






105

3 vols 1st



ANNALS

OF THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.




“ NUNC IGITUR, NUNC CŒLO ITERUM VICTRICIA SIGNA
(RES EGET HIS ARMIS ET BELLATORIBUS ISTIS)
ELEVA, ET ACCELERA PUGILES ARMARE BRITANNOS.”

BAPTISTA MANTUANUS.



SKETCH of the Battle of BAYLEN.

English Miles
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ANNALS

OF THE

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS:

FROM

MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND
T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON.

MDCCCXXIX.

ANATOMY

PERMANENT CHARACTER

APPLIED TO MEDICINE

BY THE AUTHOR OF 'VITAL THORNTON'

IN THREE VOLUMES

VOL. I.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH AND

EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY J. JOHNSTONE.

MDCCLXIX.

PREFACE.

IN offering the following volumes to the Public, the Author would by no means be understood as courting any competition with the more able and elaborate works of his contemporaries. To all the British historians of the Peninsular War, he has been largely indebted, and it would ill become him to speak of their labours, otherwise than with respect. The works of Colonel Jones, and Colonel Napier, display a very high degree of talent and ingenuity; and that of Mr. Southey, considered as a vast magazine of facts, laboriously collected, and embodied in a narrative of uniform clearness, may be considered as a valuable addition to our literature.

Yet, admitting the merit of these writers, it appeared to the author, that their accounts of the Peninsular War were calculated rather for the closet of the professional student, than for the great mass of the public, who are little likely to feel interested in any dry or lengthened detail of accessory incidents, or to enter very deeply into the intricacies of military discussion; and that there was still wanting a work which should introduce to the intimate acquaintance of the great body of the people, the events of one of the most memorable periods in the history of their country, which should diffuse and imprint, more widely and more deeply, a fitting pride in the great achievements of the British arms, and render Englishmen more familiar with the circumstances of the most splendid and important triumph ever gained by the supporters of liberty, justice, and the rights of man, in opposing the gigantic usurpation of wild and profligate ambition.

To furnish such a work has been the object of the author of these Annals. That he has succeeded he cannot flatter himself; yet he trusts that he has at least deserved the credit of having detailed the occurrences of the war with fairness and impartiality; and that he has, in no instance, made his work subservient to the dictates of national bigotry or unworthy prejudice.

To any peculiar qualifications for the task he has undertaken, the author of these volumes makes no pretension. A few years of his early life were spent in the army—when he had the good fortune to be present in some of the great battles which it has now fallen to him to describe. He was thus enabled to acquire, by personal observation, a knowledge of many important localities, which he trusts will occasionally be found to have produced a beneficial influence on his narrative. Of any other advantages he is unaware; and the circumstance of the present work being given anony-

mously to the world, may be taken as an acknowledgment that the opinions which it contains could derive nothing of authority from the name of its author. Were it otherwise, however, he would prefer that these opinions should stand or fall without extrinsic support ; and he is aware of none which he is not prepared to relinquish, whenever, by more able reasoners, they shall be shown to be erroneous.

In a work embracing so vast a variety of detail, it is scarcely possible to hope that complete accuracy has been attained. The author trusts, however, that he will be found to have fallen into few important errors ; and he submits the present work to the judgment of the public, not with confidence certainly, but with no wish to deprecate the severity of any censure to which it may be found liable.

Toulouse, 2d September, 1829.

NOTE.

IN the first volume will be found references to an Appendix which does not exist. It has been omitted, on the ground that the documents referred to were easy of access, and not sufficiently important to warrant the addition of another volume, which the introduction of an Appendix would have rendered necessary.

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
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ERRATA.


Vol. 3, page 127, line 2d, for “western” read eastern.


Do. do. line 4th, for “east and south-east” read west and south-west.

SKETCH of the Battle of VIMIEIRO. 21st Aug. 1808.




W. H. W. 1808





BATTLE
OF
Talavera
at the PERIOD of the
FINAL ATTACK
on the Afternoon of the
28th July
1809.



SKEETCH

of the Siege of

CIUDAD RODRIGO

1812

AGUEDA RIV.

SUBURB SANARINA

SUBURB ST FRANCIS

Convent of Sta Cruz carried on the 13th


Convent of St Francisco carried on the 14th


Lesser

Bodonubi carried on the 5th

British Batteries & works


GREAT TESSON





SKETCH
of the
Siege of
BADAJOS
1812





MAP OF CATALONIA.

Great roads ———
 Carriage roads ———
 Mule roads ———



PLAN OF GERONA.




Eng^d by R.H. Lloyd




SKETCH
of the
Battle of the Nivelle
10th November 1813.








SKETCH
of the
Battle of Toulouse
10th April 1814.



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


PASSAGE
 of the
DOURO.
 12th May 1809.

1
 Mile


REFERENCE.

- A. Passage of the Douro by the detachment under Gen^l Murray.
- B. Ferry crossed by Gen^l Sherbrooke's brigade.
- C. Passage of the troops under Gen^l Paget in boats brought from the opposite side.
- D. Passage of the remainder of the forces under Gen^l Hill.
- E. Building occupied by the troops under Gen^l Paget as a post of defence till the arrival of additional forces.
- F. Advance of the troops under Gen^l Sherbrooke.
- G. Advance of the detachment under Gen^l Murray.
- H. British Battery.



SKETCH
of the
Engagement of Rolica
17th Aug^r 1808.


English Miles
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


Battle of SALAMANCA 22^d July 1812.

SALAMANCA








Battle of VITTORIA 21st June 1813.

1/2 Mile



ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT.

THE Annals of neighbouring nations seldom present a contrast more striking, than that exhibited by the History of France and Spain, for the twenty years preceding the commencement of the Peninsular War. During that period, France had become the theatre of a vast and terrible revolution; the whole fabric of her government had been overthrown; society had been reduced to its original elements; and, amid torrents of blood shed on field and scaffold, she

CHAP. I.

CHAP. I. had passed from despotism to anarchy, and from
anarchy had again subsided into despotism.

These mighty changes had not flowed slowly onward, borne as it were on the progressive current of events, into gradual and almost imperceptible development. They had at once burst on the world, in all the suddenness and terror of the earthquake or the tornado. Their causes, it is true, had been long in operation, but they had wrought in secrecy and silence; and mankind stood aghast at a catastrophe so unlooked-for and appalling, whose overwhelming force and magnitude seemed to set all human efforts to impede its progress at defiance.

It was impossible that the consequences of so tremendous a convulsion should be confined to France: they were felt in every zone and region of the earth. Kings trembled on their thrones, and nobles in their palaces; while nations, partaking of the endemic delirium of the hour, were prepared to burst the chains which had hitherto enthralled them, and hail the advent of that political millennium, which they imagined had already dawned in hurricane and tempest.

All the governments of Europe became par-

takers, in a large degree, of the general alarm; and endeavoured, with natural anxiety, to avoid being drawn into a vortex so wide and overwhelming. In community of interest they found a common bond of union; and war was resorted to, as the only means of escape from those dangers, the near approach of which they had witnessed with dismay. A general confederacy of the European monarchies was formed against France, and the restoration of the Bourbons to the throne, was the avowed end to which the hostilities of the alliance were directed. CHAP. I.

To such an interference in her domestic government, it was not to be expected that France would tamely submit. Though torn by the strife of faction, and distracted by internal convulsion, she displayed, in her relations with foreign powers, a vigour, a fearlessness, and a promptitude to repel or retaliate aggression, which the feebleness and insecurity of her government at home gave little reason to expect. In the war which followed, the star of France prevailed, and that of the Allies grew dim before it. The energies of the Republic, under the guidance of the great military leaders whom the revolution had called from obscur-

CHAP. I. ity to stations of prominence and command, were directed against her enemies with decided vigour and success. The league was soon broken; one by one the members of the Alliance were encountered and overthrown; and, on the return of peace, France, triumphant at all points, remained undisputed mistress of a large accession of territory, and of an almost overwhelming influence in the whole political relations of continental Europe.

Great Britain alone remained among her enemies, unhumbled and unsubdued. Mistress of the sea, while the arms of France were everywhere triumphant on land, it seemed as if earth and ocean were divided against each other, in vast and interminable conflict. While the boundaries of their respective elements seemed to assign to either belligerent his peculiar sphere of triumph, and to prescribe the limits of his sway, there existed few points of contact on which the strength of these mighty combatants could be matched in final and decisive struggle. Each seemed armed against his enemy in mail of impenetrable proof; and France having succeeded in compelling the continental powers to withdraw from their alliance with England, the

war gradually degenerated on both sides, into a war of petty enterprises, attended only by comparatively unimportant results. CHAP. I.

In the meantime, the power of France, which, from the period of the Revolution, had been progressively increasing, had become apparently consolidated by time and conquest. Her government had at length assumed a form of sufficient permanence and consistency, to warrant an expectation, on the part of England, that the national faith, if solemnly pledged by treaty, would not, as heretofore, be sacrificed to popular clamour, or be disregarded amid the strife of contending factions. It was, at least, obvious to all reasonable observers, that whatever changes the internal government of France might yet be destined to undergo, these could proceed only from within, and could neither be accelerated nor retarded by hostile aggression from without. Both parties had, in truth, become tired of a contest which occasioned a continued outpouring of blood and treasure, but which held out to neither, any prospect of a brilliant or advantageous result. Pacific overtures were made and accepted; and, by the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the sword was again returned to its scabbard, and the

1803.

CHAP. I. world, for a brief interval, enjoyed tranquillity
— and repose.

While France had thus become the theatre, not only of a political, but of a mighty moral revolution, and was exercising an irresistible control on the destinies of Europe, Spain had partaken in nothing of the intellectual vigour and advancement which had long exerted a silent but powerful influence on the surrounding nations. The moral energy, the proud and chivalrous gallantry, the spirit of heroic enterprise, by which, in the better and brighter ages of her history, her character was so strongly marked, had, for centuries, been gradually on the decline; and the Spanish people, long habituated to despotism both political and religious, were still surrounded by an atmosphere of bigotry and darkness, which the light, dawning in the intellectual horizon of other nations, had been unable to penetrate. In the case of Spain, ignorance and misgovernment had produced their natural effect; and, notwithstanding the formidable magnitude of her physical resources, she had gradually fallen from the prominent station she once held in the foremost rank of European nations, to that of a secondary power.

During the greater part of the reign of Charles CHAP. I.
the Third, the government of Spain had fol-
lowed the true policy, dictated at once by her
geographical position, and her deficiency in of-
fensive power, in withdrawing, as much as
possible, from all participation in the contests
in which the other nations of Europe were
embroiled. Bounded by France on the north,
and on the east and south by the sea, the
acquisition of Portugal and Gibraltar were the
only projects of European aggrandizement to
which the ambition of her rulers could be ra-
tionally extended; and, in the execution of such
schemes of conquest, she could not but be aware
that the whole maritime and military force of
England would be exerted in opposition to her
views. England, therefore, she had been ac-
customed to regard as the chief obstacle to the
success of her ambition; and, actuated by dislike,
heightened perhaps by difference of religion, com-
mercial jealousies, and the great naval superiority
of Britain, the government of Spain had been uni-
formly more prompt to engage in hostilities with
that power, than any other with whom, in the oc-
casional jarring of interest or policy, she might be
brought into collision. France, on the other hand,

CHAP. I. was naturally indicated, by her power and proximity, either as the most powerful ally of Spain, or her most formidable enemy. Through France alone was the Spanish territory vulnerable to the rest of Europe; while no alliance with other powers could afford protection from her hostility.

Under the ministry of Florida Blanca, Spain, instigated by France, had taken part in the war between Great Britain and her colonies, and made a vigorous attempt to regain the fortress of Gibraltar. In this she failed; and, after a protracted war, in which her best energies had been exhausted with inadequate effect, she at length retired from a contest, of which the only favourable result was the restoration of Minorca and the Floridas.

1783. Immediately before the breaking out of the French Revolution, Charles the Fourth, by the death of his father, had succeeded to the throne of Spain. Alarmed, in common with other sovereigns, at the new and startling doctrines, both political and religious, of which the revolutionary government proclaimed itself at once the partisan and the apostle, Charles acceded to the general confederacy then forming in Europe,

1788.

and declared war against France. In the hos- CHAP. I.
tilities which followed, Spain was eminently un-
successful, and compelled to act only on the de-
fensive. The army of the Republic crossed the
Pyrenees, reduced the fortresses of San Fer-
nando de Figueras and St. Sebastian, and, after
defeating the Spanish force in several engage-
ments, became masters of the Biscayan provinces
and the kingdom of Navarre. Charles, who saw
with dismay the whole northern portion of his
kingdom already in possession of the enemy, has-
tened to supplicate for peace. The prayer of the
Spanish monarch was granted by the Republic ;
and, by the treaty of Basle, Charles was again
restored to the sovereignty of his conquered pro-
vinces, on condition of his relinquishing to France
the Spanish portion of St. Domingo.

1795.
July 22.

Once more at peace, and relieved from the fear
of present invasion, the government of Spain lost
no time in disbanding her armies, and resigning
herself to the enjoyment of an insecure and de-
fenceless repose. While the whole population
of France were training to the use of arms, the
Spanish monarch, by a sort of inexplicable fatui-
ty, was depressing the military spirit of his peo-
ple, and depriving himself of all means of prompt

CHAP. I. and efficacious resistance to future encroachment or invasion. No measures were taken to strengthen his northern frontier, or to repair the fortresses which had become dilapidated by the operations of the late war; and all the precautions necessary for the future security of his kingdom were neglected. The dreamy tranquillity of Charles, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Having placed himself at the mercy of France, he was speedily called on to take part in the war which that country was again waging against England. The consequence was that the naval power of Spain was encountered and overthrown, that her commerce was ruined, her treasury drained of its resources, and the intercourse with her colonies rendered precarious and uncertain.

The peace of Amiens, which had been regarded by either party as little more than a temporary cessation of hostilities, was, as if by mutual consent, soon broken. France and England, the rival and gigantic powers into whose hands were committed the destinies of the world, had again unsheathed the sword; and it depended on the issue of the approaching conflict, whether the chains, by which Europe was already encircled,

should be riveted or snapped in twain. In such circumstances, it was the natural policy of Spain to have remained neutral. In common with the other weaker countries of Europe, she would gladly have kept aloof from a contest which involved the certainty of immediate sacrifice, while its eventual advantages were only distant and contingent. In a war, however, of such a character, and with objects so vast as the liberation or subjection of the world, it was not to be expected that the rights of neutral powers should be held sacred and inviolate. To remain neutral was, in truth, to encounter all the hazards and sacrifices of war, without participation of its benefits; and the minor states of Europe soon found themselves absorbed in the eddies of a whirlpool, and carried involuntarily forward by an impetus, at once rapid and resistless.

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It was not long before the eyes of Spain were opened to the bold and decisive policy of the belligerents. While yet at peace with both parties, four Spanish frigates, loaded with treasure from America, were captured by an English squadron, without any declaration of war. By this flagrant act of national piracy, Spain was at once driven into the arms of France, and war against

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CHAP. I. Great Britain immediately declared. She saw
 1804. that, for a mean and unwarrantable purpose, she
 had been made the object not merely of robbery
 but of insult; and the unprincipled aggression of
 England drew from the whole Spanish nation a
 burst of indignant hatred, which the policy of
 France led her, by every means, to cherish and
 prolong.

1805. The throne of France was now filled by Na-
 poleon; and the ascendancy of his master-mind
 contributed to rivet yet more strongly the fetters
 by which Spain was already shackled. The tone
 at first assumed by the new Emperor, was in-
 tended to lull the Spanish government into still
 deeper security; and it succeeded. Assurances
 of friendship, and promises of support, were made
 with a profusion, and an apparent warmth which
 seemed to warrant their sincerity; and they
 were received by Charles, with a credulity quite
 in harmony with the general imbecility of his
 character.

The minister to whose hands the reins of go-
 vernment had long been intrusted, was Don
 Manuel Godoy; and surely never was there a
 servant less qualified by character and talents,
 to compensate for the deficiencies of his master.

Raised by the illicit attachment of the Queen CHAP. I.
from the situation of a private gentleman to the 1805.
highest rank and office of the state, he brought
to the task of governing a great nation, a narrow
and uncultivated mind, a grovelling and selfish
spirit. He was a man alike devoid of principle
and firmness; and the only proof of talent ex-
hibited in his unfortunate career, must be sought
in the ascendancy, which, under every change of
circumstance, he appears to have maintained over
the minds of Charles and his consort. By their
favour he was first created Duc d'Alcudia, and
afterwards, in honour of the treaty of Basle,
which he had been chiefly instrumental in con-
cluding, Principe de la Paz. To his hands
were committed the direction and patronage
of all the departments of the state. Every
honour in the power of the monarch to bestow
was lavished on the favourite. By his marriage
with Marie Therese de Bourbon, the niece of
Charles, he was elevated to the rank of royalty;
and the state and magnificence of his establish-
ment were such as had never before been affect-
ed by a subject.

Some men there are, who, when called on by
events to figure in a new and higher sphere of

CHAP. I. action than that for which they were originally
1805. destined, experience a proportionate expansion
of intellect and power—in whom new energies
are elicited by the dangers and the difficulties,
which, perhaps by a wise dispensation, are
fated to surround and darken the paths of glory
and ambition. Such a man was *not* Godoy.
In him power called only into development the
baser and more grovelling passions of his na-
ture, while all the higher impulses by which
humanity is graced and ennobled, slept on in
undisturbed repose. Under the sway of such
a person it was impossible that Spain should pros-
per. The honour of the country was sacrificed,
her vital interests were disregarded, and the whole
functions of the government of a great nation
were made to converge towards a single point—
the gratification of an unprincipled favourite.

It is scarcely possible to conceive a court more
thoroughly dissolute and degraded than that
of Madrid under the administration of Godoy.
Those only received his favours who pandered to
his vices ; and all in any degree distinguished by
wisdom, virtue, or patriotism, were treated with
contumely and neglect. It has been said that
he was corrupted by France ; yet, there are many

portions of his public conduct and policy at variance with such a supposition. Godoy's was not a lofty ambition: the rank, the wealth, the power he already enjoyed, afforded ample means of sordid gratification, and engrossed the capacities of his nature. France had no bribe of magnitude sufficient to secure the services of a man whose highest aspirations were already sated, to whom future glory, when weighed against present enjoyment, was but as dust in the balance.

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For some benefits, however, and these of no trifling magnitude, it is but justice to confess that Spain has been indebted to the administration of Godoy. He increased and accelerated the impulse of the national industry by patronage and encouragement. He extended his protection to artists and men of science; and it was in a great measure through his influence and exertions that vaccination became general in Spain, and was subsequently communicated to her possessions in America. Under his administration the Inquisition lost its terrors; works of national utility were encouraged and promoted; and vigorous and judicious measures were adopted to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease.

CHAP. I. Let the censures of the historian, therefore, on the

1805. character of Godoy be severe but discriminating. While he displays the darker and more prominent features of his character in their true colours, let him also do justice to those better qualities, by which, in other circumstances, it might have been brightened and redeemed.

Of Charles it would be yet greater injustice to speak in terms of unmitigated reproach. None of the elements of greatness were mingled in his composition, and his virtues and his vices were alike those of an imbecile intellect. Naturally timid and irresolute, yet of a character in which was mingled much of kindness and benevolence, Charles, had his lot been cast in calmer and more peaceful times, might have reigned in tranquil insignificance, by no means unfavourably distinguished among the tenants of the Spanish throne. But his powers were prodigiously disproportioned to the task imposed on him by the irresistible progress of events. With favouring breezes, and on a summer sea, he might have guided the vessel of the state prosperously on her voyage; but when the elements were abroad in their discord, it required another and more powerful arm, to steer her safely into port.

It was impossible for any minister to be more generally unpopular than Godoy. The ancient nobility regarded him as an upstart; and were alike indignant at his elevation and jealous of his power. By the people at large he was considered the source of all the misfortunes and the degradation by which, since his accession to power, the Spanish name and arms had been stained and humbled. The party thus opposed to the favourite, though strong in numbers were yet stronger in the rank and influence of their leader. Ferdinand Prince of Asturias, the heir-apparent to the throne, had naturally regarded the elevation of Godoy with indignation and disgust. His sentiments were no sooner known than the party opposed to the minister rallied round him as their leader. Under any other than a despotic government it would have been impossible for Godoy to have retained his situation in opposition to the public voice. He must at once have been driven into retirement with ignominy and disgrace. But it is not the least disadvantage of an absolute and unmitigated monarchy, that it is cut off from all sympathy and communion with the people; that the governors and the governed are not "bound, each to each, by natural sympathy;" that the

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CHAP. I. portents of approaching eclipse are unseen or dis-
regarded, till the earth is shrouded in darkness,
1805. and monarchs are "perplexed by fear of change,"
which it is no longer in their power to avert.

1806. In 1806 the disorders of the government had
at length reached their height: the army, un-
paid and without equipment, was clamorous and
undisciplined; the navy, which in the preced-
ing reign was formidable, both in point of num-
bers and efficiency, had been annihilated at
Trafalgar; the finances were deranged; the
treasury exhausted; and commerce, by the war
with England, almost utterly destroyed. Spain
had in truth become a mere dependent on France;
and the French ruler, far from compassionating
her difficulties, still continued to exact fresh sa-
crifices, and compliances more humble.

Godoy was now fully aware of the perils of
his situation; and, could Spain, by any peaceful
effort of diplomacy, have been detached from
her dangerous and inglorious dependence on
France, he would gladly have again raised her
from thraldom, and have unbound the igno-
ble shackles from her limbs. But the difficulties
of his situation had become far beyond his feeble
powers to overcome. On the one hand, the neg-

lect of all warlike preparation on the part of Spain, the dilapidated state of her frontier fortresses, the total want of the munitions necessary for the defence of her territory if subjected to invasion, withheld him from openly adopting any measure which might incur the hostility of France. On the other hand, from the advanced age of the king, and the aversion of the heir-apparent, he could not but contemplate the probability of a speedy termination to his power. He naturally feared the hostility of an injured people, and dreaded the arrival of the moment when, no longer protected by the shield of regal authority, he should be left the defenceless object of popular indignation.

Stimulated by such fears, Godoy felt it necessary to conciliate public opinion, by the adoption of some immediate measure in unison with the general feeling of the nation. He accordingly proceeded to concert with the Russian and Portuguese ambassadors at Madrid, a plan of combined aggression on the territory of France. The details of this project it is now curious to contemplate. It was proposed that hostile preparations should be made simultaneously at numerous and distant points, and should be conducted

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CHAP. I. with such secrecy as to elude the observation of
1806. Napoleon, then actively engaged in the war with Prussia. Spain and Portugal were to unite their forces against the common enemy. Arrangements were to be made for assembling a large army in the ports of Great Britain, which, on a given signal, was to be landed on the north of Spain. The operations on land were to be supported by a naval armament of overwhelming magnitude ; and, by a simultaneous movement in the north of Europe, Russia was to advance to the relief of Germany, with her whole military power.

In such circumstances, before the armies of Napoleon, engaged in distant operations, could be concentrated for the defence of the kingdom, the allies were unexpectedly to cross the Pyrenees, and, marching direct for Paris, to gain possession of the capital. By these measures it was conceived, that a sudden and decisive blow would be struck in the vital part where France was at once most vulnerable and defenceless.

Such were the projects of the Prince of Peace ; and small as the chance might be of maturing, under any circumstances, a scheme so widely ramified, and depending on so many contingencies

for its completion, without exciting the suspicions of Napoleon, all hope of success was at once blighted by his own rashness and precipitation.

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Before any of the necessary arrangements had been made, nay even before the powers most interested had been apprized of the part allotted to them in the projected scheme of hostilities, a proclamation was issued by Godoy, exhorting all loyal Spaniards to take arms, and rally round the throne of their sovereign. Circular letters were written to the bishops and civil functionaries of the provinces, urging them to excite the ardour of the people in the cause of their country. The nation, thus called on to defend their sovereign, could perceive no new danger which threatened his throne. The manifesto indicated no enemy against whom they were to arm. They were told of no insult or aggression which it had become necessary to repress or to revenge. The dangers of which it spoke were too indefinite and shadowy to rouse the fears or passions of the people. Its motives and its ends were alike veiled in an obscurity they were unable to penetrate. The nation wondered and were silent.

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The astonishment excited by this warlike demonstration was not confined to Spain. Europe was

CHAP. I. 1806. unprepared for the loud note of gratuitous defiance so suddenly sounded from Madrid. No alliance had been formed, no treaty concluded, no preparation made for any combined attack on the power of France. Even the ministers of Spain at the foreign courts, were left wholly in the dark as to the views and projects of Godoy. The Russian and Portuguese ambassadors on the appearance of this unseasonable proclamation, lost no time in attempting to vindicate themselves from the suspicion of a connivance, which could not fail to draw down upon their governments the indignation of Napoleon. They denied being privy to its contents, and carefully avoided committing themselves, by any future negotiations, to the discretion of a man so manifestly deficient in all the qualities of a statesman.

It was upon the field of Jena that Napoleon received this proclamation—with what feelings may readily be conceived. That which to Europe appeared vague and mysterious, to him was abundantly intelligible. He at once appreciated the policy of Charles and his minister; and then it was, as he afterwards declared, that he first resolved on the subjugation of the Peninsula.

In the meanwhile, the French Ambassador at Madrid presented an indignant remonstrance on the perfidious and vacillating policy of the Spanish government; and Godoy, anxious to escape if possible from the consequences of his rashness, replied by humble assurances that the warlike preparations called for by the proclamation, were intended as a mere defensive measure against the Emperor of Morocco, who, instigated by the intrigues, and emboldened by the protection of England, might possibly attempt a descent on Andalusia. Napoleon, still engaged in a contest which required a concentration of his resources, deemed it politic to receive this lame and improbable explanation as satisfactory. His vows of vengeance slept; but they were soon destined to awake from slumber.

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The peace of Tilsit, which speedily followed these events, left the French Emperor at full liberty to pursue his ambitious projects with regard to the Peninsula. He assembled a large army on the Garonne, and weakened the defensive powers of Spain, by exacting still larger drafts from her army than she had yet been called on to furnish. Sixteen thousand of her best-disciplined troops, under the command

August.

CHAP. I. of the Marquis de Romana, were marched into

1807. the north of Germany, and another division were
employed in the occupation of Etruria. While
matters were thus silently but rapidly verging
toward the catastrophe, Napoleon continued to
express his approbation of the conduct of Charles,
and to lavish testimonies of his favour on Godoy.
Whether the Spanish monarch and his minion
were really deceived by these hollow appearances
of esteem, it would boot little to ascertain. They
were already in the net of the spoiler, and so
involved in its multiplied convolutions that es-
cape was impossible.

No submission, however abject, no resistance,
however prompt and energetic, could possibly
have rescued Spain. It is not improbable that the
fall of the Bourbons had already been decreed.
Accustomed as Napoleon had been to the en-
joyments of gratified ambition, he felt perhaps
a new excitement to his pride in the idea that
the plebeian brows of a scion of his house, should
be graced by one of the highest and most ancient
crowns of Europe. It was yet something to a
spirit like his, to raise to the level of the no-
blest of the earth all those whose veins were
filled with blood kindred to his own. It was

yet more than this, by a striking act of violent and decisive volition, to prove to Europe, that henceforward her law was to be found in the arbitrary fiat of her master. But it was most of all to beat down, and trample in the dust, the descendants of an hundred kings; to display the full measure of his contempt for those hereditary prejudices, before which the world had hitherto bent in reverence and submission; to stand forth in the indefeasible dignity of his own majestic spirit, with all the moral and intrinsic attributes of sovereignty concentrated in his person, as the man, marked out by nature, whose brow could alone support the diadem, or whose arm could wield the sceptre of the world.

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Whether the course of Napoleon, with regard to Spain, was influenced by the instigations of an ambition so wild and reckless, is one of those problems probably never destined to be solved. It is at least certain, there were other motives, and those of cogency more powerful and immediate, to urge him forward on that course of policy which was to terminate in the deposition of the Bourbons.

In deciding on the immediate annexation of Spain, as an appanage of his empire, Napoleon,

CHAP. I. by many of the political reasoners of the day, has
1807. been held guilty, not only of an unprincipled outrage on the law of nations, but of being influenced in his proceedings towards that power, by the mere blind and vague stimulus of conquest. "Spain," say such reasoners, "feeble and inoffensive, was already in his power. Her troops had fought in the same ranks with his own; her resources had been drained to enrich his treasury, and were still at his command. What then had he to gain by outraging the feelings of a people so little capable of disturbing his security, or by deposing a dynasty which he could bend so easily to all the purposes of his ambition?"

The answer is, *much*. Over such a monarch as Charles, and such a minister as Godoy, Napoleon well knew he could exercise no ascendancy but that of fear. While his armies continued to advance, as they had hitherto done, in the career of conquest, he had nothing to dread from Spain, and he had dreaded nothing. But he also well knew, that, should the tide of battle change, should the flood of success, on which he had hitherto floated on from attack to victory—from victory to conquest, ebb again from beneath him, Spain would be among the first of the

surrounding nations to unsheath the sword, and raise the battle-cry on his declining fortunes. The proclamation of Godoy had given sufficient indication of her future policy, should adverse contingencies occur to shake the stability of his government, or weaken its power.

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Had the views of Napoleon, therefore, been directed merely to the present, he could have beheld, in the degraded state of the Peninsula, nothing to excite his alarm. But, regarding the future security of a widely extended empire, he could scarcely fail to consider the acquisition of Spain, as a measure essential to its permanence. The vast increase of territory which France had acquired by conquest, in Italy, and beyond the Rhine, rendered it necessary to her safety, that the circuit of her dominion should be proportionably enlarged in those quarters from which, by a sudden and unexpected invasion, an army might advance into the very centre of the kingdom. On this subject the reasoning of General Foy appears unanswerable:—“Spain presses on France,” says that able—would we could likewise add impartial and unprejudiced—writer, “in a way which differs wholly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and in contact only with a feeble neigh-

CHAP. I. 1807. bour, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral aggression, and, should she become the enemy of France, can bear down with all her strength on the northern frontier.—Napoleon knew, that behind the Pyrenees a generous nation had preserved its energy, and had not sunk into degradation, even under the long oppression of a government inglorious abroad and despotic at home. He knew all that might be expected from the people, and especially from the people of the south, when governed in unison with their passions, and within the sphere of their moral impressions. A man might arise who would regenerate Spain; a prince might reign, who would suffer it to be regenerated; a palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give the impulse. It was not written in the book of fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible favourite. While the eagles of France were flying to the banks of the Danube, and urging their course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at her gates on the south. The empire, which is so deeply vulnerable on one point, is strong nowhere. The increase of territory ought to be effected by concentric additions, and simultane-

ously on all sides. The French armies, when fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might be turned by an enemy's army which presented itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, because that army would be the nearest to Paris. The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the arc and buttress of its military power. Was not, then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed submission of Spain, a natural and necessary consequence of the extension of France beyond her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine? Such were the thoughts suggested to Napoleon by the idle proclamation of Godoy."

The first step taken by Napoleon towards the completion of his project, was to induce Charles, through the agency of his minister, to become a party to a secret treaty which was signed at Fontainebleau. By this instrument the partition of Portugal was agreed on. The province Entre Minho et Douro was to be erected into a separate sovereignty for the king of Etruria, whose Italian dominions were to be ceded to France. The Alentejo and Algarva were allotted as the reward of Godoy, to whom they were conveyed as a separate and independent principality. It was likewise stipulated that the sovereignty

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App. No. 1.
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1807. abeyance, till the termination of the war; then
to be restored conditionally to the House of Bra-
ganza, or otherwise disposed of, as the plea-
sure of the contracting powers might dictate.
It was further agreed, that the colonies of Por-
tugal should be divided between the sovereigns,
on the principle of an equal partition.

Such were the more prominent features of the
treaty of Fontainebleau; and on the same day on
App. No. 2. which it was concluded, a convention was likewise
signed, for carrying it into effect. By this it was
arranged, that a body of twenty-five thousand
French infantry, and three thousand cavalry,
should enter Spain, and marching directly on
Lisbon, were there to be reinforced by the junc-
tion of a Spanish army of twelve thousand men.
The troops of Charles were at the same time
to take possession of the province Entre Minho
et Douro, and the city of Oporto; while a
third division was to reduce and hold in occu-
pation the provinces south of the Tagus. It
was likewise provided by the convention, that
the French troops should, on their march, be
furnished with all necessary supplies, at the ex-
pense of the Spanish government.

Though the contracting powers appear to have contemplated little probable opposition, to this scheme of iniquitous spoliation, yet, in order to repel any possible attempts of the English to obstruct its execution, it was agreed that an army of reserve of forty thousand men, should assemble at Bayonne, ready to march to the defence of any point which might be menaced with attack.

The secrecy with which they were concluded is not one of the least remarkable circumstances connected with the treaty and convention of Fontainebleau. The negotiations on the part of Spain were conducted by Don Eugenio Izquierdo, a person uninvested with any public character, but enjoying the full confidence of Godoy. Of the powers intrusted to Izquierdo by the King and his minister, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was kept in profound ignorance. All the diplomatic arrangements connected with the treaty, were concluded without his knowledge; nor was it till several of the stipulations had been carried into effect that he first became acquainted with its existence. The instructions which Izquierdo received personally from the King, preparatory to his departure, are sufficiently illustrative both of the feeble character of Charles and his

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CHAP. I. unbounded reliance on Godoy, to merit record.

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“*Manuel es tu protector,*” said the monarch, “*tras quando te diga ; por medio suyo debes servir me.*”*

Of Portugal it is now time to speak. Engaged in the peaceful prosecution of an extended commerce, and relying for security on the faith of a treaty of neutrality—the advantages of which were purchased by a large annual tribute to France,—her government had abstained, as much as possible, from mingling in the dissensions of the more powerful nations of Europe. Towards Spain, she had been guilty of no offence ; and connected with that power by public alliance, and multiplied intermarriages with the reigning family, the Prince of Brazil imagined that if not entirely secure from insult or partial injustice, his territory was at least safe from glaring outrage and spoliation. He certainly did not, and could not anticipate, that the inoffensive policy of his government, could be followed, on the part of his allies, by an act of power so flagrant and un-

* “Manuel Godoy is thy protector. Do what he orders thee. It is through him that thou must serve me.” These are the very words of Charles, given in the correspondence of Izquierdo.

justifiable as that contemplated by the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau. CHAP. I.

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The peace of Tilsit had scarcely been concluded, when the French and Spanish ambassadors at Lisbon united in a formal demand, that the App. No. 3. ports of the kingdom should be instantly closed against England, that the ships then in harbour should be seized, and the property of all British subjects confiscated. It was likewise intimated to the government of Portugal, that, in case the requisition of the ambassadors was not followed by an immediate compliance, a speedy declaration of war by both powers would be the inevitable consequence.

The Prince Regent, unwilling to become the instrument of injustice towards an old and faithful ally, endeavoured, by a temporizing policy, to avert the necessity of immediate acquiescence in this unprincipled demand. He signified to the Court of France his readiness to prevent all future intercourse with England, but objected to the more violent measures prescribed for his App. No. 4. adoption. Aware, perhaps, how little weight would be attached by those whom he addressed, to any collateral appeal to justice or the law of nations, the Prince Regent urged, as

CHAP. I. the chief motive for the line of policy he was

1807. anxious to pursue, the fact that a Portuguese
squadron was then cruizing in the Mediterra-
nean, and the prudence of maintaining terms
with England till it had returned to port.

The feebleness of Portugal, however, render-
ed all the remonstrances of her government in-
effectual. To the confederated power of France
and Spain, it was evident she could offer no ef-
fectual resistance; and Napoleon, without wait-
ing for the result of her decision, directed an
immediate seizure of all Portuguese vessels in
the ports of France and Holland. Under these
circumstances, notice was given to the English
residents in Portugal of the precarious situation
in which they stood; and they were warned, by
a timely retreat, to escape from the rigorous
measures to which, in the urgency of the crisis,
it might be found necessary to have recourse.

In the meanwhile, preparations for the invasion
of Portugal were proceeding without abatement
or delay. An army of twenty-five thousand in-
fantry, and three thousand cavalry, under the
title of the Army of the Gironde, had assem-
bled at Bayonne, and waited only for an order
to advance. The government of Portugal was

at once intimidated and overawed; and the Prince Regent, anxious, by every possible concession, to dissipate the darkening cloud which appeared ready to burst in thunder over his devoted kingdom, was at length compelled to sacrifice principle to safety, and purchase, even the chance of impunity, by injustice. His acquiescence in the measures prescribed for his adoption was intimated to the Courts of France and Spain; the property and persons of all subjects of England were seized, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the countries.

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These extorted sacrifices of the Prince Regent, produced no favourable change in his own fortunes or those of Portugal. The dismemberment of the kingdom had already been determined, and the humiliating compliances of the government, tended rather to accelerate than retard the natural progress of events.

Such were the relations of France and the Peninsula, when the family differences which had long existed between Charles and the Prince of Asturias at length approached to an open rupture. The latter was hostile to Godoy, and naturally indignant at the disgraceful causes of his

CHAP I. favour. The party opposed to the minister, emboldened by the accession of so powerful an auxiliary, had been active in establishing intrigues for the overthrow of the favourite, while Ferdinand endeavoured to strengthen the cause which he espoused, by securing in its favour the influence of Beauharnois, the French ambassador at Madrid.

Oct. 11. Through the latter a secret communication from the Prince was transmitted to Napoleon, in which he solicited the honour of an alliance with the imperial family of France. He entreated also that Napoleon would interfere to regulate the internal disorders of the government, and conveyed assurances, that to him alone could Spain look for deliverance from the evils under which she had long been suffering.

To the solicitations of the Prince no answer was returned; and Godoy having shortly afterwards become acquainted with the particulars of the transaction, Ferdinand, on the 28th of October, App. No. 5. was arrested at the Escorial, and confined in the monastery of St. Laurence. On the 30th, a proclamation appeared charging him with high treason, in having organized a conspiracy for the purpose of dethroning the King. In a letter addressed to Napoleon, written on the 29th,

Charles made an additional charge against his son, of contemplating the assassination of the Queen.

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The people, however, considered these accusations as originating solely in the machinations of Godoy; and this persuasion tended if possible still further to aggravate the hatred with which both his person and ministry were regarded by the nation. Godoy, alarmed at the tempestuous demonstrations of popular feeling, and aware of the evident perils which surrounded him, resolved, as usual, to retrace his steps, and become the instrument of reconciliation between the father and son. Ferdinand was accordingly induced to address a letter to the King, expressive of his contrition, and imputing the errors of his conduct to the influence and evil counsels of the Dukes del Infantado and San Carlos. This submission of the Prince produced the desired effect. Charles issued a second proclamation, extending pardon to his son, but stating that he had denounced the names of those principally concerned in the conspiracy, and directing a select commission of the council of Castile to assemble immediately for the trial of the offenders. By this tribunal the partisans of the Prince were acquitted of all

App. No. 6.

Nov. 5.

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1807. tile to the administration of Godoy, through his
influence they were severally banished from
the capital, by the arbitrary edict of the Sove-
reign.

Oct. 29. The letter which was addressed to Napoleon
by the King, on the imprisonment of the Prince
of Asturias, was not more fortunate than that of
his son, in eliciting a reply. It conveyed ex-
pressions of surprise, on the part of Charles, that
the Emperor had not thought proper to consult
him, in a matter so deeply interesting as the
projected marriage of the heir-apparent. The
remonstrance of his ally appears to have been
treated by Napoleon with contemptuous neglect;
and the ominous silence of the French ruler, was
regarded by Godoy as a symptom of alienation
from his interests, the consequences of which he
was not prepared to encounter. His apprehen-
sions were still further excited by a communica-
tion from Murat, with whom he was on terms
of confidential intercourse, informing him, that
though the wishes of the Emperor prompted him
to support his authority, yet the popularity of
Ferdinand, and the near relation to himself in
which that prince would be placed by the intend-

ed alliance with his family, rendered it impossible that he should take any prominent or open part in opposition to his interest or wishes. CHAP I.

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Godoy already felt that his power was in the wane. Without the support of Napoleon, he was too conscious of his own feebleness and unpopularity, not to be aware that he must soon fall before the covert intrigues and open assaults of his enemies. Anxious, therefore, to adopt whatever measures might tend to ingratiate him with his protector, he prevailed on Charles to address another letter to the Emperor, soliciting his consent to the alliance of the Prince of Asturias with a branch of his august family. Even this second communication produced no immediate reply; and leaving the Spanish Monarch and his minister in a state of painful solicitude, Napoleon set out for Italy.

While at Milan, he at length condescended to answer the King of Spain's letters. His communication contained assurances that he was entirely ignorant of the circumstances connected with the conspiracy of Ferdinand; and stated that his first intelligence of the transaction had been derived from the letter of the King. He denied likewise having received any proposal Nov. 15.

CHAP. I. from the Prince for an alliance with his family,
1807. but expressed his sanction and approbation of the contemplated arrangement.

Such is a rapid and imperfect sketch of some of the more important events which preceded the hostile invasion of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER II.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE humiliating compliances of the Portuguese Government produced no beneficial consequences on the fortunes of the nation. Early in November, the army of the Gironde, commanded by Marshal Junot, who had formerly been ambassador at Lisbon, received orders to cross the Pyrenees, and advance on Salamanca. While thus threatening the territory of Portugal, the French Commander, so far from accompanying his advance with any profession of hostility, proclaimed his sole object to be the emancipation of her government from the yoke of England, and to enable it to assume the attitude of an independent power. Disposed as the Prince Regent might be, to yield ready credence to such flattering assurances, the return of his ambas-

CHAP. II.

1807.

CHAP. II. 1807. sadors, who had been dismissed from Paris and Madrid, could not but appear an alarming indication of the hostile purpose for which the armament had been assembled.

The arrival in the Tagus of a Russian squadron, consisting of nine sail of the line and two frigates, contributed still farther to heighten the embarrassment of the government. The appearance of this formidable force, at a juncture so critical, appears to have been a coincidence entirely accidental, and unconnected, in any manner, with the operations by which the integrity of Portugal was then so imminently threatened. But it carried with it at least the appearance of design, and was naturally regarded, both by England and Portugal, as forming part of the great scheme of events, by which Napoleon was endeavouring to realize the gigantic projects of his ambition.

The injuries which foreign coercion had compelled the Portuguese government to inflict on England, had not excited the hostility of that power. The British government saw too plainly the magnitude of the dangers by which Portugal was surrounded, to resent a policy which had been forced on her rulers by difficulties

with which it was impossible to contend. But there are certain limits to forbearance, which cannot be overpassed without sacrifice of honour; and it was distinctly intimated, that, although the exclusion of British vessels from the ports, and the expulsion of British subjects from the territory of Portugal, had not, under all the circumstances, been regarded as a hostile proceeding, any further act of aggression would be treated as a declaration of war, and give rise to immediate reprisals. CHAP. II.
1807.

In order to give greater authority to this representation, a squadron, commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, was sent to cruize off the Tagus; and, on the appearance of another proclamation, directing the seizure of the persons, and the confiscation of the property of all English residents in Portugal, Lord Strangford, the British Envoy, immediately quitted Lisbon, and retired on board the ship of the Admiral.

In such a state of things, the arrival of the Russian fleet could scarcely fail to add embarrassment and complexity to the difficulties by which the government of Portugal was environed. It was regarded by England as connected with the hostile proceedings of Napoleon; and

CHAP. II. Lisbon was immediately declared in a state of
 1807. rigorous blockade, and every effort was exerted to prevent all naval communication with the Tagus.

The army of the Gironde had already reached Alcantara, where, according to the stipulations of the convention, it was joined by the Spanish contingent. The sufferings of the troops, during the march from Salamanca, are described by the French officers to have been dreadful. The weather was stormy and inclement, and the roads, from the melting of the snow, rendered almost impassable. In proportion as the army advanced, its difficulties appeared to accumulate. The Spanish government was unprepared for the promptitude and rapidity of the march of the French army ; and no magazines had been formed for its supply. The want of provision introduced disorder into the ranks. The starving soldiers quitted their battalions, and roamed about the country in search of plunder ; and when the van of the army reached Alcantara, it was in a state of utter wretchedness and destitution.

From Alcantara, Marshal Junot issued a proclamation to the Portuguese nation, declaring, that his only object in entering their territory,

Nov. 17.

was to emancipate the government from the yoke of England. It called on the people to receive their invaders as friends engaged in hostilities against one common enemy, and denounced the severest punishments on all who should take arms on his approach.

CHAP. II.

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App. No. 7.

On the 19th of November, the army passed the frontier, and moved onward to Lisbon by the route of Castello Branco. On the 23d, the vanguard reached Abrantes, and the government had found itself utterly unable to organize any effective system of defence. The rapid advance of the enemy had taken the Prince Regent by surprise. None of the fortresses of his kingdom had been garrisoned or provisioned, and no proclamation of the government had given notice to the people in what light their invaders were to be regarded. Deceived, till too late, by the hope that hostilities might still be averted by a submissive compliance with the dictates of the Emperor, all defensive precautions had been neglected. It was only when the French army were within four days' march of the capital, that the Prince Regent received intelligence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and became at length aware of the full extent and bearing of his danger.

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While yet undecided as to the course most advisable amid the instant perils which surrounded him, a flag of truce entered the Tagus, and the Prince Regent received assurances from Lord Strangford, that, notwithstanding the demonstrations of hostility to which his government had been compelled to resort, the British Admiral would readily co-operate in any measures that might contribute to the security of the Royal Family. These assurances were relied on; and, influenced by the counsels of the ambassador, he determined at once to quit the kingdom and embark for Brazil. No time was to be lost in carrying this resolution into effect. The enemy were already at the gates; and having nominated a council of regency, the Prince Regent, accompanied by the Queen and the other members of his family, embarked amid the tears of the suffering people whom necessity had compelled him to abandon.

Nov. 27.

The French took possession of Lisbon without opposition. The suddenness of the events by which the independence of the country had been sacrificed, seems to have cast the nation into a stupor from which it required some time to emerge. Junot, a man neither harsh in dis-

position nor repulsive in manner, appears at first to have studied the arts of popularity, not without partial success. On his entry into the city he was met by a deputation from the authorities, who presented an address congratulating him on his arrival, and soliciting his protection for the capital. Nothing, we are assured, could be more wretched than the appearance of the triumphant army by which the subjection of a kingdom had been thus rapidly achieved. Piquets of the Portuguese Royal Guard acted as guides to the French troops, and conducted them to their quarters. The imaginations of the people had been excited by the achievements of the heroes of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, and they had expected to gaze on a race of beings superior in all noble and personal attributes to the rest of mankind. How then were they astonished to behold a long line of limping, emaciated, and ragged soldiers, enfeebled by incessant marching and privation, and devoid even of the ordinary appurtenances of military pomp, enter their city with lagging pace and in disorderly ranks! How rapidly the vision of glory must have vanished from their eyes!

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Foy,
v. ii. p. 401.

Junot at first endeavoured to conciliate the

CHAP. II. inhabitants by professions of friendly intention,
1807. and of a deep anxiety for the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom. The customary forms of government were observed in all his public decrees, and a politic respect was shewn to the prejudices and peculiar observances of the people. By such conduct, he succeeded in lulling for a time the more obtrusive demonstrations of innate hostility which pervaded the great mass of the population, and Lisbon remained for several weeks in a state of sullen though tranquil quiescence.

When Junot, however, had succeeded in reorganizing his army, broken down and enfeebled by the severity and privations of their hurried march; when he beheld the fortresses of the kingdom tenanted by French garrisons, the native population deprived of their arms, and many of those who by their talents and popularity were likely to incite resistance to his authority, despatched on a mission of compliment to Napoleon, he thought it no longer necessary to dissemble. He at once threw aside the mask under which he had hitherto disguised the tyrannical designs of his master, and publicly proclaimed that Portugal was no

longer to be considered an independent power, CHAP. II.
 but a mere appanage of France. It was declared, 1808
 that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign.

By abandoning the country, it had forfeited all App. No. 8.
 right to the allegiance of the people; and in
 the style of emphatic command peculiar to Na-
 poleon, the nation were informed, that “ the
 Emperor *willed* that Portugal should thereafter be
 governed in his name, by the General-in-chief of
 his army.” By another exercise of imperial despot-
 ism the estates of the crown were confiscated, and
 heavy contributions imposed on the country at
 large. The reins of supreme authority were then
 publicly assumed by Junot, and the ancient insig-
 nia of the kingdom displaced by those of France.

Dated
 Milan,
 Dec. 23.

The cause of the invaders, contaminated as it was
 by acts of barbarous oppression, found many par-
 tisans among the aristocracy of the country, and
 even among the clergy. The Patriarch of Lis- App. No. 9.
 bon issued a pastoral letter to his flock, begging Dec. 8.
 them, in the name of *patriotism* and *religion*, to
 unite in establishing the authority of the intru-
 sive government, and in bringing those to punish-
 ment who should dare to disturb the tranquillity
 of the country by vain and contumacious resist-

CHAP. II. 1808. ance. But it is unquestionable that the burden of foreign thralldom carried with it, an outrage on all the better and prouder feelings of the people. Unaccustomed to any yoke, save that of a native and domestic despot, they burned with desire to burst the galling shackles by which they had been suddenly enthralled, and to wreak their vengeance on the authors of the national misfortunes and degradation.

Yet the demonstrations of these feelings were not in proportion to their depth and ardour. Occasionally a tumult in the streets of Lisbon, and curses, not loud but deep, muttered on the French soldiery, as they passed on in the pomp and panoply of war, gave evidence how little amalgamation of feeling the government had been successful in inducing between the conquerors and the conquered—the oppressors and the oppressed. When insurrection stalked forth into open day, it was instantly punished and suppressed by a vigilant police, and the strong arm of military power: but for that alienation of heart, that deep-rooted though silent hatred of their invaders, which rankled in the bosoms of the people, a cure was not to be found by those who violated their prejudices, and outraged their religion.

It was in vain, therefore, that Junot endeavoured to captivate the nation, by dazzling pictures of the prosperity which was about to dawn on the oppressed and suffering country. It was in vain that he promised roads, canals, commerce, an improved government, and the wide diffusion of intelligence. To the value of such blessings the people were insensible. The shadowy glories of this visionary perspective were gazed on with indifference or incredulity. All their wants and aspirations were centred in one single word—*Freedom*. Not indeed freedom in its wider and more valuable acceptation ; but freedom from the tyrannical yoke of foreign dominion ; freedom again to become the slaves of a government, adapted, by its own limited intelligence, to the prejudices of the nation over which it ruled.

One of the first steps which the policy of Junot led him to adopt, in order to secure the peaceable occupation of the country, was that of disbanding a large portion of the native army, and employing the remainder in foreign service. Accordingly, the thirty-seven regiments which constituted the standing force of the kingdom, were reduced to seven regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, and of these a large proportion

CHAP. II. was immediately organized, and sent off to France,
1808. under the command of the Marquis de Alorna. The superior officers of this corps were selected from the number of those who possessed the highest character and influence among their countrymen. They were proud, we are assured, of serving under the banners of Napoleon, of enjoying an opportunity of sharing those laurels which had hitherto been so plentifully gathered by his victorious soldiers. But such feelings did not extend to the great body of the army. To them, the path of military distinction appeared less strewn with flowers than thorns. Animated, perhaps, with feelings of deeper patriotism than those who led them to the field, they felt also more deeply the pang of separation from their country, and saw, with a clearer view, the difficulties, the dangers, and the privations, to which, in their destined service, they could not fail to be exposed.*

* Of the aversion of the Portuguese to embark in the service of France, the following striking facts, narrated by General Foy, afford sufficient proof. When the army of Alorna began its march, it was between eight and nine thousand strong. In passing through Spain, more than four thousand deserted and returned home. Five or six hundred remained in the hospitals. Some

In the invasion of Portugal the Spanish troops appear to have played altogether an insignificant part. Their leaders were allowed to assume no command over the provinces which had been allotted them by treaty, and the authority of Junot was that by which alone all public acts were promulgated or enforced. Even this circumstance brought with it some alleviation to the fears of the nation. The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau had filled the people with despair. The dismemberment of their country, was the misfortune of all others which they regarded with the deepest dismay. The assumption, therefore, of the supreme authority by Junot, abhorrent as in other respects it might be to their feelings, carried with it the belief that the stipulations which decreed the separation and dismemberment of Portugal were no longer intended to be enforced. If the future presented but a choice of evils, it seemed at least the smaller and less formidable, to become the dependent of France, than to be cut up and

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1808.

were killed at the first siege of Saragossa; and, out of the whole number, only three thousand two hundred and forty arrived at Bayonne.

CHAP. II. parcelled out into sovereignties, too limited in
 1808. extent, resources, and population, to afford the means of effective repulsion to foreign insult or aggression.

Another circumstance contributed to confirm and to augment the hopes of the people, that the integrity of the country at least, would be saved from violation. The deputation from Lisbon which had been sent to congratulate the Emperor, were received by that monarch with a degree of flattering condescension, which led them to augur too favourably of his intentions towards Portugal. In consequence of this interview the
 April 27. deputies addressed a letter to their countrymen, which was made public in Lisbon. It was signed by the Bishop of Coimbra, by the Marquis of Abrantes, president of the council of regency, nominated by the Prince on his departure, and by Don Nuno Caetano de Mello, connected by blood with the reigning family, and by many others of powerful influence in the state.

App. No. 10. In this document the nation were assured, that the mighty genius of Napoleon could be equalled only by the elevation of his soul, and the disinterested generosity of his principles; that the army of France had entered Por-

tugal not as conquerors but friends; that in occupying the kingdom, Napoleon had not been influenced by enmity to their former Sovereign, but by the wish to enable the nation to cast off the trammels of England, and unite itself with the great continental system established over Europe. The deputies further stated, that the Emperor knew and lamented the privations which Portugal, in common with other nations, had endured from the temporary suspension of her commerce, and conveyed the Imperial assurance, that these would speedily be succeeded by great and lasting prosperity. The nation, they affirmed, stood absolved from all allegiance to the house of Braganza, which had forsaken them in the time of danger and difficulty; and they assured the people, that the only course by which the honour and integrity of the country could be secured, was that of unlimited submission to their great and magnanimous deliverer.

This address of the deputies was not without its influence on the people. The hope of the restoration of their ancient dynasty, for a time had died in their hearts. Their sovereign was already in another hemisphere; and the course of events seemed to hold out no prospect

CHAP. II. of his future restoration. In such circumstances,

1808. it is scarcely possible to doubt, that, had the government of France been moderated in its action on the nation by the dictates of humanity and prudence, the prejudices of the people would have gradually yielded, and their attachment to the fugitive sovereign have progressively diminished. To such a consummation, however, the abuses and oppression of the new government certainly did not tend. Contributions of unexampled magnitude were levied on the people; and the severity of the measures by which these inordinate exactions were enforced, brought home at once to the bosoms of the people, a deep consciousness of the rapacity of their rulers. They beheld the plate torn by sacrilegious hands from their churches; the palaces of their nobles plundered; while even the humble dwellings of the poor were robbed of the little hoard that industry had enabled them to amass.

Was it possible that a government which sanctioned such detestable proceedings could ever acquire a footing in the affections of the nation? Or, was it possible by any measures of insult and outrage, to rouse into more

vehement resistance, the whole passions of a people? Human action is the offspring more frequently of impulse than of reason. A nation may be subdued, but it can seldom be trampled on with impunity. Notwithstanding the hopelessness of resistance, the spirit of national animosity was continually breaking forth in acts of isolated rebellion against the power of their oppressors.

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CHAPTER III.

INVASION OF SPAIN.

CHAP. III. **WHILE** Portugal had thus become the prey of
1807. the spoiler, a deeper and more hazardous game was playing by Napoleon in Spain. The sluices of war had now been opened; and the French armies swept onward into the Peninsula, like a mighty torrent, covering and overwhelming the land.

It was stipulated, by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, that, exclusive of the force destined more immediately for the reduction of Portugal, a *corps de reserve*, of forty thousand men, should be assembled at Bayonne, ready to repel any hostile demonstration of England for the relief of her ally. The army of the Gironde, therefore,

had no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than another corps, of twenty-four thousand of the anticipated conscriptions of 1808, was assembled on the frontier. The commander of this force was General Dupont, an officer who was destined, in Spain, to blight the laurels which, under a happier star, he had acquired in other fields. Arrangements were speedily made for the advance of this second army of the Gironde; and, having crossed the frontier, its march was directed on Valladolid, in which city the head-quarters of General Dupont were established. The situation was in all respects happily chosen. Valladolid is a position which commands the roads both to Lisbon and Madrid, and thus, without any unequivocal demonstration of his views, Dupont was prepared to advance on either capital as circumstances might require.

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1807.

November.

December.

But the warlike preparations of France had not yet attained their full development. A third army, consisting of twenty-five thousand Infantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty-one pieces of artillery, was assembled on the Garonne. On the 9th of January, the vanguard of this force, commanded by Marshal Moncey, crossed the Bidassoa, and pushed onward into Spain, over-

1808.

January.

CHAP. III. running Biscay and Navarre in its advance.

1808.

January.

Even this was not all. Another force was collected at the eastern extremity of the Pyrenean chain, consisting of twelve thousand men of different arms, intended for the occupation of Catalonia. Independently of all other circumstances, the congregation of this force should at once have opened the eyes of Charles and his minister to the hostile schemes of Napoleon. All resistance in Portugal to the usurpation of France was already at an end, yet the reinforcement of the armament in that kingdom, formed the only pretence on which the introduction of large and successive armies into the western provinces of Spain, was attempted to be justified. The views of the French ruler in thus assembling an army on the north-eastern frontier of the kingdom, admitted, however, of no such colouring or excuse. It carried with it an indication of hostile intention, too palpable to admit of fallacious interpretation. But all measures of spirit and vigour seem to have been alien to the character of Charles and his minister. No energetic steps were taken to repress the invaders; no call was made to rouse the loyalty and patriotism of the people; and the des-

picable rulers of this unhappy country were contented to behold the progress of insult and aggression, in silence and submission. So blunted and obtuse were the perceptions of the government of Spain, that it could neither appreciate nor understand the moral energy of the people whom it governed, when roused into powerful and consentaneous resistance.

Though the character of Napoleon's views on the Peninsula had, in a great measure, been denuded of disguise, it is probable that, even at this period, they were apprehended by none, in their full bearing and extent. The independence of Spain indeed, thanks to the fatuity of her rulers, was gone. The yoke was on her shoulders, and the iron bit of the oppressor in her mouth. But none could calculate the erratic course of an ambition, which was continually subject to the operation of a thousand unknown influences. The measures, however, by which the projects of the French Emperor were to be carried into effect, had become no longer secret. On the great roads from France nothing was to be seen but convoys of ammunition and provisions, trains of artillery, the marching of battalions, and officers riding post in the execution of military duty.

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February.

Foy, ii. 123.

CHAP. III. From the Bidassoa to the Douro the country was covered with soldiers. The convents were converted into hospitals and barracks, forts and batteries were erected on the more commanding stations, and in all the principal towns even the functions of the civil magistrate were assumed by the intruders.

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February.

The character of the troops thus profusely poured into the Peninsula, is represented, by competent authority, to have been of the worst description. The officers were either veterans, disqualified by age and infirmities for the arduous duties thus involuntarily imposed on them, or ignorant boys, prematurely taken from school, to be intrusted with the discharge of functions to which from youth and inexperience they were inadequate. The soldiery was composed of men of all countries, returned deserters, and recruits from the hospitals. It was impossible that masses composed of elements so dissimilar, should be inspired with any corporate spirit, or sentiment of collective honour. Disunited by diversity of language, prejudice, and education, the soldiers of an army, thus thrown fortuitously together, could be animated by no common remembrances of former achievements, nor participate

in the feeling of confidence and brotherhood which emanates from the anticipated fellowship of future glory. Strangers to each other; unconnected by community of interest; united by no bond but that of military command; unknown to their officers, by whom their comfort was neglected; irregularly provisioned, and still more irregularly paid; these were apparently not the men from whom any great or brilliant achievement could be rationally expected.

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On the return of Napoleon from Italy, orders were instantly issued for summoning into service a new conscription of eighty thousand men. These were speedily assembled, and Murat having been appointed to the command, they pushed forward into Spain, and remained concentrated in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, ready, on the earliest signal, to advance on Madrid.

March

It would, perhaps, be little interesting—it would, at all events, be incompatible with the narrow limits of the present work—to enter on a detailed and minute account of the measures of disguised hostility and open fraud, by which, at this period, the projects of the French ruler made rapid advances to completion. It is suffi-

CHAP. III. cient to state, that the important fortresses of
1808. St. Sebastian, Pampluna, Figueras, and Barce-
March. lona, fell, without resistance, into the posses-
sion of the invaders, whose force in the north-
ern provinces continued almost hourly to in-
crease.

The time, however, had not yet come when Napoleon considered it prudent to throw off the mask under which his designs were veiled from the Spanish monarch. He flattered the vanity of Charles, by sending him magnificent tokens of regard, and in his letters continued to express his ardent desire for the completion of the contemplated alliance of their families. Napoleon further stated his intention of visiting the Spanish capital, where, without the intervention of diplomatic forms, all matters of difference between them might be personally arranged.

The promised visit, however, did not take place; but Izquierdo, the confidential agent of Godoy at the court of Paris, was despatched on a mission to Madrid, bearing the proposals of the Emperor to the King of Spain. These were of a character undoubtedly somewhat startling and exorbitant. Assuming his own pretensions to the

sovereignty of Portugal, to be at once exclusive and undisputed, Napoleon demanded in exchange for that country the kingdoms of Galicia, Biscay, and Navarre, in order to prevent the necessity of maintaining a military communication through the territory of Spain. It was proposed, likewise, that France should participate in the commerce of the Spanish colonies on the same terms as the mother country; and it was signified to Charles, that the time had at length arrived when it was necessary that the succession to the Spanish throne should become the subject of a final and immediate settlement. Such were the terms on which it was intimated to the King of Spain, he could alone hope to avoid the dreaded hostility of Napoleon.

Of the events in Portugal, Godoy had been no uninterested spectator. He saw that his star, which had long been declining, was at length fast approaching the aphelion. In weariness of heart, he would gladly have resigned that power, whose possession had been to him one long scene, not of enjoyment but of struggle. To the principality which had been assigned him by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, as affording the only chance of honourable retirement, he still looked

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CHAP. III. forward with fondly cherished anticipations. But

1808. time passed on without bringing with it the ex-
March. pected gratification; and at length the public de-
claration that the undivided sovereignty of Por-
tugal had been assumed by Napoleon, put an end
for ever to his hopes.

Under the deepest cloud of his misfortunes, it is impossible to compassionate Godoy. The whole efforts of his public life had been directed towards the single object, of promoting his own personal enjoyment. Never was a more ignoble purpose more perseveringly pursued, and never was there a failure more signal and complete. Disappointed in all his endeavours to secure the permanent enjoyment of his wealth and honours, his hopes were at length narrowed to passing the remainder of his life in some obscure and tranquil retreat. He already meditated the resignation of his public offices, and was restrained only by the consciousness, that by the loss of power he would be deprived of his only safeguard from the violence of an indignant people.

Amid the wreck of his hopes in the Old World, the views of Godoy were naturally directed to the New; and still anxious to escape the perils by which he saw himself environed, he proposed to

Charles to consult the tranquillity of his declining years by transferring the seat of sovereignty to his transatlantic dominions. Charles, exhausted by infirmity, and hopeless of relief from the assistance of Napoleon, acceded to the advice of his minister, and, with all possible secrecy, preparations were set on foot for the departure of the Court. The army of Solano was recalled from Portugal, and directed to march for Seville. Troops were stationed along the road by which the royal travellers were to pass, and the bodyguards were ordered to march from Madrid to Aranjuez.

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These preparatory movements, however, did not pass unnoticed by the people, whose fears were strongly excited by the prospect of the departure of their sovereign. Their discontent became clamorous and obtrusive; and a proclamation of the King, in which he denied being influenced by any intention of quitting the kingdom, had not the effect of restoring public confidence and tranquillity.

The indignation of the populace was still further excited, by the circulation of reports, that, notwithstanding the assurances contained in the royal proclamation, preparations were still in

CHAP. III. progress for the evasion of the Monarch. Among
 those who gave currency to such intelligence was
 the Prince of Asturias. Relying on the protec-
 tion of Napoleon, whom he considered favourable
 to his views, Ferdinand had openly declared his
 aversion to the project of emigration, and this
 coincidence with the national feeling, had the ef-
 fect of still further increasing his popularity.

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 March.

Time brought new confirmation to the suspicions
 of the people, and the demonstrations of public
 discontent became daily more violent and tumult-
 uous. On the 17th of March, Aranjuez was
 surrounded by a multitude of peasants from the
 neighbouring villages, in a state of violent ex-
 citation. In the palace they found every symp-
 tom of preparation for a journey; and goaded
 almost to frenzy by this proof of royal duplicity,
 they seized arms and shouted for vengeance on
 Godoy. The Life-Guards were drawn out for the
 defence of the palace, and the people rushed in
 tumultuous confusion to the house of the favour-
 ite. The servants of the Infant Don Antonio
 and the Count de Montijo were the first to raise
 the cry of "*Death to Godoy! The King for
 ever!*" In a moment it was simultaneously re-
 verberated by many thousand voices. A squa-

dron of the Prince's Guard advanced to protect their leader ; and in the execution of this duty were furiously assaulted by the mob. The brother of the favourite, Don Diego de Godoy, then came up with his regiment of guards, and directed them to fire on the multitude. The troops refused to obey ; and uniting with the populace, struck and insulted their colonel and joined in the onset. The doors of the house were burst open, the furniture broken to pieces, and the splendid contents of the mansion subjected to unsparing havoc. In the meanwhile, Godoy had escaped ; the Princess de la Paz, terrified and trembling, ran out into the street ; yet so little was that injured lady the object of popular aversion, that she was escorted to the palace with every demonstration of respect.

This alarming exhibition of national feeling produced the desired effect. Godoy was instantly removed from his offices of Generalissimo and High Admiral ; and Charles declared his resolution of assuming personally the command of his forces, both naval and military. At Madrid events of a similar character took place. Intelligence of what was passing at Aranjuez, had no sooner reached the capital, than the cry of

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CHAP. III. " *Death to Godoy*" was echoed through all the streets and squares of the city. Crowds assembled round the houses of the Prince of Peace, his mother, his brother, and his sister. They were attacked and plundered, the furniture was thrown into the streets and burned, and all their inmates subjected to insult and abuse. The greater part of the garrison had been withdrawn to Aranjuez; and the few remaining troops were found altogether insufficient to preserve order. The riot continued for two days, during which no restraint was attempted to be imposed on the violence of the people. Tranquillity was at length only restored by the proclamation of the King declaring the deposition of Godoy.

Notwithstanding the deposition of the favourite, the appetite of the people for vengeance was yet unsated. The simple privation of that power which he had so flagrantly abused, appeared, in their ideas of retributive justice, to be a punishment altogether inadequate to his deserts. Nothing less than the gibbet or the block would satisfy the excited craving of the populace, who thirsted for his blood. The escape of Godoy was no sooner known, than pursuit was made after him in every direction. On the

morning of the 19th he was found concealed in a garret at Ocana, where he had remained without food for nearly two days. The populace dragged him from his hiding-place ; and he would inevitably have fallen a victim to their fury, had not the Prince of Asturias, with a body of Life-Guards appeared to his rescue. The popularity of Ferdinand saved the life of Godoy ; and the multitude, on receiving the promise of the Prince, that the object of their hostility should be given up to justice, quietly dispersed.

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The support of Charles was at last broken. Godoy, in spite of the favour of the monarch, was in the power of his enemies ; and Charles, in his declining years, at length knew himself to be friendless and alone. Suffering from the united inroads of age and infirmity, he felt

—— That like a column left alone,
 The tottering remnant of some splendid fane,
 'Scaped from the fury of the barbarous Gaul,
 And wasting time, which has the rest o'erthrown,
 Amidst his house's ruins, he remained
 Single, unpropped, and nodding to his fall.

In the person of Godoy, the real, though vicarious sovereign, had already been dethroned,

CHAP. III. and the crown at once fell from the brows of the
 shadow which had hitherto worn the semblance
 of a monarch. On the evening of the day fol-
 1808. lowing, Charles notified, in a public decree, his
 March. abdication of the throne. "The habitual infir-
 Mar. 20. mities," he said, "under which he had long la-
 boured, rendered him incapable of supporting
 the heavy burden of government; the enjoyment
 of private life, and a climate more temperate than
 that of Spain, had become necessary for the re-
 storation of his health; and, in these circum-
 stances, he had resolved on abdicating the crown
 in favour of his beloved son. He, therefore, by
 this decree of free and spontaneous abdication,
 made known his royal will, that the Prince of
 Asturias should forthwith be acknowledged and
 obeyed as king and natural lord of all his king-
 doms and dominions."

The joy of the nation on the abdication of
 their monarch was extreme. Charles had long
 ceased to be popular, and participated largely in
 the odium attached to his minister. Ferdinand was
 the idol of the nation; and to him alone did the
 people look with passionate ardour of expectation
 for deliverance from all their perils and oppres-
 sions. Never, in times of danger and of trou-

ble, did a monarch mount the throne under loftier auspices. He carried with him the affections and devotion, of a proud and generous people. The seeds of resistance to foreign tyranny had been planted in the bosom of the nation, and were ready, at a breath, to have risen into a glorious harvest of armed men, prepared to sanctify the soil that bore them, by the outpouring of patriot blood. Never was the sacred cause of liberty and justice, more deeply injured and contaminated, by the folly and apostacy of its champion.

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The Council of Castile is the only body in Spain which bears even the semblance of a constitutional assembly. The princes and nobles of whom, in former ages, it was composed, held their seats by hereditary tenure, and acted in a capacity somewhat similar to that of privy council to the king. In later times, it was constituted a judicial body; and, since the disuse of the Cortes, had succeeded to many of the functions of that national assembly, while the prerogative of nominating or displacing the members at his pleasure, had been assumed by the monarch. Notwithstanding this dependance on royal favour, the Council of Castile, in character of conservator

CHAP. III. of the laws of the monarchy, resolved, with becoming dignity, to withhold their sanction from the abdication of the King, until the highest legal authority should have pronounced it valid, and consonant to constitutional usage. The new sovereign, however, was little disposed to give time for any laborious investigation of his title; and issued an ordinance, enjoining the Council, without delay, to publish the abdication of Charles. The vicinity of the French army to the capital, and the danger and unpopularity of the duty they had assumed, induced them to comply with this peremptory mandate; and the abdication of the late monarch was publicly notified by the Council of Castile, unpreceded by the constitutional formalities.

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The first edict of the Crown tended still farther to increase the popularity of Ferdinand. It contained an order both for the confiscation of the property of Godoy, and the privation of his honours; and directed that, along with his brother, and the chief instruments of his malversations, he should be brought to immediate trial. The publication of this decree was the signal of public triumph and rejoicing. *Te Deum* was sung in the churches; and in almost every village in the

kingdom, effigies of the favourite were burned, or trampled under foot by the populace. At Salamanca, the professors and scholars of the university gave scholastic demonstration of their joy on the downfall of the favourite, by dancing round bonfires in the market-place; and even the magnificent Botanic Garden, of which Godoy had been the founder and the patron, containing perhaps the finest collection of Exotics in Europe, was destroyed by the blind impulse of popular fury.

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After his accession, Ferdinand lost no time in promoting to office and honour, all those who had suffered in his cause in the affair of the Escorial. The Duke del Infantado was appointed commander of the Spanish Guards, and Governor of Castile. Don Miguel de Azanza was made Minister of Finance, and Don Gonzalo de O'Farrel, Minister of War. Of all the counsellors of the late king, Cevallos and the Marquis Caballero alone retained their situations, and continued to enjoy the favour of the Court. The former, from motives of delicacy, arising from family connexions with the late minister, tendered his resignation to the king. This was not accepted; and Ferdinand, in a public decree,

CHAP. III. vindicated Cevallos from the suspicion of participation in the evil projects of Godoy.

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Such were the domestic arrangements of the new monarch ; with regard to the character of his foreign policy, the world were not long left in doubt. Immediately on the abdication of his father, Ferdinand had addressed a letter to the French Emperor, in which the notification of his accession to the crown was accompanied by a declaration, that the recent changes at Madrid would, in no degree, affect the political relations of his government with France ; and this assurance was accompanied by an expression of his desire, to draw still closer the bonds of amity by which the two nations had been so long united. In the same communication, Ferdinand repeated his request, that the personal alliance with the family of the Emperor, of which he had long been ambitious, should be happily accomplished.

The chief command of the French armies in the Peninsula had been assumed by Murat. He was already approaching Madrid, when intelligence reached him of the commotions at Aranjuez. It is probable that both Napoleon and his commander had calculated on the departure of

the Spanish Monarch before the arrival of the army at the capital. The successful resistance of the people to this measure had not been foreseen; and it occasioned a considerable derangement of their schemes. It is certain that the subjugation of Spain could not have been more effectually promoted, than by the emigration of the reigning family to America. Disappointed, however, in the result thus confidently anticipated, Murat continued his advance, in order to take advantage of any political disturbances which might be made conducive to the interests of his master. On the 23d he entered the capital, of which military possession was immediately taken by the troops under his command. This startling event was accompanied by assurances on the part of Murat, that the stay of his army would be of very limited duration, and that whenever public tranquillity should be restored at Madrid, it was his intention to continue his march towards Cadiz.

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On the following morning Ferdinand made his public entry into the capital, where he was greeted with tumultuous welcome, and received the homage of the nobility and great functionaries of the state. Of all the foreign Ambassa-

Mar. 24.

CHAP. III. dors, the French alone declined joining in any
 1808. public demonstration of respect towards the new
 March. monarch, or in acknowledging his title to the
 Crown. The same line of conduct was adopted
 by Murat, and justified to the Spanish ministers
 by an equivocal explanation of its motives. He
 declared himself solely influenced by a desire to
 heal the divisions of the council; but likewise
 stated the propriety of awaiting the decision of
 the Emperor, before committing his government
 by any step which might imply an acknowledg-
 ment of the right of Ferdinand to the Crown.

The letter of the new monarch to Napoleon
 was not the only communication from the parties,
 regarding the recent changes at Madrid. Charles
 Mar. 20. likewise transmitted immediate intelligence to
 the Emperor of his abdication. In his letter he
 solicited a continuance of that protection which
 he had hitherto enjoyed, and expressed, like
 Ferdinand, his fervent hope, that the intimate
 alliance between the countries would continue
 firm and unbroken. Of the claim for protection
 thus doubly urged, Napoleon did not fail to
 take advantage. By the application of both par-
 ties, a right was apparently given to an inter-
 ference in the internal government of Spain,

too favourable to his views not to be exerted to the utmost. The functionaries of France, in executing the designs of their master, assumed the tone, not of counsellors, but rulers, and exercised a paramount influence in everything connected with the internal policy of Spain. The yoke of Napoleon was not easy, nor his burden light. Yet the government of Ferdinand was too unstable, and even the tenure by which he held the sceptre too precarious, to admit of his adopting any vigorous measures of resistance to the imperious dictation of a monarch, whose armies already girded his palace, and held possession of his capital.

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A bolder monarch might have pursued a bolder policy. One more generous would have placed greater reliance, on the courage and devoted loyalty of his people. In the dictates of his own proud and daring spirit, in his own indignant impatience of foreign tyranny and dominion, he would have learned that the chivalrous energy of the Spanish character, though it had long slumbered, was not dead; that the voice of their monarch might yet rouse it into grand and irresistible action. A gallant people waited but for the signal to burst, by a

CHAP. III. mighty and unanimous effort, the chains of the
 1808. oppressor. That signal was not given. It was
 March. not in the nature of their sovereign, either to
 appreciate the dictates of true wisdom, or to
 be influenced in his actions by generous and
 lofty impulses. The nation had not profited
 by their change of ruler. In power or eleva-
 tion of intellect, Ferdinand was not superior to
 his father ; and he possessed none of that bene-
 volence which tended, in some measure, to re-
 deem the weakness and the vices of Charles.
 Like Charles he was devoid of moral courage ;
 but he was even more obtuse in his moral sym-
 pathies, more selfish, sensual, and not less ignor-
 ant. He bore the heart of a slave in the bosom
 of a monarch.

While the French were in the capital, the Spanish government made no endeavours to resist the progressive encroachments which were gradually circumscribing both its power and independence. No effort was made by a concentration of military force to counteract their increasing ascendancy in the capital. The division of Solano, which by its presence might have given confidence to the people, and have operated as a check on the measures of Murat, was ordered to

Badajos, and placed at the disposal of Junot. CHAP. III.
 The Spanish garrison in Madrid was trifling,

 1808.
 when compared with the numerous army of March.
 the intruders, stationed in and around the city.
 The military force of Spain was dispersed
 in isolated divisions through the distant pro-
 vinces, or cut up into petty garrisons, which
 could scarcely be made available to any imme-
 diate necessity of the government.

It was not therefore from the rulers of Spain, it was not from an undisciplined and scattered army, devoid of munition, and officered by men ignorant of war in all its practical details, that any formidable opposition to his projects was anticipated by Murat. His fears were alone excited by *the people*. The occurrences at Aranjuez and Madrid, the enthusiastic devotion manifested by the whole nation to their new sovereign, could not but engender the conviction, that from a people thus powerfully actuated by one common sentiment of loyalty, he had yet to calculate on a fierce, strenuous, and protracted resistance to any scheme of foreign usurpation. He read in the proud independence of the national spirit, that the day of struggle was fast approaching. The horizon of Spain had been overcast, but the

CHAP. III. stillness which pervaded her atmosphere, was yet
unbroken. Murat was not deceived by this.
1808. In the unnatural hush of the elements, he beheld
March. only an indication of the coming storm.

To intimidate the people, therefore, had now become the chief object of his policy. With this view measures were immediately taken for strengthening the position of the French army at Madrid. A large corps of infantry, with a numerous artillery, was posted on the height of Casa del Campo, in the immediate vicinity of the Royal Palace, which it commanded. Cannon were planted on all the eminences in the neighbourhood. New divisions were ordered instantly to direct their march on Madrid; and the troops were publicly reviewed, in order, by a formidable demonstration of military power, to impress the people with a conviction of the hopelessness of resistance. The command of the capital was then assumed by the intruders. By order of Murat, General Grouchy was appointed Governor, and the municipal regulations by which Madrid had hitherto been governed, were superseded by military law.

Intelligence of the occurrences at the Spanish capital no sooner reached Napoleon, than he set

out for Bayonne, in order to be nearer the scene of action, and to maintain a more rapid communication with his armies. His final purpose of deposing the dynasty of the Bourbons had at length been adopted. Till now, it had probably been his intention that Ferdinand, united to his family by marriage, should have filled the throne of Spain. The Emperor well knew his intellectual weakness, his utter destitution of high and honourable principle, his timidity, and that ductile subserviency of character which adapted him for the servile instrument of a more powerful intelligence. Where could he have found a fitter or more submissive agent of vicarious tyranny than this? Why then, to dethrone a man so happily suited to his purposes, did Napoleon commit an act of perfidy incomparably greater than any by which his character had been stained, and which he could not be unconscious would be regarded throughout Europe with indignation?

To this question the answer is not difficult. It appeared necessary to Napoleon, in order to secure the subserviency of Ferdinand, that he should be dependent on his power. Had the new monarch, like his father, been an object of indifference to the nation, nay, had his assump-

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CHAP. III. tion of the crown been generally unpopular, he
1808. might have found support in the armies of
March. France. In such circumstances, it is probable,
Napoleon would have seated him on the throne,
and have stood forward as the champion of his
right. It formed part of his policy that the Span-
ish nation should continue, as in the time of
Charles, to be divided by parties, so nearly ba-
lanced, that the influence of France, when thrown
into the scale, could give to either a decided
preponderance. When he saw, therefore, that
Ferdinand, weak and unworthy as he was, had
become the object of a loyalty and devotion so
deep and ardent, and already occupied a throne
to which he had been raised by an influence
altogether independent of his power, the views
and policy of Napoleon were at once changed.
The king who, by a single word, could rouse
a nation into arms, who carried with him the
full and undivided sympathies of a generous
and brave people, was not the man by whom it
suited his purposes that Spain should be govern-
ed. Contemptible as he might be, in all personal
attributes, there was danger in the vicinity of
such a neighbour. In the affections of the peo-
ple, he possessed a mighty lever, by which Na-

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napoleon was aware that the schemes of his ambition might at any time be overthrown. He knew it to be impossible that a sovereign, backed by an influence so powerful, could become the tame dependent on his will. Even the obedience of such a monarch would bear the character rather of voluntary compliance than of humble and enforced submission. This was not a state of things which the policy of Napoleon was directed to establish. It was indispensable to his purposes that the crown should be torn from the brows of a prince who reigned in the affections of his people; and the imperial fiat, which decreed the deposition of the Bourbons, was at length sent irrevocably forth.

It is difficult to believe that the sudden demission of the crown by Charles was altogether an independent and voluntary act. Connected with the preceding events, it certainly bore evidence of haste and compulsion. The act of abdication was unaccompanied by any future provision for the King and Queen, the place of the royal residence was not determined, and none of the stipulations, by which it is probable that such a document would be preceded, appear to have been proposed by the retiring monarch.

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Napoleon was not slow in taking full advantage of these suspicious circumstances. Murat was no sooner apprized of the intentions of his master than he despatched a messenger to Aranjuez, with assurances to Charles, that his cause would be supported by the arms of France. Naturally actuated by a deep sense of filial injustice, the deposed monarch instantly expressed his readiness to avail himself of the offers thus conveyed. He assured General Monthion that the revolution had been the consequence of a conspiracy; and vehemently complained that his son, in spite of his entreaty, was about to banish him to Badajoz, the most unhealthy situation in the kingdom. The Queen, it was further stated, had entreated permission that their departure might, for a short time at least, be deferred, but this likewise had been refused. There is something pitiable in the bitter and helpless complaints of the aged Sovereign; and it is well they should be recorded, from the light they throw on the causes of that relentless hatred, by which Charles and the Queen appear to have been actuated towards Ferdinand, in the subsequent transactions at Bayonne.

The exile of the dethroned monarch was averted

by the intervention of Murat. Emboldened by this act of favour, Charles placed in the hands of the French General, a formal protest, declaring, that the Deed of Abdication was invalid and compulsory. He likewise transmitted a letter to the Emperor, containing a statement of the facts connected with his resignation of the crown, and professing that he relied on the justice and magnanimity of Napoleon, to re-establish him in his rights.

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There was another object, however, on which the desires, both of Charles and the Queen, were even more deeply fixed than on the restoration of the Crown. From the time of the tumult at Aranjuez, the danger of Godoy seems to have haunted their imaginations like a frightful dream. They now besought Murat, with importunate solicitations, to exert his influence in behalf of this unworthy object. His only crime, they said, had been his attachment to his sovereign; and Charles, in the fulness of his heart, declared, that the death of Godoy would be but the harbinger of his own,—he could not survive him.

The intercourse thus carried on between Charles and Murat, was kept profoundly secret

CHAP. III. from the government of Ferdinand. The agents
 of Napoleon had hitherto refrained from any
 acknowledgment of the new monarch. It was
 their policy to impress Ferdinand with a feeling
 of insecurity, and to induce him, by humiliating
 submissions, to court the favour and protection
 of France. A report was accordingly spread,
 that Napoleon had quitted Paris, and was already
 on his route to Madrid. It was notified to the
 French army, that the Emperor in person was a-
 bout to become their leader. Ferdinand was like-
 wise informed, that it would probably be consider-
 ed by Napoleon, as an acceptable mark of respect,
 should the Infante, Don Carlos, be deputed to
 receive him on the frontier. The suggestion
 was immediately adopted, and the Infante, ac-
 companied by the Duke del Infantado, set for-
 ward on the complimentary mission.

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The policy of Murat was not limited to the
 attainment of this partial success. A still more
 delicate proposal was made to the Monarch. It was
 hinted, that if Ferdinand in person would advance
 from his capital for the purpose of welcoming the
 Emperor, a mark of consideration so distinguish-
 ed could scarcely fail to influence the sentiments
 of Napoleon powerfully in his favour. The

suggestion of Murat was seconded by all the influence of Beauharnois, the Ambassador of France ; and the King was yet wavering in his resolution, when General Savary arrived in Madrid, and declared himself the bearer of a message from the Emperor.

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Apr. 7.

In his first audience of the King, the nature and extent of his mission were explained to Ferdinand. He had been deputed, he said, to convey the compliments of his master, and to express his desire to be informed whether the sentiments of Ferdinand towards France were similar to those of his father. Should his answer on this point be considered satisfactory, the Emperor was willing to cast a veil over the questionable proceedings connected with his accession to the throne, and at once to acknowledge him as King of Spain and the Indies.

Though Savary brought with him no credentials, nor was the bearer of any answer to the letter of Ferdinand notifying his accession, the terms of the communication were too gratifying not to be warmly welcomed by the Monarch. It had never been the intention of Ferdinand to separate his policy from that of

CHAP. III. France, and assurances of unshaken fidelity were accordingly given to the Envoy.

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By Savary, Ferdinand was informed that Napoleon was already on his route to Madrid. He had in fact quitted Paris on the second of April. Instant preparations were accordingly made for his reception in the capital. Guards of honour were appointed to escort him in his progress ; nor did it occur to the Spanish Monarch or his ministers to doubt the truth of intelligence thus apparently corroborated. The entreaties of Beauharnois and Murat, that the King should quit his capital to welcome his formidable ally, were again renewed, and at length successful. Ferdinand fell into the snare. He was assured it would be unnecessary to extend his journey beyond Burgos, where he would certainly be met by Napoleon. He accordingly set forth ; and the Emperor not having yet entered the Spanish territory, Ferdinand was persuaded to extend his journey to Vittoria. On his arrival, he received a letter from Napoleon, and learned that he was still at Bayonne. The communication was in a very different spirit from what his hopes had led

Apr. 10.

him to anticipate. It cautioned him to beware of using popular violence as an instrument of power, and censured the part he had taken in encouraging the tumults of Aranjuez and Madrid.

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The advice of one in a situation to command, is generally unpalatable; and Ferdinand did not want counsel but encouragement. The letter gave him little. Napoleon did not address him as a sovereign, nor commit himself by any acknowledgment of his title. He hinted that the circumstances of Ferdinand's accession were full of suspicion, and that the abdication of Charles bore strong evidence of compulsion. Little disposed as he might be, to participate in such suspicions, it had become necessary, for the satisfaction of Europe, that the recognition of his rights should be preceded by an elaborate investigation of all the circumstances by which his assumption of royal authority had been accompanied. The letter, moreover, conveyed a strong expression of opinion, that the prosecution of Godoy should immediately cease. It was impossible he could be brought to trial without eliciting disclosures injurious at once to the interests of the Prince, and disgraceful to his parents. "Beware," said Napo-

CHAP. III. leon, "of adopting a policy of which you may
 yourself become the victim. Your Royal High-
 1808. ness has no title to the throne but that derived
 April. from your mother. Should the process dishon-
 our her, your own rights must be the sacrifice.
 Shut your ears to perfidious counsels. You can-
 not prosecute the Prince of Peace without dan-
 ger to your crown. You have no right to
 try him; the crimes with which he is reproached
 are lost in those of the throne. I have often ex-
 pressed a wish that he should be removed from
 the direction of affairs, though my friendship for
 King Charles made me anxious to shut my eyes
 on his weak attachment. Miserable men that
 we are! Weakness and error are the badge of
 all our tribe!* Your Royal Highness," reiterated
 the document, "should beware of popular com-
 motions. Through their means, some murders
 may be committed on the soldiers of my army;
 but the ruin of Spain will be the consequence. I
 have already seen with pain that every thing has

* It is not often we find Napoleon in the moralizing vein, and this singular specimen of Imperial hypocrisy, is therefore curious enough. One can scarcely read it without participating in the fervid disgust of Sir Peter Teazle, to any thing smacking of fine *sentiment*. It betrays at least, the low estimation in which Napoleon held the understanding of his correspondent.

been done at Madrid to inflame the public feeling; and that certain letters of the Captain-General of Catalonia, tending to interrupt the existing harmony between France and Spain, have been industriously circulated through the kingdom."

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This remarkable letter concludes with the following menace and benediction, which are probably not equally entitled to the praise of sincerity: "I have now opened to your Royal Highness my whole mind; and you may perceive I have hitherto hesitated between conflicting motives; but decision is at length necessary.

"I pray God, my brother, that he may have you in his high and holy keeping."

The receipt of such a letter did not tend in any degree to allay the apprehensions of Ferdinand. From Vittoria he would willingly have returned to Madrid; but surrounded on all hands by the French armies, there was danger even in retreat. To the adoption of this course, however, he was strongly urged by the faithful servants who accompanied him in his journey. Various projects were devised for his escape, but Ferdinand rejected them all. In vain did his counsellors appeal to his pride, and ask whether

CHAP. III. the monarch of Spain and the Indies would submit to the public degradation of entering, without invitation, without suitable preparation, or any of the formalities which became his dignity, the dominions of a foreign sovereign, by whom he had not yet been recognised as King. The pride of Ferdinand was overbalanced by his fears. Influenced by the promise of Savary, that his arrival at Bayonne would be immediately followed by the Imperial recognition, and by dread lest his return to the capital might tend still further to alienate Napoleon from his cause, he at length decided on the perilous measure of continuing his journey.

Apr. 20. Ferdinand on his arrival at Bayonne, was received by the Emperor with every demonstration of respect. He dined at the same table with his host, and was treated with all the observances due to royalty. Scarcely, however, had he retired to his residence, when Savary, by the falsehood of whose promises he had already been so fatally deluded, apprized him of the irrevocable decision of Napoleon for the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty, and required that he should instantly sign an abdication of the crown. Astounded by this sudden and unexpected demand, Ferdinand

refused compliance; and supported by the advice of those intrepid counsellors by whom he was accompanied, he declared his unalterable resolution that no exercise of power should draw from him the surrender of his rights.

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But Napoleon too thoroughly understood the character of his victim, to be deterred from the prosecution of his views by this temporary demonstration of firmness. Every engine was employed, to render the advisers of Ferdinand subservient to his purposes—and to their honour be it recorded—in vain. The petty kingdom of Etruria, of which the rightful sovereign had been deprived by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was tendered as an equivalent for Spain and the Indies, and at once rejected by the Council. In vain did Napoleon exert his powers of argument and corruption; in vain did he attempt to intimidate and overawe the men, who though open to his vengeance, yet dared to oppose a barrier to the schemes of his ambition: the counsellors of Ferdinand remained alike impregnable to his persuasion, promises, and threats. They refused to compromise the honour of their country, or the rights of its monarch; and it soon became evident

CHAP. III. that another course was necessary for the attainment of his views.

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Such occurrences, it will be readily believed, did not contribute to enliven the residence of Ferdinand at Bayonne; and Cevallos was accordingly directed to notify to the French Minister of State, the intention of the Spanish Monarch to re-enter his dominions. To this communication no answer was returned, though the measure immediately adopted of doubling the guards by which his residence was surrounded, was in itself a practical response, which could scarcely be considered as equivocal.

In the meanwhile, the chief authority at Madrid had been assumed by Murat. Shortly after the departure of the King, a military requisition for the instant release of Godoy was transmitted to the government. It was stated, by Murat, in explanation of this extraordinary demand, that as Charles IV. alone could be recognised by Napoleon as monarch of Spain, it was considered necessary for the public tranquillity, that the Prince of Peace should be removed from the kingdom, in order that the counsels of the King should no longer be perverted by his pernicious interference.

Apr. 20.

With this authoritative requisition, the fears of the Council of Government induced them to comply. Godoy was accordingly removed by night from the prison of Villa Viciosa, and sent off under a strong escort to Bayonne.

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The departure of Godoy was speedily followed by that of Charles and the Queen, whose presence Napoleon considered necessary to the further prosecution of his schemes. The appearance of these new personages on the scene, produced a considerable change in the character of the drama then acting at Bayonne. All his former ascendancy over the minds of the Royal pair was reassumed by Godoy; and, with hatred exasperated doubtless by the memory of his recent sufferings, he became a willing instrument of Napoleon in depriving Ferdinand of the crown. Nor were Charles and his consort without a deep and resentful remembrance of the unnatural conduct of their son. In bursting the bonds of filial duty he had likewise broken those of parental attachment; and, influenced by the counsels of Godoy, Charles and the Queen were now prepared to join in unnatural coalition with the destroyer of their house, and

Apr. 24.

CHAP. III. lend support to any measures by which the
downfal of Ferdinand could be effected.

1808.

April.

Apr. 30.

From the period of the arrival of Charles, Ferdinand was no longer treated with the honours of sovereignty. By the agents of Napoleon, by whom he was surrounded, he was even denied the most common and perfunctory observances of decent respect. Denounced as a rebel to his father, and the usurper of his power, his ear was only visited by threats of punishment, which instant obedience could alone avert.

Thus surrounded by dangers, from which it seemed impossible to escape, Ferdinand was induced by his counsellors to address a letter to Charles, in which, while he continued to assert his right to the throne, he offered, on his return to Madrid, to resign his claims in presence of the Cortes, or other high authorities of the kingdom. This mode of proceeding, however, which was, in truth, little else than an appeal to the sentiments of the nation, was not at all in harmony with the projects of Napoleon. The offer was accordingly declined; and the ingratitude and contumacy of Ferdinand were somewhat prolixly set forth in a letter bearing

the signature of Charles, which, exhibiting in some portions strong marks of the peculiar and emphatic style of Napoleon, is abundantly distinguished in others by the feebleness of his own. To this communication Ferdinand transmitted an immediate reply, vindicating his conduct and motives from the charges of his accusers. He once more testified his readiness to resign the crown in presence of the Cortes; or, should his father, from personal infirmity, not chuse again to assume the duties of sovereignty, he was willing to govern the kingdom as his deputy, and in his name.

 1808.

April.

This answer of the Prince produced no mitigation either of the menaces or persecutions of his enemies. On the day following, Napoleon had a long interview with Charles and the Queen, to which Ferdinand was summoned. Some particulars of this conference have been recorded by Cevallos. By those whom power had constituted his judges, and evil passions his accusers, Ferdinand was treated as a culprit, and made the object of the most vehement and disgusting abuse. Charles asserted his usurpation; the Queen denied his legitimacy; and Napoleon, by

May 6.

CHAP. III. an alternation of threats and promises, endeavoured to extract from his victim an unconditional abdication of the crown.

1808.

May.

May 6.

Considering the circumstances of his situation, it is not surprising that the resolution of Ferdinand should at length have yielded. On the same day he gave his signature to a document containing an absolute renunciation of his rights to the throne. A similar resignation of their claims was extracted from the other branches of the Royal Family; and thus, by a series of the most flagrant violations of the vital principles of law, the legal restoration of Charles to the sovereignty of Spain was considered as complete. These disgraceful transactions were accompanied by a joint address of Ferdinand and the Infantes, Don Antonio and Don Carlos, to the Spanish nation, in which they formally absolved them from their allegiance, and exhorted them to conform implicitly to the new order of events.

Even before the completion of this formal mockery, Charles had become disqualified for the reassumption of the crown. By a treaty which bears date the fifth of May, he had already

App. No. 11.

conveyed his rights to Napoleon. By an edict on the day preceding, addressed to the supreme Junta at Madrid, he had likewise delegated Murat to act as Lieutenant of the Kingdom, and President of the Council of Government. A proclamation to the people accompanied this document. They were assured that the King was engaged in concerting with his ally the measures best calculated to promote the prosperity of Spain; and they were warned, on pain of signal punishment, to reject the perfidious counsels of those turbulent disturbers who endeavoured to excite enmity against France. "Trust to my experience," said this miserable instrument of foreign tyranny, "and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers. Follow my example, and believe, that in your present situation there is no prosperity or safety for the Spanish nation, but in the friendship of the great Emperor, our ally." CHAP. III.
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App. No. 12.

In a rescript addressed to the Councils of Castile, and the Inquisition, Charles publicly notified to the nation his final abdication of the throne, in favour of his friend and ally the Emperor of the French. With this act the political life of App. No. 13.

CHAP. III. Charles terminated. He soon after went into retirement at Compiègne, where, supported by a pension from Napoleon, he passed the remainder of his life. Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos were dismissed to the Chateau of Valencey, in which they remained securely guarded till the return of better times. Godoy, the weak, sensual, and depraved instrument of his country's ruin, deprived of his wealth and honours, was saved only from the sufferings of abject poverty by the bounty of that monarch whose confidence he had abused.

Thus have the chief victims of Napoleon's tyrannical ambition at length vanished from the scene. Many of the details of those events with which their history is intimately connected, must have been felt by the reader to be at once painful and degrading. But a new era is now about to commence. The pictures of human weakness, guilt, and suffering, which he is still destined to behold, will at least be partially redeemed by noble and animating examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal. He will gaze on a horizon, clouded indeed, but never wholly overcast; and he will watch the dim twilight of the coming glory, as it grad-

ually brightens into that flood of radiance, by which the name and arms of his country shall continue to be illustrated, till all written and traditional records of this memorable contest be swept into oblivion.

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CHAP. IV.

1808.

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CHAPTER IV.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES IN
SPAIN.

CHAP. IV. **THE** departure of Ferdinand spread alarm
 through the nation. The French had hitherto
 been regarded as allies, and the presence of fo-
 reign armies had excited in the people neither
 jealousy nor alarm. There was no press in
 Spain. Public proclamations were the only re-
 cognised channels by which intelligence could be
 circulated through the provinces ; and the infor-
 mation of the people was seldom suffered to ex-
 tend to the political relations of the kingdom.
 A despotic government delights in the ignorance
 of its subjects. It is on ignorance alone that it
 can rely for unhesitating submission to its will ;
 and it had long been the policy of the Spanish

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government to obstruct every channel of know- CHAP. IV.
ledge by which the people might be raised to a
higher rank in the scale of intelligence.

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It was long, therefore, before the body of the nation became aware of the extent to which the encroachments of their invaders had been carried, or of the purposes they were directed to effect. The progress of the French armies had been silent though sure, swift, yet calm and unruffled. The people in one province were ignorant of the events simultaneously passing in another. In beholding the occupation of one fortress, they did not know that this assumption of power was neither isolated nor incidental, but formed part of a skilful and connected scheme of usurpation, by which the independence of the country was to be overthrown. They saw but one link of the chain by which they were inthralled; and, habituated to tranquil and unthinking submission, their dreams of security had even in the midst of danger remained unbroken.

But this was not always to be. The burden of the maintenance of the French armies pressed heavily on the people of the provinces. Their invaders, emboldened by success, became haughty and overbearing; and occasional acts of violence

CHAP. IV. and rapacity, which the enforcement of the strict-
 est discipline could not always prevent, contri-
 buted to break the harmony which had hitherto
 subsisted between the military and the populace.
 These evils had been progressively increasing.
 Foy. Not a day passed in which Castilian pride was not
 wounded by the military arrogance of the in-
 truders. The fire which thus smouldered in the
 bosoms of the people, occasionally burst forth
 into a flame. Hostile rencontres ensued, not
 always unattended with bloodshed; and a spirit
 of national animosity took place of the ancient
 favour with which France had been regarded.

To these feelings the abduction of their Mon-
 arch, and the liberation of the Prince of the Peace,
 gave additional strength and bitterness. The
 Governors of the provinces yet unoccupied, began
 spontaneously to collect arms, and prepare
 measures of defence. In the name of their im-
 prisoned Sovereign there was a talisman of
 sufficient power to rouse the sleeping energies
 of the nation. There was indignation in every
 heart, and defiance on every lip. The signs of
 the times were no longer to be mistaken; and it
 was evident that the crisis of struggle was at
 length come.

The French on their part neglected no pre-
caution by which their security could be promot-
ed. The division of General Vedel was direct-
ed to march from Segovia to the Escorial; and the
lines of communication with the capital were
strengthened. Dupont was ordered to transfer
the head quarters of his army from Aranjuez to
Toledo; and the troops in the neighbourhood of
Madrid were kept in constant readiness to bear
with all their power on the people, in case of
tumult or insurrection.

It had already been publicly announced that
the Emperor refused to acknowledge Ferdi-
nand, and that Charles was about to reassume
the reins of sovereignty. At Toledo this intel-
ligence was followed by a riot. Crowds collect-
ed in the great square of the city, and cries of
“*Ferdinand the Seventh, for ever,*” rent the air.
A flag bearing the picture of the King was the
banner of this tumultuous assemblage, which,
armed with musquets, pikes, and bludgeons,
paraded the city, inflicting vengeance on those
whose sentiments were conceived hostile to the
restoration of Ferdinand. The house of the
Corregidor was attacked and plundered, and that
functionary with difficulty effected his escape.

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CHAP. III. In a few days the division of Dupont arrived in
the city. Doubtful of the temper of the inhabitants, he advanced in order of attack, ready on any apparent symptom of popular resistance to act on the offensive. But quiet had already been restored. The Princess of the Peace, accompanied by the Cardinal de Bourbon, came forth to meet the General in the neighbourhood of the city, and informed him that the efforts of the municipal authorities, aided by those of the clergy, had already been successful in quelling the tumults. From this demonstration of popular feeling no immediate consequences followed; but it indicated to the French leaders the necessity of increasing their forces in that neighbourhood; and another division of Dupont's army was accordingly advanced to Aranjuez.

But the chief precautions of the invaders were directed to the maintenance of the capital. From the time of Ferdinand's departure, all harmony between the military and the inhabitants was at an end. The intelligence subsequently received, of the proceedings at Bayonne, had the effect of rousing to its highest pitch the indignation of the people. Their imprisoned monarch was the engrossing subject of their thoughts. When a

courier was expected to arrive from France, im- CHAP. IV.
 mense crowds surrounded the post-house, and
 waited with intense anxiety to receive intelli- 1808.
 gence of his safety. The French generals, April.
 alarmed at these tumultuous masses, endeavour-
 ed to divert their attention, and to conceal the Foy ii. 173.
 real character of the transactions at Bayonne.
 In both these objects they were unsuccessful.
 The falsehoods of the public journals were dis-
 credited and detected; and private letters, con-
 taining a true description of the passing events,
 were circulated through the city. The situa-
 tion of the French was that of men on the brink
 of a volcano, when the portents of an approach-
 ing eruption are already manifest.

In such a state of things it appeared to Murat
 that strong measures were necessary to tame the
 spirit of the people. The natives of Madrid had
 engaged in frequent rencontres with the French
 soldiers; and blood had been shed. The spirit of
 loyalty had penetrated even into the mad houses;
 and lunatics rushed forth into the street to assas-
 sinate the enemies of their country.

It was natural that the antipathy of the people
 should generate similar sentiments in the French
 armies. The soldiers already regarded the par-

CHAP. IV. tisans of Ferdinand as enemies, and were even
anxious for a conflict, the successful termination
of which they regarded as undoubted. Their
wishes were soon gratified. On the 30th of April,
Murat presented to the Infante Don Antonio,
president of the Junta of Government, a letter
from Charles, requiring him to send off the Queen
of Etruria, and the Infante Don Francisco de
Paula, brother of Ferdinand, to Bayonne. With
this mandate the Junta at first declined com-
pliance, till the pleasure of the King should be
known. But their scruples were overruled by
Murat, who declared himself ready to assume the
whole responsibility of the proceeding, and inti-
mated that any opposition to his commands would
be repressed by the full exercise of his power.

The time appointed for the departure of these
Royal personages came. On the preceding day no
intelligence had been received from Bayonne ;
and this circumstance had contributed to deepen
the anxiety of the people. Early in the morning
great multitudes assembled at the Puerta del Sol,
waiting in a state of great excitement for the
arrival of the expected courier ; and the square
in front of the palace was crowded with women,
who watched with melancholy earnestness the

preparations for the journey of the Royal travellers. At nine o'clock the *cortege* set forth. It was reported that Don Antonio was likewise about to quit the capital for Bayonne; and two carriages, which still remained at the palace, evidently prepared for travel, gave support to the rumour. The fermentation of the populace was now excited to the highest pitch. The cry, "*They are all forsaking us; the last of the family of our kings is about to be torn from the country!*" flew from lip to lip; and a violent commotion was the consequence. The servants of the palace declared that Don Francisco had betrayed reluctance to depart, and even wept bitterly. On hearing this the women burst into tears; and the men, almost frantic, fell upon the carriages, and broke them to pieces.

At this moment a French officer, who had been sent to ascertain the cause of the tumult, appeared in the crowd. He was indicated by his dress to belong to the staff of Murat. The sorrowful exclamations of the mob were at once changed into expressions of indignant hatred. The officer was immediately attacked, and would probably have become the sacrifice of popular fury, had he not been rescued by a patrol of

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CHAP. IV. the Imperial Guard, which succeeded, by a
 charge of bayonets, in driving back his assail-
 ants.

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The affair now began to wear a serious aspect ; and the piquet battalion on duty for the day was immediately ordered out by Murat. They fired on the people ; but this had only the effect of increasing their numbers. The whole population of the city rushed into the streets. The air became vocal with cries of “ *Vengeance !* ” “ *Death to the French !* ” “ *Ferdinand the Seventh for ever !* ” and accumulating masses came pouring on, armed with such weapons as they had been able to procure, and prepared to join in the onslaught. Stones were thrown, and musquets fired from the windows. A party of Mamelukes of the Guard was massacred by the mob, and every French soldier found straggling in the streets met a similar fate.

The whole troops in the city were now under arms ; artillery was planted in the squares, and a destructive fire of musquetry and grape-shot opened on the multitude. The Plaza Mayor, the Puerta del Sol, and the great street of Alcala, were the chief theatres of slaughter. Ter- rified by the havoc, the people would have sought

safety in flight, but even this was denied them. CHAP. IV.
They were charged and sabred by the cavalry,

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and fired upon by bodies of infantry stationed at May.
the intersecting points of the streets, in order to intercept their retreat. Thus driven to extremity, they rushed into the houses, where they were followed by their pursuers, and put mercilessly to the sword. Parties of cavalry were stationed at the outlets of the city, to charge and cut down those who had succeeded in escaping from the scene of slaughter within.

While the work of extermination was thus vigorously carried on, Murat had taken post on the height of St. Vincent, which commands the western part of the city. Thither he was followed by several members of the Junta, who implored him to put a stop to the effusion of blood. O'Farrel and Azanza, accompanied by many of the nobles and French officers of rank, rode through the streets, endeavouring to restore tranquillity, and waving white handkerchiefs as a token of peace. By their personal exertions, many lives were saved; but the firing in the streets still continued till not a Spaniard was to be seen. By two o'clock, however, hostilities had ceased, and all was silent in

CHAP. IV. Madrid. Towards evening a body of peasantry from the neighbouring villages, on approaching the capital, were charged and fired on by the military. Many were killed; a still greater number wounded by the sabres, and trampled down by the horses of the cavalry.

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In the events just narrated, the Spanish troops took no part. They were detained in barracks by their officers; and a small body of artillery, stationed at the gate of the Arsenal, was the only part of the garrison which attempted to co-operate with the people. Their conduct, and that of the gallant men by whom they were commanded, is worthy of record.

At an early period of the conflict, a detachment was directed by Murat to seize possession of the Arsenal. The execution of this order was opposed by two officers of artillery named Daoiz and Velarde, who, assisted by their fellow soldiers, harnessed themselves to the cannon, and succeeded in bringing three pieces to bear on a French column then advancing to enforce the execution of their orders. A discharge of grape-shot followed, which made such havoc in the ranks that the French instantly retreated. In consequence of this disaster, fresh columns were

instantly advanced ; but before they succeeded in obtaining possession of the neighbouring houses, many discharges had taken place with terrible effect. The guns were at length taken. Velarde was killed on the spot ; and Daoiz, though severely wounded and unable to stand, continued to give orders, till he had received three other wounds, the last of which was instantly fatal.

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On the termination of active hostilities, Murat was not satisfied with the punishment already inflicted on the inhabitants, and determined yet further to signalize his vengeance. On the evening of the same day, and on the following morning, the prisoners were brought before a military tribunal of which General Grouchy was president, and sentenced to be shot. The scene selected for the display of this terrible example, was in the neighbourhood of the Prado ; and upwards of an hundred individuals were led forth to execution, without being suffered in their dying moments to receive the last offices of religion.*

* It has been stated by Colonel Napier, on the authority of several French writers, that these executions are attributable not to Murat but to Grouchy, who continued the work of

CHAP. IV. It is admitted on all hands that many of the
 1808. sufferers were entirely innocent of participation
 May. in the tumults, and were convicted on no other
 evidence than that of large knives being found
 on their persons. Forty-five Catalan traders,
 taken in the street of Alcala, were with difficul-
 ty rescued from death by the interference of the
 authorities, who assured the French officers, that
 the privilege of carrying arms is one enjoyed by
 the Catalan merchants, and sanctioned by the
 laws of the kingdom. The trials indeed—if the
 few hasty formalities which preceded the inflic-
 tion of sentence deserve such a name—seem to
 have been intended to serve rather as a warrant
 for indiscriminate execution, than to afford pro-
 tection to the innocent.

With regard to the number of the sufferers in
 this unfortunate affray, there is much variance
 of statement. It is generally asserted by the
 Spaniards that upwards of ten thousand of their

slaughter on his own responsibility, and in direct disobedience to
 the orders of his commander. The statement would have cer-
 tainly been entitled to greater credit, had we learned from the
 same authority that the delinquency of Grouchy had been fol-
 lowed by censure or disgrace.

countrymen bled on the occasion. In the account of the transaction given in the *Moniteur*, the loss of the French was estimated at twenty-five killed, and about twice that number wounded: that of the Spaniards at "*plusieurs milliers des plus mauvais sujets du pays.*" Subsequently, however, when it was deemed politic to diminish rather than to exaggerate the extent of the casualties, a report was drawn up by the Council of Castile, and published by order of Murat, which reduced the number of Spanish sufferers to one hundred and ninety-three. From statements so widely at variance, it is impossible to draw any satisfactory conclusion. Nor is it necessary. Taken at the lowest estimate, enough will remain to rouse our warmest sympathy with the people in their first ineffectual effort to cast off the yoke of bondage which pressed them to the earth. We have no wish to magnify the atrocities of the French. We are far from supposing Murat to have been actuated on this occasion by an abstract and constitutional appetite for blood, at variance with the whole tenour of his life. Murat was a soldier, and a brave one, and adorned with all the splendid qualities which belong to that character. But,

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CHAP. IV. little influenced by principle, and accustomed, on all occasions of honourable danger, to hold his life at a pin's fee, he was led, perhaps, to place less value on the lives of others, when their sacrifice could contribute to the advantage of his cause, than any system of ethics, however lax, would pretend to justify. Murat was no statesman. He probably believed, that a striking and terrible example was necessary to intimidate the people, and secure the future safety of his army. The cause of injustice must often be supported by unjustifiable means. *Per fas aut nefas*, is ever the motto of usurpation; and the crimes it engenders may generally be considered less as emanations of the evil passions of individuals, than as necessary consequences of the system they support.

The immediate effects of the events of the second of May, were such as Murat had anticipated. Astounded by the scenes of bloodshed of which their city had been made the theatre, the inhabitants of Madrid remained in a state of gloomy submission to a power which experience had taught them it was impossible to resist. In the meanwhile, the French relaxed nothing of the rigour of their sway. The people were no

longer allowed to congregate in the streets or squares of the city; and any unusual assemblage was immediately dispersed by strong military patrols. The public proclamations which promised amnesty for the past, contained likewise denunciations of the heaviest punishment on any repetition of the offence.

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If the people, however, were silent, it was not so with their rulers. Humble addresses were presented by all the public authorities. The Council of the Inquisition denounced the censures of religion on all the instigators of "such excesses as the scandalous sedition of the second of May." Don Antonio, the President of the Junta, followed his family to Bayonne; and the authority of the usurpers in Madrid remained paramount and unquestioned.

It was in this state of things, that the order constituting Murat Lieutenant of the Kingdom, arrived in Madrid, accompanied by a proclamation, exhorting the people to yield implicit obedience to his authority. These documents were speedily followed by another, conveying intelligence of Ferdinand's resignation. To the mandate for the appointment of Murat, the Council offered no opposition; and that leader was formally in-

CHAP. IV. stalled in an office the powers of which he had
already virtually exercised.

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Ferdinand, before signing the deed of abdication at Bayonne, had taken the precaution of despatching a private messenger to the Junta, informing them of the real nature of his situation, and the compulsory measures which had been adopted to enforce the resignation of his rights. He directed that hostilities should instantly commence, on intelligence being received of his removal into the interior of France; a measure to which, unless compelled by violence, he declared he never would consent. The Cortes were likewise ordered to be convoked, in order that such steps might be adopted as would communicate the greatest vigour to the measures of national resistance.

This communication from their Sovereign was not received by the Junta till two days after the investiture of Murat as chief of the government; and it was unanimously decided by that body, that the orders of Ferdinand could no longer be obeyed. By this decision, the Junta was at once deprived of all influence with the nation; and instead of holding its authority by appointment from an independent sovereign, be-

came degraded into the passive instrument of foreign tyranny. CHAP. IV.

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The terrors of the military executions at Madrid did not extend beyond the capital. In the provinces they excited only more vehement hatred of the invaders. Murat, however, was not idle. Two Swiss regiments, which formed part of the garrison of Madrid, were incorporated with the army of Dupont. Three companies of the Body Guard, and four battalions of the Spanish and Walloon Guards, were placed at the disposal of Marshal Moncey. Three thousand of the Spanish army were ordered to embark at Ferrol for South America; and in the more important fortresses of Catalonia the garrisons were reduced and weakened. Orders were issued for the army of Solano, which had not yet entered Portugal, to march on Cadiz, and its commander was directed to resume his functions as Captain-General of Andalusia. The heights of the Retiro at Madrid were strongly fortified, and supplied with large stores of ammunition and provisions. All magazines of arms and warlike equipment were seized by the French authorities; and officers were des-

CHAP. IV. patched to Ceuta, to cause the recognition of the new government in that important fortress.

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In the meanwhile, Napoleon had formed the resolution of elevating his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain. Joseph was then King of Naples; and by the mildness of his manners and the leniency of his government, had succeeded in acquiring, in a considerable degree, the affections of his subjects. Of retired habits, and fitted by his tastes rather for the pursuits of philosophy than for those of ambition, he would willingly have declined the dangerous elevation; but his refusal was overruled by Napoleon, and Joseph yielded to the influence of that ascendancy which stronger minds had found it impossible to resist.

Intelligence of the Emperor's intentions no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than addresses of the most humble and adulatory character poured in from the public authorities of the kingdom. The Junta of Government, the Council of Castile, the Municipality of Madrid, all entreated for the honour of a King of the Imperial blood; and in this they were joined by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon, the only male branch of the

Royal family in the kingdom. Thus secure in the servility of the higher classes, and their entire devotion to his will, Napoleon thought it prudent that the work of usurpation should be sanctioned by at least a semblance of national consent. He accordingly convoked an assembly of one hundred and fifty of the chief persons of the kingdom to meet at Bayonne, and addressed the Spanish people in the following proclamation.

“Spaniards, after a long agony your nation was perishing. I have seen your sufferings,—I will relieve them.—Your greatness and power are inseparably connected with mine.—Your princes have ceded to me all their rights to the Crown. I will not reign over your provinces, but I will acquire an eternal title to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old. It must be restored to youth, that you may enjoy the blessings of a renovation which shall not be purchased by civil war or calamity. Spaniards, I have convoked a general assembly of the deputies of your provinces and towns, that I may know your wishes and your wants. I shall then lay down my rights, and place your illustrious crown on the brows

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CHAP. IV. of one who bears resemblance to myself: thus
 1808. securing to you a constitution which will unite
 May. the salutary power of the Sovereign, with the
 protection of the liberties and rights of the
 Spanish nation. It is my wish that my memory
 should be blessed by your latest posterity, and
 that they shall say, 'Napoleon was the regen-
 erator of our country.' "

By these proceedings the Spanish nation was at length effectually roused into resistance. The hatred of the people towards their invaders, broke forth, as it were, in one loud and simultaneous burst, from all quarters of the kingdom. They would not tamely submit to become the subject of perfidious barter between the servile government of Madrid and that of France. They would not transfer their allegiance at the command of a foreign tyrant, from the heir of the Bourbons, to an upstart and an adventurer. The *fusillade* of the second of May, and the disgraceful transactions at Bayonne, put an end to that state of torpid quiescence in which the spirit of the nation had so long slumbered. A loud and intelligible voice was at once sent forth from every province in the kingdom. The universal cry was for re-

sistance ; and the pervading sentiment of every heart, was loyalty to Ferdinand, their betrayed and imprisoned monarch.

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The provinces of Asturias and Galicia were the first to take arms. A representative Junta was assembled at Oviedo, and assumed the sovereignty of the district. To quiet these disturbances, Count Delpinar, councillor of Castile, and Don Juan Melendez, were commissioned by Murat to collect the forces of the district, and quell by military power the spirit of insurrection. But it was too late. The functionaries were attacked by the people, and compelled to seek safety in flight. The first act of the Junta was to despatch two deputies to England, in order to engage assistance from that power ; and measures were immediately adopted to arrange plans of concert and co-operation with the neighbouring provinces.

Leon started next into the field, and sent deputies to Corunna requesting arms. The demand was not complied with. Don Antonio Filangieri, a Neapolitan by birth, and Captain General of Galicia, was unwilling to commit himself by any act of hostility to France ; and his temporizing policy having rendered him an

CHAP. IV. object of aversion, the mob broke into his house, seized his papers, and, had he not prudently withdrawn, it is probable his life would have been sacrificed to the popular fury. A portrait of Ferdinand was carried in procession through the streets of Corunna, and the cry of "*Down with the French and the traitors,*" was heard on all hands.

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In Estremadura the rising of the people was no less decided and tumultuous. The Count de la Torre del Fresno, Governor of Badajoz, endeavoured to controul the spirit of insubordination, and lost his life in the attempt. The populace dragged him from his house, and murdered him in the street. At Valladolid, Jaen, Saragossa, Carthagená, San Lucar, Salamanca, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, and many other places, excesses equally horrible occurred. Like a river which has burst its channel, the evil passions of the people rushed onward, without limit or restraint.

By such revolting acts of atrocity was the cause of freedom at this period injured and dishonoured. They cannot be defended; they ought not to be concealed. Yet even the ferocities of a people, thus goaded into madness by

a long course of injury and insult, will weigh lightly in the balance when compared with the cold-blooded and barbarous policy of their invaders. In recording the events of this extraordinary struggle, it is indeed the duty of the historian to render justice to the oppressor; but his sympathies are due only to the cause of the oppressed. And if, by the very constitution of our being, it is necessary we should be influenced by prejudice, that prejudice is at least more generous which leans to the side of freedom in the contest, than that which would veil the crimes, while it blazons the triumphs of the usurper.

Fortunately, however, this state of anarchy was of short duration. In the principal cities of the provinces, Juntas were speedily formed for the provincial administration of affairs, and to direct and organize the resistance of the people. These assemblies published proclamations and addresses to their countrymen, inciting them to the vigorous assertion of their rights, and the vindication of the national honour. They recalled to their recollection the heroic deeds of their ancestors, and the noble struggles which they had maintained against the Moorish invaders in the cause of freedom

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CHAP. IV. and religion. They painted in its true light
the insidious and grasping policy of Napoleon.
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May. “It is better,” said the Junta of Galicia, “to
die in defence of our hearths and altars, on our
own soil; and with arms in our hands, than
to be led bound to slaughter, the unresisting
victims of bloody and inordinate ambition.
The conscription of France awaits us. If we
do not defend our own kingdom, we must go
to perish in the north. By resistance we lose
nothing; for should our efforts in behalf of our
country prove fruitless, by a glorious death we
shall at least be freed from the galling chains of
the oppressor. Fly to arms then, and assist
your countrymen to rescue your King from
captivity, to restore to your government its just
rights, to preserve your families, to assert the
independence of your native soil, and above all
to defend your sacred Religion. Employ the
arms which she tenders; nerve your minds with
the fear of God; implore the aid of the blessed
Virgin, and of our patron the glorious St. James.
Under such auspices go forth confident of suc-
cess, and grasp the victory which is prepared for
you by their intercession, and the eternal jus-
tice of your cause.”

The addresses of the other assemblies were not less energetic; nor less happy in contrasting the war in which they had been compelled to take arms by all the holiest motives that can sanctify a cause, with those in which Napoleon had plunged his country, to gratify the frantic dictates of an insatiable ambition.

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Among the provincial Juntas formed by the necessity of the times, that of Seville assumed the lead, and styled themselves, in public proclamations, "The Supreme Government of Spain and the Indies." Seville possessed at that time many claims to become the chief *nucleus* of the government. In point of influence and population it was the second city of Spain. It possessed the only foundery for cannon in the kingdom. It abounded in arms and military stores; and it possessed likewise the advantage of being removed from the immediate sphere of the influence of the French armies.

With such favouring circumstances to lend influence to its measures, the Supreme Junta lost no time in organizing a system of resistance suited to the exigencies of the country. They directed that in every town containing two thousand inhabitants, a subordinate Junta

CHAP. IV. should be established, to enlist under the national standard all those capable of bearing arms. Defensive measures were concerted by the chief military authorities of the province. War was declared against France. Vessels were despatched to the Canaries and South America to announce the rising of the people; and commissioners were sent into the southern provinces of Portugal, in order to solicit assistance and co-operation. The Junta also published a series of precautionary rules for the conduct of the war, distinguished throughout by practical knowledge of the art military, and a prudent adaptation of its principles to the situation of the kingdom.

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But not the least important step taken by the Supreme Junta was that of opening communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, and the British Admiral on the Cadiz station. Every assistance, in the power of these officers to grant, was immediately afforded to the patriots. Admiral Purvis offered the assistance of the British fleet to Solano, Governor of Cadiz, in an attack on the French squadron, commanded by Admiral Rossilly, then in the harbour. This proposal of the Admiral, Solano did not

venture openly to decline, yet he felt unwilling to commit himself by any act of what he doubtless considered premature hostility to France. When Admiral Purvis therefore arrived at Cadiz, Solano, instead of concerting measures of attack with that officer, was only anxious to repress the spirit of the people, and restore harmony with their invaders. All his measures for this purpose failed signally of effect. The time for such temporizing policy had passed. Solano, in the eyes of the people, was a traitor, and they treated him as such. The mob tore him from his dwelling, and murdered him in the street. His house was rased to the ground, yet, by an impulse of singular magnanimity, his property was held inviolate by a multitude of the very meanest and poorest of his countrymen. "We will take," they exclaimed, "nothing that belonged to a traitor." Even the jewels and money they found in his possession were deposited in the public treasury, to be employed in that cause which they held Solano to have betrayed.

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On the death of Solano, the command devolved on Don Tomas de Morla; and on his accession to the government, vigorous measures were immediately adopted to compel the squadron of

CHAP. IV. Rossilly to surrender. The French Admiral, aware of his danger, made proposals to Morla, which were rejected. He wished to quit the harbour of Cadiz; and demanded protection against the English fleet then in the offing. But Morla refused all terms, declining the assistance of Lord Collingwood, who had assumed the command of the British fleet, and proceeded to erect batteries on various parts of the Isla de Leon, from which they assailed the hostile squadron with a heavy fire. These measures, after an interval of several days, during which a strong fire was kept up on the enemy, were at length productive of the desired effect. Rossilly, on the morning of the 14th of June, sent a flag of truce to the shore, and intimated his readiness to surrender at discretion.

This success was followed by the arrival of General Spencer with a corps of five thousand men, which had been despatched from Gibraltar to co-operate with the Spaniards. By the appearance of this force on the coast, the progress of a French corps under General Avril, which had been despatched by Junot to hold possession of Cadiz, was arrested; and General Spencer having subsequently taken up a position at A-

yamonté, the garrison of Faro surrendered to the patriots. On this event, the Authorities of Algarve sent deputies to Seville, and united that province by alliance with the Supreme Junta. The patriotic force in this quarter was still further augmented by the junction of sixteen Spanish battalions, which withdrew from the occupation of Portugal and joined the standard of their countrymen.

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Previous to the appearance of General Spencer on the Spanish coast, the deputies from Seville and Galicia had arrived in England. Never was there enthusiasm more deep and general, than that which then animated the British nation in the cause of Spanish independence. The deputies were welcomed in London by loud and general acclamation. There was no hesitation manifested as to the line of policy which it became Great Britain to adopt. The people called on their rulers to assist, with heart and hand, a nation struggling for liberty, to cast off the chain of the oppressor. Never was the unanimous voice of a people poured forth with greater majesty and effect. The government did not withstand—no government could have withstood a call thus energetically made. In

CHAP. IV. such an excited state of the public mind, if their

1808. rulers had dared to oppose themselves to the
May. wishes of the nation, they must have been driv-
en from their situations with scorn and ignominy.
It mattered nothing in such a case what party
was in power, or by what peculiar principles
their general policy was regulated. The ordi-
nary barriers and distinctions of party were in a
moment broken down, and Whig or Tory must
have acted alike in yielding instant obedience to
a voice thus sublimely and irresistibly poured
forth.

Since the accession of Napoleon, England had fought not for conquest but for safety. In spite of all her efforts, she had beheld the power of France continually gaining new accessions to its gigantic bulk. Europe, after a fruitless resistance, was at the foot of the conqueror, and the subsidies of England, by provoking premature hostilities, had only contributed to accelerate the catastrophe. Since the days of Egypt, the military force of England had been employed only in the conquest of Sugar Islands, or of some distant and isolated colonies which France still retained in the East. A nobler field was now open for her exertions. She was at length

to meet the Great Conqueror of the Age on CHAP. IV.
the very continent he had subdued, to plant
her sons breast to breast with those victori-
ous soldiers who had never yet experienced
defeat. The moment of decisive struggle was
at length come, when the standard of England
was to be raised in a higher and a better cause
than any of which she had hitherto stood for-
ward as the champion. Justice was on her
side: the character of the contest was become
too palpable to be mistaken by any party in the
state. The cause of freedom and of resistance
to oppression, is one that comes home with pecu-
liar force to the heart and the understanding of
an Englishman; and followed in all its measures
by the unanimous wishes of the nation, the go-
vernment at once knew itself to be armed with
a strength, of which, during a long course of in-
glorious policy, it had hitherto been deprived.

Every practicable assistance was immediately
afforded to the patriotic cause. Vessels, freight-
ed with arms, clothing, and military stores,
were speedily despatched for Gijon. Supplies of
money were sent to Ferrol to assist the insur-
rection in Galicia. All the Spanish prisoners
of war were liberated and restored to their

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CHAP. IV. country. The British army in Sicily was or-
dered to afford protection and assistance to the
insurgent Catalans; and General Spencer was
directed to engage in active co-operation with
the patriots of Andalusia.

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While such measures were adopting in Eng-
land, the Spanish people had lost nothing of their
ardour in the cause of independence. Valencia
became the theatre of a tragedy deeper than any
which we have hitherto been called on to record.
The inhabitants, like those of the other pro-
vinces, had risen in arms against the French.
In the vehemence of the first commotion, Don
Miguel de Saavedra became the object and the
victim of popular fury. He was followed to
Requena, whither he had fled for safety, and
brutally murdered by the people. His head,
raised on a pike, was carried with acclamations
round the city of which he had recently been
governor. A Junta was then elected for the ad-
ministration of the province; and it is probable
that Valencia might have remained undisgraced
by further violence, but for the appearance of a
wretch, named Calvo, by whom the functions of
leader of the government had been assumed.
Calvo came from Madrid, and was a canon of

the Cathedral of St. Isidore. By the display of a sort of demoniac energy, he acquired influence with the people. He retained, under his command, a band of assassins; and, confident in this support, he insulted the Junta, who refused to admit him as a member, and succeeded in acquiring such power as awed the authorities into submission.

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In Valencia there were many French residents; and it was natural, in the circumstances of the country, that these should become the peculiar objects of jealousy and suspicion. Alarmed at the dangers which surrounded them, they sought refuge in the citadel, and Calvo publicly denounced them, as having engaged in a plot for the surrender of the city to Murat. Accounts differ as to the particular proceedings which ensued; but all agree in the result, that these unfortunate persons, in number about two hundred, were massacred by Calvo and his assassins.

The mad ambition of Calvo grew with his success. He caused himself to be proclaimed Sovereign of Valencia, summoned the Captain-General to his presence, compelled the Intendant to disburse the public money, and treated the

CHAP. IV. Archbishop with insolence and contempt. By
his orders, likewise, a new Junta was directed
to assemble and assume the functions of that
which he had determined to abolish.

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Fortunately for the interests of humanity, the career of Calvo was a short one. The Junta, which at first had been panic-stricken, began at length to gather courage, and to concert measures for the overthrow of this frantic demagogue. His popularity with the mob, already satiated with slaughter, was in the wane. The schemes of the Junta soon ripened into action. At one of their meetings, Calvo was invited to join in the deliberations. He came, followed by a train of ruffians who occupied all the avenues to the place of meeting. Towards the Junta he demeaned himself with his usual insolence, and attempted to awe them into submission by threats of punishment. At length a Franciscan friar, named Rico, the most intrepid of their number, rose and denounced him as a traitor, and demanded his immediate arrest. This was done. Calvo was sent in irons to the Island of Majorca, and subsequently executed as a traitor. The retribution of the Junta did not rest here. About two hundred of his blood-thirsty followers were

likewise subjected to trial, and executed in pursuance of the sentence awarded by the tribunal.

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It rarely happens, observes an able writer, that popular convulsions, however horrible may be the circumstances by which they are attended, have any prejudicial effect on the vigour of national defence; for the passions of the people, thus excited by domestic atrocities, when directed against foreign enemies, acquire new intensity. It was so in Valencia. The people were no sooner freed from the tyranny of Calvo, than they commenced vigorous preparations for defence. There appeared no limits to the popular enthusiasm. Provision was made not only for the security of the city, but of the province. The defiles leading into Catalonia were fortified. Troops were detached to co-operate with the military in Murcia; and active dispositions were made to secure the passes of the road from Castile.

Before intelligence was received at Madrid of the insane atrocities of Calvo and his followers, an expedition against Valencia had been in preparation. The command of the force destined for this service was intrusted to Marshal Mon-

CHAP. IV. cey, an officer of high military reputation and
 1808. unblemished personal character. On the thirtieth
 May. of May, Moncey received orders to advance with
 a column of ten thousand men upon Cuenca,
 where, in case the disturbances at Valencia
 should have ceased, he was directed to halt, and
 content himself with watching the country be-
 tween the lower Ebro and Carthagená. Should
 the disorders in Valencia, however, remain un-
 quelled, he was instructed to direct General
 Chabran, at Tortosa, to advance with his divi-
 sion, and effect a junction in the neighbourhood
 of Valencia.

In pursuance of these orders, Marshal Mon-
 ceý, with an army of about ten thousand men of
 the different arms, set forward from Madrid on
 the fourth of June, and reached Cuenca on the
 Jun. 11. eleventh. In that town he remained for a week,
 and received intelligence of the state of mat-
 ters in Valencia. During his march, Marshal
 Monceý found the whole population animated
 by feelings of strong aversion to the intrusive
 government. Even around Cuenca, while it
 remained the head-quarters of his army, symp-
 toms of disaffection were daily manifested. In
 these circumstances, the Spanish and Walloon

guards were sent forward to Valencia, and Moncey ordered Chabran to advance to Castellon de Plana, that a more active concert might be established between the armies. To a General of Moncey's experience it could not but be apparent that the campaign was not long destined to be bloodless. Not satisfied, therefore, with the precautions already mentioned, he wrote to Murat, requesting that a column might be sent forward from Madrid to Albacete, to protect his right from attack, during his anticipated operations.

Murat, on his part, little aware of the difficulties with which Moncey was surrounded, felt dissatisfied at the slowness of his progress. With a view to stimulate the sluggish movements of the veteran, he despatched Brigadier-General Excelmans, with directions to excite him by every means to operations of greater vigour and more decisive character than he had yet thought it prudent to undertake. Excelmans departed on his mission; but on his route was seized by the populace, and, with his suite, carried prisoners into Valencia.

The difficulties of Moncey were evidently increasing; and on the sixteenth he quitted

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CHAP. IV. Cuenca. The country around his line of march was deserted; and notwithstanding the strict discipline enforced in his army, the inhabitants everywhere continued to fly on his approach. No opposition, however, was offered to the advance of Moncey till he reached the bridge of Pajaso. There he found two or three thousand armed peasants, supported by a corps of about eight hundred Swiss Guards, prepared to dispute his passage. A clumsy work had been thrown up for the defence of the bridge, surmounted by four pieces of cannon; and fortified by the difficulties of the surrounding country, which was rocky and mountainous, they stood resolutely prepared for the advance of the French. Moncey waited for the coming up of his artillery; and then, by a vigorous attack, at once gained possession of the bridge. The Spaniards fled in confusion, leaving their cannon and about twenty prisoners in the hands of the assailants. The latter were likewise strengthened by a considerable body of the Swiss Guards, who deserted to the victors.

The next affair in which the French army was engaged, was with the force commanded by Don Joseph Caro, brother to the Marquis de la

Romana, who occupied a strong position at
Cabreras. The chain of mountains by which
Valencia is separated from New-Castile form
a rampart of great strength to that province.
There is but one road by which they can be
traversed by artillery, and even that presents
difficulties of the most formidable character.
The position which Caro had selected for his ar-
my was one of extraordinary strength. Its front
was secured by entrenchments; and its flanks
were rendered almost inaccessible by ranges of
precipitous rocks, which appeared on either side
to present an impenetrable rampart. The army,
thus advantageously posted, amounted, in point
of number, to about ten thousand; but, with the
exception of two regular regiments of infantry
and a few dragoons, it was composed exclusively
of raw and undisciplined levies, badly armed, and
without military garb.

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To attack this position in front was impossible.
A long detour therefore was necessary; and a
detachment, under General Harispe, was direct-
ed to scale the mountains and turn the right
flank of the Spanish army. This service was
executed with success, though not without ex-
treme difficulty; and Moncey immediately ad-

CHAP. IV. vancing on the front of the position, carried it
 with little loss, and became master of all the
 1808. cannon, baggage, and ammunition of the enemy.
 June.

These difficulties past, no further obstacle seemed at first to present itself to the peaceful occupation of Valencia. The hostile army had entirely disappeared; and Moncey considered it his policy to conciliate if possible the inhabitants of the beautiful and fertile country through which he was advancing. All the prisoners not in uniform, were liberated; and he gave strong assurances to the authorities of the province, that he came only as a friend to restore tranquillity and order.

June 27.

It was not till the twenty-seventh that he appeared before the walls of Valencia. That city, which is one of the largest in the kingdom, is completely enclosed by an old wall of no great height, but massive, and in good preservation. It stands upon low ground, and is surrounded by deep canals and reservoirs of water, which render approach almost impossible unless by the roads leading to the gates. About five miles from Valencia, Moncey found a body of troops under Caro entrenched on the bank of a canal, and prepared to dispute his advance. The po-

sition thus taken was strong. Several pieces of cannon commanded the road; and the peasants, who lay hid in the mulberry groves and hemp-fields on either side, harassed the march of the French army. By these obstacles, however, Moncey was not retarded. The position was immediately attacked and carried; and Moncey remained master of the suburban village of Quarte, in which he took post, and summoned the city to capitulate. But surrender was the last thing in the thoughts of the Valencians. A peremptory refusal was returned; and Moncey gave instant orders for attack. His hopes of gaining possession of Valencia did not rest exclusively on the success of his military operations. There were traitors in the city, who had promised to deliver up the gates on his approach. But these had been discovered on the night preceding the attack, and immediately put to death; and Moncey, ignorant of this circumstance, continued to expect that his efforts from without, were to be aided by treachery within.

The fire of the French batteries was directed chiefly against the gates of Quarte and San Joseph; but the troops advanced in several

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CHAP. IV. columns in order to distract the attention of the

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June,

garrison. In these circumstances, the Spanish commander had recourse to the bold stratagem of throwing open the gate of Quarte, as if to welcome the assailants. Moncey, imagining this was done by his partisans in the city, fell at once into the snare, and pushed rapidly for the gate. The advancing columns were assailed by a heavy fire of grape; and, after strenuous but ineffectual efforts to surmount the obstacles opposed to their entrance, were driven back with great loss. In the attack of San Joseph they were not more fortunate. The troops found themselves surrounded by canals which could not be crossed unless by swimming; and here too they experienced discomfiture. The heavy fire from the walls soon succeeded in silencing the French batteries; and Moncey, repulsed at all points, found it necessary to retreat.

In this affair, the loss of the French amounted to two thousand, while that of the garrison was trifling. Moncey found himself in a situation full of difficulty and peril. In the provinces of Valencia and Murcia alone the patriotic forces were in number about thirty thousand; while there remained of his army scarcely more than

five. Of Chabran and his division he could hear nothing. On all sides he was surrounded by enemies, to whom his defeat at Valencia had lent hope and vigour. His communication with Madrid was intercepted; and, to heighten his difficulties, intelligence was received on the thirtieth that the Count de Serbelloni, Captain-General of the province, was advancing, with a view to oppose his passage of the Xucar, and cut off his retreat.

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In such circumstances, instant and vigorous measures were necessary to secure the safety of the army. The first project which suggested itself to Moncey, was that of crossing the Guadalaviar, and, by entering Catalonia, to secure the co-operation of Chabran and Duhesme. But this was relinquished; and Moncey, sacrificing part of his artillery, put his army in immediate motion, with the view of attacking Serbelloni; and despatched a courier to General Chabran, with intelligence of his retreat. Two marches brought him to Alcira, about a league distant from the position on the Xucar occupied by Serbelloni. The force, under that leader, amounted to about six thousand, and consisted

CHAP. IV. chiefly of armed peasants, who, animated by
 1808. the prevailing enthusiasm, had flocked to the
 July. banners of their country. Both sides of the
 river were occupied by this body; and two pieces
 of artillery were planted for the defence of the
 bridge.

Moncey lost no time in commencing the at-
 tack. The Spaniards, on the French side of the
 river, were defeated with little difficulty; but the
 bridge was found to have been rendered impass-
 able for the army. At length the sluices of a
 canal were opened by the French, in order to
 draw off the waters of the Xucar, and render
 it fordable for the troops. This measure was
 successful. The cavalry crossed the river, and
 making a vigorous charge on the Spanish line,
 Serbelloni, after some resistance, found it neces-
 sary to retreat.

By this success, the only obstacle to the re-
 treat of Moncey was removed; and he continued
 his march to Albacete, where he arrived on the
 Jul. 6. sixth. From thence he retired on Madrid, halt-
 ing at San Clemente. At Madrid the situation
 of Moncey had excited considerable alarm. It
 was known that immediately after Moncey's ad-

vance from Cuenca, the population of that city had risen in arms, and overpowered the garrison. The brigade of Caulincourt was ordered, in consequence, to march from Tarancon to reduce the people to obedience. On his arrival at Cuenca, Caulincourt immediately attacked the insurgent army, routed them with great slaughter, and gave up the town to pillage.

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The division of General Frere was likewise despatched to the rescue of the lost Marshal and his army. Instead of remaining at Albacete, he too marched on Valencia; and, on his arrival at Requena, learned the disastrous issue of the attack on that city, and that Serbelloni was prepared to intercept the retreat of the discomfited army. This intelligence induced Frere to retreat to San Clemente, where he at length effected a junction with Moncey. Preparations were again in progress for an advance to Valencia, but these were interrupted by an order from Madrid for the return of the divisions under Caulincourt and Frere. Marshal Moncey, conceiving himself to be treated with indignity by Savary, in thus diminishing his force, quitted San Clemente, and likewise returned to the capital. Thus ended a series of operations, on the

CHAP. IV. part of the French army, glaringly marked
 1808. throughout by blunder and imbecility.* Certain
 July. it is, that the moral influence of these events in
 Valencia, was felt throughout Spain, and gave
 additional nerve and vigour to the popular re-
 sistance.

* While we venture to impugn the military talents of Marshal Moncey, it is only justice to place on record the following unexceptionable testimony to his moral worth. "We know," says the President of the Junta of Oviedo, "that this illustrious General detests the conduct of his companions. We offer him the tribute of truth and honour; and we invite this generous soldier to aid us, by the addition of his talents and bravery. If the respect which he pays to the mandates of nature, do not permit him to take up arms against his unworthy companions, yet he shall be considered by us as a just and honourable man, and our love and our esteem shall follow him wherever, in the vicissitudes of life, his lot shall be cast."

His must be a low ambition, who does not consider such a tribute, given in such circumstances, as above the value of military fame.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

IN Andalusia the French arms were destined to sustain yet deeper disaster and disgrace. In no part of Spain was resistance to the authority of the intrusive government more general and formidable. Castanos, who commanded the Spanish army stationed at St. Roque, had early opened a communication with the Governor of Gibraltar; and from that fortress had been furnished with supplies of money, arms, ammunition, and equipment. The surrender of the squadron of Rossilly, and the arrival of the auxiliary force of General Spencer, added new vigour to the measures of popular resistance. The efforts of the Supreme Junta, though

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CHAP. V. marked occasionally by indiscretion, were, on

1808. the whole, vigorous and judicious; and it was
June. already apparent that the reduction of Andalusia
would at least be preceded by an obstinate and
severe struggle.

The necessity of immediate measures for the invasion of this important province, appears somewhat tardily to have occurred to Murat. The danger of the fleet, then in harbour at Cadiz, was a circumstance not at all contemplated at Madrid; and the Supreme Junta had, in a great measure, succeeded in exciting the ardour, and organizing the efforts of the people, before the internal tranquillity of the province was disturbed by the appearance of an enemy.

At length decided steps were taken for the invasion of Andalusia. The command of the force destined for this service, was intrusted to General Dupont, who had hitherto remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Toledo. On the twenty-fourth of May, that officer commenced his march, with a column consisting of General Barbou's division of infantry, six thousand strong; two brigades of cavalry, commanded by General Fresia; five hundred marines of the Imperial Guard; two Swiss regiments in the

service of Spain ; and twenty-four pieces of artillery. In addition to this force, General Dupont was to be joined by a detachment from Junot's army ; and he received orders to collect and take with him whatever Spanish troops he might find in the neighbourhood of his route.

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The French army crossed the plains of La Mancha and the chain of the Sierra Morena, without encountering any obstacle in the hostility of the inhabitants. On his arrival at Andujar, General Dupont received information that the whole province was in arms, and that General Avril, whom Junot had detached to his assistance, had been compelled, by the appearance of a British force, to make a retrogressive movement on Lisbon.

Jun. 2.

Alarmed by this unpleasant intelligence, Dupont wrote instantly to Madrid, demanding reinforcements, and took such precautions as circumstances seemed to require for the safety of his army. On the sixth he passed the Guadalquivir, by the bridge of Andujar, and on the left bank of the stream continued his march to Alcolea, where the river is again crossed by the road.

Jun. 6.

In front of the bridge at Alcolea, Dupont, for

CHAP. V. the first time, encountered a Spanish force. It
 was commanded by Don Agostino Echevarria,
 and amounted to about three thousand regulars,
 with the addition of four or five thousand of the
 armed peasantry of the neighbouring villages.
 The bridge was fortified by works hastily con-
 structed, and a battery of twelve cannon on the
 right bank of the river.

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Dupont advanced instantly to the assault; and driving back the Spanish cavalry and infantry on the left bank, stormed the works of the bridge, and, crossing at full speed, gained possession of the village of Alcolea, and of several waggons of ammunition. Echevarria again rallied his troops on the Cordova road, but on the approach of the French cavalry recommenced his retreat.

On the evening of the same day, the French army reached Cordova. General Foy shall describe the scene which followed.

“The French arrived at three in the afternoon, eager to enter those ancient walls which were partly constructed by the Romans, and partly by the Moors. Some musquet shots fired from the tops of the towers increased the irritation of the victors. General Dupont invested the city, and expected to become master of it with-

out a blow. The Prior of a Convent in the suburbs was despatched with pacific proposals to the inhabitants. He presented himself at the gate, but was denied admission. In this city of thirty-five thousand souls, deserted by its magistrates, without recognized leader, stunned by the cries of imprudent men, who rushed on danger while endeavouring to avoid it, several hours would have been necessary to restore tranquillity. The citizens were incapable of hearing. The French General imagined they would not hear. He ordered cannon to be brought up. In a few minutes the new gate was broken open, and the troops were let loose on the city. To some shots which were fired accidentally from the windows, they replied by continued volleys of musquetry. Men in arms, and others who were defenceless, were killed in the streets; churches, houses, even the celebrated Mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral—all were pillaged. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the favourite abode of the Abderamans—the greatest monarchs that ever filled the throne of Spain—now witnessed the renewal of scenes of horror, such as it had never seen since the year 1236,

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when the Moors were driven from it by Ferdinand III. King of Castile and Leon: *dreadful scenes for which no excuse was to be found in the loss sustained by the victors, since the attack of the city had not cost them ten men, and the success of the day only thirty killed and eighty wounded!*"

Such—detailed in language honourable to the writer—were the gratuitous atrocities perpetrated at Cordova by Dupont, whose cruelty and incapacity contributed in no ordinary degree to disgrace the arms of his country. Amid the unpleasant views of human nature, to which the contemplation of such scenes can scarcely fail to give rise, it is consoling to discover how generally cruelty of disposition is united to weakness of understanding, and that the higher qualities of intellect have a natural affinity with purity of principle and generosity of feeling.*

* In contrast with the account given of this inhuman butchery by General Foy—who will scarcely be suspected of exaggerating the atrocities of his countrymen,—we beg to subjoin that of Colonel Napier. “As the inhabitants took no part in the contest,” says that officer, “and received the French without any signs of aversion, *the town was protected from pillage!* and Dupont, fixing his quarters there, sent his patrols as far as Ecija, without meeting with an enemy.”

It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier, *without any quotation of authority!*

The difficulties of Dupont were in no degree diminished by the conquest and massacre of Cordova. The intelligence he received from Cadiz informed him of the surrender of Rossilly. He learned, also, that Castanos, and the army under his command, had declared in favour of the Constitution, and were advancing to invest his position; and that the passes of the Sierra were occupied by bodies of armed smugglers, which cut off his communication with Madrid.* Under these circumstances, Dupont judged it prudent again to retire on Andujar, where he took up his position on the nineteenth. On his arrival, a detachment was immediately ordered to attack a band of insurgent peasantry at Jaen, which, by pressing on his out-posts, and cutting off his detachments, had occasioned considerable

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* The following extract, from an intercepted letter of Dupont to General Beliard, gives a striking picture of the difficulties with which he felt himself to be surrounded at this period. "We have not a moment to lose in quitting a position where we cannot exist. The soldier, all day under arms, cannot, as hitherto, reap the corn and make bread; and all the peasantry have forsaken their homes. For Heaven's sake send us prompt assistance,—send us a strong body of troops,—send us, without delay, medicines and linen for the wounded; for the enemy, for a month past, have intercepted all our ammunition, our wag-gons, and our provisions, from Toledo."

CHAP. V. annoyance. This service was performed with
 1808. success; the town of Jaen was pillaged, and
 June. many of its inhabitants massacred, but the de-
 tachment returned without having been able to
 procure a supply of provisions to relieve the
 necessities of the army. The war on both sides
 had become one of barbarous and wanton
 cruelty. The people sought vengeance for the
 massacre of Cordova; and they found it. All
 prisoners that fell into their hands were mur-
 Foy. dered. At Manzanares, they assaulted the
 hospital and massacred the sick. General René
 was siezed at Carolina, and thrown alive into a
 caldron of boiling water. Other officers were
 sawn in twain. The war of the most savage
 tribes could not exceed in guilt and cruelty, the
 contest of these two *civilized* and *Christian*
 nations.

While at Andujar, Dupont was at length
 joined by the expected reinforcements from Ma-
 drid; and was enabled to muster in the field
 nearly twenty thousand men. But even with
 this force he still continued inactive. Had
 he advanced to Seville, or at once determin-
 ed on evacuating the province, there can be
 little doubt that, in either case, his operations

would have been attended by comparative success. Had Seville not been his object he ought never to have advanced to Cordova. Nothing had occurred after his march from Andujar, which should have had any influence in changing his resolution. To remain at Cordova was to court defeat, to suffer himself to be hemmed in by the insurgent armies, to submit voluntarily to the evils of a blockade. Seville was the chief focus of the insurrection; it contained abundant supplies, possessed a wealthy population, and, by attacking it, Dupont would have aimed a blow at the very heart which had occasioned a strong insurrectionary pulsation through every member of the kingdom.

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On the other hand, there were no obstacles of any serious magnitude to interrupt his retreat. The passes of the Sierra were occupied only by bands of peasants and smugglers, unequal to sustain the assault of regular troops; and, in the plains of La Mancha, he might have awaited the arrival of such reinforcements as would have enabled him successfully to encounter the insurgent forces.

But such views, though they might have had some influence with any ordinary general, had

CHAP. V. none with Dupont. With the main-body of the
1808. army he remained at Andujar; and the division
June, of General Vedel was advanced to Baylen, with
the view of maintaining, uninterrupted, the com-
munication with La Mancha. In the choice of
his position, Dupont displayed little military
judgment. It commanded indeed the main road
from Seville to Madrid, but was liable to be
turned at many points, in the season when the
Guadalquiver became fordable; and at all sea-
sons by the bridge of Marmolexo, about two
leagues lower down the river, and by the ferry
of Mengibar, about twice that distance higher
up. Works, however, were erected for the
defence of the bridge at Andujar; and Dupont,
blind to the real perils of his position, evidently
anticipated that this would become the chief
object of the enemy's attack.

The enemy were not idle. Their commander
was Don Francisco Xavier de Castanos, a gener-
al devoid neither of talent nor experience, and
destined to play a conspicuous part in the pro-
gress of that war of which we have already traced
the commencement. Vigorous preparations were
making in Andalusia and the neighbouring pro-
vinces to attack Dupont; and the circle from

which the supplies of the French army could be drawn was becoming gradually more confined. A body of the insurgents from Grenada had advanced to Jaen, and were preparing to move on Carolina. It was necessary these should be dispersed; and General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel's division, was ordered to advance for this purpose. General Cassagne was successful in his attack on the insurgents, whom he routed after a severe engagement; yet he did not return to Baylen without considerable loss, and a fame blackened by the perpetration of the most horrible enormities.

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June.

In the meanwhile, the organization of fresh troops was proceeding without intermission at Seville. Every hour of delay was bringing fresh accessions of strength to the Spanish army. The inaction of the French army—naturally attributed to timidity—gave new confidence both to the leaders and the people. The army of Castanos, formed into four divisions, was gradually approaching the French army, and narrowing the sphere of its influence on the surrounding country. The first division, commanded by General Reding, was, in number, about ten thousand, and formed the right of the army. The

- CHAP. V. second, about six thousand strong, was led by
 the Marquis de Coupigny, a Frenchman by birth,
 who had served in the Walloon Guards. The
 third division, and the reserve, under Don Felix
 Jones, an Irish refugee, and Don Manuel de la
 Pena, amounted, together, to about ten thous-
 and men. On the ninth of July, it occupied
 a position extending from Carpio to Porcunas.
 On the eleventh, the scheme of operations
 against Dupont was concerted in a council
 of war. At this meeting, it was arranged that
 Reding's division should cross the Guadalquiver
 at Mengibar, and advance on Baylen; that Cou-
 pigny should proceed, by Villa Nueva and La
 Hiquereta, to support the operations of Reding;
 and that the remainder of the army, under Cas-
 tanos, should attack the enemy's position in
 front simultaneously with the meditated advance
 on his rear by Reding and Coupigny. The light
 troops were directed to cross by Marmolexo,
 and gain possession of the passes of the Morena
 leading to Estremadura.
- Jul. 9.
- Jul. 13. On the thirteenth, Reding advanced to Men-
 gibar, and, by a gallant attack, drove the enemy
 from the *tete-du-pont*, and established himself in
 the village, which, on the appearance of Vedel's

division, he judged it prudent to evacuate. On the fourteenth, the force of Coupigny appeared in the neighbourhood of Villa Nueva, and a continued skirmish took place during the day. On the fifteenth, Castanos occupied in force the heights of Arjonilla, and opened an immediate fire with his artillery on the bridge of Andujar. Dupont was deceived by this. He imagined the attack would be made in that quarter, and disposed his army accordingly. The Spanish light infantry, under Colonel Cruz, crossed near Marmolexo, and made an attack on the rear of the French army. This was speedily repelled. Cruz retired with his skirmishers; and Castanos, who had made a simultaneous demonstration in front of the enemy, returned to his position.

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Jul. 15.

The circumstances of his situation appeared, however, to Dupont to become hourly more alarming; and, ignorant of the occurrences at Mengibar, he directed Vedel to despatch a brigade to his assistance. Vedel, who had been strengthened by the arrival of Gobert's brigade at Baylen, either did not understand the order of his leader, or did not choose to obey it. On the evening of the fifteenth,

CHAP. V. he set out for Andujar with his whole division,
 leaving only a small body, under General Leger
 1808. Bellair, to defend the village and ferry of Men-
 July. gibar.

Reding took advantage of this. On the morn-
 ing of the sixteenth he sent forward his skirmish-
 ers as if intending to gain possession of the boats,
 while the main-body of his army crossed the
 river, about half a league above, at the ford of
 Jul. 16. Rincon. The French immediately retreated.
 Reding followed up his success, and drove them
 in confusion from point to point till the arrival
 of Gobert, who, on hearing of the attack, ad-
 vanced immediately from Baylen. The arrival
 of this reinforcement retarded, though it did not
 stop, the progress of the assailants. General
 Gobert was killed. The French were driven
 back into Baylen; and Reding, carrying with
 him a piece of artillery, and all the baggage of
 the detachment, retired to Mengibar. On the
 following day he crossed the Guadalquiver, and
 effected a junction with Coupigny.

No sooner had Dupont received intelligence
 of these events, than, instead of concentrating
 his force at Andujar, he ordered Vedel to return
 on the night following to Baylen, and, uniting

his force with that of General Darfour, who had succeeded Gobert in the command, again to drive the Spaniards across the Guadalquiver. Before his arrival, Darfour had retired to Carolina, in consequence of a report that a body of the Spanish army were advancing on that town by the Linhares road. Vedel was naturally astonished at the sudden and unexpected evacuation of this important post, but relying on the accuracy of Darfour's intelligence, he followed the movement of that general, and likewise fell back to Carolina.

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Jul. 18.

Reding, thus left without an enemy in his front, advanced successively to Baylen and the neighbourhood of Andujar, where he took up a position in rear of the French army, ready to take part in the anticipated attack of Castanos.

Dupont's illusion respecting the strength of his position was at length dispelled. Taking every precaution to conceal his intention from the enemy, he abandoned Andujar on the night of the eighteenth, carrying with him the pillage of the city. By day-dawn he had advanced about five leagues on the road to Baylen, when his advanced-guard came in contact with the Spanish out-posts. Reding, ignorant of the motions of

Jul. 19.

CHAP. V. his adversary, was at that moment forming his
columns of attack on Andujar. The appearance
1808. of the French army took him wholly by surprise,
July. yet all his arrangements were made with prompti-
tude and skill. Reding had formed his army on
the acclivity of a hill, rugged, intersected by deep
ravines, and covered with plantations of olive.
Dupont resolved at once on attack. It was ab-
solutely necessary that he should recover Baylen,
and re-open the communication with the scattered
divisions of his army. He saw at last that the
chances of a battle were less formidable than the
evils of continued inaction, and determined on
the adoption of that policy which, at an earlier
period, would probably have been productive of
a happier issue.

Dupont halted his advanced-guard, and waited
for the coming up of his army, a large propor-
tion of which, encumbered by plunder, were yet a
great way in the rear. Reding lost no time in
attacking that portion of the French army
already opposed to his division, and opened on
them a destructive fire from all his artillery.
The French cavalry at length came up, and were
ordered instantly to charge. They did so with
distinguished gallantry, but without success.

General Dupré was killed in an attack on the Walloon Guards; and though the Spaniards at first lost ground, the cavalry were eventually repulsed with considerable loss.

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On the right of the line the Swiss battalions of either army were brought into conflict. Here the battle was waged on both sides with great vigour and pertinacity. Victory at length declared for the Spaniards. The French were driven back through the whole extent of their line, and were compelled to abandon their artillery.

Fresh reinforcements, however, were continually arriving to the French army from the rear. These, with singular want of judgment, Dupont pushed forward into action as they arrived, thus affording to the enemy an opportunity they did not neglect, of beating his whole army in detail. A marine battalion of the Imperial Guard, which belonged to the reserve of the army, at length came up and overthrew the enemy opposed to it with singular gallantry. A general charge was made by the cavalry, which broke for a moment the Spanish line. But it was found impossible to

CHAP. V. drive the Spaniards from their ground ; and the
efforts of the French army gradually slackened.

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Under these circumstances, two Swiss battalions in the French service, which had already distinguished themselves in the action, went over to the enemy. The troops, fatigued by a long night march, and exhausted by the burning rays of the sun, were unequal to further exertion ; and Dupont, having failed in battle, determined to try the chance of negotiation. This might have been more successful, had not the advance of the army of Castanos, under General La Pena, at that moment attacked the bridge on the Andujar road, which Barbou's brigade had been left to defend. On hearing the report of artillery in the rear, Reding, who had readily accepted Dupont's proposal of an armistice, with the view to the arrangement of a convention, became at once aware of the advantages of his situation, and of the extent of the difficulties by which the French army was surrounded. In the new view thus afforded him of the situation of the armies, he declined the responsibility of granting any terms, and referred the bearer of Dupont's proposals to General Castanos, at Andujar.

The latter was disposed to insist that Dupont should surrender at discretion; yet ultimately consented to a stipulation, that his army should be embarked in Spanish vessels, and conveyed to France.

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During the progress of these disastrous events, the question naturally arises, where was Vedel? It is difficult, on any hypothesis, to account for his conduct. That officer had quitted Carolina at an early hour, and marched on Baylen. As he advanced, the report of artillery became more frequent and distinct, and afforded satisfactory evidence of an engagement having taken place between the armies. About nine o'clock he reached Guarroman, about two leagues distant from Baylen; and in that neighbourhood halted to refresh his soldiers. There he remained for several hours, though aware that the armies were engaged; and when he at length continued his advance, so little did he seem to dread the result of the action, that the brigades of Darfour and La Grange were left on the halting ground.

On approaching Baylen, a body of troops were perceived, which Vedel imagined to be part of the army of Dupont. He was deceived.

CHAP. V. The troops in question were Spaniards; and
 1808. Vedel, on perceiving his mistake, despatched or-
 July. ders for the immediate advance of the troops at
 Guarroman, and prepared to attack the enemy
 in his position.

Reding made every disposition to repel the
 advance of Vedel, and announced, under a flag of
 truce, the suspension of arms, which had already
 taken effect between the Spanish army and that
 of Dupont. In spite of this communication,
 some fighting took place, but without any fa-
 vourable result on the fortunes of the French
 army. At length an order arrived from Du-
 pont, directing a cessation of hostilities. Vedel
 obeyed; and in the course of the night retreated
 to Carolina, bearing with him the prisoners,
 cannon, and standards, which he had captured
 from the enemy.

We now come to the extraordinary catas-
 trophe of these most singular preliminaries. On
 Jul. 22. the twenty-second, the armies of Dupont and
 Vedel, amounting to about eighteen thousand,
 laid down their arms before an army, inferior in
 all military requisites, and not greatly superior in
 numbers.

Never did the chivalry of France receive a

deeper tarnish than in the surrender of Baylen. Occurring in such circumstances, and at such a period, it could not fail to exert a powerful influence on the character and events of the war. All hope of speedy conquest was at once overthrown. Baylen was one of those disasters which the sophistry of Napoleon could neither varnish nor disguise. Eighteen thousand of the French army had laid down their arms, before men whom they had uniformly derided as an undisciplined and cowardly rabble. A blot had fallen on the proud escutcheon of France, which eloquence could not deepen, and certainly could not erase.

Intelligence of this proud achievement flew with the speed of lightning through every quarter of the kingdom, stirring the hearts of the people like the blast of a trumpet. They had now practically learned the animating truth, that the French were *not* invincible; that even by men undisciplined and inexperienced in war, the soldiers, before whose prowess the world had bent in awe, might be encountered and overthrown. The projects of the enemy had not only been foiled, but that enemy had been humbled into submission. The Anda-

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CHAP. V. lusians felt that they had not only conquered the
soldiers of France, but stamped disgrace upon
her arms ; and it would be too much to expect,
from such a people, that they should reduce
their vanity within due limits, and appportion,
to the ignorance and vacillation of the leader
whom they had subdued, their real share of the
exploit. Could those who beheld an army of
eighteen thousand French soldiers, submit to
the ignominious ceremony of depositing their
arms, and afterwards march tamely into captiv-
ity, amid the jeers and insults of a triumphant
and indignant people, retain from that hour
any vehement and pervading terror of the arms
of France ? The plumage of those eagles which,
in other lands, had soared victoriously over fields
of blood and battle, they beheld soiled in the
dust. Against the spoilers of their beautiful
country, against the men who had not hesitated
to support the cause of usurpation by massacre
and outrage, who had trampled, in the inso-
lence of power, on all they held dearest and
most sacred, the heart of every Spaniard was
naturally animated by sentiments of indignant
hatred ; but fear, at such a moment, did not, and
could not mingle in their feelings. The terrors

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of the French arms, for a time at least, were gone. France would require many victories, to efface the memory of that solitary and disgraceful defeat.

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It must be confessed, however, that, to the Spanish cause, the consequences of the victory of Baylen were not wholly beneficial. It contributed to inspire the people with a degree of self-confidence altogether unwarranted by the circumstances of the nation, or the power and character of its invaders. It is well, in such a struggle, that the people should feel confident of victory; but they should likewise be impressed by the necessity of powerful, consentaneous, and persevering exertion. The self-esteem of the Spanish nation, their vague and dreamlike reliance on their own prowess and resources, required no Baylen to rouse them into due influence and activity. Constitutionally addicted to form an exaggerated estimate of their own powers, it became doubly dangerous to undervalue those of their enemy. Of this fault they cannot be acquitted; and of its injurious influence on the subsequent fortunes of the war, the progress of this narrative will afford abundant illustration.

The feelings of Napoleon, on receiving intelli-

CHAP. V. gence of the defeat and surrender of Baylen, may readily be conceived. On their return to France, Dupont, and all the generals of his army, were seized and imprisoned. The former, it has been asserted, died by poison in a dungeon. But why should Napoleon have been guilty of a crime to rid the world of a man like Dupont? To all the nobler purposes of existence he was already dead. He had become a thing for the finger of scorn to point at. The forfeit of his life was not necessary either for the purpose of example or retribution. To such a man death was a refuge, not a punishment. In dying, Dupont would have encountered but the common lot of humanity, the fate alike of the proudest as of the humblest of mankind; but in continuing an inglorious existence, amid the scorn and contempt of his fellow-creatures, he stood forth the marked and solitary object of a terrific retribution.

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July.

Every effort of the French Government was exerted to veil, from public notice, the disastrous circumstances of Baylen. All discussion on the subject was prohibited in the public journals; and it was only after a lapse of four years, that a military court was assembled for the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances of the capi-

tulation. What the result was, is unknown ; but shortly afterwards an Imperial decree appeared, by which the punishment of death was denounced on any general, who should hereafter become party to a capitulation by which the troops of France should, in the open field, be made to lay down their arms.

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July.

By the Spanish authorities, the terms of the surrender of Baylen were shamefully infringed. The troops, instead of being conveyed to France, were imprisoned in the hulks at Cadiz ; and, on their march, little protection was afforded from the fury of the people. Few indeed of these unfortunate soldiers survived the horrors of their confinement. Some years afterwards, a few hundreds, rendered desperate by suffering, cut the cables of their prison-ship ; and, allowing her to drift to sea, under a heavy fire, were fortunately rescued by their countrymen, then blockading Cadiz.

Such was the result of the first invasion of Andalusia.

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN
PROVINCES.

CHAP. VI. **WHILE** the arms of France were thus encountering reverses in the East and South, the most important scene of struggle was in the North. By defeat in the other quarters of Spain, the war was merely prolonged, and the ultimate issue of the contest rendered more doubtful and remote. By defeat in the Northern Provinces, especially in those of Leon and Old Castile, the safety of the French armies, in every quarter of the kingdom, was immediately endangered. The primary basis of operations of the whole armies was Bayonne, and the communication between that city and Madrid could not be interrupted without occasioning, in the words of Napoleon, "an universal paralysis."

 1808.

June.

On the first appearance of insurrection in the North, vigorous measures were adopted by Marshal Bessieres, to restore submission and tranquillity.

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1808.

June.

General Lefebvre Desnouettes was directed to advance from Pampluna to Zaragoza. From Burgos, detachments were sent against Valladolid, St. Andero, Segovia, and Legrono. Of the progress and results of these operations, it is necessary that we should now speak somewhat in detail.

The force destined for the reduction of St. Andero, was placed under the command of General Merle. Before the insurgent army were aware of his having entered the Asturias he had reached Reynosa. While there he received orders to halt, in consequence of an insurrection having broken out in Valladolid, a city whose military importance was incalculably greater than that of St. Andero. To reduce this place to obedience, General Lasalle was despatched by Bessieres with a force of about five thousand men, and six pieces of artillery. He arrived at Torquemada on the seventh of June. Five hundred peasants had obstructed the passage of the bridge with chains and waggons, and taken post in the surrounding houses and in the

Jun. 7.

CHAP. VI. church of Torquemada. The bridge was at once carried by the infantry of Lasalle, the town was sacked and burned, and the flying peasants were pursued and mercilessly sabred by the enemy.

1808.

June.

Jun. 8.

On the eighth, Lasalle entered Palencia. The prayer of the Bishop, that the town should be spared, was granted; and, having disarmed the inhabitants, he proceeded to Duenas on the twelfth. There he was joined by General Merle; and the army, thus strengthened, advanced on the following day to attack Cuesta, Captain-General of the province, at Cabeçon.

Jun. 9.

The force of that General was drawn up on the right bank of the Pisuerga, with the intention of defending the bridge and the town. The French made a vigorous attack in two columns, and were completely successful. The Spaniards were driven with great slaughter at all points, and many plunging into the river were drowned. The loss occasioned to the French, by this engagement, amounted only to twelve killed and thirty wounded; that of Cuesta's army is reported to have been very great, and no quarter was granted by the victors.

Having achieved this victory, the French

Generals continued their advance to Valladolid. CHAP. VI.
 The defeat of Cuesta had left that city at the
 mercy of the enemy. A deputation of the chief
 authorities, headed by the Bishop, came forth to
 solicit clemency, and offer submission. All the
 arms and warlike stores found in the arsenal,
 were sent to Burgos; and fifty hostages, for the
 future obedience of the city, chosen from the
 families of greatest rank and influence, were ex-
 acted by the French Generals.

1808.
 June.

While affairs had put on so pacific an aspect at
 Valladolid, the presence of the French armies
 was required in other quarters. On the six-
 teenth, General Lasalle broke up from Valla-
 dolid, and returned to Palencia. The division
 of General Merle was ordered to resume its op-
 erations against St. Andero; and a brigade, un-
 der General Ducos, was directed to advance by
 Frias and Soncillo, to effect a junction with the
 force under that officer.

Jun. 16.

During his march to Reynosa, where he ar-
 rived on the twentieth, Merle's army encoun-
 tered no opposition. But in the mountainous
 country around the Venta del Escudo, he found
 an insurgent force prepared to oppose his pro-
 gress. They occupied a range of defiles, through

Jun. 20.

CHAP. VI. which it was necessary the French should pass
 on their route to St. Andero; and had the skill
 and vigour of the defence been equal to the
 strength of the position, the French must have
 been unsuccessful in the attempt to dislodge a
 military body so formidably posted.

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 June.

Merle formed his army into three columns, two of which were directed to scale the mountains, and take the enemy in flank, while the third advanced by the road, and made a charge on the front of the position. The Spaniards were driven at all points; several guns were captured; and the pursuit of the flying enemy was continued for some distance along the St. Andero road.

Before reaching the point of his destination, General Merle had another obstacle to encounter. The road between Las Fraquas and Somahoz, is scooped out of the rock for a considerable distance, and is flanked on one side by an almost perpendicular mountain, and on the other by a steep and precipitous ravine. Here the Spaniards had barred the road by an *abattis*, surmounted by four pieces of cannon, and defended by a numerous detachment of their army.

In order to overcome this formidable impedi-

ment, Merle sent out columns on either flank, directing them, by a circuitous route, to take the enemy in rear. These lateral movements were successful. The Spaniards no sooner descried the approach of the columns than they hastily retreated; and the French, without further opposition, entered St. Andero on the following day. In that city a junction was effected with the corps of Ducos, who, on his march, had defeated a considerable body of the insurgents, by whom his progress had been obstructed at the pass of Soncillo.

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June.

These vigorous measures were for a time successful in subduing resistance in the surrounding country; and the chief towns of Leon, Biscay, Asturias, and Navarre, awed into temporary submission, sent deputies to Bayonne, to make formal declaration of obedience to the intrusive sovereign.

The operations against Aragon, were conducted by Lefebvre Desnouettes. The leader of the insurrection in that kingdom was Don Joseph Revollo de Palafox, whose name, if devoted patriotism afford claim of exemption from oblivion, will be pronounced with honour by posterity. Palafox was the youngest of three Cavallero.

CHAP. VI. brothers, and belonged to one of the most ancient and distinguished families in the kingdom. He had accompanied his sovereign to Bayonne; and his loyalty, amid the trying circumstances of the times, had been ardent and unswerving. As Captain-General, he had exerted his authority in suppressing popular commotions, and in organizing an effective system of resistance to the common enemy. In this honourable path his progress was beset with difficulties. Aragon was alike destitute of regular troops, and of arms and ammunition. No province in the kingdom was poorer in defensive resources. She was rich only in the spirit of her people, and in the talent and heroic devotion of her leader. By Palafox every thing was done to give effect to the popular resistance. With the deserters from the regular army in other provinces, he organized new regiments. A body of artillery was equipped for the field; and all who could procure arms, enrolled themselves as his followers.

When Lefebvre was directed to advance against Aragon, the Baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon Guards, was at Calatayud, which he occupied with a battalion of students, and was daily adding to his force by the volun-

1808.

June.

tary enlistment of the neighbouring population. CHAP. VI.
 Palafox was at Zaragoza, from which place he
 detached a body of his army to assist the people
 of Tudela in defending the passage of the Ebro.
 The roads from the neighbouring provinces were
 guarded by detachments of troops, armed and
 organized with as much efficiency as the urgency
 of the juncture would permit.

1808.

June.

On the seventh of June, Lefebvre commenced
 his march from Pampluna, with a force of five
 thousand infantry, eight hundred cavalry, and
 several pieces of artillery. On the ninth, he
 came in contact with the insurgent force at
 Tudela, and routed them without difficulty. With
 unwarrantable cruelty, the leaders of the insur-
 rection were put to death, and the French army
 continued its advance on Zaragoza.

Jun. 7.

Jun. 9.

On learning this disaster, Palafox, with nine
 thousand of his raw levies, and a few pieces of
 badly organized artillery, advanced to Mallen,
 and took post on the rivulet of Huerba. Here
 he was attacked by Lefebvre, and driven with
 slaughter and loss of cannon from his ground.
 Another attempt was made to dispute the pass-
 age of the Xalon, but without success. The
 French army took possession of Alagon on the

Jun. 13.

CHAP. VI. fifteenth, and on the day following appeared before Zaragoza.

1808.

June.

Jun. 16.

Palafox and his army had already retreated to the city, where every preparation for defence was immediately set on foot. He took up a position in the surrounding gardens and olive grounds, and along the banks of the canal; and having planted his cannon to defend the gates of the city, awaited the approach of the enemy. The conflict which ensued was bloody. The insurgents fought without order, yet with a resolution worthy of their cause. A body of the French army forced its way into the city, but was driven back with heavy loss by the inhabitants, who assailed them from the roofs and windows of the houses. The carnage was great on both sides; and Lefebvre, probably little prepared for a resistance so vehement and determined, having dislodged Palafox from his position, withdrew his army, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements.

Zaragoza was a walled, but not a fortified city. It stands in an extensive plain covered with vineyards and olive groves; and, within reach of cannon, is commanded on the south-west by a hill called the Monte Torrero, which forms the

site of a convent. On one side the walls are washed by the Ebro, across which the communication with the suburbs is by a bridge of stone; and at the base of the Monte Torrero, the canal of Aragon runs in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the river. On the east and west, the country is intersected by two tributaries of the Ebro, one of which, the Huerba, approaches very closely to the walls of the city. In summer the Huerba is generally dry; but the winter torrents have worn deeply into the soil, and thus formed a ravine, which is crossed in the neighbourhood of the city by two bridges. The Gallego, a river of considerable magnitude, discharges its waters into the Ebro, nearly opposite to the point of confluence of the Huerba.

The walls, though old, were massive, generally about ten feet high, and built of brick and rough stones. They were, apparently, not meant for the purposes of defence, but merely to enable the civic authorities to levy taxes on every article brought into the town for sale. The gates, which are nine in number, are of the most simple construction, and the alignment between them is, in some places, preserved by the mud-wall of a garden—in others, by convents and

CHAP. VI.

1808.

June.

Vaughan.

CHAP. VI. dwelling-houses, or by the remains of an old
1808. Moorish wall, which has a slight parapet, but
June. without any platform, even for musquetry. The
city is built of brick; the houses are three sto-
ries in height, and the streets narrow and crook-
ed, with the exception of one or two market-
places, and the street called the Cozo, situated
nearly in the centre of the town.

Such was the situation, and such the defensive appliances, of Zaragoza. To an eye merely military, it would probably have appeared incapable of resisting a siege. To one of keener penetration, which saw that all the energies of its numerous population were powerfully roused to the determination of resolute resistance, the cause, though perilous and doubtful, might not have seemed hopeless. But of a defence so gallant and heroic, as that by which the siege of Zaragoza has been rendered for ever historically memorable—of an endurance so unshrinking—of sufferings, which it is even painful to contemplate, no anticipation could have been formed by the most prescient observer.

Palafox, driven into the city, did not relax in his efforts for its defence. He exhorted the inhabitants to continue steadfast to the cause in

which they had gloriously embarked. He besought them to prove, by their actions, that they were worthy of the precious blood which had been already shed in their behalf. He animated them by assurance of victory, but did not conceal the price at which it was necessary it should be bought. Their soil was already moist with the martyr blood of their brethren. The Moloch of tyranny required new victims—"Let us," he said, "be prepared for the sacrifice."

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June.

But the views of Palafox were not confined to the internal defence of Zaragoza. As Captain-General of Aragon, his duties had a wider scope. He had to organize and embody the resistance of the whole province; and, unwilling to hazard every thing on a single contingency, he determined to distract the attention of the enemy from the siege, by another effort from without. He accordingly quitted Zaragoza; and, crossing the Ebro at Pina, with such force as he had been enabled to collect, proceeded to Belchite, where he effected a junction with the corps of Versage. With the army thus collected, amounting to about six thousand men, Palafox immediately advanced to Epila, in order to

CHAP. VI. cut off the supplies of the French army. Some
 1808. of his troops betrayed reluctance again to en-
 June. counter in the field an enemy with whom it was
 already apparent they were unequal to cope ;
 and several of the higher officers proposed re-
 treating to Valencia. Such timid counsels were
 rejected. Palafox offered passports to all who
 chose, at such a moment, to forsake his standard.
 " Let those who love me follow me," was his
 brief but emphatic address to the soldiers :—the
 whole army followed him.

Lefebvre no sooner learned that Palafox was
 in the field, than he advanced to attack him. On
 Jun. 23. the night of the twenty-third the engagement
 took place. The Spanish army were unequal to
 cope with the superior skill and discipline of
 their opponents. Two thousand of their num-
 ber were killed or wounded ; the whole artillery
 was captured ; and Palafox, defeated but unsub-
 dued, retreated to Calatayud. There he re-
 mained for a few days, endeavouring, with un-
 daunted spirit, to re-organize the wreck of his
 Jul. 1. gallant band. On the first of July he again en-
 tered Zaragoza.

In the meanwhile, the army of Lefebvre had
 been joined by that of General Verdier, who

had been successfully employed in the reduction of Lograno, and by some battalions of Portuguese. A heavy battering train was likewise brought up from Pampluna; and the combined force, thus collected for the siege of the city, amounted to about twelve thousand men. On the twenty-seventh, an attempt was made to carry the Torrero by assault, in which the enemy were repulsed with severe loss, leaving six guns and five waggons of ammunition in the hands of the besieged. On the following day, their efforts were more successful; and, owing to the cowardice of an artillery-officer, who afterwards suffered death for his misconduct, the Torrero, and a neighbouring battery, fell into their hands. This misfortune prevented all communication with the city from the south.

The French battering train was now brought into full action on the city. But the increasing danger which surrounded them, only roused the enthusiasm of the inhabitants to a higher pitch. They planted cannon at every commanding point; broke loopholes for musquetry in the walls and houses, and converted the awnings of their windows into sacks, which they filled with

CHAP. VI.

1808.

June.

Jun. 27.

CHAP. VI. sand, and placed in the form of batteries at the
gates. Every house in the environs of the city,
which could afford shelter to the enemy, was
destroyed. The gardens and olive grounds were
even rooted up by the proprietors, wherever they
were supposed to impede the general defence.
Thus was it, that in this noble struggle for free-
dom, all private interests were disregarded.

1808.

June.

The share taken by the women in the memorable defence of Zaragoza, it belongs to history to record. By their voices and their smiles, the men were rewarded for past exertions, and animated to new. Regardless of fatigue and danger, they formed parties for relieving the wounded, and for carrying refreshment to those who served in the batteries. Of these undaunted females, the young, delicate, and beautiful Countess Burita was the leader. Engaged in her blessed work of merciful ministration, with death surrounding her on all sides, she went, with unshrinking spirit, wherever anguish was to be relieved, or sinking courage to be animated. Never, during the whole course of a protracted siege, did she once swerve from her generous and holy purpose. With all a woman's softness

of heart, yet without a woman's fears, she par- CHAP. VI.
took in every danger and every privation—a
creature at once blessed, and bringing blessings.

1808.

June.

It was impossible, in such circumstances, that the defence of Zaragoza could be otherwise than heroic. Where women suffer, men will die. All ranks and classes of society laboured alike in the defence. Mothers, tearless and untrembling, sent forth their children to partake in the common peril, and to perform such labours as their strength would permit. The priests took arms and mingled in the ranks. The ammunition was made into cartridges by the nuns. In Zaragoza all hearts were animated by a sacred zeal in the cause of liberty and their country.

On the night of the twenty-eighth, a powder magazine blew up in the centre of the city, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and two hundred men killed. This has been attributed to treachery, but without evidence. The enemy, however, took advantage of the confusion which such an occurrence could not fail to create, and opened a heavy fire on the city, which continued with little interruption during the whole of the succeeding day.

Jun. 28.

CHAP. VI. In the morning the Portillo gate, and the
1808. castle in its vicinity, became the chief object
June. of attack; and the fire of the French artillery, concentrated on that point, destroyed the sand-bag battery erected for its defence. This, however, was continually re-constructed by the indefatigable labours of the people. Here the carnage was excessive. The battery was repeatedly cleared of its defenders; and so vehement and overwhelming was the fire of the enemy, that the citizens at length stood aghast at the slaughter, and recoiled from entering a scene already glutted with victims.

At this moment it was, that a young female, named Augustina, of the lower class of the people, arrived at the battery with refreshments. She read the prevailing consternation in the countenances of those around her; and snatching a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, she sprung forward among the bodies of the dead and dying, and fired off a twenty-six pounder; then mounting the gun, made a solemn vow, never, during the siege, to quit the battery alive. This animating spectacle revived the drooping courage of the people. The guns were instantly re-manned, and point-

ed with such effect, that the French were re- CHAP. VI.
 pulsed with great slaughter; and having suffered
 severely at other points, Verdier at length gave
 orders for retreat. 1808.
 July.

On the second of July another attempt was Jul. 2.
 made to effect an entrance by the Portillo. A
 strong column advanced toward the gate with
 fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. They
 were received with so destructive a fire, both of
 grape shot and small arms, that their ranks fell
 into disorder; and, dispersing on all hands, no
 further attempt was made on that quarter of the
 city. Another column advanced against the
 gate Del Carmen; and there also the enemy ex-
 perienceed a spirited repulse.

Hitherto the French had remained on the
 right bank of the Ebro. On the eleventh they Jul. 11.
 effected the passage of the river at a ford above
 the city; and Verdier crossed a body of his ar-
 my, in order to protect a floating bridge which
 he was engaged in constructing. This was fin-
 ished on the fourteenth, notwithstanding every Jul. 14.
 effort of the garrison to impede the work. The
 cavalry immediately passed the river; and scour-
 ing the country in all directions, destroyed the
 corn-mills, levied contributions on the villages,

CHAP. VI. and deprived the city of its supplies. The powder-mills of Villa Feliche, from which the city received its supplies, after a severe contest with the corps of Versage, were likewise gained possession of by the enemy.

1808.

July.

Vaughan.

△ But the energy of Palafox, and the fertility of resource by which he was distinguished, did not desert him in these trying circumstances. In the city he erected corn-mills, which were worked by horses, and the monks were employed in the somewhat unclerical and anomalous operation of manufacturing gunpowder. For this purpose all the sulphur in the city was collected; nitre was extracted from the soil of the streets; and charbon was supplied by the hemp stalks, which in that part of Spain are of unwonted magnitude.

By the end of July the city was entirely invested, and its defenders had already suffered severely from want of provisions. But the spirit of the people did not flag. Frequent sorties were made with the view of re-opening the communication with the country; and, emboldened by the arrival of the regiment of Estremadura, which had found its way into the city, an attempt was made to regain the Torrero by as-

sault. This failed; and the inhabitants, despair-
 ing of success in any external effort of hostility,
 determined to remain within the walls of their
 city, and perish, if necessary, in its ruins.

CHAP. VI.

1808.

August.

On the night of the second of August and on
 the following day, the French bombarded the
 city. An hospital, containing the sick and
 wounded, caught fire, and was speedily reduced
 to ashes. Every effort was made to rescue the
 sufferers. Men and women distinguished them-
 selves alike in this work of noble humanity, and,
 rushing amid the flames, braved all danger in the
 high excitement of the moment. It is pleasant
 that the annals of war and bloodshed, may be
 occasionally redeemed by the record of events
 like these.

Aug. 3.

The efforts of the besiegers did not slack,
 though their progress was retarded by the daily
 sorties of the garrison. On the fourth of Au-
 gust, at daybreak, they began battering in
 breach, and by nine o'clock the troops in
 two columns advanced to the assault. One
 of these made good its entrance near the Con-
 vent St. Engracia, the other by the Puerta del
 Carmen, which was carried by assault. The

Aug. 4.

CHAP. VI. first obstacle overcome, the French took the
 1808. batteries in reverse, and turned the guns on the
 August. city. A scene of wild havoc and confusion ensued. The assailants rushed through the streets, and endeavoured to gain possession of the houses. The Convent of St. Francisco and the general hospital took fire, and the flames spread on all
 Cavallero. hands. Many cast themselves from the windows on the bayonets of the soldiers; and the madmen escaping from the hospital, added to the horrors of the scene, by mingling with the combatants—shouting, shrieking, or laughing, amid the carnage.

Wherever the French penetrated they were assailed by a dreadful fire from the houses, all of which had been barricadoed. Dismayed by a resistance so obstinate and destructive, towards evening they lost courage, and retreated in confusion to that quarter of the city which remained in their possession. The terrible events of the day had thinned the ranks of the assailants. Of their number above fifteen hundred had fallen, including several generals.

In such circumstances it was, that the French

General summoned Palafox to surrender, in the following laconic note :—

CHAP. VI.

1808.

August.

Quartel General—Santa Engracia.

LA CAPITULACION.

The answer immediately returned was—

Quartel General—Zaragoza.

GUERRA AL CUCHILLO,

The morning dawned and brought with it a renewal of the dreadful conflict. The French had penetrated to the Cozo, and occupied one side of the street while the Spaniards were in possession of the other. In the centre, General Verdier was seen giving orders from the Franciscan convent. Here a contest almost unexampled took place. War was waged from every house; the street was piled with dead, and an incessant fire was kept up by both parties. The batteries of the Zaragozans, and those of the French were frequently within a few yards of each other. At length the ammunition of the city was nearly expended, yet even this circumstance induced no thought of surrender. As Palafox rode through the streets, the people crowded round him, and declared that if am-

Aug. 5.

CHAP. VI. munition failed they were ready to resist the
 1808. enemy with their knives. Towards sunset, how-
 August. ever, their hopes were cheered by the unexpec-
 ted arrival of Don Francisco Palafox, the brother
 of their heroic leader, with a reinforcement of
 three thousand men.

Eleven days passed, during which this mur-
 derous contest was continued, and new horrors
 were gradually added to the scene. The bodies
 of the slain which were left unburied in the
 streets, had become putrid, and tainted the at-
 mosphere with pestilential odours. This was
 partially remedied by securing the French prison-
 ers by ropes, and pushing them forward into the
 streets, in order to remove the bodies for inter-
 ment.

Aug. 8. On the eighth a council of war was held in the
 garrison, and in that assembly no voice was
 heard for surrender. It was determined to
 maintain those quarters of the city still in their
 possession with unshaken resolution; and should
 the fortune of war be eventually unfavourable to
 their cause, to retire across the Ebro, and, des-
 troying the bridge, to perish in defence of the
 suburbs. There is a moral sublimity in the
 courage of the unfortunate, in that patient and

unshrinking fortitude of the spirit, which enables the sufferer to stand fearless and unsubdued amid the fiercest storms of fortune. The devotion and patriotism of the Zaragozans had been tried by fire, and they came forth pure and unsullied from the ordeal.

CHAP. VI.

1808.

August.

The resolution of their leaders was communicated to the people, and received with loud acclamations. The conflict was continued from street to street, from house to house, from room to room, and with renewed spirit on the part of the defenders. They gradually beat back their opponents, and regained the greater portion of the city. In the meanwhile, Verdier being wounded had retired from the command, and Lefebvre received orders from Madrid to raise the siege, and take up a position at Milagro. On the night of the thirteenth, a destructive fire was opened by the enemy from all their batteries, and many parts of the city were set on fire. The Church of St. Engracia was blown up, and that venerable fane of ancient religion was levelled with the dust. But the night of terror was followed by a dawn of joy. In the morning the inhabitants beheld the distant columns of their enemy retreating discomfited, from one of

Vaughan.

Aug. 13.

Aug. 14.

CHAP. VI. the most murderous and pertinacious struggles
 of which history bears record.

1808.

August.

Thus concluded the ever memorable siege of Zaragoza, and thus was achieved the brightest and most honourable triumph of a people struggling for freedom. "There is not," says Mr. Southey, in a strain of eloquence worthy of the occasion, "in the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded, more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing more than a short respite from their fate? Wo be to the slavish heart that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it utterance! They purchased for themselves an everlasting remembrance upon earth—a place in the memory and love of all good men, in all ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty; they redeemed their souls from the yoke; they left an example to their country never to be forgotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to, and hasten its deliverance."

"Let it not be said," observes General Foy, speaking of the defenders of Zaragoza,

“ that it would have been better to preserve themselves, because at a subsequent period they were forced to yield. Leonidas also died at Thermopylæ, and his death was certain before he went into battle. The glory of Zaragoza is of a similar kind. There too burst forth that religious fervour which embraces the present and the future, the cradle and the tomb, and which becomes still more holy when it is exerted against foreigners and the oppressors of our country. There also was exhibited that sublime indifference to life and death, which thinks of nothing but obedience to a noble impulse; and there the triumph of moral over physical nature was signally achieved.”*

CHAP. VI.

1808.

August.

The retreat of the besieging army left the

* After these writers it is almost painful to quote Colonel Napier. “ It is manifest,” he asserts, “ that Zaragoza owed her safety to *accident*, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants, *was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue.*” CHANCE! Such is the melancholy extremity to which a writer so talented as Colonel Napier is driven, in denying the heroic devotion of the Zaragozans; and the hypothesis has at least the advantage of being one not likely to encounter refutation.

CHAP. VI. Zaragozans in a state of extreme suffering and exhaustion. Yet the privations of their situation were borne without a murmur. Many there were who had been reduced from opulence to abject poverty. Parents had to lament their children, wives their husbands, orphans were cast shelterless upon the world. Yet the voice of wailing was not heard in Zaragoza. Private sorrows were not suffered to disturb the glory of the public triumph. The time of trial and excitement had passed away, yet the fortitude of the brave and devoted Zaragozans remained unshaken.

1808.

August.

Vaughan.

Measures were immediately adopted to preserve the city from infection. The streets and ruins were cleared from their dead. Ferdinand was publicly proclaimed, and rewards were bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves in the struggle. The undaunted Augustina was distinguished by peculiar honours; and Palafox, in the name of his sovereign, granted to the inhabitants of Zaragoza, the exclusive privilege of being perpetually exempted from disgraceful punishment for any cause, save treason or blasphemy.

CHAPTER VII.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

OF the movements in Catalonia we have not yet spoken. It is now necessary we should do so.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

While the reliance of Spain on the faith of her invaders was yet unbroken, Duhesme, who commanded the army of the eastern Pyrenees, had succeeded by fraud and intimidation in gaining possession of the city of Barcelona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy. On its occupation by the French, the garrison of Barcelona amounted to about four thousand men, but so precarious was the tenure by which that city was held by the intrusive army, that Duhesme connived at their escape, and they

CHAP. VII. were suffered silently to depart and unite their
 strength with that of the neighbouring insur-
 1808. gents.
 May.

It was in Manresa that the earliest and most formidable ebullition of popular feeling took place. The inhabitants of that town, regardless of danger, were unanimous in declaring their adherence to Ferdinand; and the decrees from Bayonne, and the edicts of the servile Junta of Madrid, were burned publicly in the market-place. In Tortosa the Governor was murdered by the inhabitants, in the first exacerbation of their loyalty, and Duhesme thought it prudent still further to strengthen his position by the occupation of Lerida. The Spanish regiment of Estremadura, which had joined the French standard, was detached on this service; but the Leridans, with natural distrust, refused admission to their countrymen; and this body, unwilling again to unite themselves with the invaders, were subsequently received into Zaragoza, and bore part in the defence of that city.

There were at this period many difficulties by which the French army in Catalonia were surrounded. The Junta of Gerona was indefati-

gable in stimulating the spirit of the people into overt acts of insurrection. The whole extent of its coast was open to the Mediterranean, and the province was liable at any moment to become the theatre of action for a British army. By the Navy of Britain the insurgents could easily be supplied with arms and warlike stores; and the patriotic cause in Catalonia numbered among its assertors a very considerable body of disciplined and efficient troops.

 1808.

May.

The general population, too, by the constitution of the province were inured to arms. At the signal of the alarm-bell or *Somaten*, every person capable of bearing arms was compelled to appear at certain indicated points of each district, ready to perform such service as the authorities of the province might require at their hands. From this circumstance it was, that the insurgent Catalans were distinguished by the name of *Somatenes*, a body, in point of military requisites, more than ordinarily formidable to the invaders.

Towards the end of May, Duhesme received orders to despatch two bodies of his army to cooperate with those in Valencia and Aragon. General Chabran, with a force somewhat ex-

CHAP. VII. ceeding four thousand men, was accordingly
 1808. ordered to gain possession of Tarragona, and, se-
 June. curing its occupation by a sufficient garrison, to
 proceed by way of Tortosa, and, having incor-
 porated the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his
 division, to unite with Moncey in his operations
 against Valencia. General Schwartz, with a force
 nearly equal in amount to that of Chabran, was
 despatched against Manresa, with orders to in-
 flict punishment on the promoters of sedition in
 that city, and to levy on it a heavy contribution.
 He was then to proceed to Lerida, and, having
 gained possession of the city, to garrison the
 castle with five hundred men; and subsequently
 to join Lefebvre's army in the siege of Zara-
 goza.

Jun. 3. On the third and fourth of June, these two
 divisions set forward from Barcelona. The
 object of Schwartz's movement did not remain
 secret. It was communicated to the people
 of Manresa, by intelligence from Barcelona,
 and they were prepared for his approach.
 The Somaten rung forth the alarm, and the
 peasantry of the country assembled in arms
 at the sound. The strong position of Bruch
 was selected as the scene of resistance, and

the force congregated on that point, were supplied with ammunition from the powder-mills at San Feliche. It was a circumstance favourable to the Somatenes, that the French General was induced by the inclemency of the weather to halt for a day at Martorel, where he arrived on the fifth. When Schwartz, on the day following, advanced to attack the position, he found, to his cost, that the interval thus afforded had not been misapplied. On his approach to Bruch, a heavy fire was opened on his column from the rocks and brushwood which surrounded the road, and his men fell back in confusion. But order was soon restored; and the Catalans, driven from their station, made a hasty retreat to Manresa and Igualada.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

June.

Jun. 5.

Jun. 6.

In such circumstances it was that Schwartz, unfortunately for his military fame, alarmed at the unexpected resistance he had encountered, instead of pushing forward to Manresa, halted his division. Encouraged by this circumstance the discomfited Somatenes rallied in their turn, and became the assailants. Schwartz, still more alarmed at this fresh instance of courage, gave orders for retreat. During this operation, the gallant Somatenes hung upon the flanks and

CHAP. VII. rear of the French army, and the difficulties of
 1808. the latter becoming hourly more pressing, the
 June. ranks fell into disorder; and when they reach-
 ed Martorel, it was in such confusion, and after
 sustaining such loss, that the continuance of
 offensive operations was impossible. On the
 following day the troops re-entered Barcelona.

Throughout the whole province the tidings
 of this victory produced the most powerful ef-
 200. fect. Insurrection broke out on all hands. It
 was no longer with fearful hearts that the inhab-
 itants took arms: they flew to the standard of
 their country in the full hope and confidence of
 victory. Duhesme was soon aware of the peril
 which surrounded him, and despatched orders to
 Chabran instantly to return with his division.
 Jun. 8. On the eighth that general reached Tarragona,
 without having encountered opposition; but his
 retreat was impeded by the Somatenes, who
 already occupied the towns of Vendrell, Ar-
 bos, and Villa Franca. On arriving at Ven-
 drell, a small body of the insurgents, which
 still occupied the place, were immediately at-
 tacked and driven back without difficulty. At
 Arbos the chief stand was made; and Cha-
 bran, on his approach to that town, found

the Somatenes drawn up in position. The coun-
try was open and adapted for the operations
of cavalry; and the superiority of the French
in that arm, gave them an overwhelming advan-
tage. In these circumstances the Catalan army
was defeated, and the town of Arbos was pil-
laged and set on fire.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

June.

Duhesme, in the meanwhile, had judged it
prudent to despatch a reinforcement to Chabran,
which succeeded, on the eleventh, in effecting a
junction with the corps of that officer at San
Feliche. With this addition to his force, Chabran
marched against Manresa, in order to revenge
the disgrace which the gallant Somatenes, in
that neighbourhood, had already inflicted on the
French arms. Unluckily for the success of this
project, the pass of Bruch again intervened.
Since the former engagement every effort had
been made by the Catalan authorities to add, by
artificial means, to the natural strength of the
position. Chabran attacked it, and was driven
back with some loss; and, dispirited by this
circumstance, he retreated to Barcelona, amid
the scoffs of the triumphant peasants, who con-
tinued to harass his march to the very gates of
the city.

Jun. 11.

In every part of the province there was now

CHAP. VII. open and avowed hostility to the French authority. Almost every town possessed its Junta of government ; and the flame of resistance, which had hitherto smouldered in the bosoms of the people, now burst forth in full volume and intensity. The danger of Duhesme became hourly more imminent. The frontier fortress of Figueras had already been attacked by the insurgents, and the garrison were driven from the town into the citadel, and subjected to a rigorous blockade. Thus was Duhesme's communication with France interrupted ; and he determined, without delay, to proceed to the relief of that important fortress. With this view it was necessary that he should gain possession of Gerona ; and he accordingly set out from Barcelona with the brigades of Generals Lecchi and Schwartz, in order to reduce that city. With the view of avoiding Hostalrich, a small fort held by the insurgents, Duhesme advanced by the road leading along the coast, and employed a French privateer, then at anchor in Barcelona, to attend his march.

For this movement the Somatenes were not unprepared. A considerable body had taken post on the heights near Mongat, a small fort, which had been erected on the coast to afford

protection from the inroads of the Barbary Corsairs. In attempting to defend the position thus taken, the Catalans were unsuccessful. The French drove them from the castle, and captured their guns; and another body, which occupied the neighbouring heights of Moncada, were likewise put to flight.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

June.

Jun. 16.

The town of Mataro fell next. The resistance of the people was neither strong nor pertinacious, yet the place was given up to plunder, and the foulest atrocities were committed by the French troops.

Cabanès.

On the morning of the twentieth, Duhesme appeared before Gerona. The suburban villages of Salt and St. Eugenia were occupied and given up to plunder, and preparations were immediately made for the assault of the city. Gerona stands at the confluence of the Ter and the Ona; by the latter of which rivers the city is divided. On the east is a ridge of rocky hills; on the lower acclivity of which, the town is chiefly built, while a smaller portion, called the Mercadal, extends into the plain. On a mountain to the north-east stands the castle of Mont Jouy,* a place regu-

Jun. 20.

* There are in Catalonia two fortresses of that name.

CHAP. VII. larly fortified, and though small, of considerable
 1808. strength. By three other forts connected by a
 June. ditch and rampart, the ridge to the eastward is
 completely commanded. All of these forts are
 within cannon shot of the city, and are separated
 from Mont Jouy by a rivulet and narrow valley.
 The more immediate defences of Gerona consist
 of an old wall with towers, but without ditch or
 platform, and two bastions, situated at the points
 where the Ona enters, and where it departs
 from the city. The Mercadal is fortified by
 a turreted wall with five regular bastions, but
 without half-moons or covered way.

In the city every preparation was made for a
 vigorous defence. The garrison consisted of
 three hundred men of the regiment of Ultonia,
 and a small party of artillery, which had escaped
 from Barcelona on its occupation by Duhesme.
 But the whole population of the city were in
 arms, and ready to bear part in the approaching
 contest.

During the day, two batteries, which had been
 established by the French, opened fire on the
 city, but with little effect; and, as night closed,
 Laffaille. the assaulting column advanced, in a state of
 great disorder, against the bastion of Santa Clara.

The attack was feebly supported. Some of the assailants succeeded in surmounting the wall, but these were charged instantly by the regiment of Ultonia, and hurled back into the ditch.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

June.

Another attempt was made on the gate del Carmen. This too was repulsed with great slaughter; and Duhesme, discouraged by these reverses, made no further attempt to gain possession of the city. The day following was spent in fruitless negotiation; and, foiled alike in artifice and arms, Duhesme judged it prudent to return to Barcelona.

Jan. 21.

The leading Junta of Catalonia was that of Lerida. The authority of that body was generally acknowledged throughout the province; and its endeavours were directed to give effect and organization to the desultory resistance of the people. In pursuance of this object, a communication was kept up with Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic Islands, with Aragon and Valencia; and measures were adopted to collect and discipline a body of regular troops, or, in the language of the country, *Miquelets*, which might meet the enemy in the field with some prospect of success. Eighty *tercios*, or regiments of one thousand men each, were directed to be raised,

CHAP. VII. forty of which were to act as regulars, the remainder as a reserve.

1808.

June.

In measures of such vigour and decision, there was of course much to excite the alarm of the French Government for the stability of their footing in Catalonia. General Reille was accordingly sent forward from Perpignan to the relief of Figueras. His force amounted to about nine thousand men; and having accomplished the primary object of the expedition, he was directed to continue his operations against Rosas and

Jul. 5.

Gerona. On the fifth of July, Reille appeared in the neighbourhood of Figueras, and with difficulty effected the relief of the fortress. On the eleventh, he proceeded against Rosas, a small but fortified town on the coast, and on his route encountered no enemy. The gates of Rosas, however, were closed against his entrance; and on summoning the place to surrender, the messenger was made prisoner, and a shower of bullets from the walls conveyed the answer of the garrison. Reille had no time for a siege. Don Juan Claros had raised the country in his rear, and an immediate retreat became necessary to the safety of his army. This was not effected without loss. The insurgents harassed his march;

and his loss, before reaching Figueras, exceeded two hundred men. CHAP. VII.

In the meanwhile, the insurgents had again occupied the strong country on the right of the Llobregat, from San Boy to Martorel. In order to dislodge them, a force, under General Lecchi, was despatched from Barcelona, which, on the thirtieth, appeared before Molinos del Rey. While the attention of the Somatenes was thus directed to the movements of Lecchi, the brigades of Bessieres and Goulas crossed the river at San Boy; and, taking them by surprise, turned the line of their position. The French thus successful, continued the pursuit to Martorel, plundering and burning the villages through which they passed.

1808.
July.

Jun. 30.

Nearly at the same time, Chabran, having recruited his division by a halt at Mataro, set out from that town to collect provisions in the neighbouring country. Near Granollers he encountered a body of Somatenes, commanded by Don Francisco de Milans, and after an engagement, at most of doubtful success, Chabran fell back to Mataro, harassed on his retreat by the insurgent force.

Jul. 5.

Duhesme, still bent on the reduction of Gero-

- CHAP. VII. na, proceeded to that city by the road along the coast, and encountered new difficulties every mile of his progress. The Catalans had obstructed the road by every possible impediment ; and while his left flank was exposed to annoyance from the insurgents in that quarter, his right was cannonaded by Lord Cochrane in the *Imperieuse* frigate, and by several Spanish feluccas. After passing Mataro, General Goulas, with three battalions, was detached to attack the fort of Hostalrich, with the view of protecting the flank of the army from the continued hostilities of the Somatenes. The attack on Hostalrich failed. Goulas twice attempted an escalade, and was repulsed with loss ; and desisting from further efforts, again joined the army of Duhesme before the walls of Gerona.
1808.
July.
- Jul. 21. The city was invested on the twenty-second ; and, on the day following, the army was reinforced by the division of General Reille. By Duhesme, the capture of Gerona was regarded as certain. A battering train had been brought from Barcelona ; and he is said to have declared, that, on the third day of the siege, the city should be taken—on the fourth, it should be destroyed. There is a homely proverb, by the

recollection of which, Duhesme would have done well to temper his vaticinations. CHAP. VII.

All measures, compatible with the strength of the besieging army, were immediately adopted to cut off external communication with the city. The corps of General Reille was posted at Puente Mayor; and the line of investment extended along the heights of San Miguel to the fords of the Ter, and from thence onward to the Monte Livio.

1808.

July.

The labours of the siege were prosecuted with little vigour. Several batteries were opened, and shells were thrown into the town, but the resolution of the inhabitants remained unshaken. The garrison was reinforced by the arrival of a light-infantry battalion, thirteen hundred strong, which, with two pieces of field-ordnance, entered the city on the twenty-fifth. This raised the spirit of the people to a pitch of exultation seldom to be found in a besieged city. Jul. 25.

Nor were their countrymen without less active and energetic in the cause than the garrison within. The Miquelets of Milans, and the Somatenes, commanded by Don Juan Claros, hovered round the camp of the enemy, attacking all stragglers, and driving back the foraging-par-

CHAP. VII. ties sent out to collect provisions in the neighbouring country. The resources of the besieging army were becoming daily more precarious. Sickness broke out in the camp; and while the city, whose communication with the neighbouring country still continued unbroken, received abundant supplies, the French were, in truth, suffering all the evils of a blockade.

1808.

July.

While matters were in this situation before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, governor of the Balearic Islands, having concluded a treaty with Lord Collingwood, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, landed at Tarragona, with about five thousand men, and thirty-seven pieces of artillery. This produced a great change in the aspect of affairs throughout the province. The Spanish fleet became disposable for the general purposes of defence; and the Catalans, filled with joy at this accession of strength, became inspired with new confidence in the extent of their resources. Many officers, who had hitherto remained passive, and several of the civil authorities, quitted Barcelona, and joined the standard of Palacio. The Supreme Junta immediately repaired to Tarragona; and constituting that city the seat of govern-

ment, appointed Palacio to the chief command of the provincial forces. CHAP. VII.

 1808.

July.

The primary object of the new leader was to strengthen the line of the Llobregat, which had again been occupied by the Somatenes. With this view, the Count de Caldagues, with a force about two thousand strong, was detached to Martorel, where he was joined by the Miquelets, commanded by Colonel Bajet, a patriotic scrivener of Lerida. A part of this force had scarcely taken post at San Boy, when the position was attacked by a body of the enemy, which encountered a vigorous repulse.

An assault on the castle of Mongat was concerted with Lord Cochrane, and executed with complete success. The crew of the Imperieuse bore part in the action; and, relying on the faith of a British officer, the commander of the castle surrendered on capitulation. By this event, about an hundred prisoners, seven guns, and a considerable quantity of ammunition and stores, fell into possession of the victors. Jul. 31.

Secure in their position on the Llobregat, the Spanish army became disposable for the relief of Gerona. But Palacio, deficient in the arm of

CHAP. VII. cavalry, was probably averse to risk the consequences of a general engagement, with troops so palpably inferior in discipline and equipment, to those with whom the palm of victory must, in such circumstances, have been contested. But willing to impede the progress of the siege, he despatched the Count de Caldagues, with four companies of regular troops, three field-pieces, and two thousand Miquelets and Somatenes, to harass the French army in their position, and intercept their supplies. From the fort of Hostalrich, where he halted for some days, the force of Caldagues was increased by the addition of about two thousand of the new levies, and two pieces of artillery. On the fourteenth, he took post at Castella, about two leagues in rear of the French encampment. Here Caldagues was joined by Claros and Milans, and a scheme of joint operations was concerted with the garrison.

1808.
August.
Aug. 14.

The army, thus united, was about six thousand strong; and it was determined, on the following morning, to attack the works of the enemy, who had removed the greater part of his force to the plain on the left bank of the Ona. The batteries in front of Mont Jouy were but slenderly tenant-

ed with troops; and against these, the efforts of the Catalan army were to be principally directed.

CHAP. VII.

1808.

August.

Aug. 16.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the sixteenth, the garrisons of Mont Jouy and Gerona, made a simultaneous sally on the besiegers; and overpowering the French troops opposed to their progress, carried and set fire to the batteries. One of these was for a moment recovered by a fresh column of the enemy; but reinforcements coming up, the battery was again stormed, and remained in possession of the Spaniards.

In the meanwhile, the force of Caldagues advanced in several columns, and driving the French from the heights of San Miguel, attacked their encampment at Camp Duras, and finally pursued them across the Ter.

The advantages of this most brilliant achievement were, fortunately, not lost to the gallant Catalans, by any imprudent prosecution of their victory. Instead of following an enemy, superior in all military requisites, to the open plain, Caldagues, with the prudence of a wise general, remained on the heights, and made preparations

CHAP. VII. to repel the attack which he anticipated on the following morning.

1808.

August.

But Duhesme, dispirited by the defeat he had sustained, thought only of retreat. Under cover of night he put his army in motion; and separating his force from that of Reille, fled to Barcelona, while the latter fell back to Figueras. All his heavy artillery, large stores of ammunition, and even many of the wounded were abandoned. Duhesme did not venture to take the road by the coast; but on learning that an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march, he betook himself to the mountains, destroying his stores, and throwing his artillery over the rocks. Reille was more fortunate, and succeeded in reaching Figueras without hostile impediment.

Of the brilliant victory thus achieved over an army superior in numbers, discipline, and equipment, and commanded by an officer of high military pretensions, the Catalans were justly proud. Duhesme endeavoured to conceal his disgrace by encouraging the belief, that he had retreated, in consequence of positive orders to relinquish the prosecution of the siege. But

St. Cyr.

this report was too improbable to gain credit; CHAP. VII.
 and St. Cyr informs us, that even in the French
 army under his command, "*ce bruit ne trouva*
que des incredules."

1808.
 August.

As a general, Duhesme must stand convicted of gross ineptitude. In his management of the campaign, we can discover no skilful adaptation of means to ends; and his conduct, before Gerona in particular, exhibits a strange mixture of bullying and timidity.* His attacks on the city were foolish, and conducted in a manner utterly disgraceful to a disciplined army. He evidently expected to conquer without resistance; and, deceived in this, he sought immediate refuge in flight. To subdue a brave people he seems to have relied solely on measures of fero-

* Colonel Laffaille, in his work, "*Memoires sur les Campagnes de Catalogne,*" gives some amusing details, illustrative of the vacillation of his leader, during the first attempt on Gerona. The same author informs us, that after the second siege, it even became a question, between Reille and Duhesme, whether the latter should not abandon Barcelona, and fall back on Figueras. But Duhesme knew that the loss of Barcelona could not fail to draw down on him the indignation of Napoleon; and this circumstance overbalanced his fears. Laffaille's information, on this matter, is stated to have been derived from the General himself. It certainly affords satisfactory evidence of the terror the gallant Somatenes had excited in their opponents.

CHAP. VII. cious intimidation. But there is no axiom more true, than that cruelty is not only a moral crime, but a military error ; and we have authority for the fact, that the savage inflictions of Duhesme were beheld, not with terror, but hatred ; and that many of those who, in other circumstances, would have remained neutral in the contest, took arms from despair. At once to conciliate and subdue, is the achievement of a higher intelligence. Fire and slaughter are ever the instruments of a bungler. Let it be the lasting disgrace of Duhesme, that he employed such weapons, and employed them in vain.

1808.

August.

Cabanès.

Such was the issue of the first noble and successful struggle made by the Catalans for the liberation of their province. At the end of August, 1808, the French, defeated at all points, remained only in possession of the city of Barcelona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy.

CHAPTER VIII.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

GALLICIA possessed many advantages as a theatre of resistance to the usurping government. Its surface was rugged and mountainous, difficult of access, and easy of defence ; and, removed from the immediate sphere and influence of the arms of France, it was yet sufficiently near to interrupt, by a single successful operation, the most important line of her communication. From its numerous seaports, the intercourse with England was easy and rapid ; and Galicia may be said to have been the heart by which the vital succours of Britain were circulated through the great body of the Spanish people. The population of Galicia is hardy and vigorous beyond that of any other province ; and, driven by the poverty of their

 1808.

CHAP. VIII own country to seek employment abroad, these
1808. gallant and athletic mountaineers had become, as
June. it were, the Parias of their wealthier neighbours, and might be found throughout Spain, engaged in every labour requiring powerful exertion, and continued bodily endurance.

In Galicia, the spirit of resistance to French authority was no less resolute and pervading than in the other provinces. The assembling and training of new levies went vigorously on; and the strong mountainous position of Manzanal, in the neighbourhood of Astorga, was fortified by intrenchments, to serve as a station of defence. The leader of the Gallician army was Don Antonio Filangieri, Captain-General of the province, whose prudence and circumspection, in the first burst of national enthusiasm, had excited popular indignation. By his energy and military knowledge, he had subsequently rendered good service to the patriotic cause; but the suspicions of the people were never wholly eradicated,—and Filangieri died by assassination.

Don Joachim Blake, an officer of Irish extraction, succeeded him in command. During the month of June, the forces of the province were assembled at Lugo; and their num-

bers were materially increased by the return of Taranco's army from Portugal, and by five thousand Spanish prisoners whom England had debarked in Gallicia, in a state of complete equipment for service.

CHAP.VIII

1808.

July.

Cuesta, after his defeat at Cabezon, had rallied the army of Castile, and taken post at Benevente. There he was joined by Blake, who, leaving only one division of his army to secure the position of Manzanal, reached Benevente on the sixth. It was the intention of Bessieres, if possible, to prevent this junction by a sudden attack on Cuesta; but, disappointed in this object, he made immediate preparations to encounter the combined armies in the field. On the ninth he quitted Burgos with the reserve. On the tenth he reached Palencia, where he collected the scattered columns of his army, and was joined by the division of General Mouton, which had advanced from Bayonne to replace the portion of the army engaged in the siege of Zaragoza. The force thus assembled, amounted to about fifteen thousand men, with thirty-two pieces of artillery.

Jul. 6.

No sooner had Cuesta been reinforced by the

CHAP. VIII junction of the Gallician army, than he publicly
 1808. announced his intention of advancing to Valla-
 July. dolid. On the prudence of this project, differ-
 ences are understood to have occurred between
 the generals. Blake, aware of the superior dis-
 cipline of the French troops, and of the great
 advantages they possessed in point of cavalry,
 was unwilling to advance into the plains, and
 try the hazard of a battle. He urged the policy
 of retiring to a strong position in the moun-
 tainous country of Leon or Galicia, which, with-
 out a large reinforcement of his army, it would
 have been impossible for Bessieres to attack.
 But the more prudent counsels of Blake were
 overruled by Cuesta, on whom, as senior officer,
 the chief command had devolved. The Spanish
 army were put in motion; and leaving a divi-
 sion at Benevente, proceeded in a direction
 which threatened Burgos and Valladolid.

Jul. 12. On the night of the twelfth, the army of Bes-
 sieres set out from Palencia. On the thirteenth
 it halted in a position extending from the Torre
 de Marmojas to Ampudia. In the evening,
 Marshal Bessieres received intelligence that the
 enemy were at Medina del Rio Seco. Before

day-dawn on the fourteenth, his army, formed in two columns, was on the march to attack them. CHAP. VIII

The strength of the Spanish army has been variously represented. Amid conflicting statements, it may reasonably be assumed to have amounted to about twenty-five thousand infantry, with a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery. The body, thus formidable in point of numbers, was drawn up in two lines; the first of which, supported by a strong artillery, ranged along the summit of a plateau, with a considerable declivity towards the French army, formed by the overflowing of the rivulet Sequillo during the rains of spring and winter. The country around was flat and cultivated, and divided into enclosures by stone walls. The second line was placed about a mile in rear of the first, and extended greatly beyond it on the left. In this were stationed the best troops; and the remainder of the artillery was ranged in the centre. The position of the cavalry was somewhat in rear of the first line, and within a short distance of the road.

 1808.

July.

The disposition of the Spanish army gave ad-

CHAP. VIII advantages to Bessieres, which he did not neglect.

1808.
July.

The great distance intervening between the lines afforded an opportunity of dividing them; and, with this view, while the brigades of Sabathier and Ducos advanced in column of battalions to attack the front of the position, the divisions of Merle and Mouton took the enemy in flank, and the front line of the Spaniards was instantly broken, and driven from its position with great slaughter. Nearly at the same time, the cavalry was charged by General Lasalle, and instantly put to flight.

Under these unfavourable circumstances, a gallant attempt was made by Cuesta to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Two columns of attack were directed to advance from the second line, in order to regain the plateau. That on the right made a vigorous and successful charge on the enemy, and drove him back in disorder. Part of Mouton's division was likewise assailed by the Spanish cavalry, and compelled to retreat; but a body of the imperial guard advancing to its assistance, the Spaniards in turn were forced to give ground.

The attack of the second line, however, was

vigorous ; the French were losing ground, and several of their guns were already taken. But the right column of the Spaniards had not been supported in its advance by the left, and from this circumstance its flank was unprotected. Of the opportunity thus afforded Bessieres took immediate advantage. The exposed flank of the column was charged by the division of Merle ; and the Spaniards were driven back in irretrievable confusion. An attempt was made to rally in the town of Rio Seco, but without success. It was carried by Mouton's division at the point of the bayonet ; and the cavalry continued charging the fugitives with great slaughter, along the road to Benevente. The division of Blake was the only portion of the army which retreated in tolerable order.

 1808.

July.

In this unfortunate action, the loss of the Spanish army was about five thousand. Fifteen pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of ammunition were taken on the field. On the part of the French, the victory was earned with little expense of life. Their loss, in killed and wounded, is said to have amounted only to one hundred and twenty-five of the former, and four

Foy.

CHAP. VIII hundred of the latter. By another account it is
 estimated at eight hundred.*

1808.

July

The battle of Rio Seco, though unfortunate, was far from dishonourable to Spanish prowess. The proximate cause of defeat was, unquestionably, the unskilful disposition of the army, which exposed it to be beaten in detail. Under circumstances the most unfavourable and dispiriting; the second line of the Spaniards fought with a courage and pertinacity worthy of a better general, and a more fortunate result. The advantage of the French, in point of cavalry, was counterbalanced by nothing in the position of the Spanish army. The latter fought in front of a defile, and were simultaneously attacked both in front and flanks. That, after the defeat of the first line, the issue of the battle should even for a time have become doubtful, is a circumstance honourable to the courage of the Spanish troops. No general of sound discretion would have given battle in the circum-

* It is stated by Mr. Southey, on what he calls "*the best authority*"—that of the neighbouring priests—that the number of slain, alone, in the battle, amounted to twenty-seven thousand. Were it worth while, the extravagance of this calculation might be easily demonstrated by a *reductio ad absurdum*.

stances, and in the situation selected by Cuesta. CHAP. VIII

His true policy, unquestionably, was, to have remained in the mountains of Leon or Galicia,*

1808.
July.

* We learn from the valuable appendix to the history of Colonel Napier, that the anxiety of Napoleon, with regard to the issue of the operations of Bessieres, was intense. In his communications to Savary, he uniformly expresses his conviction, that Leon and Galicia were the only points from which a vital stab might be inflicted on the power of France in the Peninsula. In one letter he says, "Le but de tous les efforts de l'armée doit être de conserver Madrid. C'est là qu'est tout. Madrid ne peut être menacé que par l'armée de Galice."—"Un échec que recevrait le General Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec que recevrait le Marechal Bessieres serait plus considerable et se ferait sentir à l'extrémité de la ligne."

In another document we find the same opinions even more strongly expressed:—"Q'importe que Valence soit soumis? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumis? Mais general le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconveniens immenses."

The following extract, from a note dictated by the Emperor, will shew his opinion of the difficulties which must have attended the invasion of Galicia:—"S'il (Bessieres,) obtenait a Benevente et a Leon un grand succes contre l'armée de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire, et de la terreur de premiers moments, de se jeter dans la Galice."

So hazardous a measure, as entering Galicia with so limited a force as that of Bessieres, is here considered by Napoleon as only advisable in case Bessieres should previously have achieved a great victory, and the movement could be effected before the "terreur de premiers moments" should have subsided. It is therefore evident, that had Blake and Cuesta retired, without fighting, to the Gallician mountains, the French army would not have ventured to attack them.

CHAP. VIII where, in an intrenched position, he might have
 1808. bid defiance to any force with which Bessieres
 July. could have assailed him. If we assume him—as
 we must do—to have been aware of the events
 then passing in the south, his conduct becomes
 still more censurable. Though, possibly, he
 might not have foreseen a success so brilliant
 and decisive as that of Baylen, yet he might,
 and ought to have known, that the situation of
 Dupont was one of almost irretrievable difficulty
 and danger, and to have calculated on the pro-
 bability of the army of Castanos being speedily
 disposable for more distant and extended opera-
 tions. But relying on the numerical superiority
 of his troops, Cuesta forgot that more than half
 of these were nothing better than raw and un-
 disciplined levies, and advanced into the open
 country to encounter an enemy, with whom,
 when unassisted by strong advantages of posi-
 tion, it was abundantly evident he was unequal
 to cope.

After the battle of Rio Seco, the differences
 which had existed between Blake and Cues-
 ta, occasioned the immediate separation of their
 forces. The former fell back on his posi-
 tion at Manzanal, while Cuesta marched for

Leon. Neither were pursued. The energy of Bessieres seemed to have evaporated in the battle; and General Lasalle, who, with the cavalry, was engaged in full pursuit, received orders to return. During the fourteenth and fifteenth, the army halted at Rio Seco, and subsequently, by easy marches, advanced to Benevente, which it did not reach till the twentieth. In that city he remained till the twenty-second, when he proceeded to Mayorga, where his army was reinforced by the addition of ten thousand men.

CHAP.VIII

1808.

July.

Jul. 22.

Cuesta had left Leon for Toro and Salamanca; and Bessieres received orders to follow Blake into Galicia. With this view, he had advanced to Puente Orvigo, when intelligence reached him of the defeat of Baylen. By this event, an entire change of operations was rendered necessary.

CHAPTER IX.

ADVANCE OF JOSEPH TO MADRID.

CHAP. IX.

1808.

June.

THE assembly of Notables lent themselves, as might be expected, to all the purposes of the Emperor. The organization of this body was regulated by the Supreme Junta of Government; and the Church, the army, and the nobility of the higher and lower orders, sent their quota of representatives to bear part in the solemn farce about to be enacted at Bayonne.

Jun. 7.

On the seventh of June, the intrusive monarch of Spain arrived on the scene, and received the homage of all the Spanish deputies already in the city. These formed themselves into classes, according to their respective ranks, and waited on the new sovereign with addresses of congratulation.

The fifteenth was the day fixed for the con-
 vocation of the Notables. The meeting consist-
 ed of eighty-six members. Don Miguel de Az-
 anza, ex-minister of finance, was appointed Pres-
 ident, and Don Mariano Louis d'Urquijo, Vice-
 president and Secretary. Both were men of tal-
 ent, both were of the party of Ferdinand; but
 considering the Bourbon dynasty at an end, and
 hoping to extract benefit to their country even
 from her misfortunes, they were willing, in the
 necessity of the times, to transfer their allegiance
 to the new monarch.

CHAP. IX.

1808.

June.

Nellerto.

The character of Joseph seemed eminently
 calculated to allay the popular antipathy to the
 new government. Mild and generous in dis-
 position, pleasing in manners, with a mind en-
 larged by study, and a knowledge of the world
 rarely within the reach of hereditary monarchs
 to acquire, he apparently possessed every quality
 by which the happiness of his subjects could be
 promoted or ensured. Under a new dynasty,
 the evils of former misgovernment might be cor-
 rected. The institutions of antiquated tyranny,
 which had hitherto retarded the advance of
 Spain in knowledge and civilization, might be re-
 placed by others better fitted to draw forth her

CHAP. IX. resources, and enable her to reassume that rank
 1808. among nations which her natural advantages en-
 June. titled her to hold. Napoleon had promised
 Spain a constitution, which should separate the
 treasure of the state from the property of the
 king ; which should draw a salutary line of de-
 marcation between the legislative and executive
 powers, and establish the independence of the
 judicial order : a form of government, in short,
 which should encourage the diffusion of know-
 ledge among the people ; science, commerce, ag-
 riculture, and the arts ; all that can increase the
 wealth of a nation, or lend grace to its enjoy-
 ment.

It was natural that those who anticipated such
 benefits from the accession of Joseph to the
 throne should support his cause. Yet it is
 now evident they reasoned falsely, and regu-
 lated their conduct on principles inapplicable
 to the circumstances of their country. They
 either knew little of the temper and spirit of
 the Spanish nation, or knowing, underrated its
 energy. They might and should have known
 that the hearts and voices of the people were in
 favour of their ancient dynasty ; that a constitu-
 tion, however excellent, is not to be thrust on an

unwilling nation by the bayonet, or disseminat-
 ed from the cannon's mouth. A nation cannot
 be bullied into freedom. They must know and
 feel their rights, before they can enjoy them;
 and, least of all, can this sense of their privileges
 be successfully imparted to a people by a series
 of proceedings, in themselves a violation of them
 all. In supporting the cause of the intrusive
 monarch, these men betrayed, without benefiting
 their country. They contributed, what in them
 lay, to spread war and havoc through her pro-
 vinces. The course they followed was devious,
 yet not smooth; it was not the path of loyalty,
 nor of freedom—scarcely that of honour. Never
 were the calculations of the wise more effectually
 put to shame, by the honest, unswerving firm-
 ness of the ignorant. Yet surely not in this igno-
 rant, that they acted on a deep sense of
 inalienable right, and rather than their native
 soil should be defiled by the tread of the op-
 pressor, bedewed it with their blood.

Let us not, however, be unjust. That many of
 those who supported the new dynasty by their in-
 fluence and counsels, did so from pure and consci-
 entious motives, we know from their private cor-
 respondence; and we know also that many, in

CHAP. IX.

1808.

June.

Nellerto.

CHAP. IX. the long and fearful struggle which ensued, nobly redeemed their error by joining the standard of their country, and hazarding life and fortune in her cause.*

1808.

June.

One of the first acts of the council of Notables was to recognise Joseph as king of Spain and the Indies, and present an address of congratulation. The reply of the intrusive sovereign gave expression to sentiments of moderation and benevolence which might confer honour on the most *legitimate* of despots. He wished only to reign, he said, for the good of Spain. To that object should all his efforts be directed. He would not cross the Pyrenees as the partisan of a party. All his subjects had a right to equal justice, and they should all enjoy it. He knew the honour and generosity of the Castilian character. It was his ambition to be regarded as the father, not as the tyrant of his people.

While Bayonne thus presented the extraor-

* Among others, the Duke del Infantado and the Marquis de la Romana. Nellerto gives several letters of the latter, in which he declares the new dynasty to be a *blessing* to his country. That such was, at this period, the real opinion of this distinguished patriot there can be little doubt. That he soon changed it there can be less. Yet the tenor of his letters proves that even Romana could play the sycophant.

dinary spectacle of the proudest nobility of Europe, bending in humility before the throne of a plebeian monarch, a circumstance yet more extraordinary gave completion to his triumph.— Ferdinand broke the silence of his retreat at Valencey, in order to congratulate Joseph on his assumption of regal authority. In his own name, and in that of his brother and uncle, he again publicly renounced all pretension to the crown, and felicitated the Spanish nation on the accession of a monarch, adapted, by his talents and his virtues, to promote their prosperity. It is in vain for the advocates of legitimacy, to attempt to palliate the imperishable tarnish of such a document, by attributing it to necessity or violence. Disgrace is never necessary to a brave man; and no one of a spirit prouder than that of a Spanish Bourbon, but would have preferred death to the ignominy of a humiliation so degrading.

The proceedings of such a meeting as that assembled at Bayonne, can possess little interest. At all events, their acts were few, and may be soon enumerated. They acknowledged Joseph as their king; enjoined obedience to his authority; accepted, with trifling modifications,

CHAP. IX.

1808.

July.

Nellerto.

CHAP. IX. the constitution tendered by Napoleon, and regulated the law of future succession to the monarchy. This done, their part in the performance was at an end.

1808.

July.

Before crossing the Pyrenees, Joseph proceeded to appoint his officers of state. To avoid exciting national jealousies, he determined to enter Spain with but a small retinue of Frenchmen. All the important offices connected with the administration were filled by Spaniards. The Prince of Castel Franco, the Dukes Del Infantado, Parque, and Hajar, the Marchesses de Santa Cruz and Hariza, and the Counts de Fernan Nunez, Orgaz, and Castelflorido, and other great names of the monarchy, were invested with the dignities of the new court. The choice of ministers was judicious. Among the number were Azanza, Urquijo, Jovellanos, Mazaredo, and Cevallos. Men more distinguished in talent, or who possessed a higher place in the esteem of their countrymen, Spain did not afford. Blind to the dangers which awaited them, all were ambitious of taking office under the new government, and of giving public demonstration of their zeal in its behalf.

Surrounded by the grandees, and followed by

a numerous suite of noble and distinguished Spaniards, Joseph at length set forth on his journey to Madrid. On entering Spain, he was greeted in every city with congratulations by the civic and provincial authorities; but the people were gloomy and silent. It was the moment when Blake and Cuesta were marching to engage Bessieres, and all hopes were engaged in the event of the approaching contest. Should the Spanish army be victorious, no doubt could be entertained that the usurper would be compelled to re-enter France; and, under such circumstances, all were glad to shun the necessity of compromising their principles or safety, by any shew of allegiance to his authority.

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1808.

July.

On the day of the victory of Rio Seco, Joseph entered Burgos, and by that event all obstacles to his further advance were at once removed.—

On the twentieth he arrived at Madrid. The municipal authorities came forth in their robes to greet his approach; the houses by which he passed were hung with rich tapestry; laurels over-arched the streets; and it was amid the deafening and joyous clamour of bells, cannon, and military music, that the new monarch entered his capital. All was loud, save the

Jul. 20.

CHAP. IX. voices of the people. As the cavalcade passed
onward to the palace, the streets were silent
and tenantless. The citizens hid themselves in
their houses, as if unwilling to behold the living
image of their country's degradation. They
well remembered—could they forget?—that the
throne of this plebeian successor of the Bour-
bons was based on fraud, perfidy, and massacre.
The streets through which he rode in triumph
had been reddened with the blood of their coun-
trymen. Was it in the nature of the haughty
and revengeful Spaniards to forget this? Had
a few short weeks obliterated from their mem-
ories all records of the second of May? No!
The people of Madrid did not disgrace the cause
of honour, loyalty, and justice, by bending at
the chariot wheels of their oppressor. They
were, indeed, told that the new monarch came to
regenerate the country, to reform the abuses of
a government with which the nation were con-
tented, proffering immunities which they wanted
not, and a freedom from oppression which they
had seldom practically felt. But were they to
believe that pure waters could flow from so cor-
rupt a fountain? Was it possible that the u-
surper, whose very presence in their capital was

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in itself an insult and an outrage; in whom they saw only the tool and minion of an ambition which trampled on all human rights; to which no impediment was sacred, and which recklessly pursued its course, desolating and to desolate, could be greeted by the Spanish nation as the apostle of concord, the chosen minister of blessings, the saviour of their bleeding and lacerated country?

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This was scarcely to be expected. The Spanish government, though despotic, was not oppressive to the great body of the nation. The nobles, almost uniformly attached to the Court, were seldom resident on their estates, which were occupied on easy terms by a flourishing tenantry. The administration of church property was also highly favourable to the peasantry, who suffered little from the impositions of the state, and constituted a body, hardy, warlike, and independent, and attached to a government under which, for a long succession of ages, they had lived tranquil and contented. By them the evils of despotism were but little felt; the trammels on mental freedom narrowed none of their enjoyments; and the victims of the inquisition were generally taken

CHAP. IX. from a class with which they had little communion either of interest or feeling.

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To a people thus situated, the prospect of political regeneration possessed but little charm. Without knowledge, but that taught by their priests, who inculcated the most slavish doctrines, both political and religious, to them a free constitution was, in truth, nothing but a name. No adage is more true than that a people to be free must be enlightened. The sun of liberty does not rise in the zenith, nor pour down the full flood of his unclouded radiance on regions dark and benighted. The twilight of doubtful struggle must precede his appearance. It is by slow degrees that the clouds which obscure his rays are illuminated and dispelled, till at length, mounting in the horizon, he displays the full measure of his glory and effulgence.

The first acts of Joseph on his arrival at Madrid, were directed to attain that popularity of which he evidently stood in need. Alms were profusely distributed to the indigent. Bull-fights were exhibited, the theatres thrown open, and every art was employed to secure the "sweet voices" of the uncourteous populace.

The Council of Castile, in common with all the authorities of the kingdom, were directed to take the oath of fidelity to the new monarch. This, with some inconsistency,* yet with honourable spirit, the Council declined, and the members of it were, in consequence, excluded from the grand fete, at which the monarch had decided on receiving the congratulations of his more distinguished subjects.

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On the twenty-fourth, Joseph was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, with every circumstance of pomp and magnificence. On that occasion, however, the Count d'Altamira, the head of one of the most ancient families of Europe, declined performing the functions of his office, as grand standard-bearer, and that duty was, in consequence, discharged by the Marquis del Campo d'Allange, a grandee of principles more pliant and accommodating.

Jul. 24.

With these petty exceptions, all went smoothly at Madrid. The oath of allegiance was taken by the grandees and dignitaries of the kingdom; and the prelates testified their zeal, by offering

* The Council of Castile, in several of its acts, had already recognised the new dynasty.

CHAP. IX. personal congratulations to the new tenant of
the throne on his assumption of the sceptre.

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But a storm was gathering in another quarter, which suddenly overcast the French horizon at Madrid, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in that city. Intelligence arrived of the surrender of Dupont. The moral influence of this event was not less strongly felt in the capital than in other parts of the kingdom. Many, who in the prosperity of the invaders had joined their cause, now deserted it on the first symptom of misfortune. The Dukes del Parque and Infantado escaped from the city in disguise, and joined the insurgents. Cevallos, who, in the course of little more than two months, had sworn allegiance to three monarchs, again deserted his colours and enrolled himself as a patriot. These were evil omens. The capital was now open to the armies of Andalusia and Valencia; and it was reported that the former was within a few marches of the city. The Court were terror-stricken. A council of war was immediately assembled; and Savary, by whom Murat had been succeeded in command, proposed to garrison the Retiro, and attack the Spanish armies in succession, as they advanced to Madrid. But

more timid councils prevailed. It was deter- CHAP. IX.
 mined to abandon the capital and retreat behind
 the Ebro.

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Thus, after a short but fierce struggle, had the Spaniards, by their own unaided valour, succeeded in freeing nearly their whole territory from the presence of the invaders. This success had been achieved against the first army of Europe, commanded by the greatest generals of the age. At the commencement of hostilities, we know that the French forces in Spain amounted in number to one hundred and fifty thousand men. These, by the energetic courage of the people, had been driven back and discomfited. Not a foreign bayonet had been drawn in their cause. Whatever honour may attach to so splendid an achievement, must exclusively be given to the Spanish people. It is theirs and theirs only. Let this be the answer to those who accuse the patriots of lukewarmness, in the cause which they so gallantly and perseveringly maintained. In truth, considering the disadvantages under which they laboured, the wonder is, not that they did so little, but that they achieved so much. It was manifestly impossible, that a body of undisciplined levies, miserably armed and

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equipped, without experienced leaders, and deficient in the arms of cavalry and artillery, could successfully contend with the French armies in the field. No sophistry, therefore, can be more gross, than that of those reasoners, who argue that the Spanish people were indifferent to the cause of freedom, because their armies were frequently defeated in the field. The memory of Baylen, Valencia, Zaragoza, Bruch, and Gerona, will bear imperishable record of the national ardour and perseverance, and give the lie to those who would basely injure the cause of freedom, by vilifying the character of its defenders.

Yet, he would judge erroneously of the character of this memorable struggle, who should form an estimate of the amount and vigour of the hostility of the Spanish people, by an exclusive reference to the operations of their armies. These, in truth, formed but a small part of that widely extended system of destructive warfare, by which the French were encountered in the Peninsula. Wherever any detachment of their armies could be overpowered by the peasantry, they were attacked and massacred. All stragglers perished. The motion of large masses was continually required, to keep open the commu-

nication of the different corps, and protect their convoys. The expense of life, by which the invaders were enabled, at any period, to hold military possession of the country, was enormous. Throughout the whole contest, there was a spirit of fierce and unmitigated hostility abroad, in every quarter of the kingdom; an enmity which never slumbered nor slept, which was in continual and almost universal action, and which wasted, like a pestilence, the strength of the invaders.

Though the Spaniards owed much of the success which crowned their efforts, to their own zeal and courage, it must be confessed, that some portion of it is attributable to the blunders of their opponents. The French were evidently unprepared for the degree and character of the resistance which they encountered in the Peninsula. They regarded the people with contempt, and were consequently led to attempt important objects, with inadequate means. Defeat was the penalty of these ignorant miscalculations.—Something of gratuitous tarnish, something even of dark and memorable disgrace, may have been cast on the national arms, by the misconduct and timidity of those intrusted with command;

CHAP. IX. but it is unquestionable, that the disasters, in

1808. which their operations so often terminated, are
July. greatly attributable to those who directed the
conduct of the war. Objects of vast impor-
tance, which, by an effort of competent magni-
tude and vigour, might have been secured to
the invaders, were lost; and all the moral con-
sequences of failure were hazarded with an im-
prudent rashness, of which the subsequent details
of this narrative will abundantly display the
results.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL.

IN Portugal, the measures of the usurping government were not of a character to conciliate the affections of the people. The invaders had at once thrown off the mask. The ancient dynasty was proclaimed to have forfeited the throne. The pictures of the Braganzan monarchs were torn from the walls of the palace, with circumstances of public indignity. Contributions of inordinate magnitude were exacted from the people. The artifices which had been adopted in Spain, to blind the nation to the real views of the usurper, were considered unnecessary in Portugal. That country was too limited in territory, and too feeble in resources, to excite the fears of Napoleon; and there no attempt was

CHAP. X

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June.

Observador
Portuguez.

CHAP. X. made to exhibit usurpation in the semblance of
 justice.

1808.

June.

Foy.

In the eyes of the French government, a people so little formidable, had no claim to mercy or forbearance. "Of what use is it," asked the minister of Napoleon, in a letter to Marshal Junot, "to make promises which you cannot perform. Nothing, undoubtedly, can be more laudable, than to conciliate the confidence and affection of the people; but do not forget that the safety of the army is a paramount object. Disarm the Portuguese; maintain a strict watch over the soldiers, lest they become the nucleus of insurrection. Watch too the Spanish troops. Guard the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and too populous a city, and the population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it. Hut them on the sea coast. Keep them exercised, disciplined, and collected in masses, that they may be always ready to encounter the English army, which, sooner or later, will be landed on the shores of Portugal."

Though the arrogance and the rapacity of their invaders, did not, and could not, fail to excite the indignation and the hatred of the people,

yet several months elapsed, before these feelings gave rise to any general or formidable demonstrations of resistance. Intelligence of the insurrection in Spain, at length set the match to the train, and fired the spirit of the people with a kindred ardour and devotion to the cause of freedom. In vain did Junot endeavour to deceive the people by false information. In vain did he suppress or mutilate the letters by the public post, which gave intelligence of the events passing in the sister country. The news were disseminated through the country by a thousand channels. Secret messengers were employed by the Supreme Junta, to convey to the Spanish army in Portugal, injunctions to join their countrymen in defending the throne and the altar from usurpation and insults. Private letters to the military of all ranks, besought them to return to Spain, and afford protection to their families amid the dangers which surrounded them.

Such appeals were not made in vain. Thenceforward no confidence could be placed in the fidelity of the Spanish army. Junot endeavoured to conciliate them by every means in his power. He treated the higher officers with flattering distinction, and raised the pay and allow-

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

Thiebault.

CHAP. X. 1808.
June. ances of the troops, to an equality with those of the French army. Every measure was taken to guard against defection. The Spanish army was divided into small bodies, and dispersed over as wide a surface as possible; directions were given to the officers commanding in the neighbourhood, to redouble their vigilance; and preparations were made to repel, by strong measures, the first overt demonstrations of disaffection in the troops.

It was under such circumstances of impending peril, that Junot was compelled, by the order of Napoleon, to weaken his army, by detaching four thousand men under Loison, to co-operate with Bessieres on the Spanish frontier; and an equal number, under General Avril, to assist Dupont in his operations in Andalusia. The army of Junot was thus imprudently weakened, at the very moment when a powerful and general resistance was about to break forth; and the force which remained was barely equal to supply the necessary garrisons, for the more important points of occupation.

But circumstances favoured the French. Avril, having advanced to Tavira, was induced to retrace his steps, by intelligence that an Eng-

lish army was stationed at Ayamonte; and Loison, having failed in his object of occupying Rodrigo, was subsequently recalled to Oporto.

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It was in that city that the chief body of the Spanish army was stationed. On the death of General Taranco, the command had been assumed by General Quesnel, a French officer of prudence and moderation, yet by no means acceptable to the troops. The symptoms of disaffection daily increased. Quesnel, fearing a revolt, prepared the fort of San Joao de Foz, which commands the harbour of Oporto, as a place of refuge for himself, and the weak escort on whose fidelity alone he could rely. His fears were soon realized. General Belesta, the officer next in command, received orders from the Junta of Galicia to return to Spain, and to bear with him as captives all the French remaining at Oporto. These orders were obeyed: Quesnel and his staff were arrested; and Belesta having convoked the native authorities of the province, declared them at liberty to act as they thought proper, and departed for Galicia, with the Spanish army and the prisoners they had secured.

Jun. 6.

On the ninth of June intelligence of these events reached Lisbon. They were naturally

Jun. 9.

CHAP. X. pregnant with alarm. Vigorous and decisive
 1808. measures were immediately adopted by Junot.
 June. Caraffa's division of Spaniards—the only one
 remaining in the country—composed of six bat-
 talions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and
 several troops of artillery, was stationed in dif-
 ferent villages in the vicinity of Lisbon. These
 troops, by a skilful and daring stratagem, were
 disarmed, and, with the exception of a few hun-
 dreds who succeeded in effecting their escape,
 were placed as prisoners on board of vessels in
 the Tagus.

The boldness and facility of execution with
 which this success was achieved, struck the
 hearts of the insurgents with alarm. They again
 declared their allegiance to the existing gov-
 ernment. Junot was little inclined to increase
 the difficulties of his situation, by adding to the
 irritation of the people. He accepted their sub-
 mission; and endeavoured, by a conciliatory pro-
 clamations, and by increasing the allowances of
 the Portuguese army, to secure their adhesion
 to his cause.

Observador
 Portuguez.

Yet strong measures were taken for disarm-
 ing the population. Heavy punishment was de-
 nounced on the possession of warlike implements,

by any inhabitant, whether foreigner or native; and heads of families were declared responsible for the conduct of all belonging to their establishments. In the numerous quarters where resistance had already appeared, detachments of French troops were stationed, in order at once to punish and overawe the disaffected.

 1808.

June.

But the flame of hatred and indignation, which had long burned in the bosom of the people, could no longer be suppressed. Insurrection again broke forth in the province of Oporto. On the day of *Corpo de Deos*, the soldiers refused to carry the French eagles in the procession. The appearance of a few Spaniards, who had remained in concealment since the departure of Belestá's division, gave rise to the report that a Spanish army was approaching to liberate the province. An English frigate, cruising off the entrance of the Douro, contributed to spread the belief that a squadron was about to enter the river. The governor, Don Luiz de Oliveira, who had endeavoured to allay the tumult, was deposed from his command and thrown into prison. The gates of the Arsenal were forced, and arms and ammunition distributed among the people. The insurrection continued

CHAP. X. hourly to assume a more formidable character.
 1808. On the morning of the nineteenth, the populace
 June. hurried in crowds to the Episcopal Palace. The
 Bishop came forth into the balcony, and gave
 them his pastoral benediction. He then descend-
 ed to the street, and, kissing the banners of the
 country, said to those who bore them, "Let us
 go and return thanks to God." The flock fol-
 lowed their pastor to the Cathedral Church,
 where, having implored a blessing on the cause
 in which they had embarked, a junta of eight
 members was appointed for the provisional gov-
 ernment of the country, of which the Bishop
 was declared president.

While the standard of liberty was thus raised
 in the north, another insurrection, nearly si-
 multaneous, took place in Algarve. General
 Maurin, who commanded in that province, was
 succeeded, in consequence of illness, by Colonel
 Jun. 16. Maransin, who, with a force of about sixteen
 hundred men, found himself incapable of re-
 straining the tumultuous hostility of the people.
 The arrival of a British force at Ayamonte, gave
 encouragement to the insurgents; while the ap-
 prehensions of Maransin were increased, by the
 report that a Spanish force was about to cross

the Gaudiana and enter Alentejo. It was im-
possible, under such circumstances, to retrieve
the affairs of the province with so limited a
force, and Maransin instantly retreated to Mer-
tola, leaving his baggage, papers, military chest,
and above one hundred prisoners, in the hands
of the insurgents.

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June.

The insurrection had now become general
throughout the provinces on the right of the
Mondego. At Braga, at Leiria, at Coimbra,
and at many other places, the national standard
had been reared amid the acclamations of the
people. Partial engagements were continually
taking place between the natives, and detach-
ments of the intrusive army; and though these,
as might be expected, generally terminated in
the defeat of the insurgents, yet the spirit of re-
sistance was not quelled. While awed by the
presence of an overwhelming force, tranquillity
was for a time restored; but no sooner had their
enemy retired than the people were again in
arms. Thus it was, that though nominally mas-
ters of the country, the French, in truth, held
only such portions of it, as were immediately oc-
cupied by their troops.

The measures of the Junta, for the liberation

CHAP. X. of the kingdom, were vigorous and judicious.

1808. All the arms in the public depots were distributed
June. to the people; a train of field artillery was equipped; the pay of the army was increased, and the disbanded officers and soldiers were enrolled in new regiments. Generals Bernardin de Freire and Miguel de Forjas, officers of reputed talent, and of known hostility to the usurping government, were assumed into the councils of the Junta, and appointed military leaders. Proclamations, exhorting the people to burst the shackles of their bondage, and to take arms in the cause of liberty and their country, were circulated through the provinces. The Viscount de Balsemao was sent ambassador to England, to entreat the assistance of that power; and a correspondence was opened with the Junta of Galicia.

While the country was thus torn by violent convulsion, Lisbon, the very seat and centre of the invader's power, was not tranquil. The fete of the Corpus Christi, is one which had uniformly been celebrated in the capital with extraordinary pomp. On that day the whole population of the city, increased by large accessions from the surrounding country, were annually collected

to witness the procession. Nothing could exceed its magnificence. The streets were strewn with flowers, the walls decorated with tapestry, and the balconies displayed all of beauty and splendour which the country could afford. On that solemn occasion, not only the wealth of individuals, but the vast treasures of the church were displayed, to add pomp to the festival.—The most prominent figure in the pageant was an image of St. George, glittering with jewels, mounted on a horse gorgeously caparisoned, and followed by a cavalcade of the royal household. Throngs of penitents and monks, duly marshalled in the procession, formed a train so numerous as to occupy several hours in passing. The corporations of arts and trades, the senate, the tribunals, the councils, the regular troops, the generals, and the militia, followed in succession. Then came the consecrated Host, preceded by knights in their mantles, and covered by a splendid canopy, borne by the chief dignitaries of the church, in all the pomp and circumstance of canonical splendour. Last of all came the Sovereign, the Princes of his family, and the grandees, on foot, without guards, and

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CHAP. X. mixed, as it were, with the great body of the
 people.

June.

This festival, Marshal Junot deemed it impolitic to abolish. He considered that any prohibition would probably be attributed to fear, and tend to increase the instability of the new government. On the day appointed, therefore, the procession took place, though shorn of its chief honours by the absence of the Sovereign, in whose place Junot did not think it prudent to appear, and of the figure of St. George, whose dress had been carried off to Brazil.— In all other circumstances the splendour of the pageant was undiminished. Cannon were fired from the castle in demonstration of respect, the streets were lined by the French troops, and the procession, in all wonted formality, had begun its progress, when, at the moment when the sacred Host was seen issuing from the Church of St. Domingo, the crowds in the squares of the Commercio and the Rocio, became vehemently agitated, and the commotion spread like wildfire through every street in the city. For this sudden perturbation there was no apparent cause. No symptom of hostility had been

previously manifested, on the part either of the military or the people. But in a moment, from some unknown and even now inexplicable cause, the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Cries of terror arose among the multitude, and were instantly reverberated by many thousand voices. Some exclaimed, "There is an earthquake, the city is about to be destroyed;" others, "The English are landed;" but the greater number were influenced by the apprehension of a general massacre, and invoked their countrymen to resist bravely to the last.

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Among the vast multitudes which thronged the city, all was panic and confusion. Priests, nobles, penitents, and monks, in a moment deserted the procession, and mingling amid the crowd, carried with them the remains of broken crucifixes and tapers, strewing the streets with the fragments of their torn vestments. The insignia of the festival were overthrown and trampled under foot. Multitudes, actuated by blind terror, encountered each other like opposing torrents, and obstructed all avenues of escape. The disorder pervaded all ranks. The prelate who bore the Host deserted the sacred incarnation, and, returning into the church, was

CHAP. X. found concealed behind a screen. All participated
 1808. alike in the indefinite and pervading terror, and
 June. fled with tumultuous dismay.

During the progress of this extraordinary convulsion, Marshal Junot was in the Palace of the Inquisition. He immediately went to the church of St. Domingo, and endeavoured to rally the fugitive prelates and nobles, who had fled to that sanctuary for protection. He perceived that it was most important that the procession should at all events take place, as the best means of allaying the apprehensions of the people. Without waiting to inquire into the causes of the disorder, he gave the strongest assurance that the French troops should afford protection from violence, and declared his intention of joining the *cortege*. The procession accordingly again set forth, and symptoms of disorder were again manifested. The ceremonies of the day, however, were at length concluded with decency and order. On the return of Junot to head-quarters, amid throngs of people, a few voices saluted him with cheers,—the last he was ever destined to receive in Portugal.*

* The causes of this singular tumult, have never yet been discovered. Thiebault attributes it to an organized system of con-

Surrounded by increasing difficulties, Junot called a council of war; and the result of their deliberations, was, a resolution to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and abandon all the fortresses in the kingdom, with the exception of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Setubal. But even this resolution presented considerable difficulties in the execution. The communication between the different branches of the army, was intercepted by the hostile population of the intervening provinces.

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1808.

June.

Thiebault.

Loison was at Guarda, when he at length received one out of many despatches directing his return to Lisbon. In his attempt to reach Oporto he had been unfortunate. On the sixteenth of June, he had received orders to assume the command at Oporto; and, leaving a garrison in Almeida, under General Charlot, on the day following he commenced his march, with two battalions of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery.

Jun. 16.

spiracy; but this hypothesis is irreconcilable with many of the circumstances. The people were naturally suspicious of the designs and the good faith of their invaders. They saw themselves surrounded by an armed force, and at the mercy of its leader. In a multitude terror is contagious, and when the mine is laid, a spark is sufficient to explode it.

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June.

Jun. 23.

Jun. 30.

During the first four days of his march, Loison encountered no impediment. On the twenty-first he crossed the Douro at Regora, and halted at Rezamfrio. There he learned that the mountaineers, in considerable force, were prepared to dispute the strong country in his front; and, under the influence of alarm, he determined on retreating. But even this measure was not unaccompanied with danger. His baggage had been already attacked; and masses of armed peasants flocked from the surrounding mountains to obstruct and harass his retreat. At Castro d'Airo an engagement took place, in which the peasants, from want of discipline, encountered considerable loss; and the march of the French army to Celorico was no longer molested. At Celorico, Loison divided his army, and despatched one half to Trancoso, while with the other he proceeded to Guarda, where his stay was cut short by the receipt of Junot's order, for the concentration of the army round the capital.

On the thirtieth of June, Loison halted at Pinhel, and on the day following at Almeida. In that city he left his sick, and a garrison of twelve hundred and fifty men; and, having dilapi-

dated the fort Conceiçam, he commenced his retreat on Lisbon. CHAP. X.

1808.

July.

At Guarda, Loison had reckoned on a friendly reception. In this he was deceived. On approaching the city, he found a body of peasants drawn up, and prepared, with an old piece of rusty artillery, found in the rubbish of the castle, to dispute his entrance. An immediate attack was ordered. The approach of the French spread confusion through the ranks of the insurgents; and they were speedily driven from their position with great loss. The slaughter was unsparing,—above a thousand men were left dead on the field. The flying peasants were pursued along the streets of Guarda, which the French entered without further opposition; and their success was followed by the usual scenes of massacre and pillage. Jul. 3.

Thiebault.

On the fourth of July, Loison continued his retrogressive movement on Lisbon. On the day following, an engagement took place at Alpedrinham. The insurgents occupied a position of considerable strength, and had thrown up redoubts on the face of the hill leading to the village. But their flanks were unsupported; and Jul. 4.

CHAP. X. a battalion having turned their right, the position became untenable; and, after a strenuous but fruitless resistance, the insurgents were put to flight. Their loss, on this occasion, was considerable, and included their leader, the Capitao Mor, whose body was discovered among the slain. From Alpedrinham, Loison encountered no further obstacle in his retreat, except that arising from the extreme difficulty of procuring supplies, in a country decidedly hostile.

1808.
July.

Jul. 11. On the eleventh he reached Abrantes.

The Alentejo had now risen in arms. At Villa Viçosa the people attacked a detachment of French troops, quartered in the town, and forced them to retire into the castle. General Leite, who had lately governed the province, was now selected as military leader; but that officer, aware of the narrow extent of the resources which the natives could oppose to the power of the intruders, declined the responsibility of command. The choice of the multitude then fell on Antonio de Lacerda, an old officer, who took such measures as seemed best suited to the danger of the time. Messengers were despatched to solicit aid from Badajos; and

Jun. 23.

marksmen were stationed on the top of the Con-
ceiçam church, and other points which com-
manded the castle.

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June.

General Kellerman, who commanded in the
province, no sooner received intelligence of
these events, than he despatched a force to re-
lieve the troops driven into the castle. A dread-
ful massacre took place. The insurgents were
routed; and the French, entering the city at the
charge, put the inhabitants to the bayonet with-
out discrimination. Upwards of two hundred
were killed in the streets; the place was given
up to pillage, and twelve of the prisoners were
put to death as ringleaders, in what, by a singu-
lar abuse of language, was designated *rebel-
lion*.

Jun. 25.

Lacerda fled to Olivença with a few followers,
where he found a Spanish force, under command
of General Moretti. By the latter, an attack
was immediately determined upon the fort of
Juramenha, which commands the passage of the
Guadiana. This was successful. Moretti re-
ceived assistance from Badajos; and Kellerman,
not aware of the weakness of the garrison, did
not venture on any serious attempts to regain
possession of the fort.

CHAP. X. The fortunate result of this operation, and the
 hurried evacuation of Algarve by the enemy,
 1808. gave spirit to the people. Proclamations, excit-
 June. ing the population to take arms, were circulated
 on all hands; and it became evident, from the
 increasing resistance in every quarter to French
 authority, that the cruelties perpetrated at Villa
 Viçosa had signally failed of their anticipated
 effect.

No change of policy, however, took place.
 The people of Beja rose against the enemy, and
 massacred two French soldiers, belonging to a
 detachment which the day before had entered
 their city. This criminal excess was followed
 Thiebault. by a dreadful retribution. Maransin defeated the
 insurgents and entered the town. It was pil-
 Jun. 26. laged and burned, and a great proportion of the
 inhabitants put to the sword. Upwards of
 twelve hundred slain were found in the streets.
 The loss of the French on this occasion amount-
 ed only to thirty killed and fifty wounded.*

* There is something, we think, approaching to the facetious, in the gravity with which General Thiebault obtrudes the following anecdote upon the credulity of his readers. "Il y eut même à Beja une circonstance qui peut être rapportée. Un brave religieux de cette ville ayant profité du triste tableau qu'elle offroit après le combat, pour faire sentir aux habitans combien ils avo-

But it was not alone to such barbarous ex-cesses, and the unsparing exercise of the strong arm of military violence, that Junot trusted for the subjugation of Portugal. He endeavoured to enlist religion in his cause, and prevailed on the Patriarchal Chapter to denounce excommunication against all those who should venture, directly or indirectly, to encourage the spirit of rebellion which had gone abroad. To oppose the usurpation of Napoleon was declared to be a crime against God; and the divine mission of the French Emperor to regenerate Portugal, was obtruded as an article of faith on the credulity of the people.

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This ecclesiastical missive failed of its intended effect, and was treated with contempt, if not ridicule, by those to whom it was addressed. Ignorant and credulous as the people were, they could not swallow the monstrous absurdity, that the Deity was enlisted in the

ient provoqué leur malheur, produisit un si grand effet, que tout l'auditoire fondit en larmes, et qu'on le députa à l'unanimité auprès du général en chef, pour lui présenter une adresse, dont le but étoit d'implorer sa clémence, et de jurer fidélité."

To produce such an effect upon such an occasion, the *brave religieux* of General Thiebault must indeed have been an accomplished and eloquent master of pulpit rhetoric.

CHAP. X. cause of rapine and oppression; or that men,
1808. who disgraced humanity by the perpetration of
July. the most criminal atrocities, could be held in-
vested with peculiar sanctity, as the favoured
instruments of the divine will. Above all, they
remembered that these men had insulted their
religion, and extended robbery even to the altar;
and the denunciation of a timid and obsequious
hierarchy, was attributed to its true cause, and
served rather to exacerbate than soften the
hostile feelings of the people.

It was, in truth, to the very ignorance and su-
perstition of the Portuguese nation, that much of
the ardour and confidence which supported them,
in the almost hopeless struggle in which they had
embarked, may be attributed. They knew no-
thing of the relative strength and resources of
nations. They were unable to calculate the
ordinary probabilities of ultimate success or
failure. Their reliance was not merely on
human instruments of defence. The army of
saints militant were enlisted on the side of
freedom and religion. They fought with the
conviction, that the justice of their cause would
be vindicated by miraculous interposition.—
Even amid the depression of multiplied de-

feats, their confidence was unabated. The swords of the seraphim were seen waving in the sky, ready to cleave their oppressors to the dust. Secret ministers of vengeance were preparing terrible retribution for the blood of their slaughtered countrymen. The legends of St. Sebastian, which had long slumbered in the hearts of the people, were remembered in the days of their oppression; and the belief spread, that the hour of their accomplishment was at hand. The people flew to arms with the deep and immutable conviction, that their long lost monarch was again to appear; and, leading his subjects to the field, should scatter their invaders, like chaff before the wind, and re-establish their monarchy in glory and freedom.

This was the idle creed of an oppressed, an ignorant, and a superstitious people. Sebastian came not; but in their own courage and constancy, they found a nobler deliverance. In the annals of the struggle they maintained, they have left the world a memorable lesson, which conquerors will do well to remember, and the conquered never will forget.

Nearly at the same time with the event we

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CHAP. X. have narrated, a body of insurgents had collected
 1808. at Leiria; and Junot, willing if possible to effect
 July. by conciliation their return to obedience, de-
 spatched emissaries from Lisbon, with promises,
 in case of immediate submission, that past
 offences should be forgotten. No good con-
 sequences, however, ensued from the mis-
 sion. The messengers were driven back by
 the populace; and General Margaron, with a
 force of about four thousand men and six pieces
 of cannon, was directed to quell the insurrec-
 tion.

On the second of July, that officer set out
 Jul. 4. from Lisbon. On the fourth he arrived at
 Leiria. A mob of peasants, the greater propor-
 tion of whom were without fire-arms or military
 equipments, alone presented itself to oppose
 him. A few musquet shots were fired, and the
 peasantry took to flight. This was the signal
 for slaughter. The troops of Margaron entered
 the city on all sides, and the unresisting inhabit-
 ants were indiscriminately massacred. Mercy
 was implored in vain. Neither the claims of age
 nor sex were respected. The savage and un-
 natural fury of the victors, spared not even wo-
 men and babes,—all were butchered. When

the slaughter in the streets had ceased, the houses, the churches, and the gardens were ransacked for victims, who were carried to a small square in front of the church of St. Bartholomew, for the purpose of being more compendiously massacred. There the scene of Jaffa was repeated, with additional circumstances of atrocity. The slaughter of these miserable wretches commenced with the bayonet and sword, and was concluded by the bullet and the butt-end of the musquet.

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If the infamy of proceedings, so utterly diabolical, can be aggravated by a gratuitous superfoetation of insulting falsehood, even to this extent does General Margaron stand convicted. He addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, claiming gratitude for his clemency. While the streets of Leiria were yet red and reeking with the blood of the unresisting victims of a general and atrocious butchery, he declared himself to have been actuated only by the dictates of a godlike mercy. "Examine," says this smooth-tongued barbarian, "without partiality, your own conduct and mine; and decide whether those best promote your interest, and are most worthy of your confidence, who, abusing the

CHAP. X. sacred name of country and religion, provoke
 1808. you to murder and insurrection; or he who,
 July. even when provoked by outrage, limits his severity to the moment of a just and legitimate defence, and only makes you conscious of your errors in order to pardon them." It was by such means that the iron of oppression was made to enter most deeply into the hearts of the gallant Portuguese.

Under these circumstances, the tide of insurrection flowed onward with augmented force and rapidity. In Alentejo not more than twenty days had elapsed since Kellerman's departure, and the province was again in arms. By the influence of the Spanish General Moretti, and of General Leite—who had at first refused to sanction the resistance of the populace at Villa Viçosa, but had subsequently joined the standard of his country—a Junta was formed at Evora, by which supreme authority was to be exercised over the provinces on the south of the Tagus. By this body such troops as could be collected were assembled round the city, and circular letters were despatched to the local Juntas, demanding recognition and obedience.

But Loison was already advancing to quell

the insurrection in this quarter. For this purpose he had been recalled from Leiria; and with a force of about five thousand men, was directed to put down the insurgents in Alentejo, to victual Elvas; and then, crossing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes, to proceed against Coimbra, in order to inflict severe punishment on the rebellious inhabitants of that city.

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Loison had already crossed the Tagus, and was rapidly approaching Evora, before the inhabitants of that city became aware of their danger. Applications were immediately made for assistance from Campo Mayor and Badajos, but without effect. The French came on.

When they approached Montemor Novo, a body of troops, which had been stationed there by General Leite, rapidly retreated, and were met by a reinforcement of four hundred men, then marching to their assistance. Both fell back to Evora, and entered the city, exclaiming they were betrayed. The cry flew from lip to lip; the spirit and hopes of the people were suddenly depressed, and they became violent and tumultuous. The Corregidor, who had become the peculiar object of popular suspicion, escaped from the city; and a small reinforcement

Jul. 28.

CHAP. X. of Spanish troops having arrived during the
 night, order was again restored. The amount
 1808. of the patriotic force was about eighteen hun-
 July. dred men, of which more than one-half con-
 sisted of peasants newly embodied, and ignorant
 of military discipline.

Jul. 29. On the following morning, the enemy was
 seen approaching Evora ; and General Leite
 immediately placed his troops in position, and
 made preparation for battle. The ground thus
 occupied was about a mile in front of the city,
 and consisted of a range of heights extend-
 ing from the Mill of San Bento to the Quinta
 dos Cucos, near the ruined Castle of Evora. The
 Spanish troops were formed as a reserve, behind
 the hill of San Caetano, on which rested the
 centre of the army. The artillery, partly Span-
 ish and partly Portuguese, was stationed some-
 what in the rear of the left.

Loison, having reconnoitred the position thus
 occupied, directed an immediate attack. Gene-
 ral Solignac, accordingly, advanced to turn the
 right of the insurgents, while Margaron's brig-
 ade, divided into two bodies, made a simulta-
 neous attack on the front and left. Both were
 successful. The Portuguese infantry fought

well, and were only overpowered after a stren- CHAP. X.
 uous resistance, in which the cavalry afforded
 them no support. The latter fled without wait-
 ing for attack, and, accompanied by General
 Leite, reached Olivença. The infantry, driven
 from their position, fell back on the city, where
 they again attempted a stand. Cannon were plac-
 ed in battery to defend the gate of the Rocio,
 the only one which had not been walled up. But
 the works of the city were old and ruinous, and
 the brigade of Solignac effected an entrance with
 facility. In these circumstances, the Spanish
 troops fled; and many even of the Portuguese,
 scared by the terrors of an assault, were glad to
 escape from the city without offering resistance.
 Yet Evora was not gained without a struggle.
 War was waged on the assailants from the roofs
 and windows of the houses; and a body of volun-
 teers, commanded by Gallego, offered desperate
 resistance in the streets.

At length, however, the scene of contest be-
 came one of massacre and pillage. All that
 remained in the city were slaughtered in cold
 blood; and the fugitives, in their endeavour to
 escape, were charged by the cavalry, and put
 unsparingly to the sword. No sanctuary was

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CHAP. X. respected. Thousands of unfortunate wretches
 1808. were dragged from their places of refuge,
 July. and became the victims of a licentious soldiery,
 animated by an ungovernable desire of plunder
 and revenge. In this affair, the loss of the Por-
 Thiebault. tuguese amounted to eight thousand killed or
 wounded in the battle and subsequent massacre.

From Evora, Loison advanced to Elvas, in order to drive back the numerous Spanish parties which infested the neighbourhood of that fortress, and form magazines of provisions for the supply of the capital. From thence he returned to the right bank of the Tagus, and had reached Thomar, when the execution of his projected operations was arrested, by intelligence that an English army had already landed on the coast.

CHAPTER XI.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

ON the twelfth of July, 1808, an armament, whose destination was the Peninsula, sailed from Cork. It consisted of about twelve thousand men, and was commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose fame, as the conqueror of Assaye, had marked him out as a fitting leader on a service so difficult and perilous.

The expedition sailed; but it had no sooner cleared the coast, than Sir Arthur Wellesley separated himself from the fleet, and repaired in a frigate to Corunna, where he arrived on the twentieth. At Corunna he received intelligence that the Spaniards had sustained a signal defeat at Rio Seco, and that the French were thus enabled to prevent all communication between

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Jul. 20.

CHAP. XI. Gallicia and the country to the south and east
of the Douro. The chief object of Sir Arthur
1808. Wellesley was to confer with the provincial
July. Junta, and concert with them a scheme of
operations, by which the armament he com-
manded might act with the greatest efficacy
and advantage to the general cause. The
offer of immediate co-operation, made by the
British general, was declined by the Junta.
Their only wants, they said, were money, arms,
and ammunition. They were already rich in
brave hearts and sinewy frames, though poor in
those resources by which alone the ardour and
devotion of the people could be brought to ex-
ercise an immediate and decisive influence on
the circumstances of the war. They suggested
Portugal as affording a preferable sphere for the
operation of the British army, and represented
the expulsion of the enemy from that kingdom,
as the most acceptable and important service
which Sir Arthur Wellesley could render to the
patriots of the whole peninsula. The Junta
likewise recommended that he should land in
the north of Portugal, in order to effect a junc-
tion with the Portuguese troops, which the gov-

ernment of Oporto were known to have collected in the neighbourhood of that city. CHAP. XI.

In compliance with the wishes of the Gallician Junta, Sir Arthur sailed for Oporto, where he arrived on the twenty-fourth, and had an immediate conference with the Bishop and chief military authorities. By them he was informed that the force in Oporto amounted altogether to about three thousand men, and that a body of five thousand regulars was stationed at Coimbra, on the co-operation of which, though deficient in arms and equipment, Sir Arthur Wellesley was assured he might rely. He was likewise informed, that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, and a Spanish force somewhat greater in number, then on its march from Galicia, were to be employed for the defence of the province of Tras os Montes, against Bessieres.

At Oporto, Sir Arthur Wellesley received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, soliciting an interview, before the point of debarkation for the army, or the plan of its subsequent operations should be finally arranged. On the morning of the twenty-fifth he quitted Oporto, and having directed the fleet to rendezvous off the Mondego,

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Jul. 24.

Jul. 25.

CHAP. XI. proceeded to Lisbon, where he found despatches
 1808. from General Spencer, stating that, in compli-
 July. ance with the request of the Supreme Junta, he
 had landed his corps at St. Mary's, near Cadiz ;
 but had not consented to commit his army by
 forming a junction with Castanos. Sir Arthur,
 rightly judging that the general success of the
 war would be best promoted by the concentration
 of the British forces, instantly despatched orders
 to General Spencer to embark his troops without
 delay, and join the armament on the coast of
 Portugal, unless he should be engaged in an
 operation which could not be relinquished with-
 out compromising the safety of the Spanish
 army.

After mature deliberation, Sir Arthur deter-
 mined on landing in Mondego Bay. The coast
 of Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro,
 affords few facilities for the debarkation of an
 army. The shore is in general rugged and dan-
 gerous, and the entrance of the rivers is al-
 most uniformly obstructed by bars, which pre-
 vent their being found serviceable in navigation.
 Under such circumstances, it would have been
 peculiarly dangerous to have attempted so diffi-
 cult and precarious an operation as that of land-

ing the troops, in the immediate neighbourhood of a considerable body of the enemy. A part of the army might have been attacked on shore while the state of the weather prevented the debarkation of the remainder; and it was certain, that by commencing operations in the vicinity of Lisbon, the English army, for a time at least, would be deprived of the expected co-operation of the Portuguese troops. The Fort of Peniche, which stands on a small peninsula, about seventy miles north of Lisbon, alone offered a bay equally safe and accessible; but the anchorage was completely commanded by the guns of the fort, and a landing in that quarter could not have been effected without considerable loss. The choice then fell on Mondego Bay; and, fortified in his selection of this point by the opinion of the Admiral, Sir Arthur again joined the fleet, then off the mouth of the Mondego.

By despatches from England, Sir Arthur learned that a reinforcement of five thousand men, under command of Brigadier-General Acland, might be speedily expected; and that the force then acting in Sweden, under Sir John Moore, was likewise directed to repair to Portugal. The command of the army, thus power-

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CHAP. XI. fully augmented, Sir Arthur was likewise in-
 1808. formed, would be assumed by Sir Hew Dal-
 August. rymple.

The landing of the troops commenced on the first of August, and was not completed without difficulty. The wind had been fresh for several days; and the surf—from which the shelving of the Bay afforded little protection—beat on the shore with such violence as to render the service one of difficulty and danger.

Aug. 6. On the sixth, the army was augmented by the arrival of the force of General Spencer, who, without waiting for orders, had immediately quitted Cadiz on learning the surrender of Dupont. In the meanwhile, the weather had become more moderate, and the landing of the whole army was effected on the seventh.

Before the British army commenced its advance, Sir Arthur Wellesley held a conference with the Portuguese generals, at Montemor Velho. He then acquainted them with his plans; and informed himself, by personal inspection, of the numbers, discipline, and equipment of their troops. In order to render them as effective as possible, he offered such a sum, from the military chest, as the exigencies of his

own army enabled him to spare. This offer, however, notwithstanding the poverty of their own resources, was declined, and the assistance received from the British general was limited to arms and ammunition.

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Since his arrival at Oporto, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been actively employed in endeavouring to procure the necessary means for moving the stores, baggage, and provisions, with a view to the immediate commencement of operations. Though, in this respect, he had not been altogether unsuccessful, yet it was judged more prudent to march on Lisbon, by the coast, in order to keep up a communication with the fleet of victuallers and store-ships, which were directed to follow the movements of the army. As this, however, was liable to continual interruption, from the state of the weather, the dangers of the coast, and the operations of the enemy, it was judged prudent that the army should be accompanied by a supply of such articles as were of more immediate necessity, that it might be rendered as independent as possible of the contingencies of war or weather.

Before quitting the Mondego, Sir Arthur

CHAP. XI. Wellesley left instructions for the corps of General Acland to proceed along the coast, and form a junction with the army. For the information of Sir John Moore, he also left a statement of his opinions as to the most advantageous employment of the force under his command, to be delivered to that officer on his arrival. Sir Arthur strongly recommended that his corps should be marched on Santarem, to narrow the communications of Lisbon; and, if necessary, to operate to the southward of the Tagus, in order to cut off the retreat of the French army through the province of Alentejo.

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Aug. 9. On the ninth of August, the advanced-guard of the army moved onward from the Mondego, and reached Leiria on the tenth. On the eleventh, it was followed by the main-body, which, Aug. 13. on the thirteenth, advanced to the neighbourhood of Batalha. Before proceeding further, it may be well to give a slight sketch of the distribution of the French army, at the moment when hostilities, with a new and more formidable enemy, were about to commence.

When intelligence first reached Marshal Junot, of the landing of a British army, he anticipated that its first movement would be on the

Zezeze and the Tagus, in order to effect a separation between the corps of Loison and the capital. General Delaborde, therefore, was immediately detached from Lisbon, with two brigades of infantry, about six hundred cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, with directions to proceed by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and Condieiros, with a view to watch the motions of the British general, and cover the advance of Loison, with whom he was directed to effect a junction. Learning, however, that Loison had already crossed the Tagus without opposition, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley was advancing by the road along the coast, he proceeded to Alcobaça, with the view of retarding, as much as possible, the progress of the British army.

Loison, with a force of about eight thousand men, was advancing rapidly from Abrantes, in expectation of effecting a junction with the corps of Delaborde at Leiria. The sufferings of his army, during his march through Alentejo, are described to have been dreadful. Wherever they went, the towns and villages were deserted. The heat was unusually great; and numbers of the soldiers sank exhausted, from privations which it was found impossible

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Aug. 6.

CHAP. XI. to supply. All stragglers were destroyed; and
1808. many, suffering from excessive thirst, died of
August. drinking stagnant and unwholesome waters, to
which the natives had directed them. The oc-
cupation of Leiria by the British, had disap-
pointed the calculations of the French generals;
and Loison was obliged to make a considerable
detour before he could effect his intended junc-
tion with Delaborde, who, remaining unsupport-
ed in front of the enemy, was liable to sustain
the attack of his whole force.

Junot was at Lisbon, with such force as
he deemed sufficient to control the inhabit-
ants, busied in making every practicable pro-
vision for the defence of the capital. The
garrison was ordered to be withdrawn from Se-
tubal; and instructions were issued for the im-
mediate abandonment of all the French posts to
the south of the Tagus, with the exception of
Palmela.

Such was the relative position of both armies,
when Sir Arthur Wellesley had to encounter
new difficulties in the conduct of the Portuguese
authorities. Before the army commenced its
march from the Mondego, it had been demand-
ed, by General Bernardin de Freire, that the

force under his orders, should be furnished with supplies by the British commissariat, a proposal most unreasonable in itself, and one to which, in the circumstances of the army, it was impossible to accede. It was, therefore, met by Sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance; and the unreasonableness of the demand was represented to de Freire in its true colours. For some time there was reason to hope that the explanations of the British general had been received with tacit acquiescence. But this was not so. When the army reached Leiria, the demand was renewed even more peremptorily than before, accompanied by the threat, that unless it was complied with, the Portuguese forces should instantly separate themselves from the British, and advance to Santarem, by way of Thomar.

Sir Arthur Wellesley did everything in his power to change the resolutions of de Freire. He represented the strong impolicy of withdrawing himself from the British army, and the dangers to which he must necessarily expose his troops by adhering to his projected scheme. He urged him to relinquish it by all that was dearest and most sacred to a soldier and a patriot;

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CHAP. XI. and conjured him not to compromise his own
1808.
August. honour, and the safety of his country, by violating, on so flimsy a pretext, the engagements into which his government had already entered. In part only were these remonstrances successful. De Freire consented to remain safe, though inglorious, at Leiria, instead of prosecuting his original design of advancing to Santarem. This at least was something gained; yet it cannot be questioned, that the presence of the Portuguese army would have carried with it a moral influence and support, perhaps, in such circumstances, even more valuable than a large accession of mere military force.

The truth we take to be, that, at the period in question, the zeal and heartiness of England in their cause, were the object of considerable doubt with the patriots of the Peninsula. She had not then impressed, on the continental nations, the character she has since borne of a great military power. On land, her warlike operations had generally been undertaken for some limited and petty object, and conducted on a small and inadequate scale. It was imagined too, by the allies of England, that her interference in their behalf, proceeded rather from some underhand

motive of individual advantage, to be secured by their co-operation, than from hearty and zealous adoption of their cause, or disinterested anxiety for their liberation. They knew that should adverse circumstances occur, the English could always find—and they doubted not their intention of seeking—a refuge in their ships. It was familiar too, as a proverb in the mouths of all Europe, that the English were a great maritime power, but insignificant on shore. The truth of this aphorism has since been tested; yet we should take but a partial and imperfect view of the difficulties which Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the very outset of his operations, was called on to combat and surmount, were we to pass unnoticed the moral impression of our character and objects, which induced the patriots to receive our offers of assistance with jealousy and distrust.

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That the Portuguese authorities were influenced by such motives, it seems impossible to doubt. It was probably calculated by the Junta, that, whichever of the parties might be successful in the approaching contest, it was more for their advantage to possess an army fresh and uncrippled, in order to reap the full benefit of vic-

CHAP. XI. tory, or repair the consequences of defeat. It
 1808.
 August. may be supposed, therefore, that de Freire was
 glad of a plausible excuse for remaining at Leiria,
 while two more powerful combatants were about
 to try the fortune of battle. It was even with
 difficulty, that he consented to place one thou-
 sand four hundred infantry, and two hundred
 and fifty cavalry, at the disposal of the British
 general.

Aug. 14. On the fourteenth, the English entered Al-
 cobaça, from which the enemy had retired on
 the preceding night, and on the following day
 moved onward to Caldas. At Brilos, a village
 in the neighbourhood, the first blood was shed.
 The post was attacked by some companies of
 riflemen of the sixtieth and ninety-fifth regi-
 ments, who carried it with trifling resistance on
 the part of the enemy, whom they incautiously
 pursued for several miles. The detachment,
 however, was in turn attacked by a superior
 force, which endeavoured to cut off their re-
 treat; and it was only by the prompt assistance
 of General Spencer that this object was defeated.
 The loss of the British is stated in the official
 returns to have amounted to twenty-six killed,
 wounded, and missing.

On the same day, the army reached Caldas, and the advance, under Brigadier-General Fane, moved on to Obidos, and drove the enemy's piquets from the town. General Delaborde, in the meantime, had retired to a position in front of Roliça. The heights on which this village is situated form the boundary of a valley commencing at Caldas, and about three leagues in extent. Nearly in the centre stand the town and old Moorish fort of Obidos; and every favourable post on the high ground, on either side of the valley, was occupied by detachments of the French army. The main body was posted on a plain, which overlooked the valley as far as Obidos.

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On the morning of the seventeenth, Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced to the attack. Columns were sent out on either flank; and, on the approach of these, Delaborde, without offering resistance, fell back to the heights of Roliça, where he again placed his army in position.

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The ground thus occupied was strong; and having been closely reconnoitred by Sir Arthur Wellesley, he made immediate preparation for attack. His army, with this view, was formed into three columns. The right, consisting of twelve

CHAP. XI. 1808.
August. hundred Portuguese infantry, and fifty Portuguese cavalry, was intended to turn the left flank of the position, and penetrate into the mountains in the rear. The left, consisting of Major-General Ferguson's and Brigadier-General Bowes's brigades of infantry, three companies of riflemen, and about forty cavalry, British and Portuguese, was destined, under command of General Ferguson, to ascend the hills at Obidos, in order to turn the posts which the enemy still held on the left of the valley, as well as the right of his position at Roliça. This corps was likewise directed to watch for the approach of Loison, who was known to be in the neighbourhood, in order to prevent the junction of his force with that of Delaborde. The centre column, commanded by Sir Arthur in person, and consisting of Major-General Hill's, Brigadier-General Nightingale's, Brigadier-General Crawford's, and Brigadier-General Fane's brigades, with four thousand Portuguese light infantry, and the main body of the British and Portuguese cavalry, was ordered to assemble in the plain, and attack the front of the position.

Such was the order of attack. It was morn-

ing, and a calm and quiet beauty seemed to linger on the scene of the impending conflict. The heights of Roliça, though steep and difficult of access, possessed few of the sterner and more imposing features of mountain scenery. The heat and droughts of summer had deprived them of much of that brightness of verdure which is common in a colder and more variable climate. Here and there the face of the heights was indented by deep ravines, worn by the winter torrents, the precipitous banks of which were occasionally covered with wood; and below, extended groves of the cork-tree and olive; while Obidos, with its ancient walls and fortress, and stupendous aqueduct, rose in the middle distance. To the east the prospect was terminated by the lofty summit of the Monte Junto, and on the west by the Atlantic.

As the centre column commenced its advance towards the steep acclivity in front, the enemy gave no demonstration of hostility; and all was still and peaceful, as when the goat-herd tended his flock on the hilly pastures, and the peasant went forth to his labours, carolling his matin song in the sunrise. Such was the scene about to be consecrated in the eyes of posterity by the first

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CHAP. XI. considerable outpouring of British blood, in a
1808. cause as pure, just, noble, and generous, as any
August. of which history bears record.

The position of the enemy could only be approached in front by narrow paths, winding through deep and rocky ravines, and surrounded by masses of brushwood, in which Delaborde had stationed his light infantry. Till reaching the bottom of the heights, the British troops were protected by the cork and olive woods from the fire of the enemy's artillery. But in their ascent, the troops had to encounter a resistance, which became at every stage of their progress more fierce and vehement. A heavy fire was opened on the assailants from the brushwood on either flank, and at every point at which they became exposed to the action of artillery, a shower of cannon-shot came sweeping down the ravines with terrible effect.

Even in these difficult and disheartening circumstances, no symptoms of confusion were manifested in the British columns. The advance of General Nightingale's brigade was led by the twenty-ninth regiment, with singular bravery and resolution. They beheld themselves suffering from attacks which it was impossible to re-

pel; but the high discipline of the regiment enabled it to surmount every obstacle; and, under every disadvantage, they kept on their way steady and unbroken. The Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, by whom it was commanded, fell, as the head of the column reached the summit of the hill, and became exposed to a heavy and destructive fire from the vineyards occupied by the enemy. The grenadier company of the twenty-ninth were in the act of forming, when a French battalion, after pouring in a volley, advanced to the charge, and succeeded in overpowering the small but gallant body, which had already crowned the heights. This success was temporary. The remainder of the regiment came up; and, supported by the ninth regiment, the colonel of which was also killed, they drove back the enemy, and succeeded in maintaining their position, against every effort to regain possession of the heights.

The success thus gallantly achieved was rendered more decided by the brigade of General Hill, which had already formed on the heights, and the appearance of the column of General Ferguson, which at first had taken a wrong direction, but was now observed to be traversing

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CHAP. XI. the right flank of the enemy's position. Delaborde's situation had now become one of extreme peril; and he was too skilful a general not at once to perceive the necessity of immediate retreat. Precipitately abandoning his position, he retired to the village of Zambugeira, where he again made demonstration of resistance. From this, by a most gallant charge, he was driven by General Spencer.

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The loss of the French, in this engagement, was six hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of which was their brave and skilful leader. That of the English was somewhat less. It is stated by the official returns to have amounted altogether to four hundred and eighty-two. The force of Delaborde, in the action, is known to have amounted to five thousand men.*

Such are the details of the first action fought

* The force of the enemy was estimated by Sir Arthur Wellesley at six thousand men, which tallied exactly with the statement of a French officer, wounded in the action. Reasons, in our judgment, satisfactory, have induced us to make a lower estimate. The number actually in the field, is stated, by Thiebault, to have been only nineteen hundred men. Foy makes it two thousand two hundred men. Neither are entitled to credit. It is truly said, by Colonel Napier, that such puerile misstatements can only tend to throw ridicule on a deed of arms, in itself honourable to the talent of the general, and the discipline and courage of his army.

by British troops in the great cause of the Peninsula. It is memorable, as affording the earliest opportunity of displaying, on a new scene, the spirit, gallantry, and discipline of English soldiers; and perhaps not less so, as constituting one of those rare occasions, in which the judgment and prudence of the greatest general of the age may fairly be called in question. It is now admitted, we believe, by all military men, that the attack on the front of the second position at Roliça, was injudicious. The columns of General Ferguson and Colonel Trant were alone sufficient to have dislodged the enemy, who must instantly have retired on their appearance. It is indeed difficult to conceive how Sir Arthur Wellesley, the reinforcement of whose army depended on contingencies beyond his control, with a force barely equal to make head against the combined army of his opponents, should, in such circumstances, have been so rashly lavish of the lives of his soldiers. They were brought into action with every possible disadvantage, and fought for an object which a skilful general could unquestionably have obtained without bloodshed.

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It is probable that Sir Arthur Wellesley was

CHAP. XI. unprepared for the obstinate and vigorous resistance which the enemy opposed to the columns of Hill and Nightingale; and that his object was to press Delaborde in his retreat more closely than could otherwise have been done. If so, he paid the penalty of his miscalculations. It cannot be doubted that the sight of seventy English prisoners, sent in triumph to Lisbon, must have produced an injurious moral influence on the minds of the people, and have led them to give credit to the exaggerated rumours which it was the policy of the enemy to set afloat.

The numbers of the troops on both sides, actually engaged, were nearly equal. Before the appearance of the columns of Trant and Ferguson, the enemy had already been dislodged from his position; and the brigades of Hill and Nightingale were in a condition, unaided, to have driven him from the village of Zambugeira. Considering the disadvantages under which they fought, and the magnitude of the obstacles overcome, the achievement was one unquestionably highly honourable to the troops.

The talent shewn by Delaborde, throughout his operations, must be admitted, by all parties, to have been very great. His chief object

was to retard the advance of the English army, in order to gain time for a junction with Loison; and the union of boldness and skill, by which his manœuvres for this purpose were conceived and executed, is, unquestionably, indicative of a highly-gifted commander.

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Driven from the village of Zambugeira, Delaborde retired with his army, by the road to Torres Vedras. It was the intention of Sir Arthur Wellesley to have lost no time in following the enemy; but having learned that the expected reinforcement under General Acland was in the offing, he changed his resolution, and moved onward by the coast road, in order to cover the landing of the troops, and receive supplies from the shipping.

On the eighteenth, the army halted at Lourinha. On the nineteenth, it moved onward to Vimiero; and on the twentieth, was joined by the brigade of General Anstruther; and the landing of the remainder of the corps was effected, with some difficulty, in the course of the night. Delaborde could not oppose the debarkation, but sent on his cavalry, in hopes of attacking the troops on their march. This was foreseen. A detachment, under General

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CHAP. XI. Spencer, was stationed at Lourinha for their
1808. protection, and no annoyance was attempted by
August. the enemy.

It was known at head-quarters, that a junction had taken place between the corps of Delaborde and that of Loison, on the eighteenth, and that their united force was concentrated in position at Torres Vedras. The enemy daily sent forward patrols of cavalry into the neighbourhood of the British army; and their superiority in that arm was too decided to admit of opposition. Of the position occupied by the French army, Sir Arthur Wellesley could learn nothing, except that it was very strong, and accessible only by a long and difficult defile.

Under these circumstances, he had formed the resolution of advancing rapidly along the coast-road to Mafra, and thus turning the position of Torres Vedras. By this movement, he calculated on forcing the hostile army to an immediate retreat, and on enjoying an opportunity of attacking Loison and Delaborde in a new position, before they should gain time to occupy it with advantage. To this plan of operations many objections have been stated. It has been said that the flank and rear of the army, when in

march, would have been exposed to the chance of attack from an enemy greatly superior in cavalry, and one not likely to be deceived by any boldness of manœuvre. The road to Mafra, for about six leagues, runs nearly parallel to a steep and rocky coast, and passes through a series of defiles, which afford no spot on which an army could form in order of battle. Had an attack been made, therefore, in such circumstances, on the army, lengthened out in a long column on the march, it cannot be doubted, that it must have contended with the enemy, under a mass of almost insurmountable disadvantages.

On the other hand, it may be urged that before the French general could have received intelligence of the contemplated movement, the British army would have been considerably advanced on their march. That the country intervening between the direct road to Mafra, and that by which Junot, on the morning of the twenty-first, was marching on Vimiero, was of a character extremely difficult and almost impervious, and that failing in the object of attacking the British army on the march, the only alternatives which remained, were those of carrying the formidable position of Mafra, under every disadvantage, or of falling

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CHAP. XI. rapidly back, by the Cabeça de Montichique, with the view of covering the capital. In either case, the difficulties of the enemy would have been prodigiously increased. Considering the character and circumstances of the armies, it is more than improbable that an attack on the position of Mafra, which did not admit of being turned, would have been attended with success. And in the attempt to cover Lisbon, the proximity of a hostile capital, the population of which would probably be roused into acts of aggression by the near hope of deliverance, must have added exceedingly to the perils and embarrassment of Marshal Junot.

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When we consider, too, that the plan in question was the deliberate adoption of a general, who has never since been known to commit his army, by any flagrant error of calculation, we shall probably be disposed to admit the conclusion, that the operation in question was founded on sound data, and that had it been carried into execution, the acquisition of Lisbon might have been effected with smaller loss, and with circumstances more honourable to our arms, than by the more timid policy which led to the convention of Cintra.

On the evening of the twentieth, however, a frigate, on board of which was Sir Harry Burrard, arrived in Marceira Bay. Sir Arthur Wellesley, thus suddenly superseded in command, lost no time in reporting to that officer the situation and circumstances of the army, and the plan of operations which it had been his intention to pursue. Of the latter, Sir Harry Burrard expressed his disapprobation. He directed the cessation of any active movements, until the army should have been still further increased by the arrival of Sir John Moore, which might be expected in a few days.

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Against this unfortunate decision of his superior, Sir Arthur, in vain, remonstrated. He assured him that the army was already fully equal to cope with that of the enemy; that, situated as it then was, an engagement was inevitable, and that the only consequence of present inaction, would be that of yielding to the enemy the privilege of choosing the moment of attack, while the greatest disadvantage would accrue from the sudden assumption of a line of operations merely defensive. Sir Arthur likewise stated his decided conviction, that the corps of Sir John Moore would more beneficially contribute to the

CHAP. XI. common cause, by marching on Santarem, and
1808. thus narrowing and obstructing the communica-
August. tion and retreat of the French army, than by unit-
ing itself to a force already fully adequate to all
the purposes it was intended to effect. Of the
consequences to be dreaded from any demon-
stration of vacillation or timidity, Sir Arthur
also spoke strongly, but in vain. Sir Harry
Burrard remained fixed in his decision ; and the
order, which had already been issued to the
army for resuming their march, was counter-
manded. Instructions were likewise despatched
to Sir John Moore, directing him to move down
in his transports to Marceira Bay, which had
been determined as the point of debarkation for
his troops.

Such were the measures adopted by Sir Harry Burrard on the assumption of his brief command. That they were timid and injudicious cannot be denied. Yet, while we condemn the decision by which the projects of a greater military genius were at once overthrown, let us not be unjust, and blend our dispassionate regrets with the severity of personal censure. Thrown accidentally and unawares into what could only be considered as a situation of transient command, it was per-

haps scarcely to be expected that his measures should be marked by the confidence and boldness of purpose, which might have contributed so greatly to the success of the campaign. It was certainly not unnatural, that a person so situated should be unwilling to incur the responsibility of directing operations, of the propriety of which, and the chances of success which they afforded, he could form but a partial and imperfect judgment. Called summarily to decide in difficult and unexpected circumstances, Sir Harry Burrard will probably be considered to have decided wrong; yet he unquestionably decided to the best of his judgment. Fault, therefore, can be attributed only to those who sacrificed the interest of their country, by placing a man of narrow capacity, yet of honest intentions, in a situation for which he was manifestly unfit. That officers of such acknowledged talent and pretensions as Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley, should have been superseded in command by Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, is a tolerably convincing proof that the selection of military leaders, was, in those days, regulated by principles very different from that of *detur digniori*.

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CHAP. XI. Early on the morning of the twenty-first, Sir
 1808. Arthur Wellesley visited the advanced posts,
 August. but could discern no sign of an approaching
 enemy. About seven o'clock, however, a cloud
 of dust was observed in the extremity of the
 horizon, slowly moving towards the position of
 Aug. 21. the British; and at eight o'clock a strong body
 of the enemy's cavalry was observed on the
 heights to the southward. In a short time a
 strong column of infantry appeared on the road
 from Torres Vedras to Lourinha; and it became
 evident that a general engagement was on the
 eve of taking place between the armies.

The village of Vimiero stands in a valley,
 watered by the little rivulet Maceira, at the eas-
 tern extremity of a high mountainous range,
 which extends westward to the sea. In front of
 the village is a hill of inferior altitude, terminat-
 ing in a plateau of considerable extent, and com-
 manded from several points. On the left is an-
 other strong ridge of heights, stretching to the
 eastward, and terminating on the right in a deep
 ravine. Over these heights passes the road to
 Lourinha, through the villages of Fontanel and
 Ventoso.

Such were the more prominent features of the

ground. It was thus occupied by Sir Arthur Wellesley: Six brigades were stationed on the mountain to the westward of the village. The advanced-guard, under General Fane, and the brigade of General Anstruther, with six pieces of artillery, occupied the plateau. The cavalry and reserve of artillery were posted in the valley, between the heights, ready to support the troops on the plateau, should that part of the position be attacked. The Lourinha road was guarded by the Portuguese troops and a small body of riflemen. The ground having been taken up on the previous evening, rather with a view to temporary convenience than military defence, a piquet only had been stationed on the ridge to the westward. As it was obvious, however, from the enemy's demonstrations, that the left and centre were about to become the chief theatres of conflict, the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, were successively moved from the mountain on the west to the heights on the Lourinha road, in order to strengthen what was evidently the most vulnerable part of the position.

At nine o'clock the action commenced. Marshal Junot had formed his army in two divisions.

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CHAP. XI. The first of these, consisting of about six thousand men, was commanded by General Delaborde. The second, under Loison, was nearly equal in amount. The reserve, composed of four battalions of grenadiers, was commanded by General Kellerman, and acted as a connecting link between the two principal divisions. The cavalry, under General Margaron, was stationed partly in rear of the reserve, and partly on the right of Delaborde's division.

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The two divisions continued their advance, across the rough and wooded country in front of the position, towards the plateau in the centre. On approaching the scene of action, however, each division separated into several minor columns, which commenced nearly simultaneous attacks on different portions of the British line. The most vehement was that headed by Delaborde in person, who first came in contact with the brigade of General Anstruther, which occupied the left of the plateau, and the village of Vimiero. During its advance, this body was exposed to a destructive fire of artillery, which it bore with great steadiness and gallantry, and rapidly forced back the skirmishers who had been stationed in the woods on either flank. A

check, however, was soon given to the progress of the assailants, who, having reached the summit of the plateau, were met by a destructive volley from the fiftieth regiment, which afterwards rushed on to the charge, and drove them in confusion, and with great slaughter, down the face of the hill. The attack on General Fane's brigade was no less decisively repulsed; and a regiment, which was advancing on the village, by the church, was opportunely attacked in flank by the brigade of General Acland, then moving to its position on the heights. A most gallant charge, by the small body of cavalry led by Colonel Taylor, completed the discomfiture of the enemy in this quarter. They fled in utter confusion, and were vigorously pursued, by Colonel Taylor and his squadron, for nearly two miles; when General Margaron, who commanded the French cavalry, observing the small number of the assailants, advanced to the charge; and the remnant of this brave band were compelled to retreat, with the loss of their leader. General Kellerman, having rallied the fugitives, made a last effort with the reserve to retrieve the fortunes of the day. A column, strongly supported by artillery, was again sent forward to gain

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CHAP. XI. possession of the village of Vimiero. In advancing by the road, it was encountered by the forty-third regiment ; and, after a short, but desperate struggle, was driven back. No farther attempt was made on this part of the position ; and the enemy retired, leaving seven pieces of artillery, and a great number of prisoners, in possession of the victors.

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While these events were passing in the centre, an attack, no less resolutely supported, was made on the left of the British, which occupied the heights, on the Lourinha road. In that quarter, General Ferguson, whose brigade had been moved from the right to the left of the line, had scarcely taken up his ground, when he found himself assailed by a strong body of infantry, supported by cavalry. The engagement was fierce, and resolutely maintained on both sides. The troops of Ferguson remained immovable under every effort to dislodge them ; and, on the coming up of the eighty-second and twenty-ninth regiments, the enemy were charged with the bayonet, and driven back in confusion. The French cavalry endeavoured to retrieve the misfortune of the infantry by several charges, but in vain. They were uniformly repulsed with

unshaken steadiness, by the brigades of Ferguson and Nightingale, and at length ceased from farther attack.

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The fruit of this achievement was the capture of six guns; and General Ferguson, leaving the seventy-first and eighty-second regiments to guard these honourable trophies, was in full pursuit of the discomfited enemy, when the brigade of Brenier, suddenly emerging from the ravine, attacked the two battalions, and for a moment succeeded in retaking the captured artillery. But the regiments instantly rallied; and by a desperate charge with the bayonet, at once drove back the brigade of Brenier into the ravine, and remained masters of the guns. In this charge, General Brenier was made prisoner.

Affairs were in this situation on the left, when General Ferguson received an unexpected order to desist from the pursuit. His corps was accordingly halted; and the enemy taking advantage of this unlooked-for supineness of their opponents, were rallied by General Thiebault, and withdrawn, under protection of the cavalry, to a position in rear of Toledo. In the subsequent retreat of the army to Torres Vedras, it was re-

CHAP. XI. enforced by the junction of two battalions, which
 1808. had not come up in time to be of service in the
 August. action.

The results of this brilliant victory were, the capture of a general officer and several hundred men, thirteen pieces of cannon, and twenty-three waggons loaded with ammunition. The total loss of the enemy, in the battle, has been estimated at three thousand. Generals Foy and Thiebault do not admit it to have exceeded eighteen hundred. But, considering all the circumstances of the action, the latter calculation will probably be held to be as much below the truth as the former is above it.

Napier. With regard to the relative numbers of the armies, there exists also much difference of statement. There can be no doubt that the British army was numerically superior to its opponent; but Foy and Thiebault, in estimating the amount of the French force at only nine thousand two hundred men, are, unquestionably, not entitled to credit. A French order of battle, found on the field, gave a total of fourteen thousand men present under arms; and this amount accords too accurately with other estimates, and also with observations made at

the time, to leave any doubt of its authenticity and correctness.

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While the battle was yet in progress, Sir Harry Burrard arrived on the field; but, from motives of delicacy, declined assuming the command till the enemy were repulsed. Towards the close of the action, when the ultimate success of the British arms could no longer be considered doubtful, Sir Arthur Wellesley was naturally anxious to reap the full fruits of his victory, and represented to his superior in command the importance of following up with vigour the advantages already gained. But to this measure, Sir Harry Burrard, actuated by an unfortunate dread of responsibility, refused his consent. It was urged to him, in vain, that the enemy, severely beaten and discomfited, had already commenced a hurried and confused retreat; that one half of the British army had borne no part in the action, and was, consequently, in a condition to follow up the pursuit with vigour and effect; that the road to Torres Vedras being already in possession of General Hill, it was now in our power to anticipate the enemy by the occupation of that important pass, and even to reach Lisbon before

CHAP. XI. him. But these arguments produced no beneficial consequence on the resolution of Sir Harry Burrard. With the caution of an aged commander, and the diffidence of an inexperienced one, he declined encountering the risks attendant on the brilliant scheme of operations proposed for his adoption, and declared his determination of awaiting, in the position of Vimiero, the arrival of Sir John Moore.

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General Ferguson, on receiving, in the full career of success, the mortifying order to desist from farther operations, immediately sent his aid-de-camp to represent the great advantage to be anticipated from continuing the pursuit, and to state, that he himself might have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Arthur carried the aid-de-camp to Sir Harry Burrard; but this second representation likewise failed of effect.* The accounts he had received of the state of the Portuguese troops, was such as,

* There is something sufficiently characteristic in the following anecdote to merit record:—Sir Arthur Wellesley, having in vain used every argument and persuasion to change the determination of his leader, was heard to exclaim, on retiring from the conference, “Well then, we have now nothing to do but to go and shoot red-legged partridges.”

in his opinion, to preclude all hope of their being found serviceable. The artillery horses were, or were supposed to be, inefficient; and the want of cavalry appeared an insuperable objection to undertaking such operations as those contemplated by Sir Arthur Wellesley. These difficulties, in the mind of Sir Harry Burrard, were decisive. The army remained in their position; and the French were suffered to retreat unmolested, and to re-organize at leisure their broken and fugitive troops.

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It may perhaps be considered as not wholly uninteresting to indulge in a brief speculation on the probable consequences, that would have resulted from a vigorous prosecution of the advantages which the victory of Vimiero had placed in our power.

In the first place, it should be remembered, that the whole army of Junot had been defeated, when not above one half of the British had been engaged. With regard to the enemy, we are assured by General Foy, that every corps—every soldier—had fought; and, such were the necessities of Junot, that even the volunteer horse-guard, composed of French merchants of Lisbon, was made to bear its part in the engage-

CHAP. XI. ment. The whole troops of the enemy, therefore, were tired and dispirited, while a very large proportion of the British was fresh and untouched, and ready for any operation which its leader might judge serviceable to the cause.

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Before the conclusion of the action, the division of General Hill was in possession of the direct road to Torres Vedras—that by which the enemy had advanced being a circuitous one. It was, therefore, quite practicable to have occupied Torres Vedras before the French could have reached it; and this would have been effected with greater facility, had the enemy, by a vigorous pursuit, been prevented from rallying their scattered forces, while General Hill was in full prosecution of his march. The ground around Torres Vedras is extremely strong; and there is no reason to doubt that he could have maintained his position, under every effort to dislodge him, till he had been enabled to open a communication with the main body of the army.

It is indeed true, that the troops on their march would have been liable to the attacks of the French cavalry, which had suffered comparatively little in the previous battle. But when we consider the qualities of British infantry,

which have since been tested in a long course of service, and the confidence in their own prowess, which the recent victory must have inspired, it is impossible, we think, to lend to this objection all the weight which was yielded to it in high quarters, at the moment of decision.*

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The consequences, therefore, of this movement, would probably have been to cut off the retreat of the French army on Lisbon; to gain possession of their baggage and military stores; and, what was more important than either or both of these, to have saved the British arms from the stigma which attached to them in the eyes of Europe, from the unfortunate Convention of Cintra.

On the morning after the battle, Sir Hew Dalrymple landed in Marceira Bay, and assumed the command of the army, which still remained on the field of Vimiero. In the course of the day, a large body of French cavalry was observed approaching our out-posts; and the

Aug. 22.

* It is but fair to Sir Harry Burrard, to state, that his opinions were supported by those of Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George Murray. With the exception of Wellington, the service boasts no higher names.

CHAP. XI. whole line was immediately ordered under arms.
 1808. The object of the enemy, however, was pacific ;
 August. and the cavalry was soon ascertained to constitute the escort of General Kellerman, who came with a flag of truce.

General Kellerman was immediately ushered into the presence of the Commander-in-chief. He stated his object to be the proposal of a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French army. Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed to arrange the terms of an armistice ; and, in the course of the day, the basis of a definitive agreement was arranged between the parties, subject, however, to the chance of being rendered void by the veto of Sir Charles Cotton, whose approval was declared necessary to the validity of the treaty. In this preliminary compact, no reference was made to the provisional government of Portugal, which was neither informed of, nor consulted on, proceedings in which the interests of their country were so deeply implicated.

App. No. 14. The chief stipulations of the document were as follows :—

I. That a suspension should immediately take place, with a view to negotiate a convention

for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. CHAP. XI.

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II. That a day should be appointed by the Generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, for the negotiation and conclusion of the proposed convention.

III. That the river Sizandra should form the line of demarkation between the armies.

IV. That the British Commander-in-chief should undertake to include the Portuguese armies in this suspension; and that for them the line of demarkation should extend from Leiria to Thomar.

V. That the French should not, in any case, be considered prisoners of war; and that all the individuals composing the army, "*should be transported to France, with their arms, baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing should be excepted.*"

VI. That no individual should be called to account for his political conduct; that property should be respected; and that all who were desirous to quit the kingdom should be suffered to do so unmolested.

VII. That the port of Lisbon should be re-

CHAP. XI. cognised as neutral for the Russian fleet; and
 1808. that the principles of maritime law, in respect
 August. to the privileges of neutral ports, should be
 strictly observed by the British squadron.

VIII. That the horses of the cavalry, and the
 artillery of French calibre, should be transport-
 ed to France with the army.

IX. That the suspension of arms should not
 be broken on either side, without forty-eight
 hours previous notice. By an additional article
 it was likewise stipulated, that the French gar-
 risons and fortresses should be included in the
 convention, in case they should not have capi-
 tulated before the twenty-fifth of August.

On communicating the agreement to Sir
 Charles Cotton, that officer declined yielding
 his assent to that part of the convention which
 related to the Russian fleet, but declared his
 readiness to enter on a separate treaty with the
 admiral in command.

The conditions of the preliminary agreement
 being thus found incapable of execution, Sir Ar-
 thur Wellesley strenuously recommended to the
 Commander-in-chief, at once to put an end to
 the armistice, and advance on Lisbon, leaving
 it to Marshal Junot to renew the negotiation on

a different basis, if he thought proper. This advice, however, was rejected. Sir Hew Dalrymple considered that, under all the circumstances, it was more prudent and honourable to pursue the negotiation; and Colonel Murray was despatched to Lisbon, with full powers to conclude a definitive convention.

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At every step, however, new difficulties arose. The French, emboldened by the concession of such favourable preliminaries, brought forward new demands, and endeavoured, through diplomatic subtilty and evasion, to secure advantages by the pen, which they were unable to acquire by the sword. To give some idea of the character of the claims pertinaciously put forward by the negotiators, it may be sufficient to state, that they insisted on being suffered to carry off two Portuguese frigates, and required that French troops should be given in exchange for Spanish prisoners. It is, indeed, probable, that pretensions, so entirely inadmissible, were urged rather with the view of procrastination than any hope that they could be acceded to by the British generals. All delay was in their favour. The ships, on which the army depended for its supplies, were at anchor on an iron-bound coast,

CHAP. XI. without a harbour, and liable to all the contingencies of weather.

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Sir Hew Dalrymple, therefore, felt called on to transmit a distinct notification to Marshal Junot, that unless the terms of the convention, already specified, were immediately accepted, he should, in forty-eight hours, recommence hostilities. On the same day the army moved forward to Ramalhal.

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The decided tone thus tardily assumed by the British general, produced an immediate effect. It became evident to the French negotiators, that evasion was no longer possible; and, on the following morning, the convention, duly signed, was forwarded from Lisbon.

Aug. 30.

The question concerning the Russian fleet was settled by a separate treaty between Admiral Siniavin and Sir Charles Cotton. It was agreed, that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, during the war, and that the crews should be conveyed to their own country in British ships, without any stipulation regarding their future services.

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While these events were in progress, the corps of Sir John Moore had arrived in Marceira Bay; and having, with some difficulty, effected a land-

ing, it joined the army. By this large accession CHAP. XI.
 the British force amounted to about thirty-two
 thousand men; but the increase of his numbers
 had not the effect of inducing the British gene-
 ral to exact more severe conditions from his op-
 ponents, and the treaty, forwarded from Lisbon, App. No. 15.
 was immediately ratified by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

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Of the terms of the convention, the Portu-
 guese generals were loud in their complaints;
 and by the nation it was regarded with extreme
 disgust and indignation. De Freire, of whose
 conduct during the active operations of the cam-
 paign the reader has already been informed, now
 spoke out in a tone at once decided and uncom-
 promising. He disclaimed, for himself or his
 government, any share of the responsibility
 which the British general had not hesitated so
 rashly to incur. He complained loudly of the
 absence of that proper deference and respect to
 which his Sovereign, as an independent prince
 and an ally of Great Britain, was entitled, and of
 the disregard which had been shewn, in the re-
 cent proceedings, to the honour and interests of
 the Portuguese nation. He particularly object-
 ed to the article which stipulated the surrender
 of the fortified places, stores, and ships, to the

CHAP. XI. **British forces, without a solemn declaration, on the part of their commander, that this surrender was only temporary, and that the earliest opportunity would be seized of restoring them to the government of Portugal. He objected also to that article which secured pardon and impunity to all political offenders; because this was an unwarranted interference between a prince and his subjects, and deprived the former of his undoubted right to punish such breaches of allegiance as he might think proper. It likewise afforded matter of complaint, that, in the convention, no notice whatever was taken of the troops in the Alentejo, nor of the Spanish army which had crossed the frontier.**

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Although it must be admitted that these objections, among many others, were urged by a person whose previous conduct entitled him to no very flattering construction of his motives, they cannot be considered in the light of mere groundless invective. With a degree of neglect, almost amounting to insult, the Bishop of Oporto was not informed of the armistice until three days after it had been signed; and even then he was merely told, by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that it contained nothing remark-

able, except a provision for securing the neutrality of the port of Lisbon, and the Russian fleet. Now, conceding that the Junta of Oporto was not entitled to be considered in the pending negotiation, as the existing government of Portugal, it had unquestionably a right to be treated with the deference due to a body of decided patriotism, which had rendered great services to the cause, and whose authority was at least acknowledged by a considerable portion of the kingdom.

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The objection urged by de Freire to that article which provided that the fortified places held by the enemy, should be surrendered to the *English*, was one rather applicable to the form than the substance of the stipulation. It does not admit of question, that these strongholds of the kingdom ought to have been delivered up, either to the troops of that sovereign to whom they rightfully belonged, or to the English *acting in his name and behalf*; but in the circumstances of a nation without any general and acknowledged government actually in force, torn by jealousies and contentions within, and threatened externally by an enemy, to whose invading force they could of themselves have offered no

CHAP. XI. effectual resistance, it was undoubtedly more
 prudent that the important fortresses, which
 constitute, as it were, the very keys of the king-
 dom, should be held by hands of greater vigour,
 and of firmer grasp. With a view to allay the
 jealousy betrayed on this subject by de Freire
 and the Junta, Sir Hew Dalrymple published a
 manifesto, declaring, that he considered himself
 as the commander of an army strictly auxiliary
 to the Sovereign of Portugal; that he held him-
 self bound to promote the dignity and security
 of his government by every measure in his
 power; and disclaiming, on the part of Great
 Britain, all intention or desire of territorial ag-
 grandizement. In the same document he gave
 public assurance, that the fortresses in ques-
 tion should be considered only as a trust, to be
 sacredly guarded, and honourably restored, so
 soon as the restoration could be made with safe-
 ty to the interests of the country.

Sep. 2. On the second of September, the head-quar-
 ters of the British were established at Oyeras,
 and the army were put in possession of the forts
 on the Tagus. On the tenth, the Castle of Be-
 lem was evacuated by the French; and on the
 Sep. 12. twelfth, a division was stationed on the Campo

Sta. Anna, sending a detachment to garrison the citadel of Lisbon, and to maintain order in the city. It had been proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that an article should be introduced into the convention, with the view of "making the French generals disgorge the church plate which they had stolen," and for limiting, by a more particular description, the property which the army were to be allowed to abstract from the country under the name of *baggage*. This proposal, however, was not carried into effect, because it was represented by General Kellerman, that the introduction of such a stipulation, would be reproachful to the French army, and unpleasant to its commander. General Kellerman pledged himself, at the same time, that such an abuse of the terms of the convention should not take place. The consequences of this forbearance were soon apparent. It became known that the French, under cover of the second article of the preliminary agreement, and the fifth of the convention, which guaranteed the undisturbed removal of their private property, were carrying off the spoils of churches and palaces, of the royal library, the arsenal, and the museum; and that every species of fraudulent abstraction and covert pillage,

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CHAP. XI. was employed by the departing army. The
1808. knowledge of such facts could scarcely fail to
September. rouse the indignation of the people. Popular
tumults were the consequence; deep and intense
curses were cast on the degraded robbers, whose
unprincipled and oppressive tyranny had, by the
remissness of the English, been suffered to ter-
minate in flagrant and successful pillage. The
flame of hatred towards their invaders, which
had long burned in the bosoms of the Portu-
guese, now sent forth its full volume to the gaze
of the world. Songs of insulting triumph were
sung in the streets of Lisbon. Many of the
tradespeople refused to sell to a Frenchman
even the necessaries of life. Hordes of deprav-
ed wretches took advantage of the temporary
anarchy, and came forth to rob, and to assassi-
nate. Constant patrols were sent out into the
streets to repress violence and tumult. Yet
these were only partially successful. The bodies
of French officers and soldiers were every day
found dead in the streets, where they had been
trampled and spit upon by the passengers. And
so great was the insecurity of the French army,
that piquets were regularly posted, and all who
ventured to approach their quarters in the night

were fired on. In this manner several Portuguese were shot.

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In order to prevent, as much as possible, the successful exercise of the unprincipled system of pillage, in which the French were engaged, a Commission, of which General Beresford was the chief, was directed to superintend the strict execution of the terms of the Convention. The commissioners entered on their duties with becoming firmness. Through their exertions, the spoils of the museum and the royal library were restored; and the money abstracted from the public treasury was ordered to be refunded. Yet it was found altogether impossible to put a stop to many unwarranted and shameful acts of furtive spoliation which were hourly taking place, in defiance of an order with difficulty obtained from Marshal Junot, that all stolen property should be restored. By an unfortunate oversight, a division of the French army was suffered to sail before the extent of the depredations they had committed could be ascertained, and it became a matter of delicacy, as well as of difficulty, to deal more harshly with the remaining portion of the army, than with that which had been suffered to escape.

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On the fifteenth, the first division of the French army sailed. The Spanish prisoners in the hulks were disembarked, and the liberation of the country was announced by the elevation of the national standard. On this occasion, the joy and enthusiasm of the inhabitants were raised to the highest pitch. The city seemed to send forth one mighty shout of triumphant thanksgiving. Innumerable banners were displayed in every quarter of the city. The ships in the river were decorated with the proud symbols of national independence; and repeated salvoes of artillery proclaimed that the iron rod of the oppressor was at length broken. For nine successive nights the city was universally illuminated; and all was joy and festivity in Lisbon.

These rejoicings having ended, the destination of the Spanish troops naturally became an object of attention to the British general. Destitute alike of money and arms, it was quite evident they could not be brought to act as an efficient body, unless the means of organization and equipment were furnished from the funds of the British army. This was done. A sum of twenty thousand dollars was advanced from the military chest, and the troops were soon brought

into a state of complete readiness for service. CHAP. XI.
 The first project entertained, was that of sending
 them to Badajos ; but, on the representations of
 two Catalan deputies, it was thought more ad-
 vantageous to the general cause to land them in
 Catalonia, where their presence could not fail to
 produce an immediate influence. The Spanish
 corps, in number about four thousand, was ac-
 cordingly embarked, and set sail for that des-
 tination.

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In attempting to arrange the details of a civil government in Portugal, Sir Hew Dalrymple became involved in a task of singular delicacy and difficulty. The Junta of Oporto were known, for some time, to have been engaged in intrigues to secure the extension and continuance of their power. Making a pretext of the troubled state of the capital, they expressed their wishes to the British General, that Oporto might be made the temporary seat of government ; and that deputies from the different provinces should be directed to repair thither, to arrange the interests of the kingdom. It was likewise stated by the Bishop of Oporto, that he had accepted authority, only in the hope of promoting the restoration of his sovereign ; but if his con-

CHAP. XI. tinuance in office should be thought conducive to
 1808. the national interest, he intimated that his duty
 September. would not suffer him to quit Oporto, unless in
compliance with a direct order from the Prince
Regent. He strongly urged the advantages
which would accrue to the kingdom, from the
proposed arrangement; and that the opposition
to its execution would be greatly obviated, were
the measure to be suggested by the British
General.

The finesse of the Bishop was somewhat too flimsy to prove successful. Though aware of his popularity, and the services which he had rendered to the cause of his country, Sir Hew Dalrymple declined lending his sanction or support to the proposed arrangement. He replied, that his sovereign could not, in the peculiar circumstances of Portugal, consent to the unqualified restoration of the Council of Regency, some members of which had incurred suspicion of being attached to the interest of France. On the other hand, it was unquestionable, that those members who had kept their fidelity unstained during the period of struggle, were fully entitled to be reinstated in authority.

Without entering into any detail of the petty

intrigues, which had their origin in private in-terests and individual cupidity of power, it will be sufficient to state, that, after many difficulties, a Council of Regency was appointed, of which the Bishop of Oporto was a member. The Junta of Oporto then formally declared its functions at an end, with a proviso, that should the Regency be overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, their body should be held, *de facto*, to have resumed its authority. The other provincial Juntas were, in like manner, dissolved; and the authority of the Regency was universally acknowledged throughout the kingdom.

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In England, the intelligence of the Convention of Cintra was received with a general burst of indignation and disgust. The sentiment pervaded all classes, that the British arms had sustained a deep and imperishable tarnish, and the voice of the nation called loudly for inquiry. By the government, the demand of millions was not, and could not be, disregarded. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were recalled from Portugal, and a court of general officers*

* The members of the court were as follows:—Sir David Dundas, President; Generals Craig, Lord Moira, Lord Heathfield; and Lieutenant-Generals Lord Pembroke, Nugent, and Nichols.

CHAP. XI. was directed to assemble at Chelsea, in order to

1808. inquire into the causes which led to the armis-
September. tice and subsequent convention; and to report,
on a full consideration of the whole proceedings,
whether the conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple, or
that of his subordinate officers, was such as to
render them justly amenable to military cen-
sure.

Nov. 14. On the fourteenth of November, the Board held its first sitting. A minute investigation of all the circumstances took place; but the report contained little more than a summary of the operations of the army, as detailed in evidence, and a concluding expression of opinion, that no farther military proceeding was necessary on the subject; "because, however some of the members might differ in their sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention, in the relative situation of the armies, it was their unanimous opinion, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had throughout been exhibited by Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley; and that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers had, on every occasion during the expedition, done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on his Majesty's arms."

This report was not considered satisfactory by the government. The Court was accordingly reassembled, and the members of it were required to declare whether "the armistice was advisable in the relative situation of the two armies, on the twenty-second of August; and, if so, whether the terms were such as ought to have been agreed upon; and whether, when all the British forces were landed, it was advisable to form a convention; and, if so, whether the terms were such as ought to have been agreed upon." It then appeared that the members of the court were divided in opinion. Six generals approved, and one (Lord Moira) disapproved of the armistice. With regard to the Convention, opinion was more nearly balanced; four generals expressed their approbation of the policy of that measure; and three (Lords Pembroke, Moira, and General Nichols) dissented from that conclusion.

Thus were the opinions of the people left as much at large as ever, by the dubious conclusion put forth by the Board of Inquiry. The public indignation was not quieted, though partially withdrawn by the interest of the new events which were about to take place on the

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CHAP. XI. theatre of war. In the meanwhile, the King,
 1808. abstaining from any observations on the military
 September. points of the question, publicly expressed his
 disapprobation of those articles of the Conven-
 tion, in which stipulations were made affecting
 the interests of his allies. "His Majesty deem-
 ing it necessary that his sentiments should be
 clearly understood, as to the impropriety and
 danger of the unauthorized admission into mili-
 tary conventions, of articles of such a descrip-
 tion, which, especially when incautiously framed,
 may lead to the most injurious consequences."

Thus closed all judicial proceedings on this
 memorable convention.

In reviewing the operations of the short cam-
 paign, of which we have just detailed the more
 prominent events, it must be admitted, we think,
 on all hands, that the conduct of Sir Arthur
 Wellesley, while in command, was marked by a
 degree of skill, boldness, promptitude, and fer-
 tility of resource, which can only be found
 united in a mind of the first order. Like an
 early sketch of a great master, it is perhaps
 possible to detect in it some error of conception,
 or fault of execution; yet he must be blind in-
 deed, who does not perceive, in the general vigour

and boldness of the design, promise of lofty excellence and splendid achievement. The measure of landing his army, without waiting for reinforcements, has been condemned by men of different mould, as rash and imprudent. Never was an objection more futile urged against the measures of a great commander; and when stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, in his defence before the Court of Inquiry, it drew forth a most triumphant refutation from Sir Arthur Wellesley. The truth is, that the determination of Sir Arthur Wellesley to engage his army in immediate operations against the enemy, was the result of the nicest and most accurate calculation, and of a deep and well-grounded conviction, that his force was fully adequate to the expulsion of the French army from the capital. Had the projects of Sir Arthur Wellesley been carried into effect, by those who succeeded him in command, there can be little doubt that the campaign would have been conducted to a more glorious result. To say nothing of the advance on Mafra, on the morning of the twenty-first, it was the decided opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, expressed in the Court of Inquiry, that by a vigorous prosecution of the victory of Vimiero,

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CHAP. XI. and pushing forward the right wing on the
 1808. road to Torres Vedras, we might have antici-
 September. pated the enemy in reaching Lisbon, and have
 at once placed Junot in a situation in which
 another defeat must have terminated in uncon-
 ditional surrender.

To say that an operation of this bold and splendid character, was attended by hazard, is, in fact, to say nothing. All warlike operations are so. But the point is, did the one in question hold out a fair and reasonable prospect of success, and was the object to be attained of magnitude and importance sufficient to justify the risk. These are questions which gave rise to much difference of opinion at the time, and on which it would ill become the most gifted writer to express his conviction with anything approaching to dogmatism. Yet we know not why we should conceal our own decided belief, that the conclusions of those military reasoners who would answer these questions in the negative, are founded on narrow and timid views, by which it was more than improbable, that a genius like that of Sir Arthur Wellesley could be influenced.

On Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Bur-

rard we would cast no censure. Successively called on to assume the command of the army in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, of whose strength and situation they knew nothing; in a state of utter ignorance of the localities of the country, and the temper of the inhabitants, these officers were placed, by the bungling mismanagement of government, in a situation of difficulty, which it conveys no imputation, to assert they were unequal to overcome.

Up to the period of the armistice, the chief impediments felt in all the operations of the army arose from want of cavalry, and the miserable condition of the artillery horses. Why, we may ask, were these things so? Why was an expedition, thus crippled and incapacitated for vigorous operation in the field, sent forth to encounter difficulties, which might so easily have been avoided? It was solely owing to our deficiency in cavalry, that Delaborde was enabled to effect an orderly and unmolested retreat from the position of Roliça; and had our strength in that arm been greater, not only would the advantages acquired by the victory of Vimiero have been prodigiously increased, but all obstacle to a vigorous pursuit would at once have been re-

CHAP. XI. moved. Whatever degree of lustre, therefore,
 1808. the operations which terminated in the field of
 September. Vimiero, may cast on the skill of the general, or
 the valour of his troops, they can contribute
 nothing to the honour of a ministry, by whose
 negligence or incapacity so many important
 advantages were lost to the country.

On the subject of the armistice and subsequent convention, we have a few—and but a few—observations to make. In favour of the principle of the convention, and of its sound policy in the circumstances of the armies, the weight of evidence so decidedly preponderates, as almost to preclude a doubt with regard to a subject, on which we know that the highest military authorities entertained none. All the Generals of the army in Portugal, whose general or local information could lend weight to their opinions, declared their decided conviction that the Convention was founded, in the main, on a sound view of the situation and resources of the enemy, and of our own means of offensive operation. From the very commencement of hostilities, it is known to have been the decided opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that the general interests of the cause, would be best promoted by adopting the

most speedy measures for the expulsion of the French from Portugal, and bringing a British force to co-operate with the Spaniards on the Ebro. That it was in the power of the British army—numerically superior as it was to the enemy—to have expelled him from Portugal by force of arms, has never been denied. But it as little admits of a negative, that when the event of another battle should have compelled Junot to evacuate Lisbon, the province of Alentejo was open for his retreat, and that magazines had been already formed for the supply of his army during its retreat to the frontier. The strong fortress of Elvas was in his possession; and the difficulty of provisioning the British army, in advancing into the interior, must have materially retarded the vigour of pursuit. It was judged too—and we think rightly judged—that the cause of the Spanish patriots would be more efficaciously promoted by the presence of thirty thousand British soldiers, and of four thousand liberated prisoners, than it could suffer disadvantage from twenty thousand additional French troops being thrown, at no very remote period, into the country.

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So much for the principle of the Convention.

CHAP. XI. That many of its details were objectionable cannot be denied: and here alone it is that censure can fall justly on Sir Hew Dalrymple. It was certainly incumbent on that officer to have insisted on a specific stipulation by which the French should have been forced to disgorge their disgraceful plunder, and to have taken strict measures for securing its execution. It became Sir Hew Dalrymple, we think, and it was due to the character of the army he commanded, to have assumed a higher moral tone in demanding all possible reparation from the infamous marauders, who had proved themselves alike destitute of principle and honour. That the armistice and preliminary convention were concluded without the knowledge or participation of the Portuguese general, we hold to have been another error. It ought not to have been forgotten that we stood in a relation of singular delicacy to the Portuguese Sovereign and people; and it should have been the object of the British general, to regulate his conduct in such a manner as to avoid exciting either jealousy or distrust, in a nation whose cordial co-operation was so essential to the successful prosecution of the war. Sir Hew Dalrymple must have known,

that the patriots of the whole peninsula were abundantly ready to misinterpret both the motives and actions of their allies; and he must likewise have been aware, that an union of sentiment between the authorities of the two nations, was, on such an occasion, above all things desirable.

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On the whole, it will probably be admitted that the stipulations of the treaty were more favourable to the French than it was either prudent or politic to grant. To have gained the confidence of the Spanish nation in the purity of her motives and the prowess of her soldiers, was, to England, worth more than a victory. This, however, the Convention of Cintra did not tend to acquire for her. With an army flushed with recent victory, and greatly superior in numbers, and with the whole nation on our side, we shewed too plainly that the vanquished enemy was still formidable to the victors. The moral impression throughout Europe, arising from the measures in question, was decidedly unfavourable to our arms. Our military reputation was lowered; and the British generals were regarded as having scandalously sacrificed the interest of their allies. This impression may now, in a great measure, be re-

CHAP. XI. regarded as unfounded; yet we believe that no
 1808. Englishman looks back with pride on the Con-
 September. vention of Cintra, or would not feel happy
 could all record of it be erased for ever from
 our annals.

CHAPTER XII.

OPERATIONS ON THE EBRO.

It is now necessary to revert to Spain.—
 Though the attachment of the nation to the
 cause of liberty was still unabated, yet their ef-
 forts had not been attended by any of those bril-
 liant results which had been confidently antici-
 pated. No man of unquestioned patriotism and
 commanding talents had arisen to guide the ener-
 gies of the Spanish people, and direct them into
 a salutary channel. Each Junta had become an
 isolated and independent government, acting
 without concert, and on narrow views, and only
 influenced in its policy by petty considerations
 of personal or local interest. The govern-
 ment throughout Spain had devolved on the pro-
 vincial noblesse and higher orders of the clergy,

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CHAP. XII. — classes of men who, from their deficiency of
1808. information, their habits, and their prejudices,
September. were peculiarly unfitted for the task they had
assumed. On the first appearance of success, jealousies sprang up between the rival authorities; and so powerful was the feeling of hostility thus excited, that it was even proposed in the Junta of Seville, to enforce submission to its supremacy by the sword. Fortunately for Spain, the firmness of Castanos saved it from the impending horrors of a civil war. On hearing the proposal, he at once declared, that the troops under his command should not be employed against any but the common enemy.

When the French evacuated Madrid, the reins of authority were, for a time, assumed by the Council of Castile. This body, which, by the tardy yet firm resistance which it opposed to the intruder, had regained some portion of its former influence with the nation, put forth an elaborate manifesto, vindicating the line of policy it had pursued in the difficult circumstances of the country. It declared its readiness to cooperate with the Provincial Juntas, in any measures conducive to the general defence, and limited its own pretensions, as a public body, to

guiding and stimulating the national ardour into
 beneficial action. As the peculiar circumstances
 of the country did not admit of the Cortes
 being immediately assembled, it was recom-
 mended, by the Council of Castile, that the
 Provincial Juntas should despatch deputies to
 the capital, in order to decide on the imme-
 diate wants of the nation, and the mode by
 which they could be most advantageously sup-
 plied.

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A temporary form of government, founded on
 these propositions, was adopted by the Junta of
 Seville, and followed by the approbation of the
 great body of the nation. The deputies were
 consequently elected, and installed at Aranjuez,
 with much formality, in their delegated func-
 tions. Count Florida Blanca was elected pre-
 sident; and a circular missive was despatched,
 requiring recognition and obedience from the
 different authorities of the kingdom.

Sep. 25.

One of the first acts of the Provisional Gov-
 ernment, was to vindicate their authority, which
 had been publicly set at nought by Cuesta.
 That general was unfavourable to the sway
 of the Juntas, and desirous of preserving the
 authority of the Captains-general and Royal

CHAP. XII. Audiencias, which had, in a great measure, been nullified by the establishment of these petty governments. Endowed with more than an ordinary share of the national obstinacy and pride, this haughty leader was prepared, if necessary, to support his opinions by the strong arm of military force. The Junta of Leon and Castile, which he had appointed as a subordinate council for the regulation of the district, had, subsequently to the battle of Rio Seco, erected themselves into an independent government; and, protected by Blake, issued orders to Cuesta to transfer his cavalry to the army of that officer. The proceedings of the Junta were accordingly declared void; and Cuesta issued orders for the immediate assembly of a new Junta. He ventured even to seize the Leonese deputies on their way to Aranjuez, and detain them as prisoners. One of them, named Valdes, made known the circumstances of his arrest to Florida Blanca, who, willing to avoid the fatal consequences of civil dissension, wrote mildly to Cuesta, requesting the release of the deputies thus unlawfully arrested, and that their conduct should be left to the judgment of the Supreme Government. Castanos also interfered to prevent the evil conse-

quences of intestine discord; and addressed a letter to the General, containing a strong re-
monstrance on the violence and impolicy of his
conduct.

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In his answers to Count Florida Blanca, and Castanos, Cuesta entered on a laboured vindication of his conduct; and concluded, by declaring his resolution of holding his prisoners in strict custody, till the Central Junta should have assembled. It was to that body alone, he said, that he owed, or would pay, submission.

The Council of Castile was then called on to interfere, with the view of restoring harmony; but their efforts, for this purpose, were unsuccessful. Cuesta persisted in declaring, that the *soi-disant* Junta of Castile and Leon was an unlawful authority; that he considered his own power, as Captain-general, could only be superseded by the decree of a Sovereign Regency; and that as Valdes held the rank of general in the Spanish army, it was his intention to deliver him over to be tried by a military tribunal.

On the first meeting of the Central Junta, deputies from the Junta of Valladolid were sent, by the influence of Cuesta, to demand admission into that body. This was refused. Cuesta was

CHAP. XII. summoned to appear at the bar of the Junta, to
1808. answer for his conduct ; and peremptory orders
September. were issued for the release of the prisoners. On
this occasion, the influence of Mr. Stewart, the
British agent, was exerted to reduce Cuesta to
obedience. That general at length thought it
prudent to comply with the demands of the
Junta ; and, releasing his prisoners, he repaired
to Aranjuez. The result was, that Valdes was
admitted to the exercise of his privileges as a
member of the Assembly ; and that Cuesta re-
mained at the seat of government, in a state of
temporary obscuration.

The Central Junta, thus peaceably installed in
their functions and authority, at first gave fair
promise of a beneficial exercise of their power.
But the prospect, so gratifying to the friends of
liberty, soon vanished. Their president, a man
in the last stage of decrepitude, was unfitted,
by his decaying powers, for the task of guiding
the deliberations of such a body, or of enforcing
the necessary subordination in its members.
Their time was wasted in useless formalities
and frivolous debates ; and it soon became
apparent that the Assembly inherited all the
defects of the Provincial Juntas, without their

local influence. Its authority, though not openly questioned, was viewed by these bodies with jealousy and aversion; and the measures which it adopted were too little marked by vigour and decision to suit the character of the crisis. Feebleness of purpose, and tardiness of execution, were its besetting sins, and were partly perhaps inseparable from its constitution. The members, in general, were men of untarnished character; but, drawn from different provinces of the kingdom, they were unacquainted with each other, and deficient in the knowledge necessary to the successful exercise of their new duties. For a national convocation, their numbers were too few; for an executive government, too many.

The more enlightened members were by no means unaware of the almost inevitable deficiencies of the new government. It was the opinion of Jovellanos that a Regency of five persons should immediately be appointed, and that the Junta should be reduced to one half of its original number. That the power of the latter should cease on the assembling of the Cortes, which was to be convoked as speedily as was found prac-

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CHAP. XII. ticable in the circumstances of the country.

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It was scarcely to be expected that the Junta should decree the abrogation of its own powers; and the propositions of this distinguished patriot were not carried into effect.

But the measure admitted by all to be most indispensable in the circumstances of the country, was the appointment of a Commander-in-chief, who might consolidate the national troops, and direct their efforts with unity of purpose and effect, against the common enemy. To the accomplishment of this object, however, there were many impediments. Spain afforded no general whose claims to so distinguished a command were pre-eminent and acknowledged. The local governments, swayed by petty interests, were discordant in their sentiments; and it was found impossible to unite the voices of the people in favour of any individual on whom the appointment could be bestowed. Under these circumstances, the Junta endeavoured to supply the place of a General-in-chief by a Military Commission, of which Castanos was destined to be president. Yet this measure, too, was frustrated by unforeseen difficulties; and time passed on without the

final adoption of any efficacious steps for the im- CHAP. XII.
 provement and consolidation of the national
 forces.

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In the meanwhile, the confidence of the people in their own prowess and resources, had been increased, by the victory of Baylen, to a pitch of exultation almost ludicrous. In their eyes, the contest was already at an end, and it only remained to reap the full harvest of their glorious resistance. It was impossible to impress on them that the safety of their country still depended on their adoption of a system of firm, unrelenting, connected, and continuous resistance. They were unable to appreciate the dangers which surrounded them, and remained equally intractable to advice or persuasion. The Central Government, instead of exerting itself to dispel the unfortunate illusions of the people, were smitten with the epidemic delirium, and endeavoured, by exaggerated statements of its military force, to deceive both the nation and its allies. At the very moment when the troops already organized were in want of almost every necessary, they proclaimed, in the true spirit of bluster and bravado, their immediate intention of augmenting the army to

Oct. 26.

CHAP. XII. half a million of infantry and fifty thousand
1808. cavalry ; a force not larger, perhaps, than was
September. requisite in the circumstances of the country, but
one which it was quite impossible they could
possess the means to organize and equip.

While such was the course of events in Spain, Napoleon was making vigorous exertions to retrieve the disasters of the preceding campaign. Had the efforts of the Spanish people been directed by a general government with vigour and judgment, it is probable he might have been induced to resign the task of subjugating the peninsula in despair. But the ignorance and imbecility of the numerous chaotic and ephemeral governments, which the revolution had called into existence, gave a prospect of success to his efforts, which led him to renew the contest with increased hope.

At the period in question, Europe might be said to be overspread by the armies of Napoleon. The French eagles were flying in Italy, in Dalmatia, in Prussia, in Denmark, in Poland, on the Rhine, the Danube, and the Elbe ; and the annals of modern history afford no parallel instance of a dominion so widely extended, yet apparently so firmly established, as that which

a long course of victory had acquired for France.

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The internal government of Napoleon was one of trickery and deception. It was part of his policy, that the nation should studiously be kept ignorant of the real state of Spain. The French newspapers indeed did, occasionally, mention that disturbances had taken place in the peninsula; but they were described as altogether trifling, and originating only in the vulgar, who had been led astray by motives of faction, or the intriguing agents of England. All the higher orders of the nation, the nobility and the public authorities, were represented as rejoicing in the new dynasty, and faithful in their allegiance.

The cabinet of the Thuilleries, however, were aware that the deception, thus practised on the credulity of the nation, was too flimsy to be long successful. A narrative, containing a distorted account of the events in Spain, was therefore published on the sixth of September. In this paper, the disturbances were exclusively attributed to the artifices of the priests, and of the English faction. It touched on the political circumstances of the country, in a manner the most desultory and unconnected, and an impen-

Sep. 6.

CHAP. XII. etrable obscurity prevaded the military details.

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Skirmishes were magnified into battles, and the disasters of the French armies were passed over with a negligent rapidity intended to conceal their importance. The account of the transactions at Zaragoza was brought down only to the period when the French were in occupation of a large portion of the city, and no notice was taken of their subsequent abandonment of the siege. The details of the battle of Rio Seco were given with studious exaggeration. The Spanish army was declared to be annihilated; and though it was admitted that the disasters in Andalusia were of some importance, it attributed the retreat of Joseph to the Ebro to the extreme *heat of the weather*, and to the desire of locating the troops in a district which *afforded better water* than New Castile!

It was in such circumstances that two reports from M. Champagny, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were laid before the French Senate. The first of these documents contained a strong recommendation that, in order to contribute to the overthrow of British power, the Emperor should seize on Spain; and boldly asserted the legitimacy of every measure by which an object

Dated
Apr. 24.

so desirable to the peace and tranquillity of the world could be effected. From her geographical position, it was declared that Spain must necessarily be considered either as the most important ally or the most dangerous enemy of France. When either was engaged in war, the situation of the other did not admit of neutrality; the two nations must be united by intimate alliance, or separated by implacable enmity. It was for the interest of Spain, as well as of France, that her government should be regenerated, at a time when a feeble and dissolute administration had led her to the brink of ruin. It had been the policy of Louis XIV. to unite Spain to France, by an alliance which placed a Bourbon on the throne. That policy should again be pursued: Spain, by similar means, should once more be united to France. The increase of the Spanish army, before the battle of Jena, and the conduct of the government at that period, were in themselves a declaration of war. The commerce of France had been made to suffer by the laws of the Customs. The ports of Spain were open to the contraband merchandise of England, which, through her dominions, found access to the rest of continental Europe. What policy suggested, there-

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CHAP. XII. fore, justice demanded. It was an act of both,
 1808. to conquer the territory of a power which had
 September. thus acted towards France.

September.

Dated
 Sep. 1.

The second report—of four months later date than the former—was of similar import, and was intended to establish the same conclusions. It justified the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to Spain. The disturbances in that country had been excited by English gold. Would the Emperor permit England to say, “Spain is one of my provinces. My flag, driven from the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Levant, and even from the shores of Persia, rules in the ports of France.” No, never! To prevent so disgraceful a consummation, two millions of gallant soldiers were ready to scale the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the peninsula. If the French fought for the liberty of the seas, it was first necessary to wrest Spain from the tyrant of the ocean. If they fought for peace, it could not be attained till the fomenters of war had been driven from the Spanish territory. If they fought for honour, they must inflict prompt and signal vengeance for the outrages committed against the French name in Spain. At last the English would be made to feel those evils

which they had so long inflicted on others. CHAP. XII.
 "They will be beaten," said M. Champagny, "de-
 stroyed, dispersed; or they will fly, as they did
 at Toulon, at the Helder, at Dunkirk, and in
 Sweden,—wherever the French armies have
 been able to find them! Their expulsion from
 Spain would be the ruin of their cause; it would
 exhaust their resources, and annihilate their last
 hope. In this contest the wishes of all Eu-
 rope would be with France!"

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In a message to the Senate, the policy he intended to pursue with regard to the peninsula, was distinctly announced by Napoleon. "I am determined," he said, "to prosecute the war in Spain with the utmost vigour, and to destroy the armies which England has poured into that country. The future security of my subjects, a maritime peace, and the security of commerce, depend on the success of these important operations. Frenchmen, all my undertakings have but one object—your happiness, and the permanent prosperity of your children; and, if I know you aright, you will hasten to comply with this new call on your exertions, which is rendered necessary by the interests of your country."

CHAP. XII. Vast preparations were accordingly made for
 the prosecution of the war. Eighty thousand
 1808. soldiers of Austerlitz, and Jena, and Friedland,
 September. were withdrawn from Prussia and Poland, and
 directed to cross the Pyrenees. The contin-
 gents of the Confederation of the Rhine were
 likewise set in motion, and a levy of one hun-
 dred and sixty thousand conscripts was decreed
 by the Senate.

On entering France the veterans were receiv-
 ed with public honours in every town along the
 line of their march. Deputations came forth to
 meet them with greeting and congratulation on
 their return, and they were feasted at the ex-
 pense of the municipalities.

Such public demonstrations of respect to the
 soldiers of his army, were encouraged by Napo-
 leon. They contributed to diffuse a military
 spirit throughout the nation. They were a cheap
 reward for past services, and an incitement to
 press onward in that career which had led to
 such honourable results. It was his uniform po-
 licy to impress on the people, that those who
 would pursue successfully the path of honour and
 distinction, must hew their way by the sword.

On the eleventh of September, the advanced-

guard of the army was reviewed by the Emperor at Paris; when, forming the officers in a circle, he thus addressed them:—

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“Soldiers! after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, by rapid marches you have passed through Germany. I now direct you to march through France, without a moment’s repose. Soldiers! I have need of you. The frightful presence of the Leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let him fly terrified at your approach. Let us carry our triumphant eagles even to the pillars of Hercules. There also we have outrages to avenge! Soldiers! your fame has transcended that of all modern warriors. But have you equalled the glory of the Roman legions, who, in one campaign, were conquerors on the Rhine, the Euphrates, in Illyria, and on the Tagus? A lasting peace, and permanent prosperity, shall be the reward of your exertions. A true Frenchman cannot, and ought not, to taste repose till the ocean has been freed from its tyrant. Soldiers! all that you have already done, all that you will yet do, for the happiness of France and my glory, shall be eternally engraven on my heart.”

CHAP. XII. A force, amounting nearly to two hundred
 1808. and fifty thousand men, of all nations, languages,
 September. and religions, thronged the roads to Spain; di-
 verse in all of thought, motive, or expression,
 and united only by the strong bond of military
 discipline. A struggle, more vehement and
 deadly than that in which Spain had hitherto
 been engaged, was evidently approaching. Every
 nerve and muscle would be strained to regain
 the grasp which France, by the disasters of the
 former campaign, had been forced to loosen. It
 was the last and decisive contest between tyran-
 ny and freedom; and all hopes—those alike of
 the slave and the freeman—were absorbed in
 the event.

While to all eyes the horizon of Spain was
 thus hourly becoming more dark and overcast,
 Napoleon set out for Erfurth, to hold a confer-
 ence with the Emperor Alexander. The conse-
 quences of this meeting were a treaty of alliance
 between the sovereigns, and a proposal for peace
 to Great Britain. The latter was accompanied
 by a joint letter from the two Emperors to the
 King of England. “The circumstances of Eu-
 rope,” they said, “had brought them together;
 and their first object was to yield to the wishes

and wants of all nations, and to seek, in a gen- CHAP. XII.
 eral peace, the most efficacious remedy for the
 common miseries of Europe. The long and
 bloody war which had ravaged the continent
 was at length at an end, and could not be re-
 newed. Many changes had taken place in Eu-
 rope ; and many states had been overthrown.
 Of these the chief cause was the distress and
 convulsion produced by the stagnation of mari-
 time commerce. Still greater changes might
 take place against the policy of the English na-
 tion. Peace, therefore, was the interest of Eng-
 land, as well as of the continent. We write to
 entreat your Majesty," observed the potentates,
 in conclusion, " that, disregarding the dictates
 of the passions, you would listen to the voice of
 humanity. That you would at length resolve
 to conciliate all interests, and, by so doing, pre-
 serve the existing powers, and ensure the hap-
 piness of Europe, and of this generation, at the
 head of which providence has placed us."

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This singular communication was answered
 by Mr. Canning, in two letters addressed to the
 Russian and French ministers, accompanied by
 an official note. The former contained a state-
 ment of the reasons, why his Majesty did not

CHAP. XII. think it proper to depart from the usual mode
of conducting negotiations between indepen-
1808. dent sovereigns. In the latter, the King's readi-
September. ness and desire to negotiate a peace, on any
terms not inconsistent with his own honour, and
with the permanent security of Europe, were a-
gain asserted. If the condition of the continent
had been one of agitation and convulsion—if many
states had been subverted, and more were yet
threatened with subversion, these calamities, it
was declared, were not with any justice attri-
butable to his Majesty. It was most true, that
these dreadful wars were altogether in oppo-
sition to the policy of Great Britain, yet the
King could not be expected to learn, with unqual-
ified regret, that the system which had occasion-
ed a stagnation of commerce so deplorable, had
recoiled on its authors or its instruments. It was
neither, however, in the disposition of his Ma-
jesty, nor in the character of the people over
whom he reigned, to rejoice in the misery and
privations even of the nations combined against
him; and, therefore, he anxiously desired the
termination of the sufferings of the continent.
The sole object of the war in which his Majesty
was engaged, was national safety; but in its

progress, new obligations had been imposed on him, in behalf of those powers whom the aggressions of a common enemy had compelled to unite their cause with his, and of others who had solicited his assistance and support in the vindication of their national independence. The interests of Portugal, Sicily, and Sweden, the document went on to state, were inseparably connected with those of his Majesty; and for these powers he claimed a participation in the negotiations. With Spain, indeed, no formal treaty had been executed; but he had contracted, in the face of the world, engagements with that nation not less sacred than the most formal treaties; and it was, therefore, indispensable that the government, acting in name and on behalf of the Spanish monarch, should be admitted as party to any negotiation in which his Majesty might engage.

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The issue of this unpromising attempt to effect the general pacification of Europe is well known. The Russian minister, in his reply, declared the resolution of his Sovereign not to recognise the insurgent government of Spain as an independent power. The Emperor had already acknowledged the title of Joseph Buona-

CHAP. XII. parte to the crown of Spain. He had united his
 1808. interests with those of Napoleon, and was re-
 September. solved to adhere to his engagements. The
 reply of M. Champagny was insulting. "How
 is it possible," said he, "for the French go-
 vernment to entertain the proposal of admit-
 ting the Spanish insurgents to the negotiation?
 What would the English government have said
 had it been proposed to them to admit the Cath-
 olic insurgents of Ireland? France, without
 having entered into formal treaties, had been in
 communication with them, and had frequently
 sent them succours."

The lameness of this attempt, at analogical
 reasoning, was ably exposed by Mr. Canning in
 his reply; and the correspondence concluded,
 as probably was expected by both parties, with-
 out any beneficial result.

Oct. 18. On the eighteenth of October, Napoleon re-
 turned to Paris; and on the twenty-fourth, he
 opened the session of the legislative body, by a
 speech from the throne, in which, after a brief
 and compendious review of the political situa-
 tion of Europe, he made known his resolution of
 proceeding to Spain, "in order, with the aid of
 God, to crown his brother in Madrid, and to

plant his victorious eagles on the towers of Lisbon." CHAP. XII.

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Before Napoleon set forward with this purpose, above an hundred thousand French troops had already entered Spain, in order to reinforce the existing armies in that country. The flight of Joseph from Madrid had terminated at Vittoria; and there the head-quarters of the army were established.

It is now necessary we should turn to the previous operations of the Spanish armies.

Why a victory, so decisive as that of Baylen, should have been the signal for the universal inactivity of the Spanish armies, it is difficult to understand. The intrusive monarch had fled, terror-stricken, to the country behind the Ebro, where he could not muster above fifty thousand men. Had a speedy union been effected by the armies of Blake, Palafox, Castanos, Llamas, and Cuesta, their united force would have exceeded one hundred thousand men—a body, had their operations been directed with skill, at least numerically sufficient to have expelled the remains of the French army from the Spanish territory. But time passed on, and the French were suffered to remain un-

CHAP. XII. annoyed in their cantonments. The Murcian
 and Andalusian armies were inactive at Madrid.
 1808. The period of successful action was suffered to
 September. escape; and before anything approaching to a
 concentration of the Spanish forces had been
 effected, reinforcements had crossed the Py-
 renees, and a total revolution had taken place
 in the prospects of the campaign.

It was not till the month of August, that the
 Biscayans, overawed by their proximity to
 France and the presence of a considerable
 force, had been able to take part in the gen-
 eral struggle for freedom. At length, deriv-
 ing confidence from the favourable progress of
 events, the standard of resistance was raised
 throughout the province, and a Junta estab-
 lished at Bilboa. In order to restore obedience,
 a considerable body was despatched against the
 place, which routed and dispersed the patriots,
 and established in authority a Junta, whose
 members were known to be in the interest of
 France. This success was temporary. On the
 Sep. 20. twentieth of September, Bilboa was retaken, by
 a force under the Marquis de Portazgo, and the
 French garrison with difficulty effected their
 escape. But large bodies of the enemy had

already passed the Pyrenees ; and Marshal Ney, CHAP. XII.
 who had assumed the provisional command
 of the armies, determined, by another effort, to
 regain possession of the city. In order to de-
 ceive Portazgo, he first made demonstration of
 retiring on Vittoria, and then, by a rapid move-
 ment, advanced against Bilboa. The Span-
 ish general was not deluded by the stratagem.
 He withdrew the garrison from the city, and
 fell back on Valmaseda, where he was joined by
 a detachment of the Gallician army. Prepara-
 tions were immediately made for the recovery
 of the place ; but General Merlin, whom Ney
 had left in command, aware of the difficulty of
 maintaining himself in an unfortified city, with-
 drew his troops without waiting for attack.

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Oct. 11.

In the return of the Marquis de la Romana and his army, the Spanish nation had to rejoice in an event most favourable and important to their cause. When the insurrection first broke forth, that officer was in command of a corps of about fifteen thousand men, serving with the French army in Denmark. He had at first been induced to declare allegiance to the new government ; but on receiving, from Sir

CHAP. XII. Richard Keats, the British admiral commanding
 1808.
 October. on the station, intelligence of the real character of the events then passing in Spain, he determined to return, and bear part in the noble struggle in which his countrymen were engaged. The army unanimously approved of the resolution of its chief; and a project for deceiving the vigilance of Bernadotte, the French commander in Jutland, and for the subsequent embarkation of the army, having been concerted with the British admiral, it was successfully carried into effect. Several battalions were surrounded and disarmed by the French army; but the remainder, amounting to about ten thousand, arrived safely at St. Andero, where they were disembarked.

When the Spanish army was at length concentrated on the Ebro, its position was as follows.

Blake, with the army of Galicia, occupied a line extending from Bilboa to Burgos, and constituted the left of the united army. He was directed to force the right of the French, and possess himself of the great road to Bayonne.

The centre, under Castanos, had its head-

quarters at Soria, and occupied Tarazona, Borja, and Tudela. CHAP. XII.

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The Aragonese and Valencian forces were stationed on the side of Zaragoza, with their right extending to Sanguessa, and formed the right of the army.

The Conde de Belvidere, commanding the levies of Estramadura, had his head-quarters at Burgos, and was destined, when joined by the British army—whose arrival was speedily anticipated—to advance on the centre of the French army.

Morla was at Madrid with the reserve, consisting of about twenty thousand men.

At this period the left wing of the French army, commanded by Marshal Moncey, was posted along the Aragon and the Ebro, having its head-quarters at Tafalla.—Marshal Ney was at Guardia; Bessieres at Miranda; and Lefebvre, on the right, occupied the heights of Durango and Mondragon.

While the armies were thus stationed, the Spanish government and people, alike buoyed up by an overweening confidence, became impatient for action. The former despatched commissioners to the army, in order to accelerate the adoption

CHAP. XII. of active measures for the expulsion of the ene-
 my. No folly could be more egregious. The
 1808. Spanish generals required no Mentor to counsel
 October. them into measures of folly and imprudence. But,
 incredible as it may appear, the only apprehen-
 sion which seems, at this period, to have haunted
 the imagination of the Supreme Junta, and
 poisoned their repose, was, that the French, by
 a speedy and total evacuation of the Spanish
 territory, might baulk the just vengeance which
 the injured nation was prepared to wreak on its
 oppressors.

Though the advanced-posts of the armies,
 almost in presence of each other, were at
 many points separated only by a rivulet, no
 engagement had yet taken place. But this
 period of inaction was soon destined to cease.
 Palafox and Castanos had concerted a project
 of operations, in pursuance of which detach-
 ments of the central army were pushed on to
 Oct. 25. Lerin and Viana, while the Aragonese, by a
 flank march, were closing on Sangnessa, with the
 view of advancing on Roncesvalles, and thus
 cutting off the communications of the French
 army. Moncey, alarmed at these movements,
 detached a force of infantry, under Generals

Habert and Razout, with General Wathier's
 brigade of cavalry, to thrust back the Spaniards,
 and regain the positions they had seized. An
 engagement in consequence took place. The
 Spanish detachments were driven back in con-
 fusion, and a battalion of light infantry, surround-
 ed in Lerin, were made prisoners.

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October.

At the same time, Ney advanced on Logrono, which was occupied by the Castilian force under Pignatelli. After an obstinate resistance the city was taken; and the French, crossing the Ebro, continued the pursuit for several leagues.

The attempt of the Spanish army on the left being thus defeated, Moncey, while observing the motions of Palafox and Castanos, was ordered to wait the issue of the attacks on Blake and Belvidere, with the view of subsequently advancing on Zaragoza. Of these operations we must now speak.

The main body of the western army was posted in front of the heights of Durango and Mondragon, which commanded the great road to Bayonne. Blake, trusting that the Asturian General Azevedo would cut off the communication between Durango and Vittoria by Ochandiana, resolved to make an effort to gain possession of

CHAP. XII. the heights of Mondragon, and thus to effect a
 1808. separation between the advanced-guard and
 October. main body of the army. With this view he
 advanced to Zornosa; and General Merlin, on
 his approach, thought it prudent to evacuate
 the town, and take post with his division on a
 range of heights in the rear. On the following
 day, a division of the Spanish army advanced
 from Rigoytia, with the intention of turning the
 right flank of Merlin's position, while the centre
 and right pushed forward to the attack in front.
 These measures were successful. The French
 abandoned the position, and fell back on Du-
 rango.

Lefebvre, alarmed by these movements, was
 induced to violate the orders of the Emperor,
 that he should content himself with keeping the
 enemy in check, and advanced with his whole
 force, amounting to about twenty-five thousand
 men, to the support of Merlin. For several days
 Oct. 31. the armies remained inactive. On the thirty-first,
 Lefebvre advanced to the attack. Blake's army
 was considerably inferior in number, and without
 cavalry or artillery. The issue of a battle, fought
 under circumstances so imprudent, may be antici-
 pated. After a gallant and strenuous resistance,

the Spaniards were defeated, and forced to retreat on Bilboa. This operation, though conducted in presence of a superior army, was effected in good order; and, on the day following, Blake crossed the Salcedon, and took up a position at Nava.

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November.

The corps of Lefebvre, reinforced by that of Victor, continued to follow up the victory it had gained, and endeavoured to cut off the Asturian division of Azevedo. In this he was not successful; but Blake was driven from position to position. Encounters took place at Guenas, Valmaseda, and Espinosa; and his army, which for some days had been without provisions, and exposed to the most inclement weather, were at length thrown into confusion so complete, that, on the fourteenth of November, when the Marquis de la Romana traversed the district of Las Montanas, he encountered only a half-starved rabble, trusting to individual exertion for safety and support, and without even the semblance of a military body.

Nov. 9.

Jones.

In persisting in his operations against a superior and continually increasing force, it is unquestionable that Blake was guilty of a capital error. The true policy of Lefebvre was, not to have fought him at Zornosa, but to have en-

CHAP. XII. couraged him to advance still farther from his
 1808. resources, by which means his whole army might
 November. have been cut off. In the repeated engagements
 which took place, the troops of Romana particularly distinguished themselves. Brought into action, after the first defeat, piecemeal and without skill, these veterans displayed a hardihood and courage worthy of all admiration. The new levies, on the other hand, generally fled without waiting for attack. The disorganization of the army was at last complete; and, destitute of magazines, clothing, and money, it was evident that a long time must elapse before it could again be in condition to take the field.

Nov. 8. On the eighth of November, Napoleon arrived at Vittoria. He brought with him Marshal Soult; and that officer was immediately directed to assume the command of the second corps of the army. A few hours were sufficient to decide on the plan of operations to be adopted, and to direct the preliminary dispositions for its execution. It was determined to attack the centre, in order to isolate the two wings of the Spanish army; and, with this view, the corps of Marshal Soult was directed, by a rapid attack on Burgos, to drive back the Estramaduran

army under the Conde de Belvidere. On the tenth, the second corps was concentrated at the plateau of Monasterio and the Quintana la Pallia, and immediately set forward to attack the position of the Spanish army at Gamonal.

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 November.

On approaching the position, the French were received with a heavy fire from a battery of thirty pieces of cannon. But this did not impede their progress. The division of Mouton made a powerful attack on the centre of the Spanish line, where the best troops of the army were posted, and at once drove them back in confusion. Bessieres followed with the cavalry, and, having routed the wings, by a vigorous pursuit prevented the possibility of a rally. Victors and vanquished entered Burgos in a mingled and confused mass; and, some resistance being attempted from the houses, the city was given up to pillage.

Nov. 10.

This unfortunate action cost the Spanish army nearly three thousand in killed and prisoners, a great part of their artillery, and the whole of the stores and ammunition which were stationed in Burgos. The greater part of Belvidere's force consisted of raw levies, which fled without firing a shot. A battalion of students from Salamanca and Leon, alone displayed distinguished courage.

CHAP. XII. Animated by youthful zeal, they twice repulsed
 the enemy, and at length overborne by the ca-
 valry, by far the greater proportion were cut to
 pieces.

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November.

The victory he had thus easily acquired was vigorously followed up by Marshal Soult. Two corps of his army were detached in pursuit; one towards Lerma, another towards Palencia and Valladolid, while he himself marched towards Reynosa and St. Andero, where he hoped to intercept Blake's line of retreat to the plains of Leon.

Nov. 10.

In this hope he was disappointed. In spite of the rapidity of his march, he did not reach Reynosa till the day after Blake had quitted it with the remains of his army, having been successively beaten by Lefebvre at Guenas and Valmaseda, and by Victor at Espinosa. Soult, therefore, continued his march on St. Andero, where he left a division of his army; and, spreading the rest of his forces over the Montagna district, he continued to attack and disperse the insurgent bodies to be found in that district.

The left and centre of the Spanish armies being thus broken, the piquets of the French were now upon the Douro, and their cavalry

covered the plains of New Castile. Under these circumstances, Marshals Ney and Victor were ordered to advance from Burgos, by Aranda and Soria, to take the position of Castanos in reverse; while Marshal Lannes, with about forty thousand men, should attack him in front.

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On the approach of the French, Castanos abandoned Calahorra. On the twenty-third Lannes appeared in front of his position near Tudela.

Nov. 23.

The Spanish army, in number about forty-five thousand, was posted on a range of easy hills, extending from Tudela to Tarazona, distant about two leagues. The army of Aragon, which had joined but a few hours before the commencement of the action, was stationed on the right. The Andalusian army was on the left; those of Valencia and New Castile, in the centre. The artillery, consisting of forty pieces, was distributed along the front of the line.

The weakness, arising from the extreme extent of the position thus occupied, was too apparent not to be taken immediate advantage of by Marshal Lannes. The division commanded by General Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry, commenced the action by a vehement

CHAP. XII. attack on the centre. This, after a short resistance, gave way ; and the cavalry, penetrating through the opening, wheeled up to the left, and thus succeeded in enveloping the right wing of the Spaniards. The Aragonese troops in that quarter had already repelled the attack of General Morlot's division, but were now thrown into irretrievable confusion. On the success of this manœuvre, an attack was immediately made by the division of Lagrange on the left. A detachment, occupying the town of Cascante, continued for some time to offer gallant resistance to the progress of the enemy; but being at length driven back, the left wing was likewise dispersed, and fled in confusion to Tarazona, where three divisions of the army had been suffered to remain inactive during the action.

The French cavalry pursued the fugitives towards Soria on the one side, and towards Zaragoza on the other. The troops of Valencia, of New Castile, and part of those of Andalusia, directed their flight towards Valencia. Those of Palafox escaped to Zaragoza, where, by a second splendid defence, they were destined yet farther to consecrate their fame in the eyes of

posterity, and make glorious recompense to their country for the defeat of Tudela. CHAP. XII.

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As soon as the wreck of the left wing had collected in Tarazona, Castanos directed the four divisions in that town, to retreat on Calatayud, by way of Borja. The march commenced at midnight, and was proceeding with all order and regularity, when a magazine blew up, and the report spread, that the French cavalry were at hand. A cry of treason arose, and was rapidly diffused among the dispirited soldiers. The columns were thrown into confusion, and the road to Borja was speedily covered with a disorganized and insubordinate crowd.

By the French accounts, the loss of the Spanish army, in the battle of Tudela, amounted to upwards of seven thousand men; and thirty pieces of cannon were captured by the victors. Their own loss was comparatively trifling.

That any portion of the Spanish army was enabled to rally at Calatayud is, confessedly, owing to the dilatory movements of Marshal Ney. That officer was ordered to be at Agreda on the twenty-third; and had he been so, the retreat of the fugitives on Madrid must have been cut off. The tardiness of his move-

CHAP. XII. ments, on this occasion, has been attributed, by
 1808. some writers, to jealousy of Lannes, by others,
 November. to a characteristic appetite for plunder, which
 induced him to waste valuable time in the pil-
 lage of Soria. But this is matter on which it
 would be little interesting to speculate.

A British army was already in the field, to-
 wards the movements of which it is necessary
 that our attention should now be directed.

END OF VOLUME I.

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