Queen Isabella's Government should ultimately fail to indorse any agreement at which they themselves and Munagorri might arrive. Nor was their conduct merely passive; at Bayonne they threw every difficulty in the way of Munagorri; they treated all deserters to him from the Carlists as prisoners and criminals in the first instance; and it was found that the *sous-prefet* there confided to the Carlist agents everything he learnt with regard to the movements of the new party. Nor was the success of the private, or at times semi-official, overtures to Madrid any greater. An agent was indeed sent to inquire into the extent of the movement, but he was known to be anti-fucrist in his sympathies. So little, also, did the Spanish Government think of the value of Munagorri's attempt, that they did not even communicate the fact of its existence to Espartero, nor give him any idea of their wishes in the not improbable event of the new leader appealing to the commander of the Queen's armies in the North. And when at a later period of the year, in the month of October, Munagorri applied for permission to come from France, and take possession of the fortified post on the frontier called Val Carlos, or even to enter the village and obtain protection from the garrison, the Madrid Government,—although the Queen's cause was in such a plight as would have made any really beneficial movement welcome,—distinctly refused to sanction his entrance even into the village of Val Carlos, nor would they promise to grant protection to his flag unless he were driven by the enemy under the guns of the fort. The fact was that the existing garrison of Val Carlos was an admirable one, composed of the peasants of the valleys of Roncal and Aescoa, who had taken up arms for the Queen, and had been compelled to take refuge there when the line of Zubiri was

Wylde
MSS.
May, 1838.

Col. Wylde,
Bayonne,
May 27,
1838.

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
August 6,
1838.

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
Nov. 9,
1838.

abandoned by the *Christinos*. The forts were naturally strong, and the roads leading to them would not admit of wheeled carriages; nor, from their proximity to the frontier was it easy to attack them without violating French territory. It was hardly to be wondered at that the Madrid Government was reluctant to exchange a tried garrison, which had on more than one occasion proved a thorn in the side of the *Carlists*, for one consisting mainly of *Carlist* deserters, who were said to be quite ready to desert again as soon as *Munagorri's* pecuniary resources should be exhausted. There was an ill-concealed dread of this in a proclamation, issued by *Munagorri*, shortly before he made this application, in which—amid a cloud of verbiage, expressing his gratitude for their obedience, as if that were an unusual military virtue—he assured them that the means of paying every man according to his rank were at his disposal. “Confide, therefore,” he said, “in me. I will watch over your interests.” And then, with a curious but suggestive inconsistency, he cancels the gushing language in the body of the proclamation with the following commination: “If any one of you “should deviate from the line which I have traced, a thing “which I do not for a moment anticipate, I shall be under “the painful necessity of punishing him with that severity “which the high cause which we have embraced demands.”

Sara,
Sept. 25,
1838.

Col. Wylda,
Bayonne,
May 27,
1838.

It had long been apparent to the chief English Commissioner that *Munagorri* was deficient in the firmness and ability requisite to inspire his followers with confidence. He seemed the instrument instead of the leader of his committee or council; and it was evident that nothing would come of the movement unless a good *Carlist* military leader should join him, and unless he could establish himself in force on the Spanish side of the frontier. Neither of these events took place. Under the strong pressure of Lord John Hay, a *Christino* general, *Jauregui*, attached himself to the small force, never over 1500, raised by *Munagorri*. This at once gave a partisan instead of a neutral tint to the movement, and yet without affording the advantages of partisanship. When ultimately he succeeded in crossing

the Bidassoa, with the assistance of Lord John Hay's marines, it was in spite of the Christino commander in the neighbourhood, O'Donnell, who first prevented him crossing at Irun, and then sent troops to prevent him from taking possession of the village of San Marcial. He took up a position between Irun and Vera, where he was supplied by the English commodore with tents, and with the services of some engineers in throwing up his intrenchments. Here, practically, the movement collapsed; and the only effect produced by the diversion of this "lawyer of Berostigui," was a considerable loss to the Queen's treasury, in the matter of money rashly advanced before its utterly exotic nature had been detected. Nothing speaks so eloquently both of the collapse of the scheme and of the weakness and obscurity of its author, as the fact that at the Convention of Bergara in the following year, when "Peace and the Fueros" were discussed and arranged, no notice was taken of the unfortunate man who had hoped to obtain lasting fame under a banner with such inscription.

Annual
Register,
1838.

Bollaert.

But, like many other men, both Munagorri and Lord John Hay were at least stepping-stones, if not agents. There is more room in the world for the former than for the latter, and as much need. Even Archimedes had to demand his fulcrum, as a condition of his moving the world. If a minister wishes to make a statement, he may avail himself of a very obscure questioner to strike the rock, and let the water flow. The more one sees of life, the more one learns that the smallest instrument may be useful. The traveller who crosses a stream does not quarrel with the stone which supports him, because it is not marble; the man who revels in priceless wine does not feel that the relish suffers from the fact that the glass which holds it is common, or the cellar in which it gathered its cobwebs was in the vicinity of disease, and pauperism, and crime. Without saying that the end justifies the means, it must be admitted that it often glorifies perfectly unconscious instruments. The question of the Fueros was hushed for a time at Bergara; the hushing was aided by an admirable expression of the views of the

English Government; and that expression was provoked by the undue importance attached to the Munagorri movement by those who were on the spot, and were therefore supposed to be good authorities. Although the value of the "Peace and Fueros" movement was in the first instance exaggerated, the views which it called forth from so dispassionate a judge as Lord Palmerston educated both Madrid and the Basque Provinces up to a point which brought the Convention of Bergara within the region of possibilities.

Wylde
MSS., May,
1838.

The English Government, with all the weight which attaches to a purely disinterested opinion, was able to assert dogmatically that the maintenance of the Fueros of the Provinces must be the basis of any arrangement between the combatants. At the same time they said it should be distinctly understood that for deliberation on all *national* questions the provinces should send deputies to the Cortes of the United Kingdom. Otherwise, as was well urged, were the Provinces to separate themselves from the rest of the Spanish monarchy, and to have a Cortes of their own, the greatest inconvenience would arise, and it would amount in fact to a dismemberment of Spain. An entirely separate organisation of the Provinces was of comparatively little consequence while Spain was governed *despotically*, and when all questions about peace and war, and other great national interests, were determined by the uncontrolled will of an absolute king, because that will was for these purposes as powerful in the provinces as in the rest of Spain, and national unity both of action and external relations was thereby maintained. Now, however, since the accession of Isabella, a representative system had been established, and the will of the sovereign had been subjected to the control of representative assemblies. It would follow, therefore, that the unity and integrity of Spain would be destroyed if there were one Cortes in Madrid, and another in Navarre, Guipuzcoa, and Biscay; or if the acts of the general Cortes of Spain were to have no effect in the provinces north of the Ebro. In the event of such an arrangement, the provinces to the north and the south of the Ebro would practically become separate king-

doms, of which one might be at war with a foreign power, and the other at peace. Another point was also very apparent to those who chose to see: owing to the proximity of the northern provinces to France, the Government of the latter would have a strong interest in widening the separation between the former and the rest of Spain, with a view to their ultimate incorporation with France. The opportunities of fomenting intrigues and of sowing dissension would be frequent, and any patriotic Spaniard would gladly, it was hoped, avoid such risk, by agreeing to send representatives to a general Cortes. In a word, the arguments of Lord Palmerston were in favour of the *Fueros* being interpreted as meaning municipal institutions and local privileges, and not as militating against sending deputies to the Cortes.

Munagorri had endeavoured to obtain a *guarantee* from England and France that the Madrid Government would maintain the *Fueros* inviolate, in the event of peace. On behalf of the English Government it was urged that no such guarantee could be given, but that the intervention of Great Britain was not likely to be departed from; first, because the British government would of course employ all its influence at Madrid to prevent such a breach of good faith; and secondly, because a very strong reason indeed would be required to impel any Spanish government to excite the just resentment of provinces which had already shown such strength and powers of resistance. Nor would any administration, responsible, as the Spanish Government would now be, to public opinion and a popular assembly, wantonly and unjustly bring upon themselves another insurrection in the provinces north of the Ebro, by breaking engagements deliberately entered into through the intervention of another power.

There can be no doubt that these views of the British Government, although extracted by so inadequate a provocation as the Munagorri episode, gradually educated the minds of both Christino and Carlist to a compromise, such as was agreed upon at Bergara. For this a certain amount of gratitude is due to the unconscious instruments, who thought themselves diplomatists. That they worked hard according

to their lights is indisputable; that they collected whole volumes of gossip, and imagined them reliable statistics only proves their simple and confiding natures. Of the value of the information thus obtained the following sentences will enable the reader to judge. At the very time when personal inquiry at Bayonne compelled the chief English Commissioner to protest against the inability of Munagorri to excite confidence, Colonel Colquhoun was communicating with triumph to Lord John Hay that the new leader was perfectly sincere, and in his qualifications extremely well fitted for the political part of the project; and that the relations of the people under him were those of entire confidence and great respect. And of a man who never collected more than 1500 men, and these of doubtful quality, the same astute diplomatist prophesied that there would be but few found among the Basques capable either of treason or of opposition to the cause which Munagorri had proclaimed; and that the authorities of Bayonne were exceedingly well disposed, zealous, and harmonious in all their dealings with the leader of the movement. Not for three months did they discover the truth in this last point, and even then they were under the impression that "the conduct of the French authorities continues all that is favourable."

Sara,
July 12,
1838.

Colonel
Colquhoun,
Passages,
October 24,
1838.

Pamplona,
Nov. 12,
1838.

Much of the energy of the two enthusiasts was devoted to studying and reporting on the advantages of Val Carlos as a centre for Munagorri's force. Not having the faintest conception of the scorn with which the whole matter was regarded both by Espartero and the Spanish Government, the surprise of Lord John Hay must have been great when he was informed by the Viceroy of Navarre that he had received orders from both these sources that he was not to "allow the troops under the standard of Peace and the Fueros, and commanded by Munagorri to occupy or pass through any of the fortified points garrisoned by Her Majesty's troops." The shock to Lord John was broken by the valuable assurance that the Viceroy would have great pleasure in co-operating with his intentions provided that he was not required to depart from the orders he had received. He

gratified the gallant sailor by asking him at the same time to communicate as far as he could the intentions and movements of the Fuerist leader.

The next point, therefore, for the diplomatists to arrange was to get the Fuerists into Spain without occupying the forbidden ground, and without danger from the Carlists. A certain village called San Marcial occurred to them as in every way unobjectionable; but again they were baffled. With great indignation Lord John wrote to his coadjutor: Dec. 2,
1838.

“There can be no doubt of General O’Donnell’s bad feeling towards Munagorri’s cause. If the hermitage of San Marcial had been a necessary point for the Queen’s troops to occupy, how is it they only found it out on the night of Friday? I have some reason to complain, but that will of course go through the proper channel.”

After all the precautions taken by the gallant commodore to protect from the Carlists this valuable addition to the Queen’s cause, it was depressing to find that its chief opponent was the Queen’s general. His resentment grew daily, and he was furious with the want of consideration shown to his labours. He attributed it, of course, to jealousy, and “of that” he wrote, “we have had quite Dec. 5,
1838. enough already.” Again, “let Jauregui fight the battle with the Queen’s authorities, and have as little to do with them yourself as possible.”

His indignation made him somewhat sweeping in his terms, and on the principle of “*Ex uno disce omnes*,” he Dec. 15,
1838. wrote on a subsequent occasion: “The General-in-chief is determined to oppose the Fuerists, and it matters little who his agents may be. All Spanish generals are alike, and their chief is like the dog in the manger; he cannot finish the war himself, and will not allow anyone else to attempt it.” From scolding he passed quickly to threats, and wrote, “I trust Sir George Villiers will be firm with the Spanish Government respecting the cause; he ought to insist on their supporting it at the price of losing British co-operation. The threat would be sufficient for them Dec. 13,
1838. unless they are traitors to their Queen.” Again, “The new

“Government cannot possibly stand, with the exception of
 “the President; they are a mere set of creatures of the dic-
 “tator (Espartero). It is high time England should require
 “to know whom we are in alliance with. Beyond all doubt
 “the power of the Queen-regent is set aside by those generals
 “who prefer handling a quill to the sword.”

Poor Lord John! with all his blundering and his pompous
 ways, he was loyal to authority where it was evident. He
 saw that he was at cross-purposes with the Christino gene-
 rals, and although he would not admit that he had erred in
 his estimate of the Munagorri movement, he endeavoured to
 neutralise the effect of the hasty co-operation he had given
 to the Fuerists. His orders, with this view, were issued like
 minute guns, and showed a confidence in the self-denial of
 English soldiers and sailors which happily was not put to the
 test. His views of neutrality were, to say the least, quaint. In
 spite of treatment which made him exclaim that “O'Donnell
 “is determined to annoy Munagorri as much as possible . . .
 “I cannot be a party to such treatment,” he yet issued the
 following orders to Colonel Colquhoun: “Should the Carlists
 “attack, you must take care to keep your men in security.
 “It will never do for our men to be driven across the
 “frontier. . . . I do not wish our men to do more than
 “superintend the work, and you must be exceedingly
 “cautious how you assist in the construction of a bridge.
 “Not a man of ours can be allowed to put a foot on French
 “ground. They are civil, I know, but there is a reason
 “for it, which I am well aware of. . . . The instant the
 “works are secure, our people must return to San Sebas-
 “tian.” And again, “You of course will be on the look-
 “out, and keep our men away should there be an appearance
 “of an attack. . . . I am anxious that our men should
 “return before the new captain-general arrives, that we
 “may start fair, and according to the nature of the support
 “he is instructed to give the Fuerists.”

Dec. 4,
1838.

Dec. 5,
1838.

Dec. 16,
1838.

Dec. 21,
1838.

Dec. 21,
1838.

With a last wail, “I much fear the very disturbed state of
 “affairs will prevent anything being done to support the
 “Fuerists,” the commodore appears to admit that his grand

diplomatic bubble has burst, and one would expect him to devote himself to chewing on the quarter-deck the bitter cud of a first diplomatic failure. It was not so. Confident in his own wisdom and in the folly of his rivals, the gallant sailor bided his time. Like a hound that has been fleshed, he would be all the keener on the next trail. And his time would not be long in coming; in a few months he would again be doing as much to mar a complicated piece of diplomacy, as a man full of honesty and self-esteem, and at the same time devoid of tact, is capable of doing.

As has already been said, such a man's capacity for mischief is almost incalculable.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE GROWTH OF ESPARTERO.

THE marked assertion of his own position, and the rapid growth of a distinct individuality in his conduct of operations which characterised Espartero in the interval between the flight of Don Carlos from before Madrid and the capture of Peña-cerrada by the Christinos, cannot be thoroughly understood without realising somewhat of those affairs in the metropolis which provoked such assertion and educated such individuality.

The communications sent from Madrid by the English minister, Sir George Villiers,* to the English Commissioners with the Queen's armies, and the appeals through the same channel made by him to Espartero, reveal a political state which justified the very strongest reprobation.

The Government, known as the Ofalia Government, was much divided, and contained men of very different if not indeed opposing views; but they seemed at one in their desire to deceive Espartero as to the true state of affairs, and in neglecting the needful supplies for his army. While they were holding out hopes to him of French and English co-operation in the field, Sir George Villiers, feeling that Espartero would rather know the truth than be under an illusion, was compelled to convey to him the unwelcome intelligence that France would certainly not intervene in any way, that England's attention was now fully occupied with her own troubles in Canada, and that the state of parties in

To Lieut.
Lynn,
Feb. 2,
1838.

* Afterwards Lord Clarendon.

the English House of Commons rendered it impossible for the Government to propose either loans or guarantees. This warning was received in a very gratifying manner, the recipient having no desire to live in a fool's paradise; nor was its justice shaken by the subsequent intelligence that France had consented to allow a legion to be raised within her boundaries. This boon was, indeed, practically cancelled by the conditions with which it was hampered, including, among others, that no French soldier, and no individual *liable to be taken as a conscript* for the French army, should be enlisted into the proposed legion. Any superficial friendliness on the part of France which still existed seemed also in a fair way to disappear if the conduct of the Government in all matters connected with England did not speedily change. The country which was the only real and disinterested ally of Spain, and which was really anxious to put down the Carlist rebellion, was in a fair way of being alienated by the Ofaia Government. "If, then," wrote Sir George Villiers, "England becomes lukewarm and disgusted, France will become little less than hostile; for it is the desire to keep on good terms with England that now alone restrains her."

To Lieut.
Lynn,
Feb. 22,
1838.

A sample of the partiality, half-heartedness, and anti-English feeling which prevailed in the Ofaia cabinet, and which almost distracted Espartero in his capacity of chief military authority in the kingdom, occurred in connection with the Christino general Flinter, who was both an Englishman and energetic. The whole of the deputies of Estremadura, who well knew his merits, applied that this officer should be sent to their province. At first the Government refused, but ultimately yielding to pressure, they despatched him as general to Toledo, a place which was the seat of the principal Carlist Junta in Spain.

A state of siege having been declared on the approach of the Carlist leader Basilio Garcia, on a raiding expedition from the north, General Flinter was enabled to take some decisive steps. He arrested and tried by court-martial several of the local Carlist leaders for having arms and

sedition papers in large quantities in their houses. These prisoners, who evidently had taken the accurate measure of the Government, immediately sent agents to Madrid with large sums of money to procure the removal of General Flinter. The Government journals prepared the way by a violent abuse of Flinter, as one who had *maltreated harmless men*, and who was an Englishman—the latter being a serious crime in the eyes of the Moderados who were then in office. Orders were then issued for his removal; and under the impression that these orders had been obeyed, a body of Carlists, under Jara, approached Toledo, and had actually obtained possession of the bridge. Flinter was, however, still there, although with a force of only some 300 men, and he sallied forth and defeated the enemy. In pursuing them—strengthened by some reinforcements which joined him, over a country with which he was well acquainted, and where he was able to march all night—he came upon a larger body of Carlists, and, taking them completely by surprise, defeated them. A more brilliant act had not been performed away from the northern provinces during the war; and at a time when grades and decorations were conferred for every skirmish with a mischievous prodigality, it might have been expected that some special recognition would have followed. Instead of this, the Moderados could hardly conceal their mortification at the victory; the Government only gave Flinter the *third* class of San Fernando; and their journals, in alluding to the actions, skilfully avoided even mentioning the name of Flinter in connection with them. It was evident that whoever was English, or whoever took *active* measures against the Carlists, could not hope for favour with this half-hearted Government.

The continued energy of General Flinter had increased the demoralisation of the Carlists among the mountains of Toledo, had set free an important province, and had robbed the enemy of a base of operations which had been arranged for the approaching season on a scale of some magnitude. Yet the only reward practically received by General Flinter

was in "the form of disappointment and feelings bordering on regret on the part of the Government."* Sir G. Villiers.

With the same irritating jealousy of successful generals, which haunted the Madrid Government to such an extent as to lead them to the commission of foolish if not unpatriotic acts, they endeavoured to sow dissension between Espartero and Cordova, the latter of whom had now returned to Madrid, and was a probable successor of the incompetent minister of war. As this was one of the strongest provocatives to the subsequent independent and resentful action taken by Espartero, it is only just to him that the circumstances should be related by an impartial and competent observer.

"I have the most ardent desire," wrote Sir George Villiers, To Lieut. Lynn,
Feb. 22,
1838.
 "to see the triumph of the Queen's cause, and it is painful
 "to see men who could contribute usefully to that great and
 "European event kept asunder by the intrigues of others,
 "who, under the mask of patriotism, seek only their own
 "private ends. . . . Since Cordova's return to Madrid his
 "conduct has been discreet, friendly to Espartero, and far
 "from ambitious. He disbelieves those who say that
 "Espartero speaks disparagingly of him; and he says that
 "as soon as he enters the Cortes, Espartero shall have in him
 "a strenuous advocate, as one who knows the insuperable
 "difficulties of the war in the northern provinces. . . . I do
 "therefore think that it is infinitely to be regretted that
 "these two generals should not be united. . . . The war
 "can only be concluded and the country restored to order
 "by the perfect harmony of the Queen's generals; and I
 "believe that Cordova in the Cortes (or perhaps eventually
 "as forming part of the Government), and Espartero at the
 "head of the military forces of Spain, would offer better
 "prospects of success than any that have hitherto presented
 "themselves."

* Public opinion, which is often more far-sighted, as well as stronger than Governments, pronounced ultimately so strongly in favour of General Flinter, that he was made a Mariscal de Campo, and placed in charge of the provinces of La Mancha and Toledo.

To Lieut.
Lynn,
March 6,
1838.

Of the conduct of the minister of war, in particular, whose orders especially concerned Espartero, Sir George wrote:—
 “It is far from my mind to believe in treason, and I know
 “that such an accusation should not be lightly made; but,
 “if there is not foul play, the orders of the minister of war
 “would disgrace a child of ten years old.” Returning, at a
 later date, to the attempt to sow dissension between Espartero
 and Cordova, who had now entered the Cortes, he wrote:—
 “With public men, I felt that it was a public misfortune that
 “they were disunited. It is all very well for *empleados*, and
 “*avogados*, and ministers to be quarrelling about places and
 “principles. These are matters quite beyond the great
 “military question upon which the throne of the Queen of
 “Spain depends; and it is therefore a most lamentable
 “feature in this unfortunate cause to see disunion among
 “the few capable chiefs.”

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1838.

In addition to the disloyalty of the Government to its servants, than which nothing can be conceived more contemptible, it must be borne in mind that Espartero had to hear and read of discussions in the Cortes, “under this
 “administration which from the beginning wore no promise
 “of permanency,” which sapped his authority, questioned his talents, scouted his policy, and suspected his integrity. Such criticism from incompetent judges is sorely trying to a man who is conscious of no voluntary ground of complaint; and such criticism was poured forth *ad nauseam* in the beginning of 1838 by such men as Caballero and De Toreno. It was the less palatable because, while the frothy critics were mouthing their sentences at Madrid, the general, who only a few weeks before had saved the metropolis, was obtaining successes against the enemy, such as those to be alluded to hereafter as occurring on the 30th and 31st January 1838, which should have called forth the gratitude of every loyal Christino.

A sense of self-respect, a repugnance to the interested vapouring of men who did not hesitate to assassinate reputations for their selfish ends, a confident assurance that success in the field was impossible while the Government was

divided and insincere, at last provoked Espartero to a step which would be serious in a soldier at any time, but especially grave and liable to misconception during the agony of civil war. He issued a proclamation to his army, which was really an appeal to the nation, in which he detailed the hardships to which his troops had been wantonly exposed through the remissness of the Government, notwithstanding his incessant protests and petitions. He revealed the sham system under which operations were carried on, and which were yet expected to succeed; and with all the energy in his power washed his hands of such an administrative scandal.

March 2,
1838.

This address produced an extraordinary sensation in Madrid. The public had up to this moment had no conception of the state of distress in which the army had been left, or of the differences existing between Espartero and the government.

Sir G.
Villiers
to Lieut.
Lynn,
March 13,
1838.

It was of no use to attempt an unblushing and untruthful reply in the official gazette. The general's proclamation was implicitly believed; his reputation was already such as to place him beyond danger of supersession, and the only resource left to the Government was to make him their tool.

It is a tribute of the highest order to Espartero that there was no attempt made to *buy* his adherence, either by the coarse bribe of money or place, or by the more tempting bribe of flattery. His blunt, honest, and impetuous nature was well known; but it was thought possible to win him through his friends or his followers. The first step to be taken was to ensure the presence on Espartero's staff of some creatures of the Government. This was attempted first by playing on the fears of the general, by accusing him of disloyalty to the constitution, in the hope that he would hurry to prove the reverse by accepting any staff-officer of whose politics the Government might approve. "Various intriguers,"

Sir G.
Villiers
to Lieut.
Lynn,
March 30,
1838.

wrote Sir George Villiers, "are making a very scandalous use of Espartero's name at this moment, representing him to be adverse to the constitutional system, and leagued with some of the most furious of the Moderados, for the purpose of closing the Cortes and putting down the liberty of the press. I merely mention these reports because I think it

“ important that the general-in-chief should be aware of
“ what is going on, however much his patriotism may induce
“ him to despise the intriguers and intrigues. In the midst
“ of an exhausting civil war, when party passion runs wild,
“ things apparently insignificant may be of consequence.”

The most depressing consideration for all admirers of constitutional government, in the sense in which it was sought at this time in Spain, and in which it is enjoyed at present in England, her Colonies, and her full-grown child the United States of America, lies in the fact that the heat of party political warfare induces, and even attempts to justify, personal attacks on opponents which in any other matter save politics would be considered despicable and unwise. Not merely journals bidding for a circulation, and striving to create and pamper a diseased political appetite, but even individuals who are honourable in the ordinary walks of life feel no degradation in striving to obtain success for their party by following a road paved with unfair insinuations, and with still more unfair confounding of their opponents' views with those of older date which have been found inadequate and have been outgrown. The journals are indeed the ringleaders, and, like all mercenary troops, are the most unscrupulous, and the most regardless of the rules of honourable warfare; but even they would moderate their tone did the public taste refuse their unnatural bitters, and demand the cleaner nourishment of truth and impartiality. It may seem Quixotic to dream of a day when political opponents—even although innocent of the *suggestio falsi*—will also desist from the *suppressio veri*; but it is surely reasonable to hope that ere long the educated people of England will dictate to the political press the views they hold to be right, instead of accepting as gospel the opinions of mercenary writers, written it may be under the exigencies of a partisan proprietor. Highly honourable to England as is the press which keeps daily before her people the history of the world, impartial as are its views on most subjects, marvellous as are the means it adopts for making distant lands hourly tell their throbbing tale, and remarkable as is

the energy and the vision before which no fact can remain long unknown, yet it cannot be concealed that to a great extent in England, and to a positively painful degree in the Colonies and in the United States, the press in political matters is sometimes unconsciously but often wilfully unfair. It was this unfairness at Madrid that provoked Espartero to throw down the gauntlet: his reputation and power enabled him to win in the combat; but there are many innocent men without the advantages of Espartero, although with equal provocation, who would deserve to win and yet dare not tilt at the giant. Is, however, the courage of a giant great which is only displayed in the belief that his antagonist cannot be coaxed into an unequal struggle? Is any side in politics truly respectable which can afford to be defended by such weapons as violent abuse or treacherous sneer? Were it not for the firm belief that the day will surely come when right will conquer wrong and wisdom defeat folly, a man might well hesitate ere he entered lists where his worst enemies are impalpable and his most severe wounds are dealt in the dark!

The threat failed with Espartero; he did not play into their hands by justifying himself in the way the Government hoped. The next step, therefore, was to isolate him from those in whom he trusted. General Van Halen was his chief of the staff. It was suddenly announced semi-officially that he was to be removed to an inactive command. In vain did the British Minister plead for him as strongly as his position would allow; in vain did he remind the Government of the gallant way in which Van Halen had behaved during the previous year near Pamplona, and at Huesca and Barbastro. The Moderados replied that he was a Revolutionist, that he moved Espartero to be hostile to the Government, and that if replaced by a man more devoted to them the general-in-chief would soon come round to their way of thinking. The result had better be given in the words of the chief English Commissioner, Colonel Wylde: "Espartero has been for some time past on bad terms with the present Ministers, which he attributes to the intrigues of the

Sir G.
Villiers
to Lieut.
Lynn,
April 20,
1838

Ibid.
April 29,
1838.

Logroño,
August 6,
1838.

“ Ministers of Finance and Justice, in consequence of which
“ he has tendered his resignation to the Queen on the plea
“ of his health. This was replied to by her Majesty
“ requesting him to continue his command, and to inform
“ her of his real motives for wishing to resign at the present
“ moment. He then frankly avowed the cause to be the
“ want of support he had met from the present Ministers,
“ accompanied by such slights and affronts as convinced him
“ that he did not possess their confidence, without which he
“ could not carry on the service with any advantage to
“ her Majesty’s cause. These circumstances were told me
“ yesterday by Espartero himself. . . He stated that
“ some months since, the chief of his staff, General Van
“ Halen, *had been displaced without consulting him* and without
“ cause; and although on remonstrance he was allowed to
“ retain him, the permission was so couched that that officer
“ could not but resign as soon as possible after the operations
“ then commenced had been consummated. And this officer
“ was most valuable and irreplaceable. . . After mentioning
“ many other causes of irritation, he said he was of no party,
“ and had never entered into any intrigues against ministers,
“ although he was accused of having done so in conjunction
“ with Pizarro, a man to whom he had never written a line
“ since he left office. I know most of these facts to be
“ strictly true, although *certain to be misrepresented by Madrid*
“ *ministers.*”

Such are specimens of the surroundings and provocations which drove Espartero to assert an individuality which became daily more marked and self-reliant. Like Cromwell, he saw the time had come to overrule an effete and corrupt form of parliamentary government; like Cromwell he went on to assert the salvation of his country with the firm character which grew with the freedom from petty worries and miserable intrigues. His divorce from Madrid gave him freedom and strength; and it will be seen in a later chapter that the wretched Government which sought in jealousy to emasculate the movements of their generals fell a victim to the burst of indignation which followed the

collapse in the east of Spain of one of those very military undertakings which they had considered as secondary to their own selfish ends, their own political dreams. If, in the midst of indignation, the student of this period of Spanish history has room for any softer feeling, he cannot but pity the unfortunate Queen Dowager, who, standing guard over her child, had for the sake of that child and of Spain to tolerate *charlatans* and knaves as her advisers, to reason with fools according to their folly, to soothe such men as Espartero and Flinter with all the tact in her power so as to save them to Spain, and to utter in public in the name of her ministers boastings which were alien to her nature, and assurances to which her own heart did not respond.

The military movements of Espartero during this period may be briefly narrated.

The first break during an inactive winter—not inactive in the sense of organisation, but merely in that of field operations—occurred in the end of January, 1838. Espartero arrived from Logroño at Villa Nueva de Mena on the 28th, and found the enemy strongly posted and intrenched on the right bank of the river Cadagua. On the morning of the 30th he attacked them in three columns under a heavy fire, and by 10.30 a.m. succeeded in occupying the villages of Mercadillo, Covides, Uvillas, and Cileza, the enemy retreating to a still stronger position at Medianos and Santa Cruz. Thence, however, they were driven before noon, and by one o'clock were in disorderly retreat towards Arcinieja; but owing to the difficult country, no pursuit was carried on on that day. The strength of the Carlists on this occasion amounted to 14 battalions and 2 guns, under Guergue, assisted by Sopelana, Sanz, and the Marquis de Boveda (who was killed).

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Feb. 2,
1838.

On the morning of the 31st, Espartero, who had encamped for the night at Artieta and Birgol, marched with General Latré's division (8 battalions) to Berron, Iriarte going to the right with 4 battalions, and Buerens remaining with the guard at Birgol. At Berron, which is on the high road, half a league from Balmaseda, the enemy was strongly

intrenched, but retired on the approach of Espartero to the fortified convent and line of Santa Isabel, where they had a support of two Biscayan regiments under Castor, and where they formed themselves on the heights beyond and above, in heavy masses, having been reinforced during the night by at least four additional battalions of Navarrese. As soon as the firing of Iriarte's column against the Carlist left commenced, Espartero attacked the position of Santa Isabel, and in spite of heavy fire carried it with a rush, and advanced against the heights on which was stationed the chief force of the enemy. Here an obstinate resistance was made; but before dark the Carlists had been dislodged at the point of the bayonet, and were in full retreat in the mountains. The Christinos halted near Campijo on the confines of Biscay; and then remained near Berron in the Valle de Mena, to protect the evacuation of Balmaseda, which it had been considered impracticable to support at such a distance from resources. The supply of provisions could only be kept up by means of large escorts at considerable loss of life; so it was decided after careful consideration to blow up the fort and withdraw the garrison, strengthening, however, the fort of Villa Nueva de Mena, which now became the most advanced post of the Christinos in the Valle de Mena, and which was left in charge of General Latré, when Espartero returned to Villarcayo and Logroño. Of the actions of the 30th and 31st January, in which the Carlists lost at least 1000 killed and wounded, and the Christinos only 300, Sir George Villiers wrote that he feared their good effects would be neutralised by the evacuation of Balmaseda, and by permitting the enemy to enter the Valle de Mena; that he much dreaded that it would render the protection of Bilbao and Portugaleta more difficult; and that it must certainly do harm in a political point of view by allowing the enemy to overrun a district which had been faithful to the Queen. Even admitting the grounds for Sir George's fears, there can be no doubt that Espartero adopted the less of two evils; and the gloom which evidently clouded the British minister's mind was due in part to the disasters

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Logroño,
Feb. 9,
1838.
Madrid,
Feb. 6,
1838.

to the Queen's cause which at this time were occurring in other parts of Spain. Morella and Benicarlo had just fallen into Cabrera's hands; and Oraa, who was pitted against him, was shrieking for reinforcements. Basilio Garcia, who in emulation of Gomez had crossed the Ebro and entered Castile in search of plunder, had been foolishly permitted to unite with other Carlists chiefs such as Jara, Palillo, and Tallada, and was at this time in complete possession of La Mancha, and of the province—except the town—of Toledo. No wonder that gloom should occupy the mind of the anxious minister, soon, however, to be dispelled by the doings of Flinter in the south, and of Espartero in the north.

Espartero's next movements of any consequence were in connection with a Carlist expedition under Negri, which had been despatched with the intention, it was said, of laying waste the hitherto unmolested provinces of Galicia and the Asturias. It was believed that such of the northern powers as were disposed to favour Don Carlos had insisted on his making some early demonstration, as a condition of any help to be rendered by them; it was therefore all the more necessary that any such expedition should be promptly beaten. It was hoped that in that case not merely would foreign remittances cease, but that no other similar expedition would be likely to leave the Provinces. It was also desirable for another reason that this first attempt should be crushed: because if the Carlists were "permitted to lay waste Galicia and the Asturias, neither *quinta* nor contributions would be possible any longer in provinces which were the richest and best disposed of Spain."

Espartero's movements read somewhat erratic, on account of the activity and change of route adopted by the pursued, and owing to the want of accurate information, coupled with false alarms, which seemed characteristic of all Christino armies. It appeared on good authority that Negri's force at first consisted of twelve battalions and three or four hundred cavalry. Espartero had a force under his immediate command for the pursuit, consisting of 9 battalions, 14

Sir G.
Villiers,
March 20,
1838.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Breviesca,
March 17,
1838.

guns, but as yet no cavalry. General Latré, who was to follow the Carlists by a separate route, had also nine battalions. Both these columns were subsequently reinforced to a great extent.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Leon,
March 24,
1838.

The expedition under Negri passed into Castile on the 15th March by Soucillo; but on the 24th March, it was ascertained that they had gone by Reynosa, Aguilar del Campo, and Arvera, and thence into the Asturias. Latré came up with them on the 21st, and had an engagement in which he had the advantage. Espartero—as soon as he heard of the exact route taken by Negri—marched on Leon to prevent their entering Galicia or attempting to unite with Don Basilio, who was doing much at this time to keep

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Lerina,
March 30,
1838.

the country unsettled. As a specimen of the determined nature of the Christino movements under a good leader, it may be mentioned that on this occasion Espartero's force marched 200 miles in nine days; and a short time afterwards he marched 92 leagues in fourteen successive days. As a specimen of how indifferently the same sort of duty was performed by less energetic Christino generals, it may be mentioned that while Negri with his troops was quietly living in Segovia, raising recruits and exacting contributions, Iriarte, with a division capable of destroying two such bodies as Negri's, was at Alcobendas, seemingly with no other intention than that of avoiding the enemy.

Sir G.
Villiers,
Madrid,
April 10,
1838.

Had the Carlists under Negri continued in the Asturias after the defeat by Latré, they would have found great difficulty in escaping from the united action of that general and Espartero, as the mountains, in which they always had the advantage of the Christinos, were at this time covered with snow. But on hearing of Espartero's movement on Leon, they countermarched, and were heard of on the 27th March at Belorado, with Latré's division—now under Iriarte—a day's march in rear. Espartero had also returned by forced marches to Palencia; and he now reckoned on finding himself after two or three short marches in the front of the enemy, with Iriarte only a short distance in the rear. Thus hemmed in, Negri could not have escaped destruction. The

fates were, however, unpropitious. On the night of the 30th March, an express reached Espartero from General Ribero, stating that he was marching with all haste towards Villarcayo, another Carlist expedition having passed into Castile. This—like much of the Christino information—turned out to be untrue; but it was believed at the time; and as Ribero's march would leave the Rioja without a single battalion, Espartero was obliged to march in that direction, leaving the pursuit of Negri to Iriarte. When Ribero's information was ascertained to be at least premature, Espartero marched to Miranda, leaving Ribero and Buerens between Oña and Villarcayo, with 11 battalions and 400 horse, to dispute the passage of any such expedition as was rumoured to be on the eve of advancing. On the afternoon of the 16th April, news reached Miranda that Iriarte had defeated Negri between Sahagun and Benavente, and that the latter had abruptly countermarched. Espartero at once concluded that the Carlists would again make for the Sierra de Burgos, and decided on anticipating them. On the 26th April he was at Burgos, when he learnt that the enemy, as he expected, had reached the neighbourhood of Aguilar del Campo; and, marching immediately in that direction, he came within sight of their camp-fires near the village of Robledo, about 1 a.m. on the 27th. What followed was eminently characteristic of Espartero. The enemy, hearing of the pursuit, pressed on as quickly as possible, and were not overtaken until reaching the village of Fresno. This place was so near the Sierra, and Espartero was so afraid of the Carlists making their escape into it, that he impetuously decided on an act of great gallantry but rashness. He, with his escort, and a handful of cavalry,* besides the officers of his own staff, had outmarched the main body; but fearing to wait lest the opportunity should be lost, he placed himself at the head of this small body, and charging down upon the Carlists, who were all in doubt and confusion and ignorant of what force he might have in support, he had the satis-

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Miranda,
April 9,
1838.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Burgos,
April 19,
1838.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Breviesca,
April 28,
1838.

* 40 cavalry of the guard, and 25 English lancers.

faction of seeing 2000 men surrender to him literally without resistance. Of this number, 232 officers and 1353 men were taken on the field, 100 were subsequently brought in, and the remainder were secured at Burgos.

Such daring acts endeared Espartero to his men, but made statesmen who knew his value to Spain tremble with anxiety. In a letter to Lieutenant Lynn on this subject, Sir George Villiers said: "I now hasten to request that you will convey
" to Count Luchana (Espartero) my warmest and most sincere
" congratulations on the important victory which he has
" gained, and which—like all those that have preceded it—
" is due to his own personal bravery, and to the extraordinary
" talent he possesses of discerning the precise moment when
" a decisive blow is to be struck. If any drawback exists, it
" is in the reflection of the tremendous danger to which he
" exposes himself, for although fortune has hitherto favoured
" him in this respect beyond all calculation, it must not be
" reckoned upon too much, and he really should remember
" that he is—what few men can boast of being—*indispensable*
" to his country, and that his life should not be exposed to
" the same hazards as the lowest soldier in his army. I
" really tremble to think of the consequences that would
" ensue from any disaster befalling him; and I cannot but
" think that the magic influence he exercises over his troops
" would be the same, if they knew he was witnessing their
" conduct at the distance usually maintained by all com-
" manders-in-chief, as if he exposed himself to such immi-
" nent peril."

The destruction of the expedition of Negri was complete. In addition to those who had fallen in battle, or been taken prisoner, no fewer than 2000 had deserted during the pursuit of Iriarte, or had, after capture, consented to join the Queen's service. These were now at Haro with Iriarte's division, being trained and armed. The effect of the collapse was depressing at the Court of Don Carlos. In spite of the annoyance caused to the Queen's troops by such expeditions, they had not, on the whole, been lucrative to the Carlist cause. "There had been," writes Bollaert, "the expeditions

“of Gomez, Zariategui, Garcia, Moreno, and others, which system had been condemned by Zumalacarreguy, and had already cost the Carlists 22 battalions, 500 officers and 2500 horse.” To this list was now added that of Negri, at a time when the dissensions at the Court of Don Carlos, and the increasing coldness of formerly sympathetic Powers, made disaster doubly to be dreaded.

After the defeat of Negri, Espartero moved to Vittoria and Logroño. He left a small force in the Sierra, to operate against the Carlist chief, Merino, who had collected a considerable number of recruits; Buerens assumed the command of Iriarte's division at Haro, the latter general having shown himself very deficient in energy; and a brigade of 3000 men under General Mir had been detached from Leon's division in the Ribera, by way of Zaragoza to Aragon, to reinforce Oraa, who was now faced by the growing force of Cabrera—a leader towards whom were gravitating the remnants of the Carlist expeditions of Basilio and Negri, and the cavalry of Merino. The state of Aragon and Valencia was now alarming. It was felt that at least two strong divisions would be necessary to co-operate in order to have any chance of reducing the superiority of Cabrera. There were also political reasons for reinforcing Oraa. The people of Zaragoza were becoming disaffected, and any rebellion there might spread far and wide. Espartero was quite conscious of the danger, but would fain have continued his own operations in the north to the end, leaving Oraa on the defensive in the east, if it could have been done. It will be seen that he was unable to gratify his wishes, and that when on the point of giving perhaps the *coup-de-grâce* to the Carlist cause—as far as the Basque Provinces were concerned—at Estella, the cup of success was dashed from his lips by the gross failure of Oraa before Morella.

Before that time, however, he had in various ways asserted his superiority over the Carlist generals; and of his successes, the capture of Peña-cerrada is most worthy of mention. This place was a fortified town of Alava, on the high road from Vittoria to Logroño, and had been taken by

Sir G.
Villiers,
April 29,
1838.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Haro,
June 16,
1838.

the Carlists in August, 1837. It had been subsequently well garrisoned and strengthened, and although Espartero took a considerable force against it—some 13,000 infantry, 600 horse and 16 guns—an obstinate defence was expected, and it was believed that great efforts would be made by the enemy for its relief.

Lieutenant
Lynn,
Peña-
cerrada,
June 23,
1838.

Leaving Logroño on the 13th June, Espartero's force arrived on the morning of the 19th on the heights in front of Peña-cerrada, and was immediately attacked on the left by seven Carlist battalions under Guergue. This attack continued in an intermittent form more or less during the day. During the night, the Christinos placed some heavy guns in battery against a stone redoubt, on a hill to the north of, and commanding, the town, which had been lately constructed by the Carlists. The distance was found, however, to be too great; and, on the morning of the 20th, Espartero, observing that his skirmishers had been allowed to approach the ditch unobserved by the garrison, in his usual impetuous way, decided at once on attempting to carry the fort by an escalade. The defence was a gallant one, and grenades, stones and other missiles were hurled on the attacking party from the parapet, but numbers and enthusiasm prevailed. The fort surrendered, as the besiegers swarmed over the parapet. A summons was now sent to the town, which had been abandoned by the inhabitants, and had only a garrison of 400 men, but the bearer was fired upon. Artillery was therefore brought to bear on the town on the day following, and many of the houses were demolished, but no apparent breach made in the walls. The firing had lasted from 7 a.m. until 2 p.m., and the losses sustained by the besiegers had been considerable, as they were exposed not merely to a very effective fire from the garrison, but also to serious attacks on the left of the position from Guergue's force, which had been reinforced during the day by four battalions from Navarre.

Espartero, irritated by the delay and opposition, at once decided on another characteristic step. Leaving half his force to continue the bombardment of the town, he formed the rest in column of battalions, and with this force and

his cavalry attacked Guergue, who was strongly intrenched on a wooded height, and supported by four guns. As the Christinos entered the wood, they were exposed to a very destructive fire from the Navarrese battalions, but advanced steadily without firing a shot. They were next exposed to a more severe fire, both of round shot, grape, and musketry, at a distance of 300 yards, and lost many killed and wounded. They were by this time on the same side of a small ravine, between Guergue and the original Christino position, as was the enemy; and Espartero now hurled his cavalry against the Carlist column which was opposed to him, which, abandoning its artillery, broke and fled in all directions. In half an hour upwards of 600 prisoners, besides the four guns, had fallen into the hands of the Queen's troops, and many more would have been taken had it not been for the intricate and mountainous country, which facilitated their escape. "The moral effect," wrote the English Commissioner, "of this attack on the Carlist cause will be even greater than the physical. It has taught the enemy that he can be beaten under circumstances where he has generally had the advantage. No troops could possibly have done better than those of Espartero. He exposed himself too much, but the effect it had on the troops was extraordinary."

This episode was soon realised in the town, and the garrison made their escape to the woods in the rear, leaving only their wounded behind them. The town was at once occupied by the Christinos, and orders issued for the repair of the works where injured, and of the houses, after which it was intended to send the army to Vittoria.*

* From a return found among Lieutenant Lynn's papers it would appear that Espartero's force was considerably reinforced during its march between Haro and Peña-cerrada; and that the actual force which he commanded on his arrival in front of the latter place comprised 17,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 31 guns of various sorts, from 24-prs. to 4-prs.

His loss during the time spent in capturing Peña-cerrada amounted to

Killed,	6 officers,	52 men,	16 horses.
Wounded,	26 "	462 "	77 "
Contused,	12 "	145 "	—

The head-quarters ultimately reached Logroño, and commenced preparing for the siege of Estella, the Carlist centre, and the seat at this time of the Court of the Pretender. While engaged in these preparations, Espartero made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade Maroto, who was now the Carlist commander-in-chief, to risk an engagement. One of these attempts led to the capture by the Christino chief, with a force of 12 battalions, 500 cavalry and a few guns, of a village called Labraza, within two leagues of Logroño, which had been fortified by the Carlists, with a view to securing the products of the surrounding harvest.

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
July 15,
1838.

The arrangements for the siege of Estella were on an extensive scale, comprising a force of 22,000 men and 50 guns, 14 of which were heavy siege guns. Espartero had actually marched as far as Artajona, on his way to Estella, when he received the news from the East which led to the abandonment of his designs. It will be necessary, therefore, for the reader to turn towards Aragon and Valencia, and observe for a moment the movements of the army of Oraa—the Christino Army of the Centre—whose fate was so interwoven with the Army of the North as to lead the commander of the latter to suspend his most cherished operations. Happily, by this time, Oraa was accompanied by three English Commissioners,* whose disinterested narrative gives an admirable picture of the state of affairs; and as it has been seen that one of the first duties of the Commissioner with the Army of the North was to humanise the war, so it is pleasant to find with the Army of the Centre that similar motives prompted the representatives of England, and that their attempts were not unsuccessful. Before touching on the operations in the field, it will be interesting to see the quiet and yet determined way in which the English Commissioners with Oraa endeavoured to put an end to the cruel system which prevailed of massacre and reprisal. They had in Cabrera a very different man

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
July 27,
1838.

* Col. Lacy, R.A., Lieut.-Col. Alderson, R.E., Lieut. Askwith, R.A.

to combat from Don Carlos. Cabrera had brains, an iron will, a keen desire for vengeance, and a singular popularity among those whom he led; while Don Carlos has been truly, and mercilessly described, as follows, by a recent writer:

"Each and all (of his English intimates) sooner or later
"became disgusted with the incapacity of the man, who was

Globe,
Feb. 1,
1875.

"thoroughly inefficient and impracticable, and with the
"horde of seedy adventurers which swarmed around him.

"It is only too evident that his incapacity prejudiced even
"the good-natured and genial Palmerston. . . . After many

"vicissitudes this Don Carlos died in misery and neglect, a
"sort of quasi-regal Beau Brummell." Of this same Don

Carlos, at the very date in the history of the war at which
the reader has now arrived, it was said by a writer from San

Sebastian that the mass of the Basque people, the troops
and their leaders, desired now to shake him off and all his

Morning
Chronicle,
May 30,
1838.

pretensions. "They begin to see clearly that Spain rejects
"him, and that it is with their enfeebled resources and

"their blood, assisted by a trifling aid in money from abroad,
"he is attempting the conquest of the whole country.

From this weak prince in the north, the reader turns to
the strong peasant in the east. Even while these sentences
were being penned, the soul of Cabrera passed; and it may be
said of the dead, as it was felt of him while living, that in
spite of his cruelty—and it was great and wanton—he was
one of those men who are born to command; who have the
genius which devises grand actions, and the courage which
executes them, and who have the rare power of awakening
the enthusiasm of their followers.

With such a man, with his prejudices and his crooked
obstinacy, Colonel Lacy had to deal in his philanthropic
efforts. All honour to him if he succeeded.

CHAPTER XIX.

MASSACRE AND REPRISAL.

ONE great object of the British Government in sending more commissioners to the Queen's armies was to humanise the war, and to enforce the terms of the Eliot Convention. This convention had as yet been a dead letter in Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia. On the arrival of Colonel Lacy and his brother commissioners at the head-quarters of the Army of the Centre, their first humane attempts were towards putting an end to the practice of massacring prisoners which prevailed. Their difficulties were many, and were by no means confined to those consequent on the blood-thirsty character of Cabrera. To commence, they had not the support of the so-called Government at Madrid, which did not care to look beyond its own selfish interests. "Here," wrote the British Minister from Madrid, "no one thinks of his country, and still less of the common enemy; party intrigues and the most pitiful dissensions occupy everybody's attention; and, both in and out of the Cortes, people are disputing for the fragment of power which is left to a Government, but which, when they get it, they are utterly ignorant of how to turn to account. The natural consequence of all this is that the most complete confusion prevails; nobody commands and nobody obeys; and the neglect of the public service has arrived at a pitch that is really scandalous. . . . On the whole, I can only compare the state of things here to that which must have existed at the Tower of Babel, where no two men understood each other. In the meanwhile the most

To Col.
Lacy,
Nov. 12,
1838.

“important theatre of war, Aragon, is totally neglected
 “and will remain so, unless a Minister of War capable of
 “performing his duty drops down from the moon, for there
 “is as good a chance of his coming from there as from any-
 “where else. I yesterday saw the Queen-regent, and com-
 “municated to her Majesty your opinions upon the state of
 “Aragon, and the consequences which would ensue if the
 “Army of the Centre be not immediately reinforced. She
 “most fully agreed; but what can she do, surrounded as she
 “is by incapable and intriguing men?”

Another difficulty which Colonel Lacy had to encounter was with the generals to whose staff he was attached. General Oraa was reserved, almost to taciturnity, and never treated him as Espartero treated Colonel Wylde. This want of cordiality extended to the subordinates, one of whom, Col. Lacy, July 23, 1838. more candid than the others, confessed he had orders not to give any information whatever. Lord William Hervey, who had temporary charge of the mission at Madrid at this time, offered to undertake the delicate task of endeavouring to diminish the reserve shown by Oraa, but Colonel Lacy frankly replied:—“I have never mentioned General Oraa’s Ibid., Teruel, Aug. 29, 1838. reserve towards me with a desire for any interference at Madrid, but solely with a view to excuse my not giving more early and more substantial information in regard to what is going on. It has been a source of bitter mortification to me, and it is a difficulty that I must bear with patience, as I consider any attempt to remedy it would only increase the embarrassment.”

With General Van Halen, after Oraa’s disgrace, the difficulty encountered by Colonel Lacy was of an active rather than of a passive nature; and it required all the consolation and advice which even such men as Lord William Hervey, Mr. Aston, and Mr. Southern could send in succession from the British Embassy at Madrid, to make his difficult and delicate duties endurable. General Van Halen did not hesitate to accuse Colonel Lacy of forgetting, in his humanitarian zeal for prisoners taken from the Carlists, that Christinos were dying daily at the hands of such men as

To Colonel
Lacy, Dec.
19, 1838.

Cabrera. Many were the discussions on this point, both between General Van Halen and Colonel Lacy, and between the same general and the British Minister. The following letter from Sir George Villiers, following upon an act of somewhat anticipatory reprisal on the part of General Van Halen, explains the situation very clearly. "I am
 " certain that our government will entirely approve the
 " measures taken by you to check, if possible, the horrible
 " effusion of blood which is now going on in Aragon and
 " Valencia, and I can only regret that your intervention
 " has not been attended with more success. I do not think
 " that General Van Halen, even in the severest construc-
 " tion of what he believes to be his duty, was called upon
 " to order the execution of the prisoners taken in the action
 " at Cheste, merely upon the announcement of Cabrera that
 " he intended to give no quarter. It appears to me that he
 " should have waited to see whether the threat was acted
 " upon; and there was some reason to hope that it would
 " not be so, as Cabrera has in his hands a vast number of
 " prisoners whom he has not yet massacred; and, fortune
 " having proved unfavourable to him in his late expedition, he
 " might have seen grounds for pausing before he commenced
 " a war of extermination from which he might ultimately be
 " the greatest sufferer. Cabrera is a ruffian, acting upon his
 " own responsibility, who acknowledges no authority, and
 " only follows the dictates of his lawless will; while General
 " Van Halen is a brave man, and, as is usually the case with
 " brave men, a humane one. He is the General-in-chief of
 " the Queen's Army in Aragon and Valencia, and the
 " representative there of a regular and constituted govern-
 " ment. He should, therefore, act with the utmost circum-
 " spection, and never, until the necessity of doing so be most
 " clearly demonstrated, permit himself to follow the example
 " of his rebel opponent. That such a necessity may exist I
 " fear can admit of no question; for, if the Queen's soldiers
 " were to be massacred by the enemy with impunity, they
 " could never be brought into action under such manifest
 " disadvantage, and there would be an end of the discipline of

“ the army ; but I do not think that the general should have
“ been the first to act upon the system of extermination
“ which the Carlist chief announced it was his intention to
“ establish ; for he has now made it in a manner obligatory
“ on Cabrera to fulfil his threat, which under the circum-
“ stances he might possibly not have done ; and surely it
“ would have been well worth while, in the hope of pro-
“ ducing greater humanity, to have delayed for a time the
“ execution of these unfortunate prisoners. Had the at-
“ tempt failed, and the forbearance of the Queen’s general
“ been attributed, as is usual among Carlists, to fear,
“ General Van Halen might then with less remorse have
“ performed his melancholy duty. With respect to that
“ part of General Van Halen’s letter in which he implies
“ that you, as the agent of the British Government, exhibit
“ more interest concerning the fate of the enemy’s prisoners
“ than for the Queen’s soldiers who have fallen into Cabrera’s
“ power, I wish you to inform him, from me, that the charge
“ is most unfounded. You have never to my knowledge inter-
“ fered to prevent reprisals, when under the painful convic-
“ tion that they were indispensable for the maintenance of
“ the discipline of the army, nor except upon this occasion,
“ when you had reason to suppose that General Van Halen
“ was ignorant of the promise made by General Borso to
“ the prisoners, and when you thereby gave him an oppor-
“ tunity of carrying into effect those principles of humanity
“ which he professed to you at Zaragoza ; and your inter-
“ ference in any case cannot be said to be more in favour of
“ Carlists than of Christinos, as the object of the British
“ Government is to produce the cessation of a state of things
“ such as there is hardly any record of, even in barbarous
“ ages, and which throws such a stain upon the Spanish
“ character as must make it extremely difficult for the British
“ Government in the face of civilised Europe to continue
“ giving its moral support as well as active co-operation
“ to the Queen’s Government, which the numerous and
“ powerful enemies of her Catholic Majesty can—however

“ unjustly, although with apparent reason—charge with
 “ unnecessarily aggravating the horrors of civil war.* . . .
 “ Both with the government here, and with Espartero,
 “ through Colonel Wyldc, I have used my best exertions to
 “ alleviate the fate of the Queen’s soldiers who have fallen
 “ into the enemy’s hands, and to devise the means of putting
 “ an end to this inhuman warfare. . . . I can assure you
 “ that if he will suggest any other plan more likely to effect
 “ the desired object, it shall have my sanction, provided that
 “ it does not compromise the honour of the British Govern-
 “ ment, nor expose yourself to insult.”

This last paragraph names another of the difficulties in the way of Colonel Lacy, which will be alluded to hereafter. It may be mentioned, however, here, that the occasion alluded to by Sir George Villiers, on which Colonel Lacy was induced by a promise made by General Borso to make a successful intercession, was the same as that referred to in the following terms by Lord Palmerston in a despatch dated January 10th, 1839. “ Her Majesty’s Government approve
 “ of the zeal with which you have interceded with General
 “ Van Halen in order to save the lives of the Carlist prisoners
 “ taken by General Borso in the action of Cheste on the 2nd
 “ December.”

Colonel Lacy longed to write to Cabrera on the subject, but was faced by the difficulty that he himself was not a private individual, but the representative of a government which must not be rendered open to insult in his person. After much consideration and correspondence, it was suggested by Sir George Villiers that he should ask General Van Halen to place at his disposal a Carlist prisoner—an officer, and of a certain degree of intelligence; that he should then tell this officer that he had begged his liberty for the purpose of making him the bearer of a message to Cabrera respecting the horrible system of massacre now carried on by both parties, and which as a foreigner he, Colonel Lacy, interested

Nov. 28,
1838.

* The reader will readily detect the historical parallel of 1876-77.

in the name and fame of Spaniards, deeply regretted, and would willingly intervene to check. He was, however, carefully to avoid any interference in his official capacity as English Commissioner, and was to offer himself as a medium of communication, solely as a spectator of passing events. He was advised to act in this way as an experiment, and without delay, as the more the mutual exasperation increased, the more difficult would any compromise become.



TERUEL.

(From sketch by Colonel Lacy, R.A.)

The attempt was made as suggested. A Carlist officer Col. Lacy,
Teruel,
Jan. 6,
1838. was selected from the prisoners at Teruel, and proceeded on the 23rd December, 1838, to Cabrera's head-quarters, with verbal instructions from Colonel Lacy to state that he, as a British officer attending the head-quarters of the Army of the Centre, had observed with regret the rancorous spirit with which the war was carried on, and that—with a view to mitigating the horrors of such a system—he would be glad to act as a medium of communication between the opposing chiefs. He also took upon himself to promise that if Cabrera would rescind his order "not to give quarter," General Van Halen would instantly and gladly adopt the rules of civilised warfare. The officer reached Morella on the 31st December, and obtained an interview with Cabrera. That chief resented this irregular method of communication, stated that the bearer of the verbal message was not suffi-

ciently accredited to treat on such a matter, demanded angrily why the English colonel did not come himself, and then exclaiming that this was a subject on which the two generals only ought to treat, he took the officer's passport, and had it renewed in the following terms:—

“Head-quarters, Morella, Dec. 31, 1838.

“He presented himself, and this mode of treating in respect to the subject he has explained not being proper and decorous, he will return to the point from which he came.

“(Signed) The General,

“CONDÉ DE MORELLA.”

Disheartened, but not defeated, Colonel Lacy complied with Cabrera's jealous desire for a more official method of communication and treaty, and commenced a correspondence which resulted in a formal exchange of prisoners, and which is interesting as revealing the idiosyncracies of Cabrera. Although in his letters the guerilla chief protests too much, he yet clearly and gladly avails himself of the opportunity of pleading in self-defence before that bar of public opinion to which it was evident that even he was not indifferent.

Colonel Lacy wrote first on the 29th January, 1839, from Munviedro, in the following terms:—

“General,

“1. Being attached by the British Government to the Army of the Centre, in order faithfully to report events as they occur, I have witnessed with the deepest concern the cruelty by which the horrors always incidental to a state of civil war have of late been aggravated.

“2. It is not my intention to enter into an analysis of the causes which have brought about a state of things so deplorable; my object only being to contribute to the relief of human suffering, and for this purpose I hope my position is an advantageous one, as it may enable me, if assisted by the good faith of those on whom the ultimate determination must depend, to clear away any of those obstacles

“which at present impede a general exchange of prisoners,
“and the war from being carried on according to the usages
“of civilised nations.

“3. Interested as I feel in the welfare and honour of
“Spain, and knowing as I do the undisguised horror which
“throughout Europe is produced by this exterminating
“warfare, I shall deem myself most happy, if by my inter-
“vention an order of things can be established more suited
“to a great and civilised nation, to the age in which we
“live, and to the doctrines of Christianity.

“4. Consequently, I think the best means to realise my
“wishes, and those of every friend of humanity, would be
“if *you* would please to acquaint me whether you are dis-
“posed to agree to a general exchange of prisoners, promising
“to respect in future the lives of those who may fall into
“your power, being assured that there will be no objection
“whatever to such an arrangement on the part of General
“Van Halen.

“5. And lastly, whatever may be the result of the step I
“have thus voluntarily taken upon myself, it will never be
“matter of regret to me to have thus acted; for deeply
“responsible in the eyes of God and of his fellow-creatures
“is the man who either causes, or withholds his exertions to
“prevent, the unnecessary effusion of blood.”

Cabrera replied from Beccite, on the 1st February, 1839, in the following diffusive terms, full of that form of excuse which indeed is self-accusation.

“It was with much satisfaction and pleasure, Colonel, that
“I received your esteemed communication of the 29th
“January last, on account of the interest you show for the
“lives of unfortunate Spaniards, and the plausible object
“of preventing those misfortunes to which the conduct of
“the chief who commands the forces of the enemy in this
“part has given rise. I lamented, when after giving on my
“part a thousand examples of humanity, I could not find
“that they were imitated by the enemy, till, changing my
“conduct, and repeating with grief their acts, I saw the

“sought-for moment arrive, when the lives of my soldiers
“were respected, although it was done in a manner cruel
“enough, by exiling them and sinking them into a state
“almost equal to death itself, with the mere consolation that
“it was deferred. I endeavoured to treat those who fell into
“my power with those considerations of humanity which my
“position enabled me, and the conduct of the enemy per-
“mitted. But the fatal moment came when Pardiñas,
“relying on his superiority and advantages over me, consi-
“dered his victory secure at the instant of marching from
“Maella; and that confidence reminded them of the prin-
“ciples they proposed to themselves of putting an end to
“the greater part and most useful class of Spaniards, which
“is proved by their lamentable conduct towards the first
“who declared themselves for their laws and customs over-
“thrown. As many as were taken were victims without the
“least consideration, neither the sick nor those who were
“without arms, not even those who remained quiet at home,
“or in the very sanctuaries, being spared. And so it hap-
“pened, that having formed his men, he (Pardiñas) harangued
“them, and concluded, saying that they were not to give
“quarter, and that he would shoot the man who should bring
“in a prisoner,—an order which was put into execution with
“sixteen who fell into his hands when they first advanced
“upon my left wing, whereas *I* respected the lives of 400
“whom *I* took prisoners on the opposite side. When the
“battle was concluded, and I was made acquainted with the
“sanguinary order of Pardiñas, which the very prisoners
“acknowledged to me they executed with the before-mentioned
“sixteen, I immediately and in consequence thereof ordered
“their punishment, without any intention of repeating it in
“future with those who should not act under such declara-
“tion; and I can prove to you that I respected the lives of
“more than three thousand of those very prisoners, who,
“according to justice, should have been shot, which fate
“awaited mine had the victory been to the other side. The
“general exchange you point out to me would have been
“made long ago on my part, but the conduct of Van Halen

“has in several ways rendered it difficult. In the first place, when he ought to have acknowledged my generosity in preserving the lives of people who in every respect did not merit it, he ordered the murders at Zaragoza, Valencia, and Teruel, as well as at other places, of prisoners of older standing who were under the shield of having been taken at a period when quarter was given; and secondly, he retained those prisoners who were due to me; and thirdly, he declined to make his proposals *directly*, and in the manner that in decency and formality all treaties require. I consider you a witness of such conduct, and endowed with penetration and prudence capable of distinguishing these circumstances, which undoubtedly have moved your kind heart to pity,—a feeling which I assure you is inherent also in my own character, which has never denied itself, nor ever will, in any way, to what may benefit humanity, and prevent the horrors of shedding blood barbarously for the ambition of men who, under the apparent veil of liberty, have not hesitated to overturn the order in this nation, with which it was quiet and satisfied, and who have even laughed at and vilified the acts of protection they have received. I appreciate much the service you might render, contributing to the effect you propose, and which I desire. But I now call your attention in order that you may know that he only must act who can take upon himself the security of the execution of that which may be agreed upon, in order that upon his commission and person may fall the responsibility of every fault that may be therein committed. And, as long as such direct compromise be not made, neither my own honour nor that of my Sovereign’s arms can adhere to any other kind of means of arriving at the realisation of so just an aim.”

To this singular and involved exhibition of vanity, wounded self-esteem, and deliberate romance, Colonel Lacy replied on the 4th March, repeating his offer of mediation, should any favourable opportunity arise. In the meantime he ventured as follows to correct the narrative given by Cabrera as to Pardiñas. “There was,” he wrote, “a British officer under

Murviello
March 4,
1838.

“ my orders attached to that division in Aragon, and I wrote
“ to him on the subject. His answer most decidedly states
“ that although Pardiñas did harangue his troops previous
“ to the attack, there was nothing that could be interpreted
“ to the intent that they should not give quarter. The
“ clearing up of this point appeared to me to be completely
“ within my province and within my power, from having a
“ British officer in Aragon who was present at the Battle of
“ Maella, an officer placed there for the purpose of faithfully
“ reporting every occurrence, and whose testimony I am
“ satisfied you will respect. Thus, then, it appears to me
“ that one of the greatest obstacles to a favourable arrange-
“ ment between the chiefs of the contending forces will be
“ removed, and that Spain may soon be able to cast off the
“ imputation of prosecuting the war with unnecessary cruelty.
“ To this end, I entreat your attention to what I have
“ written; and I conjure you, as the chief of a considerable
“ force, and as a Christian, to do your utmost to mitigate
“ the calamities of a war where not only is brother fighting
“ against brother, but father is opposed to son.”

The pertinacity of Colonel Lacy was successful. Writing from Segura on the 16th March, in a very different tone from that displayed in his former production, Cabrera told the English Commissioner that he would soon see his wishes realised, for that the means for carrying out a general exchange of prisoners were in preparation, and a treaty was in course of arrangement which would provide for the war being carried on in future with quarter. “ These results,” he wrote, “ will enable me to fulfil those laudable sentiments
“ which adorn your mind with respect to humanity, and will
“ satisfy the impulses of mine in the same respect.” He waived the story of Pardiñas, although not quite prepared to admit the inaccuracy of his own version. He urged, courteously and gracefully, that although the English officer who had been present was undoubtedly impartial, still that his account of what took place might be erroneous; “ and,” wrote Cabrera, “ allow me to say that his evidence may be
“ doubted without offending his honour, it being very pro-

“bale that he did not understand our idiom, or that
“he had not at that moment fixed his attention on the
“subject.”

The last sentence of this letter, it will be seen, is a proof that *disinterested* exertions appeal to the rudest heart. Cabrera had rarely received a kind or courteous word from an enemy; even Sir George Villiers had pronounced him a monster on whose head a price should be set. Was this the way to soften his revengeful heart? Unexpectedly he received from Colonel Lacy the two letters quoted above, in which he was appealed to as a soldier, a powerful chief, and a Christian. The better part of his nature was touched; the longing to justify himself, of which he was hitherto perhaps unconscious, was gratified in his first reply; and the pride which the worst man must feel when he finds himself on the side of humanity is apparent in the concluding sentence of his second. The two letters of Colonel Lacy had struck the rock of a nature hardened by a sense of injury, isolation, and injustice, and at once it had melted. That they were and would be always fondly cherished is apparent from the words he used, which were not mere words, but were the sentiments welling up from a spring in his heart newly touched. “By this,” he wrote, “I give you a faithful testimony of the well-founded opinion that you manifest to have formed of me in your two letters, for the favour of which *he* will ever remain grateful who has the honour to be,

“Colonel,

“Your most affectionate and attentive humble servant,


“EL CONDÉ DE MORELLA.”*


Colonel Lacy's success in philanthropy was a consolation to him for the worries with which his too-anxious nature allowed official clerkdom at home to vex him. How far

* The officers employed to carry out the first exchange of prisoners after this correspondence were Don Antonio Carruana, Colonel on the staff of the Christino army, and Don Joaquin Aguilera, Colonel, and Adjutant to Cabrera.

philanthropy in war is even wise is an open question. Many urge that the diminution of war's terrors will only prolong it, and make it more frequently recurrent. To this it may be answered that in no country has war been so inhuman as in Spain, and in no country is it more chronic. Whether, however, philanthropy in war be politic or not, it will always be present. Recent exertions in this direction have proved that no cold rules will curb public sympathy. War touches noble instincts in man; instincts may not always be logical in their gratification; but there is a determined earnestness about them which has to be allowed for in calculating the forces which are present at the conception and birth of events. In war, the care of the prisoners, the sick, and the wounded, will always appeal plaintively to private charity. Recognising this fact, it is consolatory to remember, in the words of a recent authority on this matter, that "The more the suffering of prisoners of war is relieved the less will be the hatred and revenge stored up for a future day;" that "the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating, as far as possible, the calamities of war; and that the object of a state should be to weaken the enemy without inflicting on him unnecessary suffering."

Col. H.
Bracken-
bury, R.A.,
'Black-
wood,'
May, 1877.





MORELLA IN 1838.

CHAPTER XX.

THE FIRST SIEGE OF MORELLA.

THIS siege, unfortunate in its conduct and disastrous in its results, deserves especial and detailed consideration. In its story will be found instances of the want of forethought which characterised too many of the Queen's generals, of the suffering which in consequence pursued the troops, and of the patience and courage which that suffering was unable to reduce. For months previous ostentatious preparations for the siege had been in progress, and its success had already been assumed and discounted by the loitering government at Madrid. Even Espartero's movements had been made subordinate to it, and his attack on Estella had been suspended. If Oraa should fail before Morella, it might be necessary yet again to detach a force from the Army of the North to aid him; and, besides, it seemed unwise to undertake an operation, the failure of which, combined with a disaster in Aragon, would be almost fatal to the Queen's cause.

Col. Wyldes,
Logroño,
Aug. 27,
1838.

It will be well first to realise the situation of the Carlists under Cabrera who were to be attacked by General Oraa. The strong position held by them was the range of mountains extending from the mouth of the Ebro westward towards Madrid; but, since the defeat of Sallado, Don Bassilio, and others, they had confined themselves chiefly to that part near Morella. This place was almost inaccessible in the mountains, built on abruptly rising ground, and defended by a rude armament of about 20 guns. Morella and Santa Vieja were the head-quarters of Cabrera. His entire force, including

Lieut.
Askwith,
June 14,
1838.

those in garrison, amounted to a little over 10,000 men, and of that number some 7000 infantry and 800 cavalry were practically available for movements in the field. The cavalry was of a very inferior description, and the Carlist troops in general were in the north-east of Spain recruited from the refuse of the people, and included deserters, and men who had fled from punishment, or who preferred a wandering life of rapine and plunder to one of peace and industry.

It was believed at Madrid, and even at Teruel, where Oraa's head-quarters were stationed, that the Carlist troops were certain to shrink from defending Morella, but the marvellous power and energy of Cabrera were not taken sufficiently into consideration. A man full of fire, alive with a demonstrative loyalty to his cause, a stern disciplinarian, and an unscrupulous enemy, he succeeded in converting the hordes whom he had rallied round his standard into trustworthy troops. A sample of his stern military code was found by Oraa's army as it approached Morella. The bodies of a whole Carlist picquet were found in a prominent part of the road. For some neglect of duty the whole had been shot by Cabrera as an example to the rest of his troops.

Col. Lucy,
La Pobleta,
Aug. 6,
1838.

By decision and activity, this Carlist chief, himself untrained to arms, overcame difficulties and accomplished wonders with little means; but he tarnished his name with deeds of blood, and by the inhuman murder of countless prisoners.

Lieut.
Askwith,
June 14,
1838.

Opposed to this force, and under the command of General Oraa, was the army intended for the siege of Morella, a place which had been lost partly through surprise and partly through treachery, and which it was eminently desirable to recapture. This army was in three divisions—the first, under Oraa, Captain-General of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon, and meant for the protection of Valencia; the second, under General San Miguel Everisto, arranged so as to defend Zaragoza and the country between the Ebro and the mountains; and the third, under General Borso, intended to cover Castellon de la Plana and Vinaroz. In addition to the strategical reasons for this division was the invariable cause

for the dispersion of Spanish troops during this civil war—the policy of sending troops to food-producing districts, instead of bringing the food to the troops.*

The English Commissioners were distributed as follows:—Colonel Lacy, R.A., with Oraa's head-quarters; Colonel Alderson, R.E., with Borso's division; and Lieut. Askwith, R.A., with that of San Miguel.

The advance of the three divisions had been so planned that they should all arrive at the same time in the immediate vicinity of Morella. As a matter of fact, the head-quarters which left Ternel on the 24th of July, the saint-day of the Queen Dowager, was joined at Castellfort on the 28th of July by Borso's division, and on the following day by San Miguel's, when on the heights immediately round Morella. On these heights, and within 3000 yards of the town, the Queen's troops bivouacked on the night of Sunday, the 29th of July. The united force amounted to 16,000 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and a long train of baggage and commissariat horses and mules. The wheat had been cut and was lying in the fields, and a wanton scene of destruction ensued. The troops took the corn to sleep on and to feed their horses; much of it was used as fuel, and all that was not consumed was spoiled.

Col. Lacy,
La Pobleta,
Aug. 6,
1838.

This was an improvident beginning. Oraa knew that his supply of provisions was a scanty one. Had he ordered the wheat to be collected and placed under a guard, it might have been thrashed and ground as rations for the troops, the straw affording forage to the horses. There were the necessary mills on the ground, and also ovens.† But no such precautions were taken; on the contrary, the horses were fed and bedded on wheat, the men slept on wheat, they covered their huts with wheat, and when they changed their ground they set fire to the bivouac they left! During the

Ibid.,
Xerica,
Aug. 31,
1838.

* In March 1838 it had been decided to abandon Gandesa, a small fortified town between Alcaniz and the Ebro, which had been blockaded by the Carlists for two years. The courage of the inhabitants and the garrison had excited great admiration.


† On the ground occupied by the Portuguese Brigade.


time of starvation which followed, it was a common sight to see the men searching among the *débris* of the old camps for any stray grains of wheat which might have fallen and escaped destruction.

That even at the commencement of the march on Morella the commissariat arrangements for the troops were anything but lavish, and that during the siege the supplies were of the most scanty description, the following statistics will prove. When the head-quarters left Teruel on the 24th of July, the troops, consisting of 9 battalions, 4 squadrons, and some volunteers and partidas, were supplied with 4 days' bread and 7 days' rice. The supposed ration consisted of 1½ lb. bread, 6 oz. rice, and 3 oz. bacon; but no bacon was issued on this occasion. Some live stock accompanied the column, but not until the 30th and 31st was any ration of meat issued to the troops, and on these days the issue was limited to 8 oz. per man. And yet, during this march, the troops were ascending into high ground, where the rain fell in torrents, and the temperature was many degrees lower than in the plains which they had quitted. The exposure was severely felt, although patiently borne. On the 2nd of August the ration issued consisted merely of flour, which the men had to cook as they best could; and at this time part of the cavalry which had been detached towards Alcaniz to meet the siege artillery, was for 48 hours unable to obtain water for the horses. On the 13th of August the ration issued to the army was 6 oz. of rice and 2 oz. of bacon per man, but neither flour nor bread; on the 14th the issue was merely half a ration of flour; and on the 17th, the last day of the siege, the Chief English Commissioner wrote that "the troops were almost without food, and the cavalry horses and other animals, amounting to at least 3000, had already been two days without forage, except what they could pick up about the camp. No barley had been brought for them from the commencement." The division of San Miguel was in no better case from the commencement than was that of Oran. The English Commissioner with that part of the army wrote: "As usual, provisions are wanting. Very, very

Col. Lacy,
R.A.

Lieut.
Askwith,
R.A., to





ALCAÑIZ, ARAGON.

“small is the quantity at Alcaniz, and nothing can be pro-
 “cured on the mountains. . . . This great want of pro-
 “visions, the labour of conveying them over terrible roads,
 “make me sometimes doubt if they will ever take Morella.
 “The Spanish soldier will fight with very little, but upon
nothing is another question. There appears to me to be
 “great want of foresight; everything is left to the last
 “moment.”

Brigade-
 Major
 Cuppage,
 R.A.,
 Alcaniz,
 Aug. 1,
 1838.

The insufficient supply of provisions with the army had strategical disadvantages also. To secure even the wretched pittance brought by convoys from Alcaniz, it was found necessary to occupy the hill of San Isidro with a division of five battalions to keep the road open, a force which might have been employed with great advantage nearer Morella. And the only way of explaining the apparently insane assault of the 15th of August, to be mentioned hereafter, on a breach which was utterly impracticable, lay in the fact that Oraa was conscious of the growing and alarming scarcity of provisions and ammunition, and was provoked by this knowledge to a precipitate line of action, from which, under ordinary circumstances, he would have recoiled.

That the want of foresight in this army extended beyond the question of provisions will be evident from the following extract from the English Commissioner's correspondence. It had been estimated that the Siege Artillery might be brought up from Alcaniz in two days, but more than three times that period was found necessary. And yet the original estimate was not a sanguine one, had ordinary precautions been taken: “But,” wrote Lieutenant Askwith,
 “I never thought for a moment that all the carts would be
 “loaded with double what was proper in such a mountainous
 “country; that they would march without a grain of corn
 “for the cattle, and that after a rest of twenty days an
 “attempt would be made to march six hours, passing at
 “mid-day a good town without halting to feed or water;
 “that no officer would be appointed to regulate the march,
 “prevent unnecessary stoppages, &c.; and, lastly, that no

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“working parties would be sent in advance to repair roads, “&c., except one ignorant and indolent company of “sappers.”

Yet one more illustrative fact before proceeding to the narrative of the siege. It was found on arriving before Morella that there was no chart showing the distances of the chief points in existence, and the ranges had to be calculated by an English officer of Engineers.

Brevet-
Lieut.-Col.
Alderson,
R.E.

When the assault of the 17th August was made, and it was found, when too late, that the scaling ladders were too short, this officer exclaimed: “This fact alone speaks “volumes. Here is a place in Spain, and in the hands of “the government only six months ago, and yet no plan or “section is in the possession of the Engineer Department at “the siege.”

Lacy.

To turn now to the narrative of the siege. Oraa, having left Teruel on the 24th July, and marched by Villaroya and Mosqueruela, was joined by Borso's division, as stated above, at Castellfort, on the 28th. On the following day, Sunday, the troops heard mass on the heights at 5 a.m., and then advanced on Morella, being joined after sunset by San Miguel's division, which had just arrived—after some skirmishes with the enemy—from Cintores. That night was spent *en bivouac* about 3000 yards from Morella, and at an early hour next morning the army moved off in three columns, and crossed some very deep and rugged ravines, in order to pass round Morella, under an inaccurate fire from the Carlist garrison, and under a slight annoyance from *guerilla* attacks. Before all the Queen's forces had attained the heights on the opposite side, the head of the Carlist General Forcadell's column appeared on the offensive. He seemed to have some three or four battalions and a cloud of *partidas*. The Christinos, however, established their position; and Borso, with his own division and that of Pardiñas—ten battalions in all, and some cavalry—was appointed to hold it. On the following day, Oraa, with San Miguel's division and the reserve—in all about ten battalions—marched towards Aleaniz, whence he expected

the Siege Artillery, which he was to employ against Morella. Askwith. The guns in question had been brought from Zaragoza to Alcaniz, after a month of great labour; and it seems strange that they were not brought with San Miguel's division, when it marched from Alcaniz to Morella on the 24th July. This division had started with especial boasting, San Miguel having publicly addressed the troops on the glorious expedition which they were about to undertake, and having led them off amid shouts and salvoes of artillery, confident of victory and of the downfall of Morella and Santa Vieja. No sooner had the three divisions met, than San Miguel had to go back towards Alcaniz to escort the very guns which he had left behind; and not until the 9th August did they arrive in front of Morella. This delay was in many ways pernicious. Borso's division was left for over a week in comparative inaction and with only four days' rations. The Carlists were able to practise the guerilla warfare, which they preferred to pitched battles, and in which they excelled; and Cabrera was able to mature his arrangements for the defence. The Siege Artillery, which did not leave Alcaniz until the 2nd August, was far from formidable, and proved inadequate. It consisted of an 18-pounder, four 16-pounders, two 10-inch and one 12-inch mortars, five 8-pounders and three light howitzers. Small as this train was, it was not even complete. The platforms were bad; the Alderson. side arms were almost useless; quick match instead of port-fire was used in firing the guns, thereby rendering it impossible to fire in salvoes, a course which had been strongly recommended when breaching was commenced; and the guns had neither quarter-sights nor tangent scales, and were laid by a quadrant and plumb-line at the muzzle. Nor were the artillerymen skilled in their profession. In mortar practice they altered the elevation as well as the charge for different ranges, but cut the fuzes always at the same length. The practice was therefore very erratic. The officer in charge of one of the batteries was found elevating a mortar to an angle of 72° , and gave as a reason that he would thereby give greater force to the shell in falling! In making the

breach, they commenced at the top instead of the bottom, and made it narrow at the foot of the wall and wide at the summit, the whole of the *débris* from the top having thus fallen so as actually to *aid* in repelling an attack. So completely did the artillery, both in men and *matériel*, fail in this siege, that in preparing for the third siege of Morella, Espartero—as will be seen hereafter—threw the greater part of his energy into the task of securing a siege-train which should not prove so inadequate as that used by Oraa in 1838.

Lacy.

On the 31st July, Oraa, with the force which awaited the artillery from Alcaniz, arrived at Monroyo, where he remained with his head-quarters while San Miguel went back to Alcaniz to escort the guns which had been left. So utter had been the want of foresight in the matter of forming depôts of provisions, that it was found in Monroyo, a tolerably-sized town, and on the main road to Alcaniz and Zaragoza, that the troops, on the eve of an important siege, and at the very commencement of a long-planned campaign, could get neither bread, meat, nor wine; and had to subsist on a ration of flour, to be cooked as they best could. Mainly on this account, Oraa despatched part of the troops which he had kept with the head-quarters to meet San Miguel and the train, and part back towards Morella, on the plea of fortifying the village of La Pobleta. He himself remained at Monroyo, hoping hourly to hear of the arrival of the guns. So ignorant was he of the difficulties in the way, so completely was he without any means of communication with Alcaniz, that he rode out early on the morning of the 2nd August to meet a siege-train which did not reach Monroyo until the evening of the 6th. Then, and not until then, did he learn that in many places the road had been impassable until cleared of large rocks and other obstructions. Instead of sending forward an intelligent officer with a suitable working-party to remove impediments, San Miguel seems never to have been aware of them until the column arrived; and then the whole had to halt while a company of sappers removed the obstacle or repaired the

Askwith.

road. In this way, to the great exhaustion of men and horses, and to the great injury of the service, a petty march of six leagues occupied five days. From Monroyo to Morella was a march of four leagues, and during all this time, Borso, without food for his men, had to carry on an incessant combat, in which, if he succeeded, he had no real profit; while, if he failed, he inspired the Carlists with confidence and hope.

The march from Monroyo to Morella was no easy one. In addition to the siege-train there was a considerable convoy of provisions, and in all there were no fewer than 300 carriages of various sorts. The abrupt ascent to the village of La Pobleta tried the transport arrangements severely. The mules and horses had to make repeated journeys, the ordinary teams being quite inadequate. To get a 16-pounder Lacy gun up the hill required the utmost exertions of no less than two-and-twenty mules.

On the 8th August, Orna, with his head-quarters and San Miguel's division, escorting the artillery and convoy, marched from La Pobleta towards Morella, where they did not arrive until the following day. To cover their march, Borso had been ordered to change his position, but no precautions were taken to keep the road open. The result was, that on arriving at a part which was commanded from a rocky and wooded height, the road, which at any time was difficult to traverse, was found to have been cut, and the whole column was exposed to a heavy fire, which they were helpless to return, and which cost them in a short time the lives of some 150 men.

This strange disregard of precautions which in more recent campaigns in Europe have been looked upon as the first postulates in the problem of war, is difficult to explain. It is true that outpost or patrol duty in a Carlist country was exceedingly dangerous; as was well said, Carlists, who were invisible to large bodies, sprang up like hares at the feet of individual Christinos or small parties of the Queen's troops; but still, communications and patrol duties might have been established on a system of mutual support, which

would have ensured accurate intelligence to Oraa without very special risk from roving Carlists. As a matter of fact, no such system existed. Oraa played into the hands of Cabrera in every way; he dissipated his strength in petty engagements, he ignored the only means of ensuring rapid movement to his columns, and in a district where it was almost impossible to obtain food, he improvised an inefficient system of supply, under which his troops were virtually starved. Of all the generals who reached important commands in the Queen's service in Spain, few, if any, proved so unfit as he whose imbecility culminated before Morella. It is true that he was indifferently supported by the government; his supplies were not adequate to the work he undertook; and one hesitates to find fault with a general for attempting courageously an important undertaking with the means in his power. But he had an alternative which ought to have occurred to him, and which was indeed pressed upon him without success. Morella and Canta Vieja were only seven hours apart; the siege of the former place had been proclaimed some three months before, and defensive preparations carried on. Why not—at the last moment—taking advantage of the illusion, turn on Canta Vieja, and postpone the siege of Morella until adequate means should be forthcoming? Canta Vieja could have been taken with comparative ease; the Carlist garrison and armament had recently been weakened, and the Christino siege-train could have been easily diverted to it from Monroyo. Successful there, Oraa could have demanded further assistance from the government with the strong voice of a victorious general, and, if refused, he could have retired with honour, and, by fortifying Onda and Alcala, would have placed the Queen's cause in a comparatively favourable position in Aragon. Instead of doing so, Oraa risked all on one difficult undertaking, and being destitute of military genius and of powers of organisation, he lost.

Lacy.
Alderson.

On the 9th August the whole of Oraa's force and the siege train having united, Borso's division resumed its position on the heights of San Isidro; and on the 10th the siege may be

said to have actually commenced. General Pardiñas' troops moved round to the right, driving part of the enemy before them; they then closed in towards Morella, and two 8-pounder guns and two 7-inch howitzers were placed in position on the hills of La Ermita and El Peñon de Pediera, to annoy the advanced posts of the enemy. The regiment of El Rey then advanced and carried in good style a post near the aqueduct on the left of the Camino Real, while the Battalion of Africa took up a position still more to the left. The Portuguese Brigade under Colonel Durando went round to the south side of Morella, and occupied three houses which were intended to be an important post in the subsequent operations. With this brigade went Colonel Portilla, who had been Governor of Morella when it was taken by Cabrera, and the 200 men of the former garrison who had escaped with him. As these men were smarting under a sense of failure, not unmingled with resentment at insinuations of treachery which were more than whispered, it was thought wise to detail them as part of the forlorn hope when the attack on the breach should come to be made. During the night the sappers were employed in improving the road in the direction of the proposed attack, so as to facilitate the advance of the Siege Artillery. On the whole the work done by the Queen's troops on the 10th was good, earnest, and deliberately planned. Cabrera was quite alive to the situation; and on observing the movements of Oraa's troops he escorted the nuns and many of the civilian inhabitants of Morella beyond the walls. It is satisfactory to the historian to find that the main facts connected with the 10th August, as told by the English Commissioners, are confirmed by Cabrera himself in his own diary of the siege. Amid a cloud of verbiage, and with somewhat too loud protests as to the valour of his troops, Cabrera admits that the enemy drove him back on Morella, and commenced to hem him in and to cut his communications with that part of his force which was in the open country. It is pleasant to be able to record one fact in favour of the artillery with Oraa's force, which proved so inefficient afterwards; and Cabrera, amid the many causes given for the

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Cabrera.

retreat of his force, certainly gives the place of honour to the fire from the guns mentioned above as having been placed in position. The official report of this day's work from the Queen's side which appeared in the Gazette, was devoted in the main to a fulsome praise of one of the regiments engaged, and merely mentioned the important strategical movements, which if judiciously followed up might have led to a very different termination of the siege.

The successes of the 10th generated the usual wild rumours and sanguine reports which follow in the wake of a victory. Oraa had mentioned his determination to summon the garrison; and this was rapidly converted by gossips into the past tense, with the addition that the garrison had agreed to surrender on the stipulation that Santa Vieja should not be assaulted by the Queen's troops. These rumours were soon rudely dispelled.

Alderson.

On the following day, the 11th August, the good effect produced by the successes of the 10th were effaced by an error of judgment on the part of San Miguel. The commanding officers of artillery and engineers were engaged in a final examination of the position which had been chosen for the batteries; and Pardiñas' troops were under orders to proceed to Alcaniz to escort a convoy of provisions. These were already much required, the army being on half a ration of flour, and greatly inconvenienced by scarcity of water. The health of the troops was also severely tried by the oppressive heat by day, followed at night by heavy dew and excessively cold winds. The movements of the besieging army being somewhat cramped by the position occupied by the Carlists under Forcadell to the left of the encampment, San Miguel was ordered to make a diversion in that direction, but not to attack unless the conditions should be perfectly favourable. If he should succeed in making the enemy retire from the position he then occupied, Pardiñas would be able to get his division away towards Alcaniz. Cabrera saw the importance of the movement, and at once reinforced Forcadell with all his available troops, the Carlist force under Merino and Negri being engaged, as will be seen, elsewhere. Cabrera

Oraa's
Diary.
'Gazette,'
Aug. 16.

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assumed the command himself, and recorded a graceful and well-earned tribute to the gallantry of the Queen's troops, "their resolution, ardour, and audacity." San Miguel found Cabrera's force, under his favourite generals Llangostera, Forcadell, and Cabanero, strongly posted behind walls; and attacked them rashly but fearlessly, carrying three of their positions. In front of the fourth he found himself more stoutly opposed, and had to remain for some time under a heavy fire. While there he received from Oraa an order to retire, as the object for which he was contending did not seem of sufficient consequence to justify such a sacrifice of life. The order was obeyed, but not without much mortification and confusion; and the exultant Carlists hung upon their rear in their favourite guerilla style. According to the reports of the English Commissioners, based doubtless on Oraa's official returns, the number of killed and wounded in San Miguel's division was only 150 of all ranks; but according to Cabrera's statement the number of dead alone left by San Miguel on the field was 146, and the number of wounded carried away was no less than 650. If the former statement is correct, the loss of life was surely not sufficient to warrant Oraa in ordering a retreat, which was certain to inspire the enemy with a sense of victory, and in proportion to depress the army of the Queen. San Miguel certainly erred when he attacked the enemy in a strongly intrenched position, and under conditions so favourable to the Carlist method of fighting; but the attack once made, it would have been better had Oraa confirmed and strengthened it. The wretched arrangements for supplying his army with food, and his want of foresight in that respect, here thwarted him again. He was so eager to send Pardiñas in search of the convoy that he did not dare to use his division in reinforcement of San Miguel; and he appears to have made no use of his light artillery to silence the fire under which that general's troops were suffering in front of the fourth Carlist position. As a matter of fact, he succeeded in clearing the way so that Pardiñas was able to march on Alcaniz, but he did it at a terrible cost. The *morale* of the army was

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shaken; the Carlists were jubilant; and there was some good foundation for the wordy pæans in which Cabrera loved to indulge after any success, however small, which might attend his movements.

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The reinforcement, as suggested above, of San Miguel by Pardiñas would have been the more feasible, inasmuch as the Carlist divisions under Merino and Negri were held completely in check on the right of the encampment by Borso's division, towards the north-west front. Borso had been directed to proceed in support of the Regiment of Africa, which was threatened by Merino; and he took with him some mountain guns. He succeeded as thoroughly as San Miguel failed; and drove Merino back into Morella.

Lacy.

On the 12th the heavy artillery was taken to the places determined on as sites for the siege batteries, respectively 550 and 350 yards distant from the wall of the town and 1300 and 1100 yards from the castle which crowned the summit. The more distant of the sites was intended for the mortars, the other for the guns. Before commencing to build the batteries, Oraa sent an officer with a flag of truce to offer terms to the garrison. He not merely offered pardon for the past, but promised to endeavour to obtain employment in the Queen's service to all who desired it. His message, however, never reached Morella. With that barbarous disregard for the laws of civilised warfare which was characteristic of Cabrera, and which—while possibly born of a cruel disposition—seemed, as on this occasion, to imply a want of confidence in the sincerity of his own troops, he directed his men to fire upon the bearer of the flag of truce, and refused to hold any parley.

The day following was devoted to the formation and the arming of the batteries, occupations which strangely enough were not interfered with by the garrison. Some skirmishing took place during the day between Colonel Durando and some of the enemy on the south side, but otherwise the 13th was a quiet day. Standing on the Ermita de San Pedro, one could see a wall extending from the foot of the Castle Hill to the onlooker's left, and encircling the town of Morella. At

a point in the wall, which was nearly in the centre as viewed from the Ermita de San Pedro, was a gate, built up and flanked by two towers, which was known as the gate of San Miguel. The face of the wall adjoining this gate, and to its left as one approached, had been selected as the part where the breach was to be made. The breaching-battery contained five 16-pounders; the mortar battery in rear was armed with one 12-inch and two 10-inch mortars, and two 7-inch howitzers. The fire from the mortar battery was intended to act against the castle and the town, and to attract the enemy's fire away from the breaching-battery.

The enemy was in the meantime far from idle in Morella. A convoy of ammunition and provisions had been introduced into the town without difficulty, and a force was kept on the alert to watch for the convoy for the Queen's troops which was known to be approaching from Alcaniz. Cabrera's system of obtaining information, although irregular, was perfect; every peasant was in his service. In the town he completed a second intrenchment behind the wall, and fortified the main avenues and streets. Bomb-proofs for the ammunition were erected in the church, and the approaches to it were carefully defended. With the fire and energy which seemed never absent from him, Cabrera animated the garrison and prepared them for the bombardment which was to commence on the following day.

At daybreak on the 14th August, the fire from the batteries opened, and continued briskly until 12, recommencing at 4 p.m., and not ceasing until it was dark. The enemy's fire in return was fairly steady, and much more accurate than that of the besiegers; but the configuration of the ground was such as to prevent many losses occurring in the batteries. An explosion in the castle caused a good many casualties among the Carlists; but it was due to accident, not to the enemy's fire. General Oraa, in his usual roseate language, praised the fire of his artillery; but the English Commissioners, who could judge professionally, as well as kindly, on this question, did not hesitate to say that the practice was uncertain and unequal, and displayed very little science.

Alderson.

Diary of
Don R.
Cabrera.Diary of
Don R.
Cabrera.
'Gazette,'
Aug. 21.Lacy.
Askwith.
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As soon as the garrison was certain of the spot which had been selected for the breach—near the gate of San Miguel—immediate and ingenious steps were taken to defend it in case of assault; and these cannot be better described than in Cabrera's own words. "We commenced to construct
" on the front and flanks of the second intrenchment a thick
" parapet, with sacks of earth for its additional protection.
" From the round tower to the breach a parapet of sacks
" was erected with a ditch defended by a row of *chevaux-de-*
" *frise*, and at the other side a light wall with a loop-holed
" parapet of mason-work, also with a ditch; the whole in such
" a manner that when the enemy should enter by the breach
" he would find himself in a very confined space on which
" from their loopholed positions the fire of a whole battalion
" could with safety be concentrated, and which would in
" addition be commanded by the loop-holed houses in the
" neighbourhood, and by the high towers at the gate of San
" Miguel. . . . On the 15th August, at a convenient time,
" we heaped up in the breach a great quantity of combustibles,
" and reinforced the garrison at that point." The result of these precautions will appear in due course.

During the night of the 14th the besiegers fired occasional rounds at the breach, to prevent its being repaired. The fire from the castle during the day was found to have been from a 16-pounder, two 12-pounders, and a 10-inch mortar.

Lacy.

At daybreak on the 15th the fire from the batteries was resumed with considerable vigour, and very soon the houses in the town were visible through the breach at the top, but the mass of *débris* at the bottom of the breach was in itself a powerful obstacle against assault. The astonishment of the English Commissioners was great on hearing at 6 p.m. that the breach, which seemed as yet utterly impracticable to them, had been pronounced practicable by the Queen's engineers; however, they had no alternative but to be silent. The arrangements made for the attack, which was intended to take place at 10 p.m., were as follows: The troops were arranged in three columns, the *first* under the orders of the Colonel of the Ciudad Real regiment, who had volunteered

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Gen. O'raa.

for the assault, composed of the grenadiers of the 1st and 2nd Provincials of Santiago, who had formed part of the last garrison of Morella, and who were led by Colonel Portillo, the former governor; a company and a half of sappers; and a section of artillerymen, probably for spiking purposes: the second column, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Carlos Oscolosa, and intended to support the first, was composed of the grenadier companies of the 3rd division and of the reserve, with half a company of sappers; while the third column was composed of the Battalion del Rey, and the 1st and 2nd of Castilla, under the command of Brigadier Don Miguel Mir.

The English Commissioners carefully observed and subsequently recorded the whole events of the night. It was evident to them that a more impracticable breach could hardly be attacked. The wall at the bottom of the breach was still so high that it could not be surmounted without sand-bags or other artificial aid, and the second intrenchment was quite visible. The Commissioners were informed that a false attack was to be made by escalade on the other side of the town, under Colonel Durando with the caçadores of Oporto; and, knowing this officer's high reputation, they could not but hope, as they said, that he would succeed, as Picton did at Badajoz, in turning a false into a real attack.

The attacking columns formed first near the aqueduct in rear of the hill on which the batteries were, and, after remaining there some three hours, advanced with bands playing to within 150 yards of the breach. The broken nature of the ground—the large rocks which had to be surmounted—and the darkness of the night, combined to throw the attacking columns into confusion; while the music, which had been ordered for some inexplicable reason, removed completely the element of surprise which enters into a night attack, and kept the garrison acquainted with every movement in the assault. It was midnight before the assailants arrived under the breach; and up to this time a dead silence hung over Morella. The garrison had received orders to remain profoundly still until the enemy should reach the

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foot of the breach; the Condé de Negri, in the name of Don Carlos, offered to them the "royal pension for life," if they succeeded in repulsing the enemy; and arrangements were made for the immediate ignition of the huge pile of combustibles which had been collected.

When the assailants reached the mass of *débris* at the foot of the breach, the scene which followed was one of the most sensational in a war not devoid of dramatic interest. A brilliant and ever-increasing flame rose to heaven suddenly from the darkness, revealing swarms of men round the interior of the breach, who poured into the advancing columns—as Cabrera expressed it—a "horrible fire, causing the utmost consternation;" while from the towers of the gate of San Miguel, hand-grenades and stones descended on the devoted heads of the Queen's troops. The shouts and yells of the defenders seemed almost appalling after the former silence. The echoes from the surrounding hills seemed like the voices of demons; and the red glare, which tinged the breach and all around it with a hue of blood, only made the surrounding darkness more intense. The attacking troops were bewildered at the novel obstacles; they were enfeebled by previous fatigue and scarcity of food. There were conflicting orders from puzzled leaders: and the result was a retreat. But not before much bravery had been displayed. Even Cabrera himself, although attributing the courage of the assailants to artificial causes, frankly admitted its existence; and in describing the casualties among the Queen's troops, recognised the intrepidity of the fallen. It was 3 a.m. before the retreat was ordered, and by that hour much loss of life had occurred. In the words of one of the English Commissioners, himself a military engineer, the record of this assault may be well summed up,—words which gracefully acknowledge also the skill of the defence. "A triumph has been given to the enemy which is exceedingly injurious to our cause. . . . If from causes with which we are imperfectly acquainted, the general-in-chief ordered the assault, I can only say that he hazarded much, and ought to have had very strong reasons for attempting what

Alderson.

*Vide
supra,
p. 225.*

“ appears to me was so contrary to the rules of our profession.
“ . . . As far as the defence has gone, it appears to me that
“ Cabrera has acted most judiciously. He may not, it is
“ true, have conducted himself quite *selon les régles*; he did
“ not, for instance, annoy the besiegers when making their
“ batteries; he did not lay his guns on the short part of
“ the road leading to the batteries, which is exposed; and
“ he permitted them to bring up their guns and place them
“ in battery. Want of ammunition may perhaps have in-
“ duced him to husband his resources; but he did not, at all
“ events, strike up music until he had good reason to rejoice;
“ he waited patiently behind his walls, having made as good
“ dispositions as could Carnot, and indeed (as far as I am
“ acquainted) as novel as any that able engineer has sug-
“ gested; he did not attempt to clear the front of the
“ breach, but he made both it and its crest so hot, that it
“ would have been well for him had we availed ourselves of
“ its inviting slope. I have no hesitation in saying that the
“ attack—conducted as it was—was one that nothing but
“ the *abandonment* of the town by the enemy could have
“ rendered successful. The moral effect of this failure we
“ shall no doubt feel.”

Another of the Commissioners wrote in much the same Lient. Askwith.
strain. “ Thus terminated an ill-directed assault and a well-
“ devised defence. Morella is not taken *yet*; it was to have
“ been an affair of two days, but it will cost time, and
“ trouble, and blood.”

The most charitable interpretation of Oraa's conduct in this matter, is that given in the early part of this chapter, which attributed the precipitate nature of his action to his consciousness of failing supplies. Even while the assault was in progress, Pardiñas was fighting every inch of the road in defence of the convoy which for hours Oraa had been expecting; and, when at last in the evening of the 15th he did arrive, he had been shorn of half his charge, and had lost over 80 men. Had Cabrera never fought another campaign than this, he would yet have done enough to entitle him to high rank as a commander of men, as a

strategist, and one who knew the value of constant and keen-eyed observation; and as a cunning master of fence, not merely in the excitement of the field, but also in the more trying circumstances of a siege. He had early detected the weak point of his opponent; and—resisting the temptation to swell the garrison of Morella—he lost no opportunity of hampering and capturing the convoys of provisions which Oraa required, and the non-arrival of which involved simply the raising of the siege. In a man so fiery as Cabrera, one recognises with respect mingled with surprise the calmer qualities which one would look for in a Wellington or a Von Moltke.

Lacy.

A day of inaction on the part of the besiegers followed the unfortunate night attack, but the garrison kept up a brisk and vigorous fire. Late in the evening it was decided to make another assault at daybreak on the 17th, and the first brigade of the first division, under Brigadier Aspiroz, and consisting of about 1500 men, was detailed for the duty. The accounts given by Oraa and Cabrera practically agree, and are on the whole endorsed by the English Commissioners. They are briefly as follows.

At daybreak the above-named brigade advanced in three columns, provided with ladders and sand-bags, Colonel Portillo and his men being with the centre column. As they advanced, the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, under which the assailants became disordered and sought for shelter behind the scarped rocks which surrounded the wall. The garrison replenished the fire in the breach, and received any adventurous enemies, who came sufficiently near, with showers of hand grenades and other missiles. The left column of attack, on applying their ladders to the wall, found them too short, and retreated in great disorder. The centre column, in front of the breach, found it impossible to ascend unassisted; and the space was too confined to admit of the formation of any considerable number of troops. It was accessible only by a single, narrow, and very steep path. Many acts of gallantry were performed here by individuals, especially by officers;

and here the gallant Colonel Portillo, who led the storming party, was slain. Seeing the hopelessness of the attack, Oraa ordered a retreat, which was carried out in great disorder,—arms, scaling-ladders, and tools being thrown away, and a loss having been sustained in a very brief space of time of 276 killed and wounded. No attempt had been made to enfilade the defences of the breach, although such a fire could easily have been arranged and would have been most effective. All the arrangements for the attack were of the most crude and improvident description, and the failure was disastrous and disgraceful.

It was at once decided to raise the siege. Without provisions or ammunition, and with a demoralised and discontented army, it would have been madness to persevere. Each arm of the service blamed the other, and extolled itself; and vituperative language passed into quarrels and semi-mutiny. The Artillery said that their practice had been perfect, and that they had done their duty, or the Engineers would never have pronounced the breach practicable. The Engineers, on the other hand, suddenly discovered that Morella was a first-class fortress, and required double the quantity of artillery to reduce it, and two breaches instead of one. And the Infantry, with considerable reason, declared that the chief engineer ought to have been hanged for having sent them to an impracticable breach. The most creditable part of the whole siege was the manner in which the retreat from before Morella and the removal of the artillery and stores were effected. Only one gun, a mountain 4-pounder, was abandoned; and the whole army was in march by 11 a.m. on the 18th.

Before glancing at the retreat, it will be well to review the situation through the eyes of the Commissioners on the spot. "With an effective army," wrote Lieutenant Askwith, "at least for Spain, confident of victory, and nearly double the number which the enemy could bring into the field, an enemy which was on the contrary discontented, and fearful of the result, this General Oraa marched, or rather paraded through the country, hoping to strike terror into

“ the inhabitants, and make them espouse his cause ; for the
 “ idea of meeting the enemy, except where they chose, or of
 “ hemming them in, was absurd in such a country, or if such
 “ was entertained, surely Morella ought not to have been
 “ selected as the place to meet them. Oraa’s march was
 “ not made with the intent, as would be imagined, of bring-
 “ ing provisions from the three points, Teruel, Castellon and
 “ Alcaniz ; for each division had only rations for a few days,
 “ and the troops were indeed mainly on half-rations. He
 “ left eleven battalions for seven days with rations for only
 “ four days, in an exposed situation in front of Morella, and
 “ in the heart of the enemy’s country. . . . Oraa is an
 “ obstinate man ; he will not consult those in command
 “ under him, and he is surrounded by an ignorant staff, who
 “ have no other object than by flattery to gain favour and
 “ promotion. . . . Why did he undertake this siege without
 “ the necessary provisions in hand collected at some place
 “ nearer than Alcaniz ? To tell the world that he had not
 “ the means of conveyance is to tell the world that he
 “ should have provided such and did not. But nothing could
 “ show greater ignorance than the whole siege from the
 “ beginning to the end, not forgetting the music at the first
 “ assault, and the wilful sacrifice of life at the second. It is
 “ an unhappy event, which will prolong the war, will raise
 “ the hopes and expectations of the faction, will cause the
 “ country round to embrace their cause more earnestly, and
 “ will draw to the ranks of Cabrera five or six thousand
 “ additional muskets.”

Before
 Morella,
 Aug. 17,
 1836.

In much the same strain Colonel Alderson wrote : “ The
 “ dilemma in which the army is now placed is, I apprehend,
 “ caused by the want of foresight in the general-in-chief.
 “ The troops have been almost without rations ever since
 “ they have been here. Such a mode of proceeding in a
 “ civil war is, to say the least, injudicious. . . . It is a most
 “ disastrous campaign, and will, I should imagine, prove
 “ destructive to the reputation of the general-in-chief, par-
 “ ticularly in a country which rapidly rewards and as rapidly
 “ condemns its public servants. . . . Our troops are much

“demoralised, and the enemy much elevated. The bugle that proclaims our retreat will be the signal for incessant harassing guerilla attacks, night and day, whilst it will be with extreme difficulty we shall obtain the means of subsistence.”

The prophecy in the preceding sentence was fulfilled to the letter. The retreat was accompanied with a guerilla warfare, in which the jubilant Carlists were always successful, and in which the Queen's troops, while displaying much patience and courage, suffered severe losses. The hardships they endured were extreme; want of the commonest necessaries of life was of every-day occurrence; the wounded were so numerous that in the absence of litters or mules, they were carried in hundreds on fragments of ladders, doors, window-shutters, &c., and suffered great tortures; and, as may be imagined, the marches were slow and short. It was the 22nd August before the army reached Alcaniz; and on reaching that place there were found to have been no fewer than 1500 men wounded, exclusive of the slain, since the commencement of the siege, and fever and ague were almost universal.

Lacy,
Aug. 21,
1838.

It is a sorry story, but one that has to be told. It explains the continuance of the war, and the subsequent tenacity of the Carlists in the East of Spain, when their cause had expired in the North. The story of Morella, perpetuated in the title given to Cabrera by his grateful chief, lived and still lives as a proud tradition in the Carlist annals. To the blunders of an incompetent general does this tradition owe its existence; on the same head must rest to all time the renewed vigour which such a tradition inspired, the prolongation of the civil war in Spain, and the misery and loss which such war leaves in its wake.*

* The ammunition expended by the besieging artillery at this siege of Morella was as follows:—

16-pr. gun	1046 rounds.
8-pr. "	208 "
Shells, mortar	674 "
" howitzer	300 "

CHAPTER XXI.

THE DEFECTION OF MAROTO.

QUITTING now the East of Spain, where the war was assuming great proportions, the reader is requested to glance at the period which intervened between the siege of Morella and that treaty known as the Convention of Bergara, which put an end to hostilities in the North of Spain, and enabled Espartero himself to proceed against Cabrera, whose movements and successes had paralysed the Queen's cause both in the Basque Provinces and in Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia.

The period in question was not marked by any conspicuous military operations. All such were confined to the East of Spain, and will be treated in the following chapters.

Politics, diplomacy, dissension, and treachery, filled the air in the neighbourhood of the opposing camps of Espartero and the new Carlist Commander-in-chief, the returned Maroto; and from Bilbao the booming, as of some diplomatic thunderstorm, denoted that Lord John Hay was again on the war-path, blundering along, openly and noisily, on roads where trained politicians and diplomatists would have gone on tiptoe and spoken in discreet whispers. Of all the proofs of Maroto's determination *from the first* to prove a traitor to the cause of Don Carlos, none are so strong as the fact that he adhered to his purpose in spite of the most visible clouds of mystery, and the most noisy attempts at concealment, which attended the diplomatic efforts of the honest and transparent commodore. Were it merely for the sake of appearances, Lord John might have pretended to believe that Maroto was on the eve of committing an act which would be beneficial to Spain; whereas, by every so-called secret letter or

interview, by every superfluous wile practised on a man who had already made up his mind, by every attempt to press on a man who required no pressing, he clearly told him that he had entered on a path of crime, which it was for the good of Spain, perhaps, but certainly fatal to Maroto's honour, that that chief should pursue. Poor Lord John! ere the Convention was signed he learnt yet again the painful sensation of those who have to cry out, "Sic vos non vobis!"

Madrid remained the same. On the Puerto there were men to whom the arrival of the couriers from North and East was associated with rise and fall in their securities, and with no other history whatever. There were drawing-room soldiers, to whom, if such couriers but brought news of defeat, there would come a gleam of hope as to their own preferment, without even one sigh for Spain. There were politicians who were writhing under the consciousness that in Espartero they had found a master, at whose heels they might bark, but who knew that they were now toothless, and who despised them. There were governments which were powerless against this proud soldier, of whom Lord Clarendon wrote, as he quitted Madrid for England, "He need not wait for the ministers, but may do whatever he likes." In the North, Don Carlos proclaimed still that his was the people's cause, and strove to inspire them with righteous indignation and energy; but the Basques had by this time begun to suspect that the specious promises of the Pretender as to their Fueros were only made to serve his own immediate purposes, and only uttered for the purpose of misleading them.

[†] London
and Paris
Observer,
1839.

The Christinos went on in their own quiet, stubborn way; they fought when they were drafted, marched where they were ordered, were enthusiastic after victory, and morose after defeat, and were in their own hearts very anxious for peace. There is an old tradition in Spain that when a large force of Moors was on the point of exterminating a small body of Christians, a certain Angel of Discord was sent in answer to the prayers of the latter to stir up differences in the Moorish camp. So successful was the angel in his work that the Christians in the confusion secured an easy victory.

There are philosophical Spaniards who believe that the Angel of Discord forgot to return whence he came, and is still wandering about the sierras in search for work. He is therefore accepted as inevitable, and perhaps this fact may be allowed in a small degree to account for the phlegmatic struggle of six years, with so many idle combats, and so few real battles.

The French continued protesting friendship to the Christians, and selling arms and stores to the Carlists. The English people had their hands full at home and in Canada. They were getting tired of the Spanish War, and not a little unseemly wrangling had taken place on the subject in both Houses of Parliament. There was not a little acrimony in the country for various reasons. A certain new poor law, in particular, was irritating many. The blight also which had fallen on so many political hopes gave a curiously practical turn to the next agitation for Reform. A large body, under the title of Chartists, demanded universal suffrage, but were not to be satisfied with a mere power of voting. In the language of one of their pet orators, "The question of universal suffrage was, " after all, a *knife and fork question*. If " any man asked him what he meant by universal suffrage, " he meant to say that every working man in the land had a " right to have a good coat and hat, a good roof over his " head, a good dinner upon his table, no more work than " would keep him in health, and as much wages as would " keep him in plenty and in the enjoyment of those pleasures " of life which a reasonable man could desire."

It somewhat moderates one's transports over the advances made in England during the past forty years, when one remembers that a member was returned to the Imperial Parliament, within three years before the publication of this work, who had commended himself to a large constituency by professing opinions similar to those just quoted.

The interest in the War of Succession in Spain was mainly centred in the country immediately concerned. Other nations were weary of it, or were preoccupied. From the Basque Provinces, on the one side, came proclamations in

sounding terms, signed, "I, the King;" and, on the other, from the crowded streets of Madrid came 'Gazettes' from the Cortes in the name of the Queen; and in both the wording was most jubilant when death was said to have been busiest, or when smiling villages had been reduced to cinders to please Divine Right or a metropolitan mob. The picture presented by Spain at this the culminating point of the civil war was but a shifting scene of useless bloodshed, of meanness in politics, of petty court rivalries, of undeveloped resources, of chronic poverty. To this had ambition and civil war reduced the grand old country, whose dreams had in old times only been less ambitious than her deeds.

Espartero's remonstrance had made the Madrid Governments careful how they treated his requisitions. The result was that his army in the North was well clothed when all the others were in rags; and that, while many even of the civil officials were without pay, and the Queen's civil list was greatly in arrear, Espartero's troops were well paid. The sum of 62,000,000 reals* monthly was absorbed in this service; nor is this to be wondered at when it is remembered that the Army of the North had reached in 1839 the unprecedented strength of 98,958 men (including volunteers), and had 690 pieces of ordnance of various natures. The force opposed to it, although more concentrated, was far inferior in numbers, not exceeding 32,060 men and 52 guns.

During the winter of 1838-39 the provisions of the Eliot Convention were by no means strictly adhered to. Here, as in the East, massacre and reprisal prevailed. The Carlists were the first offenders. Balmaseda, a Carlist general, massacred thirty unresisting Christinos under very revolting circumstances, and grossly maltreated two women. In consequence of this atrocious act, Espartero ordered an equal number of Carlist prisoners to be shot on the same spot. From this time it was too probable that the war would assume in the North the same horrible features as in Aragon; for, as Espartero urged, however disposed he might be to show

Lieut.
Lynn.

Annual
Register,
1839.

Lieut.
Lynn,
Logroño,
Nov. 9,
1838.

* 620,000*l.* sterling.

Lient.
Lynn,
Nov. 15,
1838.

Ibid.,
Dec. 15,
1838.

Ibid.,
March 16,
1839.

mercy to prisoners, he *must* endeavour to check such barbarities, even by such painful means as reprisals on the innocent. At first, reprisals were not very successful. Within a few days of the event just mentioned, a Carlist *partida* went into a *puebla* in the Val de Mena, and shot the *alcaldé*, who was known to be a Christino. Next night the same men returned and killed his wife with their bayonets, with her children clinging to her, inflicting on the wretched woman no less than twenty wounds. A month later, a Christino staff officer, Colonel Reynoso, who had been taken prisoner near Villanueva, was murdered in cold blood by his captors; and Espartero, in reprisal, immediately ordered a Carlist prisoner of equal rank to be shot. Later, after Maroto had seized the reins of power from his titular leader, Don Carlos,—Balmaseda, declining to serve under him, went westward to join Cabrera, and during his march was guilty of so many atrocities that even Maroto was shocked, and sent a message to Espartero disclaiming any responsibility for the excesses of a wretch who was no longer under his orders.

'Times,'
April 14,
1875.

The question of reprisals was doubtless much considered, before he decided on that course, by the Christino Commander-in-chief; but to the impartial student they seem only to have had the effect, which followed reprisals in Spain in a subsequent Carlist War, of "making the opposing troops more obstinate and ferocious by placing inexpiable deeds of blood between them . . . and of infuriating the enemy to new deeds of violence, to be in turn the pretext for new retaliations."

Col. Wylde,
Logroño,
Sept. 14,
1838.

Before entering on the story of Maroto's treachery, it will be well to glance at Espartero's movements after he was compelled by Orma's failure at Morella to abandon the proposed siege of Estella. He had been twenty-five days before this place when he was induced by the news from the East to leave his position and retire to Logroño, spreading his army along the high road to Burgos, in the hope, it was said, of intercepting a Carlist force under Balmaseda, which was believed to be on the way to Castile. This retreat was not very intelligible, and was considered humiliating; but

Espartero's position was so strong now that he could despise critics. His subsequent inactivity for several weeks excited much astonishment; as was said by many, "The military movements of Espartero and Maroto at this time did not look like fighting." And if, as is possible, Espartero suspected what he knew very soon afterwards, he may have been wise in allowing Maroto's treachery to pass through its earlier stages without interference. It was firmly believed by many, and with great show of reason, that during the autumn and winter months of 1838-39 Maroto was fostering the discords and dissensions at the Carlist head-quarters so as to further his own ends, and that the many deserters who went over to the Carlists at this time from the Christino forces did so as part of an organised scheme with a view to assisting him in the defection which he meditated. With the same end, it was said, he reopened the communications and intercourse between San Sebastian and Guipuzcoa, allowing friends to meet again, and absentees to visit again their homes,—a step which was sure to intensify the longing for peace, for which Maroto sought to educate both army and peasantry. This measure was carried so far by him that after he had shown himself, as will be seen presently, in his true colours, he threw open the whole of the roads in the Carlist districts to all passengers and to any traffic in goods not warlike.

Bollaert.

London
and Paris
Observer,
1839.Lieut.
Lynn,
March 28,
1839.

Whether, however, Espartero was in the secret or not, his inactivity at first, and the ease with which he was allowed at a later date to drive Maroto before him, were suggestive of a mutual understanding of some sort. And the time was one when Espartero might have been expected to show extra energy, to atone for misfortunes to the Christino cause which were of not unfrequent occurrence at this time. To say nothing of such catastrophes as the defeat and death of Pardiñas at Maella in the East, which has been mentioned before, there were gross blunders committed nearer his own head-quarters by Ribero, Espeleta, and Parra, and a severe defeat endured on the 19th of September by Alaix, his favourite subordinate, near Puente la Reyna. Alaix was severely

Lieut.
Turner,
R.A.,
Larraga,
Sept. 22,
1838.

wounded, and this seems to have created a panic, ending in a disgraceful rout, and in a loss to the Christinos of 947 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

But, either for the reason named, or animated by jealousy of a rival, Narvaez, there is no doubt that during the early winter Espartero only displayed a political activity, and kept his eyes fixed on Madrid. The Duke de Frias had been called upon to form a ministry after the Morella disaster, and with interested design had kept Narvaez at the head of a new army of reserve which had been raised in the vicinity of the metropolis. Against Narvaez—it may have been from some old grudge, or more probably from present jealousy—Espartero bore a decided enmity, which he proclaimed officially to the government in unmeasured and sarcastic terms. Like many others, he was led by the violence of his feelings to overreach himself, and to give a disproportionate prominence to the man whom he sought to decry. Had Narvaez remained quiet, the conduct of Espartero would have proved beneficial to him, and would have been a certificate of his importance. But like too many other men, he could not afford to wait. To those who wait, opportunities come; to the impatient who would grasp them prematurely they are like a will-o'-the-wisp, which tempts the follower into a quagmire. It must not be a sleepy watch; of opportunities, as of laws, it may be said, "*Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, subveniunt;*" but a man may be awake on his post as well as on a march. Narvaez could not wait. To him a wakeful inaction was an anomaly; he therefore hurried to a course which was exactly what Espartero would have desired. Intelligence reached Madrid of a disturbance at Seville. Such intelligence was always reaching Madrid with regard to some place, or was in constant course of manufacture on the Puerta. But when the prominent names of Narvaez and Cordova were coupled with the rising, even the government looked uneasy, and brokers looked blank. The many creatures who envied Espartero his success, and who therefore hated him, wondered with much effusion what he would do and say. Like a wise man, he did and said

nothing now; opposition would merely have fanned the flame, and would have lowered his own dignity. The event proved his wisdom. The garrison of Seville detected under all the verbiage of Cordova and Narvaez that the attack was against the one general who had proved his right to command,—and the collapse of the agitators was signal. Increased honour awaited Espartero; a court-martial was offered as a reward to his enemies.

The year 1839 commenced with the movement of Espartero's head-quarters from Logroño to Haro, partly in order to obtain provisions and partly to support some operations of the Christino general, Castañeda, against Ramales. At the same time another reinforcement of some 3000 men under Brigadier Parra was detached to Aragon to assist General Van Halen, Oraa's successor. It being reported that Maroto had arrived at Salvatierra, in Alava, General Ribero was ordered to Vittoria to await further instructions. The season of inactivity closed with the old year; that of activity and of easy conquest came in with 1839.

The year was only a few weeks old when startling intelligence reached Espartero's head-quarters. Maroto had made no secret of his dislike of the party who, under the Bishop of Leon, were then advising Don Carlos. He had matured his plans and organised his battalions to a point which made him feel confident, and therefore candid. He showed no hesitation in the crusade with which he menaced all whose influence with Don Carlos might prove rival or injurious to his own. Perhaps, if anything, he was premature in showing his antipathies; and he very nearly received the punishment of unripeness in action. Forewarned, the members of the party then in favour took steps to arm themselves against any attack from Maroto; they had even gone so far as to get Don Carlos to nominate Garcia as commander-in-chief in his room; but Maroto learnt what was in progress, and took a very summary method of ending the discussion;—a method which furnished an instance of atrocity which even in this cruel war stood out with hideous prominence. On various pretexts he procured the arrest of thirteen rival or unfriendly

Col. Wyld,
Jan. 15,
1839.

Annual
Register,
1839; and
Lynn MSS.

generals, and had them conveyed to Estella on the 17th of February, 1839. He tried them immediately by court-martial and condemned them to death,—a sentence which was carried out in the case of *six* of the prisoners on the following morning. In this number were his most formidable rivals, Garcia, Guergue, Sanz, Carmona, Ibarrez, and Uriz. On being brought out for execution, they asked for what crime they were to die; but Maroto merely replied with a brutal sneer that they knew it well enough. From the peaceable way in which this atrocious act was received by the troops under his command, it is evident that Maroto had already saturated them with influences and individuals favourable to his designs.

Estella,
Feb. 18,
1839.

Immediately after the execution, he issued an appeal to his “volunteers, to the people of Navarre and of the Basque Provinces,” in which he drew a forcible comparison between their sufferings and losses during the past five years, and the luxury in which the courtiers of Don Carlos—that party which was hostile to his own views—were then living. He accused these of falsehood, of attempts to sacrifice the men he addressed in useless and dangerous expeditions, and of interested speculations and contracts, by means of which they filled their own purses at the cost of the starving soldiery. He assured the listeners that he had importuned Don Carlos on their behalf, and had even offered more than once to resign a command which only gave him pain as he contemplated a swindling government and suffering troops; and that at last he heard of some black treachery meditated by the men whom he had just tried, and of which in good time he would publish proofs, which forced on him a course of decisive action. “The strict penalty,” he wrote, “established by the military code has just been carried into execution; and I am determined inexorably to apply it to all who forget their sacred duties.” In inflammatory terms he wound up by exclaiming: “Let our motto be Religion or Death, and the restoration of our ancient laws, for which we are all ready to die; and let us cast out from among us every ambitious man who will not effectively aid the

“triumph of the cause we defend, and for which your parents
“and birthplaces are covered with mourning and poverty.”

Two days after the murder of the generals, Maroto addressed a letter to Don Carlos full of insolence, and making no secret of the power which he meant to exercise. Commencing with an accusation of indifference on the part of his Sovereign, he made a fierce attack on General Moreno and Teijeiro, and honoured the members of the Royal household with a whole vocabulary of such expletives as traitorous, venal, false, and seditious. “The fact is, Sire,” he wrote, “that I have ordered the Generals Guergue, Garcia, and Sanz, the Brigadier Carmona, and the Intendente Uriz to be shot; and that *I am resolved* from the proof I possess of a seditious plot, to do the same with several others whose capture I will procure, without reference to distinctions, convinced that by such means will be assured the triumph of the cause which I have pledged myself to defend, and which is not that of your Majesty alone, as thousands are interested who would be victims if it should fail. . . . Your Majesty is not ignorant of the seeds of discord which are sheltered and nourished by personages in the Royal household. Order them, your Majesty, to move immediately into France, and peace, harmony, and content will reign among your vassals. . . . I have already repeatedly pointed out to your Majesty the persons who by their acts have rendered themselves objects of general odium. . . . Your Majesty is aware that you have meritorious chiefs who have been buried in rigorous confinement for whole years, and whom envy or the blackest intrigue has succeeded in painting to your Majesty as criminals or traitors, and against whom a process was formed, which malice has obscured to the astonishment of all Europe. . . . I am bound to sustain my opinion and to justify my behaviour in the face of the whole world which is observing me, and therefore your Majesty must permit me to publish this my reverent manifestation, as *I must do in future with all that relates to these affairs.*”

Estella,
Feb. 20,
1839.

Before, however, Don Carlos received this communication, he had published his genuine and spontaneous opinion of the murder of his servants; and although he was subsequently compelled at the dictation of Maroto to withdraw it and substitute a document of a very different nature, it is but just to a prince who had many faults, but who had in him not a little that was noble, to quote some of the words which he used in the first impulse of his indignant and regretful feelings.

This precious general, who pleaded the real interests of his King and of the provinces as his excuse, was described by Don Carlos as one who had abused in the most perfidious and unworthy manner the confidence and kindness with which he had been honoured; was accused as one who had deluded and deceived the people with seditious publications, and had executed, without the formality of a legal trial, generals who had become covered with glory in the war, and whose services and fidelity had rendered them truly worthy. "My paternal heart," wrote Don Carlos, "is filled with the bitterest grief. . . . Maroto has trampled on the respect due to my Sovereignty, and on his most sacred duties, in order traitorously to sacrifice those who oppose an insurmountable obstacle to his usurping ambition. . . . I hereby declare him a traitor, as I do any one who shall aid or obey him after this declaration, to which I desire the greatest possible publicity may be given."

Bergara,
Feb. 21,
1839.

Bollaert.

Annual
Register,
1839.

Bollaert.

This strong appeal by Don Carlos to his followers was published, it was said, on the urgent request of Teijeiro, the first instinct of the unfortunate prince being to fly. It had, however, but a brief existence. Maroto set his army in motion against his Sovereign; and the latter "at once withdrew the obnoxious document, which was ordered to be burnt in every town and village, and issued another manifesto, wherein he begged his faithful servant to be pacified by this reparation. Maroto accepted the apology and "retired." This would appear to have been published on the 24th February, and the triumph of Maroto was completed by the enforced exile to France of Don Carlos' previous advisers, and the substitution of his own supporters,

Elio, Zariategui, Gomez, &c., who were released from prison to take office, but who never obtained their Sovereign's confidence. His success was celebrated in boastful language by Maroto, who coolly asserted that "the King, taken unawares by covetous and ambitious men who surrounded him, authorised the publication and circulation of an immature, illegal, and in every sense extraordinary and calumnious decree. . . . My heart pardons those who, seduced by the falsehoods of reptiles despised in all society, have been able to injure me in these later events; but if this circumstance should offer encouragement to such persons, unhappy is the man who, ignorant of the weakness of the mean sentiments in his bosom, shall dare to provoke my disgust or displeasure. . . . We all know the foul and vile qualities of the insolent Teijeiro. . . . It is painful to me to remember the faults of others, but circumstances oblige me to ask you what are the merits of this vulgar and audacious man that . . . he should be placed at the head of affairs?" He then proceeded to blame Teijeiro for persuading Don Carlos to undertake the illfated expedition towards Madrid. Among the Basques and Navarrese he knew that this Castile expedition was unpopular even to recal to memory; and that any proposed repetition of it would be met by the strongest resistance. On Teijeiro and the Court party he also laid the blame of the imprisonment of their rivals, of the loss of Peña-cerrada, and of "the effusion of Spanish blood, and the robberies and murders committed without distinction or consideration. . . . Volunteers! your most distinguished generals lost confidence, and those who were not confined in prisons were in arrest in particular villages. . . . We were hastening to ruin and dishonour under the direction of a treasonable faction, which only thought of enriching itself at the expense of thousands who throughout all Europe stake their all on the triumph of legitimacy. In the meanwhile greater sacrifices, new imposts, and the most obscure and secret distribution of them redouble our labours and our positive want."

Durango,
March 3,
1839.

April 4,
1839.

After the issue of this manifesto, Maroto had an interview with Don Carlos, at which a cabinet was decided upon favourable to the former, and all the principal offices in the provinces were conferred upon his friends. The game being now entirely in his own hands, he marched towards Santander with a force of twelve battalions—nominally to encounter Espartero, who appeared to meditate serious operations in that quarter—but really to commence those overtures which ended in the Convention of Bergara. And in the important movements of the next few weeks, resulting in successes which obtained for Espartero the high-sounding title of Duke of Victory, it was observed that Maroto uniformly avoided an encounter with the Queen's troops; and when he did on one occasion interfere, it was to order the brave garrison of Guardamino to surrender to the Christinos.

Annual
Register,
1839.

The movements of Espartero were systematic and successful during both the spring and summer of 1839; indeed, by the 22nd May he was able to boast that with a loss of only 840 killed and wounded he had opened the whole road between Bilbao and Orduña to the Christinos, expelled the Carlists from Santander, and concluded the first operation of the campaign. The most imposing events in this stage of the war were the capture of Ramales and the neighbouring fort Guardamino. It is true that against a force of at the most 13,000 Carlists on this occasion, Espartero had 22,000 men and 26 guns, 6 of which were of heavy calibre. It is also true that "Maroto evidently had no intention of "fighting," as far as the twelve battalions under his command were concerned; and that he had greatly aided Espartero by a general exchange of prisoners which he had carried out. But still the natural difficulties of the ground near Ramales were very great; the roads in the vicinity had been destroyed, and it took much time and labour to remake them. Villarcayo was the depôt of the army, and it was not easy to maintain communications; and the Carlist garrison made a stubborn and gallant resistance. The weather also was unfavourable, snow falling thickly, and the high ground being frequently enveloped in dense fog, so as to render

Col. Wyld,
La Nestosa,
May 3,
1839.

Ibid.,
May 6,
1839.

manœuvres and even simple movements impossible. Several fortified houses in Ramales were taken after a seven hours' bombardment on the 8th May; and the village was then destroyed by the Carlist garrison as it retired. The neighbouring fort of Guardamino was then attacked, and resisted so stoutly that although only armed with four guns, three of which were speedily disabled, it held out from the 8th to the 13th May; and the garrison then only capitulated by command conveyed to them from Maroto. That Espartero continued in the various engagements round Ramales to display his characteristic daring, and that it was no sinecure to be employed on his staff is evident from a letter written at this date by the Assistant English Commissioner, in which he mentioned that every one of the general's aides-de-camp, except one, had on that day had his horse killed or wounded, that the general himself had his horse wounded, and was "as usual in the thickest of it." The movements now became more like a triumphant march than a campaign, increasing the mystery to those who had pronounced that "Maroto's conduct during these recent operations at Ramales had been altogether inexplicable in not attempting either to interrupt the communications with Villarcayo or to reinforce Castor in the action with us on the 11th, and still more in sending an order to the governor of the fort, unsolicited, desiring him to surrender it." The key to the solution of the mystery was soon to be found.

Only waiting to hear of two Christino victories by the dashing Don Diego Leon,* the one at Belascoain, not far from Pamplona, and the other at Arraniz, Espartero marched on Orduña, reaching Berberana on the 21st May, and remaining there until the 24th, on which day the agreeable intelligence was received that Maroto had evacuated Orduña, Amurrio, and Arcinieja, and had withdrawn his artillery from Balmaseda. The Christinos immediately advanced, and, without seeing an enemy, entered Orduña, the ancient capital of and almost the only city in Biscay, and one easily

* Not the same man as mentioned at p. 140. This general was the Murat of the Christinos.

capable of defence. It was intended to make this the headquarters of a division, and to form a chain of posts along the high road from Puente Larra on the Ebro to Bilbao, thus opening free communication between that port and the interior, and depriving the Carlists of much of Biscay. While these works were in progress, Maroto remained idle at Llodio; nor did he make any attempt to check the occupation of Amurrio and Balmaseda by Espartero and Castaneda; nay, he continued granting further accommodation to his opponents by evacuating the valley of Guriezo and destroying the fortified church, which commanded the town and foundry where most of the Carlist ordnance had been cast.

While engaged in steadily maturing his plans and in making a marked impression on the enemy, as was evident by the number of daily desertions from the Carlist ranks, Espartero learnt several cheering facts. First, he heard that France had decided on a change of policy which would display more practical sympathy with the Christino—now the winning cause—by more active co-operation with the English fleet, and more determined prohibition of the export to the army of Don Carlos of warlike stores and provisions. Next he heard that General Leon was succeeding in Navarre, and was doing much to interfere with the supplies to the Carlist depôt at Estella; and that the bands which used to infest the country round Reynosa and Burgos had either joined the Queen's cause or been destroyed. This enabled him to send five more battalions to Aragon with the new commander-in-chief appointed to the Army of the Centre, General O'Donnell. And lastly, he heard of and was able to see for himself the change in the feeling both of the Carlists in the provinces and the Carlists in the ranks. Even among the strong partisan officials of Don Carlos, there were three parties: viz., Marotistas, men whose professed object was said to be to force Don Carlos to leave Spain, and to bring about a marriage between his son and the young Queen, which combined with a modified constitution might pacify Spain; secondly, a party headed by Villa Real and Marco del Pont, having for its object the establishment of Don Carlos

Col. Wyldé,
Amurrio,
June 19,
1839.

Ibid., July
26, 1839.

on the throne, with powers limited by a permanent Cortes; and thirdly, the bigoted Absolutist party headed by Cabrera and Teijeiro.

This was the situation when on the morning of the 29th July, 1839, Lord John Hay and Colonel Colquhoun arrived through the Carlist lines at Espartero's head-quarters in Amurrio. It would be difficult even to conceive, far more to describe, the self-importance with which the gallant com-modore was radiant as he commenced to tell his story. Maroto, he said, had sent for him to propose an armistice in order to give time to get the mediation of England on certain terms, such as the ratification of the Fueros, the marriage of the son of Don Carlos with the Queen, the expulsion of Don Carlos himself and Queen Christina, and the guarantee to the Carlist officers of their rank and pay should they join the Queen's army. To this Espartero replied, with a smile, that he himself had received, under promise of secrecy, similar overtures from Maroto some four months ago; a promise which he had kept so faithfully that not even Colonel Wylde was told it but in part, although he was generally in his full confidence. He had not informed his chief of the staff, Alaix, nor the Queen. The disappointment of the amateur diplomatist was almost ludicrous. His story had lost all its novelty. The highest rôle he could hope to play now was that of a confidential messenger. He might perhaps assert his individuality by being obstinate; and he tried this course by urging against Espartero's decided opinion the propriety of an armistice. Espartero said, and with reason: "Here am I on the point of advancing with a fine victorious army, and this man, Maroto, proposes an armistice without showing to what it is to lead, or what advantage my cause is to gain by it. This I cannot for a moment admit, nor dare I without something to show for it advantageous to the cause. Let Maroto pronounce for the Queen, and I am willing to meet him on liberal terms." It may be stated here that Colonel Wylde thoroughly approved of Espartero's action.

Col. Wylde,
Amurrio,
July 29,
1839.

Lieut.
Lynn, R.E.,
Amurrio,
July 29
1839.

But Lord John Hay—with armistice on the brain—urged

that Espartero, although much superior in force, ought still to grant the armistice and *unconditionally*; and he gave utterance to the strange opinion that because Maroto (who after all might not have the power to carry this convention through) promised not to molest the Christino line in Espartero's absence, therefore the latter might go away into Aragon with a light heart and crush Cabrera. It would be difficult to imagine any wilder notion. Even if there were an immediate armistice, Espartero would not dare to move his army, lest it should be turned to the advantage of Maroto's party among the Carlists without appreciably affecting the great question at issue. Ultimately Lord John was converted to Espartero's views; and he started on a return mission to Maroto. But, amiable man! he spread the sails of his reasoning faculties with too great liberality; he never nailed any colour of opinion to the mast; and the weary Assistant Commissioner had to exclaim of him: "Lord John, when he left Espartero, seemed to think that what the latter required was reasonable, and that Maroto would give way; but after seeing the latter he was *all the other way again.*"

Lieut.
Lynn, R.E.,
Amurrio,
July 30,
1839.

The story of Maroto's overtures to Espartero, long before Lord John greedily swallowed the bait which he hoped was to develop him into a diplomatic celebrity, was as follows. Some four months before the date of Lord John's pompous arrival, and therefore before all the mysterious conduct of Maroto at Ramales and Guardamino, a communication came from the Carlist chief to Espartero, resulting in an agreement that any one who presented a certain *key* as a symbol of his errand should be considered as accredited by Maroto. The conditions first insisted on by the latter were the marriage of the Queen to Don Carlos' son, the confirmation of the Fueros to the provinces, and corresponding rank and pay in the Queen's army to the officers who should express a readiness to quit the service of Don Carlos. In addition to these, however, Maroto insisted on that which Espartero would not entertain, unless accompanied by some very decided proof of sincerity, viz., a suspension of hostilities. On this point the communications broke down; and nothing

was heard of them again until Lord John arrived. An amusing instance of the fencing which took place on the subject of the armistice was on the proposal of Maroto that in the event of such a suspension of hostilities Espartero might march at once with perfect comfort into Aragon against Cabrera. To which Espartero replied that he would do so with greater comfort if Maroto would first swear allegiance to the Queen, and then *accompany* him into Aragon.

When poor Lord John attempted to pose as *Deus ex machinâ*, he dragged in a number of hopeless conditions. The idea of expelling Queen Christina, whether combined with the marriage of Queen Isabella to Don Carlos' son or not, was simply absurd. Nor would Maroto consent to hand Don Carlos over to Espartero. Yet both these were among the crude ideas of the commodore.

The following were the conditions which Espartero allowed Lord John ultimately to propose to Maroto, viz. :—

1. The Fueros, under such modifications as would place them in harmony with the Constitution of 1837.

2. The insurgent chiefs and all other officers to retain their rank, and a certain sum (25 millions of reals) to be placed in an English banking-house to be employed in compensation to these officers for arrears of pay.

3. That Don Carlos and the whole of his family now in Spain should be put in a place of security such as San Sebastian,—he to be treated in every way as a prince.

The Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant Lynn, was despatched to England to receive instructions as to the action which that country might be disposed to take in the matter; and he had an interview *en route* with Maroto. At first the Carlist general would not yield an inch from his first position; then he said that he might possibly meet Espartero half-way; and at last he said that he had the strongest reliance and confidence in the mediation of England, and that he believed peace would result, if faith and good-will were displayed on both sides. He stated in conversation his opinion of Don Carlos, and went so far as to say that he

was no obstacle, as far as he personally was concerned, for a corporal's guard would be at any time sufficient to send him across the frontier, or to throw him into the sea; but that he could not do anything so dishonourable as to give him into the hands of the Christinos. It was on this occasion that Lord John Hay with much effusion offered a home to Maroto and his fellow-conspirators on board the English squadron, should their machinations endanger their lives. During this discussion, Maroto, with a view to deceiving his rivals and his Sovereign, issued a bloodthirsty and abusive proclamation against the Christinos, concluding with the following words: "In vain evil intriguers spread reports of an accommodation which can never take place between two parties so opposite in their principles. Let our constant device be the King and Religion. Conquer or die with arms in our hands."

July 23,
1839.

The method in which Maroto acted, as opposed to that which he preached, was as follows:—Having allowed himself on the 14th August to be driven with ease from a very strong position near Villa Real, he sent his secretary on the 17th to Espartero with a flag of truce, requesting at the same time an armistice of three days, and a distinct statement of the terms he might rely upon if he placed Don Carlos in the hands of any of the Queen's generals. Espartero replied that if Maroto at once declared for the Queen and Constitution, and placed Don Carlos and his family in a place of security, he was ready to suspend hostilities, and to procure the terms he had already offered. On the following day Maroto announced his acceptance of the terms, and his intention of at once seizing upon Don Carlos, and sending him for safe—and he hoped honourable—keeping to San Sebastian. He also implored that a sum of £20,000 should be sent him at once, to distribute among his troops. It was not in the power of Espartero to comply with this request; and as two days passed without any other communication from Maroto, he advanced on Durango, reaching it on the 22nd, only a few hours after Maroto had quitted it for Bergara. On the following night a messenger arrived from the

Col.
Wylde,
Urbino,
Aug. 19,
1839.

Ibid.,
Urquiola,
Aug. 21,
1839.

Carlist general, Simon de la Torre, who commanded eight Biscayan regiments in the service of the Pretender. It appeared that these troops had refused to fight any longer, and were clamouring for peace and their homes. Without consulting Maroto, who seemed to have but little control over his generals, de la Torre sent to Espartero to arrange terms. The latter repeated the conditions which he had offered to Maroto, and which he was now able to say were considered reasonable by the English Government. General de la Torre's messenger was then sent to Maroto, accompanied by a representative from Espartero, to endeavour to make a *general* convention; but not until after several communications had passed, in which the Christino general would not yield a single point, did Maroto express himself satisfied, and agree to meet Espartero. The meeting took place at a farmhouse between Durango and Elorrio, at 6 a.m. on the 26th August. At first it appeared as if agreement was still doubtful: Maroto wishing Espartero to *guarantee* the concession of the Fueros from the Cortes, as he would have the power both of his own and the Carlist armies. Espartero, however, replied that nothing would induce him to violate the Constitution, or to usurp the authority of the Cortes. The commandants of the Carlist battalions would not consent to any modification of the Fueros; and de la Torre did not now like to separate himself from Maroto.

Col. Wylde,
Durango,
Aug. 26,
1839.

Matters looked very unpromising, but happily Maroto had committed himself to such an extent on the previous day, that Espartero felt confident that he could not withdraw. Don Carlos had reviewed the army, and, having learnt what Maroto was plotting, he pronounced him a traitor and urged the troops to abandon him. Maroto replied, calling him an ungrateful prince, who wished to make them needlessly shed their blood, and to entail misery and misrule upon the country. Whereupon, with the exception of a few men under the Count de Négri (who cried "Viva el Rey!" and followed Don Carlos to Bergara), the whole army shouted "Viva la Paz! viva Maroto!" It could therefore only be a matter of a few days, and Espartero was wise to be firm.

Col. Wyld,
Bergara,
Aug. 28,
1839.

He even refused to receive a verbal message which was brought to him from Maroto on the 27th; and insisted on all communications being in writing. His firmness was rewarded, and on the 29th August, 1839, the agreement, which put an end to the war in the North of Spain, and which is known as the Convention of Bergara, was signed. This convention, which is given below in detail, as well as the addresses to the inhabitants issued by Espartero and Maroto, will thoroughly explain the situation. Some little difficulty was experienced at the very last with some of the battalions, but ultimately they were overcome, and the armies mingled with much joy and effusion. Many of the Carlists entered the Queen's service; others returned to their homes; and to all a supply was given of an article which had been of late very scarce in the Pretender's ranks—money. About a fortnight passed before Don Carlos crossed the frontier into France, leaving his able lieutenant, Cabrera, to continue the war in the East; but at Bergara the war ended officially, and Espartero got his wish gratified by concluding the negotiations without foreign intervention. It was, he said with spirit, a war between Spaniards, and should therefore be made up by Spaniards.

The following are the interesting documents mentioned above, which close this epoch in the war.

CONVENTION ENTERED INTO BY DON BALDOMERO ESPARTERO,
CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL ARMIES, AND
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DON RAFAEL MAROTO.

“ *Article 1st.* Captain-General Don Baldomero Espartero
“ will recommend earnestly to the government the fulfilment
“ of its offer to compromise itself formally to propose to the
“ Cortes the concession or modification of the Fueros.

“ *2nd.* The employments, grades, and decorations of the
“ generals, chiefs, and officers, and other individuals belonging
“ to the army under the command of Lieut.-General Maroto,
“ who may present due certificates from the branch of the
“ service to which they may belong, shall be acknowledged;
“ those parties remaining at liberty to continue in the service

“ in the defence of the Constitution of 1837, the throne of
“ Isabel II., and the Regency of her august Mother; or
“ those who may not choose thus to continue with arms in
“ their hands shall be at liberty to return to their homes.

“ 3rd. Those who may adopt the first-named measure of
“ continuing in military service, shall be incorporated in
“ the corps of the army either as effective or supernumeraries,
“ according to the order they occupy in the scale of the
“ military departments to which they may belong.

“ 4th. Those who may prefer to retire to their homes,
“ being generals and brigadiers, shall be allowed to retire to
“ wherever they may choose, with the pay which corresponds
“ to their ranks by the military regulations. The superior
“ and other officers shall obtain unlimited leave, or their
“ retired allowance according to the said military regulations.

“ If any officers belonging to these classes should wish to
“ have temporary leave, they shall apply for it through the in-
“ spector of their respective departments of the service, and
“ this temporary leave shall be granted to them: this species
“ of leave of absence shall extend to foreign countries, and in
“ cases of this latter kind, by an application to Captain-
“ General Don Baldomero Espartero, he will give the parties
“ needful passport at the same time that he will forward the
“ applications of those officers with his recommendation for
“ Her Majesty's approval.

“ 5th. Those who may apply for temporary leave to pro-
“ ceed to a foreign country, inasmuch as they cannot receive
“ their pay till their return to Spain, in conformity with
“ royal orders to that effect, Captain-General Don Baldomero
“ Espartero will cause to be advanced to them four months'
“ pay in virtue of the powers conferred upon him; all
“ classes, from general officer to sub-lieutenants inclusive,
“ being included in this article.

“ 6th. The preceding articles comprise all persons in
“ civil employment who may present themselves within
“ twelve days subsequent to the ratification of this
“ Convention.

“ 7th. If the Navarrese and Alavese divisions should pre-

“ sent themselves in the same form as the Castillian, Bis-
 “ cayan, and Guipuzcoan divisions, they shall have the
 “ benefit of the concessions expressed in the preceding
 “ articles.

“ 8th. The parks of artillery, ordnance depôts, magazines
 “ of arms, clothing, and provisions, now under the com-
 “ mand of Lieutenant-General Don Rafael Maroto, shall be
 “ placed at the disposal of Captain-General Don Baldomero
 “ Espartero.

“ 9th. The prisoners belonging to the corps of the pro-
 “ vinces of Biscay and Guipuzcoa, and those of the Castillian
 “ division, who may in all respects conform themselves to
 “ the articles of the present Convention, shall be at liberty
 “ to enjoy the advantages therein expressed with regard to
 “ the rest. Those who may decline to agree to these stipu-
 “ lations shall share the fate of other prisoners.

“ 10th. Captain-General Don Baldomero Espartero will
 “ represent to the government, in order that it may lay
 “ before the Cortes, the consideration to which widows and
 “ orphans of those who have fallen in the present contest,
 “ and who may have belonged to any of the corps comprised
 “ in this Convention, may be entitled.

“ Oñate, 29th August, 1839.

“ (Signed) THE DUKE DE LA VICTORIA.

“ (Signed) RAFAEL MAROTO.”

ADDRESS OF MAROTO.

“ Volunteers and People of Biscay! When I declared
 “ myself, no one was more enthusiastic than I was in
 “ upholding the rights of Don Carlos Maria Isidro de
 “ Bourbon to the throne of Spain; but no one became more
 “ convinced by the expression of a multitude of occurrences
 “ that Don Carlos never could bring about that which
 “ was the only desire of my heart, namely, the happiness
 “ of my country. For that reason, and as I concurred in
 “ opinion with the military authorities of Biscay, Guipuzcoa,
 “ and Castile, and with some other officers, I have agreed
 “ with them to reconcile the extremes of a desolating war,

“ and have brought about peace, that peace which was so
“ much desired by all, as I have publicly and privately been
“ given to understand. The want of resources for carrying
“ on the war after the lapse of so many years, and the general
“ manifestation of the hatred to the course pursued by the
“ administrations of Don Carlos, determined me to take this
“ last step. I stated to the King my thoughts and my pro-
“ posals, with that noble frankness which characterises me ;
“ yet although I could not but promise myself a reception
“ worthy of a prince, I from that moment became a marked
“ man whose sacrifice was resolved upon. In so critical
“ a position my mind grew more ardent, and my efforts to
“ put an end to our misfortunes were redoubled. At length,
“ being authorised in due form by all the above officers, I
“ have agreed with General Espartero that the war in these
“ provinces shall cease for ever, and that we all will consider
“ ourselves reciprocally as brethren and as Spaniards, and
“ the bases of this agreement will be made public. And if the
“ forces of the other provinces be willing to follow our ex-
“ ample, and to put a stop to the ruin of their brothers,
“ parents, and relatives, they shall be considered and ad-
“ mitted ; but for this purpose, it is indispensably necessary
“ that they should signify their intention immediately, and
“ should abandon those who may advise them to continue a
“ war which cannot possibly be maintained. Men are not
“ made of bronze, nor can they like chameleons subsist on
“ air. Wretchedness has attained its highest pitch through-
“ out the army after so many months' destitution ; the officers
“ and n.-c. officers being in a worse plight than the private
“ soldier, as the latter is supplied with clothing, while the
“ former receive only a scanty ration, so that they may be
“ seen marching without shoes, without shirts, and in every
“ respect undergoing the privations and hardships of so
“ harassing a war. When any pecuniary supplies were
“ remitted from abroad, your own keen eye witnesses how
“ they were squandered between those who either received
“ or had the management of them. The country being
“ oppressed by the most grievous burthens, no one has any

" more wherewithal to meet his necessities ; and the soldier
 " who heretofore relied on assistance from his family, now
 " feels the poverty of his parents, who deplore the devotion
 " with which they espoused a cause which holds out to
 " them only death and ruin. Inhabitants of the Basque Pro-
 " vinces ! let the love of *peace* and union among Spaniards
 " take eternal possession of our hearts, and let us banish for
 " ever personal rancour and revenge. This is the advice of
 " your comrade and general,

" RAFAEL MAROTO.

" Head-quarters,
 " Villareal de Zumarraga,
 " 30th August, 1839."

ADDRESS OF ESPARTERO.

The Captain-General Don Baldomero Espartero to the People of the Basque Provinces and of Navarre.

" Six years of a war which ought never to have broken
 " out in these beautiful and flourishing provinces have
 " reduced them to the deplorable state in which they now are
 " beheld. The flower of their youth has fallen in battle.
 " Trade has suffered failures and losses ; the owners and
 " holders of property, being exposed to incessant invasions,
 " have been reduced to wretchedness. Arts and manufac-
 " tures have felt the paralysing effects of that decay which
 " brings on the ruin of families without number. In a word,
 " every thing in short has felt in that disorganisation and
 " bitterness whereby existence is rendered miserable and
 " precarious. Men of Biscay and Navarre ! behold your
 " present situation. Compare it with the happiness you
 " formerly enjoyed, and you will be compelled to own that
 " the scourge of so sanguinary a struggle has turned good
 " into evil, quiet into terror, the peaceable habits of your
 " ancestors into a desire of extermination, and prosperity
 " into all sorts of misfortune. After all, against whom and
 " by whom has war been waged ? Against Spaniards by
 " Spaniards, against brothers by brothers. You have been

“ taken by surprise from the very beginning ; you were made
“ to believe that the defenders of Isabel II. harboured designs
“ against the religion of our forefathers ; and the Ministers
“ of the Most High, who, if they had acted in the spirit of
“ the Gospel, ought to have fulfilled their mission of pro-
“ claiming peace and dispensing religious consolation, were
“ ever foremost in the endeavour to light up this intestine
“ war, which has demoralised the habitations which were
“ before the abode of virtue.

“ You were at once deceived by an ambitious prince, who
“ seeks to usurp the Spanish Crown from the successor of
“ Ferdinand III., from his lawful daughter, the innocent
“ Isabel. And what are his rights ? What just motive was
“ there that made you take arms in favour of Don Carlos ?
“ What positive benefit could you derive from his fondly-
“ anticipated victory ? Men of Biscay and Navarre ! doubt
“ no longer of your mistake and of the injustice of the cause
“ which you have been made to defend,—a cause from which
“ you could never have reaped any other reward than the
“ completion of your ruin. I know that the people are un-
“ deceived, that in their hearts they are thoroughly convinced
“ of these truths, and that they love and desire *peace* at all
“ events. Peace has been proclaimed by me in Alava,
“ Biscay, and Guipuzcoa, and this sweet and enchanting word
“ has been received with enthusiasm and hailed with fer-
“ vency. General Don Rafael Maroto, and the divisions of
“ Biscay, Guipuzcoa and Castile, who received only slights
“ and mortifying disappointments at the hands of the
“ would-be king, have already listened to the voice of peace,
“ and have joined the army under my command with the
“ view of putting an end to the war. The fields of Bergara
“ have just been the theatre of fraternal union. Here
“ Spaniards have been reconciled to each other, and have
“ mutually relinquished their differences in order to sacrifice
“ them to the general good of our unhappy country. Here
“ the embrace of peace, the union of the opposed forces, now
“ forming one body and one mind, have laid the foundation
“ for the eternal union of all Spaniards, under the standard

“ of Isabel II., of the Constitution of the Monarchy, and of
“ the Regency of the Mother of her people, the immortal
“ Christina. Here has been ratified a Convention for which
“ I was sufficiently authorised—a Convention combining the
“ interests of all, and which removes rancour, animosity and
“ the mad desire to take vengeance for past injuries. Every-
“ thing must by it be committed to oblivion, everything
“ must by it generously be offered up before the altars of the
“ country. And if the forces of Alava and Navarre, which,
“ perhaps for want of being informed, have not hastened to
“ enjoy its benefits, should wish to obtain them, I am dis-
“ posed to admit these forces, and to make every effort to
“ induce the Government of Her Majesty the Queen to show
“ its gratitude to all.

“ Men of Biscay and Navarre! let me not be reduced to
“ the hard and painful necessity of giving a hostile move-
“ ment to the numerous, experienced, and disciplined army
“ which you have beheld. Let the songs of peace resound
“ wheresoever I direct my steps. That our union may
“ be firm and lasting has been the object of my cordial
“ and sincere wishes, and you shall all find a father and
“ protector in

“ THE DUKE DE LA VICTORIA.

“ Head-quarters, Bergara,
“ 1st September, 1839.”

CHAPTER XXII.

CATALONIA.

[T is pleasant to turn from Maroto to a province where war, and not treachery, was rife—the mountainous and picturesque province of Catalonia. There, as in Aragon, every Carlist joined with Cabrera in abusing and despising the general who had now shown himself base beyond measure where many were base—and cruel, ambitious, and mean in a superlative degree, at a time when the very air stank of meanness, ambition and cruelty. From the first—finessing for power, absenting himself in sulky fits when thwarted, and returning when his incessant intrigues had again opened a door—he was always unlovely. But it was when he got his coveted power that the true hideousness of his character developed itself. Insolent to the prince whose soldier he was, he drew down upon himself a just rebuke; but rather than accept it, he turned against him with the army, and with a cowardly tyranny compelled him to withdraw his censure. Suspicious and nervous, like all intriguers, he had seduced to meet him, and had then in cold blood murdered, all the generals whom he most dreaded as rivals. He was akin to the other Spanish general, Narvaez, who, when advised on his death-bed to forgive his enemies, replied with naïve truthfulness that he had none to forgive, for he had killed them all. Maroto stands out of the diaries of the English Commissioners in true and hideous colours. When arranging the Convention of Bergara, this soldier—forsooth! whined for conditions as to his own and his traitor officers'

pay and rank, and haggled over their respective pensions and positions, but never said a word for the poor peasantry who for years had risked their lives at his call—for years had left their farms untilled, their herds untended, their wives and children in lonely homes, dull with the dread of coming disaster. So that he himself were sure of his pay, what mattered it for the patient soldiers who, in their blundering way, had been fighting for an idea!

MSS. of
Sir
Colling-
wood
Dickson,
R.A., and
Colonel
Du Plat,
R.E.

The war in Catalonia was earnest and cruel. About the date of the convention being signed, Colonel Edward Michell, C.B., Royal Artillery, an officer of the highest character and ability, and one who had seen much service in the great Peninsular War and at Bergen-op-Zoom, was appointed British Commissioner in Catalonia, to report on the operations of the Queen's armies; and Colonel Du Plat, R.E., and Lieutenant C. Dickson went as assistants. The Carlists opposed to them were under energetic leaders, and in addition to several good-sized towns they held all the mountainous parts of the province. Colonel Michell and the officers under him were employed under the English Foreign Office, and received appointments constituting them members of the British Legation at Madrid as military *attachés*; and their duties were to aid by advice and counsel the Christino generals with whom they might serve, to render any assistance in their power as staff officers in the field, and above all, to send a faithful report of the occurrences of the campaign to the British Minister at Madrid, and to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in England. When these officers arrived in Catalonia, in August, 1839, the Queen's General-in-chief was Lieut.-General Don Geronimo Valdes, Captain-General of Catalonia; and the head-quarters of the army were at Manresa, an important town about forty miles north-west of Barcelona, and twenty-five miles distant from Berga, a strong place in the mountains held by the Carlists, and their head-quarters in the province of Catalonia. The principal duties of the Christino forces on the arrival of the English Commissioners included the protection of the larger and manufacturing towns of Catalonia,

which were generally on the side of the Queen, and the hemming-in the Carlists to the mountainous district to the north of these towns, to prevent them from making incursions and levying contributions. That this duty was no easy one—that the hemming-in of the Carlist force involved a great distribution and, indeed, a great dispersion of the Queen's troops, will be evident when it is mentioned that at the date of Colonel Michell's arrival they occupied not merely the permanent fortresses of Barcelona, Tarragona, Lérida, Gerona, Tortosa, and Rosas, as well as certain castillos or forts, but also no fewer than 217 *puntos fortificados*, or temporarily-fortified positions. Some of these *puntos* were only single houses or small towers intended to secure an important pass, or to observe particular approaches; others—generally churches, convents, the residences of the *curas*, or other strong buildings—served in some of the smaller villages as a kind of fort, or, at least, a place of refuge and security. But by far the greater number of these *puntos fortificados* were important villages, and even large and populous towns, which had either been enclosed with walls or strengthened by detached towers or forts. The details of the works of defence constituting these *puntos* were as various as the localities, or as the caprices of the men who superintended their erection. There were, however, certain common characteristics. As a general rule, they were only constructed to resist successfully attacks which were not supported by artillery, and they were so arranged as to depend solely on the fire of musketry for their defence. Even the larger places, which had towers and forts to strengthen the works of the town, were often without cannon, or with guns of so small calibre or so great an age as to be practically useless. The general mode of obtaining the musketry defence alluded to above, consisted in making loopholes in the external walls of the outermost houses in the village or town which had to be fortified. The spaces which intervened between these houses were closed up by walls, either of masonry or of rammed earth, and in some instances only of loose stones. In such parts of the *enceinte*

thus obtained as were not flanked by the irregularities of the houses or walls themselves, small projecting works, with a few loop-holes, were constructed, generally somewhat stronger than the rest of the wall, and always of masonry, although not strong enough to resist the fire of artillery. As few entrances into the place were left as possible, and these were protected by small *couvre-portes* in front; and a kind of citadel or place of retreat always formed part of the inner defence. In some places, these citadels contained wells or cisterns, and casemates strong enough to resist the fire of heavy ordnance. Sometimes the streets were enfiladed by *tambours* communicating with some large substantial building occupied as a quarter by the garrison; and in the smaller villages galleries were often thrown across the street from the upper stories of the houses, from which a useful fire could be maintained against any one in the streets.

In cases where the places fortified as above described were situated on commanding ground, or on the steep banks of rivers or deep ravines, or even when situated on plains, the chances of a successful resistance against an enemy not supplied with artillery were considerable. But in a mountainous country like Catalonia it frequently happened that the villages and towns were commanded by higher ground, and in such instances their garrisons were much annoyed by small parties of the enemy even without artillery.

Weak, however, as the artificial means of defence in the *puntos fortificados* undoubtedly were, some of them succeeded in beating off the attacks of very superior forces. For example, Caldes—although containing only a fortified church and vicarage—succeeded in obstructing the passage of the corps of Don Carlos in 1837, although accompanied by artillery. And, not far from Berga, the most advanced position occupied by the Queen's troops, a mere village of 160 houses, only surmounted by a mud wall, withstood on one occasion a three days' attack of artillery; but on this occasion, the heroism of the defenders was aided by feebleness in the attack.

At the time of the defection of Maroto in 1839, the Queen's troops in Catalonia—occupied in defending the fortresses and temporarily-fortified places—numbered no fewer than 55,000 armed men of various descriptions. About 17,000—half of whom were regular troops—garrisoned the permanent forts; the remaining 38,000 being distributed among the *puntos*. Granting that of this latter number upwards of 25,000 belonged to the local militia, and only received pay when actually performing military service, there still remained absorbed in the defence of these places a force of 13,000 men, constantly maintained and clothed by Government; the erection of the works had cost much money; and the supply of ammunition and provisions was a heavy drain on the public purse. Were, then, the advantages of fortifying these numerous places commensurate with the expenses incurred, or adequate in a military point of view, to compensate for the withdrawal from the field of so large a force? Military men asserted frequently that the points fortified were selected with little, if any, reference to their influence on military operations. Whether this were the case or not, it was undoubtedly true that during the war under consideration, little security existed in Catalonia for the lives and property of the persons attached to the Queen's cause outside the walls of the fortified places, and that even a free communication between any two of these places could hardly be maintained without great exertion and difficulty. The Baron de Meer was the originator of the system of fortified places in this Province of Catalonia, and he adopted it more in reference to the influence it would produce on his administrative and financial measures, than from any idea of its military wisdom. In truth, for every point that was fortified from military considerations, three received garrisons, forts, &c., for the purpose of overawing them, and to prevent them from succouring the enemy with men or money, as well as to ensure to the Queen's Government the means of levying the contributions by means of which the war was carried on. Manresa, for example, the Christino head-quarters in the province, was well known to

be more warmly attached to the cause of the Pretender than any other town in Catalonia, and would have doubtless assisted him from its many stores and manufactures, had it not been for the presence of the Queen's troops. The want of more towns in the province prevented the Carlists from obtaining what these towns could have supplied, and what they sorely required—ammunition, muskets, church bells for ordnance, and the ingredients of gunpowder. As far as keeping these articles from the enemy, and securing to the Queen's Government the regular payment of taxes, was concerned, the system of *puntos fortificados* in Catalonia probably answered the views of its originator; but this was only done at the expense of the efficiency of the Queen's army in the field, and was fatal to any energetic or decisive measures on a large scale.

There was much cruelty practised in the operations in Catalonia on both sides; but the Carlist leader, the Condé de España, was pre-eminent for his brutal and bloodthirsty conduct, and met with a deserved retribution in being murdered by his own followers. The cruelty went, however, it must be admitted, hand-in-hand with courage; and although the prolonged and undecided campaign in Catalonia was too uneventful to demand any detailed mention, and was even apologised for by Espartero in one of his addresses at Bergara, it was marked by many acts of individual heroism both in men and women, by discipline and united courage in the small armies which garrisoned the province, and by an absence of that repulsive treachery which clings to the names of such men as Maroto.

Lieut. C.
Dickson,
Manresa,
Oct. 10,
1839.

The treatment of the English Commissioners on their arrival in Catalonia was all that could be desired. On reaching Barcelona, all the authorities, civil and military, received them with the greatest cordiality and attention, and conducted them over the arsenals, barracks, &c., with the utmost frankness. On reaching Manresa, where General Valdes (who had succeeded the Baron de Meer) had his head-quarters, the general received Colonel Michell in the kindest manner possible, and issued a general order to

the army charging every one to treat him and his comrades with all the respect due to their rank as Commissioners from Her Britannic Majesty, and alluding in the most flattering terms to Colonel Michell's former services in Spain during the Peninsular War. He also ordered a parade of the troops then in the garrison, which amounted to 9000 good infantry and 700 indifferent cavalry, with two 12-pounder howitzers and 12 mountain guns on mules, and some very bad artillerymen to man them. At this time Berga was the Carlist head-quarters in Catalonia, and was too well fortified to be attacked except by regular siege.

The movements of General Valdes were purposeless and incessant during the early winter of 1839. "We have been marching perpetually," wrote Lieutenant Dickson; "we have walked over half Catalonia (for we scarcely ever sleep in the same town twice), but without ever seeing the enemy. The Spanish infantry march well; nearly all our marches are seven or eight leagues a day, and we never leave a straggler behind."

Nothing can better explain the indolence of Valdes, the consequent procrastination of the war, and the cruelties perpetrated on the inhabitants by the Carlists, than the following quotation from an unofficial letter of one of the Assistant English Commissioners. The remainder of the weary and uneventful narrative may well be spared. "On the 23rd September," he wrote, "the Carlists were besieging Camprodon, a large town on the French frontier; they took the suburbs by storm, massacred the people they found, and burnt the houses, *although we* might have cut the besieging army off. General Valdes neglected his opportunity, and by his procrastination and delay, only arrived in time to save the town from sharing the same fate as the suburbs, giving the enemy time to raise the siege, and to retreat with their guns. On this occasion was lost an opportunity of destroying a column of 2000 Carlists, who retired safe into their own country from the culpable neglect of our general. . . . Again, on the 8th October, the Carlist army attacked Moyá, a large fortified

“ town about a day’s march from Manresa. We were, at
“ the time the despatch from the Governor of the town
“ arrived, at Barcelona. The despatch, dated the 7th October,
“ announced that the Condé d’España, with 7000 men and
“ six guns, was before Moyá, and begged that the general
“ would come up to its succour. Although Colonel Michell
“ and Colonel Du Plat used every entreaty, and urged him to
“ lose no time but to start at once, we did not go out of
“ Barcelona till the 9th (the day after the receipt of the
“ despatch), and arrived at Moyá after a severe march on
“ the 10th, again too late. The Carlist army had retreated
“ only an hour before we arrived, having taken the town and
“ fort by storm, and butchered all the defenders whom they
“ found. Some of the inhabitants held out in the church in
“ hopes of relief, but surrendered before we came up, to the
“ number of 103 men, women, and children. Their lives
“ were spared, but they were stripped and led away prisoners.
“ On the 11th we entered what had before been a flourishing
“ place, but was now no more. On entering the fort, the
“ scene was horrible in the extreme; the defenders lay in
“ heaps, just as they had been murdered, to the number of
“ 140, gashed and mutilated in a terrible manner. Had we
“ marched on the first arrival of the news, we should have
“ saved the town, and might perhaps have beaten the enemy.
“ The Carlists here are not at all discouraged with the recent
“ events at Bergara; on the contrary, their numbers are
“ increasing every day by fugitives from the Basque Pro-
“ vinces, who pass into Catalonia *viá* France. With such a
“ general as we have at present, God knows when the war
“ will end here! At present, we are in Manresa doing
“ nothing. We arrived here on the 14th, but I believe to-
“ morrow we march again, nobody knows where as yet, but,
“ I suppose, to do nothing as usual. . . . As to *doing*, we
“ have done little enough as yet, but we have seen a great
“ deal in a short time. I hope I may never see such
“ another sight as I saw at Moyá the other day; the people
“ lying butchered in their own houses, even women and
“ children. The church is the only building standing, as

“they had not time to burn it. If we, spectators only, looked on with so much horror, with what feelings must General Valdes have entered this unhappy town, when he reflected that it was entirely owing to his own laziness! He excuses himself by saying that he did not think it would have been taken so easily, and might have resisted for some days. . . . The general always listens with the greatest attention to Colonel Michell and Colonel Du Plat, but his laziness destroys all his good intentions.”

The winter of 1839-40 was spent in Catalonia by the army which was able to move in the field, in convoying provisions and ammunition to the various posts, or in carrying out the usual relief of such costly garrisons as Solsona. The guerilla attacks made on the convoys by the Carlists were gallant and incessant. The marches made over snowy heights and through misty valleys by the patient Christino troops were frequent, and weary, and dangerous. It was the war of a people encamped in isolated posts in a hostile country, holding their own bravely against enemies active and passive, against natural difficulties, and in spite of feeble leaders and an impecunious government. And it was a war in which women and children lived daily in dread of dishonour and death at the hands of their own countrymen, and for reasons which they did not and could not understand. The humanity which now gleams under the sign of the cross in the battle-fields of our own decade, fled in horror from the burning houses and heaps of innocent dead on the mountain slopes of Catalonia.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE SACRIFICE OF VAN HALEN.

Lacy MSS.,
Askwith
MSS., and
Alderson
MSS.

GLANCING southward from Catalonia to the district where the Army of the Centre, confronted by Cabrera and his generals, was struggling in vain to stamp out the rebellion which was now extinct in the North, let the reader endeavour to realise the state of affairs in Aragon and Valencia between the disaster met with by Oraa before Morella in 1838, and the successful siege by Espartero in 1840. In a previous chapter allusion has been made to the humane endeavours of the English Commissioners in this part of Spain to put an end to the atrocities which disgraced the war. The present



SEGORBE.

chapter will therefore be more a chronicle of the events which passed under the notice of these Commissioners, than of any of their individual acts.

The year 1839 commenced to Colonel Lacy at Segorbe. He found the new Captain-General, Van Halen, more ener-


getic and intelligent than Oraa, but under sore difficulties from want of support from Government both in men and *matériel*. The reinforcements were wanted not so much to fight battles as to hem in Cabrera's troops in their mountain fastnesses. The inclement weather and the large numbers of the Carlists had combined to exhaust their supplies; and if they could have been prevented from making expeditions into the plains for food, desertion would have commenced, and, as Colonel Lacy wrote, would have embarrassed the cause of the Pretender more than twenty actions. Van Halen did what he could to compensate for the incapacity of the government; he did not hesitate to assume responsibility, but seized all the revenues of the provinces and ordered levies to be made on all sides. But after these years of war, neither levies nor revenues were so productive as they had been; and his recruits required both training and food to enable them to face the determined foes and rough work to which they had to be exposed.


While at Segorbe, the kind heart of the English Commissioner was pained by the incessant tales of cruelty which reached him. On one day he learnt that Cabrera, in moving his prisoners from one part of the mountains to another, finding some thirty unable from weakness to keep up with the others, shot them on the road. On another, he heard from Colonel Alderson, one of his assistants, that a small party of the local militia of Castellon had been surrounded by a large body of Carlists in an old tower near Buriol, and, being obliged to capitulate, were instantly shot, although they had received a promise to be treated as prisoners of war. No wonder that Colonel Lacy became more urgent in his endeavours, ultimately successful, to put an end to such barbarity.

Acting on a good system, both as regarded the procuring information, and exercising a humanising influence on the war, the English Commissioner detached his assistants to other divisions of the army from that with which he himself was serving. The student is thus able to learn many interesting facts which would not otherwise have come to his

knowledge. In the beginning of 1839, Lieutenant Askwith was at Monreal, attached to a force which had been detailed for the not very heroic duty of preventing the Carlist leader, Llangostera, from making his escape to the mountains with some 3000 sheep which he had appropriated from the unfortunate peasantry on the plains. At this time, Cabrera, who had been prevented by Van Halen from pillaging the Ribera, was in the neighbourhood of Onda, a place situated at the foot of the mountains with a rich plain in front of it, which was a favourite resort of the Carlists in the East of Spain. It would have been well if the Christinos had been able to take and fortify such places as Onda and Alcora, and this would have greatly hindered the movements of Cabrera. But neither men, money, nor munitions of war were available for the purpose; and the cry for reinforcements from the Army of the North fell as yet on deaf ears. As weeks went on, a brigade under General Parra *was* sent to strengthen the army of the centre, but its orders were that it was not to pass a certain line, but was to operate merely between Calatayna and Molina, and was *not* to be considered under the orders of Van Halen. Its arrival was therefore a questionable boon; it consumed provisions which might otherwise have been available, and it did very little good in a military point of view.

The month of February was mainly spent by Van Halen in conveying provisions to Lucena, one of his garrisons, and in listening to the urgent entreaties of Colonels Lacy and Alderson that he should fortify the castle at least at Onda. He gave in so far as to accept a simple plan of defence proposed by Colonel Alderson, and then retired to Murviedro to brood over it. While so engaged, he learnt that his plan had been suspected by the Carlists, who were then engaged in demolishing the castle which he had so foolishly delayed to fortify! Happily, they were checked before it was too late, and the danger which had been averted decided Van Halen to delay no longer. Colonel Alderson's plan pre-supposed a very modest working party — only 200 men per diem, — but when tools were demanded for this number, it was found





SEGURA, ARAGON.

that they did not exist in the province, and had to be procured from Cadiz! It seems almost incredible that in a district where war had been going on for years, there should not have been tools enough to fortify a village; but it was typical of the *laissez-aller* system of carrying on the campaign which had characterised the Queen's generals in the East of Spain. With great difficulty, and in main owing to the exertions of Colonel Alderson, the castle of Onda was considerably strengthened during the month of February. During this time Lieutenant Askwith was with the division under General Ayerbe, endeavouring, and with success, to carry out the wishes of his chief and his own instincts on behalf of the prisoners and wounded, who would otherwise have been murdered in reprisal. Ayerbe's division was not strong enough to prevent the Carlists for carrying out what proved an important measure—the fortification of Segura in Aragon, a place lying in the line of march between Ternel and the district of Alcaniz. Although Parra's divi-



DAROCA.

sion might have greatly aided Ayerbe in this matter, yet such were the orders given to it, and the jealousy between Spanish generals, that Parra would not go a day's march out of his way to assist. Matters becoming serious, Van Halen decided on marching on Segura himself, and while *en route* received a satisfactory Royal order placing Parra under his command. He also received when at Daroca the gratifying intelligence

that Ayerbe, reinforced by three battalions from Calatayua, had defeated the Carlists on the 23rd March* at Cortes, about two hours' march from Segura, and had driven them back on their new works, which he was, however, unable to attack without heavy artillery.

Without waiting for the necessary information, or perhaps acting upon erroneous reports as to the state of the roads and the means of obtaining provisions, Van Halen decided on bringing up a battering train from Zaragoza, and laying siege to Segura in regular way. He awaited the arrival of the train at Cariñena, and must have frequently anathematised the jealousy which prevented him from ordering Parra in the first instance to co-operate with Ayerbe, a step which would have prevented the Carlists from fortifying Segura, and so would have rendered the proposed siege unnecessary.

The force under General Van Halen's immediate command, irrespective of the battering train from Zaragoza, consisted of fourteen battalions and 1200 cavalry. Weary of waiting and in want of supplies, he at last left Cariñena, and met the train and convoy on the 1st April at La Cartuja. It was a sorry train with which to undertake a siege. It consisted of three 16-pounders, one 12-inch mortar, and one 9-inch howitzer; and all the ammunition on which the general could lay his hands amounted to 1500 shot and 1000 shell. With this train he was urged on all sides to undertake, in the midst of inclement weather and in an inhospitable country, the siege of a place both naturally and artificially strong, into which Cabrera was pouring reinforcements from Valencia, declaring that he was determined to conquer, or to make Segura his tomb.

Sending on his siege-train to Cortes on the afternoon of the 4th April, Van Halen with the main body marched to the same place from Muniesa on the afternoon of the 6th, and, accompanied by General Amor, the English Commissioner and Lieutenant Askwith, and his commanding officers

* For his services on this occasion, Lieutenant Askwith, R.A., Assistant Commissioner, received the 1st class Order of San Fernando.

of artillery and engineers, he rode within 400 yards of Segura to reconnoitre, and to realise for the first time the gravity of the situation. As he lost his command for not proceeding with the siege, and suffered in reputation both as a soldier and a loyal Spaniard from insinuations against his courage and honour in connection with Segura, it is but just to show on impartial testimony—that of the English Commissioners—what actually took place.

The position of the Castle of Segura was exceedingly strong, and it was evident that the Carlists had succeeded in making it a respectable fortress. They had also burnt the town, which might have been a source of weakness to the defence, and the ruins of which were yet smoking as Van Halen and his staff made their reconnaissance. Behind the castle, on some strong heights, large bodies of Carlists were also seen approaching.

The general asked the advice of both his English and Spanish companions, and they all replied frankly that at so early and inclement a season, and with so limited a supply of shell, the siege could only be undertaken with great risk; for, although the castle might possibly fall in three days, it might hold out for *ten*, in which case the ammunition would certainly be exhausted. He then asked the colonel of engineers how long it would take to reduce the castle; he replied, twelve or fourteen days, and this answer seemed to the English Commissioner conclusive, because before the expiry of that period one-third of the army would have been sick from exposure, and a great many would have been otherwise non-effective, as the Carlists would be certain to attack some part of the force daily. It was a country Lacy MSS. almost without a tree, and every hovel within a league of Segura had been burnt; there would not, therefore, have been any cover for the ammunition or provisions, nor even a single roof under which to shelter the sick or wounded for even a few hours. With an enemy equal, if not superior, in numbers to the besieging army, not a day would have passed without a combat, nor a night without a surprise.

The general did not, however, relinquish the siege has-

tilly; he desired the commanding officers of artillery and engineers to submit reports and opinions in writing, and even when he received them, and found them strongly in favour of the abandonment of the enterprise, he hesitated. To quote from Colonel Lacy's words: "The general said, "that notwithstanding every opinion was against it, he "thought he should undertake it on his own responsi-
 "bility. I said that the risk was great; he said, yes, but that
 "his situation was very mortifying, and that the public
 "journals would say so much about it. I said I foresaw that,
 "but that in my opinion a general should always act for the
 "best, and not try to please the world. . . . The object,
 "too, of possessing Segura is, I think, much diminished by
 "the destruction of the town, by burning which the Carlists
 "have also rendered the post less valuable to themselves.
 "Considering the limited resources the Queen's army pos-
 "sesses in *matériel* for sieges, and the unpractised state of
 "the army in such enterprises, I should almost say it would be
 "better to confine all their energies to the persecution of the
 "enemy in the field, and, if possible, shut the Carlists up in
 "the mountains, and reduce them by cutting off their means
 "of obtaining provisions. We last night had a very heavy
 "fall of snow here,* and in the mountains it probably was
 "much greater. Had we commenced the siege, the army would
 "have suffered extremely, particularly the cavalry; and it
 "greatly confirms the prudence of relinquishing the siege."

The above narrative and extract, while not acquitting Van Halen of want of forethought, prove his innocence of anything like treachery. But a victim had to be found, and he was sacrificed. His own officers were among the first to reproach him. "In all the communications," wrote Colonel Lacy, "which I had with the general about Segura, I always
 "expressed my fears in regard to the early season of the
 "year for such an operation in the mountains; but he con-
 "sidered it to be an expedition of only two or three days at
 "the utmost. Unfortunately, all his officers acquiesced in

Muniesa,
 April 11,
 1839.

* Cortes.

“his opinion until he got into the mire, and now they cover him with mud. They all now blame him for going at such a season and with such small means.”

Anticipating the removal called for by a furious and vapouring press, and sore under the injustice and ingratitude of his officers, Van Halen applied to be relieved. “If he goes,” wrote Colonel Lacy, “we shall at any rate lose a gentleman. He has been too much cramped for want of men and means for any one to form a fair judgment of his abilities as a commander-in-chief.”

The removal of the general took place very soon, but not until the following movements of the army had taken place. The heavy artillery—save the mark!—was sent back to Zaragoza under escort. Van Halen and the main body were drawn towards Muniesa by a groundless rumour that that place, Blesa, and Guesa had been occupied by the enemy in force. He then heard that Cabrera had marched towards



MURVIEDRO.

(From sketch by Colonel Lacy, R.A.)

Valencia, leaving only two battalions and some cavalry in the vicinity of Segura. This decided him to go in pursuit, and to pass by Segura; and after a few skirmishes he arrived at Villanueva and Bibel, where he divided his force, he himself taking Ayerbe's division, and leaving that officer to consolidate Parra's brigade and the battalions of the reserve. On the 16th of April he reached Teruel, and hearing that the


Carlists were besieging Villafames, he marched with a view to its immediate relief by way of Sarrion, Segorbe, Torres-torres, and Almenara, at the last-named of which places intelligence was received that the Carlists had failed and had been obliged to raise the siege. Van Halen then counter-marched to Murviedro, where news arrived of Carlist concentration in Aragon; he therefore at once crossed the mountains to Segorbe, and thence to Sarrion, which had been menaced by a large body of Carlists, who disappeared as Van Halen approached. On the 26th of April he reached the Puebla de Valverde, and on the 27th re-entered Teruel, after a display of activity almost unparalleled among Christiano generals, and worthy of Cabrera himself.

At Teruel he officially handed over the command, orders to that effect having been received, and his successor having been appointed in the person of General Noguêras, whose name was notorious in connection with the murder of Cabrera's mother. The appointment was offensively worded, and was pronounced to be merely temporary, and subject to Noguêras' good behaviour; but it was not the less an indiscretion on the part of the Madrid Government. Not merely were his abilities below mediocrity, but he was also generally disliked by the people, who said that he had done much to consolidate the Carlist faction in Spain by invariably retiring before it at the commencement of the war, when he might have resisted with success. To the English Commissioners the appointment, which was happily short-lived, was unpalatable for the reason that the bitter hatred of Cabrera towards him might possibly lead to a renewal of the warfare without quarter, from which the armies in the East of Spain had been so recently emancipated.

Col. Lacy,
Teruel,
May, 1839.

Looking back on what had happened under his own eyes, Colonel Lacy was compelled to write at the date of Noguêras' appointment: "Within the last two years Cabrera has got
" possession of Canta Vieja and Morella, as well as of several
" small forts, and he has fortified other places. He has
" burnt Segura and Cutanda, and depopulated Montalvan
" and Alvalate, the latter a wealthy place, which contained

“1200 families. On the 20th of April, 1839, they received
 “notice to quit in eight days on pain of death, and at the
 “same time the water was cut off. Not a soul now remains
 “in the town except the garrison of the castle. . . . The
 “Queen’s troops have not taken a single place from him, nor
 “do I think they are likely to do so. On neither side is the
 “Spanish army good at attacking fortified places. That they



MONTALVAN, ARAGON.

“defend them well is, however, evident from the resistance
 “made against us at Morella, and against the Carlists
 “fourteen times at Lucena, and lately at Caspe, Villafames,
 “and other places.”

No wonder, under these circumstances, that longing eyes
 were cast towards the Army of the North from Aragon and
 Valencia, in search of help, and of some fit leader to com-
 mand them.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CONCENTRATION.

Lacy MSS.,
Alderson
MSS., and
Askwith
MSS.

COLONEL LACY was a conscientious man, and, knowing that his duty was to report to his government all that it was desirable to know, he went about the camps and garrisons of the Army of the Centre thirsting for knowledge, and like an embodied mark of interrogation. His curiosity was too little concealed, and defeated its own purpose. As he appeared, full of questions, every staff-officer became mute; or, if they spoke, it was in evasive or deceptive terms. Driven frantic by the determined opposition to his investigations, the gallant colonel wrote to the English Minister at Madrid, and in due time a royal order was sent to General Noguêras, directing him to furnish to the English Commissioner all the particulars connected with the campaign which he might desire to know. The result of the order cannot be told more quaintly than in Colonel Lacy's own words. Noguêras had become feeble in body and mind alike, under the responsibilities of a command for which he knew he was unfitted, and from which he longed to be set free. "The "general," wrote Colonel Lacy, "has been and still is, poor "man! very ill and confined to his bed. He has had inflam- "matory rheumatism, I believe; his right arm was first "attacked, and then it fell into his feet. It is reported that "he has applied to be relieved, and it would be better in all "respects, for he never will be fit to stand a campaign. . . . "Notwithstanding that my representation lately that I could "not obtain information produced a royal order that every "facility should be given to me, I find it very difficult to

Zaragoza,
June 23,
1839.

“ascertain what is going on. I believe I ought to do the
 “general the justice to say that I think he knows very little
 “himself; for he is always very civil and apparently anxious
 “to give me news; and the instant I enter his apartment he
 “screams out for the ‘Gazette’ to be given to me. I at first
 “thought it was the effect of a sudden paroxysm of his
 “pain. . . . I believe they wish to keep him here as a puppet
 “until Espartero can come.”

The period between the disappearance of Van Halen and the end of June, 1839, was marked by no special event save a few unprofitable successes on the part of General Ayerbe. One action was fought by him on the 23rd of May, in which he succeeded in driving the Carlists from a very strong position above Utrillos, and would have inflicted a very serious loss upon them had not General Amor’s division, which had been intended to co-operate with him, been a march behind him. On the 29th of May Noguêras heard that the Carlists, who had been besieging Montalban, had retired with their siege artillery to Morella, and he at once decided on marching to the former place with a large convoy of provisions. His movements were, however, checked by the arrival of an unexpected order, appointing Ayerbe, who was junior to General Amor, to the command of the Queen’s troops in the Province of Aragon. “To do this,” wrote Colonel Lacy, “it was necessary to remove Amor, so at the same time he received leave of absence to visit the baths. The baths are a sort of Chiltern Hundreds to the Spanish Army. If a poor fellow has his horse killed, and has not money to buy another, which is very generally the case, he obtains leave to take the baths.” The result of the order was that while Ayerbe marched with the troops, the head-quarters went for an inglorious term of weeks to Zaragoza.

Zaragoza,
 June 23,
 1839.

Ayerbe reached Montalban with his supplies on the 2nd of June, and having thrown them into the garrison, was in the act of retiring when he heard that the omnipresent Carlists had reappeared in front of the fort, and he was therefore obliged to retrace his steps. He appears at this time to

have decided on withdrawing the garrison, which was now clamorous for relief; and he obtained a report from some obsequious staff-officers that the fort was untenable, which he considered would justify his destroying it. Lieutenant Askwith, who had a good opportunity of inspecting it at the time, said, on the other hand, and without hesitation, that the fort was certainly much damaged, but that the garrison had made no attempt to repair the breaches, although they had ample material, nor to intrench themselves, and during his visit were in great disorder and clamorous to be relieved. The importance to the historian of such dispassionate evidence is admirably instanced by comparing his observations with the inflated language of the Christino press at the time. In one journal the thanks of the public were called for to this same garrison for "their example of loyalty and heroic constancy in the defence of a fortress, where, without water and other necessaries, no one thought of capitulating, no one was dismayed, no one desired other than to fight and to die!"

'Eco de
Aragon,
June 14,
1839.

The moral injury to the Queen's cause which was induced by the evacuation of Montalban was intensified by the usual harassing attacks on Ayerbe's rear guard as he retired, which were only prevented from being very serious in their results by the gallantry of a smart cavalry commander, afterwards famous—Colonel Serrano. The month ended with both Noguêras and Ayerbe being idle at Zaragoza, although the air was rife with rumours of Carlist activity. And yet at least fourteen battalions were at or near this inactive headquarters seeking for food merely, and 1700 men were on the march from Madrid to swell their numbers.

Col. Lacy,
Valencia,
July 21,
1839.

Until the 4th of July, when General O'Donnell arrived to relieve Noguêras, nothing occurred. Colonel Lacy, frantic and curious, called daily on the commandant, asked him for news of the enemy, and warned him that Valencia was in danger; and the general as regularly screamed out for the 'Gazette,' said he knew nothing of the Carlists, that some said Cabrera was in one part and some in another, and protested that everything had gone on admirably while he had

been in bed. It was fortunate that O'Donnell arrived when he did; and he—the youthful Captain-General, as he was called—was happy in having an immediate opportunity of displaying his energy. The narrative of his movements was given by the English Commissioner with unusual satire on the bungling which had rendered them necessary. “General Asnar had been a considerable time in command of the 1st Division, in place of General Aspiroz, who was absent on account of illness. Asnar had done nothing but march backwards and forwards on the high road, while the Carlists were collecting what they required of the harvest; and about Lucena they had three or four battalions to protect 500 peasants whom they employed by force to collect the whole of the harvest as a punishment to the Lucenese. . . . Asnar, therefore, mustered resolution to go there with five or six battalions to obstruct the Carlists, and of course with that superiority he beat them. He wrote stating his success to General Noguêras; and then in the pride of his heart and in the glow of victory he went into Lucena with two battalions to receive the homage of the inhabitants and to write a detailed despatch; and he sent the rest of his force to repose in Alcora. That night Cabrera received a reinforcement of three or four battalions, and immediately darted like lightning across Asnar's path, interposing between Lucena and Alcora. The enemy possessing those strong heights with a superior force, it was impossible for the four battalions at Alcora to afford Asnar any relief, and he was completely shut up in Lucena. It was this fact which compelled General O'Donnell to march immediately. He ordered the reserve of five battalions to meet him at Cariñena, but three battalions had been sent somewhere with a convoy, and could not come. Between Cariñena and Daroca he collected five battalions and nearly 600 cavalry, with which small force, at some risk, we proceeded, and reached Castillon de la Plana on the 14th inst. (July) in eight marches, upwards of 200 miles. Here we found Amor, the renowned Commandant-General in Valencia (under a recent order), with seven battalions and about 500

“cavalry. They had pressed him to attack the Carlists
“when it was positively known that there were only four
“battalions blockading Lucena; but Amor was too cautious
“to risk anything, so the affair was left to be decided by
“O'Donnell.”

Leaving Castellon at 2 a.m. on the 15th July, with a force of 12 battalions and 1000 cavalry, unencumbered by baggage, O'Donnell proceeded to relieve Asnar from his confinement in Lucena, marching by Adzaneta, from which place the ascent of the Sierra at once commenced.

General Aspiroz had recovered sufficiently by this time to assume the command of the 1st Division, and he went on with the advanced guard to attack the enemy's first position near Lucena, which he easily carried. The reserve—five battalions—was then ordered to attack the enemy's left, and succeeded in compelling the abandonment of what would have been an awkward flanking position against a Christino advance. The battalion of Almanza and the Caçadores then attacked the right of the strong position in front, O'Donnell supporting the attack by a general advance, he himself heading a line of contiguous battalions in column, advancing with loud cheers to the charge, over very rugged ground and under a very galling fire. The Carlists would not, however, wait for the bayonet, and soon abandoned their ground, leaving Lucena relieved, and enabling the troops under Asnar to quit the place where they had been imprisoned for twenty-two days.

On the following day O'Donnell's army marched unmolested to Alcora, and thence to Castellon and Murviedro, having rarely, if ever, had more than three hours' repose during any night since they left Zaragoza.

This military movement is not merely interesting as O'Donnell's inauguration, but also for the following reasons mentioned by the English Commissioner: “The cool, steady
“and judicious way in which General O'Donnell directed all
“the movements, contributed to the success of a day in
“which the enemy were favoured by the strongest natural
“positions, and he inspired the troops with a confidence

“which they will not easily forget. . . . The enemy had in
 “all eleven battalions of their best troops and 500 cavalry.
 “The Christinos had twelve battalions and 1040 cavalry;
 “but the ground was so extremely rocky and rugged, that
 “the latter could not act. . . . I have rarely seen anything
 “here but guerilla warfare, which is seldom decisive, and
 “only terminates with nightfall. The attack in masses had
 “an evident effect upon the enemy; he could nowhere stand
 “it, and the combat was over by 11 o’clock in the morning.
 “It is a mode of attack which I have always recommended
 “when circumstances would admit, and I think its advan-
 “tages may be estimated not only by the moral effect it
 “had on the enemy, but also from the smallness of our loss,
 “which does not amount to 300 *hors de combat*.”

On the 30th July, General O’Donnell announced his intention of besieging or rather attacking Tales; and at



TALES.

(From sketch by Colonel Lacy, R.A.)

2 a.m. on the following morning, the army marched from Murviedro to Onda. At 4 a.m. on the 1st August, O’Donnell proceeded to take possession of the heights beyond Artesa, towards Tales. The position of the enemy was a strong one; his right being on the Peña Negra, and a round tower on the slope between it and Tales; his centre on the Castle of Tales; and his left on the precipitous heights of El Tosal de la Frontera and El Tosal de Pedrera.

Col. Lacy,
 Valencia,
 Aug. 18,
 1839.

The 1st Division, under General Aspiroz, carried these

last-mentioned heights without loss, the resistance being feeble and half-hearted; and the reserve under Brigadier Hoyas then took possession of El Tosal de Monti, a steep mountain opposite the Peña Negra, on which the breaching-battery was at first intended to be placed, the commanding position being supposed to more than compensate for its distance from Tales, some 880 yards. Happily, owing to a succession of blunders on the part of the engineers, who were of the weakest, the battery was ultimately constructed several hundred yards further in advance, but not without considerable loss caused by *sorties* from the garrison, inspired by the arrival of Cabrera himself. The battery was ulti-



CHULIJA.

(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.E.)

mately finished on the night of the 6th August, and armed, by degrees;* but not a little depression was caused by the necessity of having to send reinforcements to a body of

* The Artillery brought by O'Donnell was very indifferent, and much of it became unserviceable during the siege. It consisted of—

2 16-pr. guns with	..	700	rounds of ammunition	} There were also			
1 12-pr. gun	..	350	" " "		} 4 12-pr. moun-		
2 12-pr. (short guns) with	1350	"	"			} tain howitzers,	
4 7-in. howitzers with	450	"	"				} and 1 7-in. mor-
2 8-prs. with	..	192	"				

the Queen's troops, called the Division of the Ribera of Liria, which had received a severe and somewhat disgraceful defeat at Chulilla on the 2nd August, intelligence of which reached O'Donnell in his trenches on the 6th. The battering lasted seven days, and although at the end of that time the tower was much damaged, the breach was not yet practicable without ladders, nor had the assailants succeeded in setting fire to the town.

On the 14th August the assault was ordered, and in spite of strong resistance the enemy's left was turned, and the Round Tower, which was part of their position on the right, was captured, and held in spite of the many waves of attack that beat against it during the day. Artillery fire was maintained against the breach in the castle, and a couple of guns were brought round to the other side to bear upon a door which it was hoped might be converted into a breach, but which was found to be too well barricaded with sand-bags, stone and timber. Had not the Spanish engineers obstinately refused to accept Colonel Alderson's advice to make ladders, the castle might have been carried early in the morning, and twelve hours' fighting spared; as it was, the engagement lasted sixteen hours, and at least 400 of the Queen's troops were killed or wounded before the garrison of the Castle of Tales surrendered, after a defence as gallant as Cabrera himself could have wished. He had gone away after making all the dispositions, and his orders for the defence were found in the castle.

Before returning to Onda, O'Donnell destroyed the castle and tower, in the hope that the Carlists would no longer make use of Tales for the purpose of annoying Onda, and depriving it of the supply of water sent to it from the Tales heights by a canal. It is probable that he would have done better had he garrisoned, instead of destroying, the castle. Nevertheless, the moral effect on the rebels was good, and it was decided to enter on the task of reducing many such places which had been fortified by Cabrera, and to continue it until the arrival of Espartero with the Army of the North might render such concentration possible as would admit

of attacking the vital points, instead of the mere outposts, of the Carlist territory.


This resolution was not carried out at once, as was hoped. The activity of Cabrera was never more apparent than during the few weeks in September and October, 1839, which followed the receipt of the intelligence that Maroto had turned traitor, and that Don Carlos had fled to France. Marching and countermarching, with meteor-like rapidity and an apparent want of method, which was better than the most deliberate scheme, he led O'Donnell and the various divisions of the Army of the Centre many a weary and purposeless march; while at the same time, with his extraordinary energy, he counteracted in the minds of the peasantry the effect of the news from the North, which had stirred his uncouth rage and nearly broken his passionate heart. In some places he fired the minds of his listeners to such an extent that they ceased to care for Don Carlos, or his cause, or anything but this leader, who seemed to them an embodiment of victory and life and courage. When O'Donnell parleyed with the Carlist garrison of the picturesque Chulilla, they wrote in huge letters on the wall: "Mucra Don Carlos, viva Cabrera!" Cabrera was to them their cause, their proved leader, their staunch if exacting friend; beyond him there was nothing but a mist of politics and considerations which they could not understand.

During the first fortnight of October, the advent of Espartero was daily expected at Zaragoza, and intelligence of his movements was watched for by O'Donnell with an interested eagerness. For it was whispered that Espartero, the hero of Bergara, the Duke of Victoria, had determined to operate with his own army in Aragon, leaving Valencia to the Army of the Centre under O'Donnell; and this meant that all the glory of the campaign, all the final stamping-out of the rebellion, would go—not to the ambitious O'Donnell—but to Espartero. This was indeed proposed by Espartero, when he and O'Donnell at last met at Munciesa, on the 14th October; but it was ultimately decided that until the arrival of certain reinforcements ordered from

Navarre, the 2nd Division of the Army of the Centre, with seven battalions of the 4th Division of the Army of the North under General Castañeda, should operate together under General O'Donnell, who was accordingly appointed second in command of the united forces of the North and Centre. The distribution of the Army of the Centre would therefore now be as follows :

General Aspiroz	6 battalions,	Plain of Valencia.
Colonel Villa Longa	3	„ Campo de Liria.
General Hoyas	6	„ Sarrion.
General O'Donnell	6	„ Camarillas, &c.
Brigadier Beccar	2	„ Molina de Aragon.
Colonel Durando	1	„ Cutanda.

General Hoyas was directed to fortify Sarrion, as an intermediate post between Segorbe and Teruel; and O'Donnell thought how to strengthen Camarillas, as a good depôt for




ARES.

(From sketch by Colonel Lacy, R.A.)

provisions. Had Espartero advanced towards Forcall, had O'Donnell manoeuvred towards Ares del Maestro, and had the 3rd Division advanced from Palomar, it now seems certain that Cabrera would have had no resource but to throw himself into one of his fortified places. But the elements fought for him. Winter came on early; roads became impassable; provisions were scarce; and the movements of the Queen's armies were paralysed. During the month of November, nothing was done by O'Donnell save strengthening a few

points on his lines of communication. Espartero remained inactive; and Aspiroz confined himself to the capture of a few unimportant forts.


O'Donnell—indignant at some conduct of the peasantry favourable to Cabrera, and at the continual murders by that



CASTLE OF ALCALA, ARAGON.

leader of any peasants friendly to the Queen's cause who were employed as messengers—sent a retaliatory message to Aliaga (a Carlist stronghold, which he afterwards captured), directing the inhabitants to quit the town, or he would burn it to the ground. His words were empty threats; and he appears to have forgotten his message altogether in a few days, thereby eliciting from Colonel Lacy the remark that "The Spaniard is a peculiar being, extremely excitable, and

“violent in his decisions. While in this disposition, he gives a strong order which is left to another to execute, who leaves it to another, and another, so that it is seldom or never executed properly, if at all.” At this time, also, O'Donnell made a demonstration, but nothing more, against another place which he afterwards captured—



ALCALA DE LA SELVA,
(From sketch by Colonel Lacy, R.A.)

Alcala. But no real work was done at this time in the field; and all the energies of the various commanders were devoted to the difficult task of obtaining food in a country which had suffered now for years from the desolating influence of a bitter war. Cabrera had, in the meantime, silenced by terrorism any attempts among the peasantry to circulate the true story of the collapse of the rebellion in the North, and had issued bombastic proclamations to encourage his followers, and to throw discredit on his opponents.

The last few days of the year 1839 were relieved by the capture of Chulilla on Christmas morning by General Aspiroz, after a siege of thirteen days, and in spite of a determined attempt of another Carlist force under Forcadell

to relieve the place. O'Donnell also made a reconnaissance at this time of another place, Baxix, which he subsequently



BAXIX.

(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.E.)

took, but which he postponed attacking until the weather and other circumstances should be more favourable.

The arrival of detachments from other parts of Spain, the



ALPUENTE, VALENCIA.

(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.E.)

collapse of the Carlist cause in the North and in Catalonia, and the surrender of many places in Aragon in the beginning of the year 1840, foreshadowed the complete overthrow of Carlism in the East of Spain, which culminated in the siege of Morella. The story would be both long and uninteresting, were one to follow O'Donnell and Aspiroz in their work of reduction in the Spring of 1840. Suffice it to say that within eleven weeks, dating from the fall of Segura on the 26th of February, to the abandonment of Santa Vieja on the 11th of May, the Carlists lost twelve fortified places, viz.: Segura, Castellote,* Aliaga, Villarluengo, Alcala de la Selva, Peñaroya, Alpuente, Linares, Mora de Ebro, Villahermosa, Ares del Maestro, and Santa Vieja,—many of them by force of arms, and the remainder abandoned by their garrisons. Aliaga surrendered to O'Donnell on the 15th April after three days' siege; and Alcala to the same general after two days.

Col. Lacy
to Lord
Palmer-
ston,
May 14,
1840.

With these successes came a large number of deserters from Cabrera—men flying from the sinking ship of Carlism, to which their fierce leader clung to the last. At first, these deserters were chiefly the raw and untrained recruits whom Cabrera had recently levied; but soon his veteran troops came over in considerable numbers. Those who remained true to him gathered round him, then sick almost unto death, in the mountain fortress where he had gathered such renown—Morella.

* The sieges of Segura and Castellote were undertaken early in the year against the wish of Espartero, and were successfully conducted in spite of very severe weather.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE SECOND SIEGE OF MORELLA.

AS the story of this war draws to a close, the student again finds himself near the picturesque city in the heart of the Valencian hills—the chief fortress of the Carlists,—Morella.

In the last chapter, the preliminaries to the siege were discussed; the siege itself has now to be described. It was the last act in the drama; but it was an act which could not have been omitted without marring the historical justice of the war.

For, the waves of combat had already twice surged against the heights which made Morella so powerful. They had at first carried Cabrera to easy victory; and then they had carried back, as they receded, the discomfited Christino general, Orua.

A convention, which allowed Morella to change hands again peaceably, would have left a grievance among the Queen's troops, and a source of vaunting pride for ever among the Carlists. Happily for the Christinos, Cabrera would have nothing to say to the compromise of Bergara; and therefore the spring of 1840 saw Espartero at the head of a powerful force in front of the now celebrated Morella.

The illness of Cabrera robbed the defence, no doubt, of much of its spirit. Still, the numbers of the garrison, the extraordinary natural strength of the position, and the obstacles interposed in the way of an attacking force by weather and difficulties of locomotion, combined to render

this successful siege a distinct source of pride subsequently to the Queen's troops.

General Oraa had failed partly on account of the absence of an adequate siege-train. Espartero avoided this possible source of failure, and remained in Zaragoza until he had ensured the presence with the army of sufficient battering artillery to render him independent of the precarious fortune which attends on simple assaults.* Besides his siege-train, he was also provided with three field-batteries, comprising four 12-pounders, two 24-pounder howitzers, two 16-pounders, two 8-pounders, and two 7-inch howitzers. All this involved great difficulty, in such a country, as to transport. To carry the ammunition alone, 500 country carts with 2000 mules were required. There were also some 300 carts employed by the commissariat, besides those required for the regimental transport of the various brigades. The whole of the heavy guns were also drawn by mules, hired by contract.

The force to be employed in the siege amounted to about 20,000, viz.:

1st Division, Royal Guard	7 battalions, or 4000 men.
2nd " under Brigadier May ..	7 " " 5200 "
3rd " " General Ayerbe	6000 "
Brigade of Vanguard	3 " " 2400 "
Artillery	800 "
Sappers	600 "
Cavalry	1000 "
	Total .. 20,000

To ensure the communications with Alcañiz, a division of 6000 men under Brigadier Zurbano was posted at Valdeobres, at the foot of the mountains of Beceite; two battalions and a regiment of cavalry occupied the high road from Monroyo to Alcañiz, and garrisons were left in various detached villages.

* The battering train of Espartero consisted of 40 pieces, viz., eight Lieut. 24-prs., twelve 16-prs., five 14-in. mortars, five 10-in. mortars, and ten 7-in. howitzers. Each gun was provided with 1000 rounds, each mortar and howitzer with 800. Lyon, R.F.
Morella,
June 2,
1840.

On the 18th May the battering-train moved forward under the escort of the 2nd division as far as the small village of La Pobleta, a league from Monroyo, which had been burnt by the enemy, and which was subsequently occupied during the siege by an infantry garrison.

On the 19th the head-quarters* marched from Monroyo at daybreak. The road almost immediately entered the mountains, and the transport of heavy guns became very difficult. Added to this, a change for the worse in the weather compelled Espartero on reaching La Pobleta to call a halt. The 1st division advanced as far as the heights of San Marcos, where they encamped within sight of Morella; the main body, with the head-quarters and artillery, encamping on the heights above La Pobleta. During the night there was a severe snow-storm, and several men and mules were frozen to death; nor was there any improvement in the weather on the following day.

On the 23rd the army again advanced towards Morella, and arrived early in the afternoon within range of San Pedro Martir. Espartero himself, proceeding to the opposite height of La Pedrera, ordered up the field-artillery, which opened an effective and almost unreturned fire against the right flank of San Pedro. This fort was the principal advanced work of Morella, situated to the north of the city, and about 2000 yards distant from it, on a commanding height to the west of the Alcañiz road, which ran close under it. It was an irregular work, built of solid masonry, and with a deep ditch. On the south and west sides it was inaccessible, and its north front was well covered by a *glacis*. Its only exposed side was on the east, where the wall was completely visible from the height above-named, Pedrera—at a distance of about 1000 yards—on the same level, and on the opposite side of the valley through which the road from Alcaniz passed.

Owing to its great distance, the communication between

* With the 1st Division and the Brigade of Vanguard.

San Pedro and the city was precarious; and therefore to make it more secure, and at the same time to interfere with the passage of the Queen's artillery from the North, the enemy had erected another strong redoubt, La Querola,* with an advanced flèche, between Morella and San Pedro—and about midway—which enfiladed the high road, and at the same time protected the rear of San Pedro Martir. “The original Lynn MSS. intention was to have made the work of San Pedro much larger, as its importance was very great; and Cabrera made a great oversight in not erecting another strong redoubt on the opposite height of La Pedrera. The two would have protected each other, and their fire crossing on the road in front might have enabled them to hold against all our artillery for at least a fortnight. Instead of doing so, he threw much time and labour into making useless intrenchments within the city.”

These comments of an engineer officer of great ability afford another instance of the evil consequences, in war, which attend on professional ignorance in a commander. Cabrera was deeply sensible of his own shortcomings in this respect; and he found that the *esprit* and recklessness which so often made his tactics successful, were often useless in the colder regions of fortification and strategy.

Between the redoubt La Querola and the city, there was a deep narrow valley, across which ran the aqueduct which supplied the city with water, and behind which a large body of troops could be formed without being seen from Morella.

It was determined to make the attack on the north front for various reasons: among others, because the artillery had to come by the Alcaniz road, and it would have cost much time and trouble to have transported the guns to another front; and also because the weakest part of the city wall was the line between the castle and the gate of San Miguel, as, had a breach been once effected there, the whole of the city and its interior intrenchments would have been commanded

* The Fort of San Pedro Martir, and the redoubt La Querola, had been erected subsequently to the first siege of Morella.

and taken in reverse from the breach itself. To effect this it will be seen that the defences of the *north* front of the castle had to be destroyed, as they flanked the above-mentioned line of wall. The fire of the artillery was therefore ultimately concentrated on the castle.

In 1838, as has already been shown, General Oraa, who had only 15,000 men and 7 guns, made his breach to the left of the gate of San Miguel, *and did not attempt to silence the fire of the castle.* He assaulted the breach, and failed. Had he succeeded, he would have found it very difficult to maintain himself in the city under the fire from the castle; and as Cabrera was in the neighbourhood with some fifteen battalions, Oraa was very fortunate in getting his guns away as he did.

But to return to the events of the later and successful siege. It was necessary to take San Pedro before Morella could be closely invested. The army was therefore encamped in its front and flanks; the stores and heavy guns were parked in its rear and on the heights of San Marcos; in rear of all was encamped a covering brigade of the 2nd division. The fire of the field artillery on the right flank of San Pedro was not sufficiently effective to induce the main attack being made on any other than the northern front; and the fire from some mortars which were placed during the night of the 23rd on La Pedrera to shell the city, was found to be very inefficient owing to the great range, very few shells reaching the place.

On the 24th May the engineers commenced a deliberate approach against the north front of San Pedro under a heavy fire, which was rendered more destructive owing to the ground being so rocky as to make it difficult to obtain shelter for the sappers. When within 200 yards of the fort they covered themselves by a hurriedly thrown up stone wall. Behind this wall an infantry force kept up so severe and incessant a fire on the fort that it quite subdued that of the garrison, and the sappers were enabled before daylight on the 25th to continue their work to within 100 yards of the ditch, and to finish a battery for three 16-pounders, which were to fire at the small part of the work not concealed by

the *glacis*. Very little injury was done by these guns when mounted; but those on La Pedrera produced an increased effect, destroying the whole of the parapet on that side, and enabling some of the light troops to approach close to the ditch. This movement being mistaken by the garrison for an assault, led to their exposing themselves in a very gallant but fatal manner, the fire from La Pedrera remaining excellent and clearing the wall of its defenders several times. At 8 a.m. the garrison of the fort sounded a parley, and the governor offered to surrender on the condition that the garrison should be permitted to retire to Morella. Espartero refused; and as the garrison refused to continue the defence, the governor was compelled to surrender at discretion.*

While the discussion was going on at San Pedro, Espartero moved some light infantry forward against La Querola, the garrison of which showed conduct the very opposite of their comrades. Notwithstanding the support of a very strong *sortie* from Morella, they only resisted the gallant attack of the Christinos for about half an hour, and then shamefully abandoned the fort. In this assault, that rare thing in siege operations occurred—the employment of cavalry. Espartero's escort, always large and always ready, did much to hinder and disperse the troops which had sallied from Morella. Indeed, the whole of the Queen's troops behaved admirably in these earlier operations of the siege.

With the exception of the covering brigade on the heights of San Marcos, the whole army was now moved nearer to Morella, and batteries were traced for 15 guns and 10 mortars. A natural ridge fortunately existed which greatly aided the construction of these batteries, the most distant of which was only 800 yards from the city. Before the 29th other batteries had been constructed both for guns and howitzers, until no fewer than 35 pieces of ordnance were in battery, and a tremendous fire was opened on the devoted

The guns were seven 24-prs. and eight 16-prs.

* The strength of the garrison of San Pedro was only 277 of all ranks; and over 1800 rounds had been fired against the fort by the Queen's artillery.

town. The remarkable absence of wood in the construction of the houses diminished the extent of the bombardment, but the destruction wrought was very great, the castle fire was almost wholly silenced, the breach in the line of wall between the castle and the gate of San Miguel had become formidable, and had called forth the same internal precautions as had been employed against General Oraa; and an explosion of a very destructive nature had occurred in one of the largest magazines. The northern defences of the castle were soon almost destroyed, and its connection with the town by day almost severed. The reply from the castle and town was never very warm, and was soon practically silenced.

About 2.30 p.m. an officer belonging to the garrison of the castle let himself down by a rope from the western wall, and informed Espartero that a meeting of the principal officers of the garrison had been summoned, at which he himself had been present, and at which it had been determined that the garrison of the city should that night endeavour to escape through the besieging army and join Cabrera, who was with the field force, sick. The garrison of the castle, however, some 300 strong, was to remain, and to conceal by their continued defence the escape of their comrades.

On receipt of this intelligence, Espartero took at once the following precautions for frustrating the Carlist schemes. Directing an incessant fire to be kept up from all the guns in battery, he despatched staff officers to the different divisions with orders that the investment, which had as yet been very incomplete, especially to the eastward, should be carefully closed; that at nightfall the troops should draw nearer to the city and occupy in force the roads round the place, particularly towards the gate known as the *Puerta del Estudio*, which alone was open; and that patrols should approach close to the city walls in every direction. Lest, however, the information brought by the deserter should prove inaccurate, the ordinary preparations for a continued siege were continued. Two new batteries were commenced about 350 yards from the north-west angle of the city wall, one for four and the other for six guns, and the aqueduct wall was made

use of for this purpose. On the south-west side of the city, General Ayerbe constructed a battery, at a distance of about 800 yards, for four 16-pounders which had been brought from *Canta Vieja*; and a couple of field batteries were sent round to him from the north side. Had the defence been prolonged, these guns would have been of great service against the somewhat weaker works on that side, in which the garrison took refuge on being driven from the north side by the heavy fire.

About 10 p.m. on the 29th, the sound of firing all round *Morella* proved that the information brought by the deserter was correct; and on the morning of the 30th, at daybreak, the garrison—still ignorant that their scheme had been betrayed—marched out, headed by the governor. To their surprise they were encountered by the 3rd and 4th divisions, and by part of the 1st. In the hasty struggle which ensued, about 350 of the *Carlists* were made prisoners.

Then followed a horrible scene. Under the impression that escape would be easy and certain, many women and children had followed the garrison. When the unexpected check occurred, the column pressed back to the gates, but before they could effect an entrance a shell fell upon the drawbridge, completely demolishing it. The fugitives next the ditch were crowded into it, amid wild confusion and horrible cries. Mothers were to be seen holding their children—all bruised and wounded—aloft, to save them from being suffocated in the growing heap of dead and dying; strong armed men, as they fell backwards, grasped at comrades, at women, even at little children, like drowning men at straws, and dragged them to death with themselves: and to complete the horrors of the scene, those who had not quitted the city, hearing from the victorious *Christinos* the cry of "*Viva la Reyna!*" fired in a panic upon their own retreating comrades, many of whom, falling wounded, still further blocked the way against the terror-stricken crowd.

This daybreak scene was in a compressed way a fair type of civil war in Spain, and a fitting act with which to close the drama and draw down the curtain. It embraced the

usual characters, horrors, and motives which—never absent from civil war in any country—were notably present in Spain. There was, first, the leaking-out of plans to the enemy through the inevitable traitor; there was next the element of *surprise*, so chronic in this Spanish War, so strong a testimony to the utter absence of those precautions without which a victory is an unmerited accident, and impunity no proof of generalship; there was the confusion of panic, the characteristic of raw and undisciplined troops; the absence, also, of care for women and children, telling of men brutalised by selfish terror—that blind and merciless terror which infects crowds rather than individuals; and there was, as a grim comment on the confusion, the announcement, when the breathless roll of the escaped was called, that the *governor*—he who should have striven to allay panic, to recreate order, to organise retreat, to save women and children,—that *he* had succeeded in effecting his escape.

The system of terrorism in this war, which the Eliot Convention had failed to remove completely, had not only infected an unwilling peasantry, fighting often for a cause but half understood, but had also touched the professional soldier, to whom the disgrace attaching to cowardice should have been more deterrent than even death at the hands of his captors.

One of the forts, Santa Clara, having been taken by the 4th division during the night, almost without resistance, the officer second in command in the city, and now acting as governor, offered at about 6 a.m. on the 30th to capitulate on the condition that the garrison should be allowed to withdraw to a foreign country. This was peremptorily refused by Espartero; and at 8 o'clock the place was given up at discretion.

The garrison* marched out and piled arms under the castle. The total number exceeded 3000, with a very large proportion of officers. In both the city and castle the

May 30,
1840.

Lynn MSS. * The garrison consisted of the 1st Regiment of Tortosa, 5th of Valencia, 5th of Aragon, part of 3rd of Valencia, 2 companies Artillery, 2 companies Sappers, 2 companies Miñones, and about 300 armed peasants.

magazines were found stored with provisions for several months.

The same engineer officer as has been quoted above sums up his narrative as follows:—"The defence was entirely confined to the advanced work of San Pedro Martir, whose garrison behaved well. When that fort fell, the enemy was panic-stricken, and scarcely made a show of defending the works of La Querola and the aqueduct, which, particularly the latter, might have held out for some days. When the batteries were commenced against the place, the fire opened on them from the castle was very weak, and scarcely a casualty occurred in them during the whole attack. The garrison appeared entirely to trust to the repelling of an assault, and were obviously ignorant of the great power of so numerous a train of heavy artillery. To this cause, and the explosion of the magazine, may be wholly attributed the fall of this formidable place with so little loss of life* in the short space of eight days. The fall of Morella has put an end to the civil war in Aragon and Valencia. Cabrera, with his remaining force, has already crossed the Ebro, and the divisions of Ayerbe and Zurbano have followed him."

Lieut.
Lynn, R.E.,
Morella,
June 2,
1840.

The following pieces of ordnance were captured in Morella:—

	<i>Iron.</i>	
1 16-pr.		1 12-pr.
1 18-pr.		1 4-pr. (spiked).
	<i>Brass.</i>	
2 16-prs.		1 12-pr. howitzer.
2 12-prs.		1 16-pr. "
2 8-prs.		18 Small brass mortars for
1 10-in. mortar.		throwing hand-grenades.
2 7-in. "		

This siege of Morella had an importance which was overlooked by contemporary writers.† Some of the reasons for this assertion may be found in the narrative; a strong senti-

* The loss of the Queen's troops was only 100 killed and wounded.

† It is not even mentioned by the Annual Register (England).

mental reason existed in Morella having been associated with Carlist triumphs; but not the least was that it afforded an excellent opportunity of contrasting the Queen's troops, in their now admirable organisation, with those who had in the earlier years of the war been so deficient in discipline, drill, and equipment. And if the army before Morella in 1840 was in every way superior to that which wandered foolishly and purposeless some years before around Vittoria, Pamplona, and Miranda, who can measure the greater contrast between the Espartero of 1836, fiery but ignorant, brave but vacillating, and the same leader, now fittingly termed the Duke of Victoria, who did not allow recent successes to excite him, but with elaborate deliberation planned and executed his last worthy exploit of the war—the second siege of Morella.



MORELLA.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE END OF THE WAR.

THE importance to the Queen's cause of the Convention of Bergara was very apparent to those who were engaged in the sieges of the fortified places in Aragon and Valencia, of which a sample has just been given in detail. Had not Espartero's army been released, the successful operations of that of the Centre in the East of Spain would have been impossible. The Army of the Centre would have been fortunate had it succeeded in obtaining the necessary provisions for its own existence;—the capture of fortresses would have been a luxury utterly beyond its means. The arrival of the Army of the North—its presence, even when inactive—acted on the spirits of their sister force like a stimulant: and before the troops, who would otherwise have merely fed themselves and been thankful, the strong places of Cabrera went down like the walls of Jericho. This is no fanciful opinion of historians,—than whom, in these times, no men are more fanciful or opinionative. The Christinos themselves, with the impartiality which goes hand in hand with confidence, admitted it. Cabrera had made the East of Spain bristle with strong places. The materials existed in the forts, castles, and churches, which had been created and strengthened to meet the cry of defenceless citizens, lawless chiefs, and wealthy but timid priests. Most of these sources of defence in irregular warfare had been strengthened by restoration of the walls, and by the addition, in the most commanding situation, of a light loop-holed wall, quite

Alderson
MSS.Askwith
MSS.

sufficient for practical defence in the many districts in the Maestrazso which were inaccessible to artillery.

Climate, peasantry, exhausted pastures, infamous roads,—all these, also, were obstacles to the Christino efforts to subdue Cabrera. But there were moral, or immoral, agents also at work to thwart the forces of Isabella in the Eastern campaign. The name of the child-queen had been trumpeted over the land as a synonym for liberty, pure government, and respect for popular impulse and sympathy. And yet, after years of trial of a representative form of government, the English Commissioners—devoted to the cause of constitutional liberty—were obliged to admit that as yet its course in Spain had been merely one of intrigues and dishonest practices, such as shocked the advancers of really liberal opinions. Writing in 1840, one of the Commissioners had to admit that “shameful jobs and bribery and corruption are flagrant throughout this unfortunate country in all places under government.” To the student, in 1877, the record of political incapacity and selfishness,—of a press both petty and mendacious,—suggests the parallel of a South American Republic or a British Colony.

And, to crown the edifice—to surmount as a monstrous deadweight the Juggernaut which was crushing the infant constitutional liberty of Spain,—enters Louis Philippe, breathing platitudes, and meaning nothing but opposition. If the King of the French had in him the power to do anything so strong as to hate,—he loathed representative government, while he professed admiration for the people. He wished to be considered the Nestor of the Bourbons, and to command in Spain as if it were a French Province. And yet, in spite of failures in Spain, and intrigues from France, in this last year of the war, one of the English Commissioners was able to write:—“It is well worth remarking that even the French, as well as the English, who have been on the spot, and had ample opportunities of investigating the true state of the case, and entering into the question—which is one of principles, not of succession,—all become convinced of the impossibility of Don Carlos ever reigning in Spain:

Alderson
MSS.

Jan. 22,
1840.

Colonel
Alderson.

“and all who wish well to Spain cannot do otherwise, if he
 “be a civilised being, than see the immense advantages to
 “this fertile and splendid country in possessing a repre-
 “sentative and responsible government.”

If this were true in 1840, it is equally true now, and in other countries than Spain. Monarchical institutions, “broad-based upon the people’s will,” offer the stability which is absent, and the freedom which is present, in a republic. The statesman who refuses to let all have a voice in the government of a nation who prove their stake in it by direct contribution to its welfare, is sitting on the safety-valve, and is ignoring the first lesson of Conservatism. To widen the base on which the edifice of the State is reared,—to enlist the sympathies of as many as possible of the governed in the mode and success of the government,—to arrange that not a voice however foolish, however unreasonable, shall but feel that it has means of expression,—to break down the political barriers between classes, without annihilating the social rights of privacy which belong to rich and poor alike,—these are the maxims of true Conservatism—the secret of strength in a nation. Don Carlos—in lieu of this—offered priestcraft and despotic power to Spain: and the nation, although weary of the littleness of the men who acted in the name of representative government, and sick of the Liberalism which was aggravated by hypocrisy and corruption, turned its back upon Don Carlos and would have none of him. As Colonel Alderson said, it had become a question of principles, not of succession; and although the wizards who affect to work charms in the name of liberty are often sorry impostors, and dullards, and selfish demagogues, the principles of liberty are eternal, and though at times obscured, are never extinguished. Spain has gone through much suffering since 1840; but the horizon is clearer now, and in the words of a recent writer—
 “Those who know what Spain became under Alberoni and
 “Charles III. will hesitate to assert that this noble country
 “will not be powerful and great again.”

‘Times,’
 Oct. 11,
 1871.


Although the fall of Morella, succeeded as it was by the capture of Berga, practically terminated the War of

Succession, there were many opportunities afforded to the English Commissioners, during the last six months of



MANZANERA.

hostilities, to distinguish themselves with the armies under Aspiroz, O'Donnell, and in Catalonia, where Van Halen had



CASTEL FAVIT.

(From sketch by Lieut.-Colonel Alderson, R.E.)

received a new command: and it was during the earlier movements that such places as Manzanera, in Aragon, a

place between Teruel and Segorbe, near Sarrion, were taken, Vide supra, p. 302.
—and the many others mentioned at the end of a previous chapter. General Hoyas—with whom was Lieutenant Askwith—had the honour of taking Manzanera, on the 14th December 1839, the Carlists making but a feeble resistance. Beceite and Castel Favit were scenes of similar Christino successes.

In April, 1840, Colonel Wylde was appointed Equerry to H.R.H. Prince Albert, and returned to England. He was selected, at the end of the war, to convey to Espartero, from Queen Victoria, the cross of the Bath: and he arrived at a time of coldness and jealousy between the Queen Dowager Christina and the victorious general, which he was happily able to remove for a time. Colonel Michell, then in Catalonia, was appointed Chief Commissioner in his place, and was ordered to proceed to Espartero's head-quarters, then Dickson MSS. at Monroyo, preparing for the siege of Morella. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Dickson, but such was the unsettled state of the districts in the East of Spain, that in order to proceed from Barcelona to Monroyo he had to go through France. Lieut.-Colonel Du Plat was left as Commissioner in Catalonia, and his tact and talents are borne witness to by the recorded expressions of thanks and esteem from the Spanish generals with whom he served, and the testimony—in language of warmth and affection—of Michell MSS. Colonel Michell himself. In leaving the narratives of these English Commissioners in Spain, one rises with a strong sense of the courage, endurance, far-sightedness and conscientious truthfulness which animated them all; and every Englishman must rejoice that his countrymen were of service to the cause of humanity as well as that of constitutional liberty in Spain. Their genial and cordial demeanour, their modestly-offered counsel and advice, their great tact and unselfishness, endeared them to the Spaniards; and although there have been more brilliant pages of the history of the English in Spain than that now treated, there are none recording a more pleasing instance of that which is happily characteristic of English officers,—the quiet and thorough performance of duty for duty's sake.

Dickson
MSS.

It was about the end of June, 1840, that Espartero quitted Lerida, and directed his march on Berga, where he arrived on the 4th July. Here, after the fall of Morella,* Cabrera had in person collected all that remained of the Carlist forces—about 10,000 men,—and attempted to make a stand against Espartero's Army of the North, numbering at least 25,000 men, with a large proportion of field artillery. Cabrera trusted to the strength of the lines round Berga—strong redoubts occupying all the important positions, and the town and castle also being well fortified. But he was outflanked and overpowered; and, after a short resistance, the Carlist troops abandoned their redoubts in succession, and the town itself was carried by escalade. The Carlists, leaving both the town and the castle, took to the mountains; and in a few days Cabrera entered France with some 7000 men, who laid down their arms and were interned in towns in the interior. In a quotation given by Bollaert, but from a source not named, it is said that "Cabrera on the last day of the campaign exposed his life a thousand times; and had it not been for his orderlies, who tore him from a parapet and mounted him on horseback, he must have been bayoneted." The courage of Cabrera, his military skill, his terrible provocation, his wisdom in steadily extending and securing the frontiers of the district under his rule, his marvellous power of exciting the devotion of those who served him,—all these qualities at times make one almost forget his cruel and atrocious conduct, especially to prisoners and wounded. One of the English Commissioners, who had much to do with effecting the exchange of prisoners, was compelled, looking back on his experiences, to say that "Christino prisoners in the hands of the Carlists were *always* huddled together in misery and filth with very poor rations; and that as a general rule they perished, few surviving the hardships they had to endure." And if any further proof is needed of the naturally cruel disposition of this remarkable

Cordoba,
Vol. IV.,
p. 7.

* General O'Donnell was not idle at this time; and at La Cenia, one of the actions fought by him, one of the English commissioners was wounded.

man, it will be found in the following circumstance narrated by another of the Commissioners, Colonel Alderson, from personal knowledge, and—as he wrote—“a matter beyond dispute.” Cabrera, having at Villahermosa, as his billet, the house of Señor Monferrer—a friend of himself, a staunch Carlist, and a Captain of Realistas,—became enamoured of his patron’s daughter, and molested her with his attentions. His passion being in no way reciprocated, and he having uttered threats against her should she not yield to his entreaties on his next visit, the girl spoke to her father and implored his protection. The latter at once arranged to have her sent out of the town before Cabrera should return; and when asked by the fierce lover on his next arrival what had become of his daughter, he merely replied that she had left Villahermosa. Cabrera made no remark at the time; but that day, after dining with his patron at his hospitable board, he told him that he was wanted without. The unsuspecting host went out, and was seized at his own door by some of Cabrera’s men, and shot. In the annals of atrocity it is difficult to find a worse crime than this. Even savages respect the rites and debts of hospitality: but to murder a man whose only offence was saving his child from shame, was a degree of brutality reserved for Cabrera.

The rebellion died at Berga. A few uncaptured places of no importance remained in Aragon and Valencia,—like shallow pools in the hollows of the sands when the tide goes out; but they soon disappeared in the sun of national rest and happiness, under which all discontent evaporated. The labour of building up the weary and disintegrated nation had yet to come; but the nightmare of civil war had passed, and all men could now breathe freely. Jealousy would soon come—that parasite of success,—but it was confined to those who thirsted for power, a thing which under the new *régime* seemed accessible to so many. The masses had rest. The sword was sheathed; and, as old opponents gazed at one another over ripening fields, the dead past buried its dead, and its horrors seemed but a dream. One by one the English in Spain disappeared. Their mission of philanthropy in war

ended at Berga: their duty as chroniclers of an evil time passed away when the right had conquered the wrong, and the harvest-fields of Aragon and Navarre had ceased to give crops of dead men, and offered instead to heaven the grateful thanks of a people no longer hungry, but at rest. The homely pleasures which had flown from peasant cottages while war and terror and cruelty stalked abroad, returned to roost in a land where nature supplies so readily her simple joys, and where a great history should furnish an ennobling sentiment.

The English quitted Spain: and of all the Commissioners there was not one whose subsequent career has not justified the promise of usefulness made upon Spanish fields, and of humanity registered amid Spanish agony. The relentless scythe of Time has mown down those whose years numbered most in Spain. The English Commissioner, *par excellence*, lived to be the father of his corps; and, while the

General
Wylde.



CASPE.

halting pen strove on these pages to record his work, he passed to a rest better than follows earthly wars, and to a brightness greater than is born of Spanish suns. Another at Jaffa, on historic ground, shuffled off that mortal coil which he had so nobly worn, laying it down as he had ever worn it, in the midst of earnest and reproductive work. And yet others—one great in courtly diplomacy, the others masters in technical science—have passed away, inscribing on the sands of their age's progress footprints which their followers will come upon with wonder, whispering as they

Colonel
Michell.

Colonel
Du Plat,
Colonel
Lacy, and
Colonel
Alderson.

gaze on them that there were giants in the land in those days. The others yet live to prove that there is as great an epitaph as worldly honour, or even worldly love,—the epitaph that to the last they have worked for the advance of their corps and of the world.

The English quitted Spain: but, alas! two sorts of Spaniards were left who have ever been a source of restlessness and trouble to Spain—the selfish soldiers and the hungry politicians. The graves of those who fell at Morella were not green, the children whose crying was hushed at the name of Cabrera were infants still, when that occurred with which this narrative finishes—the rising at Madrid on the 7th October, 1841.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SEVENTH OF OCTOBER, 1841.

ALTHOUGH the narrative of the actual war is now finished, there was a subsequent occurrence which took place at Madrid, and which is worthy of comment as being a key to many, if not most of the troubles of Spain.

Patient and amenable to discipline as the Spanish soldier is, these very qualities make him often a tool in the hands of ambitious officers; and in the history of Spain during the past forty years there have been too many of such designing leaders. To Englishmen the combination of intrigue with the possession of military authority is happily unknown; in no time of civil trouble has the nation ever to ask what the army will do; officers and men may entertain political opinions, much as their fellow citizens do, but when their military services are required, they know no politics but obedience. It is greatly to the credit of the national character that the sense of duty in the army eclipses all individual opinions, overcomes all personal reluctance, and drowns all recollections of disappointment or even of grievance. The contemplation of official favouritism and jobbery, and the hope of attaining rapid promotion, have been the origin of most of the disloyal risings among Spanish officers. It cannot be said that in the English Army promotion is very rapid, nor is its history totally devoid of grievance and even hardship; but far above all personal considerations the English officer places the grand mission

of his life, that of displaying in the midst of a busy people the standard of unselfish duty.

The events of the night of the 7th October, 1841, afford an instance of that selfish ambition of Spanish officers, so fruitful of anxiety and unrest to their country, and so disloyal to the chivalrous character of a true soldier. It must be granted that the Convention of Bergara contained provisions which were almost certain to lead to disorder and disaffection. The officers who were allowed to transfer their services to the constitutional army were not likely to quit themselves in a day of the old opinions for which they had fought so long; nor were they likely to be very cordially received by their former opponents. So sudden a reconciliation, also, was not very sincere. With the cessation of active employment, unsuspected differences of opinion and of interests speedily revealed themselves, and were increased by the honours paid to the more fortunate. The situation became more complicated than ever, when the Queen Dowager was defeated in politics by Espartero; for she not only had a powerful party in the army, but was also a woman who was not likely to let her party sleep. There was a growing danger, also, which had hardly been visible to the army while actively employed, but which was becoming daily more apparent with the growth of extreme doctrines, and the boldness of extreme utterances at Madrid. With the development of constitutional liberty in Spain would come inevitably a change in the relative positions of the Army and the State. The former, instead of being the dictator of the latter, would be reduced to its proper sphere, and be merely its right hand. Were the development to go beyond constitutional liberty, and to land the country in anarchical radicalism, the army—it was true—as history had always shown, would again assume the dictatorship. But there was no inclination among the officers who hankered after the old despotism, and despised the Madrid enthusiasts, to wait for this last contingency. They hoped by immediate action to prevent any further advance in the direction of

radicalism, and at the same time to secure for themselves some of the state loaves and fishes.

Unsuccessful as the revolt was, it was not unskillfully planned, and it evinced considerable knowledge of the Spanish character. Knowing how indifferent the masses were to the political revolutions with which at Madrid they had become so familiar, the disloyal officers did not take them into consideration at all, as regarded the actual *émeute*. But being at the same time aware that these same masses were patriotic at heart, and always loyal to the Government *de facto*, provided that they could in their simple way see that it was also the Government *de jure*, the leaders of the revolt decided on endeavouring to secure the person of the young Queen, and on assuring the people that their act was to save her from evil advisers and enemies. In this resolution they paid an unconscious compliment to that deep loyalty and patriotism in the Spanish people, the existence of which has been before pleaded in these pages, and which on the night now under consideration manifested itself in an unexpected manner. In the tactics adopted towards the troops whom they hoped to seduce, the rebel officers justified what has been said of the loyalty of the rank and file. They did not so much attempt to convince them by argument, as to win them by an appeal to their feelings. They knew that they were not so fickle as themselves, and that they were ready to follow leaders whom they loved, and under whom they had fought in honourable combat, without feeling or expressing much doubt. Popular leaders were therefore told off to assume command of their old regiments at the critical moment, with an appeal to follow their old chiefs yet once again in defence of the Queen.

The Government was aware of the intended conspiracy, but had been led to believe that it had been postponed, pending intelligence from the Basque Provinces. Precautions were not, however, discontinued; and strong detachments of troops and of the National Guard were distributed in various quarters of the metropolis. The troops actually in

Madrid on the 7th October, 1841, besides three batteries of artillery and twelve squadrons of cavalry, consisted of the following regiments:—

1	Regiment of Guards,	containing	3	battalions.
1	"	" Princessa	" 2	"
1	"	" Soria	" 3	"
1	"	" Luchana	" 3	"

in all eleven battalions, or about 9000 men.

But the Government was also able to trust thoroughly the National Militia of Madrid, consisting at that time of nine battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and eight guns. The service done by this force was as valuable as it must have been unexpected by the insurgent officers. Referring to this occasion, the resident Military Commissioners from England in Madrid wrote:—"It may with truth be said that in the rebellion in the capital on the night of the 7th October, 1841, the National Militia saved the Queen and Constitution; for the garrison alone would have been insufficient. Never did the Militia of all ranks and political opinions muster so strong as on that eventful night, and they did their duty during dreadful weather with the steadiness and order of a parade."

Strong suspicions had been entertained of some of the regular regiments, and of many of the officers of the Guards, who were known to be of very reactionary opinions. Many of these latter were quietly separated from their men, and the command of the Infantry of the Guard was given to a thoroughly reliable officer, Brigadier Velarde. The corps considered most worthy of confidence were the Luchana and Princessa, which had both served under the personal command of the Regent, Espartero, during the greater part of the late war, and the latter regiment especially had for some time been looked upon as a model of discipline. Nor was any fear entertained with respect to the Hussars and light cavalry regiments.

Between six and seven o'clock p.m. on the 7th October, information was received by the Regent from different quarters that the revolt was on the point of taking place; and

immediate orders were therefore issued for the garrison to get under arms. About half-past seven, firing was heard in a barrack situated in the outskirts of the town, which was in the joint occupation of the Hussar and Princessa regiments. The National Militia beat at once to arms, and by a preconceived signal, every house in Madrid was at once illuminated. The troops were distributed with great judgment in all the principal streets and public buildings, the Captain-General and chief military authorities stationing themselves in the Post Office, the civil authorities in the Town House, and the Regent directing the whole operations from his own residence.

By eight o'clock the firing first heard had ceased, and was transferred to the Palace, where it continued more or less actively until three a.m. on the 8th. During the greater part of the night, the rain fell in torrents.

The general plan of the insurgents was to assassinate the Regent, to take possession of the young Queen and her sister, and, if necessary, to carry them off to the Basque Provinces, which they expected to be in arms to receive them. The principal persons implicated were Generals Leon and Concha, both very distinguished for their services under Espartero during the war, Brigadiers Norzagaraz (late Under Secretary of War), Pezuela, and Quiroga, Colonels Fulgosio and Nuvilas, several officers of the Guards, and others who had joined the Queen's army from the Carlists at the Convention of Bergara.

Askwith
and Lynn
MSS.

Their hopes of success appear to have rested entirely on the chance of gaining over the whole or part of the garrison. To effect this, it was arranged that General Leon, dressed in the Guards' uniform, should place himself at the head of that corps, which he had formerly commanded, and that General Concha should do the same with the Princessa, of which regiment he had been colonel, and in which he was much respected and beloved.* Leon failed in his attempt; Concha for a time succeeded.

* Considerable sums of money had been spent in attempting to suborn the troops, and the exterior guard of the Palace had been tampered with.

The 1st and 3rd battalions of the Guards were in a barrack at a considerable distance from any other corps. After the suspected officers had been weeded out, the new colonel, Velarde, and the few remaining officers, found that they could trust the mass of the regiment thoroughly, it not being even tainted, as far as the men were concerned, with disloyalty. Not only did they resist the seditious harangues of the dismissed officers and others, who found their way into the barracks, but they even expelled them by force, and, by order of the colonel, fired on them when they attempted to re-enter. They also arrested Brigadier Norzagaraz, when he came to the barracks in search of General Leon; and behaved altogether so loyally that before nine o'clock Leon abandoned all hopes of doing anything in this quarter.

It was otherwise with the Regiment of Princessa, so trusted by the Regent. Its devotion to General Concha, and the treason of the lieutenant-colonel, overcame its loyal discipline. Concha presented himself at the barracks, in plain clothes at first, at 7 p.m., and was met by the lieutenant-colonel, Nuñilas, who made the two battalions fall in under arms. Concha then addressed them, calling on them to save the Queen from the hands of traitors; and his appeal was endorsed by the lieutenant-colonel, and by two majors who had been gained over. The men, carried away by their feelings, and deceived as to the motives of their leaders, yielded to the appeal. Colonel Ena, a loyal officer, who commanded the regiment, was at this time unfortunately absent from barracks.

Concha, knowing that the officers of Hussars who were in the same barracks were hopelessly loyal, surprised and made prisoners of them all, with the exception of the colonel, Rodriguez, who was absent in search of orders,—and three subalterns.

The orders now given to the mutineers were to force the quarters and stables of the Hussars, and to shoot the horses. So stout, however, was the resistance made, that Concha, being pressed for time, sent a cowardly threat that he would

shoot all the officers already in his hands, unless the regiment surrendered ;—and his threat was successful.

Leaving five companies of the Princessas in charge of the prisoners, he then marched to the Palace. He had scarcely left the barracks, however, ere Colonel Ena, who had been added to the other prisoners on his arrival, appealed, with the aid of other officers in the same predicament, to the loyalty and traditions of his regiment, and exposed the machinations of Concha and the other insurgents. His eloquence was successful ; the five companies at once returned to their duty, and the released Hussars marched without delay to the posts which had been previously assigned to them.

Concha reached the Palace before eight o'clock, and took possession of the theatre and other large buildings in the vicinity. No resistance was made to him on the ground-floor of the Palace, the guard having retired to the armoury, a large building commanding the southern part of the Palace, where they remained quiet and inactive all night. Their conduct does not appear to have been satisfactorily explained, except on the theory of bribery.

From this time, the whole contest was concentrated in the Palace itself,—the troops stationed elsewhere by Concha being almost immediately driven there by the garrison and the Militia. The Queen's apartments were on the first floor, and the custody of the royal person was entrusted to the Alabarderos, a company (about 180 strong) of veteran sergeants, with the rank of officers, selected on account of good conduct and long service. Their guardroom was at the head of the principal staircase, and there eighteen of these men under Colonel Dulce defied the utmost efforts of the mutineers to force an entrance, keeping up at the same time an effective fire through *impromptu* barricades which they had erected. With this small force, Dulce kept until 1 a.m., without losing an inch of ground, not merely the entrance, but also four large rooms *en suite* leading to the Queen's private apartments, the doors and windows of which opened on a passage occupied by the rebels.

Concha was joined in the Palace by Leon and the other

leaders, who all made desperate efforts to force the doors; but ignorance of the interior, and the absence of the necessary implements, made their efforts useless. Had they known of a door only partly bricked up, on the opposite side of the quadrangle, opening directly on a passage leading to the Queen's rooms, they might easily have forced it, and have carried off the Queen and her sister, almost without the knowledge of the Alabarderos.

At about 1 a.m. it was evident to the rebel leaders that success was hopeless. Horses taken from the royal stables were in readiness close by; so, accompanied by about two companies of the Princesses and a few horsemen, they abandoned the rest of their followers to their fate, and went off by the road to Guadarama. Being pursued by some light cavalry placed for the purpose, most of the troops were made prisoners or dispersed; but the leaders, being well mounted, escaped. About this time the Regiment of Mallorca marched into Madrid, about 3000 strong.

After this, a desultory fire was kept up until daybreak, when the Regent arrived, on which being made known the Princesses and the guard in the armoury surrendered at discretion. The affair might have been brought to an end sooner, had the Regent consented to an attempt being made to drive the rebels from the Palace by means of artillery; but he was fearful of increasing the Queen's danger, and was reluctant to deluge her residence with blood. He relied much also on the gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Dulce, and believed him to have a much stronger force at hand than was the case. This gallant officer, who had also gained honour on the field, was promoted on the spot to the rank of full colonel, his men received a step in rank, and all were decorated with the Cross of San Fernando.

On the Regent's proceeding to the Queen's* presence, all the officers were introduced, and she appeared in the balcony to show the falsehood of the report current that the rebels

* The Queen and her sister received Espartero at the head of the great staircase, pale and greatly agitated.

had succeeded in carrying her off. The whole garrison and the National Militia of Madrid marched past, and cheered her Majesty with enthusiasm,—not the less because it was soon known that her life had been in danger,—a bullet from the street having entered her room and struck the wall immediately above the Infanta's bed. The courage shown by her Majesty's female attendants was worthy of all praise.*

Lieut. W.
H. Ask-
with, R.A.,
and Lieut.
Lynn, R.E.

In writing of this occurrence, the English Assistant Commissioners said:—"It is proper to remark that nothing " could exceed the order and discipline observed by the troops, " with the exceptions stated, and by the National Guards " throughout the whole night. Not a single act of robbery " or excess of any kind was committed, nor *did a single civi-* " *lian join the tumult*; and business went on in the town next " day as usual."

When the mass of the people and the ranks of the army are true to the cause of order, the ambition and disloyalty of individuals will—if wisely checked—do no lasting harm. They may retard progress, they may give to other nations an exaggerated idea of internal divisions; but they will have no permanent effects, unless permanent themselves. Under a constitutional monarchy, such as Spain now happily possesses, the army will assume a different position, and its officers will learn that they are most truly great, and honoured, and successful, when in the eyes of their fellow-citizens they are a synonym for duty and disinterested loyalty.

Spain will then as surely resume her old greatness, as by a continuance of the opposite course, of restless military ambition, and contemptible military differences, she will be reduced so low that there shall be "none so poor as do her "honour."

* With the disappearance of danger, it was a singular coincidence that the heavy storm which had raged during the night passed away, and there was a brilliant sunrise.

APPENDIX.

NATIONAL MILITIA OF SPAIN.

AS allusion has been made during the course of this narrative to the Militia forces of Spain, it may be well to add here a few words with reference to their organisation and duties at the date of the war between Isabella and Don Carlos. Very thorough investigations were made in Madrid in 1841-2 by the two English Assistant-Commissioners so often quoted in these pages, Lieutenant W. H. Askwith, R.A., and Lieutenant Lynn, R.E. A *précis* of their exhaustive inquiries may be found to have a special interest in England at a time when army reform and organisation seem to have a fascination for statesmen and for thinkers beyond the ranks of the military profession.

The National Militia of Spain was first organised during the Constitutional Government in 1822. It was dissolved in the following year on the resumption of despotic rule, and was replaced by the Royalist Volunteers. These latter were disarmed on the death of Ferdinand VII., and (during the *Estatuto* of Queen Christina) the National Guard was re-established under the title of Urbanos. A further organisation was given in the year 1836 on the proclamation of the old Constitution of 1812.

By a law passed in the Cortes of 1822, and confirmed on the 28th November, 1836, it was decreed that "every Spaniard between the ages of 18 and 50, being a householder, possessing property or rents, exercising any trade, or procuring subsistence in a way satisfactory to the

First organisation.

Realistas.

Re-organisation.

Eligibility.

“ municipal authorities, or the son of any person in the
 “ above circumstances, is bound to enlist in the National
 “ Militia of the place of his residence . . . and lists have
 “ to be furnished annually by the municipal authorities of
 “ the young men who have completed 18 years of age and
 “ of all who have passed that of 50.”

Exceptions. From this general rule were excepted foreigners, the clergy, certain *employés* of the Crown and Government, deputies to the Cortes during its session, medical men, members of the tribunals of justice, livery servants, &c. Persons whose political opinions were publicly known to be at variance with the existing institutions, and those who had committed offences against the laws of the country, were likewise excluded from the Militia; and for this purpose a board of censure was formed in every battalion, presided over by the *alcaldé* of the town which was the head-quarters, assisted by a committee of the *ayuntamiento*, and of which board the commandant-major, all the captains, and a subaltern, a corporal, and two privates of each company were members. There was an appeal allowed from this board to the same with the addition of all the officers of the Militia resident in the same place, and the decision of the latter board was final.

Subscriptions from non-members. All persons not belonging to the National Militia for any cause—except labourers, domestic servants, paupers, soldiers, and retired members of the army and navy whose pay did not exceed £5 per month—were obliged to pay a sum not exceeding 5s. per month and not less than 1s., the exact sum being fixed by the municipality according to the means of the individual. These subscriptions were devoted solely to the purchase of arms and accoutrements for the battalion, and was the principal fund at the disposal of the authorities.

Nature of arm. The majority of the Militia belonged to the infantry arm, and was organised in battalions; but in many districts there were troops of cavalry, and in the cities there were often companies of artillery, and a few sappers who acted as firemen.

was a regular scale of punishments for the court, consisting of fines, arrest, imprisonment, and, in flagrant cases, expulsion. The amounts realised by fines were spent on the equipment of the corps.

Armament. Up to the year 1842, the numbers of the militia had been too great to allow of their being completely armed, especially in the rural districts. Arms once issued to a man had to be kept by him in good order and repair; and he was supposed always to have in his possession ten rounds of ball cartridge.

Uniform. Although the men of the militia were generally expected to purchase their own uniform, in cases of poverty or inability it was purchased by the municipality out of the general fund. In 1842 many rural corps were without uniform.

Colours. Each battalion had a colour or standard, to which they swore fidelity, and this form was followed in January by all who had entered the corps during the past year.

Bands. Most of the battalions had bands, kept up by voluntary subscriptions in the corps.

Drill and instruction. All corps and detachments were drilled on Feast days until perfect; and the different battalions were united at some head-quarters on one Sunday in every month. Members of the corps who had served in the regular army were preferred as instructors; and in their absence, officers and sergeants of the army were selected for the duty.

Obligations and duties. The principal object of the National Militia was to support the Constitution established by law. It was bound at all times to mount guard when called on by the municipality, either in the town-house, or other convenient or special spot fixed by the *ayuntamiento*. It was required to attend at all public ceremonies, at which the presence of an armed force was considered necessary by the civil authorities; and, in the absence of a sufficient military force, had to pursue and apprehend all malefactors and deserters within the jurisdiction of the corporation. It had to escort prisoners and public treasure within the Militia district, and to defend the town or place of their residence against all enemies,

foreign or domestic. The Militia was forbidden to assemble under any pretext without the positive order of the alcaldé or superior civil authority. On emergencies, *provided the consent of the civil authorities had first been obtained*, the Militia might be placed under the military powers for guard and garrison duty. And, in event of disturbances, the Militia, when once called out, remained under the orders of the military until tranquillity was restored.

By a decree of the Cortes, 9th October, 1837, the government was empowered to embody if necessary one or more battalions or squadrons of Militia in each province (composed of widowers and bachelors between 18 and 40 years of age), to do duty for a specified time under the military authorities in garrisons, escort duties, &c.; their equipment to be defrayed out of the provincial funds. Several battalions were called out in this way during the war, and did good service.

According to the official returns (which were, however, far from perfect or accurate), on 1st September, 1841, the following were the numbers of Militia enrolled:

	Armed.	Unarmed.	Total.
Infantry ..	195,699	544,637	740,336
Cavalry ..	6,648	4,953	11,601
Artillery ..	7,388	1,749	9,137
Firemen ..	1,518	569	2,087
Total ..	<u>211,243</u>	<u>551,908</u>	<u>763,161</u>

It being, however, idle to take the unarmed portion into account, it may be assumed that, allowing for some omissions in the returns, the armed and serviceable Militia fell little short of 240,000 men. In the large towns their discipline and appearance were striking, and the service was popular. In Madrid, there were about 14,000 of all arms, and on several occasions as many as 9000 turned out at a very short notice. They are described as having been exceedingly well equipped and steady under arms.

During the seven years of the war treated in these pages, the conduct of the Militia was generally admirable,

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and many of the acts performed by them in defence of towns, forts, &c., evinced heroic patriotism. The Militia of the Basque Provinces deserve especial mention; for they, to the number of about 4000, nearly all fell victims, either in person or property, to their constitutional political opinions. "For their patient suffering and the sacrifices made by them in support of the Constitution they deserve the highest praise. In numberless instances they were forced to emigrate with their families from the place of their residence, and abandon their property to the enemy. Taking refuge in the fortified towns, they would often have perished had not Government provided them with rations. Thousands also fell victims to the cruelty of a ferocious enemy, for almost on all occasions when made prisoners they were shot under the name of *traitors*. Cabrera, Patillos and others murdered hundreds in cold blood."

The local knowledge of the men belonging to the Militia proved very valuable to the Queen's generals, and was always readily placed at their disposal.

To this general expression of praise there must of course be some reservation; and in Seville, Cadiz and Barcelona it was found necessary to dissolve entire battalions.

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


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