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



SIX YEAR
IN BISCAY



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1668







SIX YEARS IN BISCAY.

1831—1837.

SIX YEARS IN HISTORY

LONDON:

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SIX YEARS IN BISCAY:

COMPRISING

A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

OF

THE SIEGES OF BILBAO,

IN JUNE 1835, AND OCT. TO DEC., 1836.

AND OF

THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN THAT CITY
AND THE BASQUE PROVINCES, DURING THE YEARS

1830 TO 1837.

BY

JOHN FRANCIS BACON.

" Quæque
Pars ipsa miserrima vidi."

LONDON:

SMITH, ELDER AND CO., CORNHILL.

MDCCCXXXVIII.

SIX YEARS IN BRITAIN

A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

BY THE REV. J. W. B. WILSON

OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

AND THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS

IN BRITAIN

LONDON

PRINTED BY J. W. B. WILSON

1840

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INTRODUCTION.

PREVIOUSLY to entering upon the narrative to which this volume is more particularly devoted, it may not be uninteresting to offer a few observations on that mighty contest of principles and dynasty now desolating Spain; of which the Basque provinces are, and have been the principal theatre, and the sieges of Bilbao the most animating episodes. The author having resided in the Peninsula from the beginning of 1830 to May 1837, five years of which interval were passed in Bilbao, his narrative has been compiled entirely from personal observations; and, although these introductory remarks have not the same authority, it is hoped that they will be found to

be tolerably accurate. In a question of principles and dynasty, it is as absurd to expect impartiality in a writer, as to suppose each of the contending parties to be in the right; which is impossible. It is the province of the writer to collect all the facts bearing upon the case which his observations or researches may elicit, and then to deduce his conclusions, which the reader may adopt or repudiate, as his judgment may incline.

That the elements of a furious conflict of principles have long been gathering in the Peninsula does not admit of a doubt. Placed at the tail of France, — often the theme of her jest, always her dupe, — her Bourbon cabinet obeying obsequiously the mandates from the Tuilleries, — with an absolute monarch, and an equally absolute priesthood controlling all activity, whether of the mind or body, — the progress of the age was nevertheless not without its effects upon Spain. The pride and luxury of the king were interested in the cultivation of the exact and physical sciences; for *these* concerned the safety of his dominions, *those* his personal enjoyments; and such is the beautiful bond which connects the entire circle of the sciences, that advancement in one branch, invariably leads to improvement in the others. The Spanish mathematicians and naturalists of the eighteenth century* will bear honourable com-

* D. Jorge Juan, Ulloa, Mendoza Rios, Malespina, Tofiño Churruca, Cavanillas, Azara, Mutis, and many others.

parison with those of France and England: by their side flourished, as statesmen and legislators, Ward, Campomanes, the Count Aranda, Jovellanos, Sempere and others, who, although ministers of the crown, were not the less inclined to introduce gradual reforms into the administration, and to improve the education of the people; and in this arduous but invaluable public duty, which continually involved them in dangerous disputes with the formidable hierarchy, they met with constant support from that excellent and enlightened prince, the third Charles.

With the dynasty of Bourbon, a taste for French literature began to be slowly diffused in Spain: some of the best, and many of the worst French authors were translated; and, although those of the ancient school bestowed upon these writers and their imitators, the title of "Gallicists," their influence continually increased, and, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the philosophy of the Encyclopedists was as powerfully felt in Spain as in any other part of Europe. Slowly emerging from its long repose, beholding those dogmas, which had been so long implicitly believed without examination, crumble away before the touch of true philosophy, based upon experiment and facts alone, the human mind in Spain became involved in that state of doubt which usually marks every great revolution in matters of belief. To be sceptical, is easy; but, to disentangle truth, when

interwoven with error and falsehood, is laborious and difficult. As in most countries, few chose the latter; many embraced the former alternative: in both instances fanaticism and despotic rule received severe and deadly wounds; but while the few sought and found, in the pure doctrines of Christianity, undefiled by human inventions, that serene confidence of mind which it alone can inspire, others wandered in the cold shadow of infidelity, or blind Pyrronism; or else, in the hour of death or danger, paralyzed by fear, their souls relapsed into deeper superstition, and they strove with gifts and largesses to buy forgiveness from their Creator. Of the numerous orders of the regular clergy in Spain, the Benedictines, Augustines, and Jesuits are the most celebrated for their learning; while the mendicant orders are the most ignorant, indeed they are almost wholly recruited from the peasantry,* to whom a life of lazy indolence, and implicit obedience to their superiors, seems to be as attractive as to the Egyptians of old.

* St. Athanasius, in his biography of St. Anthony (the Egyptian monk), declares that thousands of able-bodied peasants were buried in the monastic solitudes of Upper Egypt; that Alexandria contained a countless multitude of these holy men; but even this, though a tolerable allowance, was nothing compared to the city of Oxyrinchus, where the number of monks surpassed that of the other inhabitants. *Rufinus in Vita Patrum, c. 7. page 461.*, as quoted by Gibbon, vol. iv. p. 394. *edit.* 1828.

The impudence, knavery, and low debauchery of these battalions of the standing army of Rome had long excited the disgust of the better-informed classes in Spain; but these feelings were indulged in secret, for the open expression of them would have been unsafe, since the doctrine of forgiveness of injuries formed no part of the creed of the followers of St. Francis or St. Dominic. A Benedictine monk, the celebrated Father Feijoo, safe beneath the cowl, ventured to attack these useful but disgraceful allies of papal power. His success was immense, and his writings, whose satire consisted in their truth, gave a deep wound to the mendicant orders, and, through them, to fanaticism and superstition in every shape. Thus the increase of education among the more affluent classes was continually sapping the influence of the hierarchy, and even inducing people to canvass, with a freedom hitherto unknown, the measures of the sovereign. Next came the mighty revolution in France, and the wars arising out of it, by impoverishing the country, compelled both monarch and minister to listen to the just complaints of an oppressed people; and so popular had the idea of a representative government become, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, that the convocation of Cortes was openly discussed.

The disasters of the war with Great Britain only increased the growing discontents of the

country, and the belief that the then existing form of government could not continue; which soon received ample verification when the French emperor, tired of cheating and degrading unfortunate Spain, kidnapped her monarch and all his family, poured his armies into the country, and placed his brother, as his lieutenant, upon the throne. This arbitrary and precipitate step much embarrassed the partisans of reform and the representative system; for having imbibed their ideas on these subjects chiefly from French sources, and usually counting upon the assistance of France in regenerating their country, they found themselves in direct hostility to those whom they regarded as their masters. To league with the invader was to submit to insult, and to disclaim their nationality; to join the nation in its struggle against Napoleon was probably to perpetuate the very abuses they strove to amend: nevertheless the liberals, (for such that party was now termed) did not hesitate; but, with few exceptions, flung themselves into the foremost ranks of opposition to France, and were rewarded, perhaps, beyond their hopes, by the summoning of the Cortes, the direction of public affairs, the reform of abuses, and the new-modelling of the government, which, in their hands, was so effectually altered, that from being the most absolute monarchy in Europe, as far as ink and paper could go, it became the most strictly limited of all

limited monarchies. But here the zeal of the liberals outran their judgment: experience and practice gave way to theory; the result was, that the first shock showed their edifice to be constructed on the sands: Ferdinand returned, and, at his nod, the fabric of the Cortes disappeared. However, the long war, the intercourse with England, the decline of the church, and the increase of the middle classes of society, rendered a completely retrograde movement impossible; nay, a few years manifested to the king and the serviles, that their sweeping abolition of the Cortes and their reformations were as distasteful to the nation as the organic changes introduced by that body had been.

The loss of the Spanish colonies may also be considered as one of the causes of the present war; retaining, as it did in the Peninsula, a crowd of aspirants for place and power, who were previously disposed of in the vast American dominions of Spain; and this has increased the elements of discord and dissatisfaction. Men who would obey without scruple a government that gave them fat benefices and good commands, begin to talk about reform when nothing is to be had. Without despoiling the church, I do not see how the thousands of unemployed *Pretendientes*,* who

* *Pretendientes* "a Spanish word signifying all those who seek situations under government, and, in fact, all persons who *pretend* to favours or places of any sort."

formerly were provided for in the Americas, are to be distributed. To a nation, the loss of her colonies is like that of a limb to the human body; the circulation is increased in the other members. When Great Britain lost the thirteen American colonies, she still retained a great many, which became yearly more valuable; at the same time she gained in the East Indies more than she lost in America, and thus the patronage and field for emigration was increased instead of diminished; but Spain lost all hers, except three, which offer comparatively little patronage, and no field for emigration: thus the home country must find room for all her children, and society must be roughly shaken ere that can be done. Perhaps the day when Great Britain loses her colonies will be the signal for a civil war; for the continually growing artificial state of society, engendering discontent, will hardly bear such a rude shock without breaking up into a state of anarchy.

Then came the insurrection of the Isla de Leon, and the re-establishment of the Constitution, the civil war originating in the Pyrennees, supported by France, afterwards spreading over the remainder of the kingdom. The new Cortes of 1820—3 did not seem to have profited much by past experience; their legislation was crude and theoretical as before; still, however, they reformed numerous abuses. The sale of the property of the regulars was absolutely necessary, and not

less so, the closing of the convents ; for the hostility of the regular clergy could neither be appeased nor disarmed. It was but prudence, therefore, to incapacitate them from doing mischief. Notwithstanding the errors of the Cortes, considering that the king was with them, and that his brother Charles, although approving of the conduct of the absolutists, had not ventured to join them, it is probable that the struggles, after enduring for years, might have ended in a compromise, had not the whole power of France been thrown into the scale of the serviles, when that of the liberals "directly quick up flew and kicked the beam."*

The king was restored to his full absolute power ; all the acts of the Cortes were annulled ; the

* A curious instance of the lukewarmness in the cause of freedom and the representative system, among the officers of the army, is presented by the following anecdote of General Piquero. When King Ferdinand returned from France, this man commanded the regiment of Malaga. On his receiving a copy of the decree of the 4th May, by which the Cortes were dissolved, and the sovereign declared absolute, it appeared to him an opportunity not to be lost of making his way at court. Under his direction and influence, an address was sent to the king, purporting to be from the regiment and himself, wherein was solicited the singular honour of carrying *chains* embroidered upon their colours, as a proof of their entire and implicit obedience to the will of the absolute monarch ! All this was most graciously conceded by the king, and the address, with the privilege granted, published in the Madrid Gazette. The "chains" were borne on the colours

church property sold was taken from the purchasers and restored to the original owners, the ceremony of returning the purchase money being dispensed with. The Carlists reigned all powerful at Madrid and over the provinces; their opponents sought safety in flight or concealment. The ten years following was one continual reign of terror for the liberals, who were plundered and imprisoned on the slightest pretexts: the army was purged of all officers suspected of liberalism, and their places were filled by a motley gang of adventurers, friars, smugglers, mechanics, publicans, and muleteers, who had been officers in the guerilla bands of Cataluña and Navarre. The fatal effects of this proceeding on the Spanish army will be shewn hereafter; even the military forces thus reorganised and officered were still regarded with suspicion by the Carlists; and an enormous force,* consisting solely of their ad-

of the regiment, until the second epoch of the Constitution, when they were disused. Yet this man, Piquero, who in this instance had carried servility and adulation to the utmost, became, in 1821, a furious *exaltado*, for whom no reform was sufficiently sweeping, no government sufficiently democratic.

* In 1832 this force consisted of 500 battalions of infantry, 51 squadrons of cavalry, and 24 companies of artillery, with 3 companies of sappers and miners, amounting in all to above 300,000 men! exclusive of the "free companies of Cataluña," and the "Tercios" of the Basque provinces, and Navarre, equal to 50,000 more; Biscay alone raising 14,658. See *Guia de Forasteros*, published 1833.

herents, which in a few years numbered above three hundred thousand men, was organised in the provinces.

Notwithstanding the arbitrary rule of the Carlists, the country, after a few years of peace, began to improve, and even assume an air of prosperity. The short-lived insurrection of Bessières, and the more serious troubles of Cataluña in 1827, the work of the ultra-royalists, were soon appeased; new roads were opened, others commenced, the internal communications were continually improving, and, on the king's marriage with the Princess Christina, the rigorous proceedings of the government against the Constitutionals were much alleviated, and several permitted to return to Spain.

This lenity to the fallen liberals greatly exasperated the ultra Carlists, in whom time had abated nothing of their animosity. They were favoured by the outbreak of the revolution of July 1830, and the ill-judged invasion of the Basque provinces by Mina: next came the sad expedition of Torrijos and his companions — their betrayal and massacre; and it was feared that the liberal party would suffer a severer proscription than ever; but Ferdinand had the good sense to reject the sanguinary councils of Trasierra and Calomarde; the liberals, though closely watched, were not persecuted.

The birth of a daughter,* while it gratified the king, naturally increased the queen's influence; the Carlists by this event were in a manner paralysed: the question of the succession was fiercely disputed at their meetings, and the prophecy of the Spanish historian† was on the eve of fulfilment, whenever the king's death should take place. A schism arose among the Carlists, and, as the pretended Salic law never had any weight in Spain, thousands of the Carlists declared their belief in the right of succession being vested in the king's daughter, in default of a son. Meantime, the open and unconcealed hostility of the ultra Carlists to the queen compelled her, unless she chose to sacrifice the rights of her daughter, to look for friends and support in another quarter; hence, she exercised her influence with the king

* The Count O'Neil had stopped in his carriage, in the Calle Montera, to speak to a friend of the author, on the day of the birth of the Princess Isabel. On hearing the first cannon fired, both ceased speaking, and listened attentively to count the number of guns. At nineteen there was a dead pause; then, after a long silence, O'Neil covered his face with his hands, and throwing himself back in the carriage, exclaimed, "Alas! unhappy Spain, grief and mourning will cover the land." ("Ay! infeliz España, estarás cubierta de luto y duelo.") He spoke prophetically; two of his sons have already fallen fighting on different sides, with numbers of his friends.

† The Prebend Solau y Blanco—Comm. on Mariana, Hist. de España, vol. xviii. edit. Madrid, 1820-3.

to remove some of the disabilities under which the Constitutionals laboured; Murillo the famous Count of Carthagená, the Prince of Anglona, Arguelles the statesman, and many others were suffered to return to Spain, and were even graciously received by the king at his court. It is time to say a few words on the famous question of the succession.

I shall not insult my readers by supposing it necessary to inform them, that there have been queens of Spain in the olden time, before the accession of the house of Bourbon. The names of Doña Urraca, and Doña Berenguela,* of the famous Doña Isabel, the patron of Columbus, of her daughter Doña Juana, the wife of the Archduke Philip, and mother of the great Emperor Charles V., of Germany, and I. of Spain, are familiar to all acquainted with Spanish history. Nor is the crown of Aragon without similar examples: witness Doña Petronila, daughter of Ramiro, el Monge, [the monk] so called, because he was taken, by the states of Aragon, out of the

* Speaking of this princess, the Franciscan friar Negrete says, "Doña Berenguela aunque virtuosa por otro lado, fue tambien otra usurpadora. *Sus Virtudes no pudieron hacer que dejase de ser muger.*" "Doña Berenguela, although virtuous, was still only an usurress. Even her virtues could not prevent her being a *very woman.*" Be it remarked, that this lady was about as much an usurress, as the English Queen Elizabeth. The last sentence is just what might be expected from a filthy-minded monk, always uncharitable to the sex.

monastery to be their king, to whom, at his decease, succeeded his daughter Petronila.

In Biscay it is well known that the sisters of D. Nuño, the nineteenth lord of Biscay (who died childless), were married to D. Tello, brother to Peter the Cruel, and to D. Juan, of Aragon, his cousin. D. Tello, in right of his wife, was proclaimed Señor de Biscaya; but, quarrelling with his brother, he was driven from the country, and his wife, Doña Juana, put to death by Peter. D. Juan of Aragon then asked the lordship of the king, in right of *his* wife, Doña Isabel, which so enraged the tyrant, that he slew him, by throwing him out of the window of a house in Bilbao; he also killed his wife. On the death of Peter the Cruel, Henry of Trastamare reconfirmed D. Tello in the lordship, at whose death without issue, it reverted to the crown of Castille, from which it has not since been separated. Again, it is notorious, that as the house of Austria derived their rights to the throne of Spain through a woman, so the house of Bourbon can only substantiate their title to the crown by the female side; nor is their claim any of the best, for Philip V., the first of the Spanish Bourbons, was the grandson of the younger daughter of Philip IV.; whereas his rival, the Archduke Charles, was the grandson of the elder daughter of that monarch; consequently, when the Infante Don Carlos attempts to deprive his niece of the throne, he

infringes the very law from which his own title is derived.

But it may be alleged, that Philip V. established the Salic law, thus cutting off, for the future, all right to the female succession. Now, it is perfectly clear that this decree was totally arbitrary on the part of Philip,—that he made the law “*motu proprio*,” without the Cortes in full convocation having given their assent; for the king ordered away all such as were unfavourable to his views, and even against the remonstrance of the Council of Castilla.* Nevertheless, waving that objection, it is clear that whatever right Philip V. possessed to alter and change the old laws of the realm at his pleasure, his descendants had an equal right to restore things to their ancient footing; which was done, first by Charles IV.,

* It has been asserted in a newspaper (Times, 24th August, 1837), that the English minister, Livingstone, and the French ambassador were present, and offered no opposition. It would have been, indeed, extraordinary, had the envoy of France opposed a measure of which he, in all probability, was the principal instigator. That Livingstone made no remonstrance, is certainly more to be wondered at, but it is by no means clear that he did not. Beyond a simple remonstrance or representation he would not go, because, the king of Spain having a male heir, there was no apparent probability of a female possessing the throne. The peace of Utrecht had stipulated that the crowns of Spain and France should never be united, and the ministers of George I. would scarcely think of involving the nation in a war for an abstract question.

secondly by the Cortes of 1812, who solemnly revoked the decree of Philip V., re-established the old law of the Partidas (*si fijo varon nin oviese, sigue la hembra*), and the right of female succession. Nor can the impartial judgment of the Cortes ever be disputed; for when they decided this question, there was not the most remote chance of a female successor to the Spanish throne. Howbeit, to make assurance doubly sure, King Ferdinand called a general Cortes, before whom the edict of Philip V. was again repealed, and his daughter, the Infante Isabel, sworn to, as Princess of the Asturias. Among the works circulated by the Carlists in favour of their leader's right to the crown, was a small pamphlet, written by Friar Negrete, the prior of the Franciscans of Bilbao.* This personage prefaces his book with two extracts from the *Partidas* (L. 2, title 13, par. 2; and L. 10, title 13, par. 2,) the first of which intimates "that a loyal people will do all they can to please the king;" and the second informs us, "that a loyal people ought to know and prefer those things which are

* This father Negrete was a chief leader of the Carlist faction in the Basque provinces, an adept at intrigues of all sorts. He was an astute and subtle disciple of St. Francis, very well suited for the times and his party. Besides the performance here noticed, he further distinguished himself as a literary character, by writing an obscene song against the queen Christina, before her husband died, called "*La Reyna Trompón*."

pleasing to their sovereign, and that such as do not love the king, but oppose his desires, commit great sin, and deserve hanging, with loss of goods, &c."

After quoting this comfortable doctrine, the friar proceeds to lament the evils brought on the country and *true religion* by the queen's accession. He next quotes the decree of Philip V., *yet not as such*, but simply as the law of the land, contained in the L. 5, t. i. b. iii. of the *Novissima Recopilacion*.* So this faithful and veracious guide takes no notice of the *date* of this *Novissima Recopilacion*; nor does he mention, that of three editions of the *Recopilacion*, published since the death of Philip V., this decree is only to be found in the *last*, that of 1805; nor does the "worthy friar" inform his readers, that throughout Spain, and particularly in the Basque provinces, all *mayorazguias* (entails) descend to the daughter, when there is no son, unless the founder, by his will, had limited the succession to tail male. He ought also to have told his readers, that the reason why females inherit entails, unless their right be barred by the founder, is, that all entails are supposed to follow the crown, itself the highest of the order. Nothing of this suited the *padre prior* to relate; still less the fact, that this decree of

* The edit. of Valdelomar, 1805. No other edition would have suited him.

Philip V. has been thrice repealed. Indeed, Father Negrete is so pushed to make out his case, that he brings in, as evidence of the impropriety of female reign, the words of the Almighty, when passing sentence upon our first parents (Genesis ch. iii. v. 16), and those of St. Paul, when writing to the Corinthians touching the duties of wives (1 Cor. ch. xiv. v. 34). Had the friar Negrete possessed common sense, he would have felt the impropriety of these citations from the Scriptures, and had he possessed ordinary piety, he would have been convinced of their profanity; but as he is destitute of either, it would be only a loss of time to argue the question, particularly since it is clear that pride and self-love have made this man impenetrable as the nether mill-stone; for Prior Negrete is evidently one of those professors of religion, who always brand their opponents as impious enemies of the Eternal, when they are simply exposing the errors of an erring and fallible mortal.

After a great deal of abuse of the liberals, who are denominated *philosophers, jews, freemasons, heretics, &c.* the Prior of St. Francis comes to the period of the king's illness, and states, that on the 7th of July, the Duke of Alcuia, by command of the king, went to inform D. Carlos that his majesty had determined to name the queen regent, and his royal highness her counsellor; to which the prince replied, "that he had

made up his mind to take no part in the government during his majesty's life." Half an hour afterwards, a second message was brought from the king, desiring his brother to be co-regent with the queen, until the majority of the princess Isabel. The infante replied, "I cannot agree to any such condition, without forfeiting my claim to the crown." Said the Duke of Alcudia, "This conduct of your royal highness exposes the nation to a civil war, the results of which it is not easy to foresee." "Tis precisely because I wish to avoid the fatal evils of a civil war, that I am determined to sustain my claims," replied the infante:* and with this truly absurd *non sequitur*, the correspondence closed. In his zeal for the cause of his master, the friar goes so far as to become almost republican. He also declares, that up to the seventh century, the monarchy was elective, and not hereditary (p. 23); and that subsequently, at the fourth and sixteenth councils of Toledo, the

* A la media hora, volvió el Ministro á proponerle, ya que S. M. quería, que aceptase ser Regente juntamente con la Reyna, hasta que la Infanta que debia ser proclamada Reyna despues de su muerte, llegase á la edad completa para reynar por si. "Yo no puedo convenirme con semejante condicion," respondió S. A., "sin renunciar mis derechos y los de mis hijos á la Corona de España." "Esto Señor," repuso Alcudia, "expone la nacion á una guerra civil, cuyos resultados no es facil preveer." "Por evitar esto es justamente," replicó S. A., "por lo que yo estoy resuelto á defender mis derechos y los de mis hijos."—Restaurador, p. 20.

choice of a candidate was confined to the clergy and lay nobility ; that such was the usage and law, until D. Alphonzo X. (the Wise) enacted the law of the Siete Partidas. All this is true enough ; but what has it to do with the question—unless the claim of D. Carlos is to be supported on the grounds of election ? which I suppose is intended, since the prior, forgetting his quotation from the Partidas prefixed to his book, as well as what he has just written, has the inconceivable stupidity to declare—“ No ! the law of Partidas was never admitted as authority, nor was it ever the usage of Spain.”*

And this is the best case the Carlist advocates can make out for their master. Of the remainder of the friar's furious invectives against the Liberals, wherein he declares that they intend to murder the queen and her daughter first!!! it would be an insult to the reader to take further notice. The right of the young queen of Spain is unexceptionable and unquestionable, but her ability to maintain her rights is by no means so sure ; for while her uncle brings forward a new revolutionary army, raised in the mountains, well officered and obedient, the cause of Isabel is supported by the old army, with 700 generals of different degrees of badness, and not a few of the

* No, la ley de Partida jamas fué admitida, ni estuvo en uso en España, p. 29.

officers either Carlists,* or lukewarm in the cause. (1834.)

SECTION II.

THE PAPAL CHURCH IN SPAIN.

With diffidence I approach this subject, which has occupied the attention and pens of many writers. In treating on the Spanish clergy, it has been the custom to represent that body as the chief cause of the depressed state of the country, and their bigotry as only equalled by their unbounded ambition and grasping avarice: small praise, but ample censure has been heaped upon them; howbeit the enthusiasm of the writers hurries them too far. That the influence of the clergy in Spain is very great, that it is in some provinces almost all-powerful, admits of no dispute: but, that this influence is exercised in the way and to the extent many writers suppose, is not the case.

Nor is it easy to reconcile the high praise be-

* This was the case for the first two years of the war. Latterly the noble and heroic devotion of the Spanish army to the cause of the queen, under every privation, has been worthy of all praise. The various vicissitudes of a doubtful contest have cleared its ranks, and there are, probably, few or no Carlists among the queen's battalions at the present day.

stowed upon the Spanish nation with the abuse heaped upon the clergy: considering that the clergy are in Spain, *ex officio*, the teachers of the nation, it is impossible to controvert the assertion, that if the body of the pupils deserve high praise, the teachers deserve more. However, it is certain that the Spaniard, without dreaming of changing his religion, is becoming daily more indifferent to it under its present form.

A vicious monarch may wretchedly govern a country, and it may be more to the honour of the nation to cast him off; but the suffering his reign does not imply a total prostration of independence: for the regal tyranny and the regal vices, like those of Charles IV. (of Spain), may be chiefly felt by those about him, and the mass of the nation, averse to civil commotions, and not much interested in the royal caprices, may patiently wait for a change, which sooner or later must occur.

But very different is the case where a particular class of men rule the state; such as the clergy or nobility; their influence whether for good or evil is felt by all, from the serf in his hovel to the monarch on his throne: the lordly baron, or mitred priest may and can impose respect, and exact obedience from every one: their name is Legion, their power every where felt and seen.

Now, since none escape the power, all are in-

terested in its abridgment or restraint within reasonable limits; for, unlike a monarch, an aristocratic or clerical hierarchy never dies, nor does it change its principles of policy; and the bulk of the nation can hope for little more than that this influence and power be used with some moderation, so that coercion and tyranny be not carried too far; otherwise the people will rise in self-defence, of which the history of Europe offers many examples.

Pursuing the course of policy laid down by Ferdinand the Catholic, the Spanish monarch studiously endeavoured to humble the Castilian and Aragonese nobility, who, in so many previous reigns, had been signalised by their turbulent and restless spirit. Then rose the gloomy fabric of the Inquisition, among whose familiars might be numbered the first nobility in Spain. The stubborn Hebrew, the zealous Moslem atoned with their blood for the crime of being born in Spain, and of having followed the religion of their fathers. Nor did the holy wrath of the chosen priesthood flame out less violently against those virtuous and pious christians, who, imitating the examples of Wicliff, Luther and Calvin, dared to take the scriptures for their authority, and to commit the heinous offence of thinking for themselves. By the bigoted churchmen, these righteous victims were hunted like wild beasts, until their extermination

by the halter, sword, or stake was complete. Then, gazing on their altars heaped with slain, the fierce followers of Dominic and Francis called mankind to witness their piety, and glorified *their* God — which must be the Moloch of Tyre and Carthage—not the blessed Redeemer of the world: and yet, should Charles V. establish his throne in Spain, such scenes will be repeated, for he is but the servant of the high church party, to whom forgiveness and forbearance are alike unknown. As the power of the aristocracy declined, so that of the hierarchy increased, almost in an exact ratio. Credulous monarchs and a superstitious people heaped riches upon a class, whose dominion, not content with the temporal honours of this world, dared to dispose of the glories, and to remit the punishments of the next. Thus the Spanish church may be considered as an ecclesiastical aristocracy, which, in addition to the influence that high rank and great wealth always give, imposes awe and respect from its sacred character.*

* Those familiar with Spanish history will remember the daring reproof of the friar confessor of Ann of Austria, Queen Regent of Spain, during the minority of her son Charles II. to some of the Spanish nobility who had treated him slightly: "What are ye compared with him, who each day holds your God in his hands, and sees your queen at his feet?" "*Que sois vosotros al lado de aquel que todos los dias tiene en sus manos á vuestro Dios, y á vuestra Reyna á sus pies?*"

The principal declaimers against the clergy are to be found among the nobility and commercial or middle classes. The former, often needy, are, when not withheld by the trammels of superstition, much mortified to reflect that the wealth and consequence of their order has passed to the church; these, would gladly see some of the vast possessions of that church assigned to them—perhaps, to be again dissipated by idle extravagance. The commercial and middle classes, who, desirous of imitating the example of Great Britain, France and America, would fain have a representative form of government, are well aware that the church colossus is their stumbling block, and that while her wealth and power are discreetly managed, all their attempts have but little chance of success. It is from these two classes, as being most in contact with strangers, that foreigners chiefly derive their ideas of the Spanish clergy.

The relationship between the clergy and the peasantry is also upon a better footing, than that between the upper and middle classes: the nobleman often spends his rents in the great cities, and leaves his estates to a middle-man; and the poor peasantry are frequently scourged and oppressed with impunity. Even if the lord dwells among his peasantry, he usually makes them feel the distance which separates them. With the mercantile or middle class the peasant is generally at

variance; occasionally wronged by them, he is apt to overrate the injuries he may receive. Now the Spanish peasant has a strange notion of his own dignity and importance. As the labouring farmer addressed King Ferdinand uncovered, but with free and lofty carriage, and unembarrassed manner, *Sois vos el Rey de Castilla?* (*Are ye the King of Castille?*) [the most finished grammarian could not have selected a more correct and dignified phraseology]; so the Spanish peasant is accustomed to address himself to all classes with a fine disregard for the conventional forms of society; wherefore he cannot brook an insult, and he is quick and ready to observe if the *Indiano*, presuming upon his wealth, treats him at all as an inferior. I doubt whether the Spanish peasantry would ever submit to the stern iron reality of English society, where a wakeful and active police is continually gathering up the stray individuals, whom misfortunes, vices, or age have reduced to destitution; confining them between four walls, dieting them by a belly-guage, one or two degrees above the zero of starvation, and burying them at eight shillings and sixpence each, fees included.

There is a wonderful feeling of equality among the northern peasantry of Spain, and this is mainly due to the church. The Spanish peasant goes daily in his homely garb to the nearest con-

vent or parish church ; there are no pews nor inclosures, as in England, to separate the *profanum vulgus* from their "betters." The clergy of all sorts mix freely with the people, affecting no pride of place ; nor does the humble attire of the monk, or the decent black of the curate hurt the self-love of the peasantry, by its contrast to his own modest apparel. The gorgeous ceremonies and splendid vestments of the hierarchy on the festivals of the church, so far from exciting envy in the breast of the peasantry, make them proud, for they consider the splendour as much theirs as the church's, because they are of *the flock of the faithful*. When the church displays its wealth the people participate ; when the baron and merchant display theirs, they lock the doors to all but a chosen few : when a convent or church becomes wealthy, or receives a large legacy, they buy beautiful pictures or valuable pieces of plate, which are exhibited gratis for the admiration of all. The rich banker and wealthy landholder buy pictures and plate also, but none ever behold them but their friends and their butler. It is all very natural that such should be the case ; but then it need not excite much surprise that the Spanish peasantry like that system best, by which most is reserved for them.

The great drawback to this system is the deadly apathy to which it reduces all beneath its sway,

and which nothing can dispel but schism, or the tramp of foreign invader. The rule of an hierarchy also involving, as it does, the doctrine of infallibility and perfectability, precludes all hope of change, all chance of amelioration or improvement. Such being the case, the standard of learning and civilization declines daily, for there is no need of the teachers and governors being at the trouble of much study and learning, when their flock are content with the veriest common places. Then the human mind, debarred from its proper field of activity, loses and degrades itself, as in the case of the Greeks and Egyptians, with the most absurd and ridiculous speculations : while sensuality and immorality of every description overspread the land. Nor can those of the clergy who may strive to check the evil, succeed. Such are the inevitable results of attempting to cram the versatile growing intellect of man into a Chinese iron shoe of non-advancement. The leaders of a party are often obliged to go farther to please their followers than their own philosophy approves.

Without instituting comparisons with other countries, which would be foreign to the purpose, suffice it to say, that as landlords, the ecclesiastical are, as a body, superior to the lay. This superiority is partly due to real, and partly to adventitious circumstances. Estates held of the

church are not often mortgaged, nor are the farmers rack-rented; neither are the clerical lords of the soil often absentees; on the contrary, most of the wealth of the cathedrals, chapters and convents is expended among the very tenantry that support them. Generally speaking, the tenants of a convent are better off than those of a lay nobleman. Are the seasons bad, and the harvests scanty? the rents are often lowered, or a smaller share of the produce* taken than the landlord (clerical) is intitled to; and this, the comparatively scanty wants, and strict economy of a convent render by no means a large sacrifice. Are they sick? their tenantry and neighbours find both medical aid and medicine *gratis* at the convent. There also the poor are fed, not in great numbers, perhaps, but nearly always on a par with their means. In addition to the substantial benefits conferred in this world, there are for the next,

“Indulgences, exemptions, pardons, bulls,”

all which, to those who devoutly believe in their efficacy, is no light matter. Besides, the Procurador or Syndic of a convent generally dwells on the spot, and is easy of access, as indeed are the agents (administradores) of the Spanish noble-

* In many parts of Spain rent is paid in kind: the proportion varying from 20 to 30 $\text{P} \frac{1}{2}$.

men, being, in this respect, very different from the agents of the Irish lords. None of the lay nobility can hope to exercise such an influence over their tenantry as the convents do; because, even if they excel them in the management of their estates, they cannot dispense the favours of Heaven so bountifully as the good fathers; or, what amounts to the same thing, the people do not believe they can. And as the territorial possessions of the church are enormous, as will be shewn hereafter, it follows, that exercising in this manner their power, their influence among their people must be proportionally great.

Thus we see the ecclesiastical aristocracy resting upon a broad and firm foundation, which, while they exercise their power with as much moderation as at present, is not likely to be easily shaken; nay, although the present government may close the convents, disperse the regular army of the Roman pontiff, and seize their revenues, I do not consider those measures in any way detrimental to the influence of the church; and while she can, by a prudent use of her temporal and spiritual riches, wield at will the energies and physical strength of the million, she need not dread the hostility of the Madrid government. Had the secular clergy (by which I mean the real church) been as universally hostile to the government of Queen Isabel as the regulars, the infante would have been undisputed King of Spain before

the end of 1834 ; but the majority of the secular clergy, not considering their existence (like that of the regulars) bound up with the maintenance of extreme principles, took the natural and common sense view of the question, and, without hesitation gave their allegiance to the daughter of Ferdinand.

With respect to the education of the people, the church of Spain—(be it observed, that henceforth by the “church” the secular clergy alone are meant)—is rather active than otherwise in diffusing education, although naturally anxious to retain the direction : in this they (the clergy) are little aided by the people, who set small price upon education, seeming perfectly content that their children should remain as ignorant as themselves. Indeed, education can make but slender progress in a country where books of all descriptions are rare and expensive, except novels and works of devotion. The youth of both sexes devour the former, while the aged thumb the latter. This system saves the clergy a deal of trouble ; they have only to rail against the sensual vices, and to cry up the merits of particular rites and ceremonies : perhaps, all long established churches have the same tendency, when without a rival. I am, however, of opinion that, with all their prudence and caution, the influence of the ecclesiastical aristocracy is not upon the increase, but rather on the wane, taking the whole of the

country into consideration. Indeed, were it not for the great moderation observed by the clergy as landlords, and the exemplary conduct of the prelates and dignified clergy, the Catholic church in Catholic Spain would long since have received a severe wound. What church can boast of more truly pious and disinterested prelates than the Archbishop of Valencia and Bishops of Murcia and Santander? * This decorous and christian conduct has long been the characteristic of the Spanish hierarchy. More than that of any other section of christian Europe the church of Spain has been *united*: it was this union which subverted the Arian heresy, though supported by the arms of the conquerors of Spain and Rome, the companions of Alaric: † it was this union which maintained the faith of Christ throughout a struggle of seven centuries against the followers of Mohammed, thereby stamping upon the Spanish character that intense feeling of religion, veneration or superstition (for it varies with the individual,) which so distinguishes the Peninsula from the

* When the cholera attacked Valencia in 1832, the archbishop not only gave in charity all his surplus revenues, but even sold part of his plate and furniture, and reduced his expenses one half for the same purpose: he also borrowed money to distribute to the widows and sick. The conduct of the bishop of Murcia in 1829, was equally pious and charitable when his diocese was fearfully ravaged by an earthquake.

† Vide Gibbon, vol. v. edit. 1812.

French, Italian or Briton. The union of the Spanish church has also contrived to maintain the unity of the faith, throughout Spain and Spanish America, unbroken by schism or dissent. The dread tribunal of the inquisition and its searching tyranny was deemed requisite in Spain, as in Italy, and Germany, in order to attain this blissful homogeneous orthodoxy; but at all events the Spanish church, unlike that of Italy, France, or Germany can boast of entire success. Howbeit that very success may be adduced as a proof of the shortsightedness of man, and the scanty benefit arising from unity of belief; for the intellectual, religious, and physical condition of the inhabitants of Germany, Britain, and British America, where the modes of belief are various, *is decidedly equal, perhaps superior*, to that of the people of Spain and Spanish America.

But it is useless to deny, that beneath the smooth glaze of orthodoxy, there exists much unconcern about religion, verging perhaps upon infidelity with some. These examples are chiefly found among the more affluent classes, who often treat with contemptuous indifference, or cavilling scepticism, the rites and ceremonies they were taught to venerate when young. Others again there are (and these are still more dreaded by the clergy), who having been educated in Protestant countries, with a fervent zeal for true Christianity, have none at all for the pomp and ceremonies of

the Spanish church, and would gladly see extensive reform introduced both in her discipline and doctrine. The self-styled infidel gives the Spanish church little uneasiness; she well knows that a dangerous illness, or old age, will send the trembling sinner back to beg absolution (perhaps with large gifts) of mother church. But the well grounded dissent of serious and religious persons fills the hierarchy with alarm; for they see in that the disunion of their power, perhaps the rise of a rival church.

During the war of independence, many of the convents were emptied of their inmates, who forsook their dwellings at the advance of the French armies. Subsequently many returned, but within a few years were again unseated by the Cortes of 1821. Upon the re-establishment of absolutism, the friars once more took possession of their ancient abodes; and instructed by past experience, they devoted themselves seriously to increase their ranks and extend their influence. Their efforts at first were unsuccessful; the monastic habit had lost much of the reverence which it once inspired: but, as years rolled on, in appearance serving only to confirm and strengthen the power of the regulars, old feelings began to revive, and the convent life, as before, began to have its attractions. Nor is it surprising that such should be the case. There are, in this world, too many mouths needing sustenance, for such a

well-spread table as that of the Catholic convents, to lack guests. Conversing one day with a young Franciscan friar, about twenty-five, I could not avoid expressing surprise at his choice. "What better could I do?" he replied. "Be a merchant, and charged with taxes, duties, and contributions, varying with every ministry: you are accused of smuggling and fraud, in order to have a pretence for inflicting fines. Do you seek to follow the line of government service? Unless you are so fortunate as to possess high influence, it is hopeless. The career of letters with us is neither known nor honoured. A soldier?—nor does this profession offer much attraction, when you look around and see the number of maimed soldiers, and worn-out aged officers, pining in misery. I had no paternal fortune, and behold me free from care about that which embarrasses most men—subsistence. True, it appears hard to be confined in a convent; but we live at peace, are respected by all the world, and have many enjoyments: and if you compare our condition with that of any other class of society, it will be seen that we need not envy them, for we have all that they possess, and more. Is any influence wider felt or greater than ours?" This description struck me forcibly; for without betokening the least elevation of soul, it contemplated the affairs of life in that sensual every-day point of view, in which so many of mankind habitually regard them. Satisfied with the

gratification of their grosser appetites, they care for nothing beyond; and the character of the inhabitants of the Peninsula seems to be well adapted for the monotonous contemplative life of a convent. The oriental extraction of the people of the south of Spain is very perceptible among the inmates of their convents, who are more indolent and more prone to sensual indulgences than their brethren of the north, whose chief distinction is a bustling restless activity, which continually plunge them into intrigues of all kinds. How singularly constituted, and little to be envied, that nation and government must be, wherein the service of religion is the most profitable and the safest road to power!

The abolition of the convents, by the present government of Spain, and consequent dispersion of the friars for the third time in this century, remains to be considered. In this, as in many other instances, the Cortes seem to have acted with more zeal than prudence. True it is that the regular clergy were inveterately hostile; but, instead of dissolving the whole fraternity, would it not have been better to have taken a lesson from their adversaries, and acted on the old principle of *divide et impera*? There could have been no harm in retaining the Benedictines, Augustinians, Capuchins, and perhaps the powerful aid of the Jesuits might have been gained. In my opinion, convents are, and will be for some time, a kind of

moral necessity in Spain: their number should, of course, be limited. I should propose the maintenance of the few Benedictine convents, for the sake of the arts and sciences, like the fellowships of Oxford and Cambridge. The Augustinians and Capuchins are sought to be retained on other grounds—for the benefit and advantage of the humbler classes of society, to whom they are of much use, and by whom they are much respected; nor must it be overlooked, that the doctrines held by the Augustinians are at the very zero of the theological thermometer of the Romish church,* the difference between their tenets and those of the reformed church being very small. The Jesuits should have been retained through policy, as the price of their aid. Female convents or nunneries are more needed than those for the opposite sex. Their total abolition is much to be regretted; and I have no doubt, if the present system of government be permanent, that before many years, they will be again re-established.

The number of the secular clergy in Spain is to me unknown, although it is, no doubt, not beyond what the service of the religion professed by the inhabitants requires. The duties of a *cura* in a Spanish village far exceed those of the English rector or vicar. Besides, the Catholic church

* Luther, the venerable father of the German Reformed Church, was an Augustinian monk. At the present day, most of the Spanish Augustines are Jansenists.

takes cognizance of many affairs of ordinary life, which, in the Protestant persuasion, are abandoned to the discretion of the individual. Now, although this may tend to fix and establish the ecclesiastical influence, yet, by increasing the duties, it makes the labour fall more onerously upon the professors. Thus, the Protestant vicar has little to do beyond officiating once a week, or, it may be, reading prayers on Wednesdays and Fridays, which does not occupy him long. There is, I believe, little visiting at private houses, unless he be sent for, which is not usual. But with the *cura* of the Romish church, it is very different. Mass must be celebrated every day, on many days twice, on Sundays (if a large parish) three times, and occasionally even four, during which time the officiating clergyman must not break his fast. Then there are numerous saints' days, when extra masses are celebrated; the vigils of particular saints to be observed—sermons to be preached—private masses for the souls of the departed, not a few. Then, again, confessing the devout occupies much time at all periods of the year, but especially at Easter, when I have seen an aged *cura* for above a week, employed from morning till night, hearing, chiding, and absolving the follies, frailties, and sins of his flock. In addition to all this, there is the visiting of the sick, which is considered indispensable. On the other hand, marriages and burials are in general performed in

a very slovenly and unimpressive manner, greatly inferior to the decent and reverend solemnization of these offices by the Anglican and other Protestant churches.

Whatever may be alleged now, there is no doubt that the monastic institutions were eminently useful in their time. Their origin dates from that period when religion was little more than a gloomy superstition. Availing themselves of this, they often made the feudal baron tremble in his castle. The monks dwelt in comparative safety, when security and peace were well nigh banished from Europe; and within their convent walls learning and the arts sought for, and found shelter. Nor is agriculture and general civilization less indebted to the monks;* but the day of their utility is past, and there is no more occasion now to maintain, in a country like Spain, 2000 establishments for recluses and anchorites, than to re-establish the feudal system. Since the suppression of the convents, the higher orders of the regulars, such as the Jeronimites, Trinitarians, Benedictines, and many of the other classes, have been attached to parishes, or to chapels of cathedrals. It is needless to say, that, in consequence,

* "Hæc vir apostolicus Nicetius, arva peragrans,
 Condidit optatum pastor ovile grege,
 Turribus inciuxit ter denis undique collem
 Præbuit hic fabricam, quo nemo ante fuit."

Fortunat. *Carm.* lib. iii. cap. xii.

they are all zealous partisans of D. Carlos, particularly the mendicant orders, who have supplied his army with some thousands of lusty soldiers.

How strange, how incomprehensible is the conduct pursued by the Spanish Cortes, in its dealings with the church of Spain! What a picture of folly and bad policy it presents! The year 1812 beheld the Cortes, amidst the applause of the nation, establish a constitution which kings, who since have sneered at it, were then eager to recognise; but fair as seemed this image of their handy work, its feet were but of clay. They appeared to be, and, as it proved, they were, ignorant of the people of Spain,* and alive only to the feelings of the numerically small class of which themselves formed a part, and whose political knowledge was all founded upon the French revolution, which they had studied, or rather had looked at, only through the dirty windows of a French café. Instead of conciliating their church, the Cortes made open war upon her, perhaps for no better reason than because they knew that the French had pulled down the church, and they therefore thought it incumbent upon them to follow the example; forgetting that in France the clergy and nobility were linked and chained together, the former, if it were possible, more hated, more

* By the people of Spain, I understand the class emphatically called *el pueblo Español*; that is, all ranks and conditions, save the gentry and affluent classes.

despised, than the latter; whereas, in Spain, the clergy and the people were hand and glove. Their lofty dignities and vast possessions excited no envy in the minds of the people, whatever it might cause in those of the upper classes; in fact, the truth is self-evident, that whereas the French revolution was the outburst of the people, aided for the time by a few of the superior ranks of society, its humble imitator of Spain is the effort of the burgher class, with a scanty help from the people, to introduce a representative system, as a check to the overgrown regal and clerical power. It has been shown, at page 7, that ruin was the reward of the Cortes of 1812, for this, their great political error (that of uncompromising hostility to the church). Ten years later, the Cortes, uninstructed by experience, again committed the same error, and were again overthrown. A third period of ten years rolled away, and the Cortes once more assembled to re-enact the same laws, to beat down the supremacy of the church. As before, their measures find no echo among the people, who, on the contrary, seem to throng to the standards of the Pretender, solely because of the attacks made upon the church. What can be the cause of this inextinguishable hatred of the middle classes to the power of the clergy? It is the terrible reaction of centuries of systematic oppression and insult. The whole weight of the rule of the hierarchy fell upon the middle classes;

no wonder, then, that they deeply felt their degradation, and the instant revenge was in their power, overlooking all considerations, or probably not foreseeing the consequences, they hastily struck down the Colossus to which they had so long been compelled to bow the knee. It has been shown, that twice their blows have recoiled upon themselves, which, however, has not prevented them from again adopting the same measures, the instant fortune placed it in their power. What will be the result of this tenacity of purpose, met by an equally tenacious resistance? At present, the result is a war of extermination. The Cortes show no inclination to relax their stringent measures against the church; on the contrary, their late decree, confiscating all the church property, and making the whole body of the clergy dependent on the state, shows the most uncompromising hostility and fixedness of determination. Bold, even to rashness, is their resolution, particularly when it is considered that the Cortes who enacted this decree, had not the power to punish a few mutinous officers, or to exact obedience from their generals, even when unsuccessful.

To the well-grounded dislike of the middle classes to the Spanish church, it is very probable some longing for the possessions of the clergy was added. Indeed, after every extenuation, how cruel, how impolitic, has the conduct of the Cortes been towards the Spanish church. It has

been a series of blunders. True, the regular clergy were all more or less Carlist, but there was no need of throwing the entire mass into the ranks of the Pretender. Had they so few enemies, that more were required? With the enormous amount of landed property belonging to the crown and the military orders, which was fairly at their disposal, what need was there of confiscating the property of the convents? Did they consider, that by thus overstocking the market, they should increase demand? or did the Cortes and the government imagine, that when civil war was raging, when men could neither dwell upon their estates, nor travel the roads in safety, more buyers of land would come forward, and higher prices be obtained? And then the mockery of assigning a pension, varying from five reals to twenty reals daily to each of the 30,000 monks and friars! thus entailing upon the state, at a period when money was so scarce, a cash payment of *about 8000 dollars daily!* Why, even as a mercantile speculation, abstracted from all political considerations, it was ill judged and disadvantageous.

More politic, more consonant with justice and the true interests of the nation, would it have been, had the Cortes decreed the extinction of the mendicant orders, in proportion as the individuals composing them should decease. All the religious, dwelling in convents belonging to orders

which possessed property, should have been declared usufructuaries for their lives, with power to bequeath one-half of the landed property to their own heirs; the convents in all cases to belong to the state, but the moveables to the inmates. Some regulation, of course, would be required, as to the mode of sharing the convent property amongst the inmates. Perhaps, also, it might be deemed advisable to retain some of the monastic orders, as before hinted at, such as the Augustinians, Benedictines, Jesuits, and the Hospitallers of St. John.

Now, had the Cortes acted in this manner, they would from the beginning have neutralised the hostility, if not secured the attachment of a very large section of the regulars; indirectly, the government would have obtained the good will of some thousands of families, heirs expectant of the friars; the agricultural peasantry would have had time to have been reconciled to the change; the government would be unincumbered with its present heavy burthen of eight thousand dollars daily, which it certainly lacks the means, perhaps the inclination to pay; and when, in the course of nature, inmates of the convents should have descended into the tomb, the state would have lawfully become the owner of vast possessions, unstained by any usurpation.

Such has not been the conduct of the Cortes. Listening more to their own passions, than to the

voice of reason, and urged on by the higher classes, who longed to rob the church and fatten upon her spoils, like the English Somersets and Herberts,* they have despoiled the regulars of all their property, and not content with that, have, at one fell swoop, seized the possessions of the secular church, and declared all the clergy stipendiaries of the state! If this total overturn of the ancient and all-powerful church of Spain does not ruin the authors, it is clear a mightier revolution than the present is at hand in the Peninsula.

Among the regular clergy, there was a great difference in their numbers and wealth. Take, for instance, the Franciscans, with their hundreds of convents, thousands of inmates, possessing no property ostensibly, and the order of San Martin, with only one convent (that at Santiago, in Galicia), containing some fourscore inmates, enjoy-

* Lord Pembroke [Herbert] begged for and received the Abbey of Wilton, in the days of Henry VIII. On the accession of Mary, "la nieta de España," he went and waited on the lady abbess and her nuns, who came to take possession of their own, "cap in hand." A few years rolled by, and Elizabeth ascended the throne. His lordship of Pembroke became once more proprietor; so, out he turned the poor abbess and her family, saying, "Go, spin, you jada, go spin;" and this true story of this mean, cowardly, and heartless scoundrel is told without a word of comment by the historian! To judge of writers and noblemen by this anecdote, we should say, that the one were thieves, the other sycophants.—Vide Hume and Lingard.

ing a rental of 20,000*l.* per annum. After the Franciscans, the next classes in point of numbers are the Dominicans; next come the Augustinians, divided into the "sandaled" and "bare-footed;" the Capuchins come afterwards, and so on. The Carthusians are not numerous, but very wealthy; their convents at Burgos, Xeres,* and Seville, were probably worth, on an average of the three, 12,000*l.* per annum each, while not above a score of inmates could be found in either of them. Since not all of the orders of the regular clergy held property, the estimate of the annual rental of the convents would be far from giving an accurate account of the total income drawn from the nation by the regular clergy. For we must add to that amount the sum received for the support of thirty thousand of the mendicant orders, who are maintained, and their buildings kept in repair by the alms of the faithful.† There is also to be added the sums received for masses for the dead, for however much a Spaniard may affect to despise this as superstition before foreigners, they are at the last usually afraid of

* The Syndic of the Xeres *Cartuja* assured me (1831) that their properties extended over 37,138 *estadales* of land: and this in a country where rents are high.

† When the church or convent needs repair, the friars usually get it done *gratis*, or for a few masses. One man brings a load of timber, a second gives stone, and a third lends oxen to draw; others give a day's labour, &c.

being left in purgatory, and almost invariably bequeath something *pro salute animæ*. Probably, if we consider that each of the mendicant orders cost the nation, in money, food, clothing, labour performed for them, &c.,* 25*l.* per annum, we shall not be far wrong; to which may be added 150,000*l.* annually received for masses, &c., which is a very moderate sum, when it is considered that the Franciscans of Bilbao received above thirty dollars daily for pious foundations of masses, &c. Many of these foundations are very old, and settled when money was not so plentiful, and masses cheaper than at present, being only 1*s.* and 1*s.* 6*d.* (5 *rs.* and 8 *rvñ.*) each; thus the labour of reciting so many masses was not inconsiderable, which induced the friars to apply to Rome, stating the inconvenience, and asking permission to *lump* the lesser and older masses in groups of sixes and twelves. With some slight differences, this was granted, and the book containing the correspondence, "expediente," besides the endorsement of the contents, had a singular notice affixed, written by the prior, cautioning against visitors, or

* The average duration of life in the northern provinces of Spain, is about thirty-two years, twenty-nine in the southern. The average of the two is 30.5, which, upon a population of fourteen millions, gives an annual mortality of 427,000 individuals; and, supposing that each person bequeathes, or that their friends or parents pay, one with another, two dollars each for masses, the result will be 854,000 dollars, nearly 180,000*l.*

such like, being allowed the perusal, or even the inspection of this book, lest the heretics and infidels should make fun (*paraque los herejes y infieles no harian burla*). The properties belonging to such convents as are allowed to possess land, and their other sources of income may probably amount to something more than the income of the mendicant orders, although the individuals sharing are not one-half so numerous: it may be assumed at one million sterling, which, with the sum received by the mendicant orders, forms for the regular clergy, a sum of 1,800,000*l.*, to which may be added a considerable sum for the landed properties belonging to the females' convents, which might probably swell the whole to near two millions sterling. However, few of the nunneries are wealthy, and they are mostly supported by the sums paid by the inmates on entering (*el dote*), which varies from 200*l.* up to 1000*l.* The money thus accumulated is usually lent out on mortgage, or applied in the purchase of fixed rents (*Censos*). Indeed, the ready money of all convents is usually invested in this manner, so that one-half the mortgages in the kingdom belong to the church—rather a dangerous temptation to the landholders, and so it has proved.

The revenue of the secular clergy is derived from estates belonging to the different chapters and cathedrals, pious foundations of chapelries

attached to different churches, tithes, office fees for celebration of marriages, burials, &c.

Previously to the late changes, two-ninths of the tithes were taken by the sovereign, for the purposes of government, by virtue of permissions to that effect obtained from the court of Rome. The entire annual amount, before the late decrees of the Cortes, may probably be estimated at about four millions and a half sterling, which is not more than the support of such a numerous clergy, in an extensive country like Spain, requires. However, this sum is most unequally divided. The Archbishop of Toledo,* before the late changes, possessed a revenue of above 50,000*l.* annually. Santiago, Seville, Burgos, were also very rich sees; but in the new revision of ecclesiastical property, by the Cortes, a very large share has been kept for the exigencies of the state, and much has been sold; but, as in the case of our Henry VIII., the plunder of the church does not seem to enrich the spoiler, in the first instance at least; for the penury of the Spanish exchequer is as great as ever; indeed, the good effects of breaking up the immense church property is not so much to be expected, in the present, as in the next ge-

* With characteristic impolicy, the Cortes have transferred the see of Toledo to Madrid; from venerable Toledo, the seat of some of the early Christian councils, to a town comparatively of yesterday. Legislators should be chary of removing those landmarks of society, consecrated by time and historic recollections.

neration, when it will be found that the number of small landholders, and, consequently, of the best class of the population, will have much increased; for, notwithstanding that the clergy, taken as a body, are indulgent landlords, they are, in one sense, bad masters, from the pertinacity with which they resist all improvement. Their wishes appear to be, that the condition of the people should not change, nor their numbers increase, so that they may be able to govern them with little trouble. It remains to be seen whether the next changes introduced by the Cortes will be lasting. I am inclined to think that some concessions must be made to the secular clergy, if the government wishes to avoid throwing the entire body into the arms of D. Carlos. At present, or rather in 1834, probably full one-half of the secular clergy were partisans of the queen, ranged on her side from a conviction of the justice of her hereditary right. The remainder may be considered to consist of the supporters of Charles, but with opinions varying from neutral indifference to decided Carlism.

It could not be expected that the power and dominion of the Spanish hierarchy, which fifteen centuries have so rooted in the country that not a family, nor even one solitary individual, escapes its influence, could be broken up by a purely temporal authority, without convulsing the entire state; and such has happened. It was the wrath

of the church that shook down the constitution of 1823, on which, else, the 100,000 bayonets, led by the Duc d'Angouleme, would have made little or no impression; and it is the hostility of a large section of the church which is now drenching the dusty fields of Spain with the blood of her children, and will continue so to act with unrelenting fixity of purpose. To what can be attributed this deadly hatred and opposition, on the part of the Spanish high-churchmen, to all the attempts of the nation to advance its social state? In my opinion, it is mainly due to the unity of belief, so carefully preserved in Spain; for the professors and teachers of religion, in a land where only one belief is permitted, become absolute in every sense of the word. They are the uncontrolled and irresponsible masters of the nation which they rule; but the possession of absolute power hardens the heart, deadens the feelings, and perverts the understanding.

Exalted above their fellow-creatures, such a priesthood forget that they themselves are mortal; and with strange impiety they confound the Deity with themselves. Should any of their vassals venture to entertain different opinions from theirs, they are styled blasphemers, and are stigmatised as heretics and schismatics. To those who dare provoke their utmost hostility, by striving to curb and check their power and dominion, no epithet is too atrocious, no punishment too severe. To

obtain this desirable end, the tribunals of this world, and the terrors of the next, are unsparingly employed. No remorse is ever felt, no compunctious ray of feeling ever pervades such a body, however compassionate individuals pertaining thereunto may be; but cold as marble, and hard as adamant, they bruise down the nobler faculties of man to a low uniformity, and, consequently, the animal and more ignoble passions riot unheeded and unchecked, for their luxuriance rather tends to strengthen than weaken priestly dominion. The result of this state of society is, that all those classes who have leisure and means to instruct themselves, feel acutely their degradation, hate bitterly the priesthood, and despise their doctrines; thus, by a natural reaction of feeling, confounding with religion itself her unworthy ministers. Meantime the lower classes, fed upon the husks and chaff of theology, instead of the pure spirit of Christianity, become superstitious and fanatically intolerant. They lose all relish for the plain and primitive truths of Christianity, but worship stocks and stones and all outward shows and ceremonies with devotion and fiery zeal.

Now, when the course of events incline the upper and educated classes of a society so constituted to make a struggle to shake off the priestly incubus, the clergy fall back upon the lower orders, heat their zeal, inflame their fanaticism,

decry their opponents as traitors in this world, and rejected in the next, whom to destroy is a virtue: the result may be easily foreseen. Divided among themselves, unsustained by the fervour of the true religion, the superior classes are oppressed by the furious and fierce fanaticism of myriads of *proletarii*, led on with perfect unity of purpose by a skilfully organised hierarchy. Dismayed, and vanquished, they are glad to escape with the loss of their wealth, and resume their chains, which now gall them heavier than before. Despairing of success in ever delivering themselves from their Egyptian bondage, the more generous emigrate, and the rest suffer their lot with sullen indifference. This scene is now acting in Spain; the result would not be doubtful an instant, could the liberal party oppose the fervour of a reformed religion to the fanaticism of the mountain peasantry of the Pyrenees. Such has not been the case, and dark and distant is the prospect of the deliverance of Spain.

SECTION III.

OF THE BASQUE PROVINCES AND NAVARRE.

The population of these provinces form, at the present day, the most compact and ancient race in the Spanish peninsula. Notwithstanding the

assertions of some writers, who coolly derive the origin of the Basques from a party of emigrants *direct from the fields of Sennar*,* there is no doubt that the Basques are a branch of that great Celtic nation, which appears to have held dominion over all the west and north-west of Europe, about two thousand years since, whose genuine remnants can nowhere now be found unmixed, except in the Pyrenees and Cevennees, the mountainous districts in the British Isles, and the coasts of Brittany. It is true the Basque language is very different from the Gaelic, Welsh, or Irish, but this does not disprove their being radically the same people: their physiology and manners have a strong resemblance, and their traditions are very similar. The languages of the tribes in Guayana are more unlike each other by far, than the Basquence and Irish, and yet few or none have ever entertained the idea, that the tribes of the Orinoco are not descended from the same stock. Perhaps, when the science of ethnography is more known, it may be ascertained that there *is a tendency* in small secluded tribes to corrupt and change their original language: and the wilds of America or Australia may one day furnish the proof, in the discovery of the descendants of Europeans, who, separated from society and civilization, have relapsed into the savage state, so

* V. Oihenart and Garibay, quoted by Astaloo, vol. i.

that even their speech shall be unintelligible, a result which might possibly be accomplished in a few generations.

From the total absence of Roman antiquities in the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa, there is much reason to suppose that the country lying to the north of the great Roman highway, leading from Bordeaux to Leon, passing by St. Jean du Pie du Port, was almost uninhabited. The *Varduli* are mentioned by Ptolemy as being the owners of this country, although others place them in Alava; and it is just probable that the tribe first dwelt in Alava, and only took to the mountains of Biscay when pressed by their enemies or their own numbers. The Varduli seem to have assisted the Cantabrians (who were their neighbours and kinsmen) in their wars against the Romans, and probably their subjection served to increase the population of the Vardulian mountains. After the Cantabrian war, the Basque provinces are not heard of in history, until the breaking up of the Roman empire by the barbarians, when the Alani, Vandals, and Suevi burst over Spain; and to these soon followed the more formidable Visigoths. After the establishment of the Gothic monarchy, one of their dukes appears to have governed Navarre and Alava; and since Bayonne (*olim Lapurdum*) was included in the duchy of the Vascons, it is but reasonable to conclude that Biscay and Guipuscoa formed a

part of it. In the seventh century we find the Basques maintaining a furious struggle against Ebroin, the mayor of the palace to the Frank king of Austrasia, because they refused to deliver up the Neustrian and Burgundian lords, who had fled to them for refuge. The downfall of the Gothic monarchy, in the beginning of the eighth century, no doubt caused a great influx of inhabitants seeking a refuge from the fury of the Arabs.

Soon after this event, the kingdom of *Sobrarbe* begins to appear; and the Biscayans date the reign of their first lord in the latter part of the eighth century. From this date, until, by the marriage of the last heiress, the lordship of Biscay merged in the crown of Castilla, the history of the country is one continued series of squabbles with the neighbouring kings of Castilla and Leon, or among themselves. Notwithstanding the assertions of the Basque authors, such as Garibay, Oihenart, and others, there is small reason to believe that the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa ever constituted an independent state. As shown by the learned Travia,* it is almost certain that the lords of Biscay always were subject to the kings of Castilla, Leon, or Navarre, although it is quite clear that this allegiance was of a doubtful and uncertain character, varying with the character of

* *Diccionario Historico de las Provincias Vascongadas*,—Art. Vizcaya—of which Travia was the author.

the reigning monarch, or that of their own chief. In the early times of the kings of Leon, the lord of Biscay often treated his sovereign after the same fashion as the Norman and Aquitain dukes did the French king. The different *anteiglesias* of Biscay possess privileges granted indiscriminately by their own lords and the kings of Castilla, and they are considered of equal validity.*

* It has long been my opinion, that the lordship of Biscay, *quoad hoc*, dates its origin from some of the Norman chieftains of the seventh century. One of the Biscay traditions is, that D. Zuria,† the first Señor, landed with some forces, to the assistance of Doña Blanca, the lady of Durango, who was then attacked by the "king of Castille."—There was then no king of Castille, but—in the supposition that the vulgar assigned that title (to them most familiar), which their foemen from the south and west obeyed—the story is clear and common-place enough. Some fair-haired Harold, one of the Vikingr, after plundering and establishing a colony at Lapurdum (Bayonne‡), hears of a row in the provinces; he goes either personally or by proxy, with a squadron, lands at Mundaca, and proceeds to the interior. Doña Blanca, whose father, a petty chieftain of the valley of Durango, has just been slain in combat with the invaders, begs the assistance of the Norman conquerors. It is granted; the Northmen, with the Celtic peasantry of Doña Blanca, march to meet the Castilians, and totally rout them: the leader of the Northmen then marries Doña Blanca, probably at Guernica, and begins the line of the lords of Biscay. The portraits of the early lords of Biscay strongly confirm this story; they are all represented with

† *Zuria* in Basquence means "white." *Mutil suri*, a fair lad.

‡ The Normans became masters of Bayonne about the middle of the seventh century, and held it until the year 930.

Their constitutions resembled strictly those of the ancient Roman *Municipia*. At the present day, the *Ayuntamientos* or *Cabildos* preside over, and defray part of the expense of the religious festivals. 2. Each ayuntamiento has the management of the town revenues; also to its care is entrusted the preservation of the public buildings, walks, &c., and the direction of public amusements. 3. The police also of the different localities is directed by the municipalities, who are considered in a manner responsible for the safety of the inhabitants of their district. 4. With these corporations also rest the arrangement and fixing

light flaxen hair and the full Norman face, very different from the Celtic character.

I know that the pride of the Basques will reject this account of their lords, as derogatory to the old Vascones, and contrary to their writers; but let it be considered that Garibay, Oihenart, Astalca, Larramendi, and all their squad, were ignorant of Europe north of the Garonne. Nothing but Latin, Greek, Arabic, or Phœnician would go down with them. Yet, when Europe, from the Baltic to the Pyrenees—when the main land of Britain throughout its extent, the shores of Africa, the islands of the Western Ocean, bore witness to the Norman prowess, and beheld the sea-kings dwelling in the halls of their native princes, when Bayonne was a Norman colony, can the Basques think it disparagement that their ancestors yielded to a Norman baron's rule? As well might the noble Churruca think it dishonour to be overcome at Trafalgar by him, the peerless successor of the sea-kings,

“The flower of all the admirals who ever trod the sea.”

of fairs and markets, tolls, &c.; measures relating to the public health; and, through their *alcaldes*, the determination in the first instance of all civil actions brought before them. 5. The members of the different ayuntamientos are elected annually by all the householders of the villa or anteiglesia; and, after their election, another officer, styled *el sindaco del comun* is chosen by the inhabitants; his duties are analogous to those of the *defensor civium* of the Roman law, only that instead of protecting or defending the people against the imperial officers, the duty of the *sindico del comun* in the Basque municipalities is to watch over the rights, revenues, and liberties of his fellow citizens, that they be not infringed by the ayuntamientos.*

As in the days of the decline of the Roman empire, Spain possesses a numerous body of *privilegiados*, who, in the enjoyment of their distinct and separate *fueros*, dwell apart from their fellow-countrymen, and are, as it were, encamped amongst them: these *privilegiados*, as in the days of Hadrian, have little in common with their fellow-citizens; they have their separate tribunals (*fueros*), to which alone they are amenable; are not eligible to municipal offices, nor have they a voice in the

* Compare this with the duties of the Roman Municipia, as described by *Roth. de re Municip. Roman.* p. 21, 22. 24; and under the head *Defensor*, p. 100—107.

election. To be one of the *curia*, and subject to the "*cargas concejiles*," is considered, even at the present day all over Spain, the Basque provinces not excepted, as a great hardship, which all who can, willingly escape from.* The privileged classes are as follow. 1. The grandees of Spain, answerable to the *clarissimi* of the Roman law.† 2. All the government *employés*, and officers of the royal household. 3. The army and navy, from the recruit of yesterday to the captain-general.‡ 4. All the clergy, secular and regular, from the humble sacristan to the cardinal-archbishop.§ Thus, in the Spain of the Bourbons, as in that of Honorius, despotism and the privileged classes are in strict alliance, and yet, excepting the clergy, the privileged classes, depending wholly on the nod of the sovereign, are but a sort of superior slaves, to

* *Curiales omnes jubemus ne civitates fugiant aut deserant res habitandi causa, fundum quem civitati prætulerint scientes face esse sociandum, eoque rure esse carituros cujus causa impios, vitando patriam, demonstraverint.* (Cod. Theod. lib. xii. tit. 1. l. 2.)

† In the other provinces, the "*titulos de Castilla*" are exempt; in Biscay such is not the custom, for there all are noble.

‡ The British subjects residing in the Basque provinces, being continually teased by the local authorities about their liabilities to serve, &c. represented their case to the Madrid government, which could find no other way of giving relief, than by extending to them the *Fuero militar*.

§ *Curialibus muneribus atque omni inquietudine civium functionum exsortes cunctos clericos esse oportet.* (Codex Theod. lib. xvi. tit. 2. l. 9.)

whom their master throws a part of the spoil, the better to secure the rest. Next to the householders, who may be said to bear nearly all the burthens of the state, come the populace or *proletarii*, from which numerous class the army is chiefly raised, and the clergy also is largely recruited. From among them also the "privileged" are supplied with domestic servants, *who share the fueros of their masters*, so that it need not excite surprise that the *proletarii* should almost invariably side with the oppressor instead of the oppressed. In the Basque provinces, the privileged classes being very scanty, the independent householders very numerous, and the *proletarii* very few, the municipal government is admirable, and is so well organised, so agreeable to the wants and wishes of the people, that a better could not be substituted nor desired. The converse is the case in the rest of Spain, where the middle class (by which is meant those who are neither of the privileged nor of the *proletarii*,) can effect nothing of themselves. Exempt from taxes except of their own imposing, free from the scourge of a standing army, or of any officers of the king, one excepted,* with no class of clergy among them, except the curas and a few convents; blessed with such an equal distribution of property that the extremes of rich and poor are hardly known, the Basque provinces resemble the small republics of Greece and Italy in their best

* The Corregidor.

days. Let us turn to the other side of the picture, and behold the state of the other provinces of Spain, wherein exist the same laws, institutions, and a similar municipal organization ; but these, blighted by the despotism of the sovereign and the privileged, become a curse instead of a blessing. The municipalities,* in place of being the guardians

* C'est dans les villes, et par les libertés municipales que la masse des habitans, la classe moyenne, s'est formée et a acquis quelque importance dans l'état. Mais une fois en possession de ce point d'appui, cette classe se sentit bientôt à l'étroit et sans surêté. La force des choses lui fit comprendre que, tant qu'elle ne s'y serait pas constituée, tant qu'elle ne posséderait pas dans l'ordre politique, des droits qui fussent le développement et la garantie de ceux qu'elle exerçait dans l'ordre municipal, ces derniers seraient insuffisans pour la protéger dans tous ces intérêts et pour se protéger eux-mêmes. De tous les efforts qui à dater du XIII^{me} siècle, soit par les états généraux, soit par les parlemens, soit par des voies plus indirectes, eurent pour but, en France par exemple, d'élever les bourgeois à la vie politique et d'associer aux droits et aux libertés de l'habitant les droits, et les libertés de citoyen. Après trois siècles de tentatives ces efforts furent sans succès. Le régime municipal ne put enfanter un régime politique qui lui correspondit, et devint sa garantie. La centralization du pouvoir s'opéra sans celle des droits. Des lors le régime municipal lui-même se trouva faible et incapable de se défendre. Il s'était formé en dépit de la domination féodale ; il ne put subsister en présence d'une autorité unique et au sein de la monarchie administrative. Les villes perdirent peu à peu obscurément et presque sans résistance, leurs anciennes libertés. Personne n'ignore qu'au moment où notre révolution a éclaté, le régime municipal n'était plus en France qu'une ombre vaine, sans consistance et sans énergie.—*Guizot Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, p. 44, et seq.

of the people, degenerate into the agents of government, for whose benefit they squeeze the contributors: upon them devolve the execution of all obnoxious measures, the government thus inge-

Such was the case in France; but in Spain affairs took a different turn. There the king's power, although centralised, was not sufficient to break down the municipal governments, which were in a great measure supported by the church. In every nation there are four powers—Regal, Noble, Clerical, and Municipal: whichever of the four gains, and wishes to preserve the ascendancy, must play off the other powers one against the other; nor should the fifth power, that of the multitude, be overlooked: when the struggle comes to blows, *their aid* invariably turns the scale. This class, when educated, might give laws to the others; but that it will never do, for this obvious reason, that the leading men of the multitude will infallibly be absorbed into the superior classes.

In Spain, the only vestiges of freedom remained with the municipalities. Despotic as the kings of Spain were in theory, they were something less so in reality; and the provinces of Spain enjoyed more or less liberty, in proportion to the energy with which their municipalities resisted the royal mandate. Let Biscay be taken for the example, wherein the royal order was frequently eluded thus, "*obedientes pero no cumplidos*," let it be obeyed, but not fulfilled,—a formula so much in unison with the countless fictions of the English law, that I am sure all the professors thereof will be rapt in admiration with it.

By thus effectually interposing a sort of breakwater to the royal caprices, the Basque municipalities found, in the day of peril, that they had gained a friend in the multitude, which they never counted on. So, when the chosen of the provinces assembled in cortes, ignorant of their position, and looking only to France as their fixed (qu. variable?) star of direction, aimed at centralization, the humble clients of the municipalities quite astonished their

niously contriving to cast the unpopularity of its own proceedings upon the class it most dislikes and most oppresses. They are compelled to maintain and support a numerous army, besides a

masters, by their undisguised reluctance to "go the whole hog." Neither rail-roads nor steam-coaches being yet in vogue in Spain, the Basque peasantry very properly and very righteously thought that a batch of men packed together from all parts of the Peninsula were not half so likely to attend to their interests, as a small municipality elected from their own numbers. They were and are right in their ignorance—the Spanish cortes wrong in their wisdom. The true policy of Spain at present, is to spread education and increase civilization, by means of the local juntas or municipalities, acting as so many centres. When the people of the provinces beyond the Ebro are on a par with Biscay, they may tighten the bonds of centralization, secure that the growing good sense of the people will see the necessity of strengthening the general government, in its relationship with foreign powers. And it may be laid down as a rule, that political freedom ought to be preceded by civil freedom, which is all the better, and usually the more appreciated, for originating from small centres.

Men of active habits, trained in this school, when sent as deputies to the general congress, easily expand their ideas to their new situation, and the result is beneficial to the commonwealth. But unless the population is very civilized, and also very homogeneous, all attempts at spreading the influence of government from the centre to the circumference by means of the *direct election*, without the medium of the smaller centres, will turn out a total failure; the circle is lost in its extension. The system of self-government should be first applied to small communities, then the best of those should be elected to govern the state, and so on. The system of centralization with representation, of the European monarchies, is a superb and magnificent plan, which, aided by steam and education, *may* resolve the problem of one vast European

host of government officers, whose sole duty is to insult, harass, and oppress the contributors who support them; nor can the ayuntamientos exercise any jurisdiction, without the risk of its being annulled by the royal magistrate, and heavy fines exacted for their imprudence: in a word, in the Basque provinces the inhabitants are free citizens, in the rest of Spain they are a mere flock, who are squeezed and beaten at the will of their masters. Tired of this state of things, the provinces beyond the Ebro attempt to raise themselves somewhat in the scale of nations, when behold! they find their favoured brethren of the Basque provinces joining their own oppressors, the privileged classes, to crush all their efforts to ameliorate their social state—which is neither just nor generous.

The fueros of the Basque provinces did not

confederation, having nine languages. But ere this splendid scheme can be realised, the German, Latin, and Slavonic nations must be thoroughly accustomed to self-government, in the way they alone are at present able to appreciate, *i. e.* by the full enjoyment of their municipal privileges, and their participation in the central government, by the system of double election. Let the citizens of the European states once become thoroughly accustomed to that system, and their minds will afterwards as easily take in the political combinations of the different kingdoms of Europe, as they now do those of adjoining parishes. Like a man standing in the centre of a plane,—when once he hath learned how to strike a circle, it matters little to him whether the same be large or small, for he then knows that as is the radius, so will be the circumference.

originate in any one particular grant, but at different times, and in divers manners. To induce people to dwell in a town lately taken from the Moors, or in one which the reigning monarch determined to build; or to favour a town wherein he dwelt, or which had rendered him signal services, were the reasons of the kings of Castille and Navarre granting fueros to their cities; for, whatever may be the case now, in the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries, the fueros of many of the Castilian cities and towns were quite equal to those of the Basque provinces: take, for instance, Logroño and Haro, of both which cities the fueros were so extensive, that the town of Vitoria,*

* The earliest authentic date wherein mention is made of the city of Vitoria, is in the eleventh century. Larramendi says the etymology of the name is from *Bitorea*, a Basque word, implying "lofty and commanding," which certainly agrees with the position of the town. D. Sancho the Wise, of Navarre, fortified and enlarged it in 1181, and gave it the fuero of Logroño: it is however, worthy of remark, that the Navarrese king, in granting the fuero, prohibits all trials by the ordeal of boiling water, heating iron, and single combat,—declares also, that all clergymen who may come to reside in Vitoria, shall pay the same taxes and levies as the rest of the inhabitants. The fuero of Vitoria was highly celebrated in the provinces, and was, at their petition, granted to the towns of Orduña and Arciniega, in Biscay; to Salvatierra, in Alava; to Tolosa, Elgueta, Azpeytia, Azcoytia, Deva and Vergara, in Guipuscoa.

D. Alonzo the Wise, of Castille, planted a colony of Jews in Vitoria, in the year 1256; they remained until the total expulsion of their race from Spain, in 1492. This monarch, although

Alava, petitioned for and obtained the fueros of Logroño, from D. Sancho the Wise, in 1181. Many of the Basque fueros also arise from their ancient customs; others are founded upon their excellent municipal law. But in the early part of the reign of the Emperor Charles I. a commission was appointed to collect and revise the scattered fueros of the different towns and districts, and form them into a code, so that in future they might be determined and known to all: which was done, and, solemnly ratified by Charles, it became the charter of the Biscayans, and has

confirmed the fueros of Vitoria, soon after substituted for them the *fuero real*, which the king was anxious should supersede all other fueros, throughout his dominions. The Vitoreanos opposed, without success, the king's attempt at centralization: but D. Sancho, son of D. Alonzo, being at variance with his father, in order to gain popular support, repealed the fuero real, and swore to confirm, on his accession to the throne, the old fueros of Vitoria. D. Sancho kept his word, and solemnly ratified and confirmed the fueros at Valladolid, the 1st December, 1284, with this alteration, that homicides in future should be punished with death, and that it should nought avail to plead privilege of fuero in arrest of judgment. In erecting Vitoria into an episcopal see, the Cortes have only performed the promise made to the good people of Vitoria by the Cardinal Adrian, on the occasion of his being a resident in Vitoria, when the couriers arrived with the intelligence of the cardinal being chosen pope. Adrian VI. (such was the title he chose,) promised then to make Vitoria a bishop's see, which his short pontificate prevented.—*Diccionario de las Proc. Vascongadas, Art. Vitoria.*—*Mariana, Hist. de Esp.* Vol. V. p. 11. Ed. Paris, 1725.

been regularly confirmed by his descendants. Thus the very prince who destroyed the liberties of Leon and Castille, at Villalar, respected those of the Basque provinces, not from any affection for them, but through fear lest, if they should be provoked to revolt, the rival monarch of France might interfere in their behalf: nor was it to be expected that in the event of a rising in the Basque provinces, either the newly conquered kingdom of Navarre, or the lately subdued *Comuneros* would be quiet. Probably in no instance was the good fortune or good policy of the emperor more conspicuous, than in his securing the affections of the Basque provinces, by confirming their fueros. Had he not done so, it is probable his campaigns in Italy, France, and Africa, would never have taken place; there would have been employment enough at home.

The fueros of Biscay, as confirmed by Charles I. and ratified by his successors, form a pretty large volume; the greater portion of which relates to the local government of the province, or as it is termed, *la administracion foral*, and both in the civil and criminal part, is mainly taken from the Roman municipal law,* and does not much differ

* In Biscay, the towns (Villas) are governed, with regard to property, by the general laws of Spain. The property in *enfiteneuzonado*, that is to say, every description of property, save that within towns, is subject with regard to transfer by will or sale to the *ley del fuero*. According to this law, no man can by will

from that of the rest of Spain, at least in theory; but the practice is wholly in favour of the Biscayans, in consequence of the courts being all in their own little province, of which the judges also are all natives, except the *corregidor*. The administration or government thus left in their own hands, has been managed with much lenity and prudence, and to this the improved condition of the people is mainly owing. The privileges possessed by the Biscayans, Alavese, and Guipuscoans over the rest of Spain, are the following :

1. The conscription (*quinta*) was not enforced in these provinces: but in return, in time of war the provinces were bound to maintain their *tercios*,

bequeath his property in *infanzonado*, to any person but to a relation by blood, within the fourth degree; but he may leave it to any one he pleases, within the aforesaid pale of affinity, even to the detriment of his nearest kin. It is said, that the object of this law was to prevent the clergy inheriting landed property. The property in *infanzonado* cannot be sold without previous notice given to all the relatives, to the fourth degree, by advertising publicly at the parish church, three consecutive Sundays previous to the intended sale. The relatives have the preference in the purchase, and amongst them the nearest is preferred.† In the *infanzonado* a father may leave, by will, his whole property to any one of his children, provided he leaves to each of the others a tree, a tile, and a real, *un arbol, una teja, y un real*.—Communicated by D. Maximo de Aguirre Barrondo, of Bilbao.

† A similar law or custom prevailed among the Hebrews. See the beautiful pastoral of Ruth, chap. iv. ver. 4. "For there is none to redeem it beside thee; and *I am after thee*."

as long as the war lasted. The strength of these *tercios* it is difficult to state, but, during the war with France, the Biscay *tercios* amounted to four battalions, consisting of about 3000 men, armed, equipped, and maintained by the province; a very respectable force, for a population then not much exceeding 100,000. The *tercios* were not obliged to leave their own province; that is, not only the Biscayan would not march into Castille—he would not even march into Alava or Guipuscoa. Near Llodio there is a tree, which marks the limit of the Biscayan soldier: should his lord (*su señor*) demand his services beyond those bounds, such can be given for the term of three months, during which time their pay and maintenance is at the cost of the king; the three months expired, the *tercios* return home.*

But as the *tercios* of the Basque provinces were only useful to the king of Spain, in the event of the war being carried into their country, it was the custom of the government, when engaged in hostilities with any power, to demand a subsidy or donative from the provinces, which was usually

* This has a strong resemblance to the feudal system, as it existed in the 11th and 12th centuries in England and France, when the military vassals were bound to follow their prince to the war for sixty days, at their own charges. The repugnance of the Basques to leave their country, or even their province, may be traced to the fear of leaving their families unprotected, and the difficulty of supporting their troops out of their own territory.

granted, although with reluctance, and many doleful complaints of their poverty. It must be remarked, also, that notwithstanding the Basques have an inveterate dislike to becoming soldiers, they have none whatever to be officers; and while in the three provinces not a company of volunteer soldiers could be found, the war-office in Madrid was besieged by scores, nay, hundreds of Basque adventurers, clamouring for *su colocacion* in the army or navy.

The kingdom of Navarre is not exempt from the conscription, at least not *de facto*; for in 1830 I witnessed a large body of Navarrese *quintos* marched into the interior of Spain.

2. The next great privilege of the Basques is, that in time of peace no soldiers are allowed to remain in their country. With respect to Navarre, this privilege has been nullified from the time that Cardinal Ximenes fortified Pamplona, which ever since has contained a garrison. In Guipuscoa, the fortress of San Sebastian has also constantly been garrisoned, much to the chagrin of the Basques, who have frequently memorialised the crown on the subject. In Biscay and Alava there are no fortifications, nor indeed are there any in the three provinces and Navarre, save the above mentioned. The introduction of the revenue military guard (*Real cuerpo del Resguardo*) into the provinces was likewise the subject of a stout remonstrance, which was so far successful, that in Biscay and

Guipuscoa these obnoxious characters were never seen, except at the towns of Orduña and Balma-
ceda, where there were custom-houses; in Alava,
only at Vitoria and on the frontier line; in Na-
varre their ascendancy was complete, that king-
dom being placed on the same footing as the rest
of Spain.

3. Exemption from taxation, except of their
own imposing. Under this head may be classed—
(1.) Freedom from customs duties on goods im-
ported from foreign countries. The benefit of
this is directly seen by the traveller, when con-
trasting the comfortable and decent clothing of
the Biscayan peasantry with the ragged attire of
the Asturian or Gallician, or the antic rags which
partly cover the sturdy limbs of the Montañeses.
(2.) The Biscayan eats his salt duty-free; the
Castilian pays twelve shillings per bushel; the
Biscayan has tobacco for one shilling per pound;
the Castilian or Andalucian pays ten. (3.) There
are no stamp duties of any kind in the provinces.

4. Another privilege possessed by the Biscayans
is, that any person of the native province, dwelling
beyond the Ebro, if accused of any offence, can
bring his case before the Juez Mayor at Valladolid.
This curious privilege, probably, was of some im-
portance two centuries back; at present I can
affirm, from my own knowledge, that the *Sala Bis-
cayna* at Valladolid is wholly occupied in hearing
and determining appeals from the Basque provinces

and Navarre, just as the *Sala de Leon, de Galicia* are occupied in hearing appeals from those provinces.

5. The next and most important privilege of the Basques is, that they are left to govern themselves, after their own customs and usages. The king nominates none of their officers, one excepted, —the *corregidor*. This officer is considered the first magistrate in the province, the representative of the king; and, as such, presides over the junta or congress at Guernica. It is stipulated that this distinguished magistrate should always be noble (*hijodalgo*), and he is usually selected from the *oidores* of the Valladolid chancery.

These are the *fueros* of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa, as contrasted with the rest of Spain. It remains for us to consider how the kings of Spain endeavour to extend their authority, or to counteract the *fueros*.

This has been accomplished by acting on the old maxim, so congenial to mean and weak minds, *divide et impera*. From time immemorial the Basque provinces have been divided into parties. Biscay was for a long series of years torn with the dissensions of the Oñasindo and Gamboina parties. Of course, the original cause of dispute was utterly worthless; so much so, that none had left it upon record: but that is immaterial, for the vehemence and rage with which men dispute are usually in exact ratio to the worthlessness of the object. The

French wars changed the names of the parties in strife, but not their hatred. The Madrid Carlist government identified itself with the Carlist party in the provinces. The police regulations, and the law of passports were introduced into the provinces in defiance of the fueros,* the Carlist party

* Some writers of recent date, much enamoured of the Basques, possibly by reason of their Carlist predilections, have described their privileges, &c. in such glowing terms, that, judging from their description, no such thing as tyranny or oppression ever existed in the happy valleys of Biscay and Guipuzcoa. Sorry am I to destroy the illusion, but truth obliges me to say, that from 1830 to 1833, I witnessed more acts of cruelty and oppression for political offences, than probably have occurred in Great Britain ever since the peace of 1815. The population of Britain, as compared with Biscay, being 150 to 1. Take, for instance,—no person whose opinions were other than Carlist, was allowed to shoot or have a gun in his possession, under penalty of fine and imprisonment. This was hard enough, considering that three-fourths of the land of Biscay belonged to Anti-Carlists. Thus, the artisans and peasantry used to direct themselves in sporting over the estates of the Uragons, Aldemas, Allende, Salazar, and others, their owners not daring to pull a trigger, nor even complain. None opposed to Carlist politics could stir from home without a *Carta de Seguridad* (a sort of license). They were fined and imprisoned upon the most trivial pretence, without ever dreaming of first proclaiming them at Guernica. Sometimes it was ordered that they should not assemble at each other's houses; at others, that not more than three should be seen together in the streets. Their houses were searched for "prohibited books," the Bible or New Testament being of course of the number. In a word, there might be "liberty" for the party in power; but such is the case, I apprehend.

only claiming the management; and unsparingly they used this new arm against their political antagonists. The same took place with the royalist volunteers. It was openly in contravention of the *fueros* that the Carlist party levied the corps, styled "los Realistas de Bilbao," and afterwards raised similar bodies of troops throughout the provinces. Provided that Valdespina, Verastegin, Ibarrola, Epalza, Batis, and others were in power, they cared little for the *fueros*.

The Madrid government, to indemnify itself for the privilege of exemption from customs enjoyed by the Basques, endeavoured to retaliate, by charging heavy duties upon the productions of the exempt provinces, iron, &c., and also by prohibiting them from entering into a direct trade to her colonies. This did not much trouble the Carlist party, for the chief *ferrerias** belonged to the more affluent classes, who were nearly all hostile to them: the Carlist party being, with few exceptions, composed of lawyers, friars, and peasants.

Nor have any of the *fueros* been respected by the party which has ruled Spain and the Basque provinces from 1823 to 1833; for their antagonists, the *fueros*, were a dead letter: nay, more, the

head, at Moscow and Tehran, which places are not, I believe, considered the classic abodes of "liberty."

* Iron-works, which are numerous in Biscay, and constitute its chief wealth.

infamous policy of the men who so unworthily held the government of these fine provinces, with scandalous treachery connived at the infringement of the Madrid government upon the long-cherished liberties of their country. So long as they were the medium of oppression, they seem to have been careless as to the consequences. Look at the continued arrest and imprisonment of the most distinguished individuals of the provinces, Olalde, Otalora, Ubagon, Imaz, Ferrer, Allende, Arana, Landesa, and numerous others, who were without ceremony* torn from their families and imprisoned, solely for their political opinions; and to one of the number (Olalde) it is supposed to have cost 10,000*l.* sterling.

It may be asked, how came it that the Basques, with all their acuteness, allowed themselves to be so easily gulled by the Carlist party? The answer is easy: all secluded people, and mountaineers especially, have a great reverence for old customs, and a sort of instinctive horror of change.

* As a sample of the gentle treatment of the Constitution-
alists by their opponents, take the case D. Emeterio Landesa,
who was accused of having stuck his knife into a portrait of the
king, Fernando VII., which some zealous loyalist had drawn
with a burnt stick, upon the walls of a wine-shop. Landesa,
with a friend who accompanied him, swore positively that the
accusation was false. Both, however, had to hide themselves;
and, after five months' adventures, reached England in safety.
Meantime the tribunals condemned both to death!

The apostolic party, having the clergy on their side, soon enlisted all the superstitions of the country on their behalf. This attained, the next step, that of stigmatising their opponents as heretics, freemasons, &c., was very easy, because most of the affluent classes lived in the cities,* abandoning their tenantry to be governed by their priests; besides, many of these had been forced to emigrate after 1823, and those who did remain, knew better than to incur the risk of fruitless opposition. By and bye the lawyers,† a very

* The Guipuscoa landed interest, being chiefly composed of small proprietors, who lived in the little towns, and not in the capital of the province; and being nearly all liberals, for a long time held up against the growing influence of the Carlists, but the folly of the Madrid government, and the stupidity of Rodil Quesada, Osmia Espartero, and the rest of the queen's generals, so far from deriving any advantage from the co-operation of this noble and high-minded body of men, actually betrayed them to be slaughtered by their merciless foes, consisting of their tenantry, led on by the clergy and escribanos. When I say betrayed them, I mean, that the queen's generals, after urging these gallant and high-spirited men to take up arms for their cause, afterwards abandoned them to their exasperated foes. Let Villafranca, Eybar, Vergara, Guetaris, bear witness.

† The hostility of the escribanos to the constitution, dates from the year 1812, when the Cortes enacted, that in every district there should be a "*juez de conciliacion*," alias a peacemaker; and that all suits and contentions *in obo* were first of all to be heard before this personage, who was to endeavour to reconcile the parties and prevent them from making fools of themselves, and spending their money in law. Of course, had the escribanos been men of

numerous class in the Basque provinces, joined the curas y frayles, and then their sway was supreme. The peasant was taught to look upon his landlord (if a Constitutionalist) as his direst foe, that faithful attachment to the cause of the altar and throne should be rewarded by his elevation in rank, from tenant to freeholder. In a word, the rabid friar preached damnation, the *escribanos* held out confiscation, while the secular leaders pointed to their organised battalions. The peasantry could not resist all these arguments, and joined the cause of the Carlists.

It has been asserted that Don Carlos supported the Basque fueros in 1829, when the Madrid government was anxious to do away with them. Never was assertion more unfounded — never was credit so ill deserved heaped upon any individual. Had the influence or the *will* of the infante been so good or so great, why did he allow the faithful Navarrese to be taken as common soldiers, or permit custom-houses to be established all over Navarre, with duties not

the world, instead of being wise only in their own conceit, they would have laughed at this act of parliament, convinced that not a single law-suit would be lost thereby; for, with most men, the expense of law is an attraction, rather than a repulsion, and they would care nought even for the judgment of Solomon, were it given *gratis*. However, the *escribanos* chose to take umbrage at the act, and imagined their emoluments in danger (*hinc illæ lacrymæ*), and thenceforward became staunch absolutists.

much less than those of Castille? The answer is plain. Charles dared not defend the fueros of the provinces; he knew well that the Castilian, Andalusian, and Aragonese sections of the apostolic party were bent upon abolishing the fueros. Don Carlos wished to be king of Spain, not king of Navarre only, and therefore he dared not displease the main strength of his party. The infante acted with his customary dissimulation: he deplored the necessity of infringing the privileges, and recommended it to be done gradually. In 1830 the measure was resolved upon; General Joseph O'Donnell was chosen to command the corps d'armee; head-quarters were fixed at Burgos; and a considerable body of troops was collected. The author met General O'Donnell in the Montaña, in the spring of 1830, then on a tour of inspection, and the conversation that he held with that officer, although on general topics, served but to confirm the reports which he had heard at Bilbao, relative to the projected abolition of the fueros. *It was the revolution of July which saved the Basque fueros*; that event caused even the government of Calomarde to pause, for even the apostolicals thought it not unlikely that France, under her new dynasty, would interfere. So Don Carlos takes the credit for averting that peril, which is justly due to the barricades of July. Verily, the prince who can strive to rob his brother's daughter of her heritage, and in so

doing, shed the blood of myriads of his wretched countrymen, is right not to hesitate at a simple falsehood.

The privileges of the Basque provinces are odious to the Spanish nation, of which Charles is so well aware, that if he was king of Spain next year, he would quickly find excuses for infringing them, if not for their total abolition. A representative government will endeavour to *raise* Spain to a level with the Basque provinces,—a despot, to whom the very name of freedom is odious, would strive to *reduce* the provinces to the same low level with the rest.

Not content with the real privileges enjoyed by the Basques, some of their Anglo-Carlist advocates have represented them as so full of lofty independence, that even the dread tribunal of the inquisition was stayed in its course, at their frontier: the fact also that none of the capitals of the Basque provinces are bishops' sees, is likewise dwelt upon with no small complacency. In respect to the inquisition, so far from such being the case, there were commissaries of the inquisition depending from the tribunal at Logroño, established at Bilbao, Vitoria, and San Sebastian; but in former times, this tribunal was so much in unison with the fanatical feelings of the inhabitants, that there was scarcely any employment for the "Comisarios," unless it was to persecute some unfortunate foreigner, or to search for prohibited books. What

else could be expected from the people who gave to the church of Rome the founders of the Jesuits and Franciscans, a people whose lively imaginations render them exceedingly prone to superstition, and whose veneration for every custom stamped with antiquity is so firm and deeply rooted. Nevertheless, were Charles to be king of Spain, the inquisition will have at least one tribunal in Bilbao, for long before the war had reached that terrible degree of intensity which now distinguishes it, many Carlists had assured the author that it was the firm intention of the "*Junta Apostolica*" to establish the inquisition in every town of consequence, as the only means of maintaining the purity of the faith (?) and destroying the liberals!*

* There was a man known by the nickname of *El Turco*, who kept a tobacconist's shop, in the street of the *Sombrereria* at Bilbao, who had been much persecuted by the inquisition, in 1817, on account of his religion. This man was, I rather think, a Greek or Candiote; he was often threatened with banishment, and only escaped by paying heavy fines, and binding himself to attend mass and confession regularly. The condition of this poor man was not much improved when the inquisition was abolished, for the *curas* and friars teased him just as before. Even the foreign residents were often troubled by them, under one pretence or another; and although the English were not so much molested as the Germans, Italians, &c. they did not wholly escape. Mr. Barrow, a wealthy and long established merchant, together with the author, were both summoned on the same day, to prove their "*filiacion*,"—that is, to prove that they were of *noble blood*, and of *clean lineage*, not descended from Jews or infidels, and good catholics.

The Basque provinces are, with respect to ecclesiastical matters, included (1836) in the dioceses of Pamplona, Calahorra, and Santander: there is little doubt that the establishment of the two first bishoprics dates as far back as the fourth century, when, it is but fair to conclude, that the Vardul, or Bascones, were but thinly scattered over the country, and possessed no town of sufficient consequence to become an episcopal see. The rise of Vitoria,* Bilbao, and San Sebastian, is comparatively quite modern; even now, Pamplona is larger than either of them, and, exclusive of the three capitals, the Basque provinces contain no town with a population exceeding 4000. Thus there has been no motive for changing the original state of things, up to the present time, when, so far from a repugnance being manifested thereto, I am well aware that there has long existed a strong desire to have an episcopal see established either at Vitoria or Bilbao.

When praising the clerical establishment in the Basque provinces, it is strange that the Carlist advocates never thought of alluding to that curious law contained in the fueros of Biscay relative to the clergy, wherein it is stated that "inasmuch as the clergy, being obliged to lead a life of celibacy,

* The cortes have erected Vitoria into a bishop's see, by the new law of September, 1837, which establishes several new dioceses, and annuls many others.

are continually committing divers immoralities, &c. endangering the peace of families,—now in order that they (the curas) shall have no excuse for corrupting our wives and daughters in future, they shall be allowed to maintain one or two *meretrices* [*barraganes**] in their houses.”

It remains for me to make a few observations on the local government of the provinces. In each of the three, the administration was in the hands of the “*diputacion*,” which consisted of two “*diputados*” in Biscay, and four in Guipuscoa, but of only one in Alava; all elected by the juntas of their respective provinces, for the term of two years. The *diputados*, for the time being, are invested with the management of the finances and defence of the province; they are the organs of communication with the central government, none of whose orders or decrees are binding, until they have passed the *diputacion*. This body also has the management of the police, and acts as a tribunal for the trial of civil suits; for which purpose, and also for that of giving advice generally concerning the customs, usages, and laws of the province, an assessor is appointed. In Biscay, the *diputacion* usually reside in Bilbao, Guernica, or Durango: in Guipuscoa, the four deputies must be residents of the four towns of St. Sebastian, Tolosa, Azpeytia, and Azcoytia, and the deputy for the town

* Whence, perhaps, our word *harridan* is derived.

wherein the corregidor resides, becomes, *por fuero*, chief of the ordinary *diputacion*: the extraordinary *diputacion* consists of the four deputies, the syndic and secretary; they must be convened twice a-year, and the juntas once. The sessions of the Guipuscoa juntas must be held in one of eighteen towns, which follow in turn. The corregidor dwells, *por fuero*, in one of the four towns of Tolosa, St. Sebastian, Azpeytia, and Azcoytia, for three years, and then translates his residence to another of the four. In Alava, the *diputacion* reside constantly at Vitoria. In Biscay, the towns and anteiglesias are summoned once in two years to send their representatives to the junta of Guernica. In Guipuscoa, the juntas are chosen by 18 *Partidos*; Valle de Leniz, 2; Alcaldias, 3; Uniones, 5; Towns, 27; the University of Iruia, 1; in all, 56.

In all the provinces, although the representatives are supposed to be chosen by the heads of families, the business is usually managed by two or three lawyers and the cura; in point of fact, two-thirds of the members of these rustic parliaments are the *fieles* of their respective anteiglesias; the large towns, however, frequently send men of education and abilities.

The sessions-house (*casa de juntas*) for Biscay is a large and handsome building, situated at the

* The juntas always meet on even years, such as 1830, 32, 34, 36, 38.

south end of the town, to the left of the Durango road; by the side of the edifice is the famous oak* of Guernica, beneath which is a stone seat, where the corregidor sits when the laws passed by the junta are promulgated. The session generally lasts about a fortnight, and is usually wholly employed in examining the accounts of the late diputados, discussing their conduct, arranging disputes between the towns, and business of a like nature. The existing taxes also are continued, sometimes increased, and sometimes changed: roads and harbours are directed to be made or improved. The meetings of the junta usually commence at about nine in the morning, and last till three or four each day; the speakers use indifferently the Spanish or Basquence. In Guipuscoa, I believe the Basquence to be invariably spoken, while in Alava, Spanish is almost always used. To the right of the corregidor, who presides over the assembly, are seats for those gentlemen who have been elected diputados, and creditably fulfilled the duties of that high station; these are called *Padres de la Provincia*, and are entitled to a seat in the juntas for the remainder of their lives; however, as the diputados are seldom chosen when young men, but usually when advanced in life,

* The present oak-tree is comparatively modern: the French, in 1808, cut down and burned the old tree, so that the traveller who expects to find a forest monarch, like that of the Grindstone oak in the Holt forest, will be disappointed.

the number of senators seldom amounts to a dozen.*

The last day of the sessions is fixed for the election of deputies for the ensuing two years: plenty of intriguing is carried on by the different candidates amongst the electors; promises are profusely given, but nothing more substantial in this stage of the voting. All the names of the individuals composing the juntas are now thrown into two urns, and three drawn by lot from each *bando*—these are the six electors: now the canvassing begins in earnest, for, in proportion to the number of electors a candidate can secure, are his hopes of success. About sunset the six electors assemble, and throw into the two urns three tickets, each inscribed with the names they deem most proper: the urns are shaken, and from each are drawn six tickets, in regular rotation; the first of each urn becomes the two diputados; the next three, the six regidores; the fifth and sixth, are the two syndics and secretaries: this effected, the six electors choose each a regidor, and these six regidores, thus selected, take precedence of the six chosen by lot. The duty of the six electors is now completed, and the proceedings terminate.†

* These senators only take part in the discussion; they have no vote.

† The representatives for the different towns and districts occupy certain invariable places in the house: for instance, at Guernica, the anteiglesias of Guernica and Luno are first called.

The regidores succeed as diputados, according to their rotation, in case the first chosen chance to die, or incur any other disability. In 1832, I heard of as large a sum as fifteen ounces, near 50*l.* having been offered for a vote, nor did there seem to be any feeling of reprehension manifested against those who sold their votes; on the contrary, it was considered a piece of good fortune for a man to draw the electoral prize, and it was looked on as quite natural that he should make the most of his luck. The first deputies chosen at the sessions of 1832, were D. Ferdinand Zavala, and D. Pedro Pascual Uhagon; the second pair, D. Francisco Batis, and D. Jose de Rotaeché; the third pair, D. Mariano Eguia, and D. Silvestre de Lecanda. The choice of D. Pedro Pascual Uhagon greatly enraged the Carlist party, and gave little confidence to the constitutionalists; indeed it has been asserted, most probably without foundation, that the election of this gentleman was the principal reason which induced the Carlist leaders to act with such precipitation in proclaiming the infante

then the other anteiglesias (*del infanzonado*); then the towns beginning with Bermeo and Bilbao, then follow the members for the Encartaciones, those for the valley of Durango, and last those for the valley of Orozco. The same is the rule in the sister congresses of Alava and Guipuscoa: it is also an invariable custom in all, never to allude to any member by his own name, but always by that of his town. For instance, "Durango has asserted so and so, which Elorrio approves of, but which Bermeo entirely dissents from."

king of Spain, the very instant the news arrived of the King Ferdinand's decease.*

If the Basque provinces possess privileges with respect to the rest of Spain, so also is their own soil overrun with distinctive privileges belonging to different communities, families, and individuals. The town of *Munguia* has the privilege of deciding cases in its courts with a direct appeal to Valladolid.† The town of Elorrio also claims particular privileges for its inhabitants, in respect to succession and inheritance. In Orduña, the customs of Biscay are not adhered to, in the sale of landed property, nor in the right of succession, nor in criminal cases, the general laws of Spain being in force. In some places, such as Durango and Bilbao, the *alcaldes* are chosen by the householders. At Begoña, one or both are named by the Condesa de Hervas, hence known as *la patrona de Begona*. For Lequeitio, the family of Adan name the *alcaldes*. At the town of Llodio, the inhabitants choose one *alcalde*, and the Conde de Ayala the other: in short, particular privileges meet you at

* The king died on a Tuesday; the Thursday morning following at three, A. M., the news arrived; in half-an-hour the royalists were under arms, and crying through the streets,—*Viva Carlos Quinto! Death to the liberals, Christians and heretics!*

† This town (*Munguia*) contains more lawyers than any town in Biscay. There are about 400 families, of whom about sixty are lawyers. The Basque peasantry are as litigious as the Normans; for the merest trifle they go to law with each other.

every step: not only is nearly all the property in the country entailed, but even particular employments become the appanage of certain families, and as such, are entailed; for instance, in Bilbao there are twelve *escribanias* or notarial offices, one of which is in the gift of the Mazarredo family; indeed, I believe they are all *owned* by one family or another.

The provincial revenues of Biscay are derived from, 1st, the tobacco rent. The duty on this article is usually fixed at 2½rs. vn. per lb.; this produced to the diputacion about 15,000*l.* annually, a prodigious sum for such a small population; but the wonder diminishes when we consider that fully two-thirds is smuggled into Castille, where the duties are *only* fifteen-fold higher. 2d. Duties on wines and spirits of eight rs. vn. each *cantaro* (four gallons). 3rd. Duty levied on iron, of half a real per quintal macho, equal to 150 lbs. English. 4th. A proportion of the land-tax, usually fixed at 5 per cent. on the rental—this tax in Bilbao and Portagalite is collected by the town municipalities, and I am of opinion only one-fourth belongs to the diputacion. 5th. Sundry small revenues arising from tolls, roads, markets, &c., of trifling import.

All these revenues exceeded 30,000*l.* annually, a large sum for that country; their expenses (those of the diputacion) consisted in defraying the salaries of the persons employed in the administration; paying and clothing the *miqueletes* or armed police;

paying grants of money made by the juntas for roads, schools, &c. Not a little was expended at Madrid, in "keeping up their interest at court;" and it appears that from 1823 to 1833, not only were large sums expended in purchasing stores of arms, clothing, and ammunition, but there was still enough left to make a decent fortune for two, at least, of the diputados during that time. One of these greatly increased and improved his small paternal property near Sornoza; the other built a good row of houses in the town of Munguia.

The revenues of the different municipalities in Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa, are usually derived from a tax on wines and spirits, and from the monopolies of bread and meat. Not that the municipality exercise the functions of butcher, baker, &c., but that they sell the privilege of killing cattle, or selling bread within their jurisdiction for one year. The parish of Deusto, near Bilbao, received for their shambles (*mataduria*) one thousand ducats annually, about 110*l*. The city of Bilbao did derive an enormous income from these two branches, but lately (1836) the municipality nobly abolished their own monopoly, allowing any one to follow those callings who was inclined.

The system of charging a local duty on wine in each anteiglesia, exclusive of the *derechos del senorio*, paid to the diputacion, is universal over the Basque provinces; but as the proprietors of each parish or anteiglesia insist on *their* produce being exempt, it follows that every parish

must drink its own growth, be it bad or good, adequate or inadequate to the consumption, or else pay the duty on that introduced from the neighbouring districts. Now, as the same duty which impeded the entry of good wine into a particular parish, prevented its export to the neighbouring villages in years of abundance, it happened that in some years (1832) wine might be bought for two quartos the azumbre, equal to $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ the gallon, in particular places, whilst all the year 1836, it would have been hard to get it for twelve times or even sixteen times that price; a sort of epitome of our corn laws in miniature.

The revenues of Alava and Guipuscoa together would scarcely equal that of Biscay alone, but their expenses were much less: as in Biscay the provincial revenues were managed by the diputacion which was elected, in the same manner. The diputado for Alava, Don Valentin Verastegui having been constantly elected for a number of years following, was generally known by the name of Valentine the First. I should consider that the government of Madrid received from the three Basque provinces about 20,000*l.* annually; not a very large sum, certainly, but which was not paid without much murmuring and continual remonstrances on their part.

POPULATION.

There has been no census of the Basque provinces taken since 1797, at which period, accord-

ing to the account published in 1801, the numbers were,—

	Males from 16 to 50.	Under 16, above 50.	Females.	Clergy.	
ALAVA 69158	Single 6300 Married..... 8762 Widowers.... 305 <hr/> 15367	18284	33872	1160 Secular. 248 Regular. 227 Female.	1635
GUIPUSCOA 105962	S. 11305 M. 11538 W. 500 <hr/> 23343	25145	56003	1471 { 764 S. 249 R. 458 F.	
BISCAY 113196	S. 10078 M. 14345 W. 603 <hr/> 25026	28134	58276	1760 { 1085 S. 325 R. 350 F.	
NAVARRRE 226400	S. 23897 M. 31781 W. 1448 <hr/> 57126	55293	109309	4672 { 2778 S. 1287 R. 607 F.	
<hr/> 514716	=	<hr/> 120862	<hr/> 126856	<hr/> 257460	<hr/> 9538

Thus we find that in 1797, the number of people able to bear arms in the four provinces was 120,862. The population has ever since been steadily increasing; the war of independence cut off a good many of the Navarrese, although but few of the Basques, who can scarcely be said to have made any resistance to the French prior to 1812. Nor were the years 1820—1823, although years of warfare, very destructive to the population, which continued increasing; so that in 1833,

Biscay was calculated to contain	140,000
Alava	80,000
Guipuscoa.....	125,000
Navarre	260,000

Making a total of.... 605,000

which number will give the following proportions, according to the preceding table:—

	Males.		Females.	Clergy.	
	From 15 to 50.	Above 50, under 16.			
Biscay,	30,910	34,800	72,072	2,218	— 140,000
Alava,	17,776	21,150	39,181	1,893	80,000
Guipuscoa,	27,527	29,652	66,037	1,784	125,000
Navarre,	65,574	63,507	125,521	5,398	260,000
	<u>141,787</u>	<u>149,109</u>	<u>302,811</u>	<u>11,293</u>	

Being of Men able to bear arms, 23·43 p. cent. of the population
 Males unable to bear arms, 24·64
 Females, 50·05
 Clergy, 1·88

The number of married people would be as follows:—

In Alava,	10,158	} 88,035
Guipuscoa,	13,606	
Biscay,	17,741	
Navarre,	36,530	

The military organization of the provinces, between 1823—1833, was carried into complete effect by the Carlist *diputaciones* in Biscay and Alava. In the adjoining province of Guipuscoa, the presence of the captain-general, with the garrison of San Sebastian, served as a slight check, and still more the presence of numerous landed proprietors, who, being attached to the queen's cause, discouraged the arming of the peasantry by all the means in their power. In Navarre, the royalist volunteers were very numerous, although

they were but indifferently equipped. The superior resources of Biscay, and their uncontrolled possession of the country, enabled the diputacion to perfect their arrangements. Numbers of cannon, which had long been abandoned as unserviceable, were repaired and fitted for service; large quantities of gunpowder imported; and arms of all descriptions carefully warehoused. — All this was not so secretly done, but that the Madrid government knew of their proceedings, of which however they took no notice. A short time after the outbreak in 1833, I was informed at the diputacion, that the number of royalists on the muster-rolls in Biscay was 14,276, an immense number, in proportion to the population, being nearly one-half of those able to bear arms. As will be shown hereafter, when active service began, much inconvenience was experienced from the withdrawing such a large proportion of the population from their homes, since fully one-third were married. In Guipuscoa the enlistment was not so heavy, the number being between 8,000 and 9,000. In Alava, Verastegui had enrolled a large force, probably nothing short of 6,000. The royalists in Navarre, with the Rioja, did not fall short of 30,000. Thus, the Carlist party in the Basque provinces, when they rose in favour of Charles, had an organised militia of near 57,000 men, with a further stock of about 80,000 men able to bear arms, on which to fall back as a reserve, and they

could safely count upon an annual crop of at least 7,000* young men, for several years to come. It is true, that from these numbers no small deduction must be made for those well affected to the queen's cause, and those who, residing in lower Navarre, or in the fortified towns, incurred some risk in joining the faction. However, I alter not the numbers, because,—1. If I am to strike off 15,000 or 20,000 of the male population as favourable to the queen, as many will have to be added for recruits raised in Castille, deserters from the queen's army, and Carlist volunteers from the interior of Spain. 2. Although the queen's forces held lower Navarre, and do so still, that has not in the slightest degree prevented the young men from joining the faction. About 300 left Pamplona in one week.† When I passed through Puente la Reina, in 1835, where there had been a garrison for two years, scarcely a man was to be seen. Here, in Bilbao, the whole of the Carlist part of the population have gone to the Carlist ranks. Occasionally one or two return, because they have some business to settle in the town. They deliver up an old musket, tell some story

* I have estimated the births in the Basque provinces at 48·5 per thousand annually: of this number there will be, males, 24·2; females, 24·3; then from the number of males subtract 12·75, for deaths occurring prior to their seventeenth year, there will then remain 11·45 \times 1000 = 11·45 \times 605 = 6927 yearly crop.

† June, 1834

about their *desengano*, and get leave to go to their homes. On enquiring about them a month or so afterwards, you are told—"Oh! So and So, he has been gone long ago." Therefore the numbers, above, may be fairly taken to represent the actual and perspective force with which the Carlist Basques began the struggle to place Charles upon the throne of Spain. And yet Mr. Hennigsen states, that when ZumalacarreGuy took the command, he could not muster 150 men! It is barely possible, that when the ex-colonel of the regiment of Africa left the queen's service, to join that of the pretender, on his first arrival he might find only 150 men disposed to obey his orders; but when his authority was once recognised, as commander-in-chief of the Carlist forces, he had but to stamp his foot, and forty battalions would start up, so excellent was the organization of the provinces; for which both Don Carlos and his generals might thank Verastegui and Valdespina.

It is time to say something respecting that system, which has enabled a small province to maintain 30,000 soldiers for four years, to resist successfully the attacks of five armies, and even now, October, 1837, although one-third of their territory, and all their chief cities are still in the hands of their foes, their troops overrun the Castiles and Aragon, where, if not always successful, they hold up an even fight.

The first consideration with the Carlist leaders,

was, that their troops should never lack food. This object being constantly in view, the whole province was divided into districts, and a commissary appointed for each. Every town and village, nay, even the smallest *barrio* or hamlet of half a dozen houses,* was assessed at so many rations *per diem*; the total number for the entire province of Biscay being 10,290 rations of meat and bread *daily*, and 29,600 rations of wine *weekly*.† As the meat ration was one pound, that of bread one pound and a half, and that of wine one pint, it follows that the weekly contributions, in provisions alone, amounted to 72,030 pounds of meat, equal to about 180 oxen, 108,045 pounds of bread, and 3,700 gallons of wine. Thrice a week the rations were collected in some convenient place of each *anteglesia*, when the *alcalde*, agreeably to the orders he received from the commissary, despatched them to head-quarters. Those districts wherein the troops were quartered, had, of course, to find for the immediate wants, a quantity of rations far beyond their *quota*, for which the commissary gave them credit, so that they ceased supplying rations until their advance was made up. It is, of course, understood, that salt, oil, fuel, and lodging had to be found for the soldiery, in addi-

* The little *barrio* of Bolivar, in the Marquina district, was assessed at $3\frac{1}{2}$ rations daily.

† According to the printed circular, signed by the Carlist diputacion, in October 1835.

tion. In Navarre, the Carlists had to adopt rather a different system. There they compelled the farmers, after getting in their crops, to send heavy contributions of corn to certain places which were appointed. The corn so gathered was placed in *positos*, the same as the *silos* of northern Africa, and issued to the commissary, to be ground and distributed as was required.

The clothing of the troops was provided for, although but indifferently, by cloth purchased in France or Bilbao, or stolen in a marauding excursion into Castille, and made up in the provinces; certain quantities being sent to each of the towns, such as Vergara, Villafranca, Segura, Oñate, with orders for the return of so many coats, caps, or trowsers in a given time. On receiving the cloth, the *alcalde* or *ayuntamiento* summoned all the tailors, set them to work *nolens volens*, at cutting out. As fast as the *sastres* drafted out the habiliments, they were hastily carried to the houses of the inhabitants, with orders to have them made up instantly, (those suspected of liberal sentiments usually having the largest share). A traveller, coming into a village which had just received such a commission, would find all the females employed the same way—making jackets or trowsers. In this manner was clothed and fed, by a small country, not containing one-eighth of its population, an army as numerous as that of Bavaria.

But, it must be observed, that prior to the capture of the queen's garrisons in the small towns of the Basque provinces, it was found wholly impossible to levy the rations with that regularity which was afterwards attained. The commissaries and generals accordingly, between October 1833, and September 1835, seized provisions wherever they could find them, giving their owners "bonos" for the amount, payable after the king enters Madrid. Now, since, in the war of 1821-3, the Carlist chiefs had in a similar manner paid for their supplies with these *bonos*, which were in due time fairly liquidated at Madrid, the peasantry, bearing this in mind, took these notes of hand greedily. The Carlists' commanders were prodigal in their issue, and in two years the amount of this paper for Biscay alone was eighty millions of reals, while for the entire provinces the amount would not be underrated at two hundred millions of reals. At present (Oct. 1837), the debt is probably twice as much; and it has been of incalculable service to the Carlists, for the Basque peasantry are now obliged to support Charles, or else they will never get a farthing of what is due to them.

Notwithstanding the large quantities of arms and ammunition gathered together by the apostolical party, prior to the breaking out of the war, the Carlists soon found themselves in want of both. The excessive humidity of the climate, the

carelessness of the men, and the nature of the war, all contributed to increase the consumption of ammunition and to render fire-arms un-serviceable. Here the Carlists received an aid from the population of the Basque provinces, which, probably, might have been sought for in vain in any other European province or district. Throughout Biscay and Guipuscoa iron abounds, and the manufacture of this metal in all its stages employs numerous hands. These, however, are not, as in Great Britain, gathered together in huge manufactories, but are dispersed over the country, working at the *ferrerias*, as these iron-works are termed. The iron-works of Biscay and Guipuscoa produced before the war about 15,000 tons annually of iron, which bore an average price of about 16s. to 17s. per cwt. Besides these *ferrerias*, where the ore was smelted, there are several towns where the inhabitants dedicate themselves to the manufacture of arms and iron-mongery in general. The principal places are Eybar, Plasencia, Elgoybar, Elgueta, Durango, Ochandiano, Tolosa, Vergara, and Balmaseda; but the manufactory of small arms, swords, bayonets, &c., is chiefly confined to the first two places, that at Plasencia being a royal or government establishment. Probably not less than one-third, certainly not less than one-fourth, of the population of Biscay and Guipuscoa derived their principal means of support from the iron manu-

factures. Let it be considered, therefore, what an immense advantage was possessed by the Carlists in thus having a population at their disposal, whereof every fourth man understood how to clean and repair his musquet, and which could furnish thousands of able and skilful workmen for the making of arms and accoutrements of all descriptions. Nor were they less fortunate in the manufacture of gunpowder; their forests furnished inexhaustible supplies of charcoal, which the long practice of the charcoal-burners employed for the *ferrerias*, enabled them to make of a superior quality, whence, perhaps, the great strength of their gunpowder, in the manufacture of which many friars were employed. At first their only manufactory was in the woods of Ereño; subsequently, another was established at Oñate. The saltpetre and sulphur required in these manufactories were brought from France; vast quantities were continually arriving, and the *holymen*, both at Oñate and Ereño, worked with a will incessantly; still the consumption of the Carlist army was so immense, that great difficulty was often experienced for want of ammunition. It must here be observed that since the queen's forces for the first eighteen months of the civil war garrisoned the towns of Tolosa, Eybar, Ochandiano, Vergara, and Durango, the Carlists were frequently straitened for musquets, for, although they had abundance of workmen, the tools and machines requisite for the

manufacture of small arms were not so easily attainable : however, the preremptory commands of Zumalacarreguy and the zeal of the diputacion, managed to fit up a manufactory near Eulate in Navarre, and another near Segura. The foundry at Orbaiceta, in Navarre, was worked by the Carlists, and although Mina and Valdez at different times destroyed what they could find of the works, they were soon put in order again. It was at Orbaiceta that the mortar was cast which enabled Zamalacarreguy to reduce the small garrisons in the provinces : afterwards the principal foundry of the Carlists was removed to Oñate, where the howitzers and mortars employed against Bilbao were cast under the direction of Don Jomas Reyna, an artillery officer, who had deserted the banners of Spain to join the faction.

It has been shewn how the Carlists contrived to feed, clothe, and arm the numerous forces raised to carry on the war ; it remains to offer some observations as to their pecuniary resources. Previously to the death of Ferdinand, the Biscay *diputacion* had a surplus in hand of about 10,000*l.* ; they levied on the commerce of Bilbao two contributions of 20,000*l.* each ; but of the second, not above three-fourths was collected. In Alava some funds were also laid by, but in Guipuscoa and Navarre nothing, for the *real consejo* of that kingdom, together with the captain-general, declared for the queen, and, of course, kept posses-

sion of the treasury. After the Carlists were driven from Bilbao and Vitoria, for some months they seem to have exacted money wherever they could get it: at length, the necessities of their forces becoming more urgent, the deputies from the different provinces met in 1834, and drew up a tariff of custom-house duties, payable upon all goods imported into the Basque provinces and Navarre from France, or proceeding from Bilbao and other towns held by the queen's troops. This tariff was agreed to at the juntas de Guernica, and signed by the diputados, the curates of Marquina and Larrabesua. Thus, the Carlist party of themselves violated those fueros which they pretended they were in arms to defend.* The next step was to sequester the rents of all the partizans of the queen throughout the provinces; this secured an immense income, for certainly above two-thirds of the rental of the provinces belonged to the Constitutionalists.† Then they proceeded

* The duties levied by this tariff were about one-third of those exacted upon similar goods by the Spanish Arancel, and the Madrid government could not possibly do better than to burn their own tariff and adopt that of the Carlists: it would increase their custom-house revenues 50 per cent., and go very far to stop smuggling.

† "It is difficult to say what may be the number of the chief landholders in the four provinces on the side of Charles; but you may boldly assert, as an undeniable fact, that the immense majority of the landed interest in number, wealth, and talent, are in

to sequester the rents of those families who had emigrated, anxious to withdraw from the contest without compromising themselves with either party. Next they seized and sold the corn, cattle, and other moveables belonging to the liberals; and not content with this, they sent messages to the principal proprietors dwelling at Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Vitoria, demanding large sums of money, threatening, in case of refusal, to burn their houses. Some were foolish enough to comply, but they did not save their property, which was impartially burnt, together with the houses of those who scorned bargaining with an enemy whose treachery and bad faith were too notorious.* In addition to the funds arising from these sources, the country generally were heavily taxed, the usual form being a poll-tax levied upon each family, the amount of which varied from one dollar per week to seven, according to the means of the individual, and also according to his suspected political opinions. And

favour of the queen."—*Letter from Don Maximo de Aguirre Barrondo to the author, dated Bilbao, 27th Sept. 1837.*

* The house of D. Gregorio de Aguirre near the Puente nuevo de la Bolueta, was burnt after money had been demanded and paid as the price of forbearance. The country seat of the Uhago family in Baracaldo was burnt, as was that of Colonel Arana, the commandant of the nationals of Bilbao. The Carlists seized all the property they could lay their hands on belonging to this gentleman: in short, to enumerate all those who were plundered by them, would be endless.

as all these sums, joined to the ordinary revenue of the province, were insufficient, large subsidies were occasionally demanded, which sometimes were enforced, and once or twice were (as I have heard) abandoned in consequence of the discontent of the people. Enquiring of some gentlemen well acquainted with the administration of the provinces, at what amount they estimated the sums extracted from the three Basque provinces by the Carlists, during the four years of warfare, they gave it as their opinion that above five millions of dollars in *money* alone had been raised—being fourfold the amount of the revenue in time of peace. If to this amount be added the value of provisions, clothing, effects, and stores of all kinds furnished to the army, labour of the peasantry, as also the exactions of the queen's troops, destruction of property on both sides, &c., it will be found that the Basques have subscribed very handsomely towards the cause of the Pretender, and yet the enterprise is not half accomplished.

Upon the revolt of the provinces in October 1833, there were no other regular forces to support the central government than those composing the garrison of San Sebastian. At first the aged commander, D. Federico Castañon, with one battalion of the 6th light infantry, pushed forwards to Tolosa, where he was soon joined by Colonel Jaureguy (alias El Pastor). At their instances, several of the inhabitants took up arms,

and preparations were made for a defence; but the Biscay militia, marching to join the Guipuscoans, such overpowering numbers came forward to the attack, that Castañon and Jaureguay evacuated Tolosa and fell back upon San Sebastian. Now this short expedition sufficed to point out to the Carlist leaders the error they had committed in admitting so many married men in their ranks; there was no getting rid of the women, who were seen marching by scores alongside of their husbands in each company, and their encampments reminded the spectator of a German or Muscovite emigration. Soon after the evacuation of Bilbao, the Carlist leaders disbanded the old militia battalions, and raised the following in their stead.

The 1st battalion of Biscay consisted of men from Bilbao and its neighbourhood.	
2nd.....do.....	Sornoza, Durango.
3rd.....do.....	Munguia, Erandio.
4th.....do.....	Valley of Arratia.
5th.....do.....	Bermeo, and the coast.
6th.....do.....	Orozco, Orduns, Amurrio.
7th.....do.....	The Encartaciones.
8th.....do.....	Ochandiano, Aramayona.

Each battalion had its complement fixed at 850 men and officers: however, this was purely nominal, for nothing was more uncertain than the numbers of these battalions. After an unsuccessful action, or during a period of inactivity, the strength of the battalions will fall off to one-third of their number, or even less. The prudent leaders, well knowing their countrymen, give

them time to recover from their despondency, for they know when and where to find their stray sheep; so, after some fifteen or twenty days have elapsed, they begin collecting. The first that return to their ranks are scarcely chidden, but the colonel becomes severe as his files thicken; and when few only are missing, parties are sent to their houses, and if the men are not forthcoming, their fathers are severely punished; 50, 100, and even 200 lashes (*palos*) is no uncommon punishment for the innocent and aged father of a deserter to receive. Castor Andachaga and Ibaizabal have been known to thrash, and that right soundly, one-half the *aldeanos* of Somorrostro and Erandio, because the young men of those villages were missing from their respective battalions.

In Guipuscoa the standing force was also fixed at eight battalions, in Alava at six, while that province raised three squadrons of cavalry, Biscay and Guipuscoa one each, and very great service was rendered by the cavalry, notwithstanding the mountainous nature of the country. The queen's generals did not like to bring cavalry into the provinces, for an excellent reason, since, from the bad management of the leaders it was of little or no service. It may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that a single squadron of lancers are invaluable in the hands of a good general, let the country be never so mountainous.

Navarre raised twelve battalions and four squa-

drons, and a battalion of guides : Alava and Guipuscoa had also their battalions of guides ; these troops were supposed to be the crack corps of each province, and received, or at least were promised, higher pay than the rest of the army. The corps of artillery was chiefly organised from deserters of the French legion and the queen's regular forces — it was never very numerous, and the siege of Bilbao pretty nearly cleared out the whole concern. Thus it will be seen that the total forces raised by the Carlist party in Navarre and the Basque provinces are not less than thirty-seven battalions and nine squadrons, to which must be added a ninth battalion for Biscay and Guipuscoa, and a seventh for Alava, two additional, the thirteenth and fourteenth, must be included for Navarre; thus making in all forty-two battalions and nine squadrons : but I am disinclined to think that this additional number of battalions gives any additional force : to me it is very doubtful that these battalions ever averaged six hundred effectives, and now that they have increased the number, it is most likely at the expense of the strength of the battalions. Taking the forces raised in the most unfavourable point of view, it shews that four provinces, with a population not exceeding that of Kent and Surry, maintained, out of its own children, an army of 24,000 men, which was kept continually recruited through a bloody war of four years, and now, when enter-

ing on the fifth campaign the army is rather increased than otherwise. I do not notice in this place the numerous battalions of Castilians and Aragonese which the Carlists have raised out of the deserters and prisoners from the queen's armies; true it is that the lavish expenditure of their blood has often gained an advantage for which the Basque battalions have received the praise; such is natural and to be expected. The heavy losses they have sustained before San Sebastian and Bilbao have been suppressed, because nobody was interested in their well-doing beyond the officers; even the merits were usually ascribed to some Navarrese or Guipuscoan regiment.

At the risk of being accounted tedious, I have been thus far minute in this sketch of the Basque provinces, for it has been my object to clearly point out,—1st. In what their privileges or fueros with respect to the rest of Spain really consisted. 2nd. How completely the Carlist party had gained the ascendancy over the minds of the population, and with what forethought they had organised the civil and military administration of the provinces. 3rd. And how extensive and formidable their resources really were to sustain the contest which their leaders knew was inevitable. Far different from what is generally known or believed, it has been my task conclusively to prove that the means of the faction when they proclaimed the Infante,

were equal, if not superior to those of the queen's government, particularly if the nature of the country and the character of the inhabitants are considered. On their side we behold four provinces, with a population of six hundred thousand souls, speaking a different language, of peculiar manners, fanatically enthusiastic, and yielding implicit obedience to their chief. On the side of the Christinos we behold a mighty array of provinces, and an imposing army: but the government is in the hands of a female; every branch of the administration swarms with open or concealed enemies; the very constitutionalists divided into parties; dissensions in the provinces; even the fidelity of the army is doubtful; while an enormous force of royalists, whose numbers were counted by hundreds of thousands, and whose hostility could not be doubted, was in arms, waiting apparently only for the signal or a leader to rise. Under all these disadvantages, did the reign of Isabella II. begin, and for my part I am more surprised at the want of success on the side of the Carlists, than that the queen's government with such insufficient means, and amidst such jarring elements, has hitherto been unable to terminate the war. That they have been so far able to control the insurrection, that up to the present time (October 1837) the pretender has been unable to obtain possession of any town of consequence, is a tolerable proof that beyond the limits of the Basque pro-

vinces the feelings and wishes of the people are in favour of Justice, Right and Isabel.

Let us now examine more in detail the resources possessed by the queen's government at the period of her accession to the throne.

Had her father Ferdinand VII. died of his illness at the Granja in September 1832, there is scarcely a doubt but that Charles would have succeeded him on the throne without trouble; for not only were the dying monarch's fears so wrought upon by his priestly attendants, that he annulled his testament in favour of his daughter, (to which his wife the Queen Christina with a noble charity of feeling that cannot be too highly appreciated gave her consent,) but all the provinces were ruled by his partizans, and the then ministry was devoted to him. However, Providence was pleased to spare the Spanish monarch's life, and it is well known that, on his recovery, indignant at the fraud imposed upon him, he dismissed his ministers, taking in their stead others not quite so subservient to his brother's interests. Soon afterwards the sanguinary tyrants of Galicia and Cataluña,—Eguia and the Conde de España, were deprived of their commands, as were also Moreno and Campana; by degrees the provinces were freed from the rule of the Carlist chiefs, and latterly some progress was made in disarming the royalist volunteers. But the long rule of the Carlists, aided by the high churchmen, had filled every

department of the government with their creatures. In another place I have said that the Spanish provinces are overspread with a triple network of functionaries, civil, military, and clerical; the former were Carlists *ex officio*. The civil *empleados* of the government of 1820—3 were all turned out, and their places given to Carlist adherents. It was the same with the army; all the officers of the constitutional army 1820—3 were compelled to leave, or else to undergo a strict examination by a Carlist tribunal, to prove themselves pure from the least taint of liberalism — (*purificarse* — those that could not pass this ordeal were styled “impurificados” and received no pay); their places were filled by a crowd of guerillas, from the provinces of the Pyrenees and La Mancha chiefly; among whom even decent conduct was rare, respectability of birth or education much more so. After the first five years of their reign, the Carlists were compelled to relax some of their regulations, or else three-fourths of the gentry of Spain would have been shut out from the government service. Young officers of good families began to enter the army, but as the line regiments were filled with the *guerilleros* and old subalterns from America, all that had sufficient interest entered the guards. However, the Carlists never much trusted the army; their principal reliance was upon the royalist volunteers, a force which might be said

to be devoted to them. The regular army was neglected, until the revolution of 1830 roused them from their apathy; then the forces were increased, and a better description of officers began to be introduced, amongst whom were many who until then had been on the list of *impurificados*. General Llauder, being named inspector-general, introduced some useful reforms, and both the regiments of the line, and the cavalry began to show signs of improvement: the provincial regiments continued the same as ever, the majority of the officers being decided Carlists.

STATE OF THE SPANISH ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
WAR, 1833—4.

Captains General	7*
Lieutenants do.	67
Majors do.	137
Brigadiers do.	341

552

INFANTRY.

	Regts.	Batta.	Strength of each.	Total.
Infantry of the Royal Guard	4	8	1008	8064
Do. of the Prov. R. Guard	4	12	800	9600
Do. of the Line	17	47	750	34650
Do. do. Light	6	12	700	8400
Do. Prov. Regts.	42	42	600	25200
				85,914

CAVALRY.

	Regts.	Squad.	Strength.	Total.
Of the Royal Guard	4	16	200	3200
Line	12	25	200	5000
				8,200

* Of which number two are English; viz. the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the victor of Albuera.

ARTILLERY.		Brought forward	94,000
Regiments	3	strength 1000 each	3000
Battalions	2	500	1000
Squadrons	2	120	240
Comps. of Artificers	5	100	500
Do. of Garrison	10	80	800
			<hr/>

5,500

Officers of Artillery.

General	1
Sub-Inspectors	5
Chiefs (Jefes de Escuela)	5
Colonels	24
Lieutenant Colonels	33
Majors	11
„ brevet	9
Captains	87
Lieutenants	93
Sub-Lieutenants	115
<hr/>	
	383

SAPPERS, MINERS, ENGINEERS.

Generals	3
Brigadiers	6
Colonels	17
Lieutenant-cols.	18
Majors	8
„ 2nd	2
Captains	50
Lieutenants	51
„ 2nd	14
Two Battalions — 14 Comp.	1120
<hr/>	

1,220

Total 101,000

STATE OF THE SPANISH ARMY, 1836.

Captains General	7
Lieutenants General	73
Majors	159
Brigadiers	384
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Brought forward 623

ROYAL GUARD.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Life Guards 4 Squadrons	..	500	..	
Halberdiers 1 Company	100	
Infantry 4 Regts. 8 Batts.	8064	
Cavalry 4 16 Squad.	..	4000	..	
Horse Artillery 1 Troop } Foot 3 Batteries }	320			
Prov. Infantry of the Guard, 6 Batts.			4956	
	<u>320</u>	<u>4500</u>	<u>13,120</u>	7,940

LINE.

	Regts.	Batts.	Each.	
Infantry	19	57	1000	57000
" light	8	17	1200	20400
Artillery and Engineers				7200
Cavalry of the Line 6 Regts. 24 Squad.	180	each		4320
" light 7 29		150		4350

PROVINCIAL.

42 Regts. Infantry each 1200	50400	
		<u>143,670</u>
	Total	<u>162,233</u>

RECAPITULATION.

Staff	623
Infantry	140920
Cavalry	13170
Artillery, &c.	7520
	<u>162,233</u>

This appears, at first sight, an imposing force; but its efficacy was soon found to be greatly neutralised, by the number of Carlist officers it contained. So it was in all the branches of the administration; the cause of the queen had greatly improved it is true, between the period of King Ferdinand's sickness at the Granja, and that of his decease. Freed from the yoke of the Carlist

viceroys, the provinces proclaimed Isabel every where, the Basque provinces only excepted; the unhesitating recognition of her title by the powerful and neighbouring nations of France, Great Britain, and Portugal, tended to fix some of the wavering; all the fortified towns obeyed the queen, and when Sarsfield and Rodil gave in their adherence, it was fondly hoped that the Carlists would resign the contest. Nothing was farther from their intentions; together with the central government, the queen inherited all the accumulated burthen of debts which the corruption of ages had entailed upon it. She had succeeded to a government, where, from time immemorial, every thing had been conducted by intrigue and chicanery, whereof the springs of action were antiquated, and unsuited either to the wants or wishes of the nation: the ranks of her administration were filled with hollow friends and concealed enemies, who, at every reverse, abandoned her standard in crowds, for that of the pretender; and who, notwithstanding, until their desertion revealed their sentiments, could neither be detected nor punished; and, worse than all, the young queen was obliged to trust implicitly that army, which she knew was partly in the interest of her foes.

However, out of this chaos, after a contest of four years, the dawn of a better day appears; the varying fortunes of the war have induced the Carlists every where to declare themselves, and the

ranks of the administration are no longer thronged with the supporters and partisans of Charles; in the army also, desertion has done its worst, and there is probably at the present time, hardly a single officer who from preference would join the Carlists. The defenders of Isabel have shaken themselves tolerably clear of the suspicious characters introduced by Saez and Calomarde, and now face the pretender openly, whose chances of success will have disappeared, when he can no longer count upon treachery among his opponents. The desolating contest may, and probably will be carried on for years to come, and myriads of lives be sacrificed, in addition to the tens of thousands already wasted; but of the final defeat of the pretender and his unholy cause, there is no reason to entertain a doubt.

I cannot conclude this Introduction, without venturing a few observations upon the *questio verata* of "French intervention," or foreign interference in general. We have seen, in 1823, the French army, commanded by the Duc d'Angoulême, joining the rural insurrection in Aragon and Navarre, break up the constitutional party, and reinstate Ferdinand in the plenitude of absolutism, after a short campaign of six months. Then the dynasty of the elder branch of the Bourbons ruled France, which now obeys the skilful hand of the head of the Orleans line; therefore the advocates for French intervention cry aloud to the French

government of 1836, to repair the evils inflicted on Spain constitutional by that of 1823: but the cases are different. When the cabinet of Louis XVIII. ventured upon the enterprise of overturning the constitutional government of 1820—23, they had with them the sympathies of all the great powers in Europe, except Great Britain. No people so thoroughly know the Spaniards as the French: M. de Villele was not behind his countrymen in this respect, and to his penetration it appeared that the shadowy and disjointed democracy of Spain, supported only by the *bourgeoisie* and an undisciplined army, without even hopes of assistance from abroad,—at home, scarce able to make head against the rural population, which, under their clergy, was daily narrowing its sway,—could hardly be capable of offering any very serious opposition to the armies of France. The event proved that the sagacious minister of Louis XVIII. was in the right.

Now let us examine the question of intervention in 1834—7, by Louis Philippe. Immediately on the late King of Spain's decease, his brother Charles claims the crown; the northern provinces revolt in his behalf; his partisans appear to be numerous every where, particularly among the rural population. The great powers, and many of the secondary states, such as Holland, Sardinia, and others, make no secret of their sympathies in his favour: they furnish him with frequent and

considerable supplies; their agents intrigue for him, and are lavish in their promises in his behalf. Nor is the pretender to the Spanish throne without the support of a large party, even in France: whilst even now (1837), there is a very strong party of the Christinos, opposed to any foreign intervention. Thus the case of French intervention at the present day, is far more complicated than in 1823. Now, should France interfere, she must be prepared to brave the hostility of the great powers; and the army of intervention must be strong enough to extinguish the Carlist faction, and to impose silence upon the dissidents among the liberals: and supposing that the French government were to interfere, and that with success; will Spain indemnify her for the expense? Whoever interferes in Spanish affairs, may expect to have most of the work to do: the expression, "They are now *in for it*, as much as we are,—let them work;" will often be made use of. Nor are they likely to get even dry thanks for their trouble; "*era de su interes, sino jamas hubieran intervenido,*" (it was their interest, or else they never would have interfered,) is the reply which a Spaniard would give. What Spaniard has ever testified his gratitude to the Duke of Wellington and the English army, for their services in the war of independence? None!—on the contrary, I have heard it asserted hundreds of times, that Great Britain owes an immense debt to Spain, for making that country her battle-field

against Napoleon! And has any Frenchman ever heard his countrymen heartily praised by the Spaniards, for the campaign of 1823? I think not.

The different ministries of Martinez de la Rosa, Toreno, Mendizabal, Isturitz, all have asked for the intervention of the French, and to each and all it has been refused. And yet these ministers were well aware that a large party of the liberals were opposed to foreign intervention: still they would have risked their displeasure, for the satisfaction of terminating this cruel civil war, of which the end appeared every day more distant. The highly respectable party who support the queen's cause in the Basque provinces, and who have rendered her cause far more services than many other provinces, are nearly all advocates for French intervention: they are quite right; for, benefiting by past experience, they have ceased to entertain the hope that the Madrid government will be able to terminate the civil war. They know, if the Carlists win, their only choice will be emigration or the scaffold; while their daily experience of the queen's generals, teaches them that the benefits of the constitution have not yet reached Biscay.

But admitting, it may be alleged, that Louis Philippe is unwilling to embroil himself with the northern powers, for the sake of interfering in the affairs of Spain, at least he might have abstained from aiding the pretender in secret! and so,

indeed, he might. The conduct of the French monarch, in this respect, appears indefensible: it seems even incomprehensible, unless he wished to foment the war. His connivance at the passage through France of the pretender; his continual intrigues in Madrid, and at the head-quarters of the Spanish generals; permitting all sorts of supplies to be furnished to the Basque insurgents; having a secret agent at Oñate; allowing the ministerial journals to be filled, month after month, with long articles tending to discredit and throw an air of ridicule upon the efforts of the Spanish constitutionalists, while his accredited ambassador was residing at Madrid; while his ministers professed such an anxiety to serve the queen, that they actually not unfrequently directed the seizure of forty pounds weight of salt-petre, and six or seven muskets, two mules, and a pack-saddle,*—all this has conferred such an unenviable character of meanness on the French government, that it is unpleasant to reflect on it. The result has been, the strengthening the Carlist cause, the prolongation of the war, the great increase of the misery of the nation,—and, to the French monarch, his own particular detestation, by every party in Spain: like the frogs in the fable, the Spaniards cry out,

* This is not imaginary; it is faithfully copied from the French papers, when magnifying their services for the cause of the Queen of Spain. On recollection, I rather think I have omitted six gun-flints and a foraging-cap, but am not certain.

“It may be very good sport to you, but to us 'tis death.” Had the French King been really desirous of aiding the Queen of Spain in her endeavours to finish the war, it was in his power to have closed the frontier to all exports from France, except to places held by the queen's troops. As the Carlist insurrection never spread in Upper Aragon, the whole extent of the frontier line to be guarded, does not exceed forty miles: but the best proof of how easy it was for the French army to close the frontier, had they so chosen, is to be found in the fact, that after the loss of Hernani and Irun, the Carlists preferred trying their luck across the Ebro, to remaining in the provinces with no other resources than such as they could procure from France, through the Bastan. However, if the wish of Louis Philippe has been to let both the contending parties in Spain have a fair trial of strength, to let them “fight it out,” certainly his plans have been crowned with success.

The French press has also been exceedingly active, in circulating unfavourable reports concerning the British nation and their foreign policy. At one time, the English were going to garrison Santoña, San Sebastian, and Passages; at another, they were in possession of Barcelona. Of course these were all lies, and so the French newspapers well knew; the only shadow of foundation for the report was, that the English government, having sent a squadron to assist the Queen of Spain, very

properly demanded a port of refuge for their ships, which they fortified of course, for their own protection. Another story got up by the French press was, the "immense contraband" carried on by the English. I know that it is almost useless to confute this ridiculous assertion, for the publishers and circulators of this story know it to be false: however, it may be as well to remark, that the English exports to the north of Spain have declined to one-third of what they were in 1833, while those of the French have greatly increased.

As for the projected "commercial treaty" in favour of Great Britain, the English minister will be particularly soft if he allows himself to be gulled out of a single penny for the sake of a "commercial treaty." Let the infamous slave-compact of 1817, be always borne in mind, whenever a treaty is in contemplation with Spain*.—Were the English minister to give the Spanish nation half a million sterling, for the exclusive privilege of introducing cottons, &c., for twenty years, at a duty of 10 per cent., such treaty would become the constant theme of vituperation for the French press; it would be continually infringed by all "good patriots," and no ministry,

* By the treaty of 1817, Spain agreed to abolish the Slave Trade, on consideration of the sum of 400,000*l.*—paid by Great Britain. Spain took the money which we were fools enough to give, and the trade went on as merrily as ever; at least, for what the Spaniards did to the contrary.

at Madrid, would dare to punish the infractors. No; the only way of dealing with the peninsular nations, is to get them to reduce their import duties, if you can, but at the same time insist upon having it extended to all nations alike. We have nothing to fear from open rivalry; and when all are treated equally, none can complain; in other words, we should grant no favours, nor receive any. Should money be lent by Great Britain to Spain, let it be lent by the British to the Spanish parliament, a transaction kept perfectly distinct, and security of one sort or the other might be given; such as the states of Holland gave to Queen Elizabeth.

Should the expedition of D. Carlos be finally baffled and driven back into the provinces, I think that would be the most opportune time for the Queen of Spain, and her Cortes, to ask for the united intervention of France and Great Britain. Enough blood will have been shed to satisfy the most insatiable, and the pretender, dejected with his bad fortune, and probably *rather* apprehensive for his life, may be inclined to hear reason, and retire from a fruitless contest. In such case a simple note from the two powers might be sufficient to induce the Infante to give way. I use the words "might be" advisedly; for a weak man under the influence of a blind fanaticism, which he mistakes for religion, is not to be judged by ordinary rules,—it is just as likely that he would

reply "My trust is in the Virgin and the mountains." However, since Venus Victrix proved once unfaithful to the banners of the first Cæsar in Spain, it is possible that even N. S. de los Dolores might forsake the standard of her votary, particularly when opposed to the armies of Spain, supported by 50,000 French, and 20,000 British troops.

But should the fortune of war prove favourable to D. Carlos, should the generals of Isabel, repeatedly defeated, be unable to prevent the Carlist march upon Madrid, and the occupancy of the capital, there is no need to despair. His namesake, the Austrian Archduke, also entered Madrid, but it was but a barren triumph; so it will prove to the Infante. From the day he enters the capital, the reaction will begin—the Queen and her government should retire to Leon and raise the Asturias and Galicia. Let those hardy mountaineers once arm in her behalf, and her cause is safe; very little assistance from France and England would enable her to defy her "uncle" and hold him very uneasy on his throne. His life, besides, is wearing fast, and not worth two years' purchase; the Galician and Asturian provinces have four times the population of the Basque provinces, are quite as mountainous, and the inhabitants quite as brave. But if, through bad influence, the queen is induced to go to Cadiz, her cause will be nigh ruined, for the Andalucias

would make no efforts on her behalf, and how long would Cadiz like to be burthened with a court without a kingdom?

To conclude, it has been my endeavour, in this introduction, to sketch the state of Spain before the war broke out; to state the matured plans and skilful organizations of the Carlists as contrasted with the feeble and discordant measures of the Queen's government. In the following narrative, it will be my task to make manifest that the rising of the Basque provinces was wholly unconnected with their *fueros*; that they proclaimed the pretender king of Spain, before even a voice had been raised, or a line written against their privileges.—I shall have to show that this "much injured people," were the most unjust aggressors, and that their bands over-ran Castille, even to the gates of Burgos, long before the forces of Isabel crossed the Ebro; that it was only afterwards, when their own territory was invaded, and their hopes of a simultaneous rising all over Spain disappointed, that they began to assume the character of a virtuous race struggling for their ancient laws and liberties; and truth will compel the future historian, when reviewing the causes of this disastrous war, to say, "When, after three centuries of uncontrolled and absolute power on the part of their kings, the people of the peninsula endeavoured to ameliorate their social system, by allowing the mass of the contributors a voice

in the government, the most deadly opposition they experienced was from those favoured provinces which, exempt from taxes, free from the conscription, unmolested by that swarm of employés which devour the substance of the rest of Spain, had flourished at the cost of their less favoured brethren—then did these provinces, so far from sympathising with their oppressed countrymen, in their attempts to regain their freedom, exert all their efforts to prevent it; and strange to say, this wicked, envious, and unjust attack upon the dawning liberties of Spain, found numerous advocates, even amongst those nations who had repeatedly derided the Spaniards for their long suffering of absolute and despotic rule.”

the government, the most deadly of persons
 was killed. These persons were
 which were from 1850 to 1860. The
 government, threatened by that movement, was
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 the following phrases of Spain, some
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 and the world.

[Faint handwritten signature or scribble]

CHAPTER I.

Death of Ferdinand VII.—Rising of the Basque Provinces.—Proclamation of the Infante Don Carlos Isidro de Bourbon, as King of Spain, by the Style and Title of Charles V.—Supplies forwarded to Vitoria and Navarre from Bilbao.—Arms and Emissaries sent into Castille, followed by some Troops.—The Carlist Junta of Castille—occupy the Merindades, and push their Advance to the Gates of Burgos.—Expedition to Tolosa—Evacuation of that City by the Christinos.—March of Sarsfield and his Army from Burgos—defeats the Carlists at Pefiacerrada—enters Vitoria.—The Count Armildez de Toledo defeats the Carlists at Castille, near Medina de Pomar.—March of Sarsfield upon Bilbao.—Flight of the Carlists.—Sarsfield enters Bilbao.

October 3—November 26.

EVER since the events of the Granja, in 1832, there had been a great influx of strangers into the Basque provinces. They were particularly numerous in Bilbao, so much so as to attract general notice. Though dressed in plain clothes, it was evident that many of them were military, while their attendance at the *Casa del Señorío* was assiduous and frequent. The late events at Madrid naturally attracted much attention; and the change in politics of the government, viewed with great complacency by the Liberals, was bitterly cen-

sured by most of the new comers. Nor was the new corregidor, D. Modesto de la Mota, less disagreeable to the leaders of the faction so long dominant in the provinces. This gentleman had been selected, by the cabinet of Madrid, to replace the former corregidor Sanahuja, a venal and corrupt magistrate, whose vices were, however, unregarded by the Carlists, of whom he was the zealous adherent and obsequious instrument.

The corregidor Mota was an upright magistrate, but not a very profound politician. From the period of his arrival, he in a great measure took to his councils the constitutional party, and in a manner opposed the pretensions of the leaders of the faction, whose will had hitherto been law. Neither do I think that the corregidor or his advisers were fully acquainted with the extent of the Carlist organization of the provinces, or if they did, they under-rated its strength. In proportion to the aversion of the Carlists to this magistrate did his popularity with the constitutionalists increase; in proof of which, upon his return from Valladolid, a large body of them went out of the town to meet him, and welcomed him back to Bilbao. However, the restoration of the king's health, the breaking up of the exclusive Carlist ministry, the exile of Calomarde and Alceda, with the departure of their chief, the Infante, for Portugal, had rather tamed the aspiring views of the Carlists, and they submitted to an abridg-

ment of their authority, which, a year previously, they would not have endured for an instant.

In July, 1833, were the juntas of Guernica, wherein the corregidor presided, when chance gave to one of the constitutional party the high office of *diputado* for the province. Now, it so happened, that the gentleman upon whom the lot fell, was, of all the liberal party, probably the most obnoxious to the peasantry, although for no better reason than that his family were new in the province: partly on this account, and partly from other motives, the constitutionalists themselves regretted the election of Don Pedro Pascual de Uhagon, although he was one of the wealthiest men in the province, and connected with some of the oldest and most distinguished families. Be that as it may, there was now no remedy, and the Carlist functionaries paid the usual visit of ceremony on his inauguration, which they did with a very bad grace. Soon after the election, the suspicions of the corregidor, as to the designs of the Carlists, became aroused. They were confirmed by a visit which Castañon, the commandant-general of Guipuscoa, made to Bilbao, when he cautioned the corregidor to be upon his guard against the Carlists. He even pressed the sending of a battalion of the line from San Sebastian, protected by which, he would disarm the *realistas de Bilbao*, and form another corps of constitutionalists. Unfortunately the corregidor, acting (as

it was reported) by the advice of Uhagon, who wished not to increase his unpopularity by bringing troops into the Señorío, declined the offer, alleging that he did not wish to infringe the fueros of the province; nor did he deem the faction so formidable.—“*Creo que Vd: se engana, pero ojala que no sea asi,*” replied General Castañon. The conference was closed, and he returned to San Sebastian.

Early on the morning of the 3d October, there was considerable tumult in the streets of Bilbao; people hurrying along; *aldamas** thundering at every second door. Shots were often heard, and towards day-break the noise and confusion increased. Going out to ascertain the cause of the disturbance, I met parties of armed men in every direction, by whom I was roughly interrogated. They however let me pass on; and in the *Plaza Vieja* I found a large body of the royalists under arms, loudly cheering for *Carlos Quinto*. It was enough—the veil was rent—the die cast—I beheld the first scene of this eventful drama.† The plot

* *Aldama* is a knocker, which in Bilbao is a long lever of iron, very ponderous, weighing near thirty pounds.

† As the Carlist advocates in France and England have taken such extraordinary pains to disguise, by an uninterrupted tissue of lies, the real facts of the case, namely, that the Carlist Basques were the aggressors in the contest, I will adduce the evidence of their champion, P. Negrete, who, at page 43 of the *Restaurador*, says, “*A las armas puez Españoles todos: imitemos, intrepidos para tener parte en estos bienes, el heroico exemplo que acaba de darnos la M. N. villa de Bilbao y todo el señorío de Vizcaya, que*

thickened during the day. Numbers of the neighbouring peasantry flocked into the town all around; most of the shops were shut; bands of the royalists paraded the streets, shouting *Mueran los liberales, mueran los Christinos!* At the Casa del Señorío the corregidor Mota, with the deputy Uhagon, held long dispute with Ventades, Batis, Zavala, and others, the leaders of the Carlists. In vain they were entreated not to be so precipitate; that, as yet, they scarcely knew if the king was really deceased, and warning them of the long train of evils which their conduct must inevitably bring upon the province! In vain—entreaties were laughed at—menaces disregarded. Meantime the royalists out of doors, eager to have Charles proclaimed in form, and guessing what was passing

apenas recibieron la triste noticia de la muerte de nuestro amado Rey, el señor D. Fernando VII. (que en gloria esté,) cuando, espontaneamente al campo como si cada uno habiese sido avisado por un anjel proclamaron denodados al extrañado Rey por qui en suspiraban, gritando unanimes con entusiasmo *Viva la Religion, Viva Carlos V., Rey de las Españas;*" which being interpreted, is, "Therefore to arm all Spaniards, let us boldly imitate (the better to share in these benefits) the heroic example just shewn us by the town of Bilbao and all the lordship of Biscay, who scarcely received the news of the death of our late beloved king, Don Fernando VII., (may he be in glory,) before they rushed spontaneously to arms, as if each had been warned by an angel, fearlessly proclaiming the banished prince, for whom all were sighing and shouting enthusiastically, Hurra for Religion and King Charles the Fifth!"

in the council, began to roar out, "Let us slay the corregidor and Uhagon!" Headed by one of their captains, a lawyer named Epalza, a large party rushed into the building, searched the apartments for these obnoxious personages, who escaped assassination almost by a miracle; one of the clerks of the office, leading them out on the roof, whence they clambered along over the tiles to a neighbouring house, where they concealed themselves.

Having no further opposition from the liberals to apprehend, yet vexed that hitherto they had wreaked no vengeance on any of the constitutionalists, (who, to be sure, had done nothing yet to offend them,) large parties of the Royalists went about in hopes of meeting some. Now, it so happened, that at the west entrance of the chain-bridge, one Anton Zuloaga, a sergeant of the Carlists, accompanied with a few others, met three or four gentlemen of the town, known to be constitutionalists, who were unarmed. Then, Zuloaga and his mates, set upon, and slew one named Don Candido Arechaga, (the brother-in-law of the deputy Uhagon) wounded another, who however escaped with his life, as did the rest. As for the young gentleman slain, his body was left in the street, which the *Cargueras* party stripped and treated with great indecency—his friends not daring to leave their dwellings, they themselves hourly expecting to be massacred. Howbeit, at

nightfall, an escribano (Arribalzaga) had the courage to go and take cognizance of the body, and, conformable to the Spanish law, declare it to *muerte alevosa*, wilful murder.

The Carlists continued to parade the streets, crying *vivas* for Carlos V., and the customary *mueras* to all liberals, freemasons, foreigners, heretics, philosophers, &c. They beat and wounded several of the inhabitants, known as constitutionals; among them Don Vicente de Landesa, an aged and inoffensive man. They attempted to break into some of the rich merchants' houses; and their appetite for rapine and plunder was growing so strong, that the deputies, Zavala and Batis, issued a *bando*, ordering all persons to stay within doors after dark, and the streets were kept clear by strong patrols.

Next day Charles V. was proclaimed in form. A white flag, bearing his device, was hoisted in the Arenal; the corporation and diputacion took the oaths of allegiance; and a proclamation was issued, announcing to the provinces that their new sovereign was installed.

Meantime preparations for war were going on with activity. All the powder which was in the magazine at Luchana was brought up to Bilbao, and lodged in the convent of San Francisco, whereof the pious inmates were busily employed day and night in making cartridges, casting balls, &c. All the armourers in the town were set to work in

repairing arms, and large contracts for clothing were entered into with different tradesmen. The Marquis of Valdespina also arrived in the town, and took his post at the head of the diputacion, as corregidor, or rather as *juez regio*.^{*} This nobleman had long been the *Corypheus* of the Carlists in Biscay; his family was one of the first in the province; his property of the largest. In early life a zealous liberal, he now repaid his previous ardour for the Constitution with tenfold hatred of it. Education had given him gentlemanly manners, nature an ill-favoured countenance, which age had not improved; nor was his personal appearance at all mended by the loss of an arm, which has procured for him the name of *Manchuelo*. Active, dexterous, and intriguing, he had immense influence over the country people; nor were his abilities of an inferior class. The marquis, first in rank and property, was also first in point of talent of the Carlist party; and to him D. Carlos owes a greater debt of gratitude than he can ever repay.

On the 10th of October an English cabinet

* The first step of the marquis was, to detach a body of troops to Orduña, to drive away the carabineers, and seize the Custom-house there. The detachment sent was entirely successful. About 5000*l.* was stolen. Another party was sent to Balmaceda, to perform the same operation upon the Custom-house there; but they were not so fortunate, and had to content themselves with a much smaller sum.

courier was brought into the town by the Carlist guerillas: by his own account, after leaving Burgos, he had struck off to the left, in the direction of Santander, in order to avoid passing through Vitoria, which he had heard in Burgos had proclaimed Charles V. Near Soncillo he fell in with the Biscay guerillas, who sent him with an escort to Bilbao. The British vice-consul, Mr. Hoyles, accompanied the messenger to the diputacion, and, after some conversation, the despatches were returned, and the courier was allowed to proceed overland.

Great efforts were now making to compel all persons able to bear arms to enlist in the royalist corps. Instead, however, of treating the constitutional party with decency and kindness, they seemed to grudge them the very air they breathed, which was certainly not calculated to induce them to change their sentiments. An order was issued that all the liberals should give up their horses,* which was enforced; another, that they

* D. Diego Macmahon, a respectable merchant, had a valuable thorough-bred mare, for which he had not long before paid a high price. It naturally vexed him to part with this beautiful animal; however, he was obliged to submit. The man who came for the mare coolly put the saddle and bridle on. "You have no order for the saddle," cried Macmahon.—"You are mistaken if you think I am going to ride without a saddle," replied the man; "besides, D. Diego, where is your cloak?"—"What cloak?" said the other, enraged at the question.—"Now, be quiet," answered the Carlist horse-dealer,—"'tis no use making a noise. I know

should not meet at each other's houses, nor be in the streets after dark, nor stand in groups of more than three persons. Strict search was made for the corregidor Mota and the deputy Uhagon, and a *bando* was published denouncing the penalty of death against such as harboured or concealed them. They were not, however, successful in discovering the hiding-place of the fugitives. Search was made for several others of the leading constitutionalists; numbers were arrested daily, so that the prisons began to be thronged. Very many of the liberals fled from Bilbao to Castro Santander, and other places—there was even some indication of resistance to the Carlist party in the towns on the sea-coast, but it was of the most trifling nature, and soon subsided.

The French government, soon after they heard of the revolt of the Basque provinces, and of Charles V. being proclaimed at Bilbao, sent the *Hirondelle* schooner-of-war from Brest to lie in the Nervion, in order to afford some protection to the subjects of France, of whom there were some

you have a good cloak, which will do for me nicely when campaigning; so hand it out, or it will be the worse for you." There was no help for it, so Macmahon sent his servant to fetch it; and as the lad went slowly up-stairs on the errand, the defender of the altar and the throne roared out, "and bring D. Diego's silver spurs along with the cloak; do you hear, youngster, for you know," turning to Macmahon with a pleasant smile, "you know the spurs will be of no use to you when you have no horse to ride!"

hundreds in the town. Her arrival excited much ill-will on the part of the populace, who cursed the French openly; their leaders more prudently did so in secret, and outwardly made much show of friendship to the captain of the schooner.

A contribution of two million reals was now demanded of the inhabitants: nominally it was levied on all alike, but in reality, on the Christinos only. Of this sum, 1100*l.* was assessed upon two English mercantile houses, who, however, very properly refused to pay it. This contribution was quickly gathered in, and as the stock of ammunition was now considerable, a large convoy was sent off to Navarre, and another to Castille; a large sum of money was also forwarded at the same time. However, the convoy for Navarre was detained in Vitoria, an accident having happened which greatly impeded the Carlist plans in that quarter. Pamplona, with the garrison, had proclaimed the queen, but in Estella and some other places in Navarre, Charles V. had been declared. As it was considered of the utmost importance to raise Navarre, it had been arranged beforehand by the Carlist leaders, that this enterprise should devolve on D. Santos Ladron, an old Navarrese *guerillero*, who possessed much influence in the province. This officer held at this time the rank of major-general in the Spanish army, and his station or residence (for I do not think he was on active service) was at Valladolid,

whence he started about the middle of October, traversed Castille, threw himself into Navarre, and in a few days was at the head of some hundred followers. He had, however, been vigorously and rapidly pursued by a diligent officer, General Lorenzo, who overtook him near Lodosa. Drawing up a squadron of lancers, and telling them to follow, he rode rapidly up to Santos Ladron, who, with a few mounted men, was in front of his followers. In an instant, D. Santos was seized by Lorenzo, and as his men presented their musquets, the queen's general cried out, "*Pobre del que se atreve á disparar un tiro.*" They were intimidated, and did not fire, for which lucky chance, perhaps, General Lorenzo may be indebted to the rapid advance of his lancers, as much as to his own courage. The Carlists dispersed; about twenty were taken prisoners, and two or three were wounded. Conducted to Pamplona, Santos Ladron was tried, convicted, sentenced to death, and executed. The day before his execution, he gave out that he had much to reveal, but he confessed nothing, and his sentence was carried into effect. When the news of his capture and death reached Bilbao, the Carlists were desperately enraged; they talked loudly of murdering all the constitutionalists by way of retaliation. Then it was that they invented the report which afterwards obtained so much credence in foreign countries, that Santos Ladron had surrendered on a promise to have his life spared, a lie which was

invented by the Bilbao Carlists, in order to serve as an excuse in the probable event of the constitutional party being murdered. The royalists continued to cry out for the heads of the deputy Uhagon and the corregidor Mota; but, as yet, those gentlemen were secure. More of the liberal party were arrested daily, and great consternation prevailed among them, for none could tell but that the next moment might tear him from his family, to be immured in a prison whose gates open only for a passage to the grave.

News was now received that the Merindades of Castille were favourably disposed, and that a Carlist junta had been established, consisting, of course, of friars, curates, and lawyers. Proclamations were also addressed to the Montañeses by Ibarrola, a nephew of the ex-minister Zambrano, and by somebody, an *escrivano*, at Oñate, directed to the Guipuscoans. Verastegui also published a proclamation to the Alavese, whilst Basilio Garcia, Eraso,* Marichalar, Modet, and

* Never was a more unfounded calumny uttered, than that the Basques took up arms for their *fucros*. I have shown that to be impossible. Let any one refer to the proclamation of Bilbao, signed by Valdespina, Batis, and Zavala; there is not a word about "*fucros*;" they call upon the Spaniards to rally round the altar and the throne, for religion and Charles V.

Eraso, in his proclamation, dated at Burguete, 17th October, 1833, also talks about "religion" and the "sacred right of the king," but not a word about the "*fucros*." Their motives are easily seen. Had the leaders of the insurrection declared that they stood for the *fucros*, the Spanish Carlists would have dis-

others, calling themselves the junta of Navarre, roused that province by similar manifestoes, so that the ferment was general through the north-eastern provinces of Spain. Things being so far prosperous, the Biscay junta despatched a messenger to Madrid with letters to the minister, the contents of which are to me unknown, although, according to one report, it was a kind of confidential communication to Zea Bermudez, whose Carlist predilections were known; while, according to others, the despatch was simply to inform the government that the Biscayans had proclaimed Charles V. and set the queen at defiance. On my meeting the Carlist *propio* after his return, and enquiring as to the state of the country, he informed me that the Carlist guerillas held all the land to the north of Burgos, and that they counted on entering that town soon, for they had many friends inside, and the garrison was but scanty; indeed, quite insufficient to defend the city, if seriously attacked; but as the Carlists had no cannon, they could merely attempt a blockade.

Some uneasiness beginning to manifest itself among the royalists, on account of their receiving no tidings from their king, Valdespina made a speech at the Casa del Señorío, or county house, to the persons assembled, wherein he informed them that messengers had been sent to the king,

trusted them, and the nation at large would have said, "who has attacked your *fueros*?"

in Portugal, who had promised soon to be among his faithful subjects. Great activity prevailed among the Carlist leaders, and numbers of their opinion, from all quarters, came into Bilbao; amongst them was Cuevillas, Villalobos. The favourite place of resort was the Franciscan convent and the post-office, where long and frequent councils were held.

The Carlists, who at first contemplated a rising over all Spain in their behalf, became rather dismayed when the unwelcome truth broke upon them, that the queen Isabel was recognised without opposition through all the provinces of Spain; and, moreover, that forces from the interior were daily arriving at Burgos. Nor did it at all lessen their vexation to hear that the enterprise of Ibarrola, Cuevillas, and others, against Santander, had entirely failed, they having been totally defeated at Vargas, and Ibarrola himself taken prisoner, with 120 of his followers, by a small force consisting of a few carabineers and militia. They, however, manifested no outward sign of discouragement, and aware, from their excellent intelligence, that it would still be some time ere Sarsfield, who had assumed the command of the army at Burgos, would march, they determined on sending an expedition to Guipuscoa, to join the *provincianos* in attacking Tolosa, which was done, and on their approach, Jauregui, with Castañon, not deeming their force sufficient to resist effectually, withdrew to San Sebastian. After this

triumph, the Biscayans returned, covered with glory, to their own province, and the realistas de Bilbao received each a gratuity of three dollars.

But with the cost of this expedition, and that of the succours sent to the confederate juntas of Navarre and Castille, the daily disbursements for the province, &c. the cash in the treasury began to get very low. Now there is no way so easy to get money, as to seize upon the richest individuals, and strip them of all their wealth; besides being the most simple, it is also most agreeable to the tastes of the populace. By this means, cash is also more speedily obtained than by the slow progress of taxation, besides saving the heavy discount on collecting! This plan, too, has the additional merit of being strictly conformable to the "greatest happiness" principle, for, supposing there to be in a town one man worth a hundred thousand pounds, and a thousand families worth one hundred pounds each, it would be a far more popular act, and inflict the least amount of suffering, for the "king" to strip the rich man of his one hundred thousand pounds, than to take from the thousand their one hundred each. So thought the Carlists then, and ever since have acted up to their opinion. When Basilio Garcia, alias the *Bulero*,* raised the standard of D. Carlos, he wanted money to pay

* A dealer in "Bulls," not Irish, but Roman, pontifical and apostolical.

his followers; to give his own was inconvenient and was, moreover, a bad precedent. He, therefore, seized sundry of the richest proprietors in Logroño, and Santo Domingo, and "put the screw on," to make them come down with the cash—which was done to some purpose, for one gentleman alone was compelled to draw bills upon the Messrs. E. and son, of Bilbao, for no less than two millions of reals. Upon these drafts being presented for payment, on the part of the formidable diputacion, the bankers acknowledged they held the funds, but demurred to paying without advice—to which Valdespina replied, that they would send a messenger. This was done; the letter of advice soon appeared, and the ransom was paid. Not to be behind hand with their friends, in raising the needful, the Biscay junta now called for a fresh contribution of 20,000*l.*; and the report was circulated that they would continue exacting this sum monthly, which confirmed the constitutionalists in the belief that their opponents desired their total ruin, and that nothing short of this would satisfy them. The Carlist soldiery, and the populace, were continually screaming about the streets "Mueran los negros," "this time we will kill all the negros, even to their little children;" "*esta vez matarèmos a todos los negros hasta sus chiquillos.*" The sum of 1,100*l.* was again assessed upon the two British mercantile houses, but, as before, the payment was

very properly obstinately refused; many threats were made, and probably force might have been ultimately used, but fortunately H. M. brig *Nautilus*, commanded by Captain Lord George Paulet, came into the river, and the Carlist leaders ceased to molest the British subjects with demands for contributions, although still persisting in their right to tax all persons dwelling under their jurisdiction, as they thought fit. I remember one of the diputacion making a very pertinent remark to me: "You say it is contrary to the tenor of the treaties to enforce loans from British subjects residing in Spain; it may be so, but do you think that if the English government, during the Irish rebellion of 1798, had laid a contribution on the city of Dublin, they would have exonerated a Spanish resident from paying his share." My reply was, of course, that as the case had not arisen, there was no need to give an opinion on the point;—the treaties clearly stipulated that the subjects of either of the two contracting powers, residing in the dominions of each other, should be exempt from all forced loans, war contributions, or compulsory payments of any kind;—the application chanced to arrive first in Spain;—they must abide by it.

Notwithstanding the coolness of the Carlist leaders, they began now to entertain some apprehensions; for all their expectations from the rest of Spain having been frustrated, it was clear

that they must now prepare for a war against the entire force of the Spanish monarchy: but this risk they did not hesitate to incur. With the exception of Novia, Valdespina, and two or three others, the Carlist leaders were men who had nothing to lose, and were bent upon a contest at all hazards; they were sure to hold the honours. Personal danger, they well knew, there was very little; for a leader of Guerillas, unless he chooses, need scarce ever be in the fight: it is all desultory skirmishing, where running away, so far from being considered dishonourable, is looked on as cleverly outwitting the enemy. Even at the worst, they knew they could always escape into France. It was at first contemplated, that all the forces of the provinces should unite, take up a position near Peñacerrada, and give battle to the Queen's forces the instant they crossed the Ebro. In such case they would have mustered 15,000 men, and I doubt if Sarsfield would have attempted the invasion. This project was, however, speedily abandoned; the Biscayans and Guipuscoans did not like to leave their provinces; the Alavese did not wish them to come, because they would have to feed them; so the Alavese with a few Navarrese, remained alone to meet the squall.

The revolt had now lasted forty days; the faction were complete masters of the provinces except the two fortresses of San Sebastian and Pamplona; Sarsfield remained inactive at Burgos,

and nothing denotes more clearly the low state of the Spanish army, than the difficulty experienced in gathering this small corps d'armée. I have heard it asserted, by competent persons, that General Sarsfield refused to advance until he could muster 10,000 men, and if such was the fact, it shews his judgment was correct. However, the people in Madrid murmured at his unaccountable delay; the complaints of the liberal party in Bilbao became daily more pressing; and finally, Sarsfield's officers made a representation to the government, declaring their willingness to march. Orders were then sent for Sarsfield to move, which he did on the 15th of November; his left division, commanded by the Count Armildez de Toledo, fell down upon the Merindades, by Villarcayo, and, at his approach, the peasant levies of the junta of Castille every where dispersed. Colonel the Baron Solar de Espinosa, with the regiment of Chinchilla, surprised and routed the Carlist clerical brigadier Echeverria, taking him prisoner. After this Arroyo, Cuevillas, Castor, and all the Carlist guerillas abandoned the Merindades and fell back into Biscay. The Count Armildez, uniting all his division, crossed the Ebro at PuenteIarrá, and joined General Sarsfield, who, having descended from Castille by the Rioja road, crossed the Ebro near Logroño; then, directing his march by Peñacerrada, he totally defeated the Alavese, who lost above 600 killed and wounded, one-half of whom were *Vitorianos*, a dreadful

blow for the Carlist faction in that town, from which it never recovered.

The news of the defeat of the Alavese, and the entry into Vitoria of the queen's forces, threw the Biscayan Carlists into consternation. The bulk of their troops were stationed near Llodio, where the roads to Orduña and Vitoria meet; they, however, felt no great confidence in their military preparations, and prepared to be off: the friars were packing up, the diputacion was packing up, the principal Carlist families were packing up. The corregidor Mota, and the deputy Uhagon, who had been dragged from their concealment, and imprisoned, were now sent off, together with nearly one hundred other political prisoners, all ironed, to Guernica. The constitutionalists began to breathe more freely; notwithstanding, on the 23rd of November, a furious decree was published, signed by Epalza the escribano, denouncing deadly vengeance against the "*negros*," who were "infamous" enough to shew signs of joy, and who did not instantly pay their contributions; and declaring that the "virtuous defenders of the altar and throne," could in a moment severely punish or even exterminate the "*negros*."

On Sunday the 24th, most of the Carlists went off, and the remainder on the following day, leaving only one of the corporation, the Alcalde Ibarreta, to receive the conqueror. During the nights of the 23rd and 24th, all the friars of San Francisco disappeared; there was something ex-

cessively ludicrous in hearing these holy men "vexing the drowsy ear of night" as they fled, galloping over the chain bridge.

On the 24th, Sarsfield left Vitoria at the head of about 4,500 men, marching upon Durango by the Ochandiano road, thus leaving the Carlist forces on his left. He encountered no opposition at Durango; on the contrary, the peasantry were fast returning home, and numbers of them brought in their musquets at Durango, and gave them up. When the Alcalde asked him, what am I to do, General, with these musquets? "Take care of them," he replied. "But I have no force to guard them,—pray leave a battalion as garrison for the town?" "No," replied Sarsfield, "not a company." The arms were left without a guard. Next morning Sarsfield marched upon Bilbao, and the Carlist force, breaking up from Areta, marched part to the valley of Arratia, and part by Sornoza to Guernica, not forgetting to gather the arms at Durango.

Whether General Sarsfield was right in taking the Ochandiano road, instead of that by Attubi and Orozco, may admit of a doubt, because, had he thrown 1,500 men into the valley of Orduña by Amurrio, and with his remaining force of 3,000 moved on Areta, he could not have compelled the Carlists to fight unless they chose, for they had an easy line of retreat by Galdacano or through Bilbao upon the coast: nor is the queen's general to be blamed for not leaving a garrison at

Durango; he was right not to separate his small force; yet then what prevented his destroying the arms if he could not find means of conveyance? But his vital error was not marching upon Guernica instead of Bilbao. Had this been done, in all probability many of the Carlist leaders would have been caught, and their troops farther dispersed; for it is to be observed, the queen's generals, so far from finding a hostile population flying at their approach, found every thing the reverse. There was no want of intelligence; on the contrary, he knew, that is, he was informed, of all the enemy's movements. The Carlist leaders, with that admirable tact which they always have manifested, seemed to have gauged the calibre of Sarsfield's abilities, and knew that he would go straight to Bilbao; *therefore* they coolly ordered their troops to rendezvous at Guernica. It may be that the Carlists had a friend upon the general's staff, as they have usually had the luck to have: or it may be that Sarsfield was something of a Carlist himself; but I rather am inclined to think that he was a mere soldier by trade, who never gave himself the trouble to think of the difference between leading an army to suppress an insurrection, and commanding a similar force against a foreign foe. His orders probably told him to occupy Bilbao, and he did so, but the general who aspires to conquer provinces must be capable of something more than barely obeying orders.

However, the fault was committed, and General Sarsfield, with his division, entered Bilbao about one in the afternoon, having done the twenty miles from Durango in six hours amidst a heavy rain, which did not, however, damp the joy of the inhabitants; in fact, no troops could meet with a better reception; the good effects of which were long after felt, for it fixed the attachment of the army; since soldiers, who see things only in the gross, finding themselves well received every where, became firm in their belief that they were on the right, and also on the strongest side. As for a campaign or so, against the faction, they rather wished it than otherwise; and as many months wore away before they sustained any reverses worth speaking of, the army became compromised, and it was a long time ere the soldiers, despite the miserable incapacity of their generals, who were constantly sacrificing them, could be induced to desert, or even, when prisoners, to enlist under the banners of the pretender.

When it was known, for a certainty, that Sarsfield was on his march, the French consul sent his secretary after the Carlist diputacion, to endeavour to obtain the release of the corregidor and Uhagon. Whether the chiefs of the faction were apprehensive of their being murdered by their followers, or whether they thought nothing was to be got by keeping them, certain it is, that they set them at liberty, and on the 27th the cor-

regidor got safe on board the French schooner *Hirondelle*, from whence he came up the river, and made his entry into the town, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants.

On the very day of the arrival of the army of General Sarsfield, a new municipality was chosen — of course among the constitutionalists. Don Mariano de Eguia, one of the richest proprietors in the province, became diputado, instead of Fernando Zavala, the former colleague of Uhagon. The new municipality were quickly installed, and things looked quite flattering. Sarsfield published an *indulto*, which every general afterwards for two years regularly imitated; a most foolish idle ceremony, which never did the queen's cause the least good, but, on the contrary, was equally as injurious as so many defeats.

The first step taken by the new municipality was a call upon the liberal party to take up arms, which was so eagerly responded to, that in the three days, above eight hundred enrolled themselves, all smarting under the long series of insults and oppressions, which the Carlists had for ten years heaped upon them. These became in after-times the Bilbao national guard, at once the glory and safeguard of their beautiful town. Nearly three hundred of the nationals were old soldiers, who had made the campaign of 1823, and had marched to Coruña, where, after sustaining a siege against the French general Bourke, they had capi-

tulated upon the most honourable conditions, which, it is needless to say, were never fulfilled. Happy, were those, who, distrusting the tender mercies of their countrymen, refused to return to Biscay, but embarked for Great Britain, or else went to Portugal. So perfectly fanatical were the Basque populace against the constitutionalists, that imprisonment was almost looked upon as good fortune, since those met in the streets were always insulted, and often murdered.*

* Let the following tragedy serve as an instance. Amongst those who capitulated at Coruña, was a shoemaker by trade, one Valentine Muñosuri, who trusting in the word of the French general, returned to Bilbao, his native town, and resumed his trade. The Carlists or royalists passing by his stall, continually insulted him, which the poor man endured quietly, well knowing the penalty of resistance. But one day an armed royalist, not content with insulting him most grossly, beat him severely with the butt of his musquet, and even drew his bayonet on him; whereupon the man, losing all patience, seized his knife, closed with his assailant, and quick as light plunged it twice or thrice into his belly. His antagonist fell dead; Muñosuri knew that his fate was sealed, and so fled, and took refuge with the French corps de garde. The town was speedily in an uproar—the populace assembled—demanded the man should be given up. The municipality was obliged to ask it, the French officer finally agreed to conduct him to prison: on the way the wretched victim was stoned, beaten, stabbed by females, who penetrated between the ranks, until he fell from loss of blood. They then rushed upon the maimed carcass, and tore it limb from limb; next making a fire in the old square, they cast upon it the fragments of what was once a human being, danced round the flames, and were not ashamed to commit other horrors, which cannot be mentioned. Nor is this

all—this tragedy was performed by the priesthood and their Carlist disciples in 1823. In 1835, twelve years afterwards, the perpetrators thereof actually had the matchless impudence to publish in the French papers the entire account, merely changing the date, and substituting an “unfortunate Carlist” for the poor shoemaker. Nor was this lie without its effect; for it was translated into the English newspapers, and sundry pieces of pathetic eloquence wasted on the occasion. Who can venture to compete in lying with the Carlists? when even their own crimes, almost too atrocious for belief, they fasten upon their opponents!

In the *Sentinelle des Pyrenees*, and in *Galignani* of June 1835, (I forget the date, but think it about the 20th,) was published the whole story—styled it a “Christino atrocity.” D. Francisco de Gaminde, one of the most respectable inhabitants of Bilbao, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Sentinelle*, exclaiming against this monstrous falsehood, and putting the saddle on the right horse. The “worthy editor” acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Gaminde’s letter thus: “On vient d’écrire de Bilbao que l’assassinat d’un habitant Carliste par les Urbanos de cette ville dont nous avons fait mention dans notre numero de — est denué de fondement.” No better authority than Mr. Gaminde could be desired, for he was a witness of the murder of Muñosuri.

It is part and parcel of the Carlist tactics, whenever they wish to slaughter a few score prisoners or nationals, to circulate, a short time previously amongst their followers, and in their journals, both French and English, some lie like the foregoing, in the hope that they will diminish the public odium naturally consequent on their massacre of defenceless prisoners, by causing it to be by many considered as mere retaliation. I see that they adopted the same plan at Bilbao, during Eguia’s siege, circulating a report that the nationals had slain a bearer of a flag of truce. This was, as a justification, got up before hand, wherewith their friends could apologise for or extenuate their conduct, when it should be known that they had massacred all the nationals: they counted, of course, upon taking the town, indeed, they entertained not the least doubt of it.

CHAPTER II.

Sarsfield leaves Bilbao, after naming the Count Armildez de Toledo as Commandant-general of Biscay. — Arrival of General Valdez to take the Command of the Northern Army. — Affair at Guernica. — Brigadier Yriarte enters Bilbao. — The Count Armildez named to the Viceroyalty of Navarre: General Espartero his Successor in Biscay. — Activity of Valdez—is succeeded by Quesada. — Zumalacareguy takes the Command of the Basque Forces. — Attempt upon Vitoria, and Failure. — Massacre at Heredia. — Corps of Cazadores de Isabel raised in Bilbao. — Activity of the Carlist Partizans. — Reverses of the Christinos in Alva and Navarre. — Imbecile Conduct of the Queen's General. — D. Carlos arrives in Spain.

It is very far from my intention to write a history of the war; but the narration of occurrences in Biscay, will compel me to make brief mention of events in the other provinces.

Having restored the constitutional party to the chief authority in Bilbao, General Sarsfield marched from that city with about 3500 men, leaving one battalion of the guards, and the provincial regiment of Chinchilla in garrison, and the Count Armildez de Toledo as military commandant-general; no alteration whatever was made in the local government of the province, nor were

the fueros, or privileges, in the slightest degree infringed. The diputacion were actively employed in arming and equipping the Urbanos, which they were soon able to effect, with the arms brought in by the Carlists; some of whom, not liking a winter campaign, returned to the town and took the oath of allegiance. Proceeding to the election of their officers, the Urbanos chose for their colonel-commandant D. Juan Antonio de Arana, the same gentleman who had commanded the Bilbao nationals in 1823, and who brought forth the old standard, which he had secured after the capitulation of Coruña. The next step adopted by the diputacion was to raise a free corps, under the denomination of Cazadores de Isabel II., the command of which was given to a most excellent officer, Don Bernardo Echaluze. The pay of the soldiers of this battalion was high, being six reals, or about sixteen-pence, daily; and in addition, they were equipped and clothed at the expense of the diputacion, and received a ration daily, of bread and wine. A good many French Basques and Catalans joined this force, which soon mustered 500 strong, and was afterwards much increased. It will frequently be my duty to record the zealous and gallant actions of this corps.

The unopposed march of Sarsfield, and his entrance into Bilbao, struck dismay amongst the Carlists; their battalions dispersed in all directions, crying out that they had been deceived!

They had been told that all Cataluña and Aragon had declared for Charles, and that no troops would ever come to Biscay, &c. Their leaders did not attempt to thwart the wishes of their followers; those that chose to go home, went; but about 500 of the Bilbao men, and some hundreds of the other battalions, accompanied the Carlist diputacion, and formed a sort of nucleus of an army. The queen's generals on this occasion, as ever after, played their opponents' game. Instead of eagerly following the faction, seizing hostages from the towns and villages, and negotiating with the Carlist leaders and influential men of their party, General Sarsfield published an *indulto* for fifteen days, and then went to sleep. To prove what value they set upon the "*indulto*," the Carlist diputacion arrested six Bilbao gentlemen, who, with regular passports, were coming from France, overland. Although they were all engaged in trade, and had not been in Spain since the rising, they were imprisoned, threatened several times to be shot, and only released at last, by paying a heavy ransom. Of course, had the Christinos acted with common sense or common energy, they would instantly have arrested half-a-dozen of the leading Carlists in Bilbao or its vicinity, and treated them exactly as the faction behaved to Lapeira and his associates. Nothing of the kind was attempted, and hence the Carlists took the initiative, and behaved to their opponents ever after with a sort of scornful arro-

gance, which contrasted oddly with their then condition.

Nor was it long before they gave the queen's followers a dreadful example of the ferocity with which they meant to carry on the contest. Don Antonio de Muroaga, a gentleman of respectability in Bilbao, had been arrested and imprisoned by the Carlists, in consequence of a bill, drawn upon him, being found upon the person of one of those arrested for Mier, the bookseller's plot, in 1830. The proceedings against Muroaga were carried on by the fiscal Epalza, with great acrimony; because the political opinions of the accused were not Carlist, it was supposed that he was connected with Mina, and that this bill proved him to be acting as a pecuniary agent. This reasoning was of course unanswerable before the Carlist tribunal at Bilbao; and the corregidor, Sanahuja, agreeably to the demand of the fiscal, declared Muroaga guilty of high treason, and sentenced him to death. The appeal court at Valladolid quashed the finding and the sentence, but the Carlists did not let people, once in their clutches, escape so easily; they again proceeded against him, the appeal was taken to Madrid, and, in all probability, the influence of the faction would have triumphed, had not the events of the Granja transpired. One of the first acts of the new corregidor Mota, on arriving at Bilbao, was to release Muroaga. Broken in health and fortune, the unfortunate gentleman went to

Madrid, where he resided at the time of the king's decease. Upon Bilbao being occupied by the queen's troops, the new diputacion offered Muroaga the treasurership of the province; this choice being confirmed by the crown, he left Madrid to take possession of his employment. Reaching Vitoria in safety, he was recommended not to proceed to Bilbao without an escort; but, disregarding this advice, he set out on his journey accompanied only by one person, when, near Barambio, he was arrested, sent to Guernica, kept some time in prison, and then led out and shot, "in pursuance of his sentence," as the Carlist junta termed it, in derision. Great was the clamour amongst the Bilbao liberals, on hearing of this barbarous murder; but, instead of inflicting an immediate and inexorable retaliation, nothing was done until some time afterwards, when reprisals appeared more like an act of ferocity on their part, than of strict justice. Events succeed each other so rapidly in civil wars, that, for acts of retributive justice to have their due effect on the public mind, it is imperative that they should tread close upon the offences which they avenge. When such is not the case, the public is apt to consider rigorous justice—very great cruelty.

Some of the principal Carlist families were now banished from the town; a proceeding which I am inclined to think was impolitic. The Carlists knew better than to allow those suspected of con-

stitutional feelings to escape out of their hands; *they* were carefully kept, to serve as hostages, and to pay double contributions,—to suffer the insults of the peasantry, &c.

About a fortnight after the departure of Sarsfield, the Baron Solar de Espinosa marched, with a small column, to scour the country. He first went to the valley of Orosco, and then to Durango; where, hearing that the insurgents were in force at Guernica, he marched to attack them. Apprised of his approach, the Carlist leaders prepared to evacuate the place; but, on the representation of Simon Torre, an *ex garde de corps*, who had been with them some time, they resolved to oppose the entry of the Christinos. The column of the Baron Solar advanced, without resistance, to the main street, when the queen's troops were suddenly assailed by a heavy fire from the houses, and thrown into confusion. Their commander seems to have been the first to fly, for he made off with a handful of men, and reached Bilbao quite panic-stricken. To the enquiries of the Count Armildez, he could only reply that "he did not know what had become of his brigade." Great confusion ensued in the town on this disaster; fortunately, the Brigadier D. Fermin Iriarte, with a small column, was not far off; and, after receiving a small reinforcement from Bilbao, proceeded to Guernica, picking up a good many stragglers on his way. On reaching that town, he found Colonel

Villalonga, of the guards, in possession of a convent outside, on the Bermeo road, into which it appeared he had thrown himself, with the best part of his battalion, and had defended himself vigorously, although without provisions. The Carlists did not oppose the march of Iriarte, who, in company with Villalonga, returned to Bilbao. This affair greatly raised the spirits of the Carlists: it was a decided check for the Christinos, who lost full 300 men, while the Carlists did not lose 100. At Madrid, the affair was magnified into a victory; and the Baron Solar, who, had he been a soldier of Napoleon, would most likely have been broke, if not shot, was made a brigadier-general,—a bad omen for the queen's cause.

General D. Geronimo Valdez, who had gained a deservedly high reputation in Peru, now replaced Sarsfield in the command of the northern army. He brought with him some new general officers, amongst whom were Bedoya, Osma, Benedicto, and Espartero. The first three very soon lost what reputation they ever had; the last has been more successful, and has raised himself from a brigadier-general, in three years, to be commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies. The predominant failing in General Espartero's character is indecision,—but he is capable of acting with startling energy on occasions. He belongs to the American party, is popular, and liked by the troops; and is decidedly a zealous and faithful adherent of the

queen, although his conduct has sometimes been rather prejudicial to her cause. At this period, he was chosen to succeed the Count Armildez in the government of Biscay, and the division assigned to him was increased to 3500 men, exclusive of the fine provincial regiment of Compostela, which was left to garrison Bilbao. Brigadier D. Miguel de Arechavala was named governor of the town, and forthwith set about fortifying it; not, however, as the localities would appear to indicate, by building strong block-houses on the heights commanding the town, but by constructing a sort of garden wall, furnished with loop-holes, and blocking up the street entrances. General Valdez manifested much activity in pursuing the Carlists, and, as he combined his plans well, met with considerable success; moreover, the leaders of the enemy were at variance with each other, and offered but little opposition. Espartero, also, scoured the country to the east of the Nervion, whilst Iriarte and Quintana did the same in the *encartaciones*, where the Carlist chief, Castor Andachaga, found them both plenty of employment. A few prisoners were occasionally brought in, and as their number kept increasing, about eighty were sent to Santander, whence, it was reported, many escaped.

As the spring advanced, numbers of the Bilbao Carlists, who had taken the benefit of the indulto, now returned to the faction. A party of these

were made prisoners by the Spanish gun-boats, at a place called Baquio, near Cape Machichaco. Brought round to Bilbao, they were tried by a court-martial, their persons identified, and sentenced to death. Six of them were executed.

The late commandant-general of Biscay, the Count Armildez de Toledo, was appointed to the viceroyalty, *ad interim*, of Navarre, and he accordingly took up his residence in Pamplona, where, exclusive of the garrison, a small division was placed under his orders. The queen's generals continued placing garrisons in many of the small towns, such as Durango, Balmaceda, Ochandiano, and Bermeo, in Biscay; Vergara, Tolosa, and Villafranca, in Guipuscoa; also at Salvatierra, Treviño, and other places in Alava. For the present, these garrisons had the good effect of inducing hundreds of the respectable classes of the townspeople to enrol themselves as national guards. The little towns of Eybar and Plencia, of their own accord, took up arms for the queen, shut their gates, and, though destitute of any regular garrison, set the Carlists at defiance. Indeed, the Eybarese cast some small cannon; and, when attacked by the Biscay faction, under Zavala, made a stout defence, and beat him completely with no trivial loss. The correspondence which, on this occasion, took place between the Biscay chief and the men of Eybar, affords a

curious sample of provincial hatred and animosity.

Either Valdez did not do enough to please the Madrid government, or what is more probable, he did too much, so that both Republicans and Christinos began to fear the war would end *too soon*. He was therefore replaced, and Quesada, whose reputation, from his pacification of Old Castille, stood very high, was appointed his successor, with more extensive powers than Valdez had enjoyed. The rest of Spain being tranquil, considerable reinforcements of troops and military stores were sent to the northern army, which probably now exceeded 30,000 effectives, of whom nearly one-half were employed in garrisons.

It has been asserted by Captain Hennigsen, that the Spanish armies under Quesada, Rodil, and Valdez, were composed of "veterans of the old constitutional armies." Never was there a more erroneous remark. The Spanish constitutional forces were disbanded in 1823-4; the army remodeled; and very few even of the old officers remained. Besides, as the Spanish soldier's period of service is seven years, it follows that none of those recruited in 1824 or 1825 could have been in the ranks in 1833, much less those of 1822, even supposing that they had not been for the most part disbanded, which they were. A few of the old serjeants and corporals had probably

served in the time of the Constitution, but the ranks were chiefly filled with men of the conscription of 1828 and 1830, who certainly had seen no more service, nor were better entitled to be called "veterans" than the Biscayan or Navarrese tercios : nor indeed so much, for numbers, probably one-fourth, of the Carlists now in arms, had served in the war of the Constitution. The regular army was certainly superior in discipline and organization to the battalions of the Carlists ; but, then, the provincial militia regiments were decidedly inferior to their opponents, and had the additional disadvantage of many of their officers being favourable to the pretender. The two parties therefore were not unevenly matched, although, having the population of the country which was the theatre of war wholly on their side, the Carlists had a decided advantage.

But the disjointed and unconnected operations of the Carlists were now to be exchanged for unity of design, and a steady system. All the elements of a long resistance were at hand : an enthusiastic and hard-working peasantry ; thousands of willing soldiers, capable of any fatigue ; an excellent civil administration, which would extract the last bushel of corn from the country, rather than let the army want. There was only needed a firm hand to seize the reins, control local jealousies, and direct aright the energies of

the provinces. That man was at hand—he was Thomas Zumalacarreguy.

Practised in the warfare of the provinces, knowing well his countrymen, not without ambition, Zumalacarreguy, almost the instant he took the command, scanned the chequered array of the Christinos, determined to strike an early blow, which could secure him an ascendancy over the crowd of chiefs who were already in arms for Charles. Where the wings were so spread, it was not a difficult matter to clip them. Descending into Alava, he burst into Vitoria, where, however, he met with a severe repulse. Turning instantly to the north-west, he enveloped a body of Christinos at Heredia, who, after a courageous resistance, surrendered, and the prisoners, to the number of 160, were all massacred. There is no doubt that Zumalacarreguy slew these unfortunate men from motives of policy—to strike terror into his opponents, and to save his own party; for in the days of revolution and civil war, the most sanguinary characters are treated with the most respect and deference.

All the benefits the Carlist general hoped for, from this pitiless massacre, were attained. The queenites were intimidated; and, instead of five-fold retaliation upon the persons of the Carlists who were in their power, they submitted quietly; nay, some of their officers had the inconceivable

baseness to attempt to exculpate Zumalacarreguy, by stating that these gallant victims were slaughtered because they were "peseteros;" that is to say, were not of the regular army, but belonged to the free-corps. Henceforth, despite the gasconading proclamations of the queen's generals, full of high-sounding threats which they never dared inflict, the Carlists gained a moral superiority over their antagonists, which they never lost.

The activity and enterprise of Zumalacarreguy increased daily; he attacked and routed Quesada's rear guard, near Alsasua, in the Borunda. This long valley, which lies between the Sierra de Arala and the Sierra Andia, extending within two leagues of Pamplona to Salvatierra, was a favourite theatre of his exploits. He seldom came into Biscay. Apparently convinced of the inefficacy of Espartero's operations, he let him amuse himself by running after the Biscay battalions, who were accustomed to lead him a dance all round the province; and when his men were totally fatigued with four or five days' marches, they would make a stand upon some hill-side, right in his road; then after disputing the ground for half an hour or an hour, and causing the loss of some 50 or 100 men, they would run off, leaving the *victorious* general to write such bulletins as probably were never equalled. In one of Espartero's despatches, the enemy had suffered such a loss, that the "*rivulets*

flowed with blood;" on another occasion, he had *"exterminated the faction;"* on another, *"he had driven them into the sea."* In short, no greater satire upon a general could be written than the mere publication of the official bulletins of this singularly strange and wavering character.

Early in April, Castor Andachaga attacked Portagalete, and made himself master of some houses contiguous to the gate; but the small garrison, though not exceeding 100 men, defended themselves right valiantly, and Castor had to retire with loss. Nor was this all, for Espartero's column happening to arrive in the afternoon, he went straight on to Burseña, where there is a chain bridge. A party of lancers charging across, supported by the excellent regiment of Gerona, drove a battalion of Carlists out of the village, up the hill, and right over to the Galindo river, leaving the road open to Portagalete, where the division arrived in two hours and a half after leaving Bilbao, the distance being eight or nine miles! Castor retreated in confusion to Somorrostro. The affair at Burseña cost him 18 killed, and, perhaps 50 wounded. Espartero, in his despatch, describes the field as *cubierto de cadaveres* (covered with carcasses). There were plenty of spectators, the writer among the number; and yet nobody could find above 18 dead bodies!

Considerable sensation was excited now in Bilbao, by a report in circulation, that the queen's

general, commanding in Vitoria, was actively engaged, in company with some merchants in Bilbao, in speculating in the Spanish funds; and that many expresses, which came hurrying in from Madrid, appearing to the vulgar to be the bearers of the most urgent and important despatches, "big with the fate of Spain and Isabel," were in reality simply the bearers of the latest price of the *vales non consolidados*, or the *dcuda sin interes*. To match the warrior stock-jobbers, some of the Bilbao speculators contrived to have relays of *paciegos* on the road from Madrid, by which plan, at the cost of about 20*l.* per week, they obtained intelligence as early as their gallant competitors, although, to be sure, not quite so cheaply.

In one of General Espartero's expeditions, he made prisoner a Carlist officer, named Armencha, in rank a brigadier; this unfortunate man was sentenced to be shot, and he was accordingly executed in the Campo Volantin. Alluding to the execution of this gentleman, Captain Hennigsen says in his work, on the authority of a French emigrant, "that when on his way to the grave, he was insulted by the ladies of Bilbao." Never was there a more unfounded calumny uttered. Never was the slightest insult offered, by male or female, to any person in the wretched situation of Brigadier Armencha; on the contrary, I have frequently witnessed ladies of the

first families in the province, whose fathers, brothers, husbands, were Urbanos, in tears, when an execution was to take place: and as the females of the lower order were all zealous Carlists, Brigadier Armencha was not likely to be insulted by them; no person would have been suffered to insult an unfortunate being in his path to the scaffold, as was the custom during the regime of the defenders of priestcraft and despotism. Having been a spectator, I can assert that the real facts of the case were the following. A young woman, in decent attire, came forward near the *Estufa**, and said, "I must speak to him first." Armencha turned round and said, "*No tengas cuidado, he arreglado todo,*" (Do not be uneasy, I have arranged it all);—something else passed, which I could not distinctly hear; however, the young woman made no mystery, but told several persons then and there, that she had borne a child to the Carlist general, and had come that morning from Lequeitio to enquire of him what provision he had made for the infant. Finding that the answer of the then living, now deceased gentleman, was satisfactory, she appeared perfectly resigned, and soon afterwards took her departure. By the way, it may not be irrelevant to mention, that the dying man, turning towards the Convent of San Francisco,

* A building so called in the Campo Volantin, near the place of execution.

said, "I am one of the victims of those who dwell there, and thousands more will follow me, for that crew (*esa casta*) are for ever plotting the misery and woe of unhappy Spain;" which words are truth itself.

In order to afford some protection to the gallant Eybarese, who had in vain solicited a garrison from Espartero, (who refused it, upon the plea that the town was untenable, and altogether ineligible as a military position, which was true, in a professional sense, but when the people are bent on defending a place, it is no easy matter to take it, be the town tenable in a military point of view, or not,) the Biscay diputacion determined to send Colonel Echaluze, the commandant of their free corps, to Eybar, with 300 men; this was of essential service, and this little town, for a year afterwards, proved a sad thorn to the Carlists. But an event now happened which changed the fortunes of the war. D. Carlos arrived in the provinces. At first the Christinos would not believe it: "How can it be possible?" they cried; "only a few weeks since he was a prisoner in Portugal! How came he to escape from England? — to travel all France unknown to the police?" Nor were there wanting others, who affirmed it was all done with the connivance of the English and French governments, to embroil Spain, perpetuate the civil war, &c. Meanwhile the chief comedian at Madrid cast about him to see what worn-out

French phrase would serve his turn. He chose that which Louis XVIII. and the Giraffe had already made illustrious. "*Messieurs, il n'y a qu'une bête de plus.*" "*Senores, hay un facioso mas.*" The joke was applauded among the Proceres and Procuradores; but strange to say, had no effect upon the fortunes of Don Carlos.

I have before observed, that when Zumalacarréguy, at the beginning of his career, slew the 160 prisoners at Heredia, he calculated on inspiring a deep feeling of awe, both in his own followers, and his opponents; for he well knew that hitherto there had been much insubordination among the Carlists, and in more than one instance the peasantry had refused to serve, unless the king came. The wary leader, not anxious for unpopularity, did not wish to make examples among his own men, but by the dreadful example at Heredia, he gave them clearly to understand, it was no trifle that he would hesitate at. The effect desired was obtained, and in their leader's presence, at least, no murmurs for the king's arrival were heard. Still, however, the Basque chieftain well knew that all his countrymen were anxiously expecting to see their king, and their anxiety had much increased, since the return of Cuevillas, who, with about sixty horse, had coolly traversed all Spain, from Orduña to Portugal, had visited Charles at Chamusca, and, unable to prevail upon the prince to accompany

him, had returned in safety, though rather dissatisfied, to Biscay. In all probability it was the earnest representations of Zumalacarreguy that finally determined the infante to come to Spain. He arrived, and the joy of the Basques, for a short time, knew no bounds. His general introduced him to a young army, already proud of its deeds, and which was daily gaining confidence and experience: on the other hand, the Christinos were not at all discouraged; their losses, in a numerical point of view, had not exceeded those of their opponents, for if Quesada was unlucky, he fought hard; and General Lorenzo, had given the Navarrese some bloody defeats: besides Rodil was on his march with a gallant army of ten or twelve thousand men, flushed with their easy triumph in Portugal. Thus the coming of the infante to the theatre of war, served but to deepen the horrors of this terrible drama.

CHAPTER III.

General Rodil succeeds to the supreme command of Navarre, and the Basque provinces; he presses vigorously the Pretender—tactics of the Carlist chieftains.—Capture of the Carlist Commandant of Biscay, and several Officers, by the Spanish Frigate *Perla*.—Ezpartero continues his operations in Biscay.—Reverses of the Queen's forces.—Rodil resigns; is succeeded by Mina.—Decree of the government, deciding the right of presentation to various livings to belong to the diputacion.—Mina defeats the Navarrese.—Winter campaign.—Carlists appear before Bilbao, and burn the Mills.—Brigadier Iriarte replaces Ezpartero in the command of the province.—Mina, from ill health, resigns the command of the Northern Army, and is succeeded by Valdez, now minister of war.—The Carlists reduce several of the small garrisons in Navarre.—The Eliot treaty.—Iriarte totally defeated at Guernica.—Valdez beaten in the Amescuas.—Ezpartero attempts to relieve Villafranca, and is routed.—Abandonment and fall of the small garrisons in the provinces.

IN America, General Rodil had earned a high character for inflexible obstinacy, and cruelty; and as he was considered, in Spain, to be something of a tactician, great hopes were entertained of his success. He brought with him large reinforcements, so that he was able to give further extension to the plan arranged by the war de-

partment in Madrid,—to garrison all the towns of any consideration, and these to be supported by movable columns. At first sight, the plan appears very feasible; but, on close inspection, serious difficulties present themselves. What becomes of this multitude of small garrisons when the protecting columns are beaten? The problem was soon solved, to the disadvantage of the queen's cause. What was the benefit to be derived from placing garrisons in all the small towns? With few exceptions, the towns in the Basque provinces are bad military positions, being mostly seated in the valleys. Nor were they of any advantage in preventing the young men joining the faction, for, even from Pamplona, hundreds had gone forth to share the fortunes of Charles. Much more easy was it to escape from these small unwall'd towns.

The great soldier of modern times has said, that in a war of insurrection one cannot go to all places,—*the principal* ones only must be attended to. Had this admirable common sense opinion governed the councils of the queen's generals, what thousands of lives, what ignominious defeats would have been spared them! They could not, or would not see that every garrison they established was a heavy link of the chain which bound them, and the weaker the garrison the more imperatively it called for frequent succour. The Basque provinces being composed of branches

of the Pyrenees, intersected with deep valleys, offer in various places, such as at Irurzun, Lecumberri, Arlaban, Elgueta, Amurrio, the mountain between Sornoza and Guernica, certain commanding military positions, where the mountains form knots, which serve as the keys to so many valleys. By tradition or instinct, the Basque peasantry know the value of these positions, and always make them their places of rendezvous or resistance. They are, as it were, the handle of the sticks of the fan, offering a short and easy point whereon to assemble the armed peasantry of the valleys, and, in the event of defeat, a happily chosen point of dispersion. Look at Elgueta, with one descent to the valley of Durango, another to that of Vergara, a third to that of Marquina, and a fourth road over the mountain tops to Mondragon; so that troops dispersing from hence, in two hours could make a march which would cost their opponents a day to equal. In short, it appears evident, that if, instead of placing small garrisons in every town, commanded in many instances by officers of doubtful fidelity, the queen's generals had established regular military camps, entrenched on the knots of the mountains commanding the entrance of many valleys, each camp consisting of 3000 men at least, the tactics of the Carlists would have been, in a great measure, frustrated. Of course it would be necessary that the soldiery be well commanded, in order that they

might derive all the benefit from their situation. Huts might have been built for the soldiers, and the inhabitants of the valleys would not refuse rations when they saw an avalanche constantly hanging over their heads; for the access being easy to so many valleys, if they attempted to blockade the camp, all their young men must have been recalled from the faction. But nothing of this was done: the officers of the army, anxious to live in as good quarters as they could get, were reluctant to leave the snug little towns of Biscay and Guipuscoa, and thus the queen of Spain's generals frittered away 7000 or 8000 men in petty garrisons of 200, 300, and 400 men. The folly of this plan was soon perceived by Zumalacarreguy, and these small detachments were blockaded by single companies. In this manner, Ochandiano has a garrison of 300 men,—it is blockaded by thirty. No provisions are allowed to enter unless protected by a large force. The garrison cannot spare above 100 men to make a sortie, and this the besiegers well know, consequently, if the troops march out, they are skirmished with incessantly; obliged to keep together, not knowing the number of their assailants, the regulars usually lose two and perhaps three for one, and when the casualties amount to twenty, their leader generally retreats, having taken little by his motion. The Carlists celebrate their victory by screeching and various antics; all this has the effect of disheartening the queenites, until at last they will not stir forth on any account, and

thus the garrisons become a dead weight upon the attentions of the commander-in-chief instead of an assistance.

Zumalacarreguy had made war against the French, and was perfectly acquainted with the system of harassing his enemy. Well aware that the numerous small garrisons, always annoyed, and often closely blockaded by the Carlists, would incessantly claim the protection of the columns, he quickly formed his plans, which were strictly based upon the well-known and thoroughly Spanish system of bull-fights. The reader may smile, but such is the case. Rodil's column was the *toro*, or bull—the infante D. Carlos, with a small but trusty band, were the *bandaleros* to *torear* the bull, or take off his attention; while the detachments, sent by Zumalacarreguy to operate upon the rear and flanks of the columns, were the *picadores*. Ridiculous as this may seem, it is matter of history that the Carlist chief, much to his master's displeasure, made him his stalking-horse, to entice the queen's columns into a sort of wild-goose chase, while he waylaid their scattered brigades, cut off the convoys, and so worried the garrisons and the army, that Rodil, after losing (more by the fault of his lieutenants* than his own) above 5000 men in as many months, was fain to relinquish the strug-

* As for example—General Carondelet surprised and defeated with a heavy loss at the Carrascal, and again at Viana under discreditable circumstances—at least such was stated at the time.

gle and the command. The date of his resignation was marked by the most disastrous defeat which the queen's arms had yet sustained, that of General O'Doyle at Alegria en Alava; and General Osma, whose want of prudence had been the main cause of O'Doyle's defeat, was himself totally beaten, and in a more disgraceful manner, on the following day.

There is very little doubt that, ever since the war broke out, the Carlist party have always had powerful friends in Madrid, who have constantly contrived to place upon the staff of all the generals in command, some one of their party to give intelligence. Were such not the case, how can the following circumstance be accounted for, and many others might be cited.

General Osma formed a plan to surprise the junta of Alava agreeably to advices he received. With this intention he assembled two brigades, one at Vitoria, the other at Ulibarri, and wrote to Colonel Yarto, commanding a brigade at Salvatierra, for his co-operation. Osma says that himself, with Figueras and Aguirre, two generals of brigade on his staff, wrote out the orders for the three brigades, copied and sealed them; they were not delivered till 7 P.M.; the troops were to march at 12, and to surround the village where the junta were by day-break. The troops arrived punctually, favoured by a fog, but the birds were flown; some kind christian had sent them the whole particulars, which they received at 10 P.M. With great unconcern, Verastegui read the letter

to his friends, and then went to supper, desiring that he might be called at 3 A.M., and that the videttes and outlying pickets should be on the alert. At the hour appointed, the junta, with their clerkage, arose, took chocolate, and rode off, and were quietly at breakfast at Eulate, when the enemy was rummaging the place they had left four hours before. After this strange business, all the three generals were removed; perhaps it would have been as well had such been done earlier.

The Carlist tactics, which at such length I have above explained, were carried into full effect against Espartero; they danced him and his division round and round the province; but they never could get him to divide his troops, and as only two of the Biscay garrisons were inland, he was little troubled by their claims, for the sea offered easy means of relief to the places on the coast. Thus, beyond tiring his men, nothing particular occurred for some time, until Arana, an old Spanish colonel, and now commandant of Biscay for the Carlists, being anxious to come to blows, took up a position near Elorrio, on a mountain-side, which was intersected with stone walls, forming a post of amazing strength. Here Espartero attacked him, and had the Biscayans been Kentucky riflemen, they would have destroyed his division; but they had such an excessive dislike to lose a man, that after their front line behind the parapet had delivered its fire, the troops ran off right and left, and rallied behind

the second line of walls, thence to a third, and so on. But these unsteady volleys did the queenites little harm, and Colonel Echaluze, with his cazadores, having turned their right flank, Arana's men abandoned their superb position, after sustaining a loss of above 200 men, which was equal to, if not more than that of Espartero.

A regular European army, after being completely driven from such a strong position as that of Elorrio, would lose its *morale*, the soldiery would become disheartened, and tacitly allow their antagonists to be better men. Such was not, nor is the case with the Basques; they run off in every direction, and the scattered cottages and hamlets, for miles round, are filled with their soldiery, as gay and unconcerned as if they had been victorious. Their very dispersion renders it impossible to know what loss they have sustained, and they are always ready to hope for the best. Next day they direct their steps to some village, where they are sure to learn the place of re-union. Thus, after a sharp fight, which has perhaps disabled the column from moving any farther, the Carlist Basques would be two days later, operating in the rear of the column or showing fight in front. It may also be remarked that the Navarrese or Biscayan, when they run off the field, rarely throw their musquets away; the queen's soldiers almost always do so. The reason is obvious enough. The Basque soldier sought safety in

dispersion; out of reach of the musquetry of the column he was secure, nor was it difficult to carry a fusil that distance; but the Christino soldier, when his regiment was broken, usually saw no safety except in flying to the nearest garrison town, and so, to run the faster, threw down his arms and all incumbrances to flight.

Soon after this action, Espartero returned to Bilbao, where he received information that the Carlists were expecting a large vessel, laden with arms and ammunition, from England or Holland; notice was accordingly sent to the Spanish squadron on the station, and the commodore kept on the alert. On the 17th August, the *Perla* frigate appeared off Lequeitio, and observing a signal flying on shore, which she did not understand, hoisted a white flag in reply, and, soon afterwards, the English jack. Now, by a singular coincidence, it so happened that these signals were the identical ones which had been concerted with the expected ship; and Arana, the commandant-general, the diputacion (Carlist), and sundry other persons of note, were at that time in Lequeitio, eager to get the arms, and expecting also various passengers. Accordingly, Arana and five or six other personages went off to the ship, and, of course, when alongside were arrested; Batis, the deputy, escaped by a mere chance,—he was unwell, and had been dissuaded from going, by Arana, who told him that sea-sickness would make him worse.

When the *Perla* arrived off the bar of Portugalete, she transferred the prisoners to a gun-boat, which conveyed them to Bilbao, where they were of course sent to prison; and although many efforts were made to save their lives, in which I believe the commander of H. M. B. *Leveret* joined, the order for their execution came down from Madrid, after a rather long delay, and they were all shot, in the *Campo Volentin*. Arana behaved with much firmness, but the friar shewed great want of courage. The savage massacres of *Zumalacarreguy* had exasperated even the tame government of Madrid, and instigated it to order for execution these unfortunate men, whose lives, in all probability, would otherwise have been spared.

The apologists for the Basques have frequently adduced the proclamation of *Castañon*, governor of San Sebastian, as a sufficient motive for the provinces declaring in favour of the pretender. It has been shewn, in the course of this work, that the revolt broke out in Bilbao, on the 3rd of October; that it rapidly spread through the provinces; and that, in the beginning of November, the Carlists attacked and drove the queen's troops from Tolosa; now the proclamation of *Castañon* is dated the 30th of November, wherein he only says, "that the *fueros* are *suspended*, in consequence of the provinces being declared under martial law;" but even in the *bando* of the queen's general, that part of Guipuscoa which obeys its

former diputacion, is exempt. It is useless, as well as absurd, to argue with those who can assign, as a cause for actions done on the 3rd of October, a proclamation published on the 30th of November. But let that pass: the Madrid government signified its dissatisfaction with Castañon for his proclamation, and although the ministry did not think fit to annul the same openly, they gave satisfactory assurances to the Guipuscoan diputacion, that nothing would be done in contravention of the fueros. Now it happened that, for many years, there had been a question of *Patronato* in dispute between the crown and the Biscayan diputacion. During the whole of Ferdinand's reign, the Carlist government of Biscay never could obtain a decision in their favour; and there appeared still less chance of obtaining redress at the present time (1834), when the province was in full rebellion. Nevertheless, the queen's government issued a royal order, giving up the right in favour of the diputacion, which, upon its arrival in Bilbao, immediately received the "cumplese" of the deputies, and became one of the cherished fueros.

Much was hoped from Mina, who had now taken the command of the northern army; but the *pastalero* party in Madrid, destitute alike of courage and conduct, capable only of intrigue, and striving to engross to themselves all the benefits of the revolution, distrusted, feared, and hated

Mina. Of their own will, they would never have recalled the Navarrese chief from his banishment, but the generals of their own party had been so unfortunate, that it was no longer possible to conceal the losses of the army. The nation clamoured, the *camarilla* trembled, and recalled Mina; but when giving him the command of the forces, now discouraged by defeat, they, with the mean jealousy of their class, took care to restrict his authority more than that of any of his four predecessors. Nevertheless the old warrior, though broken by sickness and infirmities, with a badly organised and dispirited army, made head against the hitherto victorious Carlists; brought victory to the standards of the queen; and, at Unzue and Asarte, gave the followers of Zumalacarre-guy the severest overthrows they had ever yet experienced.

However, all the efforts of the aged and worn-out chief were doomed to be in vain; the crowd of Carlist officers in his army, particularly in the provincial regiments, occasioned him losses which he could not avoid. Two officers of the regiment of Bujalance engaged to deliver to Zumalacarre-guy the fort of Maestu, and were only prevented by the merest accident. At Unsue and Asarte,* the veteran chief taught his *quondam* secretary that he was still his master. After fighting the enemy

* The battles of Unsue and Nazar y Asarte, were heavy blows to the Navarrese; they were supposed to have lost 3000 men, in the two actions, besides being entirely defeated.

three times in twelve days, and being each time victorious, Mina went to the Bastan. Zumalacarguy, with unwearied zeal, fell upon Echarri Aranaz, and it was soon given up: in spite of these reverses, however, Mina kept the Carlist faction at bay, during the whole winter; and, when his health would no longer permit his taking the field, he resigned the command to General Valdez, in a better condition than he had received it.

It was the custom of Espartero to march out with his column for a few days, and then to return, and stay a week or fortnight in Bilbao. Of course, this rather singular mode of carrying on the war was better adapted to prolong than to terminate a contest; however, hitherto he had escaped being beaten, which at least was something. The Carlist commander-in-chief was rather indignant at the inactivity of his lieutenants in Biscay; but the terrible scourge of the cholera was now superadded to the rage of civil war. Bilbao and its neighbourhood suffered severely from the ravages of the disease, and ere the minister of vengeance disappeared, above a twelfth of the population had been swept away.

Slowly and drearily did the winter of 1834—5 pass away; and the hopes even of the most sanguine, that the war would soon terminate, were entirely extinguished. The Carlists pushed their incursions into the Montaña, and Old Castille; and

their quick, desultory forays, laughed to scorn the lumbering movements of the Christino brigadiers. In one of these inroads, Eraso beat up the quarters of the regiment of Granada; brought the colonel, and twelve officers, to the Puente Nueva, and shot them all. After the Carlists had retired, having left their victims for dead, a peasant passing with a cart, found one of the men yet alive; him this good Samaritan lifted up, and finding some chance of saving his life, put him in the cart, covered him up with straw, and brought him safely to Bilbao. The unfortunate man was a serjeant of the regiment of Granada; two balls had pierced him; he had been wounded by a lance in his back, and by a bayonet in his side; yet, strange to say, he recovered. I regret to add, that the kind-hearted yeoman who brought the wounded man into Bilbao, was imprisoned by the Carlists for his humanity, and, as I have heard, executed. Nothing proves more conclusively the rage and inveteracy of party wars.

On the 1st January, 1835, an atrocious outrage was committed on the person of M. Mazé, captain of the French schooner of war *L'Hirondelle*. This gentleman, whose amenity of manners had made him a general favourite in the town, had dined that day with M. Laffitte, the French consul; Captain M. took his leave, at 9, p. m., and set off alone, to go on board his vessel, which was lying about two miles down the river, at Olaviaga;

when passing a place called La Cava, he was attacked and murdered, and his body left in the road. As it was well known that small parties of peasants prowled nightly around the town, Captain Mazé had often been cautioned of the danger he incurred, in thus exposing himself alone after dark; but the gallant sailor had no apprehension. Two officers of H. M. S. Saracen, Mr. Henry Rogers, and Mr. Hoblyn, happening to pass by, some time afterwards, on their way to their ship, found the lifeless body of the unfortunate Mazé, and after carrying it to the nearest house, one of the gentlemen proceeded to inform the crew of the schooner of their commander's death; the other remained with the corpse. Soon after, the boats of the *Hirondelle*, manned and armed, appeared, and carried the body of their deceased commander on board. Two days later, his remains were interred in the burying-ground of Begoña, with a magnificent public funeral, attended by all the civil, military, and naval authorities. It was never ascertained who were the murderers of the French captain, although it was generally attributed to the Carlists; indeed, not an individual of the queen's party were ever outside the gates, after dark; so that, unless Captain Mazé was killed by a deserter from his own ship, it is scarcely possible that he should have met his death from any other hands than those of the Carlists.

Espartero continued to make his *paseos* in the

province, but so seldom went out of the high-road, that the Carlists in derision nicknamed him "*el Ordinario de Durango*"—the Durango Carrier. It often happened, that when the column was out, some of the enemy's battalions would come and annoy the town; but, after a little skirmishing, usually retired. This time, however, Eraso menaced something serious, and kept his word.

About half a mile from the Durango gate are, or rather were, the beautiful and extensive flour-mills and bakehouses belonging to the town. They had not long been finished, at an expense of 20,000*l.*; and besides bringing a good income to the town, were capable of making 20,000 rations of bread daily. On the morning of the 7th of March, it was ascertained that the enemy were around the town in force, and had cut off the communication with the mills, which were defended by a detachment of 36 men, of the regiment of Oviedo, commanded by a sub-lieutenant, a lad of eighteen. A message was sent into the town, demanding a reinforcement and ammunition. Neither was forwarded, although there were 2,000 men in the town, exclusive of nationals. The poor sacrificed boy defended his post as long as his ammunition lasted, when he surrendered, and, with such of his men as were left alive, was haled forth to the top of the hill, and there butchered. The bodies, hacked and disfigured, were left to the fowls of the air. Eraso then gave orders

to burn the mills, which was done; and, after a conflagration of three days, nothing but the shell and smoking ruins remained.*

It might have been expected, that Don Miguel Arechavala, the governor, with his large disposable force, would have struck a blow for his provender; but, no, he would not move. Irritated by the sarcasms of the townspeople, he took a very mean revenge. When the firing had partly ceased, he ordered *one* company of the nationals (the light company) to go forth and engage the enemy, who was supposed to be at least 2,000 strong, while the nationals mustered only 53. Out they went, however, and before they had proceeded fifty yards, they were assailed from every wall, window, and tree. Ten of their number went down in an instant; and had not their wor-

* After the enemy retired, the ruins were examined, and a man was found alive, stowed away under the arch, below which the water passed on its way from the wheels to the river. When the place was taken, this man, throwing away his firelock, hid himself near the water-wheel, where he heard the cries of the wounded as the Carlists were despatching them. His hiding-place was not discovered, and he began to think himself secure, when the thickening smoke warned him of the building being on fire; and, to avoid being crushed by the falling timber, he crawled under this archway, which, being of solid stone, resisted the crash of the tumbling edifice. The water was deep, and had it not been for a log, which got jammed amidships, he must have been drowned. Indeed, it is hardly possible that a human being could have existed so long in such a situation.

thy captain, Nafarrondo, had the good sense to halt his men, fire a volley, wheel, and run back instantly, not a man would have escaped. A minute more, and the Carlists would have cut them off.

The outcry against Arechavala for this conduct, so marked by spite and ignorance, was very general. Both the soldiers and nationals talked of vengeance. The governor took the hint, and changed his residence, remaining quiet until Espartero returned, when he resigned his command, which was given to Colonel Solano.

Considerable inconvenience was at first experienced by the destruction of the mills, although it may be questioned if their loss was not, in one sense, an advantage. Previously, very little flour was ever stored in the town, which nevertheless held plenty of grain. Henceforth flour, instead of grain, was imported; and the reader need hardly be told, that, had the siege found us, according to the former custom, with no flour in the town, and the corn in the mills, we should most likely, in losing the mills, have lost the town.

After this adventure, things were comparatively quiet. We heard that Valdez was very busy in preparing a new expedition against the Carlists, and that he had named Espartero commander-in-chief of the Basque provinces, *vice* Cáratalá, one of the Peruvian incapables, who after getting well beaten by the Colombian general Sucre, had dis-

tinguished himself in his command at Vitoria, by being soundly thrashed by Zumalacarre-guy at Ormaistegui. The veracious general, in his despatch, claimed a victory, while Colonel Echaluce, and various other officers, on their return to Bilbao, told me that they had the worst of it, and were pursued to the gates of Vergara.

Espartero was replaced in the command of Biscay and the six divisions, by the Brigadier D. Fermin Iriarte, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself, and to whose prudence and activity it was mainly owing that Castor, Arroyo, Cuevillas, and that crowd of petty guerillas on the borders of Castille, had been kept in check. The Constitutional party in the province were delighted with the change. As much cannot be said for the troops, at least for those who had long served under Espartero. The new general was known to be a strict disciplinarian, and not to allow pillage, which Espartero had usually connived at, and rarely, if ever, punished; and yet this excellent officer, who had hitherto been so fortunate throughout a long career, was fated to be far more unsuccessful than his predecessor.

Events now began to thicken. The contest, which had hitherto partaken rather of the character of a desultory guerilla warfare, now began to assume a more imposing appearance. The army of Don Carlos, before split into sections, now took the shape and fashion of a regular force.

Notwithstanding that some of the battalions were replenished every six months, and the waste of life was prodigious, the male population of the provinces, roused to enthusiasm by the mere fact that they were struggling, and that successfully, with the millions of Spain, crowded to the banners of Zumalacarreguy. The reason is obvious,—the first plunge made—the first advantage gained—and the old Celtic tribe despised, as much as before they feared, the Spanish regulars,—the single circumstance of their general having stood, with even balanced success, against four generals of Spain, spoke volumes in his favour. In that success, however, they forgot that the provinces of Spain could afford to lose thousands for their hundreds. Nevertheless, rival chiefs laid aside their rivalry, and thirty battalions, good troops from the first, and now veteran soldiers, obeyed rejoicingly the orders of Zumalacarreguy.

But the government of Great Britain was now in the hands of the Duke of Wellington; and, although he adhered to the quadruple alliance, he sent an embassy, consisting of Colonel Gurwood and Lord Eliot, to talk to the contending parties about the cruelty with which they carried on the war. The Carlist chief saw at once the advantage to be gained by an ostentation of humanity, although he cared no more for slaughtering his prisoners, than he did for opening oysters. To slay all his prisoners, which even now were nume-

rous, would probably turn out a *blunder*, prejudicial to his master's cause; while, in sparing them, he was enabled to appear in the light of a virtuous and humane soldier, who wished to mitigate the horrors of war. Thus he took even the moral superiority out of the mouths of the Christians; and forgetting the cold-blooded assassinations of Arechaga, Muroaga, and the victims of Heredia, the virtuous though unfortunate general Valdez gave way, and subscribed every thing that was asked; and this, it is reported, was mainly owing to his secretary Colonel Labastida.

I am not desirous to appear the advocate of a war of extermination, and am aware that most of the furious Spanish liberals who have impugned this treaty, have done so when sitting in safety in their coffee-houses, where it is marvellously easy to talk about national honour and so forth. It is, however, clear enough, that had the envoy of the Duke of Wellington been desirous of throwing his weight and influence into the queen's scale, he would have enlarged upon the barbarous murders in Bilbao and Heredia; and the repeated slaughter of prisoners by the Carlist generals. He might also have slightly and delicately alluded to the civility received by his majesty so lately in England and Portugal, and then asked how he could sanction such a mode of warfare? It was evident that Valdez would not have refused to give quarter, and thus the treaty might have been confined to

one article, simply specifying that all classes of combatants, on both sides, should have quarter when they asked it.

Had such been the case, foreigners in general, and Englishmen in particular, would have been spared the pain of seeing the Carlists infringe the treaty—nay, declare that it did not include,

1st. All the national guards.

2nd. All the soldiers and officers of the *free* corps or volunteers.

3rd. All foreigners in the queen of Spain's service.

Gracious God! here is a treaty which carefully excludes the militia, the very pith of the popular cause; next the volunteers and foreigners, with whom the only difference is, that they *are* volunteers, but not Spaniards. Whom, then, may it be said that the famous Eliot or Gurwood treaty protects? Why, the regular army; that is, the force of which many of the generals and officers were strongly suspected of a half-and-half hostility against the infante. Possibly Colonel Gurwood, himself one of the regulars, could not find in the plenitude of his humanity for them, room for any one else. But, were such the case, how came the commissioner to shut his eyes to the fact, that the very army of Don Carlos came more under the description of "militia and volunteers" than any thing else? Besides, talking of foreigners, did not Colonel Gurwood see Captain Hen-

ningsen? Did he see no Frenchmen? no German? or, is it, that in the gallant colonel's opinion, a few gentlemen may do that with impunity, which the mob of plebeians are righteously hung for?*

But although the charge of partiality may rest with the commissioners, nothing can ever wipe away the stain which this treaty inflicted upon the Spanish army. They, soldiers by trade, whose profession was the noble career of arms, bargained to save themselves at the expense of the unfortunate tradesman who took up arms to defend his town, and his family from rapine and murder. The miserable national was often (I have witnessed it) obliged to sleep on the bare ground with his wife and children, and to resign his only bed to the soldiery. Often has he been compelled to sell his scanty furniture to find money to buy them fuel and oil, and yet this wretched father of a family is obliged to take his turn of duty, without pay or rations! and, if taken prisoner by the enemy, is duly delivered over to the peasantry to be tortured to death, or else, harder still, is sent to the mines at Barambio, to languish for months, until kind death end his sufferings.

- * That in the colonel's but a choleric word,
Which in the soldier is flat blasphemy.

Measure for Measure.

Neither with the volunteer or the foreigner is the case so cruel as with the national; *they* are fighting men by trade, and receive pay; but why should they be put out of the pale of the treaty, as if unworthy of a thought? Are not Don Carlos and his followers continually dinning in our ears that his army is composed of volunteers? Well, then, if his forces are volunteers, why can he object to those of his opponents being of the same description?—Ay, there is the rub! and the duke's commissioners well knew it. D. Carlos and his officers wanted their own followers to be represented as all pious and virtuous volunteers fighting *pro bono regis*. The queen's forces, of course, were all conscripts, obliged to serve, poor things!—and as for foreigners, the commissioners could not see the French, English, Portuguese, Germans, Italians, at the head-quarters of D. Carlos or those of his generalissimo, neither could they in after times hear the cries of their countrymen, murdered at Arrigorriaga and Hernani, agreeably to the "*tratado Eliot*."

Thus much for the famous Eliot convention, which, apart from the spurious philanthropy, with which it was ostensibly covered, was discreditable to the English commissioners, who displayed a want of ordinary attention or common humanity in leaving out all mention of the militia, free corps, and foreigners, and was dishonourable in the last

degree to the Spanish generals, who ought to have spurned the mere idea of bargaining for their own safety at the cost of the families who fed, clothed, and paid them—besides fighting for their cause as well, if not better, than themselves. The British commissioners might plead ignorance; but for the Spanish generals there is not the shadow of excuse.

Let us turn to the military operations, which became now of extreme importance. Shortly after Don Firmin Iriarte took the command he marched from Bilbao with a fine division, consisting of two battalions of the Principe, one of Almanza, one of Gerona, one of Segovia, part of the 4th light infantry, three companies of the cazadores of Isabel II., about a score of horse, and two mountain guns (four pounders.) After visiting Durango, and supplying the garrison with ammunition, the general turned the heads of his columns towards Lequeitio, which town, as was also that of Bermeo, was now garrisoned by the Christinos. Having rested two days with his troops at Lequeitio, he received information that Sarasa, the new Carlist commandant of Biscay, had gathered his forces at Guernica, and meant to fight. On the 1st of May, Iriarte left Lequeitio and took the road to Guernica, which, bad at all times, was now rendered almost impassable by the incessant rains. The distance is about twelve miles, and although the column set off at an early hour, it was near two P. M.

before they reached Guernica, which Iriarte determined on attacking, notwithstanding the jaded condition of the men. His dispositions having been made, the assault commenced about three P.M. The cazadores, with Almanza and one battalion of Principe, attacking from the north side of the town, got possession of the main street, but the Carlists clung firmly to the county court-house, and some large buildings near it. Almanza was drawn up in column in the street, to make a vigorous attack on these houses, but on emerging into the open space, they became confused and disordered under the heavy fire, and broke and fled. The Carlists followed up closely and slew or took great numbers, both of this regiment and that of Principe, which had dispersed into the houses for plunder. Seeing the confusion, Iriarte brought up Gerona and Segovia, but, at this critical moment, Sarasa filed two battalions and a squadron of horse round the west side of the town, who fell furiously upon the baggage, guarded by the 4th light infantry:—these gave way and fled, the baggage was lost, and so were the two light field pieces, Iriarte himself being wounded, and all his staff, with one exception, either killed or wounded. The Carlists pushed their advantage, and the whole division was totally routed. Iriarte rallied the cazadores, and, with them and a battalion of the Principe, which had been stationed in observation on the Lequeitio road, made a

stand to cover the escape of his routed soldiers. Sarasa attempted to dislodge him, but in vain, and at dark drew off his men. Iriarte continued his retreat upon Lequeitio, which he entered with his worn-out and foundered soldiery at a late hour, when, upon his reviewing his column, nearly one-half were missing; but the total loss was not so great, for above 300 had thrown themselves into the Carmelite convent, where they made a gallant defence. The news of this defeat was brought round to Bilbao by a launch the next day, and confirmed by stragglers arriving from the field. An express was hastily sent to Espartero, who happened to be with the fine division of Alava at Ochandiano. Glad to humiliate his rival, Espartero marched straight upon Guernica, which he reached on the 4th, the Carlists retiring on his approach, after a skirmish, in which the lancers of the queen caused the enemy a loss of some sixty men. The troops blockaded in the convent were now at liberty, and Espartero, after stopping a day or two at Guernica, went to Lequeitio, whence he accompanied Iriarte to Durango and Bilbao, and soon after returned to Vitoria.

This was a most important victory for the Carlists; it broke up the division of Biscay, which had lost 1200 men and most of the best officers; henceforth the column made no more *paseos*. The soldiery murmured against Iriarte, who shortly

after resigned the command, which was given, *ad interim*, to brigadier Solano, and some additional fortifications were traced out around the town.

But if the queen's forces had been unsuccessful in Biscay, in Navarre the minister of war had been still more unfortunate. Considering the Amescuas as the stronghold of the Carlists, he led his fine army into these barren valleys. After suffering great privations from want of provisions, and the enemy closing round him on every side, Valdez was fain to fly to Estella with the loss of above 3000 men, and with his army wholly demoralised. The great error of General Valdez consisted in thinking that the occupation of the Amescuas was of any importance, while it was not of the least. These rugged rocky wooded valleys, thinly populated, were the best possible ground for the Carlist chief to meet his enemies in: he could disperse his men with safety among the mountain hamlets to look for food, whilst his opponent durst not detach a brigade. In fact, so completely did Valdez play the game of Zumalacarguy, that there seems some foundation for the rumour current at the time in the army and in the provinces generally, that the Carlist chief had, amongst the staff of the queen's general, some trusty friend, who had great influence over his councils. Dispirited by his bad fortune, General Valdez withdrew to Logroño; shortly afterwards

he retired the garrison from Estella and many minor places, and it was time to do so, for Zumalacarreguy, having now nothing to fear from the army, hastened to attack the small garrisons, and, as Villafranca greatly annoyed his communications with Guipuscoa, he instantly besieged it.

Villafranca de Guipuscoa, so called to distinguish it from the hundred other Villafrancas in Spain, is a small neat town, with about 1500 inhabitants, seated upon the eastern slope of the high mountain called the Descarga, near the head waters of the little river Orio. From Villafranca to Tolosa is a long valley, through which winds the Orio; the high road from France to Biscay and Alava goes through Villafranca, so that the Carlists had to make a long detour to avoid the town. The garrison consisted of 250 men, exclusive of about fifty Urbanos, and there were two pieces of cannon mounted. Soon after the siege had commenced, Espartero marched from Vitoria to relieve the place, and the Carlist general, not choosing to fight, marched away to Segura; Espartero accordingly increased the garrison instead of withdrawing it; but the real reason was that the previous retreat of Zumalacarreguy led him to believe the Carlist chief was afraid to measure strength with him; however, he was soon disappointed. Scarcely had Espartero retired, when the active Carlist was again before the gates of Villafranca, the garrison of which, em-

boldened by their late relief, made a most vigorous defence, causing Zumalacarreguy a far more serious loss than he contemplated. However, he was determined to take the place, and the second approach of Espartero, who now appeared in the heights of the Descarga with 10,000 men, had not the least effect upon his resolution. Lining the woody slopes of the Descarga * with his Guipuscoan battalions, he shewed his main body upon the eminence to the right of Villafranca, off the high road, behind which he placed his cavalry. The queen's general reconnoitered his enemy, and not liking his preparations, tenaciously clung to the heights. About dark, Espartero gave up the enterprise and began his retreat to Vergara, but he forgot the activity of the opponent with whom he had to deal. Sending a couple of Biscay battalions over the hill to the left, the advanced companies poured an unexpected fire into the flank of the column, as slowly down the mountain-side it wound its long array. The confusion that followed this sudden attack exceeds belief, and it was still farther increased by the rear of the column being attacked at the same time. There was hardly

* On the Villafranca side the mountain of the Descarga is well wooded; but on its western slope, towards Vergara, it is, in general, bare and chequered with deep ravines, very much resembling the descent from Stanwick into Saddleworth, on the road from Leeds to Manchester.

any fighting, but the Carlists made 2000 prisoners and drove the whole division into Vergara in a deplorable state. The loss of the Carlists in this brilliant affair was about a score, so that cheaply as they were in the habit of gaining their victories, this was probably the cheapest.

Espartero returned to Bilbao with his division, a few days after, from whence, after a brief stay, he departed for Alava, by the way of Balmaseda, leaving the Count Mirasol in command of the town. Every day now brought us news of fresh disasters. Villafranca surrendered the day after the route of the Descarga; Vergara two days later. Eybar, seeing the futility of resistance, capitulated. Durango was abandoned by the garrison, which marched into Bilbao, on Sunday morning, the 10th of June. From all quarters was heard the sound of the approaching tempest, which threatened to overwhelm our beautiful town. For a day or two the attention of the Carlist chieftains was occupied in reducing Ochandiano, which was surrendered by the governor, the Marquis of San Gil, upon the second or third shell being thrown. I have heard it asserted that this personage, one of the "regulars," of course, had an additional article attached to the capitulation, stipulating that *his horses* were to be given up to him; but not a word was stipulated in favour of the unhappy Nationals, of whom there were above eighty; these unfortunates were sent to the mines

of Barambio, where, from ill treatment, and bad usage, they all perished, except a few, who contrived to escape: *but the horses of the Marquis of San Gil, were restored to their noble master, with full license to bear him wheresoever he bade them, which was some consolation.*

CHAPTER IV.

FIRST SIEGE OF BILBAO,

JUNE 10th, TO JULY 2nd, 1837.

THE town of Bilbao, which has of late acquired such celebrity, from the sieges it has undergone, is seated at the head of the lower valley of the Nervion, about eight miles from Portugalete, in $43^{\circ} 23'$ N. lat. ; and long. 2° , west of Greenwich. On the East, the mountain chain of Archanda separates the valley of Bilbao from that of Derio and Asua ; while on the West, the range of Pagarri divides it from that of Oquendo. About half a mile above the town, the river winds round the base of the mountain of Ollargan, while immediately in front, is the counterfort of Echevarri, itself a spur from the Archanda range. Between these two hills the river forms a horse shoe,

emerging from which, it flows along beneath a steep bank, to the Puente Nueva de la Bolueta, a handsome stone structure of five arches. From this point, the ground rises on the right bank, forming the hill of the Morro, the forked summit of which is now crowned with two redoubts.

Upon the spur projecting from the base of this hill, were formerly the magnificent flour mills now in ruins, and over the flank of the Morro hill, is the high road to France, by Durango. Opposite to the ruins of the mills, on the left bank of the river, is a deep secluded ravine, separating the mountain known as the Peña, from that of Ollargan: the Peña itself being a branch of the great range of Pagasarri; and its eastern face forms the hill of Miravilla, which completely overlooks the town from the left bank. Beyond the hill of Miravilla, to the westward, is the hamlet of Ventabbarri, whence a path leads to the hermitage of S. Roque, and thence, by the *Neveras*, to the summit of Pagasarri, along which is a road practicable, in dry weather, to the country above Balmaseda.

At the foot of Miravilla, and along the river side, are the fields and gardens of Alvia, varied with the hills of Basurto, and the range of Castrojana, the eastern abutment of which forms the cliffs that overhang the river at Olaviaga.

The Castrojana range of hills, is a branch from Pagasarri, and, with the opposite hill of *Burseña*, (also an off-set from Pagasarri), encloses the valley of the Cadagua, or of Balmaseda. In this narrow vale the slope of the mountains is so precipitous, that there are few places where a passage can be attempted; indeed, for troops it is impracticable, except at Castrojana, and *Burseña*; at the former of which places, is a stone bridge, and at the latter was a very neat chain bridge, which last, however, was destroyed by the Carlists in the latter end of 1835. On the North side of the Cadagua is the lofty conical hill of Santagueda, which is connected with Pagasarri, by the heights of *Alonsoategui*, whence the little river Galindo takes its source, and after winding round the base of Santagueda, and that of the hill known as *Las Cruces*, joins the Nervion at the Convent of the Desierto: This river is navigable, for lighters, to the bridge of Retuerto, and is the chief channel for the export of the iron ore of Somorrostro. Beyond the Desierto the hills of Cestao arise with a bold bluff to the river; they continue increasing in altitude above the town of Portagalete, which is built on their slope.

Immediately beyond the hill of the Morro, (which, as well as that of *Miravilla*, is in a geological point of view very different from the principal ranges, being masses of rich iron ore, while these latter are of slate clay)

the broad counterfort of Santo Domingo, descends from the Archanda range, entire, as far as the turnpike (Cadena), where it breaks off into two ravines; that to the southward is known by the name of Barranco del Bosque, that on the North-west, is called the ravine of Uribarri, and these two ravines completely enclose the town of Bilbao. Directly below the separation of these ravines, the Santo Domingo counterfort forms a sort of platform, whereon are seated the church and palace of Begoña, above which rises the cup-like eminence of Artágan. From Begoña church three glens or ravines descend; one to the heart of the town called Iturribide, or the path of springs: the second is the ravine of Mallona, and extends from the church of Begoña to the Convent of San Augustin, forming a natural escarpment to the east side of the town. The third ravine is one which passes by the garden of Celimnichu, and falls into that of Uribarri, a little above the Augustin Convent. Beyond the ravine of Uribarri, the hills recede, and form a spacious valley in the shape of a crescent, of which the river forms the chord, the counterfort of the *Salve*, which abuts so close upon the river, as to barely leave room for the road. From thence there is a succession of ravines, all of which take their origin from that point in the Archanda range, known as the *Molino de Viento*, until you reach the *Cava*, whence the hills again recede, enclosing the rich and fertile vale of Duesto.

above which, towers the hill of *Banderas* with its counterfort the Capuchine hill. *Banderas* is the terminating point of the Archanda range; below it are the steep and rocky heights of Montecabras, and at their base the river of Asua unites with the Nervion, at the bridge of Luchana. This small stream rises near Larrabesua, and flows down the valley to Derio, where it is crossed by a fine bridge; thence it winds down to the bridge of Asua, where it meets the tide—it flows throughout in a narrow, deep, and muddy channel, quite unfordable below the bridge of Asua.

Passing the river of Asua you come to the low hills of Arriaga, which border the northern and eastern bank of the Asua river. These hills soon retire, and, after describing a bold curve, reappear about a mile lower down, close to the river at the bold rocky heights of Axpé. Here begins the mole of Portugalete, which bestrides the washway of Gobelás, for three miles, until it terminates near the bar of the Nervion, and the range of hills now forsaking the river-side, turns inland to the villages of Lexona, Hondis and Argorta, finally terminating in the bold and lofty cliffs of Point Galea, the eastern limit of the height of Bilbao.

From this description, and still more from a reference to the plan, it will easily be seen how completely the town is commanded on every side, and how indefensible it is according to the ordinary rules of war; even when the hills of Artágan,

Miravilla, and Morro, are fortified, a besieging enemy can, at any rate, cut off all communication with Portagalete, the river being a water defile eight miles long; at Axpé, and Montecabras, ships can be prevented ascending almost by means of stones, nor can any vessel pass, or even remain at anchor, beneath the heights of Olaviaga, in defiance of an enemy armed with musquets alone. Above Olaviaga there is not depth for vessels drawing above eight feet of water, and even for such, only at the top of the tide. So rapid is the fall, that at little more than half-ebb, even boats ground off the ravines of the *Salve*,—off the ravine of La Cava, and off the Chorros of San Augustin, close to the entrance of the town. However considerable the garrison of the town might be, even after the leading points of the river were fortified, it was, at any time, a matter of exceeding facility for a few companies of the enemy to intercept all communications by land or water, when unaccompanied by a strong escort. The desultory character of the war, the hostility of the peasantry, and the shelter afforded almost at every step by the numerous cottages in the glens, and ravines, gave great encouragement to those marauders who, in times of public tumult, make war on their own account.

Soon after the expulsion of the Carlist faction by General Sarsfield, the newly installed authorities began to put the town in a state of defence:

the military by profession, of course, directing the fortifications; for such, in courtesy, they were styled. The different avenues leading to the country were barricaded, and a slender brick wall, about two feet thick, was raised around the heights, which, on the eastern side, overlook the town.

The important posts of the Morro, Miravilla, and Artágan were left out of the line of defence; but the line embraced the hill of Larrinaga, on which was erected a small battery, with three embrasures, the merlons of which were about four feet thick. At Solacoeche a small battery was erected, with two embrasures, and this was connected by a low wall, which served as a curtain with Larrinaga. The ravine of Iturribide, was defended by a brick wall, about two feet thick, loopholed throughout. At the Circus gate, leading to Begoña, was a small battery, with four embrasures, the parapets of which were even weaker than those of Larrinaga, not affording shelter against even grape-shot. From the circus to the burying ground was a slight curtain, which was continued to Mallona; this was more serviceable as a covered way, than for any other purpose. The fort of Mallona, at the extremity of the ravine bearing its name, overlooked the Convent of San Augustin, the road to Olaviaga, and the fields of Alvia, on the opposite side of the river; its guns took in reverse the hill and church of Begoña, and

the line as far as the burying-ground. But this important post was, like all the rest, very weak; there was no ditch, the parapet was not even proof against six-pound shot, and only three guns were mounted, all of light calibre. Such was the miserable state of the defences of a town which, from the beginning of the war, the Carlist insurgents had repeatedly threatened to besiege. No ditch, no outworks, nothing but a couple of ravelines, connected by a loopholed garden wall; all the principal points of defence unoccupied, without a sufficient supply of ammunition, with its heaviest guns only twelve pounders, and with a garrison something dispirited by the recent defeats of the queen's armies. In this situation was the town of Bilbao, on the 10th of June, when menaced with a serious siege by the whole of the Carlist army, flushed with numerous victories, and led by Zumalacarreguy.

On the 6th June, the division under Espartero, which had fallen back upon Bilbao, after the disastrous affair of the Descarga, marched by Castrojana upon Balmaseda. Being unable to keep the field against the Basque army, the queen's general did right in retiring; for his forces, blockaded in the town, would only have served to consume the stores and provisions the sooner, and to deprive the northern army of two of its best divisions. Probably it might have been better had the queen's general retired no farther

than Castrojana or Portagaleta; the former place being an excellent military position, and connected with Portagaleta by the forts of Burseña and the Desierto, could not have been starved, whilst nothing but great cowardice on the part of the soldiers, or of their general, could have lost the position, from which the relief of Bilbao at any time would have been easy.

Previous to his departure, Espartero gave the command of the town to the Count Mirasol, a brigadier in the army, and formerly chief of the staff. Without possessing military talents of a high order, the count proved himself a zealous and active governor; besieged before he had been four days in command, in a place not well provided with stores, and with hardly any defences, he was nothing discouraged, but exerted himself vigorously to arrest the enemy's career. His efforts were aided by some excellent officers, strenuously supported by the local authorities, and highly favoured by the enemy's blunders; nevertheless, a large share of the honour and glory of the defence to him of right belongs.

The garrison with which Count Mirasol was left to defend the place, consisted of the following battalions:—

4th light infantry, 2 weak battalions, about	900	effective strength.
3rd..... do..... Gerona, part of a battalion	300	
3rd of the infantry of the line, Principe, 1 battalion..	520	
18th.....do..... Almansa, 1 .. do.....	400	

	Brought over . . .	2120	effective strength.
Provincial regiment of Compostela, . . .	1 battalion..	550	
Do	Mondonedo, . . . 1 .. do . . .	600	
Do	Alcazar de San Juan, 1 do . . .	400	
Do	Ronda	600	
Cazadores de Isabel II.		350	
Artillery and artificers, sappers, &c.		110	
Battalion of Urbanos		650	
		<hr/>	
		5380	
Crews of the gun-boats'		108	
One company of <i>Ancianos</i> , to patrol the streets		100	
		<hr/>	
		5588	
		<hr/>	

Last, though certainly not least, must be enumerated the small detachment of marines, commanded by Captain Ebsworth. At the recommendation of the British commodore on the station, Lord John Hay, Captain Henry, of the armed Spanish steamer *Reyna Gobernadora*, sent this detachment, together with two of his guns, to co-operate in the defence of the town. Right gallantly did this little band fulfil their duty, nor was there any corps of the garrison which so distinguished itself; to this all the inhabitants bore willing testimony. From the effective strength of the garrison must be deducted 300 of the cazadores, who, with their colonel, Don Bernardo Echaluze, defended the important post of Burseña. Of the different regiments composing the garrison, those that were the best disciplined were Principe, Gerona, and Compostela; of this last regiment three officers had deserted to the enemy a short time previously. They had been in the faction of 1823, were well known to the Carlists, and their desertion was rather considered as a matter of course, than as

reflecting any discredit on this, in other respects, excellently officered regiment. The regiments of the 4th light infantry, Alcazar, Ronda, and Mondoñedo were but indifferently officered, nor was much to be expected from them. The stores of powder and shot were very scanty, and as the enemy came rushing on so fast, there was no time to introduce more, for, of course, until the hour of peril came, none ever gave such a trivial object a thought.

On the 10th, the jolly boat of H. M. ship *Saracen*, while descending the river, was stopped by the Carlists, at the Convent of San Mames, and a youth, the son of the deputy, Don Pedro P. Uhagon, taken out. Hearing of this, the commander of the *Saracen*, Lieutenant T. P. Lehardy, instantly went to the head quarters of General Sarasa, which were then at a place called the *Arboleda*, of Mena; the English officer insisted upon the release of the youth, which, after some demur, was civilly granted, and he was allowed to return with the *Saracen's* commander. The next day Captain Lapidge, of H. M. ship *Ringdove*, who now was the senior officer in the river, the commodore having left, sent out a flag of truce, desiring an interview with the Carlist commander-in-chief, which was fixed for the day following; when, in company with the consul, and one of the British resident merchants, Captain L. went out to visit Zumalacarreguy. After exchanging the usual com-

pliments, the Carlist chieftain was asked if he would guarantee the safety of British lives and properties, to which General Z. answered in the most off-hand way, "*Si, si, con mi cabeza respondo.*" "Yes, yes, with my head I answer, (for their safety)." Next, at Captain Lapidge's request, he offered the British residents twenty-four hours to move their effects; and when the British officer, with kind consideration, said, "General, you do not war on women, I hope: you must, therefore, allow our boats to take such Spanish ladies as choose to leave the town." The Carlist General winced a little at this, probably because his conscience (memory I should say,) recalled the scenes of Cenicero; however, he, after a short pause, said, "*Bueno, que salgan si quieren, aunque sean Españolas.*" "Well, they may leave if they like, although they be Spanish women." With this, the conference closed, and Captain Lapidge, with his party, came away, highly satisfied with the civil attentions of the Carlist commander.

Immediately on his return, Captain Lapidge convened a meeting of the English residents, when he informed them of the promises made by Zumalacarreguy, and then enquired if they felt inclined to rely on them and leave the town, or to stay and take their chance. Most of the English determined upon leaving, which they accordingly did in the boats of the men-of-war, together with several Spanish ladies. But two of the British

residents preferred staying in the town, the better to protect the property entrusted to their charge.* Captain Lapidge also determined to stop, and so did Mr. Clark, the consul.

While these negotiations were going on, the besiegers were busy with their preparations. The important posts of Luchana, Banderas, the convent

* It has been asked by some journals in the interest of Don Carlos, "Why did not the English residents remove their property, seeing that the Carlist general, with such unexampled generosity, allowed them twenty-four hours to do so." The unhappy man who perpetrated this unfortunate question can have no idea of war, his notions of which must be drawn from the custom-house and steam-packet office, because *there*, carts, waggons, and lighters are to be had upon lifting up the finger; such, fancies the easy individual, is the case in a besieged town. Allow me to inform him, that my goods in store alone would have filled the *Saracen*, while those of Mr. Barrow would have sufficed for two vessels like her. Not a lighter was to be had, and as for porters, pay what you would, not one was to be obtained; they were all under arms or labouring on the defences. The boxes of specie and the trunks of apparel belonging to the English residents and their families, had all to be carried down by the British sailors to their boats; but how were 500 tons of goods to be moved without men or lighters, and that in two tides? and if you moved them out of Bilbao where were they to be placed? The Carlist general's offer was liberal—but he lost nothing by making it: his heavy cannon had not then arrived. Perhaps he knew nothing could leave the town except the persons of the British residents. Had the town been captured, there *might* have been respect shewn to British property, but that must have depended upon circumstances, and certainly the chances of protection were not diminished by the owner or his agent being on the spot.

of the Capuchins, that of San Mames, with the villages of Deusto and Alvia, were seized by them; they next occupied the heights of Miravilla and the Morro: to complete the investment, and at the same time to make manifest the contemptible abilities of the Spanish regular officers, the besiegers seized the strong church and palace of Begoña, in front of which they were seen constructing a battery for five pieces, while on the adjoining eminence of Artagan, they were busy in raising another. On the 13th the town received a formal summons to surrender, which being dily answered in the negative, the enemy sent forth a cloud of skirmishers, who, lodging themselves in the houses and vineyards, (which with admirable judgment had been allowed to remain within pistol-shot of the defences,) kept up a biting fire, which swept every street in the town. To this no adequate return could be made, for the guns from the forts, firing sparingly to save their ammunition, quite failed in dislodging the enemy. At eight A.M., on the 14th, the Carlist batteries opened on the town; that of Artagan played from one large mortar and two seven-inch howitzers; that of Miravilla from one mortar and two small guns; the largest near Begoña pounded our feeble battery at the Circus from two twelve-pounders, two nine-pounders, and one four-pounder. The effect of this heavy fire was rapid and disheartening to the garrison, for while the shells fell fast

and thick into the town, the miserable defence of the Circus crumbled away like lath and plaster before the enemy's fire. By noon all the guns were silenced, and the place a heap of ruins.

Fearing lest the besiegers should assault immediately—for the breach was sixty feet wide, and there was no ditch,—the general ordered up two companies of the 4th light and the 3d company of the Urbanos. These immediately ensconced themselves amidst the ruins, and maintained such a deadly fire that the Carlist skirmishers, not being able to stand it, went off; and the enemy, thus intimidated, hung back from the attack. They were quite right in so doing, for unless their soldiery had been of that downright daring sort who would fight their way into any place, it was not to be expected that they would stand a hot fire in front, with the batteries of Mallona and Larrinaga pounding their flanks. For these, or for other reasons which are not known, the Carlists refrained from the assault; thus the afternoon wore away, and at dark the cannonading ceased, but the enemy continued to throw shells during the night, and as the weather was clear, their marksmen were not idle, so that in many streets it was unsafe to have a light at the window. Brief as were the hours of darkness, they sufficed for the Christinos to repair the breaches, and to throw up huge breast-works, consisting of many thousand sand-bags, and thus at dawn on the

15th, the foe found his work was yet to be done. In addition to the heavy fire from Larrinaga and Mallona, that from the battery at Solacoeche incommoded the besiegers greatly; but the Circus was unable to answer their fire otherwise than with musquetry, although, as yesterday, the chief fire of the enemy was directed on this point. But the queenites soon took the ascendant in artillery practice—the mortar at Miravilla was disabled by a lucky shot, and at 3 P. M. the besiegers' batteries were all silenced. During the whole of the day the enemy's light troops, posted in houses, ditches, and behind walls, kept up such a furious and deadly fire, that none were safe either in the streets or their houses; when night fell, therefore, carpets, tarpaulins, mats, and similar things were stretched across the entrances of all the streets that debouched to the river. Within the town, at every thirty yards, strong blinds were thrown up so as to intercept the enemy's musquetry from scouring the streets. A covered way was also made to the hospital, which was much needed, since the wounded and their bearers were often hurt, when crossing the Plaza de Achuri, by the enemy's fire, which completely commanded it within half musquet shot.

This day the governor, Mirasol, convoked a meeting at the house of the chief artillery officer. Besides the heads of departments, there were present the French and English consuls,

Captain Lapidge, and the commander of the French schooner, a few other officers, and the writer of this narrative. After some preliminaries, the count stated, that his motive for calling the junta, was to state that the town had only four days' ammunition, and to consult how the place could best be defended until succour arrived. Various schemes were proposed, one of which, if not the most feasible, at least the most original, was that suggested by D. Pedro Pascual Uhagon, the deputy for the province. This gentleman was desirous "that the consuls of France and Great Britain should take the town under their protection, and hoist their respective flags on the forts;" but M. Lafitte, the French consul, observed, that supposing such a ceremony to be performed, it was hardly to be expected that a besieging army would be thereby induced to relinquish their undertaking, and supposing, *what was most probable*, that the besiegers paid not the slightest attention to the two flags, what force had he to repel them? None, unless the small French schooner of two guns and forty-five men was to be considered as a "force." After this satirical speech, D. Pedro's notable plan was dismissed. Much conversation ensued, as to the best measures to save the town. One proposed this plan, another that; but it was finally determined to hold out stoutly, to economise their ammunition, while the English should urge the march of reinforcements. Furnaces were

prepared for casting shot, and, some materials having been found, they set about manufacturing gunpowder.

On the 16th the Carlist batteries opened at dawn, but they were more unsuccessful than before. The Circus battery had been thoroughly repaired, and the guns there maintained a vigorous fire. A young artillery officer* having espied a good position to flank the enemy's breaching battery at Begoña, hastily threw up a battery of sandbags, and placing there a twelve-pounder, opened such a well-directed fire, that the enemy's guns were no longer served with vigour; their shot went wide, and, by noon, their artillerymen abandoned their guns. At two p. m. the besiegers' mortars and howitzers began to play upon the town; and as no adequate return could be made for want of shells, the enemy had it all their own way, until ten at night, when they ceased, after having grievously mauled the houses, and occasioned about forty casualties among the inhabitants. During the night a strong blind of two-and-a-half inch plank was thrown up the whole length of the Arenal, to protect, in some measure, that much-frequented spot from the enemy's musquetry.†

* Lieutenant Tejada.

† In the course of the night information was received, that the Carlist commander-in-chief had been wounded, and carried to Durango in a litter. This news served to inspirit the garrison.

In the morning of the 17th the besiegers' batteries were silent, and some unusual movement

but did not seem to depress the besiegers in the slightest degree. Eventually Zumalacarreguy died of his wounds, it is said, through unskillful treatment (vide Hennigsen's Campaign, vol. ii.), but I should be inclined to think more likely from his bad habit of body and impetuous passionate disposition. A person who saw him a few days before he was wounded, said that he appeared full of humours.

The name of the Carlist chief is said by Captain Hennigsen to be *Gothic*; it is genuine Basquence, and signifies either "a place abounding in osiers," or else "a place whence they bring osiers," from *Zumala—mimbres*, (Sp.) osiers or withes, and the verb "*carri*," to bring or carry. The terminative *gui* or *guy* indicates locality. All the Basque names are significative, as *Mendiola*, mountain forge; *Achuri*, rock in the river; from *mendi*, a mountain, *ola*, an iron-work (*ferreria*); *acha*, rock; *wri*, water or river. So also *Zabalburu*, broad valley, from *zabal*; broad, *buru*, valley. When the name terminates in *echea* (*house*), it is a mark of distinction, as *Goicoechea*, *Barnichea*.

The abilities of Zumalacarreguy have been greatly over-rated, by both his friends and opponents. It was highly natural for his followers to praise their fortunate leader; and his antagonists thought, probably, by giving him the credit of great military talents, to lessen their own humiliation. So far from Zumalacarreguy having recast the art of war, he simply did what Mina had done before, which system of tactics is indigenous to the Basque provinces, and may be thus described:—As the foe advances, the Basque soldiery retire regularly from mountain to mountain, stopping in favourable positions, or to allow the peasantry time to escape. Wherever the troops halt, the invader probably attacks. After firing a few volleys they usually run off, without having suffered any loss. Pursuit is all but useless. Now, while a part of the Basque forces thus keep always in front of the invader, the remainder hang

appeared to be taking place. Information was received by the governor, that two battalions, with upon his flanks, close upon his rear; cut off convoys, murder stragglers, sick, and wounded; and thus a fine army melts away in detail, like feathers falling from a sick fowl. Then, when the invader's columns become weary and disheartened, they are suddenly set upon in some of the countless passes and defiles of the country, and most likely totally defeated. It may be said, why not occupy the towns? When an invading force reaches any of the Basque villages, he finds every one of the inhabitants fled. Their valuables are few; and what they have are quickly buried or carried off. Such is the Basque system of tactics; the Swiss against the Austrian; Hofer and the Tyrolese against the French; Scanderbeg and his Albanians against the Turks. All these people had, and still have, the same system or mode of warfare; and at this very day the Welsh could defy the whole power of Britain, if they possessed the same advantages, and were willing to make similar sacrifices.

The advantages are—to have a foreign power on the frontier, from whence to procure succours and supplies; to have a strong party in their favour in the London cabinet, and in the country generally; to have the male population thoroughly well armed and organized; to have all the people (of Wales) enthusiastic in the cause, except the wealthy landholders and inhabitants of a few large towns. These are the advantages. Now for the sacrifices they must make:—to abandon their towns, villages, and dwellings the instant an enemy appears either by night or day; to see their houses burnt, and to live in the woods; to bury or conceal in caves or woods their little properties; to destroy their roads, bridges, and, very often, their crops, lest the enemy should derive benefit from them. Now, when a population of 600,000, in a strong country, are determined to carry on the war in this manner, and to submit to such sacrifices, the chances are that they must win; for in war, as in trade, those who work hardest and live hardest always win. Imagine how many armies, how

a convoy of ammunition, had arrived at Portugalete from San Sebastian. This induced Count

much money, England would have to spend before she could hope to subdue such a population. Now, such is, and has been, exactly the case with the Basque provinces. The folly of the Madrid cabinet and the stupidity of Sarsfield converted the insurrection into a national war. Zumalacarreguy thoroughly understood the tactics of the country, for he was a native, and had served under Mina; he well knew also the bad organization of the Spanish army, and the character of its generals; he possessed great activity and tact in ruling the mountaineers, with sufficient strength of character to make himself feared. Eraso, Sarasa, Sopelana, Zariatégui,—all these chiefs would have succeeded just as well as Zumalacarreguy, the best proof of which is the fact, that the affairs of Charles did not decline after the death of the supposed invincible general. As a further proof that it is the system which holds up the Basque chiefs, and not they the system, look at Moreno, decidedly one of the most incapable men in Spain, and yet he has gained signal victories,* perhaps more so than any of the renowned Zumalacarreguy; yet either of these men, in command of a Spanish army, opposed to a French or British force, commanded by Soult or Harispe, Hill or Colborne, would be broken like reeds in an hour. So also, had Zumalacarreguy remained faithful to the queen, and been in command of the army instead of Quesada or Epartero, he would equally have failed, perhaps to a greater extent than even those generals, on account of his impetuous disposition, that not seldom got his active peasantry into scrapes, from which, however, a dispersion, with orders to rally thirty miles off the next day, always freed them. But this method, practicable with the Basque peasantry, would have ruined a regular Spanish army. United, it is nothing very splendid—when dispersed, it is good for nothing.

* At *Villar de los Navarros*, in August, 1837, where the division of Buerens was almost totally destroyed.

Mirasol to direct a sortie to be made about the time of high water. Accordingly, the grenadier and flank companies of the 3rd and 4th regiments, with one company of the Compostela regiment, and one of the Urbanos (the 4th), the whole commanded by Colonel Araoz, the chief of the staff, marched out by the Augustin Gate, in the direction of Olaviaga. The Carlists defended their strong position but feebly, and the troops had little difficulty in driving them to the village of Deusto, where Araoz judged it prudent to halt, and await the coming of the troops from Portugalete. Three hours having elapsed without any signs of the expected reinforcement, and observing that the enemy's force was continually increasing, Araoz determined to retire into the town, which was effected in good order; but the Carlists, having now massed a force of near 2,000 against this little column, Mirasol sent four companies of the 4th light infantry to his support. The Carlists kept up a heavy firing, which did little damage, for the troops experienced a loss of only sixty-four men.

The besiegers now opened their batteries with such vigour, that by ten p. m. they sent us 130 large thirteen-inch shells, besides abundance of round shot. The damage occasioned by this shower of projectiles was but insignificant, for although a shell blew up the expence magazine at the Circus, no lives were lost. This busy day being over, an equally busy night succeeded; for

the hours of darkness being few, it was important to press the forwarding of the defences. At the corner of the street Santamaria a battery was constructed, and an old iron twenty-four pounder, long since condemned as unserviceable, was dug up from where it had been lying for years, mounted, and placed there to check the besiegers' fire from Miravilla. The barricading of the streets was continued, and numerous sand-bags repaired the damage done to Fort Larrinaga by the enemy's fire.

On the 18th Count Mirasol determined to try another sortie, which was equally injudicious with the former, no combination having been arranged with the division at Portugalete; nor was the military skill displayed in conducting this sortie at all superior to the planning. Instead of turning the enemy's position by the ravine of Uribarri, Mirasol plunged into the long defile of the Campo Volantin, as Araoz had done the day before; but this day the Carlists were better prepared. The column of attack consisted of the same companies of the 3rd and 4th regiments as marched the day previous, the light company of Mondoñedo, 100 men of Compostela, one company of the Cazadores of Isabel II., and the small detachment of marines under Captain Ebsworth. Two gun-boats were stationed off the convent of San Augustin, to protect the left flank of the column, which, as soon as it cleared the Estufa,

was saluted by a heavy fire of musquetry from three hundred Carlists, concealed in the woody bank on the Alvia side of the river. It is strange that none of the military ever thought of the enemy occupying such an advantageous position, and it is equally singular that Mirasol, when he saw his men fast falling from this flank-fire, did not send across from the Arenal a battalion to dislodge the Carlist sharpshooters; he had not even sufficient presence of mind to march his men inside the rope-walk, which would have completely sheltered them from this galling fire. The column, however, pushed on; and on reaching the Junta de Caminos, which is about three-quarters of a mile from the town, drew up in position to receive the enemy, who now threatened a serious attack. The hour of high-water having passed, without any signs of the expected Portugalete column, and it being evident that the enemy had obstructed the navigation of the river, by sinking lighters loaded with stones, the general, seeing nothing more to be done, gave the order to retreat, which instantly brought the Carlists headlong on. Nevertheless the troops retired with order and precision, despite the incessant attacks of the enemy, who followed close to the Estufa. Having been that day to Portugalete, on my way back I fell in with the Carlist troops returning from the fight. They were evidently not very well pleased, so that I judged the combat had not

been so favourable to them as they wished. The Christinos also suffered severely. Of the small detachment of British, Lieutenant Fitzpatrick was killed, with two of his men, and three were wounded, which, with the three hurt the day before, reduced this little band to twenty. Lieut. Fitzpatrick was buried the next day with the military honours due to a general officer. Two Spanish officers were killed and five wounded; the entire number of casualties exceeding seventy.

The 19th and 20th passed away quietly. A few cannon shot were exchanged occasionally, and the fire of small-arms at intervals was rather brisk. The garrison and inhabitants improved the time to the utmost, by assiduously labouring upon the fortifications, which were now far more efficient than on the first day of the siege.

In the afternoon of the 20th a heavy fire of small-arms was heard in the direction of Olaviaga, which, it being about high-water, clearly indicated that the column from Portugalete was attempting to ford a passage. Such proved to be the case. The commanding officer of that division, Brigadier-general Alaix, having formed the regiments of Africa and San Fernando, four battalions, in column, marched forwards with a large convoy of vessels, laden with stores, convoyed by the Spanish flotilla of gun-boats. Strange to say, the Carlists allowed him to pass, without opposition, the formidable defiles of Montecabras, and to oc-

cupy Olaviaga ; but here the further progress of the column was obstructed by a bridge of boats, a chain stretched across the river, and lighters sunk mid-channel ; the whole protected by the convent of San Mames, where was posted the Carlist chief Guibelalde, with two battalions. After reconnoitering these obstacles, as the tide had now turned, and there was no appearance of a movement on the part of the town, Alaix determined upon retreating to Portugalete, which was fortunately effected without loss. In this expedition, as on many other occasions, the garrison of Burseña, commanded by the gallant Echaluze, greatly distinguished themselves. Crossing the Cadagua, they drove the Carlist guerillas from Sorrosa and the heights of Olaviaga, without which the column of Alaix could not have advanced beyond the old quarantine ground, nor could the flotilla have remained an instant in the reach of Olaviaga.

In most countries military operations seem to be carried on in a very slovenly manner. The difference between theory and practice is immense : possibly this chiefly arises from the countless details of a modern army, which, conjointly with the dread of responsibility, render the machine too ponderous for any but men of first-rate abilities. Now, men of this description are always rare ; perhaps more so in the army than any other profession, because in it there are in all countries more who rise from influence than from merit.

Now in the Spanish army this is very universally the case: hardly any one ever dreams of getting forward by his deeds—no, he has a surer card, a good friend in the war-office. Had either Mirasol or Alaix possessed military abilities, they must have felt the imperative necessity of a strict co-operation to ensure success to the expedition; but these personages, although daily receiving despatches from each other, through the medium of the British officers, had so little notion of combining for their mutual support, that we see Mirasol making two sorties, whilst Alaix remains quiet; and then, when the Portugalete column *does* move, Mirasol does not stir, as if he was desirous of being *even* with his outside friend: for when Alaix, with his column, did march forward on the 20th, Count Mirasol was so far from being prepared for such an event, that, instead of having 2,000 men ready to march for the protection of this convoy, to him of priceless worth, when he was first apprised of the firing, he appeared surprised, and refused to credit that it could be the Portugalete troops. Sending an aid to reconnoitre, the count (then in company with the author) met the deputy Uhagon, who said the firing was occasioned by a sortie of the garrison of Burseña.* Satisfied with this explanation, General Mirasol gave the

* Señor de Uhagon was naturally led to entertain this opinion, in consequence of the firing being chiefly on the left bank of the river.

matter no further notice. Soon afterwards, however, when authentic intelligence did arrive, the count was sorry that nothing had been done, for now it was too late. To what can such strange conduct be attributed? No excuse can be made on the score of want of communication, since, probably, no besieged town ever yet enjoyed such facilities; for the British officers were employed to the utmost stretch of service, perhaps beyond what was decent, in carrying letters to and fro. What could be the purport of these despatches, which, according to the invariable language of the Spanish authorities, were of such urgent importance, and which the young officers of his majesty's navy often incurred serious risk in carrying? None can tell—except that it is abundantly clear that no *plan* for a combined movement on both sides could ever have been the subject of these “important despatches;” for when Mirasol went out, Alaix staid at home, and *vice versa*. Nor can it be objected that Alaix disobeyed his orders; for Count Mirasol, in his public despatches, praises him abundantly.

On the three following days, the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, the besiegers appeared to labour under a scarcity of ammunition; from their batteries they fired very rarely. The said indispensable article, powder, being scarce with us also, our guns were silent; but while the ordnance department enjoyed an armistice, the fire of small arms was incessant all

round the lines. The enemy's marksmen, sheltered in houses, ditches, vineyards, and the thousand hollows and inequalities of the soil, fired with extraordinary precision, continually picking off men and officers, in the batteries, and passengers in the streets. Had it not been for the blinds, parapets, and barricades, which now were erected every fifty or a hundred yards, none could have left their houses without imminent risk; even with all these precautions, accidents were numerous.

For some time past a report had been current in the town, that Generals Latre and Espartero were at Portugalete, or, at least, in the neighbourhood; this day the news was confirmed, with the addition that Valdez, the minister of war, was at Orduña; all, therefore, now anticipated a speedy deliverance, and the more sanguine indulged hopes of a total defeat of the enemy. However, it was clear that the besiegers entertained no great apprehensions, for they continued to be busily employed in bringing up stores, ammunition, &c. Nevertheless, the main force of besiegers crossed over to the left bank, and took up a position on the heights of Castrojana, which command the passage of the Cadagua, in every direction; for although the queen's troops might have crossed by Burseña, the position of the enemy, entrenched on the flank and summit of the mountain, amid walls, ditches, hedges, and houses innumerable, offered serious, if not in-

superable obstacles to the march of the Christinos. It appeared, however, that the Christino generals considered the attempt must be made, and accordingly led forth their troops to the attack. One column tried to force the bridge at Castrojana, the other crossed at Burseña. No progress was made by the first column: without destroying the bridge, the Carlists had rendered it impassable, and the Christinos were compelled to desist with some loss. On the Burseña bridge, the assailants, at first, were more successful, but they gained ground very slowly, and the repulse of the Christinos, at Castrojana, enabled the Carlists to send reinforcements to their right; so that Latre, finding that he could make no impression, drew off his men. The enemy followed, even across the river, but, charged vigorously by the Cazadores, they were driven into the stream, where many were drowned. Young Cuevillas was here killed, and altogether the loss of the Carlists might be 300 men, whilst Latre lost fully 500, and besides, completely failed. He fell back upon Portagalete.

On the 24th, the enemy's masses were seen slowly approaching the town, leaving only a rear-guard on the Castrojana heights—their sharpshooters scattered round the lines, as usual, kept up a biting fire. At noon their mortar batteries began to play, and continued, for four hours, throwing shells with extraordinary good for-

tune,—precision it cannot be termed—there was scarcely one of their missiles that did not do mischief to buildings, or individuals; three shells fell into the Convent of San Francisco, where there was a powder magazine; and, although a box of hand-grenades took fire, and twenty-eight exploded, yet by the admirable exertions of the officers and soldiers, the flames were extinguished without further damage.

Notwithstanding the trifling defences of the town, it was now seen, that since the besiegers lacked resolution to assault firmly, the ravages caused by their artillery could be easily repaired with sand-bags, and that so efficiently, as to render the works daily more formidable; so much so, that the besiegers' twelve and nine-pounders, which, at the beginning of the siege, swept away the miserable lath and plaster walls by fathoms, became incapable of doing any very serious damage; for our batteries now were faced with sand-bags, sixteen to eighteen feet thick. Thus as far as a cannonade went, besieged and besiegers were equal; but to their shells we could make no return. A city, particularly one situated as Bilbao, is an easy mark to hit,—far more so than a little pinched-up battery, about ten yards square. Nor could all our ingenuity avert the mischief occasioned by their musquetry; for, they being in quiet possession of all the heights, their fire searched every nook in the town; females were

wounded in their sitting-rooms, and the musquetry from Miravilla actually wounded soldiers in the battery at Larrinaga, the balls ranging from hill to hill, clear over the town, a distance of 700, or 800 yards; so that strong blinds had to be erected, to screen the men: but, not before Lieutenant Macduff, of the little English party, had been severely wounded in the back, by a spent ball, whilst pointing a gun against the besiegers' breaching battery. Hitherto the casualties in the garrison, and among the inhabitants, were far from being so numerous as the severity of the siege might have led one to expect. The weather continued fine, provisions abundant; the spirit of the townspeople, so far from diminishing, was brighter than ever; the soldiery imbibed something of the gay good humour of the Urbanos; and the long line of defence was guarded with still greater vigilance than ever; for each person felt, that to suffer by a surprise now, when the term of our troubles was nearly over, would have been bitter indeed.

On the morning of the 24th, the French and English consuls, with Captains Lapidge and Bouvet, went to the head quarters of Eraso, then commander-in-chief of the besieging army, to demand redress for the stoppage of their boats on the river. General Eraso was lodged in a good house, near the Puente Nueva; a few ill appointed soldiers were at the door, together with some hundreds of peasantry. In the *Sala*, above stairs,

the general was seated at dinner, with his wife, a comely dame of some thirty-five years, and about a dozen or fifteen officers; amongst whom I recognised Epalza, the famous Carlist notary,—Arjona, the son of the wealthy *asistente de Sevilla*, who owed every thing to Ferdinand, and repaid his benefactor by waging war against his daughter,—Zariategui was there, a good-looking man, and an excellent officer,—a Portuguese, whose name I did not hear,—and a young English or Hanoverian officer, named Hennigsen, whom Colonel Arjona told me (by the way he called him *Enny*) was much liked by Eraso and the other generals. In person, General Eraso was the reverse of a soldier-like looking man; tall and thin, clad in clerical black, he had the appearance of a country curate, but his face was pale and wan, although his eyes were beautiful, and shone with strange splendour. He received the English and French gentlemen with an unembarrassed dignity of manner, which was pleasing,—promised that strict orders should be given for the boats and subjects of the two powers not to be molested on any account; that he would give, besides, passes to the French and English officers, so that they might have ingress or egress at their pleasure. This done, the conversation took a general turn; they spoke of the Eliot treaty in terms of praise, but seemed rather surprised at the protracted resistance of the town, although they did not appear to

entertain the least doubt of eventually capturing it. Indeed, Arjona said that they might have taken the town the first day, had they chosen to lose 500 men, but it was of no use to throw away lives when they were certain that Latre would never force their lines, and that the garrison had little or no ammunition. However much the first part of this observation might be open to dispute, there was no mistake about the second; there they were right enough. Neither did it surprise me, that they should know so well what passed in the town, for I was aware that they received daily intelligence; besides, such is the habitual carelessness of the Spanish generals, and their lumbering mode of doing business, that, among a hostile people, their intentions are found out long before they are put in execution.

25th and 26th. — These days passed over quietly; the besiegers fired but seldom; their workmen were seen marking out a new battery, in the ravine of Ulibarri, evidently intended to flank Malona. In the Barranco del Bosque, they were also constructing a battery for two guns, to flank Larrinaga. The artillery of the town fired a few shots occasionally, at the enemy's workmen; more could not be spared; meantime the fire of musquetry was, as usual, vigorously kept up on both sides, though with small loss to either, both besiegers and besieged being now well under cover. Fresh supplies of ammunition being seen to arrive

in the Carlist camp, the inhabitants feared another bombardment, and naturally became more impatient for the arrival of the army.

At four in the morning of the 27th, the besiegers' batteries made amends for their long silence, by opening a tremendous fire. By noon they had thrown 195 shells into the town and lines, occasioning deplorable havoc. A large shell, falling into a house in the street of Barrencalle, killed the adjutant of the regiment of Ronda in his bed; the rest of the family escaped unhurt, although the explosion blew out the side of the building, and destroyed all the partitions. When the bombardment ceased, two battalions advanced, and scattering themselves around the lines, kept up such an unrelenting fire of musquetry, that, notwithstanding all the defences thrown up, the streets were nearly impassable. Above five P. M. the firing ceased, when an officer with a flag of truce presented himself at the Durango gate, with a summons to surrender. The letter brought was received, and a speedy answer promised: but as Mirasol judged that this might be a pretext to lull the town into a false and fatal security, favourable to the enemy's attempting a surprise, he very wisely doubled the patroles, increased the guards, and, besides recommending to his officers the strictest vigilance, he frequently visited the posts himself during the night.

With the dawn, the besiegers, who had been

howling hideously during the night, began to stand to their arms, leading us to anticipate a repetition of yesterday's sport, but we were mistaken: before six A. M., the musquetry ceased, and at eight A. M., the officer who brought the summons returned for an answer. Mirasol, whose object was to gain time, admitted Eraso's proposal to send two officers into the town to have an interview. For this purpose, a truce was agreed upon for four hours, all hostilities ceasing on both sides. At half past eleven A. M. the Carlist commissioners arrived, and were civilly received by Colonel Araoz, the chief of the staff, Don Juan Arana, the alcalde, and the corregidor. Accompanied by these gentlemen, the Carlist envoys, Colonels Arjona and Zariatogui, went to the house of Count Mirasol: here they summoned the town in form, declaring that their instructions from General Eraso were to the effect that all hope of succour was lost, for Valdez, the minister of war, was opposed by Villareal with superior forces, and that General Latre had been completely defeated by Sarasa at Castrojana. Persisting in his scheme to gain time, Mirasol said he was not aware of General Latre having been defeated; and therefore he supposed the besiegers would not object to his sending two officers to Portagalete to verify the fact, and for that purpose proposed to extend the truce for two days. The Carlist commissioners did not much relish this

offer, but nevertheless agreed to bear the message to their general, promising an answer by four in the afternoon. They then took their leave, returning as they came. On passing the town house, where was stationed the principal guard of the urbanos, the cheers were loud for the queen, and no little abuse was heaped upon the Carlist commissioners, their cause, and king: being, however, present, I can declare that no violence was offered to these personages, and therefore Mr. Hennigsen's account of their ill treatment is destitute of foundation. Men, like the urbanos, who knew the fate reserved for them by their implacable foes, from which all the capitulations, all the oaths in the world would not have protected them, who had seen their dwellings laid in ashes, their children slain during the siege, were not likely to be lavish in their compliments to the authors of their sufferings. Ill treatment, indeed! not a hand was lifted against them; abused by speech they certainly were, which was quite natural. Did they expect to be received with fear and trembling, or with acclamations for Don Carlos? The gallant bearing of the urbanos did not warrant the one, nor their well known principles the other. In the time of the French war, it is well known that the envoys who summoned the Spanish towns to surrender, were frequently with exceeding difficulty saved from the hands of the populace, who would have torn them to pieces:

but in the ranks of the urbanos there were none of those miscreants who disgrace a cause by their brutal cruelty on defenceless individuals. Such wretches abounded among the Carlists, composed of the lowest rabble of the cities, and the fanatic and ignorant peasantry of the mountains; the same who murdered Don Candido Arechaga, and who would have torn to pieces any of the liberals with whom they might chance to meet.

The Carlist commissioners having left the town, the truce continued for two or three hours; fourteen deserters came over, and several of the enemy, who came down to enquire for their friends, were without hesitation admitted; two, in particular, were with their relatives in conversation, when the truce terminated; not the slightest attempt was made to detain them,—they returned unmolested to their party.

A few minutes before four, a trumpeter brought a note from Eraso to the following effect; "If within two hours no envoys are sent from the town to treat for a surrender, hostilities will recommence." To which Mirasol drily replied; "Begin when you like." At a quarter past four, the Larrinaga battery opened its fire, and as the besiegers were not slow in returning it, the action became general, and lasted until midnight, when the firing ceased. The enemy's fire was wholly directed against the Larrinaga battery, which was reduced to a heap of ruins; three shells fell into

a small building in the fort, which served as a magazine, and, although the explosion destroyed the interior and roof of the edifice, the powder did not take fire; 184 bombs fell into the town, which suffered considerably; still the loss of life on the side of the besieged was small, when contrasted with the length and severity of the combat. During this action, an expense magazine, situated in a house in the rear of the besiegers' breaching battery, blew up, occasioning a serious loss of lives, as was afterwards ascertained: at a later period, the same house, either by accident or design, was set on fire, and continued burning for many hours.

After the combat ceased, a profound silence ensued; a silence so deep, that the hissing and crackling of the flames in the burning house alone were audible, although ten thousand men, lately engaged in mortal fight, rested upon their arms, within half gunshot of each other.

After this rude trial of strength, the besiegers seemed, on the following day, to be unwilling to recommence hostilities. By the advices received from Portagalete, we were aware that Valdez had been removed, and a new general appointed; also that Latre had been reinforced by a strong division, so that there was some probability of a speedy movement to raise the siege. The besiegers were very active in making signals to their different positions, construed by some as sympto-

matic of the advance of the army. Towards the afternoon, parties of the queen's troops were seen near Burseña, and during the whole of this day (29th), both besieged and besiegers seemed content to be spectators, so that, beyond a few musquet shots, nothing occurred to break the tranquillity of the scene.

On the morning of the 30th, the besiegers were silent as before; the inhabitants and garrison became impatient for the advance of the army, although perfect assurance was now entertained by all that the siege would soon be raised: many were of opinion that the enemy was withdrawing his cannon, and strongly advocated the propriety of a sortie, to make the besiegers display their force, and convince them that they could not with safety concentrate their whole army to oppose the march of the queen's forces. This advice was not, however, palatable to the military authorities; — *they* said the besiegers' lines were too strong to be easily taken; that it would cost a great many lives unnecessarily, as the city would soon be relieved. It is barely worth while to point out the fallacy of this reasoning; the Carlists were morally depressed by their failure before the place, but they had suffered little numerical loss. Now had the garrison made a desperate set upon the besiegers the instant the columns moved, they must have caused them great loss, perhaps a total defeat. Of what consequence would it have been

had the garrison lost two thousand men, if the besiegers lost as many; they must have been beaten, and this heavy loss would have added to their discouragement. Lahera's thirty thousand men would have replaced all deficiencies; besides, recruits are never wanting to the victors: but then, had the garrison marched, fought, and with the loss of two thousand bought a complete victory, a great number of those who were then speculating upon their "getting a step" for the siege, might have been beyond the reach of fear or favour.

Advices were frequent during this day and following night; several deserters also came over from the enemy; most were of opinion that the besiegers intended to give battle, but some thought they would retire without hazarding an engagement.

At dawn, on the 1st July, it was observed that the *reveille* of the Carlists was not so prolonged as usual; various movements on the part of the enemy were distinguished, all indicating a retreat. At half past eight A. M., the Carlists displayed, from the signal house at Banderas, a red flag on the eastern, and a white on the western flag-staff. This sufficiently indicated that the army was marching on both banks of the river, and in fact soon after, a despatch was received, announcing the march of the army on both sides of the river. At ten A. M. the Carlist battalions were in rapid

retreat from Castrojana towards Miravilla, and from Archanda and Olaviaga towards the Puente Nueva. With their columns were seen hurrying some hundreds of the *amiable and high-spirited peasantry*, whom zeal for their liberties, joined with a *trifling* appetite for plunder, had induced to gather from far and near, to rejoice over the ruin and fatten on the spoils of Bilbao.

At eleven A. M. the queen's troops were seen to occupy Banderas, while, shortly after, another column was seen crowning the heights of Castrojana. The besiegers were still hampered in the defiles around the town. A bold push might have carried Begoña or the Morro; in short, the opportunity was such as to tempt a blind man to strike; however, Mirasol kept still,—not a soldier moved; prudence was carried to such an extent, that it looked like fear. Near noon, the enemy having completely retired, Count Mirasol, in full uniform, went out with a detachment to meet the columns, which quietly and slowly advanced, just in proportion as the foe retired. When the Carlists halted, so did the Christinos: it appeared a burlesque upon war, and more like an agreement than aught else. With the *tide* came the flotilla, which on its way destroyed the bridge of boats at San Mamès; and at three P. M. seventeen battalions marched into the town, while about twenty other battalions were cantoned in the neighbouring villages. Little discipline was observed by the soldiery,

and numerous houses were speedily in flames. The miserable excuse offered by the generals for this shameful conduct was, that from these houses the enemy had annoyed the town. True it is, that the besiegers had derived great and manifold advantages from having possession of such solid edifices so close to the lines; but whose fault was that? Clearly of the folk called engineers, who constructed, and generals who directed the fortifications. Now that the danger was past, why destroy them? Common sense pointed out, long before, the propriety of bringing them within the line of defence; and what was from ignorance, laziness, and pride neglected before, might now have been remedied; but even experience is lost upon the queen's generals. These observations particularly apply to the church and palace of Begoña, two solid stone structures, on which the cannon of the town had made no more impression than pocket pistols. Yet Count Mirasol, from a perversity of judgment, which made the Carlists smile, ordered the tower of Begoña church to be pulled down, and the palace to be burnt!

OBSERVATIONS ON THIS SIEGE.

The three commanding positions of Artágan, Miravilla, and the Morro, which on all sides overlook the town, and are the keys of its defence, were carefully left out of the lines constructed by

the Spanish engineers, and yet the garrison of 5,300 men was amply sufficient to defend this extension; indeed, the occupation of the church and palace of Begoña alone would have paralysed the enemy's plan of attack, and also rendered fewer men necessary for the defence; for with the church and palace well fortified, and a garrison of 300 men therein, not above one-half the number actually on duty at the Circus, would have been required; besides, the Carlists had no guns of sufficient calibre to breach such solid buildings. The error was great in not fortifying these positions of Artagán, Miravilla, and the Morro; but when the place was really threatened with a siege, it was too late to attempt fortifying either the Morro or Miravilla, for each of these eminences are distant about 600 yards from the city, and there are no buildings thereon, as at Begoña, which could be instantly converted into fortresses. For this neglect, therefore, Count Mirasol deserves not blame so much as his predecessors; but, for the abandonment of Begoña, contrary to every rule of science, and to the plainest dictates of common sense, he is certainly responsible; and this neglect, had his enemy been more enterprising, would have been fatal. On the left bank of the river, near the water-side, is the church and town-house of Alvia; there are also two solid stone edifices, perfectly commanding that part of the town, and which lies between the Augustin

Convent and the Arenal, were in like manner abandoned to the enemy. On the right bank of the river, opposite the church of Alvia, stood the large building, known as the Estufa: it was the work of one night only to connect the Estufa with the convent of San Augustin, and little more was needed to place the church of Alvia in a state of defence, when that entire quarter of the town would have been secured. But Mirasol, far from adopting this measure, and thus availing himself of all those huge massy structures which girdled the city, to keep her destroyers at bay, shrunk up his defensive lines, abandoned Alvia and Begoña, and actually burnt the Estufa, which was a piece of gratuitous destruction, for three companies would have sufficed to defend the whole. In such case it would have been perhaps necessary to burn the rope-walk opposite the Estufa. In consequence of these posts being abandoned, the besiegers' light troops instantly took possession: they occupied all the houses in Alvia, whence their fire swept all the Arenal and streets contiguous, greatly incommoding also the troops in Mallona and the Circus, and thereby obliging the garrison and inhabitants to devote ten times the labour in making blinds and parapets to screen themselves from the besiegers' fire, than was required to render Alvia impregnable. This error, and it is a grievous one, must also be charged to Mirasol.

From the point of Achuri, where the river enters the town of Bilbao, to the San Augustin, its north-eastern limit, there are several fords. The first and most extensive is opposite to the open space between the Town House and the Civil Hospital, called *Los San Juanes*. This ford extends about 150 yards, in an oblique direction, crossing from the left bank of the river towards the eastern end of the stone bridge. Below the chain-bridge, opposite to the convent of San Francisco, is another and smaller ford, extending barely twenty yards. In front of the theatre is another, which, however, is only practicable at low-water, and not even then, should the river be at all swollen with rain. Near the Augustin Convent, at a place called the Chorros, the river is again fordable at low-water, and even at three-parts flood there is not three feet water, unless there be a fresh in the river. Now, it was imperatively necessary to defend these fords, either by driving stakes in the bed of the river, or by planting chevaux-de-frise, chained together, so as to render a surprise impracticable. Nevertheless, nothing was done; and had the Carlists been men of hardy valour, they would have poured in a body of 2,000 by the fords of the San Juanes, at the same time that they attacked the Circus, and in all probability the town would have been theirs without their losing above 500 men.

Nor did Count Mirasol display more judgment in the management of his sorties, although the main defence of a town, situated as Bilbao is, should consist in well-planned sorties. Never would the general attempt to sally out upon the enemy's batteries, although the capture of two or three of their guns would have been tantamount to raising the siege, and certainly would have been the preservation of the town; but, then, a sortie, to be effective, ought to be made with 2,000 or 2,500 men; and yet, with a garrison of 5,300, the general was repeatedly heard to say, that he could not dispose of a larger force than 500 for a sortie. The reasons for this extraordinary fact must be sought for in the count's own intricate arrangement of his troops, and in the organization of the Spanish regiments, which, to judge by the result, is none of the best. Contracted as the line of defence was, 2,000 men, exclusive of the urbanos, were amply sufficient for the defence. This number deducted from the strength of the garrison, as also 500 for sick, servants, *rancheros*, and such like, would still leave above 2,000 disposable. However, the number of idlers and non-combatants in a Spanish regiment is very great; but this is, of course, all the fault of the generals who allow it. Probably, of the 4,450 composing the garrison, excluding the urbanos and sailors, not less than 800 never pulled a

trigger, or did a day's work during the siege. This being the case, it is no wonder the force disposable for a sortie was so small.

Of the egregious error committed in the two sorties, of allowing the enemy to pound the flank of the column with impunity, I have already spoken, as also of the total want of a combined plan between Alaix and Mirasol, although unity of action was indispensable to success.

For the rest, Count Mirasol's conduct was very creditable; he was very active in visiting the lines night and day; and, although a little hasty in his temper, became quite popular with the soldiers; he was indefatigable in hastening on the works, and, after the first day or two, seemed to get more confidence; and notwithstanding many of his officers did not scruple to acknowledge their belief of the inutility of resistance, (it was reported that some even hinted at the propriety of capitulation), the general never despaired of making a successful struggle. The garrison behaved very well, doing their duty with alacrity and cheerfulness. Very few deserted to the enemy; and, upon the whole, the soldiers displayed, with a good deal of valour, an earnest attachment to the cause for which they were fighting, and well deserved the praise bestowed upon them by their general. The battalion of urbanos rivalled the very best troops of the garrison; indeed, this fine corps lent a spirit and enthusiasm to the garrison,

which, of a surety, they would have otherwise wanted. Either acting in a body, or as volunteers with the English detachment, or wherever there was any danger, these gallant youths were always the foremost.

As for the little band of English, commanded by Captain Ebsworth, their courage and conduct was the theme of praise with all the garrison and inhabitants. Together with some of the artillery company of the urbanos, and a few of the Spanish royal artillery, they defended Fort Larrinaga during the entire siege; and latterly it was the especial point of attack. They likewise took part in the sorties. Out of the number, three officers and twenty-five men, they had one officer and three men killed; one officer and eight men wounded, being thirteen casualties in all. Of the *ten battalions* composing the garrison, *five* sustained a smaller loss than this little detachment. In his despatch, Count Mirasol spoke, as was most just, in terms of the highest praise of the exemplary courage of Captain Ebsworth and his men; and in memory of the siege, ordered the battery of Larrinaga to be in future called Libertad.

But without the cordial co-operation of the civil authorities, and the inhabitants generally, the exertions of the military would not have prevented the fall of the place. There is, generally speaking, a lazy helplessness and want of foresight about Spanish commanders — they rarely ever

think of any thing until it is wanted, and then if not attainable, straight they blame the *gobierno*. It is unjust to expect civilians to anticipate the wants of military men, and yet such was the case with the Bilbao authorities; although generals and colonels of horse and foot, of artillery and engineers, had been in the city for twenty months, almost all the materials of defence were wanting. However, the admirable municipality soon rectified the blunders of the military; they charged themselves with the police of the town, and so well did they preserve the peace, that not a robbery, nor any disturbance took place. Enormous quantities of planks, barrels, spars, sacks, working tools, &c., were gathered together; all the labourers in the town not under arms were divided into companies, and regularly employed on the defences; the provisions were distributed with a due regard to economy, and while there was no waste, none wanted. Nor is it meet to pass over in silence the generous and noble conduct of the nationals during the siege, towards the Carlist families in the town, of whom there were hundreds; not one of them was either imprisoned, insulted, or in any way injured, although the conduct of some few among them little deserved forbearance, while the nationals knew full well that in the event of the town being taken, they would be slain, and their families either murdered or imprisoned for life. Such exemplary conduct

formed a strong contrast to the ferocious cruelties of Zumalacarreguy at Cenicero* and Ochandiano, and was highly honourable to the urbanos.

BESIEGERS' ATTACK.

If Count Mirasol committed errors in his defence, the besiegers made more in their attack: they took up their ground well, for the fault of abandoning Begoña and Alvia was too glaring not to be seen directly, but that was the only part of their conduct marked with judgment. The attack on the Circus ought to have been the false, that on Larrinaga the real one. In storming the breaches at the Circus, the assailants would have suffered from a cross-fire from Mallona and Larrinaga: it is true enough that this would not have intimidated good troops, but even less was enough to check such soldiers as the Carlists, who, being accustomed to desultory fighting—to surprisals where, at the cost of a score, they catch a hundred prisoners—did not relish the idea of marching in close column up to a breach with grape

* After taking Cenicero, the Carlist chief, in revenge for the obstinate defence of the church by the urbanos, (there was no garrison of regular troops,) tarred and feathered the wives and daughters of the urbanos, and paraded them through the streets exposed to the contumely and opprobrium of his soldiery, he, himself, beating these unfortunate females with his whip as they passed before him.

playing upon both flanks, while round-shot and musquetry are pounding the front. There is no doubt that it was the admirable position of Begoña, with its church and tower within pistol-shot of the Circus gate, that induced Zumalacarre-guy to attack in that quarter. Had Larrinaga been the point of attack, Miravilla and the Morro would have covered the assailants with their fire, and the guns at the Circus were unserviceable, after the first three hours' cannonade, for four days. Admit that the fort of Larrinaga was stronger than the Circus; but then the approaches were easier, and that fort taken, the town, in all probability, would have been lost, which was not likely to be the case at the Circus. After the decease of Zumalacarre-guy, his successor, Eraso, conducted the siege with little vigour; he allowed days to pass without his batteries firing; he changed the point of attack three times without any apparent reason. This vacillating conduct, of course, encouraged the garrison. The bombardment of the town was a silly piece of useless cruelty, justifiable, I suppose, by the laws of war, but it produced nothing beyond a more obstinate disposition on the part of the inhabitants to resist. It is very probable that Eraso's delays arose from a scarcity of ammunition, but that should have been provided against, or else his soldiers taught to win the place without expending powder. But the chief fault of Zumalacarre-guy

was the *not* taking Portugalete with the Burseña and Desierto convents, prior to his attacking Bilbao. Against his means these places would not have held out two days; then, stationing his army between Castrojana and Portugalete, he could have blockaded Bilbao with three battalions, and there is little or no probability that any amount of Spanish troops, under such commanders as Latre, Lahera, or Espartero, would have beaten on that ground the Carlist army led by Zumalacarréguy.

But the truth is, the Basque leader never anticipated such a resistance: this some of their officers testified to me one day during the siege, when I was outside. They alluded to Villafranca and other places which had so easily fallen, and seemed surprised that Bilbao held out, and still more so, when I told them that they were not likely to take it at all, unless with a loss of men which would half ruin their army. The Basque soldier, excellent in skirmishing, good behind defences, or in pouncing upon a battalion which has lost its way—where the gain is great and the risk is small,—is not at all suited for sheer hard fighting: he would rather make war for two years than fight such a battle as the 57th regiment did at Albuera. It has been the fashion to say, that if Zumalacarréguy had lived, the place would have been taken. My opinion is quite different: the leading faults of the attack were his, and his

only. Why did he not first attack Portugalete? why attack the Circus instead of Larrinaga? why not have stormed the breaches at the Circus on the Monday? they were, at least, sixty feet wide, and there was no ditch. It is said by Captain Hennigsen, that the men were impatient to be led to the assault, and cried out they were "ready to go to hell, even." I have no doubt that many of them would have had *their desires fulfilled, had they attempted an assault*; but, strange as it may appear, the 5th Navarrese battalion, chosen by lot to attack, manifested no particular anxiety to move on, and this, it is said, induced Zumalacarre-guy, (who was not wounded till the day after,) to abandon his intention of carrying the town by storm, at least for that time.

In fact, the whole campaign was full of blunders on the part of the Carlists. It was the obstinacy of Don Carlos that sent Zumalacarre-guy against Bilbao, instead of Vitoria or Pamplona,* or across the

* It may appear strange that I should propose the siege of Pamplona as an easier undertaking than that of Bilbao. The former is a first-rate fortress, but that does not alter the case: the population of Pamplona is very far from being so liberal or zealous for the queen's cause as that of Bilbao;† it is three parts Carlist; there are few national guards; and accustomed as we are to negligence of every description, who would believe there were ever sixty days' provisions in the fortress? For soldiers who

† Such was said to be the case in 1835: it may have changed for the better since.

Ebro; and even in the prosecution of the siege thus forced upon him, neither the Carlist leader nor his successor displayed either skill or conduct, and their soldiers were far, very far, from giving proofs of that desperate valour which their admirers had so lavishly attributed to them. It is even no more than truth, when I affirm that they made war upon the town more like a tribe of American Indians than a European army; their favourite employment being to scatter themselves around Miravilla, the fields of Alvia, or the houses near Begoña, and fire at any one passing in the streets, so that the batteries were by far the safest places. It was perfectly easy for them to distinguish a soldier from a civilian, a man from a woman or child, but no regard was paid by the besiegers to those trivial distinctions. One boy of ten years old was killed by a musquet-shot at my door, another wounded, as also a woman, and in the streets the casualties were numerous.

do not like to mount a breach, all places are alike, whether it be the lofty castles of Pamplona or the mud garden-walls of Bilbao. The siege becomes a blockade. Now famine will as soon reduce one fort as another, the quantity of food and number of mouths being equal. Then, again, the default of the national guards would greatly lessen the chances of the regular military making a desperate defence.

CHAPTER V.

General Cordova arrives and takes the command of the Army.—
 Carlists testify their Vexation at the Interference of the English.—Attack on the Ringdove's Boat.—H. M. S. Royalist comes into the River.—The armed Schooner, Isabel, sent from Santander to join the Squadron in the River.—Carlists under General Maroto blockade the Town.—Cordova, with the Army, having gone towards Alava.—Battle of Mendigorria.—Boat of the Isabel fired upon, and Lieutenant Pike made Prisoner.—Boats of the Royalist attacked.—Remonstrances of Captain Lapidge unattended to.—Part of the British Legion arrive at Portugalete.—Lord John Hay detained by the Carlists when passing up the River in the Ringdove's Cutter.—Blockade raised by the advance of Espartero and Ezpeleta.—General Evans, with the entire Legion, comes to Bilbao.—Fortifications on the River.—Battle of Arrigorriaga (11 Sept.)—Ezpeleta and Espartero leave Bilbao.—General Evans, with the Legion, march round by Castro and Limpias, through the Merindades, to Vitoria.—The Battalion of Royal Marines arrive in Bilbao.—Hostility of the Cordova Party to the Biscay Provinces, and to Bilbao in particular.—Famous Decree of the Blockade.—Its probable Causes.—Effect thereof upon the Trade of the Garrison Town.—Actions at Arlaban.—Siege of Guetaria.—Balmaseda taken by Eguia.—Plencia taken by Eguia.—Lequitic surrenders to the Carlists.—Cordova completely outgeneralled.—San Sebastian blockaded.—British Legion, with General Evans, returns to the Coast,—land at San Sebastian, and defeat the Carlists.—Cordova attacks the Carlists and claims a Victory—goes to Madrid.—Isturiz Ministry.—

Return of Cordova to the Army.—Excursion of San Miguel to Somorrostro. — Gomez marches westward, defeats Tello, and plunges into the Asturias.—Espartero follows, keeping always one day behind.—Carlists attack Evans and are repulsed.

THE partiality of General Valdez, when minister-of-war, had given the command of the army of reserve, then assembling at Burgos, to General Lahera, than whom a more incompetent person could probably not have been found in the ranks of the Spanish army. The other general, Latre, in his despatch, says, that he urged the march of the new general-in-chief, by all the means in his power, and that among the arguments which he used, one was to the effect, "that even the English officers had manifested an earnest desire to save Bilbao, which was very extraordinary and unaccountable."* From this sapient remark, we may fancy what sort of a genius Señor Don Manuel Latre himself was. On the entry of the army into Bilbao, Lahera published a bando, ordering the soldiers to abstain from robbery, under penalty of death. The captain of the 4th company 1st battalion of Castille, who, with his entire company, was lodged in my house in Deusto, drew up his men, and read the proclamation, which being done, he added, "This is discreditable to the army, and we do not deserve it; we are

* Quoted from memory.

punished for the faults of others." But little discipline could be expected when the officers held such language to their soldiers.

On the 3rd of July, General Cordova arrived, and took the command of the army; when Lord John Hay, who was then in Bilbao, paid him the usual visit of ceremony. The appointment of Cordova was decidedly popular with the army; he had seen much service during this war, and was almost the only officer who had gained any increase of reputation. This judicious appointment, together with the facts of the English and French governments having agreed to send each an auxiliary legion into Spain, besides other succours; and of the Carlists having just lost their leader, and suffered a repulse before Bilbao, encouraged the general opinion that, with a little management, the fortune of war would turn against the Carlists. It was not considered that the Basque population was now thoroughly hostile, that it had suffered but small numerical losses, and could still count eighty thousand able to bear arms.

The active part taken by the officers of the English squadron in the late siege, and the fact of H. M. government being determined decidedly to support the cause of the queen of Spain, occasioned a great change in the conduct of the Carlists towards the English. Very plain intimation was given that the English should not be allowed

to "*alcahuetear** *para los negros*," as they had before. Nor did they allow the British to wait long for a sample of the treatment that in future they might expect.

The Ringdove's boat, commanded by Mr. John Elliot, admiralty-mate, coming up the river under sail, was fired upon when near the English burying-ground, and two seamen were wounded. Captain Lapidge immediately wrote to Maroto, the Carlist commander in Biscay, demanding satisfaction; which was evaded, and Captain L.'s complaints were replied to by recriminations. Afterwards it was ascertained that the man who fired upon the boat was one Macharratia, formerly a waterman in the Bilbao river, now a soldier in the 1st battalion of Biscay, commanded by Luqui, † *alias* Verastegui. At a later period, when Captain Le-Hardy, of the Saracen, waited upon Maroto with a letter from Lord John Hay on the subject, wherein something was said about this man being given up, Maroto almost laughed at the idea, and all that he could be made to promise was, that he would give strict orders to prevent the recurrence of such an outrage.

A deeper revenge was soon taken by the Carlists. Three soldiers belonging to Captain Ebsworth's detachment, despite of the orders they had

* See Newman's Dictionary, *passim*.

† *Luqui*, in Basquence, means a fox—but the Celtic Basques, like the American Indians, are fond of significant nicknames.

received, would go beyond the gates of the town; they were dogged by the peasantry, and, the instant they were induced by some women to enter a house, they were set upon by a party of Carlists. Although unarmed, the soldiers fought hard, and one was killed on the spot; the other two, wounded, were led away to Arrigorriaga, where Sarasa, having had them identified, ordered them to be instantly shot. These were the first victims of the Durango decree, and these unfortunate men belonged to the crew of that vessel which, having captured twenty-seven Carlist officers, coming to join the insurrection, declared, that if their lives were not spared, they would no longer serve the queen's cause! The lives of the twenty-seven officers were spared, and many of them are now serving the Pretender; but this act of mercy, the Carlists repaid with blood,—the blood of the very men who had spared the lives of their confederates.

General Cordova had now led away the army to the line of the Arga. The Carlists, who had been besieging Puente la Reina, raised the siege at his approach, and at Mendigorria the two armies came in contact. The result was rather favourable to Cordova, who published a bombastic account of the action, which sufficed to put him at the head of the aristocratic party.

The Carlists did not display less energy after the death of Zumalacarreguy, than before; clearly shewing their strength to depend upon a

steady system, not upon one man. As a matter of course, after the death of Zumalacarreguy, the Castillian party became ascendant in the councils of Don Carlos, and the Basque party thrown into the back ground. Moreno became commander-in-chief, and Maroto replaced Sarasa in the command of Biscay—this latter chief directly invested Bilbao, so that before one month had elapsed from our late siege, we were again blockaded.

While the British commodore was in Bilbao, the Duke of Buccleugh's yacht arrived, with his brother on board, and some other gentlemen. They went out to see Sarasa, at his head-quarters near Galdacano, and were very civilly received. Some sort of apology was made for firing on the Ringdove's boat; but when allusion was made to the murdering of the Englishmen, Sarasa said, it had been done by his order, and in pursuance of the royal decree. No sort of excuse was offered, or compunction manifested; on the contrary, it was distinctly asserted, that such should be the fate of all foreigners taken with arms in their hands.

H. M. ship *Royalist* was now ordered into the river; and, shortly after Lord John Hay's return to Santander, he found, by Captain Lapidge's despatches, that the promises of the Carlist generals were not much to be depended upon, for their soldiers had again been stopping and molesting the boats of the squadron: therefore, the com-

modore fitted out the schooner Isabel, giving the command of her to Lieutenant Pike, first officer of the Castor; she came into the river, and was anchored off Luchana. There were now four British pendants in the river, and the commodore, anxious to secure the best anchorage, directed the Royalist to anchor off the Desierto, and land a party of marines, to take possession of the Convent.

As the blockading forces were pretty numerous, they occupied all the principal points on the river, cutting off all communication with Portugaleta; although, without the least concern for the town, which was now well supplied with provisions, stores, and ammunition, besides having erected fortifications on the hills of Miravilla, and Morro, so that the enemy's light troops kept at a distance, and did not much annoy the town. Their presence was, however, excessively disagreeable, and Cordova, being willing to do something, sent Espartero with a strong force. The latter obeyed with great promptness, and was at Durango most unexpectedly, the inhabitants and authorities having fled during the night. The next day he entered Bilbao; Maroto and Sarasa retiring at his approach. Ezpeleta also, who now commanded the reserve, was directed to march upon the town, to co-operate with Espartero, which he did.

But during the blockade, a sad occurrence took place, with the boats of the British squadron.— On the 14th of August, but a brief period after the

commodore's interview with Sarasa, the boat belonging to the schooner Isabel, commanded by Mr. Lodwick, admiralty-mate of the Castor frigate, but then attached to the Isabel, returning from Portugalete, was fired upon by the Carlist guard, at Luchana, when close to their own schooner. A seaman was wounded, and Mr. Lodwick himself had a narrow escape. On their coming alongside, Mr. Pike, who had witnessed the affair, and had hailed the Carlists not to fire, stepped into his boat, and crossed over to the house of Echevarria, where Castor Andachaga, who commanded the Carlists on that side, had his head-quarters, to demand satisfaction for the insult offered. Scarcely was Mr. Pike on shore, when he was seized, disarmed, and his men led away under a strong guard. Captain Barlow, of the Royalist, seeing this, considered it his duty immediately to acquaint the senior officer of the hostile conduct of the Carlists, and having manned and armed his boats, hastened down to Portugalete. Aware of his intentions, the Carlists lined the garden walls of the Convent with a battalion, and, for a mile the boats of the Royalist had to run the gauntlet of the enemy's fire, which killed two and wounded four. To add to the disaster, a marine fell overboard, and was, of course, at first considered lost; however, it appeared that he had swam on shore, and was eventually dismissed by the enemy. By extreme exertion, and favoured by the tide, the boats of the Royalist reached Portugalete. Captain Barlow's spirited conduct

was highly approved of by the commodore, and an account of this exceeding outrage transmitted to the British government, with a demand for reinforcements. A stern remonstrance was sent to the Carlist chiefs, whose answers, this time, were highly insolent,* and ascribed the blame to the English officers. Experience amply proving the futility of trusting to the promises of Sarasa, and Maroto, the ships of war, in the river, were now ordered to fire, whenever they were attacked, or any of the boats of the squadron detained, or otherwise molested.

The Carlists, aware, after this rencontre, that

* It seems to me, that the only probable way to have avoided these unpleasant disputes, accompanied with such a loss of life, was, immediately on the first boat being fired upon, to collect all the disposable force, landed, and seized sixty or a hundred head of people; if soldiers, priests, or lawyers, of course so much the better. Having got these hostages, *then* the man who fired upon the Ringdove boat, might have been demanded, and they would, most likely, have given him up. In the event of a refusal, it should then have been distinctly notified to the Carlist generals and the peasantry, through a few of the hostages set at liberty for that purpose, that the next time any boat was fired upon, and any person hurt, a hostage would be executed. One example would have had the effect desired. It is absurd to talk about executing the innocent for the guilty. When a country is in the situation of the Basque provinces, it is humanity towards your own people, and towards the inhabitants, to act in this firm manner at first. Spaniards, like the Arabs, acknowledge, in practice, no law but that of force. As events have turned out, the lives of his Majesty's seamen, who were killed by the Carlists, have *never been avenged*.

their doings would scarcely be tolerated, and that they could hardly expect that the British ships of war would allow themselves to be insulted with impunity, now drew off the river-side a little; however, not a day passed without their firing from the heights of Montecabras, and Axpé, at the boats passing up and down. This the peasantry could do with safety, as, ensconced among the rocks, they could not even be seen, much less dislodged, by the distant fire of the ships. This rendered the service of H. M. squadron, on the river, in the highest degree inglorious and annoying.

According to the instructions of the general-in-chief, Espartero was to return to Alava, and Ezpeleta to Balmaseda, as soon as the blockade of Bilbao was raised. Lest the enemy should again return to annoy this often-suffering town, the British legion was directed to be transferred to Bilbao from Santander.

Perhaps a few observations upon this celebrated corps may not be misplaced. When Mendizabal, amidst the applause of the country, entered upon the ministry, he thought that the army, if well paid, would fight, and fight better still alongside of British troops; he farther thought, by raising this large body of auxiliary troops, to identify Great Britain in a manner with the Spanish contest; and he would have fully succeeded, had not the scandalous intrigues of the aristocratic party ruined all his endeavours, and, at an early hour, disgusted the legion. It is absurd to say, that

permitting the legion to be raised was a breach of neutrality; for neutrality can only be exercised by a third power between two belligerent recognised states. Great Britain recognised no other sovereign of Spain than Isabel II.; consequently, aiding her, our ally, against a rebellion in her dominions, was a friendly act, but has nothing to do with neutrality. Had Great Britain aided Charles, it would have been acting *hostilely* to our unfortunate ally; in fact, it would be serving Spain, or rather the government of Isabel, just as the allied powers served Turkey at Navarino. Even if the British government had sent a body of its own troops to assist the queen of Spain, it would have been no breach of neutrality. For it is well known in our history, that when Charles Stuart raised the Highlands of Scotland, in the year 1745, the states of Holland sent over six battalions to defend the throne of George II.* Now France, then at war with Great Britain, assisted Charles Stuart in his enterprise, and so did Spain, and yet neither Spain nor any other power complained to the States-general of their breach of neutrality. When Don Carlos came to England, he was well aware of the treaty of the quadruple alliance, and

* No thanks, however, to the ministry, who thought to prop up the throne of the house of Hanover (reigning over twelve millions of people by their own free consent) with the purchased aid of 5,000 heavy-hoed Dutchmen, or rather of so many mercenaries that the States held in their pay.

consequently knew, previously to going to Spain, that the aid of England would be given to his niece; wherefore he can make no just complaint on the score of breach of neutrality, although he has reason to thank his good fortune that the British government, from a very prudent reluctance to commit the honour or resources of the country in too close a connection with Spanish affairs, contented themselves with simply sending a squadron to the aid of their ally. Suppose, for instance, that the Spanish Pretender enters Madrid or Valencia, and should be recognised as king of Spain by the northern powers, it would be no breach of neutrality for the Emperor Nicholas to send a fleet and army to help his ally.* This is putting an extreme case; for it is well known that Queen Isabel has reigned now four years, and that the northern powers have not yet openly acknowledged Don Carlos; besides, the presence of a Russian fleet and army in Spain would be far more hostile to France and England, than the marching of a French army into Spain could be to Russia.

But when it is considered that the British Legion was a body of troops consisting of volunteers enlisting for the service of the queen of Spain, their own government merely permitting them to go, it appears extraordinary how any one

* The northern emperor has never recognised the Queen of Spain; while, according to report, he has had always an envoy with the wandering court of Charles.

can ever have been induced to apply such a term as a "breach of neutrality" to such an acquiescence. Was it a breach of neutrality, when so many English officers and soldiers went to fight for the freedom of Columbia and Peru, against old Spain? Was it a breach of neutrality when Romarino and his followers went to Poland, in 1830? Was it a breach of neutrality for Don Carlos to have foreigners in *his* camp?—for he has had them, and has still in great numbers, although not in organised bodies,* like the British Legion. I hope these observations will suffice to show that the British government could have done much more than they have thought fit to do for the cause of Isabel, without any breach of neutrality.

Now, as to the *policy* of organising, at an immense expense, such a force as the British Legion, there may be many opinions. My own is decidedly against it. Raised in haste,—composed of all classes,—the majority of the men having never handled a musket in their lives, it required no small time to make soldiers of these men, independently of which, some of them were only engaged for one year; and this, joined to the high rate of pay, expensive appointments, &c., made this corps of 7,000 or 8,000 men cost, probably, double the amount of a Spanish force of similar strength. I think it would have been better to

* Since September, 1836, he has had a foreign legion or battalion, chiefly composed of deserters from the French or Algerian Legion.

have recruited wholly in Ireland, for the old Irish regiments in the Spanish service were still in existence in 1833. There were three, Hibernia, Ultonia, Irlanda; any number of battalions might have been given to each regiment, and such a corps officered by the O'Neils, O'Reillys, O'Donnells, Shelley, Conway, and others, all well known in the Spanish army, would probably have been of more essential service than the British Legion, and would, beyond a doubt, have been cheaper. This, however, is but an opinion, although certainly not one formed *after* the dissolution of the legion; on the contrary, I advocated the re-organization of the Irish regiments as far back as 1834.

To proceed: Two battalions, the 7th and 6th, came round to Portugalete, and were soon followed by more. Within two days, the steamers and numerous small craft brought round the entire force, with their enormous *materiel*, and still more enormous baggage. Marching towards the town, the rifles were lodged at Sorosa; the 10th at Oliviaga; the 1st at San Mamés; the 2nd in Deusto; the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, were in the town; the 4th and 5th were at Portugalete, the latter in particular was a very scanty battalion. Accustomed as the Spanish soldiers are to being billeted upon the inhabitants, hardly any attempt is ever made in time of war to lodge them in barracks; thus, there was no provision of beds, bedding, nor any thing like it, for the men on their arrival, and

this naturally gave rise to complaints. Unless the municipality of Bilbao had taken the beds from the inhabitants, they had none to give; nor was there even any straw to be had, for no force short of two battalions could venture to forage the surrounding country, and Mirasol objected strongly to risk his men for such a trivial object, preferring to bring the straw round from Castro. However, the weather was uncommonly fine, and the healthy men could not suffer much. The cavalry and hospitals were left at Santander; the former consisting of two fine regiments, were a great loss to the division, for there is no country, however mountainous, where a few good cavalry are not of service: in proof of which, look to the great advantage derived by the Carlists from their few and ill-appointed squadrons of horse! Although not a soldier, I have no doubt that a compact body of cavalry would often avert the disasters of a defeat, and add to the advantages of a rout of the enemy; for it must be observed, that the horse are the only troops which a flying foe, favoured by the population, cannot mock with impunity.

A few days after the arrival of the British Legion, the queen's generals, Espartero and Ezpeleta, prepared to march, and after some deliberation, determined to proceed by the valley of Orduña. The Carlists had gathered in great force around the town, declaring that they would give battle to all the forces united, and their king was at Durango, with five battalions of infantry;

so that, from this central point, he could bring this force to aid the troops in front of Bilbao, or those in front of Vitoria, where Cordova was with the main army, the distance being fifteen and twenty miles respectively. With that good fortune which usually favoured the Carlists, their generals received early intimation of the day and hour fixed for the march of the Christino army; in consequence of which the king arrived in their camp with five battalions, at midnight, and a large force was detached from the lines of Arlaban, by Villaro and Orosco; for, when one good friend in Ezpeleta's camp advised them of the time fixed for their march, another, in Cordova's army, informed them that he would not march on that day.

On the 11th September the divisions of Ezpeleta and Espartero, about 9,000 strong, marched from Bilbao by the Puente Nueva, and took the road to Orduña. To protect the left flank of their march, Count Mirasol, accompanied by General Evans, with six battalions of the legion, left the town with about 3,000 men belonging to the garrison. Scarcely had the leading files of Ezpeleta's column opened upon the spot where the road from Durango and Orduña unite, when a heavy fire was poured in on the column. Some confusion at first ensued; but a battalion being sent forward in skirmishing order, dislodged the enemy, who retired fighting upon his main body. A brigade

of the Christinos was now sent over the heights of Ollargan, towards Miravalles and Arrigorriaga, which had the effect of enabling the column to advance as far as the former place. Here a deep glen descends from Pagasarri, forming the south-east boundary of Ollargan; in the bottom of this ravine flows a small rivulet, and over it, near its junction with the Nervion, is a bridge, across which passes the road to Vitoria and Orduña. This bridge was held by the Carlists, who, after some resistance, were dislodged, and the column advanced along the road, whilst the enemy still tenaciously held the upper part of the ravine just mentioned. It was now past twelve, and Ezpeleta, thinking that all farther resistance would be but trifling, sent word to Mirasol that he might return with his division. Accordingly the British Legion, with the two field-pieces, were marched into the town, where they had scarce arrived when orders came for their return; and indeed it was time, for Ezpeleta, after passing Miravalles, finding the position of Arrigorriaga held by the Carlists in great force, and learning also that they had secured the passes at Orduña, determined to return to Bilbao; and, in consequence, halted his troops, and gave orders for them to march back. The retrograde movement of the Christinos, of course, brought the Carlists headlong on, and the rear was speedily engaged. It is reported, that when the Christino general ordered a retreat, he never sent a fresh brigade to the rear, but allowed it to be composed of

the same battalions which had formed the advance, and had already been roughly engaged, and sustained no trifling loss ; nor did his foresight extend so far as to suspend his retreat until he had secured the heights of Ollargan, around the flank and base of which was the line of march.

The Carlists, who had never abandoned the upper part of the glen of Miravalles, now sent a large force in that direction, to seize the heights of Ollargan. It was done ; and while the rear of the Christino columns was furiously assailed, the eastern slope of Ollargan sparkled with fire, the effect of which was soon visible in the fearful confusion which ensued among the dense columns which now choked the road at its base. Now Ezpeleta's bad generalship had to be atoned for by the blood of his soldiers. The error of withdrawing the English was apparent, for they might, at an earlier hour, have occupied the heights ; whereas now they were unable to advance along the left bank of the river, by reason of the enemy holding the woody slopes, at the foot of which was the road ; and the right bank of the river, by the Puente Nueva, was thronged with retreating troops. Thus the English battalions were reduced to be mere spectators.

The head of the Christino column was now on the bridge, and the troops passed over rapidly. A battalion was posted in the houses on the west side of the bridge, whose fire, in some degree, checked the Carlists on the woody slope of Ollar-

gan; but the rear of the column was still furiously attacked; the men got clubbed and unmanageable; and the enemy, closing with them, made many prisoners, while not a few, hurled over the steep banks into the river, were drowned. Now, the troops left on the other side would have been sacrificed, had not Espartero, in person, led a handful of horse over the bridge, and charged furiously the disorderly advance of the Carlists, jammed in the narrow road with steep banks. Many were lanced by the troopers, who thus gave time for the infantry in the houses to escape to the other side. Espartero, himself slightly wounded, then returned with his men, and the Carlists, gathering in force, now pushed their guerillas across the bridge, and drove the Christians from the houses on the right or east bank. Again they were driven back by Espartero, but they returned and made good their footing. The 3rd or 7th regiment of the legion was then sent down the hill to dislodge them, which was done by two companies only, with equal courage and order. The regiment kept the vantage, and after a slight renewal of the firing, for a short time, the combat ceased, the 7th regiment retiring at nine P. M. in the utmost order, unmolested into the town. Thus ended the famous action of Arrigorriaga, discreditable to the abilities of Ezpeleta, who proved himself unfit to be entrusted with such an important command. Espartero displayed much personal courage, and his conduct through-

out the day was that of a gallant soldier. The calm valour of General Evans was much noticed. At one time he was so near the enemy, that had not Captain Turner, R. A., rode after him to warn him of his danger, he would, very probably, have been captured.*

The Carlist loss in this action, according to Belingero, one of their generals in command, amounted to 400, that of the Christinos to between 1000 and 1200, of whom about 350 were brought in wounded; I should consider an equal number were killed or drowned, and the rest taken prisoners.

A few days after this action, Ezpeleta, with one division, left the town for Balmaseda, taking the road by Castrojana; the divisions of Evans and Espartero taking up positions to protect his march, which was performed without molestation. This done, the protecting divisions returned to the town. Notwithstanding the numerous forces collected in Bilbao, the Carlists continued hovering round, stopping the peasants from bringing provisions, picking up stragglers, or, indeed, any one who ventured beyond the outposts. In order to restrain the audacity of the enemy and to preserve the communication with Portugaleta, so

* In their account of this action, the Bayonne journals said that Evans, with 500 of the legion, were taken prisoners, and the whole immediately stripped and shot. No doubt the wish was father to the thought. The legion had *one* killed and *six* wounded; prisoners, *none*.

essentially important to the city and army, it was determined to fortify the hills of the Morro and Miravilla, as also the convents of San Mamés and Capuchinos, with the hill of Banderas. The small blockhouse, which had previously been constructed in Olaviaga, and destroyed by the Carlists during the past siege, was rebuilt, while the bridge of Luchana, partially destroyed by the besiegers, was repaired and fortified, sufficiently to repel an enemy unfurnished with cannon. The convent of the Desierto was now held by a detachment of royal marines, commanded by Captain Malloch, and this important post was becoming a respectable fortification. Portagalete, also, was strengthened with extra works; a small martello tower was erected on the hill above it, of which the plan was good, but the execution indifferent. With these precautions, in addition to the flotilla in the river, it was considered that the navigation was secure.

On the 24th of September, the division of Espartero left Bilbao by the road to Somorrostro; the British division accompanied the march as far as Sodupé, a village about ten miles from Bilbao, and as the country is very mountainous, the march thither and return the same day, was very creditable to these young soldiers—the more so, when it is considered that their knapsacks were twice as heavy as those of the Spanish soldiers, and that they had few or no stragglers. The

remainder of the time they passed in Bilbao, was chiefly occupied in drilling and disciplining the troops, who, being new levies, of course required it. Occasionally, the general-in-chief, with his escort, visited the adjoining valleys of Asua, Miravalles, and Baracaldo, as much to become acquainted with the ground as to reconnoitre the enemy's position. However, on the 10th of October, having received information that the army at Vitoria intended a movement in advance, General Evans led forth his division on the road to Durango, to call the enemy's attention to that quarter. The troops marched in two columns upon Galdacano, when, having passed the defiles, they turned to the left, and ascended the heights to Larrabesua; they then proceeded along the crest of the mountain range until they reached the Alto de Santo Domingo, whence they descended by the Bermeo road to the town. Wherever the columns marched they met with uncompromising hostility from the natives: the peasantry fled their dwellings, or lurked in the thickets to fire upon the rear-guard. It was dark ere the troops reached the main-road, and no small confusion was caused in passing some broken ground before arriving at the Santo Domingo, so that it was fully ten P.M. ere the last of the column entered the city. From the paucity of force shewn by the Carlists, it would seem that the march of the column failed to cause a diversion, probably because the enemy, from his

excellent intelligence, was aware that nothing serious was contemplated.

Hitherto it was supposed that the British Legion would remain at Bilbao, until it was in an efficient state to take the field, and that when such should be the case, it would commence operations by occupying Durango and Elorrio, in conjunction with a Spanish force, covering Bilbao, and paralyzing the Carlist forces in front of Vitoria, by holding a strong position only three leagues in their rear, and straitening their supplies of provisions. The roads being good in every direction from Durango, and the country comparatively open, an enemy cannot so easily blockade a force stationed there, or even interrupt its communications. Of this the French were well aware, so that although they often evacuated Bilbao, they ever clung fast to Durango.* The legion being about 8000 strong, had a force of 5000 Spaniards been added, the position of Durango could have been held with 7000, while 5000 more might have encamped at Sornosa, half way between Bilbao and Durango. The Carlists would thus have been cut off from the litoral of Biscay, except by the valley of Marquina, and the cavalry of this corps d'armée, supported by two battalions, could at any time have swept the rich valley of Guernica. It is not likely that the Carlists would have been successful had they attacked either the positions at Sornosa or Du-

* In the great war of independence, from 1808—14.

rango; nor could they have maintained themselves in the lines of Arlaban. The probability is, that in such case, their forces would have concentrated upon the knot of mountains around Segura and Oñate; but this would have shut them out from Biscay, thrown them back upon Guipuscoa and France for their supplies, and almost isolated their main body from the partisan chiefs who made war in the encartaciones and the west of Alava. I am aware, that had the Christinos adopted this plan, and the Carlists found themselves at all hampered for room, they would have despatched light brigades to get into the rear of the main army, by crossing the Ebro and overrunning Castille; still, however, they would have been more straitened than they were by Cordova's plan, which abandoned to them all the country north and east of Vitoria and the Ebro, except the garrisons of Bilbao and Balmaseda, which remained strictly on the defensive; whereas, had General Evans, with his division of 12,000 or 13,000 men, been at Sornosa and Vitoria, the reserve division could have moved forward upon Amurrio, and the garrison of Bilbao could have furnished a brigade to scour the country for a few miles round. But General Cordova had taken it into his head that the Carlists could be starved out by a strict blockade; a most incomprehensible idea, seeing that from Roncesvalles to Portugalete, the line is 150 miles, to defend which he had

about 40,000 men, including the British and French legions, but exclusive of garrisons. His opponents, on the other hand, mustered fully 25,000, were perfect masters of the country, and their troops were twice as active as his, while their operations were conducted with so much secrecy and celerity, that when they attacked, little time was given for preparation.

In pursuance of the plan thus formed, General Cordova gave orders to General Evans to join him at Vitoria: for that purpose he detached Espartero from the main body, who, with good judgment, marched straight upon Villareal de Alava, thus obliging the enemy to concentrate their forces upon the lines, because Cordova threatened from the side of Guerara. This accomplished, Espartero made a rapid flank march upon Ochandiano, passed the defiles of Mañeria, and reached Durango, which once more was emptied of its inhabitants at his approach, and the next day he entered Bilbao, having lost scarcely twenty men in this bold and skilful march.

The route to be taken by the legion was now the subject of long and anxious deliberation; for, although Espartero's division alone had descended the mountains into the vales of Biscay, it was by no means clear that he could have returned in safety by the same road: it was even matter of serious doubt, whether, when united with the British, the entire body would suffice to force the

formidable defiles of Mañeria,* in the event of the enemy choosing to defend them in earnest. Had the legion been composed of veteran soldiers, inured to war, as accustomed to marching, and as little encumbered with baggage as their allies, the difficulty would have been trifling; but the park of artillery alone, with the ordnance stores, required 500 draught-cattle, and for all the other endless baggage belonging to the legion, probably not 3000 mules would have been too many.†

* The pass of Mañeria can only be attacked in front, and cannot be turned, whilst the defenders have three lines of retreat open. A force from Vitoria directed upon Gorbea, would render Mañeria untenable, but the retreat is perfectly secure either upon Oroscó or Aramayona.

† From the prodigious quantity of baggage and other *impedimenta*, brought out by the officers of the legion, (some individual officers had sufficient equipage to load *six* mules!) a mere spectator would have concluded that these gentlemen either anticipated little to do, or else a campaign upon a grand scale, such as those of the Duke of Wellington against the French marshals, when the Spanish population was so favourably disposed to the British. Independently of the expense, a large stock of military finery is always inconvenient to the soldier on active service, and it becomes doubly so in a country where every inhabitant is an open or concealed foe. Mules and animals of transport are scarce at the best of times, and when to this are added the numerous thefts committed by the camp followers, and above all, the active fox-like foe, adroit in thieving and always on the look-out, it need not excite our wonder that many a gallant officer's superb *kit* was sadly curtailed of its fair proportions ere it arrived at Vitoria. The less baggage the better, is probably a safe rule at all times; but it is emphatically so in a war against a hardy but active

Now, it was not to be expected that such a monstrous convoy could be got in safety over Mount Gorbea, and therefore this route, although for other reasons very desirable, was abandoned, and the road by Balmaseda chosen.

When it was publicly known that the legion was to march, it was amusing to see the scramble for cattle, among the officers. Miserable animals, taken from carrying sand, or bricks, dear at any price, or even as a gift, were eagerly bought up at 10*l.* to 15*l.* each; although certain to break down or founder by the way-side. At length, on the 28th of October, early in the morning, the troops stood to their arms, and began their slow march along the left bank of the river, in company with Espartero's division, and the fine regiment of *Chapelgorris*, or *red caps*, now attached to the legion. It was soon seen, that the generals considered even the road by Castrojana, and Sodupe, to Balmaseda, too dangerous; for, on reaching Sorrosa, they ordered the columns to march on to Portagalete. Strange as it may appear, in a march of only eight miles, such disorder should occur, and so much time be lost. Espartero, with his Spaniards, was in Somorrostro, by two o'clock, while, I have been informed, that there were bat-

mountain peasantry. I should say, a blanket, sandals, one change of linen, glazed hat, with a light fusil, was the best equipment. In war, as in trade, those who work hardest and live hardest, win!

talions of the legion, who did not reach their quarters until eight in the evening. These eight miles might be easily marched, by any one, in three hours, and opposition there was none—not a shot was fired; yet, the disorder exceeded belief. Even between Bilbao, and Sorrosa, (three miles), scores of mules, and ponies, over-laden or improperly laden, might be seen struggling in ditches, and lying in the road:* further on, the *average* among the impedimenta became greater. Soldiers, not a few, were seen lying down on the road, not exhausted by the fatigue of a six miles' march, on a level road, or by the weight of their arms and accoutrements, but, as was afterwards discovered, overcome by the strength of the rum, the prudent commissary having, either with or without orders, and possibly to economise transport, issued to the men, with their three days' rations, three days' allowance of spirits! The consequences were such as might have been expected.

At Portugalete, great quantities of baggage were shipped in small craft, to Santander, and, that

* It was reported, that some of the soldiers were killed by the peasantry, whilst thus lying in the road, either asleep, or intoxicated. I remember, also, there being some talk of a serjeant found asleep, under a hedge, by two peasants, and *buried alive!* A man, accused of this crime, conjointly with other murders, was some time after brought to Bilbao; but I never heard whether this particular offence was proved against him.

done, the troops directed their march upon Castro. The confusion and disarray among the baggage was greater than on the day previous; for instance, Colonel Ebsworth, of the 5th, had his baggage *all* stolen, by his servant, in league with a Chapelgorri; the latter brought *his* share of the spoil, consisting of a large portmanteau, the contents worth 100*l.*, safe into Castro, and deposited it with a friend; but the alcalde, happening to get scent of the business, obtained possession of the trunk, and sent it to the author, who had it safely forwarded to the owner. It appears, that the filial piety of the worthy Chapelgorri was so strong, that he had declined taking any thing out of the trunk, reserving it all to be sent to his mother, at San Sebastian.

From Castro, there is a fine turnpike-road to Balmaceda; but General Evans declined marching by that route, taking, in preference, the coast path from Castro to Lareto, and Limpias. Part of this road, (that between the river Oriñon, and a small hamlet, about a league from Laredo,) crosses the Monte Candina, a rugged rocky mountain, and is, probably, as bad, or worse, than any other road in Spain. From Limpias the legion continued their route for Castille, by the fine road made in the reign of Charles IV. to facilitate the export of wheat, from Castille, — which leads through Frias to Briviesca, where it unites with the high road from Madrid to Vitoria, and France.

Shortly after the march* of the Anglo-Spanish army, the Madrid government recalled General Mirasol, and re-appointed D. Fermin Iriarte, to the command of the province; the same officer

* I remember reading, soon after this march, a long rambling speech made by a gallant officer, in the House of Commons, wherein he greatly eulogised the conduct of General Evans, in thus "effecting a junction with Cordova." One would imagine that the officer in question, considered this march as a scientific strategic movement, wherein a large hostile army was baffled in all its efforts to prevent a junction—when the real fact is, that the Carlist army made not the slightest attempt to prevent the junction: indeed, so safe was the road from the ports of Limpias and Santander, to the interior of Castille, that merchants and carriers travelled it very frequently without escort. At Bilbao, Generals Evans and Espartero, had the choice of four roads leading to Vitoria. The most easterly was that by Durango and Ochandiano, with the pass of Mañeria, distance 12 leagues, or 48 miles; the next, by the road leading through the valley of Orosco, over the heights of Altubi, distance 11 leagues or 44 miles. This route is one continued defile, and it would have been the height of temerity to adopt it. The third, by the valley of Orduña, distance 15 leagues, was, perhaps, the best; for, after passing Llodio, (3 leagues from Bilbao), the road is open as far as Orduña, and no enemy could hold the Peña of Orduña against superior forces in Alava, with the large army of Evans and Espartero, in possession of the town of Orduña, with the adjacent country. No doubt, however, the recent action of Arrigorriaga, had some influence in preventing the generals from choosing this line of march. The fourth road is by Castrojana, to Balmaceda, thence by Medina del Pomar, crossing the Ebro, by the bridge of Puente Larra, and thence by Treviño to Vitoria;—this line is about 22 leagues, or near 90 miles, and after leaving Balmaceda, is all through a friendly country. The route chosen by General Evans,

who had been so unfortunate at Guernica. Previously to this defeat, he had enjoyed a high reputation as a bold and skilful leader, but lat-

was the next in succession, that of Lempias, and the distances may be thus enumerated;—

	Leagues.	
Bilbao to Portugalete	are 0	2
Portugalete to Castro	” 3	5
Castro to Lempias	” 6	11
Lempias to Frias	” 7	18
Frias to Briviesca	” 5	23
Briviesca to Miranda de Ebro	” 8	31
Miranda de Ebro to Vitoria	” 6	37

Or, about 150 miles, or three-fold the distance of the Orozco, or Durango line. I am far from calling in question the propriety of the general's determination, in selecting this route; but it seems to me, that his reasons for so choosing, were, that he had not sufficient confidence in the discipline and organization of his army, and its consequent capability of marching 40 miles through the enemy's country; and, therefore, preferred taking a road which, though far longer, offered the certainty of being unmolested. This, joined to the great quantity of baggage, and stores, were doubtless sufficient inducements; yet it cannot be denied, that the Basque peasantry looked upon this march as a tacit acknowledgement that, even the redoubtable English feared their prowess: their leaders very properly told them so, and they readily believed it, and this had no small effect on their bold and daring comportment in after times, against the legion. Many are of opinion that the line of march ought to have been by Durango, all baggage, not easily transportable, being left in Bilbao. The mornings, in autumn, are foggy, and a steady march from Durango, at midnight, would have brought the troops, by five in the morning, to the jaws of the defile. The enemy's fire could not be very dangerous, in a thick fog, and a rapid advance

terly his spirits sunk, and his bodily infirmities so increased, that he was scarcely able to walk, or even to mount on horseback. From the arrival of General Iriarte, to the end of the year, nothing particular occurred in Bilbao, or its neighbourhood; the fortifications went slowly forward—the bastions of the Circus, Mallona, and Larrinaga, were greatly strengthened, and a ravelin was thrown out between the burying-ground, and Mallona. A ditch was also nearly completed throughout the whole extent of the line, so that their appearance became daily more different to what they had been during the past siege. The forked hill of the Morro was now crowned with two redoubts, mounting seven pieces of cannon; on Miravilla a small fort was constructed, so that in the event of another siege, our streets would be comparatively free from musquetry. Upon the river, the Convent of San Mames began to assume a rather formidable appearance; the beautiful woods, which had surrounded it, were unsparingly hewn down; a large battery was constructed upon its northern and western front, and a deep ditch enclosed the building on three sides, and it was connected by a covered way, with a picket-house, distant about 150 yards, which had been

would carry the column safely through the defile—or, two brigades of howitzers, might be brought up, in broad daylight, to shell the enemy out of their position, for they would not stand long under the fire of a dozen howitzers.

loopholed, and put in a posture of defence. Below, on the fourth, or east side, flowed the broad but shallow Nervion, at low water only one foot deep, with a hard gravelly bottom.

The Convent of the Capuchins being commanded on every side, no guns were placed therein; the garden wall was loopholed, and so was the building, but no other defences were deemed requisite. At Luchana, and Banderas, some slight fortifications were thrown up, and a gun placed in each. At Portugalete, a large star redoubt was in course of construction upon the hill, which overlooks that place, and when finished, would render the town tenable, even against an enemy provided with heavy cannon. But what made the river more secure than any thing else was the occupation of the Desierto Convent, by the marines of the British squadron, a measure imperatively necessary for the safety of H. M. ships; since the position, a small peninsula, strong in itself, well supplied with fresh water, was easily tenable with a small force, and commanded the best anchorage.

In December, General Cordova was pleased to publish a decree, prohibiting every description of wares and merchandise from being sent out from any town garrisoned by the queen's troops, unless for the use of other garrisoned towns, and even this *indulgence*(?) was restricted by the clause that security for double the amount was to be

given by the exporter, for the due and true arrival of the goods, at the place of destination; thus making the exporter liable to the risk of warfare, not a syllable being said about granting escorts. Nothing could be more impolitic than this decree, and as it was generally reported and believed that Cordova was devoted to the French interest, few doubted but that it was published in consequence of private representations from Bayonne, whose dealers, by this measure, were made the sole suppliers of every article needed by the Carlist population of the Basque provinces, and of large quantities even for the Christinos.

Let us examine this decree a little closely. Cordova, having adopted the line of the Arga, from Pamplona to its union with the Ebro, and from the Ebro at Puente Larrá to Balmaceda and Castro, as his famous line of blockade, it follows that he held *within* the line, Vitoria and its dependencies, Peñacerrada, Treviño, Bilbao, Portugalete, Plencia, Bermeo, Lequeitio, Guetaria, and San Sebastian, the garrisons of which places might amount to rather more than 13,000 men, and the inhabitants to near 40,000, of whom at least 25,000 were attached most strongly to the cause of Isabel, and furnished no less a body than 2,700 national guards, at least as good, if not rather better, than the same number of army soldiers. Now, since up to the date of Cordova's decree, provisions had not been grown in the

streets of these towns (nor has such been the case since, to my knowledge,) it follows that these 53,000 people were dependent upon the adjoining country for their food, and the country-people, in like manner, were dependent upon the towns for their supply of money to pay their rent and taxes, and for oil, salt, clothing, &c., such as they themselves did not produce. This intercourse of the garrison-towns with the country population was productive of considerable utility to them, because, in the first place, they obtained their customary supplies of provision; secondly, the trade of exchanging their stores of colonial and dry goods with the peasantry, left a profit wherewith to maintain their families and pay their heavy contributions; and, thirdly, because this trade, to the mutual advantage of both parties in some small degree, abated the rancour of the war. It is true that the Carlists were repeatedly publishing decrees, prohibiting the peasantry from coming to Bilbao and the other garrison-towns; but it is equally true that they frequently rescinded those orders, at the instance of the country-people themselves, who declared their inability to pay their taxes, unless they could sell their produce. Even while the Carlist decrees of blockade were in force, they came daily to Bilbao to buy and sell. However, after this order of Cordova was published, the peasantry were stopped, searched, and their petty purchases of a single stock-fish, a pint of

spirits or oil, taken from them; nay, I have even seen the peasant women, who from time immemorial had been in the daily habit of bringing bread from the village of Gordijuela to Bilbao, prohibited from carrying back the bread they had been unable to sell in the city. Of course, this conduct exasperated the country people beyond measure; it destroyed the trade of Bilbao; compelled large numbers of the inhabitants to emigrate; raised the price of provisions about fifty per cent.; and benefited only the French dealers at Bayonne and on the frontier, who now sold provisions to the garrison towns at an immense profit, and supplied the Basque provinces with sugar, oil, brandy, cocoa, tobacco, woollens, linens, and cotton manufactures, which the country inhabitants had previously purchased at Bilbao and San Sebastian. In this instance, at least, General Cordova showed himself sufficiently zealous to the interests of France.

But, insufficient as were the motives, and injudicious as were the results of this famous, or rather infamous, system of blockade, the queen's faithful adherents in Bilbao would have submitted patiently, had they found it in any way beneficial to the cause, and had they not beheld the influential favourites of Cordova and other Spanish generals infringing it continually to their own profit. As a means of *starving* the Carlists, the blockade was so inefficient as to excite the utmost

merriment among the country population. Who, before this sapient commander, ever dreamed of the towns starving the country? And as for infringing the blockade,—at a time when the enemy was in great want of tobacco, that article being scarce and dear in Bayonne, and when a poor peasant girl carrying an ounce outside the gate was robbed of it by the guard, I saw carts laden with many thousand pounds of tobacco leave Bilbao (by virtue of an order obtained from Cordova himself,) ostensibly for Vitoria; but as the carts left by the Durango road, and were in the hands of the factions ere they proceeded half a mile, I leave it to the reader to imagine for whose use the tobacco was sent. In a military point of view, this blockade system was highly disadvantageous to the queen's cause; for, by abandoning all the country within the lines to the enemy, it allowed him to recruit and organise his army without let or hindrance; enabled him to proceed steadily in manufacturing cannon, small-arms, and military stores of all descriptions; to strengthen with fortifications a naturally difficult country; and, above all, to impress the population of the provinces with the idea, that the Christinos once expelled, would never return to molest them; that victory, crowning their first efforts, would continue to wait on their standards, until the black cross and cowl ruled triumphant over Madrid.

The attention of the Carlist forces being at-

tracted towards Vitoria, where the concentration of such imposing forces seemed to betoken some decisive movement, Bilbao was in a manner neglected by the enemy during the winter, which was long and rigorous beyond example. Thus, with the exception of the progress on the fortifications, nothing material occurred. A small force, usually consisting of one battalion of Biscayans, commanded by Castor Andachaga,* and another under the orders

* About this time the wife of a farmer in Baracaldo told the author a whimsical story of Castor. The good woman prefaced it by saying—“*Ya estamos seguros de ganar el pleyto, un angel nos ha dicho.*”† “Indeed,” I replied, “it is news to me that revelations occur now a days.” “Yes,” said the dame; “last week, after Castor had heard mass at Alonsoategui, and was very sorrowful for the loss of a party of his men killed a few days previously by the garrison of Balmaceda, an old woman appeared suddenly before him, bade him be of good cheer; that St. Michael and our Lady watched over his safety, and that of his brave followers, who all went direct to heaven (when killed in battle) although they might be then in mortal sin. More of this description was added, and then Castor asked her before witnesses, whether D. Carlos would win? to which the lady replied, ‘He will, after a long and terrible war; but not in this year, nor the next.’ Then, observing Castor to look incredulous, she said, ‘I came not to answer questions, but to warn you against treachery. Within twenty-four hours, a man, dressed as a friar, will come and seek an interview with you alone; it will be granted; he will tell you that he is a spy, come to negotiate the surrender of Balmaceda or Mereadillo; will hand over documents in proof; and, when you are engaged in reading, will attempt to stab you with a

† We are now sure of winning the game, an angel has said so.

of Sarasa, remained constantly in the neighbourhood. One company was stationed in Santo Domingo, whence, after dark, they used to shoot down the ravines, cruising along the river side, in the hope of meeting a stray soldier or passenger, whom they might plunder and slay. With a similar intent, another company was quartered in the villages around the heights of Axpé, who, besides often firing on the boats of the squadron, on one occasion seized an officer of H. M. ship Ringdove, (Mr. T. Heywood) when shooting on the sands opposite Portagalete. His captors despoiled him of his gun and other effects, and made him send on board for his ransom, which they fixed at eighty dollars, but eventually

dagger.' The bystanders were astonished; Castor *not less so*, and demanded of the ancient dame, if she was willing to be locked up the twenty-four hours, to see if one part of her prediction came true. She answered in the affirmative; was duly bolted and locked into a small room, with sentinel at the door, &c. The 'friar' made his appearance in due course, was admitted to an interview, produced a bundle of papers, and was miraculously arrested when going to stab Castor, who, full of gratitude to the old lady, runs to thank her, to set her at liberty, and load her with gifts; but she had vanished, leaving a scroll for the king, which was duly forwarded to his majesty." Thus far my informant. This was not a badly got up story; the peasantry devoutly believed it, and Castor became more popular than ever. What an easy task for their leaders to rule such a people, who almost offer a premium to be cheated! Sam Butler's couplet applies very well:—

To some the pleasure is as great,
In being cheated as to cheat.

were content with forty, on the receipt of which they released the gentleman. Captain Lapidge, of the Ringdove, wrote an indignant letter upon this new outrage to Sarasa, who, after some demur, returned the money and the fowling-piece. As the threats of the peasantry against the British officers were openly made, it was deemed a proper precaution to issue orders that none belonging to his majesty's ships should be out after dark.

Early in January, General Cordova led out his army, composed of the British and French legions, with the Spanish troops, in all above 25,000 men, to attack the Carlist lines at Arlaban; and however his partisans may gloss it over, it is clear that his fine army suffered a repulse. I am aware that he claimed the victory, which was absurd; for he had to return to Vitoria, with the loss of 1,000 men, the enemy holding all their positions. It was reported, and currently believed, that on this occasion the queen's general retired without giving notice to General Evans, thus giving the Carlists a broad hint to fall with their entire force upon the legion. To this, however, they were not at all inclined; for they knew, that to attack the English force *when in position*, might expose them to a defeat, and that even a victory would cost them two or three thousand men. Their intention, therefore, was to harass the legion with skirmishes, in which they justly felt themselves equal, if not superior; but the rapid

and judicious retreat of General Evans saved them that trouble. To conceal his chagrin, Cordova now marched away to Pamplona, with the French Legion and a large detachment of the Spanish army. The legion remained at Vitoria, where bad food and worse lodging, added to the rigour of the season, caused the typhus to break out amongst the English with such virulence, that before the fell disease ceased its ravages, nearly two thousand officers and soldiers had perished, while the hospitals were encumbered with above a thousand sick. As if the pestilence did not destroy the *hated foreigners* sufficiently fast, the Carlists suborned persons to poison the soldiery, both of the British and French legion. In Vitoria, two scoundrels, alias Basque patriots, were detected and hanged for this Christian proceeding. Such was their fate; their memory was, and is, highly cherished by the peasantry; (as martyrs, I presume,) and I have been informed, nor see any reason to doubt the fact, that the clergy of Orriate performed a solemn mass for the good of the souls of these two wretches. It may, perhaps, interest the reader to know, that it is most probable these *patriotic* bakers made use of the *ergot* of the Indian corn [*zea mais*], called in Basquence "*lupo*," for the purpose of poisoning the bread they provided for the troops, which was bad enough, in all conscience, without this addition.

Eguia, receiving information that Cordova in-

tended to make some stay at Pamplona, and that during his absence, neither the English nor Espartero would undertake any thing, determined to strike a blow, and accordingly, withdrawing six battalions from the lines, he marched upon Orozco, bringing with him two twenty-four-pounder guns, and some smaller ones. The weather was dreadful, such, that I am sure scarce any other army would ever have thought of moving in. There were no roads for his cannon, (his aim was Balmaceda,) from Miravalles to beyond Bilbao, but the enthusiasm of the peasantry and of his troops supplied every thing. Oxen were brought by hundreds, the officers, despite the weather, worked in their shirt-sleeves, knee-deep in mud, and in forty-eight hours heavy cannon were dragged twenty miles over mountains, through defiles, amidst incessant rain, which, most likely, would have been considered insuperable obstacles to a more regular army, or if such had been accomplished, it would, in all probability, have been at the expense of the health of hundreds. Eguia gained his point: he appeared before Balmaceda, fired eight rounds against the gate, blew it open, and then the governor made a *honourable* capitulation. An unfortunate corporal or serjeant cried out that they had been sold, for which breach of discipline, in having the audacity and presumption to find fault with his commanding officer, Eguia ordered him to be shot, which was done forthwith. Nor was

the same cry repeated afterwards by any of the garrison. Besides capturing four pieces of cannon, and a tolerably large quantity of stores, provisions, and clothing, the Carlists made prisoners the entire battalion of Tuy, one company only excepted. Conformably to the practice of the Carlists, Eguia left no garrison in Balmaceda, but after he had thoroughly gutted the place, abandoned it. Thereupon the queen's general, Mendez-Vigo, came boldly down, followed by Cordova in person, re-occupied the town, and sent a boasting despatch, as usual, to Madrid, declaring that he had retrieved the honour of the Spanish arms. Certainly he had regained, unopposed, an empty town, but where were the cannon, stores, and 516 prisoners? Meantime, Eguia, leaving the queenites to congratulate each other on their *conquest*, meditated another blow.

Of all the towns on the seaboard between Bilbao and San Sebastian, Bermeo has the best harbour, Guetaria is the easiest of defence, while Lequeitio is the most difficult, and Plencia was the most zealous for the queen's cause. Guetaria had been furiously attacked by the Guipuscoan Carlists, under Montenegro, very early in January, and after a most gallant defence for eighteen days, had been obliged to give up the town and take to the castle, which Otalora, the brave governor, still held. The port of Bermeo being very useful to the squadron, was abandoned, and

the garrison withdrawn. On the other hand, Lequeitio, which has a very bad harbour, and on the land side is very difficult of defence, was crammed with artillery and stores: the garrison increased to near 1000 men. The little town of Plencia had a garrison of about 180 men, exclusive of seventy or eighty urbanos, a large number for a village which reckoned not above 850 inhabitants; but this place was an eye-sore to the Biscayans, on account of the courageous bearing of the inhabitants, and their zeal for the queen's cause. To gratify the province, Eguia led his troops from Balmaceda against Plencia, which made a most desperate defence, but at the end of two days was taken by assault, when the usual atrocities, heightened by party revenge, were inflicted upon the inhabitants; and such of the urbanos as were spared, after being exposed to the contumely and scorn of the province, were sent to labour in irons at the mines of Barambio. Shortly after this business, we heard that in Guipuscoa the Carlists had assailed and taken the small fort of Arambarri, close to San Sebastian, putting the garrison to the sword, and farther, that they held San Sebastian so closely blockaded, as even to have seized the Franciscan convent close to the bridge.

From these successes of the enemy, joined to the inactivity of Cordova, the people of Bilbao began to entertain apprehensions of another siege;

nor were their fears much relieved by a letter published in the *Correo de Bilbao*, by Colonel Lacarte, a French officer on General Cordova's staff, wherein he stated that the well-studied plans of the general-in-chief were not to be impugned, because of the loss of a couple of *bicocas* (petty insignificant places) like Plencia and Gue-taria. Nevertheless, these two *bicocas* had yielded to the enemy four cannon, with 500 men; at Balmaceda he had gained an equal number, while his own loss was very trifling. Soon after this letter was published, Eguia marched upon Le-queitio, the principal defence of which place consisted in the impracticability of bringing cannon by land to attack it. All these obstacles, however, were overcome by the zeal of the peasantry, who levelled the roads and dragged the artillery to the heights above the town. For the first few hours there was nothing but a fire of small arms; when the Carlist battery opened, the queenites ran from their guns, and the besiegers were masters of the fort in an instant. The governor, a feeble, cowardly man, behaved in the most abject manner, and, with immense means at his disposal, sent word out that he was ready to surrender, even before he was summoned. Surprised at his rapid conquest, Eguia granted an *honourable* capitulation, and thus became master of Lequeitio, where he found no less than eighteen pieces of artillery, of which four were brass

eighteen and twenty-four-pounders, above 3000 rounds of ammunition, together with a large quantity of stores, provisions, &c. The garrison consisted of the entire regiment of Ronda, some detachments from other regiments, and one company of artillery, in all about 950 men, of whom about thirty were killed and wounded, almost all belonging to the artillery, and amongst whom were some promising young officers of distinguished families, which induced a Spanish general officer to say, that at Lequeitio, all had been lost save the honour of the artillery corps, a compliment equally just and true; in fact, they were the only men who would fight. Thus another *bicoca* was gained by the Carlists almost without any loss. Two gun-boats, belonging to the Spanish marine, commanded by those active and gallant officers, Lieutenants Ondarza and Valcarcel, made their escape with a few of the inhabitants.

General Iriarte remained a quiet spectator of these events; his increasing illness prevented his taking the field, although, probably, he could not have done much good had he moved, his forces being far inferior to those under the command of Eguia. Still the gallant Plencianos deserved to be relieved. The distance was only two leagues from Bilbao, and it is a seaport. Iriarte might and ought to have brought off the garrison and urbanos in his steamers.

With this important capture the successes of Eguia terminated for the present, and Cordova was left to digest his vexation at the enterprise and activity of his opponent, who had, in five weeks, deprived him of 2000 men and twenty-six pieces, and this during such inclement weather as served for his excuse for not commencing operations.

Often was it reported that the next quarry of the redoubtable Eguia would be Bilbao; nor was it at all improbable, for now the Carlists were owners of a numerous park of artillery, consisting of above seventy pieces, of which at least ten were eighteen-pounders and upwards, while of ammunition also they had no lack; nor was it credible, that had Eguia attacked Bilbao, he would have met with much interruption. Villareal, with the main body of the Carlists, seemed to be fully adequate to repel any attack of Cordova, while the small division of the reserve, commanded by an aged and unfortunate officer named Tello, was incapable of arresting the progress of Castor, who, with two battalions, overran the valleys of Mena and Carranza, destroying the little fort of Merca-dillo, and catching great numbers of Aldeanos, who were sent to the valley of Arratia, where they were incorporated in the Carlist Castilian battalions. However, Eguia left us in peace, and with the exception of an occasional skirmish with

the advanced posts of the garrison, nothing material occurred.

On the 4th of April, three officers belonging to his majesty's sloop, *Saracen*, who were returning to their vessel, after having accompanied a friend to within a quarter of a mile of the town, were met by two men, armed and attired as the Carlist soldiers are, near the entrance of the ravine of the *Salve*, who rushed out from a ruined house, and with oaths and threats, ordered the gentlemen to accompany them to the serjeant of their party, stationed, as they said, in the upper part of the ravine. Although unarmed, the officers refused to go with them, explaining who they were, when the Carlist soldiers, without any farther ceremony, fired and dreadfully wounded Mr. Colls, the purser,—one ball and four slugs lodging in his body; Mr. Rundle was shot through the thigh; the third officer, Mr. Thompson, the master, who had escaped, now turned and grappled one of the ruffians, endeavouring to hurl him over the low parapet into the river. His cries brought his comrade to his aid, when Mr. Thompson, finding farther resistance useless, threw himself into the river with his adversary's musquet, and swam over to the other side. During this struggle, the two wounded gentlemen had crawled some distance down the road, when they dropped from loss of blood. The Carlists did not pursue them, probably because only one of them now

had a musquet. Mr. Thompson arrived safe on board the Saracen, and made his report, when the commander, proceeding immediately with a party of marines and seamen, found his officers on the road unable to move, Mr. Colls, in particular, being nearly dead. Carried to a house in front of the Saracen, they were assiduously attended to, and, with very great exertion, their lives were saved. This atrocious attempt to murder unarmed and defenceless individuals, excited a lively feeling of indignation among the squadron; nor was this feeling at all lessened, when, in reply to the letter of the senior officer in the river demanding satisfaction, Sarasa refused to give any, declaring that the officers had been the aggressors and deserved their fate! and as there was no remedy, this insolence had to be submitted to.

On receiving information of this outrage, the commodore sent round an additional party of Royal marines; he also directed the vessels of war in the river to fire upon the Carlists, whenever they approached within gunshot.

General Iriarte continuing seriously indisposed, the Madrid government appointed Brigadier Santos San Miguel, then acting Governor of Santander, to assume the command. The British Legion, though sadly thinned by disease, was now on its way from Vitoria to Santander. The new plan was to form a *corps d'armée*, with San Sebastian for its base, which, after raising the blockade of that city, was

to occupy Passages, Irun, Fuenterabia, and all the French frontier; for Cordova had now found out that his plan of blockade, which left the whole frontier line in undisputed possession of the enemy, was not well calculated "to starve" the provinces. From Santander the legion proceeded to San Sebastian, where, after a brief reconnoissance of the besiegers' formidable lines, and before all his forces had arrived, General Evans attacked on the 1st of May, and notwithstanding the enemy's obstinate defence, carried all their entrenchments and took all their cannon, thereby giving the Carlists the most complete defeat in the field they had ever yet experienced. This victory restored confidence to the queen's armies once more, and was, to use the pithy language of the gallant veteran, General Harispe, "a bill of exchange against Cordova," which that wily chief, however, declined to honour.

In all offensive wars, the great end of victory is to be able to follow up the blow given; without this, the completest victory is but a duel between two parties, and yields no result, beyond the relative numbers of slain. Such is the case, when army is opposed to army; but when an army is opposed to a population, this truth is still more emphatically apparent. What did General Beresford gain by the terrible battle of Albuera? Nothing, for want of means to follow up his hard-earned success. What did Dupont lose at Baylen?

Every thing. He fought against an army combined with a hostile population; with his force, even a victory, costing 4000 men, would have but enabled him to hold his own; defeat was certain ruin, and so it proved.

In the usual course of European wars, when army is pitted against army, a barren victory which the conqueror cannot improve, for lack of force or ability, may yet be conducive to eventual success; for the losing government may be unable to find another general, capable of restoring confidence to its army. The battle of Fontenoy, so indecisive in itself, would never have induced the English government to propose terms of peace, had they thought another general could be found to replace the Duke of Cumberland. But this never occurs in popular wars; there an invading army, to win, must be always successful, always ready to follow up the slightest success; for popular enthusiasm, though capable in its onslaught of carrying every thing before it, if once checked, and then denied breathing time, may be curbed for a season with a strong arm, and policy must work the rest. Once allow the masses time to recover, their ranks are refilled, new leaders are found, and the proverb is verified,—“*La victoire reste toujours aux gros bataillons.*”

After a defeat, all men know well enough what to do; but few, very few of those who command armies, even when their means are sufficient, know

how to make the most of a victory ; perhaps the most difficult problem in war.

When the Carlist entrenchments were forced, and the victory complete, General Evans had still 4000 British troops. Had he advanced, that day, upon Hernani, it seems probable that he would have been able to have held it ; for one battalion, with the national guards, would have sufficed to defend San Sebastian ; and who, for a moment, entertains the idea that the Carlists would have rallied in sufficient force, within seven days, to carry the position of Hernani, when defended by 4000 English ? Not 10,000 men would have done it ; and, of a surety, they could not then have mustered that number, without withdrawing half their army from before Arlaban. The occupation of Hernani in May, 1836, would have been very different in its results, to its occupation in May, 1837. Then, probably, the expedition of Gomez would never have taken place ; the communication with France would have been earlier intercepted ; and, perhaps, the Pretender would have been compelled to seek his fortunes in Castille, with an army not half so well prepared as the one he led from Navarre in June, 1837.

On the 18th of May, Commodore Lord John Hay arrived from Santander, bringing with him six companies of marines, commanded by Major Owen. This force, when united with the detachment already doing duty on board the squadron in the river, formed a superb battalion, of such

fine and martial appearance, that the Spanish officers frequently remarked that this was a picked body of men, sent to encourage the idea that all the British army was composed of similar battalions. Nothing could exceed the distinguished manner in which the commodore, with the troops, were received by the authorities, civil and military, all of whom went forth to meet his lordship. The troops were lodged in a spacious, airy building, known as the wool-warehouse; the officers were billeted among the more respectable families. After sojourning a few days in the town, the commodore left for San Sebastian.

Now that this formidable body of British infantry had arrived, General San Miguel bethought himself of doing something to gain reputation in his new command; to this effect, he ordered up a battalion of the Spanish infantry of marine, with all that could be spared from the crews of the Spanish squadron; and the entire force, thus assembled, including the British marines and the nationals, exceeded 7500 men. After some deliberation, a movement, or a reconnoissance in force, was decided; but, whatever were the plans of the Spanish general, the English commandant knew little or nothing of them, beyond the fact that his troops were to be ready for marching, by day-break on Sunday, the 15th of May; when the marines, in company with the national guards of Bilbao, and the regiment of Cuenca, marched out

in one dense column, taking the left bank of the river by the Peña, to the heights of Ollargan, where they encamped for a time, and soon afterwards marched farther on to the open ground beyond the separation of the Vitoria from the Durango road. The regiment of Cuenca was thrown still farther in advance, so as to connect this column with the main body, which, near 4000 strong, led by San Miguel in person, had marched upon Galdacano, and returned by the heights of Santa Marina. The Carlists were in such trifling force, that against the right column not a shot was fired. San Miguel, on his side, met with trifling opposition at first. The cazadores of Isabel II. soon found a party of Carlists, in a large building, known as the *Palacio de Adan*, which they attacked immediately, got close to the walls and door, where, safe from the fire of those within, they endeavoured to force an entrance, and, that failing, began to heap up wood, in order to set the building on fire. The defenders cried for mercy, and both parties were bargaining, when San Miguel, determining not to be indebted to fortune, recalled the cazadores; but, as they did not obey, the bugle twice and thrice sounded the recall. This was not unheeded by those within the building, who, seeing the cazadores begin to draw off, poured on them a shower of balls, which struck down thirty of their number, including their gallant leader, Colonel Vidasola, an officer of great merit. After

this achievement, the Spanish general retraced his steps; the peasantry gathering from every glen and ravine, hanging upon his rear, sending shot from all quarters, and, finally, pursuing his column to the very church of Begoña, which the troops passed at four in the afternoon: then the skirmishing ceased, and the Carlists, proud of their victory, assembled upon the heights, where they danced, screamed, and played all sorts of antics, till dark. This petty and fruitless march cost San Miguel 100 men, including four good officers; and he had the farther satisfaction of knowing that he had been baffled, within five miles of the town, by 300 of the enemy; who, very probably, had not lost twenty men. As far as the "moral effect" was concerned, the expedition was a total failure; an imposing force of British troops was acting in concert with the Spaniards, and yet nothing had been effected, beyond marching six miles, and returning with the foe at their heels,—an object certainly not worth the cost.

Some time after this, as the Carlists seemed more inclined to take their revenge on General Evans, than to besiege Bilbao, the battalion of Royal marines was withdrawn from Bilbao to San Sebastian; and, at the same period, the battalion of Spanish marines, and the 12th, or Zaragoza regiment, were drafted from the garrison to reinforce General Evans's division. Even with these reductions, the force under San Miguel's

command were still numerous, and, in the beginning of June, he took a turn with a column of 3000 men, through the villages of Somorrostro, Retuerto, and Gueñes. In the first-named village he captured and destroyed two pieces of cannon; and, returning, the general was met by the Carlist chief, Castor Andachaga, who, with three battalions, had posted himself on the Alto de Cruces, an amazingly strong position, from which he was, notwithstanding, dislodged by the Christinos after a brief engagement. In the account of this affair, as published in the Gazette of Oñate, it is stated, that San Miguel "could not find lighters sufficient to carry his wounded away;" the loss of the Christinos, during the whole expedition, having been sixty-seven men, of whom about thirty were casualties, in the action now referred to. Amongst them was Captain Riera, an aid of San Miguel's, and a very good officer; he died of his wounds three days after his return to Bilbao.

For some time previous to Cordova's decree of blockade, the finances of the diputacion and of the municipality had been gradually declining; yet the revenue of the province, although the province only comprised Bilbao, Portugalete, and the neighbourhood, was still considerable; for the tobacco rent, its main branch, was centered in Bilbao, and this had scarcely decreased, for any decline of consumption on the part of the peasantry was made up by the great demand for the

army. The wine duties had in like manner increased; but all other branches of the revenue had fallen off materially. This was particularly the case with the land-tax, of five per cent. on the rental of all property, which, by reason of the vast emigration from the town that had taken place, had shrunk to less than half its former produce. Both the diputacion and the municipality had borrowed until they could find lenders no longer. They were also greatly in debt; a great amount of the debts having been contracted during the siege, as well as for food and other necessaries for the troops. D. Francisco Gaminde, who had been sent to Madrid shortly after the siege of June, 1835, to entreat some attention to the wants of the overburthened town, procured the sum of a million of reals (10,000*l.*) which alleviated their necessities for the time; but as the wealth of all the banks of the world would soon be dissipated in Madrid, money was usually a scarce article; and the imperious wants of the armies being ill supplied, their generals were compelled to squeeze the suffering towns.* Es-

* Mr. Gaminde, who was sent to Madrid by the town, to lay the state of the province before the queen's government, had frequent audiences of Count Toreno, the finance minister. On one occasion, when pressing for payment of the sums due by government to the unfortunate town, Toreno said—"Why, Don Francisco, Bilbao has gained great glory, and should be above asking for money." Gaminde replied, "If our creditors and the widows

partero was not a harsh man; but his soldiers must be fed and clothed, and when the general government did not provide for their need, it must be done by the town. Thus the debts of the town and province were continually increasing with the increasing difficulties of the war, and the growing penury of the Spanish exchequer. For, in addition to the expenses contingent on feeding and providing for the queen's armies, there was the regiment of Cazadores to be maintained, which, although sadly diminished in numbers, still cost 60,000 Reals monthly, and this without the officers being fully paid. The fortifications also absorbed a very large sum of money, more by reason of the ill-judged and irregular manner in which they were conducted, than on account of their extent or solidity; indeed, I am convinced, that one-half of the money expended upon fortifying the town, with so little sound method or system, would have sufficed to have surrounded the town and connected it with Portugalete, by a

and orphans dependant on us, could be paid and fed with small *modicums* of glory, then your suggestion, Señor Ministro, would not be a bad one." The count rejoined,—“Oh, Gaminde, I see you are a man of business. How much will content you?” “Consider what we have done; pay us all.” “Bah! that's impossible. Take half a million.” “No; not a doit less than a million.” “Nothing off?” “No; return without else.” “Well, that would not break my heart; however, it would not look well—so, you shall have a million.”

series of strong forts, capable of a long resistance. These forts or blockhouses ought to have consisted of strong martello-towers, about seventy feet diameter at the base, mounting a long twenty-four pounder, with a howitzer; and around the tower, at the distance of some fifty yards, should have been a broad deep ditch, with palisades. It would have been necessary to build one of these forts on the Morro hill, on Artágan, on Santo Domingo, Banderas, and the Alto de Cruces. Smaller works would have sufficed for Miravilla, San Mames, Luchana, and Axpé. The Alto de Cruces once secured, the enemy never could prevent the march of the army to Bilbao, whenever it became necessary; and with Santo Domingo fortified, no besieging force could assail the town, without first reducing it. These forts would have been made additionally serviceable, by enclosing a large tract of country, where the peasantry could have remained secure had they wished it. Nor would they have required above 120 men in each, so that there would still be left a large force to defend the town, as also to march to the succour when needed.

From the beginning of the war the opponents of the Carlists were divided into two classes; those who supported the queen because they recognised her superior hereditary rights, and the constitutionalists, who adopted the queen's banner, from the natural idea that they were more likely to attain the

object of their vows from her than from her antagonist. The prince who engraves upon his standard absolute power—unqualified obedience, may not have so many followers as he who proposes to share his power with his subjects, but his rule is more stable; for the very terms of his adherents' submission and allegiance preclude all attempts at resistance, while, on the other hand, in establishing a limited or responsible government, the difficulty of determining, or of agreeing *how much* power shall be held by, or withheld from, the sovereign, is the fertile source of endless differences.

Thus we find, in the history of the Roman and Asiatic empires, that any military chief who was sufficiently bold and ambitious, might throw the cast for empire or the grave; but it never entered the heads of any to attempt to make more sure of their prize, by offering to share their power with the people. No, the tyrant, who had just seized the imperial purple, still wet with the gore of his predecessors, wished to rule the same; the people, "*cujum pecus*," were not deemed worth a thought; to them every thing remained the same, save the name of their *owner*.

At the beginning of the war, the Madrid cabinet flattered itself that it would be able to govern the country as in Ferdinand's time, and put down the Carlist insurrection also, which at court was considered as a family quarrel! This attempt failing, the next step was to get up the

estatuto; this pleased the constitutionalists, who took it as an instalment; but still the war went on. The immense majority of that part of the nation which was not Carlist, thought that the duration of the war was owing to the insincerity of the government, and clamoured for a change of ministry: up rose the juntas, and the central government became powerless; but still the war went on. Toreno and Martinez de la Rosa disappeared from the stage; and, amidst the applause of the nation, Mendizabal and Calatrava entered on the ministry; but still the war went on. Now, nearly all the general officers of the queen's army were of the aristocrat or *estatuto* party; and to discredit the Mendizabal ministry, they did as little as possible, in which praiseworthy attempt their incapacity powerfully assisted them. However, the ministry, tired of their inactivity and want of success, were looking round to find young men whom they could depend upon to take the command, when the *camarilla* and the aristocrats, alarmed, gained over some of the furious *exaltados*, who, at the scent of place and power, became suddenly quite tame, and walked after the *camarilla* party with the air of thorough-bred courtiers. To give the affair a little eclat, Cordova, who was probably in the secret, marched out, and attacked the Carlist lines at Arlaban. A series of desultory actions ensued, when, if belief is to be given to the queen's general, the Carlists were totally

defeated, with the loss of 2,000 men; his loss being only 600. On the other hand, the factions state that they gained the victory, driving Cordova back to Vitoria, with the loss of 2,000 men, and, as if they had read the Christino despatch, stated their own loss at 600.

It is true, that Cordova carried the enemy's positions by a very skilful flank movement, but he lost in these engagements above 1000 men, and after three days, he returned to Vitoria. Cordova had manœuvred well, and beaten his opponent, but he derived no advantage from it; whether his failing to do so was wilful, or unavoidable, on his part, it is hard to say, though my opinion leans to the former, because, immediately after, he went to Madrid, where he assisted at all the cabinet councils; and finally, the day before his departure, made a long speech at the Pardo, to the queen and her ministry, wherein he explained his proposed plans of operations. Right well were the Carlists served by some friend in court, for all Cordova's plans were known at the Pretender's head quarters, twelve hours before that general reached the Ebro. Aware that, for the present, all idea of uniting with Evans, or attacking Arlaban was abandoned, the division under Gomez, which had been organised during Cordova's absence, mustered at Amurrio, on the 4th of June, and on the 5th, fell upon, and totally routed the division of reserve, commanded by Tello.

As usual, the Christinos were surprised; and as usual, they knew nothing of the gathering storm till it burst upon them. Of this unfortunate division 1200 were killed, or taken, with trifling loss to the victor. But the Carlist general proved himself a commander worthy of victory; his force consisted of 5400 men, and in this action he loses 200 and takes 700 prisoners, with large quantities of arms, stores, &c. leaving his wounded to get back to Biscay, escorted by one company. Aware that Espartero was in his track, he does not hesitate to plunge into the heart of the enemy's country, encumbered with his prisoners, and with a powerful enemy at his heels. More than this, Gomez, losing men at every step, joined by few, over-runs the Asturias, Galicia, doubles back again upon Castille; takes Palencia; then gains the line of the Douro, and defeats the column of Narciso Lopez. Which of the queen's generals ever dared to march in this manner, through the Basque country? Gomez cared nothing for his wounded, who, with their escort, were captured by Espartero. At Villarobledo, where Gomez was defeated by Alaix, the queen's general gave up the pursuit, to look after his prisoners—here we see the Carlist commander marching straight on with his prisoners, although closely pursued. Such a difference is there between men who work with a will, and men who work only to save appearances.

Cordova, returning to his army, after having accompanied his sister to the French frontier, found the soldiery not so satisfied as when he left; they murmured openly, and there were there not wanting those who distrusted his sincerity. Nor was this feeling at all lessened by the defeat of Tello, and the proved inefficiency of his famous system of blockade.

As it was imperatively necessary to reform the division of the reserve, a large draft was made from the garrison of Bilbao for that purpose, consisting of two battalions of the fourth light infantry, one of Zaragoza, and one of San Fernando. Very soon after their arrival at Balmaceda, the grenadier and light companies of the first-named regiment, fell into an ambuscade, and were all captured by the enemy. Aware of this, Castor and Sarasa came close to the town, and made a show of attacking, which put the garrison on their mettle, and the works of the fortifications went forward in a surprising manner. Now although the conjuncture was favourable to the Carlist army, seeing that Espartero had led off with him one-third of the northern army; yet, whether it was that they preferred attacking Evans, or were planning another expedition to Castille, and had not forces to spare adequate to the undertaking, certain it is that they made no attempt, and this dangerous crisis glided quietly away, for within a fortnight a battalion of fresh troops

arrived,—that of Laredo,—and, what was of even more importance, large quantities of ammunition and stores.

One of the reports spread by the friends of the Isturiz ministry, was to the effect that they could obtain French intervention. The vanity of this hope, was quickly seen; military disasters were more frequent than before, and the exchequer more empty: wherefore, thought the people, if the Estatuto sufficeth not to put down the civil war, we must have the constitution, and the cry of “the constitution!” arose first of all from the folk of Málaga, a people more noted for fruit and wine, than for either courage or conduct. Alas! the evil was not to be remedied by this or that watchword—the civil war was not to be settled by parchment codes, but by men possessing genius, honesty of purpose, and fiery courage. The cry for the constitution of 1812 spread over Spain; town after town, city after city proclaimed it, until the aristocratic party was left alone in Madrid. Then came the events of the Granja, and the death of Quesada, the most courageous leader of the aristocrats. Cordova tried to prevent disaffection spreading in his army, but was unable; and accordingly threw up the command and retired to France. Mendizabal and Calatrava once more returned to power, and the constitutional Cortes were convened.

Many persons have raised an outcry against the

constitution, because of the way in which it was forced upon the queen, and government, by the soldiery: but how could this be avoided? In time of peace, a palace intrigue, or the grumbling discontent of the people, or the votes of parliament, (should there be one) may upset a ministry; but in time of war, a minister must rely, in a great measure, upon the army; and the more unpopular, the more dependent he is on the military; wherefore, his opponents, aware of this, must endeavour, by intrigue, to weaken the minister's hold upon the soldiery, and so turn his arms against himself; for, should an able, unprincipled man, be in power, (such as Isturiz, or Quesada,) determined not to give way, as long as the military support him, how can such a one be ejected, except by a counter-intrigue with the soldiers? An assembly of unarmed and defenceless men are much more likely to be sabred and trod down by a regiment of dragoons, than to have their humble petitions regarded. Against force, force must be employed—nothing else will avail.

The months of August and September passed away like the previous one; all our attention was engrossed by the progress of the Carlist expedition, under Gomez; and the furious combats before San Sebastian. The heavy losses sustained by the Carlists, in these actions, did not seem at all to lessen their numbers; and without diminishing their force upon the line of Zubiri, or

that of Hernani, or the troops acting in Alava, and Biscay, they drew together a force of 2200 men, under the command of Brigadier Sanz; but this officer wanted either the talent or fortune of Gomez. Like his predecessor, he fought the reserve division, and nearly on the same ground, but with very different success: bending to the right after this check, he pretended to be retiring upon Oquendo, but leaving there his wounded, he gained the valley of Carranza, and thence was within four leagues of Santander, before General Alcala, who had so gallantly repulsed the Carlist chief at *El Berron*, knew of his march: he was, however, soon after him. Sanz made for the Asturias, but every where he met more resistance than he calculated on. At Oviedo he was repulsed with the loss of 300 men; other partial actions followed, and after marching hundreds of miles, Sanz was forced to return with half his force, and his reputation rather shaded.

While this expedition was on its travels, the Carlists, having nothing to fear from the northern army, now bent their whole attention to San Sebastian, and Bilbao; another attack was determined on the former place, and a large force, exceeding 8000 men prepared. On the 1st of October, they again measured their strength with the British, and were discomfited, with a heavy loss; henceforth they very wisely abandoned all thoughts of attacking San Sebastian, and turned

their attention to Bilbao. In the councils of the Pretender, Valdespina, Landayda, Zabala, Epalza, and other leaders of the Biscay faction, urged by every means in their power the immediate siege of Bilbao. Cloaking their thirst for revenge, and the plunder of their personal enemies, under the appearance of zeal for the service of their king, they represented that it was clear there was nothing but blows to be had at San Sebastian; that Bilbao offered a richer and easier prize; that, with the fall of that town, all the north of Spain would acknowledge the king; and, as a further inducement, these gentry declared that the province, enraged at beholding her chief city so long in the hands of the *negros*, *heretics*, and *freemasons*, was willing to contribute every thing in her power, whether labourers, means of transport, provisions, or even money.

Villareal, the Carlist commander-in-chief, agreed with their views. He well knew that Evans would not act on the offensive, nor was it probable that Espartero would be able to rally his dispersed and unmanageable troops in time to impede his operations, and flattered himself that a determined attack, whilst the bulk of the Spanish army was beyond the Ebro, would place the city in his power. In the event of success, the natural consequence would be, to relieve Gomez instantly from the pressure of the queen's troops, and to carry his own victorious army direct upon Burgos. Eguia differed in opinion from Villareal; he wished

to attack the place in form, and in support of his plan, maintained there was no probability that the queen's army would be able to gather in sufficient force to relieve the town, before the middle or end of November; that before that time, in all probability, the town would fall, but should such not be the case, the country offered excellent positions, where they might defy the Christino army, which, at that advanced period of the year, would be unable to remain long in the field. After much deliberation, Villareal's plan was agreed to; the council broke up, and every one instantly set about forwarding, throughout the province, the preparations for the siege, which were truly immense. The storm, so often averted, was now gathering in gloom, soon to burst upon our devoted town.

CHAPTER VI.

SECOND SIEGE OF BILBAO.

FIRST INVESTMENT, OCT. 23rd, TO NOV. 8th.

ABOUT the middle of the month of October, it was ascertained that the enemy intended attacking the town in earnest. General San Miguel made a demand, both to San Sebastian and Santander, for artillerymen, cannon, and various military stores; but this demand, delayed until too late, sufficed merely to inform the government that the town stood in need of supplies, and which could not be introduced. The civil and military authorities were daily receiving reports, sufficiently indicative of the enemy's preparations. Some of the inhabitants also received letters in secret, from their relatives outside; for some of the Carlists, regarding the destruction of the town as inevitable, forgot, for a time, their deadly hostility, and endeavoured to save those who were still connected by the ties of blood, albeit the furious strife of civil war had ranged them under different banners.

Sunday, the 23rd of October, was a beautiful day, and the charming environs of Bilbao were

thronged with the inhabitants, quite unconscious that this was the last time, for two months, they would be able to leave their gates. News arrived that the Carlist artillery had reached Archanda, by the road from Bermeo. It was then, that, urged by the continual representations of the civil authorities, and the repeated requests of the chief engineer, Sierra, the General San Miguel gave orders to occupy the church of Begoña, a spacious and solid edifice, the abandonment of which to the enemy, during the first siege, was one of Count Mirasol's most egregious blunders. The truth of the proverb, "better late than never," was strikingly exemplified in this instance; although it does appear singular, that while every man and woman in the town was feelingly alive to the importance of this building, the superior officers of the queen's forces were the only persons who seemed to be ignorant of its value. Scarcely was this seasonable acquisition made, when three companies of the enemy, supported by two battalions, came down the hill rapidly, and opened a lively fire upon the outposts, who, quickly beaten, ran in, and the foe coming swiftly on, seized the hill of Artágan, and attempted to get possession of the church, (not knowing it was already occupied,) but the force by which it was garrisoned, consisting of two companies of Laredo, plied the Carlists with a heavy though ill-directed fire, when, mortified and surprised to find the church in the hands of their

opponents, the assailants drew back dispirited, and were attacked by the cazadores of Isabel II., some of the national guard, and the light company of Laredo. The foe retired slowly, and, at night-fall, the skirmishing ceased, each party having sustained a trifling loss. Amongst the casualties on the side of the town, was the volunteer of the national guard, D. Victoriano Borda, severely wounded.

At dawn, on the 24th, it was perceived that the enemy had seized all the heights, and completely invested the town; working parties were busy throwing up batteries at Artágan, the Salve, and on the hill behind the convent of San Augustin. All communication was cut off with Olaviaga, and the forts on the river, and some apprehension was entertained for the safety of the battalion of Cuenca, which was still outside the town. Towards the afternoon the colonel of that regiment, having reinforced the garrisons of the Capuchin convent, and of the fort of Banderas, crossed the river opposite the convent of San Mames, whose garrison he likewise strengthened, and then, with the remainder of his battalion, commenced his march into the town, along the left bank of the river. The besiegers gathered in force, to stop his progress, but the battalion of Compostela going out to assist, disengaged Cuenca, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove back the enemy.

During the day, the cannon from the forts fired

heavily against the enemy's working parties, but so ill served were the pieces, that not one shot in ten struck even the *hill* where the Carlists were working;—little loss could be occasioned the enemy from this quarter. On the other hand, the Carlist guerillas swarmed around the town, and the skirmishing fire was kept up with spirit. Amongst those who fell this day, was D. Josef de Tellaéché, one of the deputies for the province, a gentleman much respected in the province, and whose early loss was much regretted by his fellow-citizens.

According to established custom, San Miguel published two proclamations, one to the soldiers of the garrison, the second to the national guard and inhabitants; in both of which productions the Christino general treated his enemies too lightly; and, forgetting the reproof given to the soldier of Darius, when railing against Alexander, abused the besiegers in language which, although true, was ill timed. The prowess of his own soldiers was also too highly magnified, seeing that the issue of the contest was, at the best, doubtful; and praise, like pay, should neither be given beforehand, nor withheld when due. The town divided into districts in the following manner. At San Augustin, and houses contiguous was stationed the regiment of Trujillo, led by the gallant Colonel Duran; Brigadier-General, the Baron Ozores, colonel of the militia regiment of

Compostela, commanded the north-east angle of the lines from Mallona to the burying-ground; the next position, that of the Circus and the advanced post of Begoña, was entrusted to the Brigadier Oliveras, while the south-east end of the lines, including the famous fort of Larrinaga, was held by the Brigadier Arechavala; the adjoining forts of the Morro and Miravilla depended directly from General San Miguel, and the ancient governor of the town, Colonel Moreno, whose ability did not inspire much confidence, was sent to command the suburb on the left bank, where there was no apparent danger. The commandant of all the artillery was a fine old veteran, D. Pedro de Sarastegui. The detachment of artificers, with the park of artillery, were placed under the command of Captain Don Pedro White, an Irish officer grown grey in the Spanish service, and a better choice could not be made. Nor were the civil authorities idle; the leading personages of the town composed the *junta de armamento y defensa*, and their measures were prudent and vigorous. Lists were taken of the provisions in the town, and to prevent monopolists from raising the prices, they purchased various articles of chief necessity. All the casks in the place they collected and sent to the fortifications; thousands of sacks were distributed to the inhabitants to be sewn; the fire-engines were ready in the street, and the corps of sappers of the national guard distributed through

the town, in which the most exact order and quiet were maintained by the patrols of the "Ancianos," or the company of nationals, consisting of men above fifty.

At six A. M. of the 25th of October, the Carlists opened a fire from two mortar batteries, placed to the right and left of Artágan. (See Plan.) Their projectiles were shells of thirteen, ten, and seven and a half-inch shells, and also carcasses of a peculiar construction, weighing about one hundred weight each, in shape something like a flower-pot, and having, besides the fuse mouth, four other apertures, whence gushed jets of flames. Formidable as these appeared at first sight, the sappers of the nationals soon detected their insignificance, and stifled them easily, so that the Pretender, with his godly crew, who had implicitly trusted the promises of the French inventor, (M. Lisoir,) that with these projectiles the town would speedily be in ashes, were grievously disappointed in their pious and charitable desires. The bombardment continued all day and all night, with different degrees of intensity, occasioning, of course, considerable damage to the buildings and loss of life to the inhabitants, particularly among the women and children, for the men were all up at the batteries and lines, where few missiles were directed by the enemy.* As yesterday the artillery

* During the afternoon a seven-inch shell fell into the street of the Ronda, exactly opposite a powder magazine, rebounding

of the town fired with but little better success, and evidently caused the besiegers but trifling inconvenience and less loss. At daylight on the 26th the Carlist mortar batteries, which, for two hours previously had been firing but slowly, now plied their projectiles with a will, while their gun batteries opened with a salvo that made our mud walls shake to their base. Four batteries,* armed with eleven pieces of cannon, poured an incessant fire against Mallona and the convent of San Augustin. Unable to resist such a heavy and well-directed fire, the guns of the former soon began to stammer in their answers, and the besiegers, taking the ascendant, had, by noon, silenced all, and dismounted most of the pieces, while the parapets had nearly disappeared before such a heavy flight of metal, and the enemy's skirmishers approached almost to the ditch. The situation of the town was now critical enough; the besiegers' mortar batteries were throwing

against the door of which, it broke through and exploded, together with two barrels of cartridges, containing 2,000 each, which were near the entrance. The sides, roof, and supports of the warehouse were pierced in every direction by the shower of balls, and yet, strange to say, forty barrels, containing 80,000 cartridges, were at the other end of the store, within thirty feet, and not one exploded, which was truly providential, since, had this immense quantity taken fire, in all probability half the street would have come down, occasioning the loss of hundreds of lives.

* These of Esnazarraga, Celiminchu, Alvia, and behind San Augustin.

flights of shells into the town, while their guns had silenced those of the place and levelled the defences, and there was nothing but a half-filled ditch between the foe and his prey. A French or English general would have stormed instantly, and a loss of 1,000 men would have gained him the town, but the Carlist soldiers are incapable of deeds requiring desperate hardihood. Give them a tree or a rock for cover in front, and a glen or ravine to run to in their rear, and they will load and fire for a year; but to form close column and charge steadily through a breach is what they neither will nor can do. Thus thought Villareal, for he made no attempt. Meantime the Christians threw up a battery at the river angle of the theatre, and armed it with a twenty-four-pound gun and an eight-inch howitzer. The position was so well chosen that it flanked the besiegers' battery in Alvia, and enfiladed that behind San Augustin and that of Eznazarraga. The guns were well served and every shot told, to the great annoyance of the besiegers, whose fire soon slackened, and was never again so well directed. However, their mortar batteries continued to pour shells into the town, and the damage caused was immense, nor could any attempts be made at repairing the parapets during the day; but scarcely had the evening set in, when this important service was vigorously begun, despite the enemy's batteries, which continued to thunder on.

At three P. M. the Carlists first pillaged and then set fire to the suburb of San Augustin, outside the gate. With that sort of fascination which is often seen in persons whose hour is come, a few of the unfortunate inhabitants remained to the last, and after suffering every indignity from the besiegers, were either slain or burnt; the half-consumed carcasses of two females were seen for some days after near the door-way of the house known as that of "Valentin."

Between the fort of Mallona and the cemetery, is a ravelin called "El Diente," which forms a salient angle, and had received so many marks of attention from the besiegers that the parapet was almost in ruins. The position was important, and with Mallona, was held by the 1st company of the national guard, the cazadores of Isabel II., and the grenadiers of Laredo. Occupied with the repairs, and with dragging up a gun, the troops stationed at the Diente had left their arms piled under a colonnade in the burying-ground, when, unperceived by the sentinels, a strong body of the Carlists came up the ravine, their forlorn advancing silently, entered the ravelin, and more were following, when the second lieutenant of the 1st company of the nationals, D. Manuel de Mendiburu gave the alarm, and crying out to his comrades "Leave the gun you are dragging, seize your arms and follow me," rushed on the assailants, the foremost of whom he cut down, and

immediately afterwards fell by a musquet shot. The combat grew warm and serious, and the volleys of the foe outside shewed that his supporting masses were considerable. General San Miguel, who was present, was near being made prisoner; his aid, Captain M——, of the artillery, ran off and was met on the steps of Begoña by the light and 5th companies of the national guard, who, ignorant of the tumult, were going up to reinforce the forts agreeably to previous orders. To these, M—— cried out, "All is lost, the enemy are in!" Though this announcement was sufficiently startling, Captains Orbegoso and Nafarrondo ordered their men to fix bayonets and advance at a run. They arrived in time; the assailants wavered, fell back, and retreated down the glen, leaving such as had entered dead on the spot, except five badly wounded, who, rolling into the ditch, had their lives spared. A heavy fire was kept up in the direction of the enemy's retreat, and from the groans and confused clamour which arose from the ravine, there is little doubt that the assailants suffered for their temerity. Vexed at his ill success, Villareal stopped the fire of his batteries, and the town at ten P. M. enjoyed a respite, after fifty-two hours of a furious shot and shelling match.

Although there was little probability that the enemy would again attack that night, it was thought prudent to increase the guards at Mallona

and the burying-ground; the working parties were also reinforced, and the repairs of the breaches pushed on vigorously. No attempt was made by the besiegers to molest them, except that after midnight their mortar batteries occasionally threw shells and carcasses into the town. Day dawned on the 27th, but no increase of firing took place on the part of the besiegers; occasionally their batteries threw a few round-shot in addition to the shells, but this ill-sustained fire was productive of little damage. On the side of the town the theatre battery was almost the only one that operated, but its fire was terribly effective, as was apparent by the riddled state of the houses in the rear of the Carlist batteries, and the injured state of their parapets.

After dark the works on the lines were renewed with additional vigour, not without molestation by the enemy, whose light troops, spreading along the face of the lines, with loud shouts and howls, kept up a brisk fire of small-arms throughout the night, which cost us a few men. As during the previous night, their mortar-batteries amused themselves with occasionally saluting the town; but, beyond breaking a few tiles, and frightening females and the sick, did no damage. During this night a deserter came over, and from him, as well as by information received through another channel, we learned that the besiegers had received a fresh supply of ammunition, so that we

might expect their fire to open on the morrow with renewed energy. Such proved to be the case; for, at day-break, the enemy's batteries opened a heavy fire from six guns of large calibre, besides their mortars. There was no cessation on the part of the besiegers until two o'clock in the afternoon, when their fire slackened, and gradually declined, till it ceased altogether at dark, except the howitzer battery at Artágan, which threw a few shells occasionally during the night.

The damages caused by the besiegers' fire to the fortifications, were too serious to brook any delay in their repair. Many other points of the line of defence also imperatively needed additional fortifications; however, few workmen were to be found, and those not very willing ones. The reason for this scarcity of hands shall be briefly explained. Of the 2,500 men able to bear arms in the town, about one-fifth had emigrated; another fifth, consisting chiefly of the poorer classes, were in the Carlist ranks; of those remaining in the town, above 1,200 did duty, night and day, as national guards, who could not be expected to do more than their military service, which with such admirable zeal and alacrity they performed; the rest of the male population, who were, of course, chiefly Carlists, hid themselves, and by dodging from house to house, evaded the police. In this state of things the civil and military authorities published a decree, ordering that every male

inhabitant was to present himself by one in the afternoon, and make his option, either to take arms with the nationals or to work on the fortifications, the penalty for non-appearance being a heavy fine; and domiciliary visits were made by the police to enforce compliance. Now there was nothing either extraordinary or irregular in this decree, since, in ordinary warfare, the governor of a besieged place always has the undisputed right to expel from the town, or to compel to labour, those who refuse to take up arms for the defence. Nevertheless the Carlist families murmured exceedingly; and those who would have slain in cold blood every one of their opponents, had they possessed the power, had actually the impudent effrontery to declare, "that it was contrary to freedom and the constitution!" "that there was no law to compel them to work!" Despite their grumbling, the decree was properly enforced; yet, when I add that not a single Carlist was beaten, imprisoned, or insulted during the siege, although at divers times they gave provocation enough, I think sufficient is said to prove the humanity and noble feeling of the queen's supporters.

Workmen being thus forthcoming, the repairs of the defence at Mallona and the Rediente went steadily on. The platforms in the batteries were re-constructed; the guns mounted; and, on the 29th, the besiegers found to their cost two heavy

batteries, where, two days previously, was only a shapeless mass of ruins. They soon gave up the unequal contest; and, before three P. M. all their guns were silenced. With this success the enthusiasm of the garrison rose high, and was further increased by the besiegers preparing to retire with their cannon, upon which the church bells were soon ringing a joyful peal. The Carlists were astounded, and the troops stationed at the Santo Domingo convent being uncontrollable, Colonel Duran opened the gate, and sallied out with the granadiers of Trujillo, a few nationals, and cazadores, sending word to the general that he hoped to seize the enemy's guns. Here was a piece of good fortune for San Miguel; his troops were in the highest spirits; the enemy cowed; his batteries abandoned within 150 yards of the town-walls. Had 2,000 men been launched to the attack, there is not a doubt that every gun would have been captured, and perhaps some prisoners made. However, General San Miguel showed himself unable to profit by the favours of fortune; he hesitated, and then hastily recalled the troops,* when some of them were actually in the enemy's battery. It is even said that one of the cazadores was endeavouring to spike a gun. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the perfect practicability of seizing the enemy's cannon; let it suffice to say

* He ordered the retreat in quick time—"retirada precipitada."

that the troops returned with only a loss of twelve wounded, all of whom were brought in.*

Nothing important occurred during the night; and the morning of the 29th showed the enemy actively employed in moving away his siege materials; and at eleven A. M., all being quiet, the general issued an order, permitting one-half the garrison to go off duty to rest themselves until half-past three P. M. At nightfall the guards were doubled, and every precaution taken against a surprise; for, it was possible, that the retiring of the besieging artillery was but a feint to throw the garrison off its guard. The night was one of heavy rain and high winds; but, amid the gusts, the howling of the peasantry, urging on their cattle to drag off the guns, was distinctly heard, and torches were frequently seen glancing on the mountain side. This activity during such bad weather, proved that the besiegers were retiring in earnest; and a deserter, who came over during the night, farther confirmed this opinion.

On the 30th, it was ascertained that all the enemy's artillery had been moved off by the road

* This day, at about half-past three P. M., the staff-adjutant of the national guard, Don Eustace de Allende Salazar, while reconnoitring the enemy from Mallona, was shot through the head, and expired in a few minutes. This gentleman was the chief of one of the most distinguished families in Biscay, exceedingly popular with his fellow-townsmen, and his early death was deeply regretted by all parties.

to Bermeo, and the general, considering the victory gained, published two proclamations addressed to the garrison and inhabitants, cordially thanking them for their zeal and good conduct, and congratulating them on their triumph. The enemy still showed a considerable force near, although without committing any act of hostility. The day following, Colonel Ruiz, commanding at the Circus battery, observing few of the besiegers in their mortar battery at Artágan, sent out a detachment, accompanied by thirty workmen. At their approach, the few Carlists there fled, and the Christinos levelled their works, besides capturing about 100 projectiles, and some entrenching tools. Hitherto we had had no communication with the out-posts, nor the lower part of the river, but this day a party arrived from the Banderas, declaring that the enemy had wholly retired; notwithstanding this, and the assurance that General Araoz was at Portugalete, with a force of 2,000 men, and a large convoy of ammunition, the governor, San Miguel, remained close within his walls, forbidding any sortie, nor even allowing the gates to be opened.

On the 2nd of November, Brigadier Araoz entered the town, bringing with him the regiment of Toro, two companies of the fourth light infantry, and a company of artillery, in all about 1500 men. Protected by this escort came a convoy of ammunition, stores, clothing, and some provisions,

as also the mails from Madrid. After the arrival of this reinforcement, all the national guards were allowed to retire to their homes, except the company of artillery which continued on duty as usual.

Elated with this reinforcement, the next day General San Miguel ordered a sortie, with the intent of destroying the enemy's works; for which purpose a force was despatched from Begoña, consisting of one company of cazadores of Isabel II., one of the regiments of Compostela, and one of the Nationals, commanded by the Brigadier, Baron Ozores, and from San Augustin two companies of the regiment of Trujillo. Considerable opposition was made by the Carlists, who had stationed a battalion upon the slope of Archanda, covered by garden walls and houses. The firing lasted a long time, and when the Christinos returned, it was with a loss of nearly forty men, including the gallant Brigadier Ozores, slightly wounded, and a young officer, belonging to a very respectable family in the town, was severely wounded.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST INVESTMENT.

CARLIST ATTACK.

The terrible engagements against the British Legion, at San Sebastian, and the French Legion at Zubiri, having cost the Carlists thousands

of men to no purpose, it was a prudent plan to lead their battalions against Bilbao, where they had no right to expect much resistance; while, its capture would be of transcendant importance, perhaps involving the advance of the Carlist army to Burgos. As the season was not too far advanced, but that the Spanish army might muster in force, to raise the siege; and considering the inefficient state of the fortifications, the short supplies of ammunition, and the low reputation of the generals in command, the plan of attack was good, provided it had embraced the entire line. The first requisite in a siege is a complete investment; now the bulk of the Carlist forces were in front of the North-east and North side of the town. Miravilla and the Morro, they scarcely heeded, so that it was soon seen that no danger menaced on that quarter, and thus the attention of the garrison was undivided. Nevertheless, had Villareal boldly attacked the breaches, when practicable, at the same time making a false attack by the fords of Achuri, he would have taken the town, provided he chose to lose 2,000 men: but the night attack, well planned as it was, and so favoured by fortune as to allow the forlorn to enter unopposed, failed; and why? Because the Carlist troops were not sufficiently courageous. The forlorn, composed of deserters from the French Legion, behaved gallantly. But the Basques, of whose prowess we hear so much,

would *not* support their advance. And thus will they always behave; equal to any troops in Europe, at desultory fighting, they are inferior to any in those enterprises which require cool, steady, and determined valour. After the failure of the assault, on the 27th, Villareal should have attacked the out-posts; their capture, (an easy matter) would have inspirited his men, and given him supplies of guns and ammunition, supposing that he needed them. The retiring from before the place, (a superior force not being present) and the allowing a powerful reinforcement to enter the besieged town must, of course, be attributed to his orders; on any other supposition, such a glaring neglect of all rule, is barely credible. Even had his instructions been peremptory, it is difficult to say why he did not station a battalion on the heights of Axpé, and another at the bridge of Castrojana, by which manœuvre Araoz would have been effectually hindered from reaching Bilbao.

THE DEFENCE.

A great master of the art of war,* has declared that the phrase *non putabam*, should be expunged from a general's vocabulary: despite the recommendation of such high authority, some peninsular

* Marshal Saxe.

generals still use the phrase, and act up to it. Had such not been the case, the fortifications of Bilbao, fifteen months after the warning given by the first siege, would not have been in such a miserable state, nor would the *materiel* of defence have been so scanty and neglected; still less, would there have been any reason to write, at the *twelfth* hour, to General Evans, asking for a reinforcement of artillerymen, which the rapid approach of the enemy effectually prevented from entering, even supposing that General Evans sent them, of which I am not certain.

It was a most fortunate thing for the town, that the general was prevailed upon to occupy the church of Begoña; it is difficult to conceive how he ever could have hesitated. Nothing could induce him to occupy the church, and town-house of Alvia, so that both became strong-holds for the enemy, within half musquet shot of the defences.

It seems natural that a town, situated like Bilbao, at the bottom of a bason, should be defended by sorties; or else, long continued bombardment might lay it in ruins; but as nothing could exceed the audacity of the Carlists, in planting their batteries at once, scorning the formality of approaches, close to the town defences; so, scarcely any thing could equal the resignation with which San Miguel saw the destruction of the town, by the enemy's shells: keeping close within his lines

he never attempted to seize the Carlist mortar batteries; which a sortie, made with a large force of 2,000 to 3,000 men, could have easily carried. So fearful was the queen's general of compromising the safety of the town by sorties, that it has been seen on the 29th of October, he actually recalled his troops when on the point of seizing the enemy's cannon, instead of sending two battalions to their support. The sortie of the 3rd of November, after the arrival of Araoz, was contemptible, in the extreme; with upwards of 6,000 disposable troops, he sent out about 450, who, of course, were insufficient to cope with the single Carlist battalions posted on the heights. By this misapplication of his force, he lost forty good men, lowered the tone of his soldiers, and proportionably increased that of the enemy, who could not entertain much fear of a garrison, whose general allowed one battalion to hold its ground, all day, within gun-shot of the town lines. For the rest, the general was active, and gave many proofs of personal courage, during the siege; it, however, appears singular, that he should, in his public despatches, have praised the conduct of Captain M——, his aid, who certainly behaved rather discredibly, in leaving his post, and giving the alarm on the night of the assault.

The conduct of the civil authorities, was admirable in the extreme; with equal foresight and

despatch, they anticipated the wants, and amply supplied whatever was required by the general for the defence of the place, while, without resorting to any measures of severity, strict order was maintained in the town. The company of sappers of the national guard, afforded signal assistance, in extinguishing the fires caused by the shells and carcasses. Without their aid, the town must have been a prey to the flames: indeed, twice the enemy's projectiles set fire to the buildings immediately contiguous to the powder magazines, situated in the Calle Santa Maria, and the Convent of the Esperanza, but, owing to the courage and conduct of the sappers, occasioned no damage, although the alarm was very general.

Thus terminated the first investment of the second siege, during which, the loss of the garrison, and inhabitants, amounted to about 400. The besiegers threw into the town some 1,800 shells of all sizes, and had, in all, nineteen pieces of ordnance in their batteries. Their guns, at the beginning, were far better served than those of the town; although, towards the conclusion, their superiority was entirely lost.

Notwithstanding the safe arrival of Araoz, with his convoy, the Carlists did not abandon the neighbourhood of Bilbao: preparations for defence were still going on, the gates were still closed, and there seemed a gloom and cloud to hang upon the Bilbainos; so that, far from re-

joicing at their deliverance, they seemed to conjecture the past as the mere forerunner of greater evils. And so it fell out: the cabinet of D. Carlos, enraged at Villareal's failure, still considered that their loss before the town had not been sufficient to dispirit the troops;* besides, there were no signs of Espartero moving. At San Sebastian, General Evans, busy in fortifying his lines, seemed only desirous of being left alone. Another attack was resolved upon, another plan adopted, and the execution entrusted to General Nazario Eguia, a vindictive old man, who probably unites the qualities of obstinacy, cowardice, and cruelty,† to a greater extent, than any of his party,

* They had probably lost 600 men, of whom one-third, at least, were French deserters from the Algerine Legion, so that of their own men, the loss was trifling. I have heard, from the peasantry, that on the night of the assault, after its failure, Verastegui, Colonel of the first Biscay battalion, was, with several other officers, highly amused at the severe loss sustained by the "Argelinos;" cracking divers jokes at the expense of the poor devils. This anecdote is so characteristic, that I am convinced it is true.

† Vide the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, vol. v. p. 49, 50, 53. In the course of his travels through Galicia, in 1832, the author visited Santiago, the capital, where General Eguia, who was then commander-in-chief of the province, resided. During his stay, of about ten days, he witnessed the execution of eight unfortunate men, who had attempted to raise a guerilla party for D. Pedro, in the north of Portugal; but, being closely pursued by the Miguelites, were driven into Spain for refuge, made prisoners, and disarmed:

his master only excepted. Disposing of the entire population of the province, with absolute and energetic rule, in less time than some generals would take to get a brigade of artillery ready for the field, the Carlist preparations were complete; an angry peasantry rushed in crowds to aid in the destruction of the "obstinate town;" and, on the 8th of November, six brief days after the entry of Araoz, the unfortunate inhabitants beheld their inveterate enemies, with increased numbers, and increased means, blockading their heroic city, which abandoned, apparently, by all Spain, seemed unable to resist the determined efforts of her assailants.

they were sent to Santiago, where the Captain-general Eguia ordered them to be shot, as above stated. It is impossible to describe how much the gloomy, sanguinary character of General Eguia was and is still detested in Galicia: hatred of this man contributed, in no slight degree, to render that powerful province so eminently zealous for the queen's cause.

CHAPTER VII.

SECOND SIEGE OF BILBAO.

SECOND INVESTMENT.

WHILST Eguia was making his preparations, and his train of artillery in course of completion at Guernica, he allowed the 2nd battalion of the 4th light infantry to enter the town. This battalion, during the previous investment, had been in garrison at Portugalete and the outposts on the river; and thus its arrival in Bilbao did not increase the effective strength of the garrison, since an equal number of the regiments of Toro, Cuenca, and the 1st battalion of the 4th, had to replace them: still it would seem to be bad generalship on the part of Eguia, to allow these changes to take place, without making any attempt to prevent them. The generals in command were well aware of the coming storm, and concluded that, on this occasion, the Carlists would attack the place by rule; first the outposts, then the detached forts, and lastly, the body of the place; and, acting upon this idea, they tried to increase the means of defence of the different outposts on the river, as

much as the past procrastination, and present difficulties, would allow. As these fortified posts will soon be of interest, some description of them may be acceptable.

Within the bar of the river Nervion, and about 600 yards distant, on the left bank, stands the town of Portugalete, whose population, in peaceable times about 1800, was now diminished to 1200, exclusive of the garrison. The town, which consists of two streets and a few lanes, is situated upon the steep slope of a hill, which entirely commands it. When the queen's troops first took possession of Portugalete, they contented themselves with simply throwing up barricades at the entrances of the streets, loopholing the houses most contiguous to the gates, and placing a small gun in the tower of the church. Castor having furiously attacked it, in February 1835, and being with difficulty repulsed, the government determined to build a fort on the hill above; and, accordingly, some time after, a small martello tower was erected, chiefly by the aid of Captain Lapidge, of H. M. S. Ringdove. This being found insufficient, a large fort was marked out, in the autumn of 1835, but so slowly proceeded with, that, in October 1836, it was not quite completed. However, it was a strong defence to the town, even in its then condition, for its guns swept all the country round to the Galindo river; thus the town was secure against a *coup de main*, and, with a resolute

governor, was fully capable of a stout defence ; for the British ships of war precluded all hope of attack on the river side. The garrison consisted of 300 men of the 1st battalion, 4th light infantry, and a few artillerymen ; the governor was Colonel Castaños, who inspired but small confidence.

In front of Portugalete, on the right bank of the river, is situated a small group of houses, known as the *Casas del Consulado*. Placed as they are, on the sands, within 100 yards of the bank of the river, and wholly commanded by the guns of Portugalete, nothing could induce the Spanish governor of the town to occupy these houses, except by day, and that occasionally. The enemy's guerillas took advantage of this neglect, and many a straggler was picked off by them on the right bank, coming along unconscious of danger ; and not unfrequently, during the night, they fired upon the shipping in the river, and upon the town opposite ; a mode of warfare more insulting than dangerous.

The next post held by the queen's troops, on the left bank of the Nervion, was the convent of the Desierto, a capacious, but by no means strong building, beautifully and advantageously situated on a high neck of land, at the confluence of the Galindo. This building had been loopholed and barricaded, the surrounding trees levelled, and a clear glacis made ; a ditch was also in progress. On the eastern side was a large battery, mounting

two long 32-pounders, and one 9-pounder. On the front, towards the Galindo river and the mainland, was a battery mounting two 9-pounders. The garrison consisted of one company of the 4th light infantry, and some eight or ten artillerymen. As this edifice commands the deepest and best anchorage in the Nervion, the commodore of H. M. forces on the station directed a detachment of British marines to be placed there, and H. M. S. *Saracen* to be anchored close under the convent. The nominal commander of this important post was Lieutenant-Colonel Angulo, but the real one was Captain T. P. Le-Hardy, of the *Saracen*, a very different officer from the aged Spaniard. At the distance of 1500 yards from the *Desierto* is the bridge of *Luchana*, of which the centre arch had been destroyed by the Carlists, and afterwards repaired by the Queenites. This bridge, over a deep and muddy stream, was approached on each side by a long open causeway; it was perfectly well barricaded and loopholed throughout, and had, besides, one small gun, either a 6 or 9-pounder, which was usually turned towards the heights of *Arriaga*, on the right bank of the river; forty men, commanded by a lieutenant, was the force usually stationed here. Some 300 yards above the bridge of *Luchana* was a low, solid, stone edifice, with double walls, which had been used as a powder-magazine, and was now dismantled. This was usually the station for the

advanced picket of the garrison at the bridge during the day. Above this building, rose the steep slaty ridge of Montecabras, which was unoccupied; and, above that, the hill of Banderas, the culminating point of the range of hills on the right bank of the river.

Banderas was originally a signal-station, from which all vessels, coming from seaward, were telegraphed to the signal-house at Bilbao. When it was determined to place a garrison here, the house was made the *nucleus* of a considerable fortification. Strong defences were thrown up on each side, loopholed throughout; the approaches, also, were cleared, which, joined to the gradual rise of the ground up to the house, rendered an attack on it a work of some danger. A nine-pounder (brass,) was mounted on the southern front, and the garrison, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, consisted of two companies and a few gunners, of which force half a company was stationed below, at the bridge of Luchana.

About 1000 yards (by the road,) distant from the fort of the Banderas, and 350 feet below it, was the convent of the Capuchins, seated upon a small platform overlooking a deep ravine, which, beginning at the Molino de Viento, descends to the church of Deusto. This edifice, though spacious, was not strong; its only defence being a loopholed garden wall, and even that was of little service, for the houses in the vicinity

overlooked it in every direction. Untenable against any thing but musquetry, it was held by the queenites more as a protection to the communication with Banderas, than for any merits of its own. One company was posted here.

Between the Cadagua and Galindo-rivers, about 800 yards above the point where the former joins the Nervion, is the convent of Burseña, situated in the village of the same name. Here was formerly an iron chain-bridge, which was destroyed by the peasantry soon after the breaking out of the revolution. This convent, which formerly belonged to the order of La Merced, was an immensely strong edifice, capable of resisting cannon. One of the first garrisons established by the Christinos, it had acquired fame from the tenacious defence made by Colonel Echaluze with the cazadores of Isabel II., during the siege of Bilbao by Zumalacarguy. This fortress was of great consequence to the Christinos, since it enabled them to force the passage of the Cadagua, which, for an army coming from the westward to relieve Bilbao, is the most difficult and dangerous part of the undertaking. This important fortress was garrisoned by 120 men of the regiment of Cuenca and 4th light infantry, with two pieces of cannon (six-pounders).

The last, and except the Desierto, the most important post on the river held by the queen's troops, was the fortified convent of the Franciscans,

called San Mamés.* This large and spacious edifice is situated on a rising bank, on the left side of the Nervion, about one mile from Bilbao. Aware of its importance, the queen's generals had put it in a decent state of defence: a deep ditch was sunk around the convent; a well secured covered-way connected the body of the works with a house of two stories, which was loopholed throughout; strong earthen parapets were thrown up within the ditch; and two batteries, armed with seven pieces of cannon, swept the approaches on the land side. Unfortunately the river side was neglected, of which, we shall soon see, the enemy was not slow to avail himself. For the rest, the building was not capable of resisting a very long hammering, but yet was defensible against any moderate means of attack. The fort was well supplied with provisions, stores, and ammunition, and commanded by an officer of reputation, Colonel Fernandez, who had under his orders a garrison consisting of three companies of the regiment of Toro, about twenty-five artillerymen, and a few soldiers of the 1st battalion, 4th light infantry, in all about 300.

* Pieces of ordnance in the convent of San Mamés:—

One long iron twenty-four-pounder.

One iron twelve-pound-carronade, landed from H. M. S. Saracen.

Two brass nine-pounders.

One brass four-pounder.

One iron eighteen-pound-carronade.

One cohorn mortar.

Of shot, shells, and ammunition there were sufficient for 800 rounds.

On the 7th, news was received that Eguia* had taken the command of the army, and that his besieging train had moved from Guernica to Munguia. On the day following the Carlist commander-in-chief took up his head quarters in Deusto; his forces, consisting of nine battalions, were all posted on the right bank of the Nervion, and the Carlist troops, which had all along held the heights of Archanda, now descending the ravines, re-occupied the houses contiguous to the town, and the siege was again commenced. Still it was not too late to hold the church and town house of Abando, and thus secure the left flank of Mallona and San Augustin; but the dictates of plain sense and experience were alike disregarded; these important buildings were not occupied, and at dark the enemy seized them. During the day, numbers of the peasantry were seen carrying up the heights of Archanda loads of fascines, gabions, ladders, planks, &c., and it needed no prophet to tell us that, this time, the outposts were not to escape so easily as the last. Early on the morning of the 9th, it was seen that the enemy were in possession of Banderas. It appears that two pieces of cannon were placed in battery by Eguia during the night. At daybreak

* He had lately been made a Count by the Pretender, in acknowledgment of the distinguished services rendered to the cause; henceforth, the Carlist general styled himself "*El Conde de Casa-Eguia*."

they fired two rounds each. The commandant of the fort, satisfied that he was attacked in earnest, fired one shot and then struck his colours. He, of the Capuchin convent, tried to escape with his garrison to the river-side, and there cross over to San Mamés; but the scheme failed, and, although we heard that above eighty escaped, it appears, from better authority, that the Carlists took or slew them all. Thus, by nine A. M. the entire right bank of the river was in the hands of the besiegers; for the detachment at Luchana Bridge, seeing the Banderas taken, immediately abandoned their post, and retired across the river to the Desierto.

The next attempt of Eguia was against San Mamés: considering that his operations against the convent might be incommoded by gun-boats from the town, he, with great prudence, threw up a battery of two six-pounders, at the place called El Salve. Availing themselves of the afternoon tide, two French gun-boats, laden with French families and their effects, attempted to descend the river; but a few well-directed shots from the battery at the Salve, told them plainly enough that all egress was forbidden. Finding it impossible to force a passage, the French commander, M. Daguerre, returned to the town, where he remained during the whole of the siege. The French consul, M. Lafitte, remonstrated strongly against this outrage upon his country's flag. It

was reported the Carlist chiefs laughed at his complaint: it is certain they afforded no redress.

The morning of the 10th was ushered in by a burst of artillery from San Mamés, which the besiegers eagerly returned. Clouds of guerillas, posted in the houses nearest the convent, and on the right bank of the river, maintained an incessant fire against every embrasure and window. The mists of the morning clearing up, it was seen that the besiegers had availed themselves of the fatal error committed by the queen's engineers, and had constructed a battery for four pieces on the right bank of the river, under some large trees, whence they battered the river-front of the convent with impunity, and also enfiladed the flank of the battery on the north side of the edifice. Hernandez, the governor, did his best under these trying circumstances; he quickly covered the flanks of his main-battery from their fire with a multitude of sand-bags, and tried his utmost to get a gun to bear upon the besiegers' battery, but without success. Still his fire was unremitting: and, after five hours' cannonade, it was clear that the enemy had their work to do, when the troops stationed in the loopholed house, at the head of the covered way, fled, and it was instantly seized by the enemy. Their skirmishers closed, fierce and eager, round the lines; the guns from the opposite side thundered incessantly, and a little before twelve some commotion was visible

among the defenders.* The besiegers hung round the angle of the ditch; one of the bravest was seen to leap in and climb an embrasure; others followed; the garrison made little resistance, and the place was won. At this moment, when only a few straggling shots were heard, just sufficient to say that the combat was not quite over, a party of the besiegers were seen fording the river,† it being low-water, and the stream not above knee-deep. These joining their companions who had entered on the land side, all resistance was at an end; and the conquerors, after shooting a few of the prisoners, stripped the rest.

That the garrison and inhabitants of Bilbao might not remain ignorant of what they had in fact witnessed, Eguia ordered the church bells of Deusto and Alvia to ring a peal of triumph. Without let or hindrance, the former rang their fill; but scarcely had the bells of Alvia church began to clatter, when a shell sent into the belfry, accompanied with a brace of 24-pound shot, silenced both bells and ringers. This was the same church which, by San Miguel's strange oversight, a second time left to the besiegers, cost the inhabitants of Bilbao so many valuable lives. Contiguous to

* It is supposed that Commandant Hernandez was wounded about this time.

† If my glass did not deceive me, some two or three of the party fording the river were wounded by stray shots, from the southern angle of the convent.

the church was a large and elegant edifice, belonging to the family of Barraucua ; it was set on fire by a chance shell intended for the church of Alvia, and being full of straw and timber, was speedily consumed.

The works for the defence were carried on with vigour. On the high ground, at the back of the town, between the burying-ground and Mallona, a large battery, looking towards Alvia, was nearly completed. The battery, known as that of "Las Cujas," at the end of the Arenal, near the entrance of the Zendeja, was strengthened and increased, and a strong parapet of sand-bags thrown up at the entrance of the Calle Esperanza. At half-past one P. M., on the 11th, firing was heard down the river, which, we conjectured, proceeded from the enemy attacking Burseña. Such proved to be the case. At three P. M. the firing ceased ; and directly after the bells of Deusto announced the Carlist victory. It is of no use to deny, that these easy conquests of the besiegers greatly dispirited the inhabitants. They saw strong positions, well garrisoned, defended with cannon, captured in a few hours ; and whether this was due to the prowess of the besiegers, or to the poltroonery of the besieged, the alternative was alike disagreeable. While the major part of the Carlist forces passed the river, to attack Burseña, the remainder, stationed in Deusto and Alvia, bestirred themselves, with their customary activity, in forming a bridge

of boats across the river at San Mames. This was not a very difficult undertaking. The general, San Miguel, unable to appreciate the value of his previous escape, had again neglected to bring all the lighters and small craft up to Bilbao, and thus above fifty large barges, moored under the convent of San Mames, when that place was taken, fell into the hands of the victors. After dark the Carlists began to howl, as usual, from their entrenchments; and, among other things, they told us that the next day they should attack Portugalete. This information was not very consolatory; for our experience of the past by no means increased our confidence in the future; and, as we were aware that Castor occupied Santurce, our apprehensions for Portugalete were at the highest.

The weather, bad enough on the 12th, became worse on the 13th; and, since the Carlists could not pass their cannon by water, on account of the British squadron, nor conduct them by the usual road, for fear of the fire of the Desierto, they were compelled to drag them through miry lanes, with enormous trouble, which even the zeal and enthusiasm of the peasants could not surmount. Meanwhile we saw from the heights of Miravilla, two steamers enter the bay, and disembark troops. Castor evacuated Santurce, and we conjectured that their contemplated attack was abandoned; for the British flag was flying on the Star Fort of

Portagalete,* which, as it seemed to imply that a reinforcement of marines had arrived, caused all apprehension on our part for that place to cease.

Thus far Eguia's operations had been crowned with success: five fortified positions, eleven pieces of cannon, with 738 prisoners, had fallen into his hands; and, except the little fort of the Desierto, from Bilbao to Portagalete, all was his. In the hopes of making a surprise, a battalion of Carlists approached cautiously to the Desierto, but the fort was in excellent hands; they were allowed to approach as near as they chose, and then a heavy and well-directed fire sent them to the right about,

* Several British officers, subsequently to the siege, informed the writer, that had the Carlists attacked Portagalete on the 11th or 12th, in all probability it would have fallen, for "neither governor nor garrison inspired much confidence." After the reinforcement arrived, it was no longer practicable. They had heard that the question of an attack on Portagalete was debated violently in the Carlist councils, and finally over-ruled for these reasons:—"That, seeing that the English forces would certainly take part, they must expect to lose 500 men; that the news of the capture of Portagalete would certainly draw down all the English squadron; that the town was untenable against the steamers; and that, in thus attempting this enterprise, they should incur an almost certain loss of near 1000 men, and thereby embarrass their operations against Bilbao to no purpose, since they would eventually have to relinquish the place; whereas, Bilbao once taken, Portagalete fell as a matter of course, and the English ships might either be detained or allowed to depart, as policy might dictate."

convinced that this was neither Burseña nor Banderas.

On the 15th we observed the enemy very busy in our neighbourhood. Carts were coming and going; troops were moving; and, by such intelligence as we could procure from the country, we learned that an attack in earnest might soon be expected. The enemy's skirmishers were also bolder than usual: flinging themselves into the nearest houses, they maintained a lively fire, which was briskly returned from the town. At dark the firing ceased; but General San Miguel, with great judgment, directed the soldiers at the San Augustin to fire during the night in the direction of the Campo Volantin and the ravine of Uribarri, for he conjectured that the Carlists would this night be working in their trenches. We afterwards learned that this prudent measure had greatly annoyed the besiegers, and cost them numbers of men, principally labourers taken from the adjoining villages.

At day-break, on the 16th, we perceived the besiegers to have thrown up a barricade of casks, the breadth of the Campo Volantin, in front of the gate of San Augustin, extending from the extreme angle of the ruins of the building called the Estufa, to the ruins of the houses burnt by the enemy, on the 26th of October; the distance of this barricade, from the Augustin gate, was about 50 yards, and from the battery of the Cujas, about

220. Captain Morales, of the artillery, coming to this battery, pointed and fired above twenty rounds at this barricade, none of which took effect; whereupon, thinking (with reason) that he had wasted shot enough, to no purpose, he left off. The fire of small arms was incessant during the whole day: we, however, suffered very little loss, and, I should conjecture that that of the besiegers must, also, have been very trifling, for our soldiers looked one way and fired another. The Carlists fired into the town, or, at least, in that direction. In Alvia, the enemy were seen working near the church, apparently constructing a battery, and, in the afternoon, three staff-officers were observed reconnoitring the defences, from the ruins of the Estufa. They were extremely cool and deliberate in their movements, although the musquetry from the town was very heavy, but, so ill directed, that comparatively sheltered as they were, their risk was trifling. At night the Carlists ceased firing; the noise of their working parties was distinctly heard: as on the previous night, the fire of small arms, from the town, was brisk; and, whether the troops see best by night, or not, it appears from all accounts, that their fire was more destructive than during the day.*

* Deserters told us, they lost that night fourteen killed, and above fifty wounded.

Besides the batteries in the Campo Volantin, Alvia, and back of San Augustin, which we knew the besiegers were constructing, there was another at the Tejerias, which we suspected to be in progress, but had no means of ascertaining the fact. Meantime, before we narrate the attack of the 17th, it may be as well to describe the works carried on by the besieged, for their defence.

At the fords of the Achuri, a strong parapet was thrown up, loopholed throughout, with a six-pounder on a small raised platform in the centre; the stone bridge was barricaded, and loopholed, as also the houses contiguous; in the tower of the church of San Antonio, a four-pounder was placed; the flooring of the chain-bridge was cut, and only two shifting planks left for a passage; the stone tower, forming the pier-head, was barricaded in front, and a twelve-pound carronade placed, which swept the bridge and opposite bank. Both the bridges were mined. Cantrips were made, and more were in progress. Above 70,000 sacks, for earth, were made and stored in the batteries, ready for use. In the street of the Zendeja, the party-walls were all perforated, so that the soldiers could traverse, under cover, the entire street. A foundry for shot was established, which produced a fair supply daily: while, under the skilful conduct of Captain White, of the artillery, old and disabled guns were rendered serviceable; carriages were repaired, and spare ones made, and above fifty

hands were daily employed in making cartridges. The distribution of provisions was carried on with admirable regularity, and, what is not the least surprising, although there was, as usual, no money in the military chest, every want was supplied by the ready zeal and alacrity of the inhabitants. Finally, every person, from fifteen to sixty, was compelled to take arms; but, in justice to the honourable population of this town, I must say, that there was no need of compulsion, except to prevent too young persons from enlisting, for all came forward readily, and even boys of twelve and fourteen might be seen by the side of their fathers in the ranks.

At dawn, on the 17th, we found the besiegers' batteries completed in Alvia, the Campo Volantin, El Chorritoque,* behind San Augustin, in the garden of Celiminchu, and their mortar battery at the Tejerias. The first, pierced for three guns, was close to the left side of Alvia church, and enfiladed all our line, from the Cujas to the convent of San Augustin. That of the Campo Volantin, with four embrasures, went straight against the north face of the convent of San Augustin, and the gate; the three others, all in the ravine of Uribarri, were three-gun batteries, and their fire was directed against the rear of the convent, and the house of Quintana, sweeping the Zendeja, the front of the battery of Las Cujas, and the Arenal; and the

* A Basque word, signifying, "A look out."

guns in all these batteries could bear upon Mallona, when required. In the Tejerias was the mortar battery, which sometimes played from three, and at others, only from one mortar.

Although it was clear that the besiegers had completed their batteries, it was by no means certain, that their cannon was mounted, for not a piece could be seen. At eight A. M. not a shot had been fired, so that most of us conjectured that the *row* would not begin until the morrow. However, we were soon undeceived: the enemy's troops gathering rather numerously in the houses around San Augustin, the battery at Mallona began to put some shells among them. This was enough,—all suspense was at an end; the Carlist batteries opened with a salvo which shook the town, and as the batteries of the besieged were not slow in replying, the cannonade became general. It was soon seen that the convent was the point of attack; assailed by such heavy ordnance, in front, flank, and rear, the old edifice crumbled under the shock, and the yawning walls soon gave proofs of the severity of the contest. The gate went to pieces, and so did the houses opposite, in the Zendeja; but the lower barricade, of six tiers of casks, filled with earth, held firm and defied all their efforts. On the side of the town, the guns were neither idle nor badly served.

The enemy's batteries of Uribarri and the Campo Volantin, began to slacken their fire, and by one o'clock they were silenced, as was also

that of the Chorritoque; but the Alvia battery fired continually. At half-past two, P.M., a huge piece of the convent wall having given way, with the bags behind, the Carlists, with loud shouts, leaped from their trenches, and rushed to the breach; but the defenders were not intimidated; they stood boldly up, received the assailants with a close and heavy fire, which soon repulsed them. Again and again urged on by their officers, they made a wild rush at the breach, but met nothing but defeat. The shouts of the Christinos rose, loud and cheerful; and when the reserve companies of the nationals and Cuenca came pouring into the convent, the Colonel, Duran, of Trujillo, told them, with thanks, "that his men would make good the convent, alone, against all the enemy's efforts." The supporting companies retired, and Colonel Duran kept his word; although his regiment lost, in this day's combat, 107 men killed and wounded. At six, P.M., all was quiet; both sides appearing to be glad to rest. The committee of defence, struck with the extraordinary courage displayed by Colonel Duran and his regiment, in defending San Augustin, sent him a letter of thanks, with a pecuniary gratification, and an extra ration of wine to his soldiers; this prudent and politic conduct had an immediate good effect, and, in the sequel, a better. During the assault, the soldiers of Trujillo, having had their colours shot away, hoisted the black flag, which was

henceforth never taken down, but continued to float over the town until the day of her deliverance. In the action of this day the captain of the 2nd company of the nationals was killed,* and this gallant corps suffered a heavier loss than any regiment of the garrison, except that of Trujillo.

The quietude of the besiegers was but of short duration; about eight, P. M., they opened a brisk fire of musquetry along the front of San Augustin, and from the opposite bank of the river; this was as briskly replied to by the garrison; but, in all probability, caused more annoyance than loss to each party. Within the convent walls, Duran and his brave followers, though half suffocated with dust and smoke, and worn down with fatigue, still worked on, repairing the breaches, and strengthening the yielding walls with sand-bags, casks, and stout beams: two companies were sent to assist in the labour. Mallona, and the Cujas battery, had suffered a good deal, and workmen were also busy there, in repairing the defences. This night a second line was begun, extending from the left corner of the Zendeja to the house of Quintana, to serve as a defence, in the event of the convent of San Augustin being taken by the besiegers. Throughout the street of the Zendeja the houses

* D. Francisco Amezaga: he had just observed, "What a glorious day to die!"—and directly afterwards said, in a low voice, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." Ten minutes after he was no more.

bore witness to the severity of the conflict, and the two corner houses of the Arenal, just above the battery of the *Cujas*, large solid edifices with stone walls two feet thick, were so terribly torn with shot, that they were deemed unsafe; and, accordingly, workmen were sent to pull them down.

The morning of the 18th was ushered in with heavy squalls of wind and rain. It was then apparent that the besiegers had erected another battery, to the right of Alvia church, and that they had constructed another in the Campo Volantin, extending from the lower end of the Estufa to the water side. At a quarter past eight, A. M., these two batteries, and that of the Chorritoque, opened their fire against the old convent and the *Cujas* battery; while their mortar-battery, at Tivoli, threw shells as usual. This day the besiegers were very unfortunate; the guns from the theatre and *Cujas* batteries fired ricochet shot so accurately, that the Alvia battery was disabled and silenced, within an hour; by eleven, the same capital practice had silenced all the besiegers' guns; their mortars, as usual, continued playing, to which we could make no return; for a town is rather a better mark to throw shells into, than a small plot of ground some four yards square. Still the shells from the town did some damage; in particular, setting fire to the house of Eznarrizaga, close to the besiegers' battery of that name, and

where they had their expense magazine. A N.W. wind favoured the flames, and frustrated all attempts of the enemy to extinguish them. The rest of the day, and the following night, passed over pretty quiet, the customary fire of small-arms being kept up by both parties.

The 19th, being the birth-day of Queen Isabel, the band of the 4th light infantry treated the besiegers to some choice music, which they ill-naturedly returned with volleys of musquetry. The town next complimented them with a salute of twenty-one shotted guns, and they replied with twenty-one thirteen-inch shells. At noon and night equal salutes of twenty-one guns were exchanged, little to our advantage, for the shells did more damage than usual. The garrison received a gratification of three days' pay, and double rations. In the afternoon the national guard hoisted upon the battery at the Cujas the black flag; a black grave-stone was also erected, with this inscription, *Bateria de la Muerte*; or, Battery of Death. Beneath the usual figures of death's head and cross-bones was the motto, *Non plus ultra*. The night, like the day, was stormy; and a sentinel on the Morro fort was killed by lightning.

Neither on the 20th nor 21st did the guns of the besiegers fire upon the town; those of the besieged were also nearly silent; but the fire of small-arms, as usual, was maintained with spirit. A deserter coming over, informed us that Villareal,

with the covering army, consisting of ten battalions, was at Sodupé, and that Eguia pressed the siege with nine, of which only seven were actually on service before the town. This led us to conjecture that Espartero, with his army, was approaching; and that Eguia had detached two battalions to aid his coadjutor, and this we supposed to be the secret of his inactivity. From Miravilla two steamers were seen to enter the bay, and disembark soldiers; which gave rise to an opinion that Espartero, despairing of forcing his way through such a strong country, was bringing his army round by sea.

22d of November.—For their silence on the two previous days the besiegers now made ample amends. As soon as the fog cleared a little away, we beheld a new battery in Alvia, the two in the Campo Volantin and that of the Chorritoque completely repaired and armed. At eleven A.M. they all began to play upon the convent and batteries adjacent; including the mortars and howitzers, the besiegers had twenty pieces in action. The batteries of Mallona, Rediente, Cujas, and the theatre, being now in good condition, answered with a vigour which could not be surpassed. The fog, dense previously to the action, was soon rendered more so by such a heavy cannonade. The enemy's batteries being undistinguishable, the flashes of their guns served to direct the pointing of the garrison artillerymen. This furious cannonade was supported by three battalions extended along the line, who maintained an

incessant fire of musquetry which fell like hail. Despite the admirable and rapid manner in which the guns of the town were served, the Carlist fire was unremitting, and terribly did the old convent feel the effects; the sacristy, part of the roof, and a considerable part of the church coming down, burying in the ruins many of its brave defenders. This was the signal for the assault; on rushed the assailants with immense uproar, and it is said that the bayonets crossed amid the ruins. However, Duran and his brave followers were not to be beaten easily; they stood firm and repulsed the enemy, who tried his fortune three times more, with no better success. At half-past two the outer angle of the convent coming down, caused confusion among the defenders, which the enemy seeing, they charged into the breach with such fury that they entered and drove the Christinos into the body of the convent. Here the latter rallied, and joined by a company of nationals, charged the foe so determinedly, that half the storming party perished there; the rest fled, but, rallying quickly behind some ruins about fifteen yards from the breach, they there clung and defied all attempts to expel them.* As this last

* About half-past four P.M. four gentlemen of the national guard went round to San Augustin, and seeing that the soldiers, weary and exhausted, fired but badly at the besiegers, who occupied a small parapet close to the breach, they placed themselves at the loopholes, and speedily shewed the difference between careful aim and firing at random, and being all good shots, they pinked every man that shewed himself. This the Carlists

attack looked serious, General San Miguel brought up to the Arenal in readiness a column of reserve, consisting of three companies of national guard, two of Compostela and one of Toro. This night a deserter came over, who, according to his own account, was a Bavarian, had belonged to the French Legion, and being taken prisoner at Larrasoña, was offered the alternative of being shot or joining the Carlists. He stated that Eguia and Villareal had a force of twenty-four battalions within a radius of four leagues—that the foreign battalion was 390 strong at the commencement of the siege, and was now barely 200; that his company had lost in this day's action fourteen men, and that the Carlist artillerymen and the 5th battalion of Biscay had suffered exceedingly. Subsequent events proved the truth of this man's statement. This night the enemy were unusually silent, even ceasing their accustomed howls.*

The 23d was a day of rest; the besiegers were quiet; abundance of stores were observed to arrive in their camp, and numbers of wounded

did not like at all, and after an ineffectual struggle for about ten minutes, they abandoned their parapet, to which they never returned.

* The Basque howl or whoop, resembles at first the neighing of a horse, then changes to a wolf's howl, and finally terminates with a shake like the expiring notes of a jackass's bray. In addition to this warlike accomplishment, they usually divert themselves with making sundry antics and grimaces, perfectly inimitable; such, that an ape, fresh from an African forest, would die of despair at being able to excel or even equal.

were seen to be conveyed in carts up the mountain. Notwithstanding the incessant rain, the garrison were active in repairing the old convent, so that it should stand another battering. In the afternoon the enemy threw about twenty shells into the lines without causing the least damage; the town batteries fired occasionally. During the night two deserters came over, who confirmed what the Bavarian had said:—they added that Eguia had declared his determination that he would make himself master of the town, or his army should perish before the place. They also told us that the attack was to recommence on the 25th, and so it proved. On Miravilla the lookout discovered this day seven flags flying on the Star Fort; none knew what this signified, but most entertained the idea that it denoted that seven battalions had arrived.*

The weather was finer on the 24th, and the works of defence went steadily forward. The besiegers' working parties were seen very busy in their batteries; the guns from the town fired grape and shells at intervals, which induced Eguia to throw out a line of skirmishers, who kept up a biting fire that caused us numerous casualties. After dusk the fire ceased on both sides, and the combatants began to abuse each other; the Carlists howled louder than ever, and

* We were subsequently informed by Captain Lapidge, R.N. that these seven flags were hoisted solely to attract attention, with a view to open a telegraphic communication with the town.

told us they would surely "Sarve us out"* next day. In the night two additional guns were taken up to Mallona and mounted; as also one gun, a twelve-pounder, in the inner line of the Zendeja. About midnight the Carlist battery of the Campo Volantin fired a few rounds, which drew down a heavy fire from Mallona that speedily silenced them. The enemy's mortar batteries then opened their fire, so that there was little intermission all night.

At daybreak on the 25th it was observed that the besiegers had constructed a fresh battery in Alvia to the west of the last. At half-past six they opened a heavy fire from this battery and from those of Eznazarraga and the Campo Volantin. The convent, as usual, was their object of attack, but this day the besiegers were more unlucky than ever; their guns, badly pointed, did scarcely any harm, while those of the town dismounted their pieces and disabled their gunners with terrible rapidity. Five officers were seen carried off wounded, two others were killed close to San Augustin, and another in Alvia was carried off on a mattress with white sheets; in short, the superiority of the fire of the besieged was never more manifest than on this day. The loss of the Christinos was very trifling, not exceeding twenty; amongst them, however, perished a young gentle-

* About the nearest version I can give of their *politest* expression.

man of good family, Don Jose Villabaso. By half-past three the enemy's guns were silenced, and as he had kept back his skirmishers when the cannonade ceased, all was quiet. This night a deserter came over, who stated that Eguia had sent two pieces of cannon and 800 men to Axpé, to oppose the march of the queen's army; this man's story was, apparently, confirmed by the report received from Miravilla, that heavy firing had been heard down the river.

The 26th passed away quietly; the Carlists were busy repairing their batteries, and bringing fresh supplies of shot and ammunition into their park. They had long since completed their bridge of boats opposite the convent of San Mamés, which was still perfect, despite the violent freshes in the river, thus bearing testimony to the abilities of their engineers. As if to give us an earnest of their determination to take the place at all hazards, it was now clearly seen from Miravilla, that the besiegers had stockaded* the river above the bridge; and, not content with this, they afterwards completed another stockade a few yards below the first, thus effectually barring the channel of the river.

* These stockades were very creditable performances; strong, and substantially composed of trees, eighteen or twenty feet in length, and from twelve to fifteen inches diameter, driven one-third of their length into the bed of the river, which is here about 100 yards wide.

The besiegers were also at work this day upon a rising ground, opposite the convent of the Concepcion, and their guerillas occupied the convent of Santa Clara. As this indicated an attack on the convent of the Concepcion, which was confessedly the weakest part of the line, a working party was sent into the convent, to strengthen the garden wall, which served for its outer defence, with a breast-work; at the same time, an eight-inch howitzer was brought into the *cavalier*, at the back of the Circus, and shells were thrown, with good effect, into the convent of Santa Clara, causing the enemy to decamp. One of the shells unfortunately fell short, and, exploding in the court-yard of the Concepcion convent, destroyed four soldiers of Compostela. Large bodies of troops were this day observed marching upon Baracaldo, and, at night, we beheld the convent of Burseña in flames, a sure sign that the Carlists had abandoned it. We also heard a salute of nineteen guns, fired from H.M.S. Ringdove, which indicated that the general commanding the relieving army had arrived; but *who* that was, whether Evans, Espartero, or any other chief, we, of course, were ignorant. All this, added to the bold and assured manner in which the columns came on, and their apparent numbers, caused every one the liveliest satisfaction. Conscious that they had done their duty, the besieged confidently anticipated, on the morrow, a glorious

triumph for the queen's cause, and a ruinous defeat for the Carlists. Never was there a more bitter disappointment.

Nov. 27.—No one, this morning, contemplated the Carlist batteries firing, it being taken for granted that the proximity of the relieving army would sufficiently engage their attention. All surmises on this head were, however, soon dissipated, by the fact of the besiegers' batteries opening, at day-break, with a furious cannonade, which the garrison returned with spirit; but, towards noon, the besiegers' fire slackened, having occasioned us little damage, for, as on preceding days, their guns were badly served. Meantime, the noise of an engagement, near Castrojana, was distinctly audible at Miravilla, and the boldness of the Carlists, in thus clinging to the siege, when the advanced columns of the army were actually endeavouring to force their lines, surprised us all. Even General San Miguel himself considered that this was merely to attract the attention of the garrison, so that no sortie might be attempted; and this opinion was farther strengthened by the fact, that the enemy's skirmishers were silent. Indeed, every one was so confident, that the besiegers' slowly recurring fire was unheeded; all attention was paid to the engagement at Castrojana, and the colonel of the regiment of Trujillo had allowed many of his officers to absent themselves for a short time. Imagine the amazement of the

town, when, at two P.M., a loud uproar arose in the convent of San Augustin, and, soon afterwards, thence rushed a crowd of frightened soldiers, crying out, "The enemy has entered!" This ominous cry flew like wildfire through the town, and the confusion consequent thereon exceeds belief; for, it being Sunday, and the weather fine, many females were in the streets, as also numbers of soldiers off duty,* whose fears magnifying the danger, increased the clamour, and, for some time, no order could be restored; the tumult, however, by the assistance of strong patrols, was at length quelled.

General San Miguel, with all his staff, was in the "*Bateria de la Muerte*" when the tumult began, and instantly hurried to the scene of action, where they united with Colonel Duran, in endeavouring to rally and reform the regiment of Trujillo, but all in vain. The soldiery became clubbed, and no better than a disorderly mob; nor did all their officers behave, on this occasion, as their previous conduct led us to expect. The town would now have been lost, had not the gallant and watchful colonel of the nationals, D. Antonio Arana, while he held the Carlists in check with a few brave men, sent his adjutant to bring

* These were chiefly servants, and other non-effectives, who, though borne on the strength of the regiments, do no duty. This practice, common to all armies, prevails to a most injurious extent in the Spanish.

up three companies of nationals, the cazadores, and the battalion of Compostela.

It appears that some Carlist guerillas, availing themselves of the shelter afforded by the heaps of ruins which the incessant cannonade had occasioned at the foot of the outer wall of the convent, had gained, unseen, a small passage which led to the sacristy, and thence to the church, and upper part of the cloisters. The garrison surprised, were thrown into confusion, and made very little defence; about seventy were cut off, and made prisoners, but the fate of one artilleryman deserves notice. Alone, he defended himself at his post, by throwing hand-grenades at the foe, until his stock (seventeen) was exhausted; he then rushed out upon the swarm of besiegers, fought his way through to a window, from which he leaped, and was taken up and brought in by the cazadores. This heroic soldier had received twenty-two wounds from ball and bayonet, and yet he finally recovered, though he remained a cripple for life.

Meantime, the Carlists (now fully established in the convent, and adjoining house of Menchaca,) galled the inner line with an increasing fire of small-arms, which told with terrible effect upon the confused masses of men who thronged the narrow street of the Zendeja. Irritated, beyond measure, at the loss they were sustaining, part of the 1st, 5th, and 6th companies of the national

guard, led by Brigadier Araoz, and Colonel Duran, rushed into the convent. For a time the strife hung evenly balanced; but the commanding position of the Carlists, who, from the roof and galleries, fired with fatal precision, compelled the assailants to retreat, after losing severely. Among those who laid down their lives here, for the safety of their native town, were D. Jose Gaminde; D. Leonardo Allende Salazar, the last surviving brother of that distinguished family; and D. Candido Pedorena, of whom it may with truth be said, that none fell during the siege more regretted*. After this repulse of the nationals, it was the duty of the Carlists to have pushed hastily on, and carried the inner line; but they paused, looked, and drew back; thus losing the fairest chance ever offered to their arms.

Nor was the attack of the nationals, though unsuccessful, entirely useless; for during the time the assailants were thus held in check, some degree of order was established, and the supports arrived. The enemy, however, was becoming more numerous, and their incessant fire of small-arms had already struck down General San Miguel, Brigadier Araoz, the second in command of the garrison, Colonel Cotoner, the second in command

* The body of D. Candido Pedorena was borne forth from the fatal convent, by his friend, D. Jose Jane, by whose side he perished; and, at night-fall, his remains were buried in the cemetery of Begonia.

of the artillery, and most of the staff. Nor could the Carlists have escaped much better; for the line of the Zendeja, now well manned, kept up a heavy and well-directed fire upon every door and window of the edifice, San Augustin,* while every gun that could be made to bear upon the building, flung into it a stream of shells and shot. Elated with his success, Eguia sent reinforcement upon reinforcement, and the combat went on with deafening uproar; but Arechavala, who had now taken the command, seeing the obstinacy of the enemy, and aware of the fatal results of leaving the besiegers in possession of this important position, after consulting with Arana and Ozores, determined on setting fire to the building, an arduous undertaking, seeing that the enemy were

* About three in the afternoon, in the heat of the conflict at San Augustin, a huge thirteen-inch shell fell through the roof into the chapel of the nuns' convent of San Merced, in the Esperanza street, where at the time were twelve orphans from the workhouse, and about as many workmen, with a sergeant of artillery, all employed in making cartridges. Fifteen barrels of gunpowder were on the floor, most of them open. Of course, all ran for safety, except one old and another lame man, who remained, terror stricken. The shell exploded, and for some time none dare enter, all anticipating a second explosion, until Captain P. White led the way, and seizing a barrel, to animate his men, carried it into the street. He found nobody hurt, and the powder as before. In another part of the building, a poor girl, a nun, while praying on her knees, was struck by a fragment of a shell or brick, which entered the little window, and caused her severe contusions.

in full possession. It was nevertheless carried into complete effect, with equal courage and good fortune. Soon after four, two companies of the cazadores of Isabel II., one company of the nationals, and one of Compostela, provided with torches, straw, and various combustibles, again attacked and entered the church. As before, the Carlists fought with singular courage, but this time their efforts were vain; they were driven from the church, after a severe contest; piles of combustibles, heaped beneath the high altar, were kindled in an instant. Retreating to the cloisters, the besiegers tried their utmost to impede the progress of the queenites, but these gave them no respite; they spread the flames over the whole of the convent, and the most desperate of the Carlists, blinded by the smoke, or scorched by the eddying flames, fell down into the burning mass, which was at eight o'clock blazing like a volcano, and by its lurid light, the rival camps and the winding river were as distinct as day. Although the besiegers now beheld the long-disputed convent in flames, they had small grounds for triumph; taken by surprise, it was re-taken by main force, and its destruction by the besieged themselves denoted the vigour of their defence, and gave Eguia clearly to understand that thousands of his army must perish, ere he was master of the place so dearly coveted. The loss of the besieged during this hard-fought day was nearly three hundred,

including prisoners; that of the assailants, in all probability, was equal, if not more considerable.*

Now that this long-disputed convent of San Augustin was lost to the besieged, the palace of Quintana, and the inner line at the head of the Zendeja, acquired additional importance. These defences were much strengthened during the night, and double rows of cantrips placed in front of the parapet. An excellent covered way was also completed, in this and following nights, between Mallona and the battery of the Zendeja. Strong supports were kept in readiness; the guards doubled at the Zendeja, and four companies stationed in the Achuri, to watch the fords, which, as the river was now very low, excited much apprehension. After the convent was thoroughly in flames, the town-batteries ceased firing, and, except an occasional discharge of small-arms, hostilities ceased during the night.

* The following anecdote indicates a degree of cool courage, seldom surpassed. When the attempt to burn the convent was made, the first lieutenant of the 6th company of the nationals, Don Luciano de Celaya, bearing a lighted torch in one hand, and a bundle of straw in the other, went alone to the door of the house of Menchaca, intending to set it on fire. Scarcely had he reached the door, when it was suddenly flung open, and eight or ten Carlists appeared; amazed at seeing him, they hesitated; Celaya, however, nothing daunted, flung down his heap of straw, waved his torch, and cried out, "Nacionales a' ellos," (at 'em nationals.) The enemy fled, and Celaya alone thus recaptured the house, to which he instantly set fire.

The events of the day preceding, so fatal in their consequences, had caused us to overlook the movements of the army advancing to our relief, in the anxiety to repel the enemy at our gates. However, those who did reflect, had small hopes of consolation from Espartero's column; for, at day-break, the Carlist batteries thundered away furiously upon Mallona and the defences of the Zendeja, while their shells fell fast and thick into the town, causing more damage than usual. Fortunately for the besieged, the house of Quintana was so low, that the enemy's guns could not be sufficiently depressed to act against it effectually, and the defences of Mallona also resisted their utmost efforts: such was not the case with the houses in the rear of the line of the Zendeja, which were so ruined by the enemy's projectiles, that the troops were obliged to be withdrawn. At half-past two in the afternoon, the firing on both sides was suspended for the following cause: among the ruins, on the near side of the convent, a white flag was seen displayed on a stick; murmurings were heard amongst the besieged, that it was a trick, and cries that it should not be received. A Carlist trumpeter, however, coming forward with a letter, delivered it to the Marquis of Torre Mexia,* who then commanded at the Zendeja; the bearer was told to be off; and the instant he disappeared behind the convent, the

* Colonel of the regiment of Cuenca,

firing re-commenced. The letter was a summons from Eguia to surrender the town, to which no answer was given.*

Soon after General San Miguel was carried off to the hospital, he directed the book of signals which he had in his possession to be sent to the committee of defence. Hitherto no use had been made of the signals, for the telegraph established at Mallona could not be worked, in consequence of the activity of the besiegers' marksmen, nor was the general willing to erect it on Miravilla, lest the attention of the enemy should be attracted to that weak point. These considerations had, however, no weight with the junta, who directly gave orders to fix the telegraph within the fort of Miravilla, which was accordingly done. At one P. M., to the great joy of all, the junta received an

* This was the first time that the Carlist generals had thought fit to summon the town. The contents of the letter were as follows:—

“To the Commandant of the enemy's Troops in Bilbao.—A honourable capitulation, made in time, may save the town and its garrison from a catastrophe. Firing and plundering, with all the horrors attendant on a place taken by storm, (without my being able to avoid it,) are the risks which you, sir, will incur, if, exceeding the bounds of your duty, (to the present honourably fulfilled,) you oblige me to reduce the town by main force, as I have done with the convent of San Augustin. The Lord preserve you many years.

“THE LIEUT.-GEN. CONDE DE CASA EGUIA.

“*Head-quarters in Olaviaga, 28th Nov. 1836.*”

answer from Portugalete, "that the army of the north, 15,000 strong, was at hand, determined to relieve Bilbao;" and, on the day following, to another demand for assistance, the reply was returned,* "*Let Bilbao continue her defence; succour is near at hand.*" Thenceforth our communications with the relieving army, though brief and limited, were certain, and we were independent of spies. It was observed, that when the fact of intelligence being obtained by the telegraph was put beyond a doubt, General San Miguel was as anxious as any other person to keep it employed.

Impelled by a strong south wind, the flames spread with such fury that the entire convent, church, cloisters, and houses nearest to San Augustin were involved in one fierce conflagration. The besiegers, convinced that all their efforts to extinguish the flames were useless, and that some days must elapse ere the ruins would be sufficiently cool to allow the prosecution of their works in that direction, now turned their attention to the convent of the Concepcion, a large building situated at an angle of the river on the left bank, where the road to Balmaceda leaves the town. In the afternoon of the 28th some Carlist officers were seen reconnoitring, and it was suspected they were marking out a battery, which proved to be the case, for on the morning

* Que Bilbao continué defendiéndose prouto será socorrida.

of the 29th it was observed that the besiegers had constructed a sunk battery for two guns, near the house of *Ruete*, about 150 yards in the rear of the convent of Santa Clara, and at ten A.M. this battery opened a fire from one twenty-four and one twelve-pounder, against the *Concepcion*. None of the guns in the town batteries could bear upon this, except the light four-pounder in the tower of San Francisco, and the mortar from *Miravilla* and *Mallona*; but neither their fire nor that of the infantry lining the nearest houses, caused any interruption to the besiegers, who continued steadily to pound the old building until a huge breach was made at the gate, and another near a loopholed house. Both being practicable, at four P.M. the enemy attempted an assault, at the breach near the gate. For 100 yards in front, the land was a dead flat, unbroken by tree or shrub; the besiegers had need, therefore, for all their valour when marching to such an exposed attack, but they could not even reach the wall, for the front fire from the convent, and the flanking fire from the loopholed house did such execution among the assailants that, after two attempts, they retired with a loss of upwards of 200 men;* — a deserter, who came over that night, stated the

* Between thirty and forty bodies were seen the next morning in the field which the assailants crossed, when proceeding to the attack, and seventy-two musquets were picked up by the troops of the garrison.

number at 250. At dark all was quiet, and continued so throughout the night, except at San Augustin, where the advanced posts maintained a constant fire of small-arms.

The troops stationed in the Concepcion on the day of the assault, consisted of 200 of the 4th light infantry, 100 of Compostela, 100 of Cuenca, fifty of Laredo, and a few sappers employed on the works of defence; the commandant was the colonel of the 4th, Don Manuel Saliquet. This was a brilliant defence and inflicted a severe loss upon the enemy, at the same time that it lowered his pride, increased the hopes of the town, and caused the besiegers to work henceforth with reduced energy, and less system than before.

The morning of the 30th was ushered in with torrents of rain, but the besiegers continued their attack against the Concepcion with no success beyond injuring the building, and occasioning a few casualties to the garrison. The besiegers' batteries at Alvia and Esnarrizaga directed their fire upon Mallona, but they were soon silenced, two of their pieces being quickly dismantled. The telegraphic despatch of this day was rather enlivening; it was to the effect that "The army of the north will this day occupy Algorta and Axpé, and thence march upon Asua, to-morrow, by Archanda to Bilbao." Sharp firing was heard in the direction of Portugalete, and the Christino army was seen retiring in heavy columns upon Cestao, thereby giving us clearly to understand

that General Espartero had found out, what we all along anticipated, that the Carlist position on the Cadagua was too strong for him to attempt to force it, and that the true plan of relieving the town was by an attack on the east bank of the river.*

The besiegers were very active to-day; large bodies of troops were in continual movement; some guns were taken from their park at Olaviaga and sent up the heights, while numerous workmen were seen labouring upon Archanda, apparently constructing batteries; fresh troops crossed over by their bridge of boats to the right bank of the river, nor did they neglect their works around the town. The heavy rains having extinguished the exhausted flames at San Augustin, a large body of the enemy entered the ruins by the covered way which they had constructed from the Tejerias to the north-east angle of the building; a party of cazadores hung about the porch, and defied all the efforts of the enemy until dark, when they were withdrawn, and the besiegers left in undisputed possession. At two in the morning the new tenants, thinking to find the town guards unprepared, stole up to

* In 1835 the Christino army attempted to relieve Bilbao by forcing the Carlist position at Castrojana; they failed, as might be expected. Indeed, we were all perfectly astonished at Espartero attempting to come by the way of Castrojana, aware, as he of course was, of its amazing strength; it may seem passing strange, but it is nevertheless true, that the only reason any person, either civil or military, could assign, was, that he always marched by that road! What a sublime idea this conveys of the general!

the parapets, but they were seen directly, and at once driven back under a heavy fire. They made no farther attempt, but all night long kept up a brisk fire of small-arms, while within the ruins they celebrated their triumph with continual shouting, and the braying of a score of drums and horns. Howbeit, the besiegers, in their zeal, rather overdid the thing, for such a continual din led the officer of the nearest guards to suspect the enemy were breaking ground for a mine, and so it proved.

The rain continued falling all night, and in the morning of the 1st of December the enemy's batteries were silent, nor did they continue their attack against the Concepcion, as was expected; on the contrary, it was observed that the besiegers had retired their guns from before it. The Carlist general continued making his dispositions for meeting the queen's army; several guns were taken from before the town up to the heights, where were stationed two squadrons of cavalry and several battalions. A considerable body of troops was also seen to descend towards the valley of Asua: all these movements clearly indicating that Eguia, firm in his intention not to raise the siege, had determined to fight in position. The fort of Banderas, with its adjacent batteries, and the river of Luchana, defended his front; strong redoubts, upon the heights at the Molino de Viento and Santo Domingo, protected his retreat

in case of need, or should any sortie from the garrison shut off that road, he had still two bridges, defended by a fortified convent, to retire upon.

In the afternoon, a message was sent from Miravilla, to the effect that the columns of the queen's army were crossing the river at Portugalete, and after forming on the sands, were marching in the direction of Asua and Axpé; the inhabitants were now satisfied that General Espartero had adopted the most feasible mode of relieving the town, and indulged the hope that the morrow would terminate their sufferings and anxieties.

On the morning of the 2d it was perceived that the besiegers had constructed a strong barricade of casks in the porch of the church, when the guns from the Arenal and Mallona instantly opened a heavy fire, so well directed, that in two hours the barricade disappeared. They next hammered away at the tower and side walls of the convent; but these, though calcined with three days' burning, defied their endeavours. Occasionally large fragments came down, and the splinters from the shot and shells must have caused serious loss to the besiegers, for numbers of wounded were seen carried off by the covered way. On the side of the besieged, the casualties were also numerous; there was no passing along the Zendeja, so deadly was the enemy's fire. In the course of the day, General Espartero enquired if the enemy still continued the siege, which was

answered in the affirmative. Later in the afternoon another despatch was received, announcing that the general would be in Bilbao "*pasamañana*." This was rather doubtful; however, we hoped for the best.

Early on the 3rd, the telegraph announced the advance of the army; at half-past seven, A. M. heavy firing was heard in the direction of Asua; the besiegers retired their last artillery from before the town, and were seen hurrying up three pieces to Banderas; their whole line seemed in movement, indicating an action of importance. With expectations thus raised, the inhabitants and garrison were surprised to learn, by the telegraph, "that the army would soon receive a reinforcement of 5000 men, and exhorting the town to defend itself as hitherto, for succour was close at hand." These messages, by making manifest the irresolution of the queen's general, although far from causing dejection, did certainly excite little confidence among the inhabitants. Both this and the following day passed away very quietly, and there were no signs of war around our long beleaguered town, except at the San Augustin, where the hostile parties, not ten yards apart, continually galled each other with their musquetry; except, also, where the Carlist batteries, on the heights of Archanda, threw shells, occasionally, at the columns of Espartero. But this forced suspension of hostilities, by the besiegers, was turned to

the utmost account by the garrison: at the Concepcion, the breaches were now thoroughly repaired, a deep ditch was dug along the west front of the building, a battery, armed with a twelve-pounder, was completed by the 5th, and the loop-holed house was farther strengthened; the road between the Concepcion and San Francisco, was rendered impassable, by a succession of deep cuts and strong barriers, and all the houses contiguous were loop-holed on the side nearest the enemy. It has been before mentioned, that the chain-bridge was cut, only two shifting planks being left; the plan was to dispute the left bank, house by house, and burn what was no longer tenable. On the side of San Augustin, equal activity prevailed: Mallona now presented a formidable appearance; from the battery down to that of the Zendeja, the ground is intersected by a number of solid stone garden walls, forming a position of amazing strength; all the houses in the Zendeja, up to No. 6, were gutted, and combustibles placed therein, so that in the event of the enemy forcing the second line, they might easily be fired. Nos. 5, and 6, were pulled down to prevent the flames spreading to the street of the Esperanza and the houses in the Arenal; at this point, also, the line of defence from Mallona intersected the street.

By the telegraph we had several communications from Portugalete. It was inquired, from the town, if Lord John Hay had arrived in the

river, and answered in the negative. The names of the generals commanding, were next asked; the reply was, Espartero, Oraa, Meer, and Carondelet. On visiting the artillery park, this day, I found that eight pieces had been disabled during the siege; that the foundry produced twenty-four pound balls very slowly, and that the stock of gunpowder was getting very low. At the instance of the commandant of artillery, the large thirteen-inch mortar, which had been, during all the siege, at Larrinaga, where it was of no use whatever, was now moved to Mallona, where it did good service. Word was also sent from Miravilla, that a large brig, followed by fourteen sail of small craft, had entered the river, and it was conjectured, that General Espartero intended throwing a bridge across the Nervion, below the Desierto.

Early on the morning of the 5th, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Asua; between nine and ten A. M. it became very brisk, and every thing seemed to announce a general action. At noon, a telegraphic despatch advised that the enemy had abandoned Luchana. The Carlist army was in position on the heights; below the windmill we saw two battalions drawn up, and some guns in position. To the eastward the country is open, and fit for cavalry, of which arm it was known Espartero had a sufficient force; persons conversant, therefore, with the localities, concluded that the queen's ge-

neral would turn the enemy's position by the bridge of Derio, at the head of the valley of Asua, whence a fine road led to the height of Santo Domingo, directly above the town. Nothing of the sort seems to have been attempted by Espartero; while General San Miguel, after the firing had all ceased, sent out a small column of about 400 men, with what object, it was difficult to say: indeed it is impossible to assign a motive, every thing being quiet; and if such had not been the case, what could 400 men have done at any time? Cause a diversion? Hardly that, for the garrison still counted 6,000 effectives, and half that number should have marched, the instant the firing was heard: such a force, even if not victorious, would at least have kept in check a large body of the enemy, and unsettled his line throughout. However, the general thought differently, so out marched these 400, and were speedily engaged with the Carlists; a furious fire was kept up by both parties, from houses, ditches, and behind walls, as customary. After some time the enemy, tired of this, sent about half a company to dislodge the Christinos from a house, and were received with a heavy volley, which felled about a dozen. They all instantly fled, and the Carlists gave ground, which caused the immediate advance of two battalions, and a perceptible movement along their whole line: thus, proving to demonstration, what would have been the result, had 3000 men been

employed, instead of 400, and had this sortie been simultaneous with the attack of Espartero. At four, P. M. Oliveras brought back his small column, which had sustained a loss of about thirty men: thus closed the business of the day.*

* From a British officer, who was present, the author received the following account of the action of the 5th, between Espartero and Villareal, in the valley of Asua.

Early in the morning, the queenites formed a strong column of attack, intending to force the bridge of Asua. Instead of forcing the bridge by a bold attack, they deployed into guerillas, and kept up the customary fire to no purpose. Seeing that they did not advance, the Carlist general out-flanked them on their extreme left. Against this force a body of Christinos was sent, but the Carlists retiring into a wood, the others would not attack; the troops, down at the bridge, were now withdrawn to the village of Erandio, and the Carlists immediately crossing the bridge, formed a strong column of attack, evidently threatening the centre of Espartero's line. The ground being favourable for horse, the queen's general directed his cavalry to charge them: expectation was now at the highest; off went the horsemen, not at a gallop, no, nor a trot, but at a walk; they slightly "mended the pace" till they came within some 200 yards of the foe, when they wheeled about, and came back. Espartero, in a rage, sent an aid with peremptory orders to fall on;—this time, the pace was something better, and the Carlists believing them in earnest, did not take the trouble to wait their arrival, but gradually *fringed away*, until the column dissolved ere a sabre stroke was given. This done, after some more skirmishing, Espartero recalled the division in advance, evacuated Erandio, and fell back upon the heights of Axpé.

Both sides appear to have fought with little animation, and sustained about an equal loss, (some 400 or 500 men),

From the 6th to the 10th the besiegers ceased to molest the town from their batteries, although the blockade was as strict as ever; and the skirmishing at San Augustin was sustained with equal vigour throughout. Not a day passed over without costing the defenders some twenty lives; so that the garrison murmured loudly against the system of defence, which allowed the besiegers, with an inconsiderable force, to beard the town so closely, for such a time, and with such a serious loss.

On the 6th, the telegraph reported from Portugalete, "that the news from Aragon and Madrid was very favourable;" but of the deeds of the army which most concerned the besieged, nothing was said. The same night, two deserters from the Carlists came over; both had belonged to the French foreign legion.* Being interrogated, they stated that the reports current in the besiegers' camp were to the effect, "that they had defeated Espartero the day before, although with considerable loss to themselves; that the queen's army intended to repass the river, and that Eguia did not expect to take the town, except by

although the Carlists, with truth, claimed the victory, for they repulsed the movement of their antagonist, for the relief of the town. This account of the action of the 5th agrees with a plan made by a German officer, in the service of Don Carlos, which fell into the hands of the author, on the retreat of the Carlist army, after the action of the 24th.

* One was a Prussian, the other a Bavarian.

famine." On this, and following nights, the besiegers, according to their custom, amused themselves with howling, yelling, and shouting, to drown the noise made by their miners.

On the 7th it was seen, from Miravilla, that the queen's army had crossed to the left bank of the river, and that their columns held the villages of Baracaldo and Cestao; the telegraph also informed us, that the division of reserve had arrived at Castro. The enemy were observed to drag a twenty-four pounder and an howitzer up the hill of Banderas, and also to be labouring incessantly upon their stockade in the river, and in the evening, two battalions crossed over from Olaviaga to the left bank. The enemy's movements continued on the 8th, on which day a large force, of above 5000 men, filed over to the left bank, marching towards Castrojana; a howitzer, with three field-pieces, accompanied this division, while two heavy battering guns, and two howitzers, were moved lower down the river.

On the 9th, the activity of the besiegers seemed unrelaxed; strings of loaded mules and carts were moving towards the town, while their working parties were active in repairing their batteries. Steamers, towing small craft, were seen to enter the bay, and disembark troops. The telegraphic despatch received, was to the effect that "the general-in-chief of the northern army and of the reserve would march upon Bilbao the next day."

However, the weather, which for some time had been remarkably fine for the season, now began to break up; torrents of rain fell during the night as well as on the day of the 10th, which also passed away quietly, and the atmosphere being very hazy, no communication could be had with Portagalete. During the past nights, strong blinds were erected along the Zendeja, and in the covered way leading from the Mallona battery to the *Cuervo*, and thence again to the house or palace of *Quintana*; so that the enemy's marksmen no longer occasioned such losses to the garrison.

The siege had now lasted forty-eight days, and provisions began to run short.* Fresh meat had ceased to be sold in the town for a month, and, for twenty-four days, none was to be had even for the sick and wounded. Bread, scarce from the first, was now become a rarity; the soldier's ration was reduced to two biscuits, nominally styled half-a-pound; while the inhabitants received a scanty ration of about six ounces of a vile compound, made of damaged corn, unsifted. Penury and hard fare pinched the poorer classes, while the continual use of salt provisions occasioned much sickness among the aged and infirm. Many of the nationals, also, began to sink beneath the severity of the duty and the inclemency of the

* Eggs were sold at six-pence each; fresh fish, three shillings per pound; fresh pork, three shillings per pound;—potatoes, vegetables, &c. were not to be had.

weather. The 2nd company of the national guard, from being ninety-two strong, could now only muster twenty-eight; and some other companies had suffered considerably, although not in the same proportion.

The besiegers occupying some houses near Begoña, from whence they greatly annoyed the lines, General Arechavala sent a detachment to expel them. This duty was performed in gallant style, by the troops sent for that purpose, who drove the Carlists from four houses, which they burnt, and causing them a loss of probably more than forty men, their own not exceeding one killed and eight wounded. It was the shells from the Circus and Larrinaga that occasioned most damage to the enemy. By a telegraphic despatch, Espartero informed the garrison that "his army now consisted of twenty-three battalions, with 600 horse, and that *he would relieve Bilbao or perish.*"

This day (10th,) the junta planned a small expedition, to seize the mill-stones at the Peña, which were sadly needed in the town; the actual mills not sufficing to grind the scanty rations which the scarcity of corn permitted them to issue. One hundred and fifty cazadores, with one company of nationals, brought away the mill-stones, and seized on some Indian corn which they found in store. To cover this movement, the garrisons of Miravilla and the Morro threw out strong patrols,

and thus the object was effected without the loss of a man, although the besiegers had a battalion posted within musquet shot. This night a deserter (a Dutchman, late of the French Legion,) came over; he stated that the besiegers had nineteen battalions, and that they intended attacking the town the next day: this did not at all tend to lessen our uneasiness.*

Dec. 12th.—This completes the fiftieth day of the siege. No movement observed among the besiegers, except a few men at work in the Alvia battery: they are also seen actively employed on the bridge and stockade at Deusto. At noon Eguia, dressed in plain clothes, was seen reviewing some troops: every thing betokens the enemy firm in his resolution to cling to the siege. By the telegraph, Espartero informed us that he had received his artillery, and that *pasamañana* he should march direct upon Bilbao. In reply, the town urged his immediate advance; alleging their ammunition and provisions to be fast decreasing, and their sick fast increasing.

The weather having cleared up, the columns

* By information received from other quarters, it was rumoured that a General Lebeau, with 5000 men, had reached Ochandiano, and that Villareal had detached six battalions to arrest his march; further, that the besiegers were only 8000 strong, and short of provisions. All these reports were ascertained to be unfounded; perhaps "a weak invention of the enemy," to be merry at our expense.

of Espartero's army were descried advancing; and it was even seen from Miravilla that he had erected a battery to cover the passage of the Cadagua. The dark masses of the queen's army were perceived crossing the Galindo: then filing right and left, these to occupy Burseña, those to seize the lofty conical hill of Santaguada. The Carlists were speedily driven from thence, and the Christinos hold the entire range of heights stretching towards Alonsoategui. Soon after two P. M. the firing ceased, and the long line of fires indicated the hostile camps, on this and that side of the Cadagua. It was the received opinion, that during the night Espartero would get his guns into position, and, overpowering the enemy's batteries, effect the passage of the river. Meanwhile, thus anxiously gazing on the movements of the army advancing to our relief, three of the Carlist batteries opened on the town at one P. M.; thus proving how little private opinion is to be counted on, or either how negligent the artillery and engineer officers were, since an hour previously, they had declared (in common with every one else) that the enemy had no guns in their batteries. Their fire soon convinced the most unbelieving. For three or four hours they hammered away most vigorously, their marks being the palace of Quintana, the Zendeja, and Mallona.* Little or no damage did they occasion,

* The battery at Mallona had fired for several hours, without

for their fire, too elevated, went over the house of Quintana and the Zendeja; to Mallona only did they cause mischief: there fifteen men were disabled, besides Don Daniel de Valcarcel, a lieutenant in the Spanish navy, of distinguished abilities and courage, whose conduct would lend lustre to any cause. The news of his being wounded was very mournfully received in the town. After dark the Carlist mortar-battery began to annoy the inhabitants, throwing shells every quarter of an hour; but even the children and females despised these missiles now, and, beyond the inconvenience of sleeping in cellars and door-ways, they were careless and unconcerned about them.

The 13th, like the preceding day, was passed in anxiety as to the progress of the columns. Firing was occasionally heard down the river, which our hopes and wishes were ready to construe into an attack by water on the part of the British naval forces. From time to time a desultory fire of small-arms was heard along the Cadagua, which, in the general opinion, indicated nothing but skirmishing. Such appeared to be the fact, for

sustaining any damage worth mentioning, when a single shot, entering at the embrasure, killed three and wounded five men, besides the Commandant Valcarcel; destroying, in addition, the carriage of a twenty-four pounder, and rendering the gun also unserviceable. A shot more unlucky for us, or more lucky for the besiegers, was not fired during the whole siege.

the day wore away without any thing decisive occurring. In the afternoon was received the telegraphic despatch, to the effect, that "*mañana á la una es el ataque, para vencer ó morir*—to-morrow, at one, is the hour of attack, to conquer or perish." Digesting their vexation as best they might, the garrison turned to with a will to annoy the enemy, who, from Alvia and San Augustin, continually kept up a teasing fire, which cost us casualties every hour. Accordingly, the howitzers and small cohorn mortars began pitching shells into the houses where the Carlists chiefly harboured. They were soon unkennelled, and one house, set on fire by an expense magazine blowing up, which probably caused some casualties to the foe, since his people were seen to rush out, as if terror-stricken. At night, the engineers having ascertained the direction of the enemy's mine, began two counter-mines in the court-yard, at the back of the house of Quintana; the first directed towards the face of the hill, so as to cut the water-course where it crossed the road; the other to cut any mine which the besiegers might bring down the ravine to the right.

Contrary to what we were given to expect by the telegraph, no attack on the enemy took place this day. Nothing was heard beyond a trifling fire of small-arms, and an occasional shot from the the Carlist batteries at Castrojana, and the *Campo de Cruces*. The besiegers, so far from firing upon

the town, withdrew their large mortar to Olaviaga, supposed to have been disabled. The guns from Mallona and the Arenal fired with their usual precision.

On the 15th, it appeared that the besiegers had been employed all the night, and still were repairing their batteries. As on the day previous, the town-guns fired with good effect, so that the besiegers' working-parties soon retired. At San Augustin the interchange of musketry was as usual; but our men were now so well sheltered, that scarcely any loss was sustained. In the afternoon it was reported that the columns were advancing in earnest. Heavy firing was soon heard; the roar of artillery was distinct and rapid; above the valley of the Cadagua the white smoke arose, spreading until it filled the ravine. The Carlists from the right bank of the Nervion were, like ourselves, looking earnestly at the combat. For a moment the firing seemed to draw nigh, and a body of Carlists, issuing hastily from the convent of San Mamés, marched rapidly up the river to Castrojana. Our expectations grew high. "The army is across the river," cried several. Vain thought! Night closed in, the firing died away, and the last rays of the sun glanced upon the bayonets of the Christino columns retiring upon Cestao and Portagaleta. At night the besiegers cried out to us that they had defeated Espartero, and taken 400 prisoners.

The morning of the 16th confirmed the worst fears of the garrison and inhabitants. The enemy were across the Cadagua, busily employed in destroying the battery erected by Espartero, and skirmishing with his rear-guard. Several houses in Barracaldo were in flames. This strange and unaccountable conduct of the army excited all manner of suspicions; many of the soldiers were heard to murmur; every one, even the firmest, were depressed, at this unlooked-for return for all the sacrifices made, and for defending an open town for fifty-five days. Few had courage to think without trembling at what must be the fate of his family in a few days; for there was no concealing the fact, there was not ammunition for a fortnight, nor provisions for three weeks; and then neither mercy nor forbearance was to be looked for from the foe. A regular army might respect the brave men, who had well defended themselves; but from the ignoble crew of savages who besieged us, nothing but the direst cruelties could possibly be expected; indeed, a general massacre of the inhabitants would have been made from revenge, and permitted by policy; for what town or city in Spain would have ventured to resist a Carlist, or rely upon a Christino army, when they beheld the sacrifices of Bilbao in withstanding a sixty days' siege, repaid by universal destruction?

At noon the telegraph conveyed the following despatch from Espartero, "The army of the north

has retired upon Portugalete, and wishes to know if Bilbao can defend itself twelve days longer." To this bitter and heartless question, after so many boasting promises, the junta of defence returned this noble and spirited reply, "Let the army pass over to the right bank of the river, and *then* the question shall be answered.* This message appears to have excited much emotion in the breasts of the Spanish generals; they seemed to feel the intolerable disgrace of allowing the place to be starved out, before their eyes,—before them,

* I have been informed, by a British officer, who was present, that H. M. commissioner, Colonel Wylde, urged the crossing of the army to the right bank, in the strongest terms: of those present at the council of war, there were but four voices in favour of that movement, while six opposed it. Espartero, therefore, when he ordered the army to march to the right bank of the river, did so upon his own responsibility—certainly Colonel Wylde did his utmost to prevail upon him to come to that determination, and when he found that the general had consented so to do, *he* promised the aid of a brigade of British artillery, for which (unknown to Espartero) he had sent to San Sebastian. Thus, although too much credit cannot be given to Colonel Wylde, for the zeal and good feeling with which he steadily advocated the paramount importance of relieving our unfortunate town, there is no small merit due to General Espartero's strength of character, who, when put upon his mettle, did not hesitate in risking his army, and his reputation, against the advice of his generals. Since it was clearly impossible for his army to keep the field much longer, he must have made up his mind to win at all hazards, for a repulse would have ruined his army;—with such a foe, hanging on their rear, not half would ever have reached Burgos.

the leaders of 20,000 men. A council of war was held, whereat it was resolved to pass to the right bank, and make a decisive blow at the enemy. This intention was communicated to the town in the following despatch, "Bilbao shall be relieved, and her constancy rewarded." Soon after, another message was received, to the effect "that the general had been joined by a brigade of artillery, that the factious, in the interior, had been defeated, and that the army would cross the river the next day." All this served to tranquillize people's minds; and hopes, nearly dead, began to revive. But another enemy was now within our walls, whose vindictive rage almost equalled that of the foe without,—this was the typhus. Bad and unwholesome food, nor much even of that, continual exposure to the weather, with all the harassing excitement of a siege, began to shew their customary effect. The strong man sickened—the feeble died. One day a pale thin woman, with her infant, begged for food, next day she begged alone, another day came, and she disappeared. The hospitals were all full; attendance was not to be had, and each was left to his own resources. With the exception of sugar, wine, and spirits, of which there were abundance in the town, all sorts of provisions increased in price, daily. Cats were considered a rarity, and persons in good circumstances were glad to get them: fowls, when procurable, cost from 15*s.* to 20*s.* each; pork was

occasionally sold for 4*s.* per pound, and eggs were now 1*s.* each; higher prices than even these were sometimes paid.

There was a thick fog on the 18th, until half-past eleven, when it cleared up, and displayed a new battery, of the besiegers, in Alvia, armed with two guns; three of the old batteries were likewise armed, and a little before noon they all opened their fire, with nine guns and a howitzer. As usual, their mark was the house of Quintana, the Zendeja, and Mallona; their fire, though heavy, was ill-pointed; by three, P. M. all their guns were silent, except those in Alvia, which kept up a smart fire until dark; without, however, causing any loss to the garrison, beyond a few wounded. In the course of the afternoon, a despatch was received from General Espartero, stating, "that he had passed his troops in review, and that they all had sworn to relieve the town, or perish;" the telegraph further informed us, that the troops were beginning to cross over. On this day, General San Miguel re-assumed the command, which had been entrusted, since the 27th of November, to Brigadier Arechavala. In the order of the day, which announced his re-assumption of the command to the garrison, General San Miguel spoke in terms of high praise, of the important services rendered by Arechavala, during the period of his command. Brigadier Araoz, the second in command, had returned to his duty some time before; the im-

portant line of the Zendeja, from the house of Quintana to the Arenal, was, as before, entrusted to the virtuous Baron Ozores, and to the gallant Arana, the colonel of the national guard.

Once more the besiegers moved their guns from their batteries before the town,—once more their crowds of peasantry, mules, carts, &c. were transporting to the heights of Banderas and Archanda, their guns, tumbrils, stores, &c.; around the town their working parties were busy in throwing up parapets, and opening ditches, evidently intended as a sort of lines of circumvallation, to prevent the garrison from making a sortie: nor did the foresight of Eguia end here; considering, that if he could not cannonade or bombard the town, he could still attack with sap and mine, that no time might be lost, he attempted to carry a mine from the Convent to Quintana—on a previous occasion he had tried but without success,—the ground being too hard. This time the besiegers brought down their mine from the water-course to the angle of an epaulement, thrown up in the rear of the house of Quintana. Rumours of this had lately been very prevalent in the town, and during the night Lieutenant Colonel Capuzo, being on duty at this place, detected the enemy's operations, and the true line of their workings; information was immediately given, and after a careful inspection of the ground, a counter-mine was begun, pushed on rapidly, and with such success,

that at half-past three, A. M. the besiegers' mine was struck in upon; when a sapper of the national guard, Don Antonio Elisagarrate, at work in the counter-mine, fought with the enemy's miners, wounded one, killed another, and took their mine, which was immediately smoked. A consultation was held, whether the mine should be destroyed or retained; the latter course was resolved on, at the recommendation of the commandant of artillery. A party of nationals, armed with pistols, and blunderbusses, now entered the enemy's mine, traversing it until they reached the mouth, which they blocked with sacks of earth, and kept guard there constantly. The entire length of the mine was eighty-three feet, and it was about three feet wide: thus the Carlists were as unfortunate in their operations below ground, as above.

On the 20th, the telegraph conveyed a message from General Espartero, warning the garrison that the enemy was mining; in reply, he was informed of our success in driving them from their own mine. The troops continued crossing to the right bank; the besiegers were quiet in respect to the town, while the operations of the besieged, on this day, as well as on the three following, were confined to counter-mining, in the direction of the gate of Uribarri. The skirmishing at San Augustin, cost us a lieutenant of Engineers, killed outright, besides several other casualties. Baron Ozores, the colonel of Compostela, was also

struck by a musquet ball in the body; his watch fortunately intercepted the shot, and spared us the pain of losing such an excellent officer; as it was, the contusion he received was very serious.

The 23rd was foggy throughout. Early in the morning, a heavy cannonade was heard from the lower part of the river, which lasted with unabated vigour all day. Two battalions were got ready to make a sortie, but nothing being seen of the queen's army, and no musquetry heard, it was deemed proper not to move, which, considering the thick fog, was a wise determination.

Slowly, and with torrents of rain, dawned the morning of the 24th December. Nothing was heard; the Carlists seemed to be hidden in the houses, reluctant to stir out. At two, P.M., two Carlist battalions left Deusto, and marched up the ravine leading to the Molino del Viento. At three the icy sleet, which had been previously falling, changed to a heavy snow-storm, a sharp fire of musquetry was heard, which continually increased; the artillery soon chimed in, and the combat was evidently raging in earnest; night fell, but there was no cessation,—it was clear that the queen's troops had made good the passage of the river Asua. The varying fight went on, and, through the dark, the heights of Banderas sparkled with fire. Towards midnight, there was a lull; but about two, A.M., the firing breezed up again, sharper than ever; and so continued until near four, when it declined. Scarcely

had the day dawned, when a large body of troops was seen drawn up in column, on Banderas, and skirmishing going on, on *this* side of Banderas, and even on this side of Capuchinos, plainly indicating that the enemy's position was forced. Howbeit, none of our generals, neither San Miguel, nor Arechavala, nor Araoz, could believe this; probably they thought the news too good to be true: certain it is that no sortie was made, not even the troops prepared. It was eight, A.M., before San Miguel would believe in Espartero's victory, and at that hour a battalion of Carlists, who had with matchless impudence remained till then, evacuated San Augustin. At nine, A.M., Espartero entered the town, and General San Miguel let slip for ever the precious opportunity of making the field of Luchana another Pavia.

Nevertheless, the defeat was fatal to the Carlists; the gloomy cut-throat, Eguia, despite his boasting, after sixty days' investment had been totally routed; his hopes of vengeance and rapine baffled; all his guns, and *materiel* for the siege, together with his hospitals,* taken by the Christians; and, first and last, by sword and sickness,

* Eguia's nephew was left wounded in the hospital. The Urbanos treated this young man, who had lost an arm, with much kindness; he was related to some of the principal families in the town, themselves zealous constitutionalists: every attention was shewn him, and I was told that he expressed something like remorse, at receiving such humane attentions from those whom his uncle and himself had, a few days before, devoted to destruction.

his army was probably 4000 minus during the siege; including, of course, the loss sustained in the different actions with the queen's army advancing to the relief.

During the remainder of the day, the division of the guards entered the town, and were billeted in the houses; the other divisions were encamped in Olavagia, Deusto, Alvia, and villages adjacent, where the peasantry had all abandoned their dwellings. A large convoy entered the town the next day, from Portugalete, the bridge at San Mamés being quickly destroyed. It was a more difficult job to pluck up the piles with which the stockade was made, but that also was completed in a few days; the lines of the Zendeja and San Augustin were cleared away, as also the enemies' entrenchments, so that, ten weeks after their first imprisonment, the inhabitants were enabled to pass their gates in safety; thus terminated this memorable siege.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND INVESTMENT.

SECOND SIEGE.—CARLIST ATTACK.

The plan of General Eguia, in first reducing the outposts, prior to any attack on the body of the place, was preferable to that of Villareal, who attempted to take the town by a *coup de main*. The

reduction of the four forts only occupied three days and cost about one hundred men. Besides raising the morale of his own soldiers by their easy conquests, Eguia derived the solid advantages of capturing or destroying 740 of his opponents, ten pieces of cannon, above 1000 rounds of shot and ammunition with a good quantity of provisions. Perhaps it might have been better, had he next attacked Portugalete and the Desierto: however, there is much to be said in favour of the plan he adopted. The English squadron was not lightly to be meddled with; the Saracen and Ringdove *might* have been sunk at their anchorage, but that would only have served to bring the entire squadron into the river, (or at least all such ships as could enter) nor would Portugalete be tenable against a combined attack by sea and land; so that considering the amazing strength of the positions of Castrojana and Banderas, it may be conceded that it was as well to let Portugalete and the English squadron alone, for the fall of Bilbao would undoubtedly cause the former to be abandoned and the latter to evacuate the river. With respect to the attack on the body of the place many think the besiegers committed a glaring fault in not reducing the fort of Miravilla and the church of Begoña, before they attempted the town: two or three days would have made them masters of both, and then these two admirable positions would have protected their attacks against the San Augustin and the

Concepción. The besieged, thus annoyed, with so many points menaced, could not have made such a determined defence; their casualties also from the cross fire would have been far more numerous; for the experience of the first siege (that of 1835) had plainly shewn, how vulnerable the town was from Miravilla and Begoña. As it was, the Carlists confined their attack almost entirely to the quarter of San Augustin; their artillery was so badly served, and their fire so interrupted, that they allowed an old convent to resist their attack for a fortnight; even when a chance gave them possession, they, so far from being prepared to push on and carry the town, suffered themselves to be driven out, and the place burnt before their eyes. The assault on the convent of the Concepción should have been at night, and a false attack made at the same time upon some other part of the lines. Instead of carrying their heavy guns once a fortnight from the batteries before the town to the positions of Banderas and Castrojana, it would have been better to have pushed the siege daily; allowing the garrison no respite to repair damages; only sending their light field-pieces to meet the relieving army. However, it must be confessed that the superiority of the artillery practice on the part of the town was so striking, that probably no effort of the enemy would have been sufficient to take the ascendancy; still much might have been done by a continual fire. As for the

mine, about which so much has been said, it was ill planned, and worse executed: the house of Quintana stands so low, that four feet below the foundations you are on a level with the tide. On the other hand, from the ruins of the house of Menchaca to the northern side of the said house, was only some fifteen or sixteen feet, half of which was occupied by a water-course. The true plan of attack would, therefore, have been by the *flying sap*, which, once across this gutter or drain, would have attached the miner to the side walls of the palace of Quintana, and these an arroba of powder would have blown in. In short, it was clear that the Carlists,—notwithstanding the presence of the German engineers, Roth and Strauss; of the Portuguese artillery officer, Coello; of the French engineer, Larochefoucauld; and the Prussian artillery officer, Prehzen; besides many others of less note and fame, from every nation in Europe, from the Volga to the Shannon,—managed their affairs very badly, and committed blunders which were hardly to be tolerated by a gang of Bashkirs; for the men they lost, and the shot and shells they wasted, if properly expended, would have gained them the place in a fortnight.

THE DEFENCE.

The chief mistake committed by General San Miguel, was neglecting to occupy the church of Alvia, an error which, after his past experience,

was unpardonable. The next was in not increasing the fortifications of Miravilla, which were wholly untenable against an attack of even six hours; for the fort was destitute of water or provisions—had not even a secure magazine—nor was there any block-house to keep open the communication between the fort and the town, so as to draw off or relieve the garrison in case of an attack. For the rest, the advantage of making sorties, has been alluded to before. In this siege, the general, instead of withdrawing all the out-posts, (when he must have known that they could not defend themselves for any length of time, and also that he was not prepared to relieve them,) suffered the enemy to take them *seriatim*. It appears also, that a very great oversight was committed in not making a sortie to bring off the garrison of San Mamés: 3,000 men could have been sent from the town, which was a larger force than the enemy had on the left bank of the river. The system adopted by San Miguel was one of passive resistance. On several occasions the extreme confidence of the enemy offered every advantage to dashing sorties; none were attempted! Finally, on the morning of the 24th, the opportunity was such as would have tempted a blind man to strike; but not a man moved. In short, as a veteran officer said, the attack and defence were equally defective. There was abundance of courage and zeal, activity and devotion, dis-

played by the subalterns and soldiers on both sides; but the mind of a great general was wanting.

The patient fortitude of the Spanish character is displayed to great advantage during a siege. Of this there was abundance of proof during the French war; and yet the hatred borne towards the soldiers of Napoleon, though sufficiently bitter, was far from equalling the intensity of abhorrence with which the Carlists and Christinos regard each other. Even their very nationality is merged in the indulgence of mutual hate. Judging their opponents by themselves, the partizans of Don Carlos know that their tyrannical conduct during their ten years rule, and their merciless barbarities during the present strife, are not likely to be forgiven or forgotten. And the Christinos, or Constitutionalists, know full well, from past experience, that their only hope of safety is in victory,—that submission would be their death-warrant. It is idle to allege, that Charles would find it his interest to proclaim and enforce an amnesty: he might *publish* a general amnesty, and doubtless would do so—were it only for the purpose of boasting thereof in the journals of his party, but he could not render it effective; he is but a tool in the hands of a party, who (if successful,) are bent upon destroying their adversaries, root and branch. Often were the officers of the Carlists (and their men also,) heard to express their bitter regret, at having spared any of the constitutionalists, during their

rule. The atrocious conduct of the Carlists towards the national guards taken prisoners at Plencia, Vergara, Ochandiano, and other places, who were compelled to work in chains on the roads, or in the lead-mines, and of whom numbers had perished, convinced the most incredulous of the inhabitants that their only safety was in an obstinate and successful defence. They were truly fighting *pro aris et focis*, for they well knew, if their courage could not save them, no capitulation could,—their foe being as faithless as unrelenting. The perfect consciousness that their only hope of safety was in victory, was, no doubt, the chief cause that induced the militia to hold out, with unbending constancy, through all the sufferings of a two months' siege, in the depth of winter; while their families, with equal fortitude, bore sickness, fatigue, and pinching scarcity, without a murmur: but, to a nobler and a holier feeling must be attributed the fact, that, with every thing to excite revenge, from the recollections of the past, and the insolent conduct of several of the Carlists in the town, during the siege, none were either insulted or imprisoned. And this superiority of moral conduct was rewarded with, as it unquestionably deserved, success.

OPERATIONS OF THE RELIEVING ARMY.

The first investment of the town by the Carlists under Villareal was so prompt and unex-

pected by the queen's generals, that the storm had burst upon the town, ere its coming was well made known to them. The hasty despatch of Brigadier Araoz, with a large reinforcement to Portugalete, was judicious; and, through the strange oversight of the besiegers, in allowing this detachment, with a valuable convoy, to enter the place unmolested, of more importance than was probably anticipated. It does not appear that General Espartero, between the 24th of October (when he first was informed of the intended attack) and the 6th of November (when he learnt the fact of Villareal having withdrawn from before the town) had made much progress in gathering together his scattered brigades. It is true, that at this time Gomez was cruising over the peninsula, and the reports of his being on his way back to the northern provinces, rendered it incumbent on the general-in-chief to keep as near the Ebro as he conveniently could, consistently with the safety of Bilbao, which it is most likely he did not deem in much danger. During the second investment General Espartero appears to have been more dilatory than usual. Perhaps his ideas were, that since the town had beaten off so easily Villareal's impetuous attacks, there was the less to fear from Eguia; particularly since Araoz, with his strong reinforcement and valuable convoy, had safely entered the town—thus leaving the general-in-chief more leisure to look after Gomez,

who was now known to be hurrying across the Castilles, at the rate of forty miles daily; thus fourteen days elapsed from the beginning of the second investment, before General Espartero began to move from Balmaceda. From this town to Bilbao is about twenty miles, by the ordinary road, through a very difficult country, offering, at every step, positions of amazing strength. On the other hand, there is an easier but far less travelled road—in fact one known only to the sportsman and peasantry of the adjoining villages—which leads direct from Balmaceda to the mountains immediately above Bilbao on the south. This road is called that of the *Neveras*; it traverses the summit of the high chain of hills known as the range of *Pagasarri*, which divides the valley of Balmaceda from that of Orduña. Marching by this route, an army would avoid the difficult passes of Gueñes, Castrojana, and Burseña. True, nothing can be found on this road or tract, beyond a few shepherds' huts; nor is it practicable, except in fine weather. However, the first objection could hardly be of much weight, seeing that the entire distance (which is less than by the ordinary road) was but a moderate day's march; and for the second, it may be remarked, that the weather was exceedingly fine from the 20th of November to the beginning of December.

However, General Espartero, after much deliberation, finally determined to risk nothing; and

accordingly, declining to march upon Portuga-lete by Somorrosto, sent the bulk of his forces to Castro, and thence by sea to Portugalete; a proceeding which, twenty years previous, would have been all but impracticable—for what general would have risked the safety of his army on board of fishing-boats in the bay of Biscay in winter? Now, however, the magnificent armed steamers of Great Britain rendered it a speedy and safe operation. Thousands of men were embarked, carried round, and disembarked with marvellous celerity, in a single tide—the soldiers had not time to get sick. When a strong force had thus been gathered at Portugalete, the cavalry and remainder of the army, with the general-in-chief, marched upon Portugalete by the valley of Somorrosto—the two battalions of the enemy under Castor retiring at his approach. Having now concentrated his army, and having the entire command of the sea and the lower part of the river from the convent of the Desierto, with the town of Portugalete for his magazine deposits, General Espartero had two lines of operations open, by which to relieve the town—both, however, exceedingly difficult and dangerous in the face of such an active foe. On the left bank of the river there was the Cadagua to be passed, and the steep ridge of Castrojana to be forced, a position of which General Espartero well knew the strength. On the right bank of the river

there was the deep and muddy stream of the Asua to be crossed, and the lofty heights of Banderas to be taken. It is true, that by proceeding up the valley of Asua, about five miles, to the bridge of Derio, the open country, free from wood or enclosures, would have afforded the queen's army great advantages, in case the enemy was disposed to fight a general action. But with such an army as General Espartero commanded, it may reasonably be doubted if this movement would not have hazarded the safety of his forces; for two strong brigades at least must have been left to guard the communication with the base, one on the heights of Arriaga, the other farther in advance of Erandio. Again, from the admirable position of the Carlists, they having possession of all the bridges over the Asua, it was to be expected that they would have attacked in force either of the brigades stationed as above, to maintain the communications, and upon their resistance depended the safety of the army. Now, since the enemy, aware of the advantages to be derived from thus cutting off the supports of the main body of their opponents, would most probably attack in considerable force—at least 2,000 men must be left in each position, which would have reduced the main body to less than 7,000 effectives, a force, which, considering all things, was not sufficient. There was yet another plan; a body of 2,000 men might have been embarked on

board the steamers and flotilla barricaded for the purpose, and these coming up at high-water would have turned the enemy's position. This appears to be extremely hazardous at first sight—much more so than on a close examination—for the Carlists had but three guns bearing upon the Nervion, and the distance for which the advancing flotilla would have been exposed to their fire was about half a mile. The vessels could have come up with the top of the tide, at the rate of eight miles per hour; and, slow as the Carlist gunners always showed themselves when under fire, it may be reasonably doubted if they would have had time to fire two shots, for when closing, the musquetry from the steamers' decks would not suffer a man to stay in their batteries.

However, after much hesitation, General Espartero led his forces on to the attack of the enemy on the left bank of the river, and, throwing a bridge over the Galindo river, occupied Burseña, and then repeated the same sort of attack as that of General Latre the year previous, and met with a similar repulse. It seems very likely that Espartero hardly counted upon succeeding, for he had no guns with him; and, in all probability, seeing before him a choice of evils, thought the attack on Castrojana was less troublesome than to transport his army over to the right bank of the river. During these operations, the Carlists set fire to and destroyed the noble convent of Bur-

seña; and the troops of Espartero, when retiring from Castrojana, burnt some score of houses. This attempt having failed, the Queen's general, after more deliberation, passed his forces over to the right bank of the river, still manifesting the same irresolution and indecision, examining, reconnoitring, marching, and counter-marching; while the spirits of his soldiery were chilled, for they saw their general could not resolve what to do. All this was very favourable to the Carlists, who had thus plenty of time given them to prepare defences and entrench themselves at every point. On the 5th of December, a sort of action took place in the valley of Asua, feebly disputed on both sides, but which sufficed to divert Espartero from the intention (supposing he ever entertained such) of turning the Carlist position by the head of the valley, at the bridge of Derio. After this we find the Queen's general crosses over to the left bank of the Nervion, to cover the march of the division of reserve; this was proper enough, for otherwise the Carlist forces, under Villareal, which were at least 7000 strong, might have overpowered this division on its march, without the main body, when on the other side of the Nervion, being able to render any assistance. But how are we to account for the general-in-chief's second attack on Castrojana? Most probably, from his desire to do something, without exactly knowing what: for it is not likely that he ever

calculated upon passing* the Cadagua. This second failure, and the length of time to which these fruitless operations had extended, began greatly to dispirit the soldiery, who had hitherto borne up against all their numerous privations with admirable fortitude and good humour. After this a council of war was held to deliberate what had best be done for the safety of the town, and also for that of the army; for the hospitals were full, the sick increasing daily, and the advanced season rendered it impossible much longer to keep the field. The old adage, that a council of war never fights, held good in this instance. The majority of votes decided for the army retreating to Balmaceda, and, consequently, for abandoning Bilbao, with its numerous garrison, to the fate to which famine must soon reduce it.

* The Carlists having constructed a battery on the right bank of the Cadagua, their guns incommoded the queen's forces on the Baracaldo side, whereupon General Espartero requested of the English officers to plant a battery opposite, to silence that of the enemy. It was done, and the guns belonging to the Saracen dragged overland, to be mounted therein; upon this, Captain Le Hardy inquired of the general, "if he intended to cross the river as soon as the enemy's guns were silenced?" "No," says Espartero, "I have no such intentions; I only wish to silence the enemy." "But to what purpose," rejoined the commander of the Saracen; "if you intend not to go forward, it is clear we must retreat, in which case the guns will only cause inconvenience to all hands." However, some were mounted; but being carronades, their shot could not reach the Carlist battery, so the guns were dragged back again by the sailors of the squadron.

However, in this trying emergency, the character of General Espartero shewed itself to advantage; for he listened to the just complaints of the suffering city, which hunger, not force, was wasting—disregarded the advice of the council of war—took upon himself the responsibility, and, determined to strike a blow, crossed over again to the right bank of the Nervion. His men recovered their spirits when they knew the determination of their general, and the British officers, who had powerfully contributed to Espartero's resolution, now brought to his aid two fine brigades of artillery, and their prompt and accurate firing soon taught the Carlists that the guns of their opponents were better served than formerly. But General Espartero, though aware that he stood committed to attempt a bold attack, relapsed into his former indecision; the severity of the winter was about to begin, which it did, on the 24th, in a Canadian snow-storm; it was then, when the driving storm had caused the Carlists to lay aside *their* contemplated attack on the Christinos, that Espartero, confirmed in his resolution by his steadfast friends, the British officers of the Royal Navy and Artillery, though sick and suffering in body, aroused himself, ordered the attack which proved so successful—the foe, discomfited with a loss he little anticipated, fled the field, and the queen's general, after giving proofs of undoubted courage during the action, entered the town in triumph.

Nothing could be more opportune than this victory; one day longer, and the army could not have kept the field, for one-third would have perished that night in the snow-storm had it fallen on them while bivouacking in the fields; and how would the remainder, thus encumbered with sick, have reached Burgos, with an active foe hanging on their rear? Though gained at the *twelfth* hour, the victory was decisive; it saved the army and saved the town, and threw back, for at least two campaigns, the cause of the pretender.

The total loss sustained by the army of General Espartero, during the operations for the relief of Bilbao, did not fall short of 3000, including sick. Now, it hardly admits of a doubt, that had the general attacked the enemy with vigour and determination on his first arrival, he would have gained a decisive victory with the loss of half that number. Nor was this all; for, as will be shewn in the next chapter, the troops were so reduced by the inclemency of the weather and their scanty rations, that sickness prevailed amongst them to an alarming extent,—so much so, that within a month of General Espartero's victorious entry into the town, nearly one-fifth of his army was non-effective.

CHAPTER IX.

Occurrences in the town after the siege.—Severe sickness among the soldiery and the inhabitants.—Decree of the Cortes respecting the town.—Arrival of the division of Narvaez, and their transfer to San Sebastian.—Projected combination of the armies of Espartero, Sarsfield, and Evans.—Espartero marches, defeats the enemy, and enters Durango.—Sarsfield obliged, by the weather, to return to Pampluna.—Evans repulsed on the 16th March.—Espartero returns to Bilbao.—Renewal of the winter.—More troops sent to San Sebastian, and four battalions to Santander.—The Guards, and the Commander-in-Chief leave Bilbao for San Sebastian.—Concentration of the Army round San Sebastian.—Combats of the 3d and 6th May.—March of the main Army of the Carlists to the South-East.—Capture of Hernani, Irun, and Fuenterrabia.—Progress of the Carlist Expeditionary Army.—Departure of General Evans, and breaking up of the Legion.—March of General Espartero across Navarre to Pampluna.—Sketch of the other Events of the Campaign.—Conclusion.

EARLY in the morning of Christmas day, the advance of the relieving army, with the commander-in-chief, entered the town; in the course of the day, two brigades of the Guards, with the detachment of British Royal Artillery, and nu-

merous officers of the squadron also came up; and very seldom has there been seen a more joyful meeting, than that of the few English residents with their friends and countrymen. The wintry storms continued so fierce, that, for a few days, the coming of the wished for army, rather added to the distress for provisions; but large supplies were soon brought in, and our market became well stocked. The different divisions of the army took up their cantonments around the town, and as the cold was intense, and fuel scarce, many a house was pulled down to furnish wood for the soldiers' fires. No attempt was made to pursue the enemy, and this, though much criticised at the time, was probably very judicious, for the troops were exhausted with their long exposure to the severity of the weather, nor could they be expected to recruit their strength very speedily, in such an inclement season. It was, indeed, a long time before any steps were taken to bring into the town the captured cannon, and to destroy the enemy's batteries: these, however, were all levelled during the month of January, and the guns taken from the enemy brought in. When arranged in the Arenal, they formed a goodly array of twenty-two pieces, of all sizes and calibres, from the heavy twenty-four pounder culverin, to the field-piece of six. Many boats laden with shot and shells were also brought up, and a good quantity of powder; so that it was

evident to the most incredulous, that our adversaries would not have had this time to abandon the siege for want of ammunition. At the request of the municipality, General Espartero repealed, as far as concerned the town, that absurd decree of General Cordova, which forbade all goods leaving the town, permitting the entry of corn into it, on payment of a duty of four reals the *fanega*, (about 4s. 6d. the *quarter*), and of flour at the same duty per cwt. (10d.) But the trade of the town, so vitally injured by the edict of Cordova, was not to be re-established in a day, and beyond a tolerably brisk trade in provisions, for the supply of such a large army as was now congregated in and around Bilbao, little or nothing was done.

Meantime, flatteries, congratulations, and honours, from all parts, flowed in upon the heroic city. The commander-in-chief published a manifesto to his army and the garrison, thanking them and their English allies for their services, in lofty and glowing terms, which, however pompous they may sound to an unconcerned reader at a distance, are quite suitable for a general when addressing his troops on such a signal triumph. On the 14th of January, the Cortes decreed a vote of thanks to the garrison and inhabitants; that the losses sustained during the siege should be made good at the national expense; and that the town, in future,

should be styled, in addition to its former titles of "very noble and very loyal," *invicta*, or the unconquered. The first and last part of the decree, consisting of words only, were easily fulfilled; not so the second, which, to comply with, would have occasioned a drain upon the treasury of a million of dollars. This, therefore, was, of necessity, postponed *sine die*.

Among the flood of congratulatory addresses poured in upon the city after the siege, the most interesting were those received from Madrid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Cadiz, Coruña, Murcia, Tarragon, Pampluna, Salamanca, Logroño, Vigo, and Valladolid; also, from the veteran Castaños, the victor of Baylen, and father of the Spanish army; and from Palafox, the defender, and Duke of Zaragoza. The two latter are inserted in the Appendix; that from Castaños is simple and unpretending; that of the Aragonese chieftain full of oriental hyperbole.

Soon after the entry of General Espartero, a meeting of the superior officers of the line and engineers was held, at which it was resolved that the town should be regularly fortified, and that Alvia and Begoña should be included within the lines. In pursuance of this resolution, a large fort was traced out upon the hill, immediately above the ruins of the Convent of San Augustine, and a smaller one on that of Artágan. The forts on the

river were likewise strengthened, and Portugalete, in particular, was placed in a state of defence, capable of resisting a serious attack.

During the latter part of the siege, the typhus began to make serious ravages among the garrison and inhabitants. After our deliverance, for a while all were too joyful to heed or care about disease, but soon after the entry of Espartero's army, sickness became so prevalent as to shock the most careless. Now that the hour of excitement was past, the fatal effects of fatigue, and continued exposure to the inclemency of the weather during the siege, began to tell severely upon the Nationals, and remainder of the garrison. Within less than two months, above thirty of the former perished, while numbers were lying ill at their respective homes. Of the garrison, more than one battalion had above 200 men in the hospital. With the army of General Espartero it was even worse ; many of the regiments composing it were from the south of Spain, and the severity of the winter, added to their previous fatigues and scanty clothing, caused the ravages of disease to be so fatal, that it was computed above 3000 perished between the 25th of December and the beginning of April ; many hundreds of the inhabitants also died, so that this visitation was nearly as calamitous for the suffering city, as the siege had been.

If, in consequence of the winter, and the sickness in his army, Espartero delayed to take the

field, similar causes, added to dissensions among themselves, kept the Carlists quiet. The famous Eguia, and the no less famous Gomez, were in disgrace, and ordered to be tried by a court-martial. The friars and clergy preached openly against them both, as traitors to the holy cause of the altar and throne, and because they had been unsuccessful, demanded their heads, after the most approved style of the French Convention. They were both imprisoned, and the Infante D. Sebastian placed at the nominal head of the army, with Moreno and Villareal acting under him as Major-Generals. Further contributions were levied upon the provinces, no inconsiderable supplies were received from abroad, and, as their numerical losses were easily replaced, the Carlist army once more assumed an imposing appearance. It was full time for them to prepare, for the reinforcements now poured into the Northern provinces were of such magnitude, as to threaten an attack from three armies at once.

Since the last attack on the British Legion, in the beginning of October, the Carlists had abstained from offering much molestation. General Evans had availed himself of this lull to strengthen his lines, so as to render hopeless any attempt of the enemy upon them. Of course, his reduced numbers, consisting only of the Legion, mustering about 4,000 effectives, and two weak Spanish battalions, precluded all attempt at offensive oper-

ations. Now, however, that the victory of Espartero had driven the Carlists into the interior of the provinces, a forward movement was resolved upon, and, for that purpose, the division of General Narvaez, which had so distinguished itself in the south of Spain, was now transferred to San Sebastian, where also was sent a battalion of Spanish marines from Galicia, thus increasing General Evans' force to near 12,000 men of all arms. The plan was, that upon a given day, General Sarsfield should march upon the Bastan, from Pamplona; and General Espartero upon Durango, from Bilbao; this combined movement would, it was supposed, so call off the attention of the enemy, as to enable General Evans to get possession of Hernani, and reduce the fortified towns on the French frontier. This well imagined combination totally failed, as, indeed, such combined movements are almost certain to fail, unless when their execution is entrusted to the lieutenants of some great captain—such as Wellington or Napoleon—who being of the same school feel and act alike. In this instance, General Sarsfield was the chief cause of the failure, for he marched out from Pamplona four leagues, and then, finding the weather unfavourable, returned, thus enabling the Carlists to bring nearly all their force against General Evans, who, victorious on the 10th and 11th of March, stopped by the incessant rains the next four days, was, on the 16th, compelled to retreat

to his lines; his left wing having given way before a superior force of the enemy. In execution of the part assigned to him, General Espartero left Bilbao on the morning of the 10th March, with a force of about 18,000 men. The Carlists, under Guergue or Goñi, were excellently posted on the heights of Santa Marina, a range of hills which, commencing at Galdacano, run parallel to the Archanda chain to within two miles of Bilbao; the river runs at the foot of these hills, which are very bold, and flank both the roads leading from Bilbao to Galdacano. Early in the morning the army marched out, in a long heavy column, and, about 10 A. M. the advanced was engaged with the enemy, who, seeing that from the bad disposition of his troops, Espartero could not avail himself of his superior numbers, had the boldness to leave their position and descend into the long, narrow valley which lies between the heights of Santa Marina and those of Archanda; but this proved fatal to them, for Espartero directed the division of Buerens to advance rapidly along the road to Larabesua, upon the left of the valley, while he brought up two squadrons of horse and charged in person. The Carlists, taken in unfavourable ground, were driven back with loss, and, on trying to regain their former position, found the light infantry of Escalera's division scaling the heights in front. They now had nothing for it but to run, which they did in disorder, having just time to

reach Galdacano before the Queen's troops, pouring from the heights, entered that village: as it was, they lost about 300 men, of whom 120 were prisoners. The next day, Espartero fixed his headquarters at Sornoza, and, on the 13th, entered Durango, where he was met by the municipality, who promised to supply rations for the troops. The Queen's general behaved with much moderation; no violence was used, no exactions made, and, despite the penury of the military chest, every thing was paid for; but this conciliating conduct was far from having the beneficial effect that was anticipated—the peasantry attributed it to fear. Like his cousin, the Arab, the sullen Basque peasant is as incapable of appreciating gentle treatment from his foe, as he is of granting it. From Durango, General Espartero pushed his advanced to Elgueta, where, overlooking the valley of the Deva, he waited for intelligence from his coadjutors, Sarsfield and Evans; the sudden gathering of the foe, in large masses in his front, on the 19th, soon told him that some disaster had happened to his allies, so, with equal promptitude and judgment, he withdrew early the next morning to Sornoza; here three or four battalions of the Carlists came up with the rear of his columns under Escalera, and a rough combat ensued, which cost the Queenites about 200 men, and probably as many to the enemy, for about 60 prisoners were taken. The next day the army

re-entered Bilbao, bringing with it some 400 sick and 150 wounded, so that the hospitals, which had begun to get somewhat clear, were once more crowded. Meantime, the different divisions of the army were cantoned as before in the villages round the town.

I have omitted to state, that when the Carlist army forsook the field on the 24th of December, besides the prisoners taken during the action and pursuit, they left their hospitals, in which were about 70 badly wounded, in the hands of the conquerors; amongst the prisoners was a nephew of Eguia, who had lost an arm, and several other officers, one or two of whom were Germans; all of them were treated with humanity and even with kindness as I myself witnessed. One of the first requests of the town to the General-in-chief was, that he should effect an exchange of these prisoners for an equal number of the Nationals, whom the Carlists held prisoners since the taking of Ochandiano, Plencia, and other villages of the provinces. General Espartero agreeing thereto, a message was sent to the Carlist head quarters, and, finally, after much reluctance on their part, they consented to exchange the Nationals; accordingly, in the beginning of February, about 70 of the Nationals, all that were left alive, were released from the mines, where they had been sentenced to labour, and brought to the Puente Nueva, where they were exchanged for an equal

number of Carlists. But no words can describe the wretched state of these unfortunate beings; worn down and emaciated with hunger and blows, covered with sores, and clad in motley rags, they more resembled spectres than human beings. Nay, so far did their vindictive and merciless foes carry their feelings of revenge, that it was reported, and currently believed, that an attempt was made to poison these unhappy wretches on the road; certain it is, that several died within a few days of their being exchanged, while nearly all were for a long time sick. In fact, the conduct of the Carlists, towards their prisoners, was so atrocious, that their shooting of the unfortunate English who fell into their hands, may almost be considered as an act of mercy, compared with the tortures inflicted upon those whose lives were for the time spared. It is in vain for any of the partizans of the Pretender to deny this, for all the inhabitants of Bilbao and San Sebastian can testify to the miserable and hardly conceivable state of the prisoners whom the Carlists brought to exchange, while those they received were stout, well-fed, fellows, fit to go direct to the ranks; the poor Christinos being fit for nought but the hospital.*

* See letter on this subject in the "*Bilbaino*" of the 22nd June, 1837, from a private soldier, prisoner to the Carlists, addressed to his Captain, wherein he states that of his company alone, *thirty-eight* had died from bad treatment!

The relief which the decree of General Espartero afforded to the trade of the town, was not destined to be of long continuance; for the government of Madrid, with characteristic impolicy, by an order dated the 14th March, directed, that instead of the moderate duties fixed by General Espartero's edict, not less than 24rs. was to be paid on the introduction of each fanega of wheat, or hundred weight of flour; these duties (equal to 25s. per quarter of wheat, and 5s. on each hundred weight of flour) were prohibitory, and thus, within two months from the date of their high-flown protestations of endless gratitude to the city which had made such sacrifices for the cause, the cortes and ministry contrived to give the world an excellent proof of how soon they forgot their promises, and how skilful they were at starving their own army; for now the population of Bilbao had dwindled down to less than 10,000 souls, while there were above 25,000 soldiers in and around the town; consequently, even allowing a free ingress of provisions, which was no more than the inhabitants were entitled to, it was clear that the army would be fed so much the cheaper. But this is just a sample of the careless, unreflecting manner, in which the Madrid government is carried on; the ministers are often men of bustle, rarely men of business. However, when the new orders arrived, the inhabitants refused to obey them; and Espartero, aware of

their mischievous tendency, suspended their execution.

The weather becoming more favourable, it was resolved that the bulk of the army, now cantoned around Bilbao, should proceed to San Sebastian; and preparations were made accordingly for their embarkation. Meantime, the new fortifications were advancing rapidly, and were already in a respectable state of defence. Four battalions were added to the garrison; and since the intended departure of Espartero in person, with the main body of the army to San Sebastian, would leave the line of the Ebro rather bare of troops, ten battalions were sent to Castro and Santander; whence they afterwards marched to the neighbourhood of Balmaceda. On the 1st of May, an entire division, of nearly 5000 men, was embarked on board the fleet of steamers in the bay of Portugalete, in the short space of six hours; and, by eight in the evening, were all landed at San Sebastian. On the 3d, the number of troops, now gathered in and around San Sebastian, being more than could be easily accommodated, General Evans made a forward movement, and dislodged the enemy from Loyola; this the Carlists resented; and, on the 6th, at day-break, made a furious and sudden attack on the troops holding the positions taken on the 3d. After an obstinate combat, they were repulsed with a heavy loss. This action was one of the most favourable that the

legion had been engaged in, for their loss was but trifling compared with that of the Carlists; and, besides, at the point attacked, they were far inferior in number. The next day, General Espartero arrived, bringing with him the first brigade of the Royal Guards; and, on the following day, another brigade, which, with the previous arrivals, increased the army, now in and around San Sebastian, to above 20,000 men. A few days were passed in preparations, and bringing down the remainder of the stores and equipments from Bilbao; but all arrangements being at length completed, orders were issued on the 13th, for the army to advance on the following day.

We have seen that the Carlists had successfully resisted the triple combined movement of the queen's generals in the month of March: they were now menaced with another and more serious attack, which was likely to deprive them of the French frontier, so long their grand resource; in March, the Carlist army was neither equipped nor sufficiently organized for an invasion of Castille; in May, every thing had been obtained from France, and their army was on a good working footing: in March, the Ebro and its tributaries were unfordable; in May, they could easily be crossed. Therefore, the policy which made the Carlists cling to their lines in front of San Sebastian in March, made them attach far less importance to them in May. It was resolved accord-

ingly in their councils, that when Espartero, with his army, should have fairly gone to San Sebastian, the invasion of the provinces beyond the Ebro should take place. In pursuance of this plan, reports were spread abroad of the determination of the Carlists to defend the French frontier at all hazards, and of their firm intention to dispute the advance to Hernani inch by inch. These rumours, joined to the wishes of General Evans, the orders from the Madrid government, and the idea entertained by most of the Spanish generals, that even if the Carlists did take advantage of the absence of the army on the Ebro to march into Castille, that they would not be found so formidable as in the provinces—induced, probably, Espartero to unite the finest part of his army with General Evans' division, for the purpose of clearing the French frontier.

Certain that the bulk of the northern army was now gathered around San Sebastian, the Carlist army prepared to march. On receiving authentic intelligence from France and San Sebastian itself, that the advance would take place on the 14th May, the Infante Don Sebastian, with six battalions, left the lines of Hernani and marched to join his uncle, the pretender, at Estella, where, on the 17th, they mustered their united forces, above 12,000 men, whereof about half were Navarrese and Alavese, the rest Castil-

lians and deserters from the queen's army. After deducting this large body of troops, there still remained thirteen battalions for the defence of the lines at Hernani, and about ten other battalions were kept in the vicinity of Pamplona, Vitoria, and Bilbao.

Sunday, the 14th May, beheld the advance of the Spanish army, the forcing of the lines and capture of Hernani, after a trifling defence by the enemy, who had previously carried off his cannon—the troops pushed on and took the next village of Andoain, which closed the day's work; two days later the division of General Evans reduced Irun and Fuenterabia; the former made a good defence, the latter none. In these actions, above 800 prisoners were made by the British legion, while above twenty pieces of cannon were found in the forts taken; nor was one of the prisoners in any wise injured, although the decree of Durango was invariably enforced against such of the unfortunate English who fell into the hands of the foe. All this forbearance was perfectly fruitless and unavailing; the enemy attributed it to fear. But a few months later, the Carlists shewed in their treatment of the soldiers of the legion, who were taken at Andoain, how little they were affected by the humanity of their opponents. It, indeed, appears very questionable policy for a general to value the lives of his own

soldiers at less than those of his enemies: to be so careless of his own men, so watchful over the safety of their foes.

The long coveted frontier was now closed to the Carlists, and in possession of the Christinos. The province of Guipuscoa, which had seen its swarming youth perish by thousands before San Sebastian and Vitoria, now murmured loudly against the system of operations which had abandoned nearly one-third of its surface to the enemy. The Guipuscoans aware of all they had done, and the sacrifices they had made for the cause of the pretender, could not understand that policy which left them in a manner defenceless. However, the queen's generals manifested no disposition to pursue their advantages, but contented themselves with improving the fortifications of Irun and Hernani. The time of service for the legion having expired, that corps was dissolved, and General Evans, with most of the officers and men, returned to England.

Now while at San Sebastian all was triumph, let us turn to the progress of the Carlist main army. As soon as the concentration of their army at Sanguesa gave clear indication of their intended route, General Iribarren, who had succeeded to the aged and worn out Sarsfield, collected his troops and marched after them. Overtaking their army at Huesca, he ventured an attack without waiting for the coming up of Buerens, and

was repulsed and mortally wounded. Near Barbastro another action took place, wherein General Conrad, the commander of the French legion, was killed by his own men, who now pretty evenly distributed their favours, there being about as many on the side of the pretender, as on that of Isabel. At the passage of the Cinca, General Oraa (who from being the second in command to Espartero, was now commander-in-chief of the army of the centre) destroyed the Carlist rear-guard. Still, after all these rough encounters, the pretender got safe into Cataluña with 9 or 10,000 men. Here he was joined by the Catalan bands, but their united forces were easily beaten by the Baron de Meer (the queen's general in Cataluña) at Guisona. However, the loss fell chiefly upon the Catalans, and the generals of the pretender, having soon rallied their troops, left the Catalans to manage their own matters, and crossed the Ebro into Valencia, the Baron de Meer giving them little or no trouble. Next we behold the pretender over-running the country, even to the gates of Madrid; while a second expedition, under Zariategui,* penetrates into Castille, and takes Segovia and Valladolid. The government of Madrid recal Espartero to save the capital; but that prudent general, instead of marching by Segovia, where he must have come upon Zariategui's division, turned off to the left, and thus allowed the Navarrese chief

* This expedition was chiefly composed of Basque battalions.

to get off with all his plunder. Nevertheless, if the queen's general did not succeed in defeating her majesty's enemies, he certainly succeeded in defeating her majesty's ministers, for, getting up a mutiny among the officers of the guards, Espartero declared the ministry to be unworthy of confidence, and demanded their dismissal. Had the Calatrava administration possessed the requisite firmness, they would have arrested the ungenerous chief, who, at such a crisis, could think of adding to the embarrassments of his sovereign and country; but they hesitated, and resigned. The aristocratic party now got possession of the government, and Espartero set off to destroy (so he gave out,) the pretender's army. Several severe actions were fought; and, in the end, the Carlist generals, finding subsistence scarce, and having collected and sent into the Basque provinces much plunder and many thousand recruits, now determined to retrace their steps, and winter in the northern provinces; where, as before, they could with safety recruit, equip, and re-organize their army, which had suffered severely in this rough campaign, not half the force returning which had left the provinces six months previous. However, it cannot be denied that this irruption into Castille produced serious injury to the queen's cause. Central Spain, from one end to the other, is over-run with bands, led by ruffians,

who assume the names of "*the Eternal Father,*" "*the Holy Ghost,*" &c.; but which it must be supposed imply neither profanity nor blasphemy, seeing that they espouse the cause of the priesthood. In Aragon, since the loss of Morella, General Oraa is hard pushed to make head against Cebrega, while in the northern provinces the queen's generals have withdrawn several of their garrisons. The fifth year of this eventful struggle has now closed; and although the pretender may have succeeded in spreading the war over the provinces of Castille, it may still be doubted if he is at all nearer the throne of Spain than when at Chamusca. Of course the high-church party in the Peninsula will strain every nerve to prolong the contest; to them, the misery and desolation thereby occasioned is matter of triumph.

The Carlists will no doubt pursue in the next campaign, the same policy as in the last: during the winter whilst their main body is re-organizing in the Basque provinces, safe from all disturbance, small bands are launched forth over the provinces to scour the country, burn and plunder the villages, collect recruits, and weary the troops with endless marching. Not only are the queen's forces harassed by these numerous bands, who ravage the country with the speed and cruelty of a horde of Tartars, but the civil government itself is completely broken down by these marauding ex-

cursions—the laws are trampled under foot—justice is not administered—no taxes are paid to the state—the young men are carried off to fill the Carlist ranks. This is the dismal picture which one-half of Spain presents. There is no security for the husbandman—none for the dwellers in villages or small towns; so that it is most probable that not two years more will pass over without the country being visited by a famine like that of 1812, and thus the horrors of this terrible drama will be deepened.

Should it be asked, what probability exists of this strife being soon terminated, the reply in my opinion should be, None. The aristocratic party are determined to have the rule of the state, now that the church party is thrown over, but they cannot find among them a man of energy and abilities. Men of moderate talents and capacities abound; nor are men wanting who, at times, can display energy and vigour enough—but it is not lasting. Spain wants a Mirabeau; and before she can hope to finish the civil war, which, like a devouring flame, lays waste her provinces, she must take a leaf out of the history of the French Convention. Both soldiers and citizens will become weary of finding all their sacrifices rendered unavailing by treachery or incapacity. As in France, after the death of Mirabeau, so it is now in Spain:—

“A myriad hands like shadows weak, or stiff and sharp as
bestial claws,
And seek to rule the fluctuant mass that bears their country's
life and laws.”*

Here the “hands like shadows weak,” are the different administrations which have had their hour in Madrid — excepting that of Calatrava. The “bestial claws” none can misapply in referring to Cabrera, the Eternal Father, the Bullman, and other worthies of that stamp. There is thus every probability of the coming campaign proving as indecisive as the last, and having no other result than that of increasing largely the miseries of the country. There are too many military men on both sides, who are interested in prolonging the war, for it to be at all likely that a speedy termination will take place. Can any one expect that the pretender will withdraw from the contest as long as he can find followers? There is not the smallest chance of his taking such a step. Each succeeding winter will see his forces recruiting themselves in the Basque provinces, to sally forth with returning spring to lay waste the provinces of Castille, and thus the war bids fair to be interminable. Nor is it at all probable that foreign intervention will take place; for not only is the peculiar character of the Spaniards of all parties, with but few exceptions, opposed to all interference of foreigners with

* Blackwood's Magazine for *February*, 1838.

their affairs ; but it is evident that France would not interfere, without exacting terms which neither constitutional Spain nor Great Britain would consent to. On the other hand, for England herself to interfere in this second Spanish war of succession with effect, not less than 50,000 men would be needed, and many millions of money ; therefore, it is scarcely necessary to say, no British statesman would entertain the idea for an instant. Well, then, it may be asked, since Don Carlos receives succours from all parts of Europe, when from England furious No Popery-men send contributions to the man whose banner is the dirty habit of St. Francis and Loyola, when even the heads of the Dutch reformed church, and the Eastern Greek church send money and effects to the pet of the Pope, shall the cause of the young queen, the cause of the representative system, find no support ? While absolute monarchs come forward so freely with their aid to a struggling would-be usurper—not from any conviction of the justice of his claim, but from sympathy with his principles—shall no assistance be given to the constitutionalist party of Spain, who have devoted their lives and fortunes to the noble task of rescuing their country from the degrading rule of the priesthood ? Many and glaring faults have the constitutionalists committed, some hardly unavoidable, and nearly all arising from a desire to conciliate their ferocious opponents ; but *those*

should not excite the displeasure of their well-wishers, while *these* should claim the sympathy of the humane. For notwithstanding all that has been written by venal pens dilating on the dangers to be apprehended to Europe in general, from the democratic tendency of the Spanish revolution, it is a notorious fact that the partisans of the Constitution, of whose republican theories so much apprehension was pretended, to suit his own purposes, by the King of the French, are almost wholly of the higher and middling classes; and who ever heard of the mass of owners of property advocating either civil war or ultra democratical principles? Indeed, this ill founded and would-be sarcasm, comes with an exceedingly bad grace from a prince, who, at the time when, by the spontaneous choice of the French nation, he was called upon to reign over France, was, from fear of assassination on the part of his loving subjects, obliged to have his carriage wadded, his guards doubled, trebled; the streets lined with military when he went on public service; and no stranger was suffered to approach him without the most jealous precautions; while the fair cousin of the King of the French, although in the hands of these so styled fierce republicans, did, nevertheless, walk, ride, and drive about the streets of her capital every day, without any guards at all; nor did any of these democrats, so dreadful in the eyes of Louis Philippe and his ministers, ever offer

the slightest insult, much less attempt to assassinate her.

Certainly it would be a great libel upon the so-called free states, if it occurred that the spread of their principles were of less importance to them, than the triumph of despotism was to the irresponsible monarchs of the continent. The Spanish question, were it an isolated case, might safely be left to the two contending parties for arrangement; but, unfortunately, as an international question, it becomes more than ever interesting to us; for, since the invention of steam, the whole northern seaboard of Spain is virtually as near to Bristol as Scotland; wherefore, we are more interested in the question of Spanish policy now, than we have been at any other time; and, of course, are bound to give every reasonable support to the cause of the orphan queen, combined as it is with hereditary right, undoubted justice, and the advancement of responsible and representative governments. And there is, probably, no method by which Great Britain could so effectually, and at so little cost, assist the Queen of Spain, as by guaranteeing a loan for the service of that country. With the guarantee of England, the money would be raised at 4 per cent.; without that security the money-mongers would not lend at 12. With the guarantee of England, five millions of pounds borrowed, would produce five millions of pounds nett; whereas, when Spain last borrowed on her own

credit, (or rather on that of Count Toreno,) eight millions only produced a little more than four millions. The interest upon a loan of five millions, supposing it raised at 4 p. % (with 1 p. % annually for a sinking fund) would amount to £250,000 yearly, which might be charged upon some especial revenue. Of course it would be but justice to Great Britain, that, in the event of a loan being raised with her guarantee, the expenditure should be in part controlled by a special commissioner, appointed for that purpose; nor ought the whole of the money to be expended at once, but distributed over a period of at least three years. This sum, together with their own resources, would enable the Queen's government to keep the army in a state of efficiency which could hardly fail to maintain its superiority over that of the Pretender. Nor is it likely that D. Carlos would be able to hold his ground for three years more, against the daily consolidating power of the Cortes. The maturing age of the young Queen, by inspiring hopes and projects of a matrimonial alliance, would tend to weaken the party of the Pretender, both in Spain and the North.

After the departure of the main body of the Carlist army, hostilities languished in the provinces: the principal part of the Queen's forces in the north of Spain were stationed around San Sebastian; their number was, however, too small to attempt any offensive operations. Count

Mirasol, left in command of this division by General Espartero, failed to gain the affections of his men, a mutiny ensued, wherein a valued friend of the author, Colonel Francis Ebsworth, whose name has been previously mentioned in this work, as one of the most distinguished defenders of Bilbao during the first siege, and who was then acting upon Count Mirasol's staff, fell a victim to his zeal and devotion to his duty, being shot by the mutineers, when attempting to save the life of his chief; and to this heroic act, General Mirasol owes his life, as he himself acknowledged.

In Bilbao, the occurrences since the author's departure have been very trifling. The fortifications are now so strong, as to leave small inducement to the enemy for repeating a siege; besides, in Biscay the war is dwindled away, so that scarcely any act of hostility is committed by either party. The feeling in favour of the Pretender, formerly so rife in Biscay, has greatly declined; and many of the inhabitants, despairing of success, have emigrated to America, and more have deserted to the Christinos; in fact, the foraging expeditions of the Carlists, which overrun the provinces, to sweep off thousands of recruits, to be trained, fed, and equipped, at the cost of Biscay and Guipuscoa, have greatly dissatisfied the inhabitants, who consider themselves ill used. All this is, however, in the nature of things, and cannot be avoided by the Pretender, even if he wished it, which it is

hardly to be supposed he does ; for D. Carlos aims at the crown of Spain, not at that of Navarre only.

The question of the *fueros* has engaged the attention of the Spanish Cortes in rather a singular manner : in April, General Espartero published a proclamation, confirming the *fueros* : at this stretch of authority, the Cortes very naturally took umbrage, and voted the proclamation unconstitutional. Subsequently, however, on the question coming before the house in another shape, the Cortes declined entering upon the subject. Indeed, it appears to me probable, that the Spanish government and the Cortes would have no objection to confirm the *fueros* of the provinces, with a few trivial alterations ; and this, with the guarantee of England and France, might probably induce the inhabitants to abandon the cause of the Pretender, of which they have been the main stay and support ; and, without whose aid, he would be chased forth from Spain in less than six months.

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

WE, the undersigned, Secretaries to, and members of the constituent Cortes of the Spanish nation, assembled by royal decree of the 21st of August 1836, do hereby certify: That on the day of the date hereof the following decree has been decreed.

The Cortes, in use of the powers granted them by the constitution, have decreed: First—The defenders of Bilbao, the generals and soldiers of the army and navy, as well Spanish as English, who have been employed in raising the siege of that town, have deserved well of the Spanish nation. Secondly—The president of the Cortes shall write an autograph letter to General Espartero, assuring him the grateful thanks of the nation for his services, and desiring him to cause the same to be notified to all the generals, officers, and soldiers, as well of the navy as of the army, who may have contributed to the defence or succour of the place: the president is also directed to write another letter of thanks to the right honourable Lord John Hay, commodore of his Britannic majesty's squadron on the coast of Cantabria, for the important services which he has rendered our cause: a third to the municipality, national guards, and inhabitants of Bilbao, testifying the gratitude of the nation for their exploits, and charging them to have this letter read in public every 25th of December. Thirdly—There shall be formed a square on the ground where formerly stood the convent of the Capuchins in this town, which shall be styled "Plaza de Bilbao;" and in the centre there shall be erected a monument to the memory of the heroic defenders of Bilbao. Fourthly—The government is authorised, in the first

place, to defray the entire amount of the losses which the loyal inhabitants of the "invicta Bilbao" may have sustained during the three sieges, in their properties and fortunes, out of the national funds, the Cortes reserving to themselves the right of extending this act of justice to all other loyal towns of the peninsula, who may have suffered for the cause of liberty: in the second place, to erect, at the national expense, a monument in the city of Bilbao, in honour of its illustrious defenders: in the third place, to assign to all the widows, orphans, fathers, and brothers of the defenders and liberators of Bilbao, who have perished, and to the military of the army, navy, and militia who have been wounded, such pensions as they may be entitled to.

The President, JOAQUIN MARIA FERRER.

Secretary, JULIAN DE HUELVES.

Do. VICENTE SALVA.

Palace of the Cortes, 14th January 1837.

The above decree is a true copy of the original, deposited in the government archives, and in faith thereof we give the present, sealed with the seal of the Constituent Cortes.

JULIAN DE HUELVES, Secretary.

VICENTE SALVA, do.

JUAN BAEZA, do.

TOMAS FERNANDEZ DE VALLEJO, do.

Dated at Madrid, 14th January 1837.

No. II.

The CONSTITUENT CORTES of the SPANISH NATION to the
TOWN OF BILBAO.

The National Congress salutes the unconquered Bilbao. It sufficeth not to declare that Bilbao has deserved well of the country, nor to have decreed ample indemnities to those of its inhabitants who have been injured in their properties, nor to have provided for the subsistence of the orphans and widows of its valiant defenders; the Cortes consider it a duty, which they with pleasure fulfil, to send their grateful thanks to that heroic population which has thrice defied the rage of faction. The first siege cost the rebels their most daring and fortunate leader; of the second they were soon tired; but on this last occasion, the enemies of freedom, within and without the peninsula, confederated for your destruction: all their efforts, all their sacrifices were made for that object, as if their existence depended upon their triumph and your ruin. Our country was grieved at the imminent risk impending over such a well-deserving town, all good Spaniards trembled for its safety, and the representatives of the nation were afflicted, not that it should surrender, for that they scarcely deemed possible, but that it should be destroyed by its barbarous besiegers. Bilbao neither surrendered nor was destroyed. Bilbao was saved—the Congress rejoices in such a glorious triumph, in itself great and important, and more so in the happy consequences which are like to ensue: to perpetuate this triumph, the Cortes have decreed (among other resolutions contained in their decree, of which an authentic copy is annexed,) that this communication should be made by an autograph letter: complying therewith, I feel myself fortunate in being selected for such a signal honour, which is farther heightened by the circumstance that my origin is from your province, wherein I have been favoured with marks of distinction.

JOAQUIN MARIA FERRER, President.

Palace of the Cortes, 14th January 1837.

No. III.

GENERAL CASTAÑOS, Duke of Baylen, to the CORPORATION OF
BILBAO.

For deeds which surpass the limits of heroism, it is hard to find language adequate to express the feelings of admiration which they excite; and since the Queen and Congress have alike borne joyful and grateful testimony to the glories of unconquered Bilbao, it may appear singular for an individual to offer *his* congratulations on the glory which the gallant defenders of Bilbao have so worthily achieved, by giving an example of fidelity, courage, and constancy, which Europe admires; but having the honour to be a Biscayan by birth, twice elected alcalde of Portugalete, and once deputy-general for the province, these titles to your acquaintance, as also that of being the most ancient general of the Spanish army, will, I trust, be sufficient to induce the acceptance of this slight testimony of the sincere love I bear to my native land, and my earnest wishes for her glory and prosperity.

FRANCISCO XAVIER CASTAÑOS, Duke of Baylen.

Madrid, 4th January 1837.

No. IV.

From PALAFOX, Field-Marshal of the Spanish Armies and Duke of Zaragoza, to the MUNICIPALITY of the heroic and invincible BILBAO.

Aroused my national pride, on contemplating the noble defence of the inhabitants of Bilbao, its valiant garrison, and heroic national guard, I feel the highest satisfaction in offering the tribute of my congratulations for the signal victory a third time achieved, amidst ruins and bloodshed, over those misguided wretches who vainly dared to pollute, with sacrilegious tread, the sacred ground.

The venerable shades of the heroes who perished for the defence of renowned Zaragoza, rejoiced gloriously in their silent mansions, that their much loved country still possessed sons like themselves: like those heroes of other days, Bilbao has sustained the long agony of a protracted conflict, which triumph crowned at last, and, like them, the brave who have laid down their lives for their country, rich in the grateful memory of their brethren, peacefully rest in their laurelled grave.

Bilbao has ennobled our glorious cause with the sacrifices of her children, and of her riches: shall such be in vain? No. Liberties thus dearly purchased shall be indestructible, and the august throne of the second Isabel, the ark and emblem of Spanish freedom, shall derive new strength, new firmness from them.

Happy should I have been had fate permitted me to partake of your glories, but if the memory of one of the defenders of the immortal Zaragoza finds favour with you, most gladly would I cherish the honour of belonging to your unconquered national guard; it would be a fresh distinction for my declining age.

Unconquered Bilbao, accept from a grey-headed soldier the sincerest and warmest tribute of admiration for your heroic deeds, the most ardent vows for your prosperity, and that Bilbao may always be the bulwark of Spanish liberty, the pride of the free, the admiration of all.

PALAFOX, Duke of Zaragoza.

Madrid, 14th January 1837.

No. V.

STATE of the FORCE of the GARRISONS in the
small Forts on the River, 23rd Oct. 1836.

NAMES OF THE PLACES.	Artillery.			Infantry.			Total.	
	Field Officers.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Field Officers.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Officers.	Men.
Convent of San Mamés	14	..	8	269	8	283
Convent of Capuchinos	7	206	7	206
Fort of the Banderas	5	..	2	61	2	66
Bridge of Luchana	1	44	1	44
Convent of Burseña	7	..	4	120	4	127
	26	..	22	700	22	726
								748

Note.—The Infantry consisted of

Regiment of Cuenca	545	} 726	} 748.
Compostela	57		
4th Light Infantry ..	124		
Officers as above	22		

No. VI.

STATE of the FORCES composing the GARRISONS
in the Forts on the River, 10th Nov. 1836.

NAMES OF THE PLACES.	Sappers.			Artillery.			Infantry.			Total.	
	Chiefs.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Chiefs.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Chiefs.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Officers.	Soldiers.
Convent of San Mamés.	10	..	1	25	1	8	276	10	311
Convent of Capuchinos	5	130	5	130
Fort of the Banderas	10	1	5	140	6	150
Bridge of Luchana	2	40	2	40
Convent of Burscña	9	..	5	128	5	137
Convent of Desierto	12	1	6	125	7	137
	10	..	1	56	3	31	839	35	905
										940	

Note.—The Infantry consisted of

Regiment of Toro 350

4th Light Infantry .. 484

Cuenca 39

Artillery and Sappers. 67

} 940.

No. VII.

ARMY OF THE NORTH.—SIXTH DIVISION.

STATE of the Loss sustained by the Garrison of Bilbao, from the
23rd of October, to the 25th of December.

	Killed.		Wound- ed.		Pri- soners.		Total.		
	Officers.	Soldiers.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Officers.	Soldiers.	Officers.	Soldiers.	
Royal Artillery	2	15	9	68	11	83	94
Engineers	1	2	2	7	3	9	12
Regiment of Trujillo.....	3	77	11	180	..	79	14	336	350
„ Laredo.....	..	28	2	76	..	2	2	106	108
„ Cuenca.....	..	10	4	53	4	63	67
„ Fourth Light Infantry..	..	8	6	51	..	5	6	62	68
„ Toro.....	..	4	2	32	2	36	38
„ Compostela	25	5	118	1	12	6	155	161
„ Alcazar de San Juan	2	1	10	..	1	1	13	14
Cazadores of Biscay	22	3	22	3	104	107
National Militia, Detachments of different Re- giments.....	6	33	13	139	19	172	191
	..	2	..	5	..	1	..	8	8
	12	228	58	321	1	98	71	1147	1218
General Staff, Four General Officers slightly wounded.....	2	..	8	10
Lost in the Forts	28	768	796
									2024

The number of casualties of women, children, and old men, were } 100
about.....

Making a total loss to the garrison and inhabitants of..... 2124

No. VIII.

ACCOUNT of the EXPENDITURE of AMMUNITION, &c.
during the second Siege of Bilbao.

SHELLS.

14 Inch	No.	250
7 Inch		5,256
4½ Inch		230
Hand Grenades		850
		<u>6,586</u>

ROUND SHOT.

Of 36 lb.	No.	522
24		1,975
22		1,116
18		395
16		1,308
12		1,750
8		2,056
6		734
4		530
		<u>10,386</u>

GRAPE AND CANISTER.

36	No.	60
24		178
16		44
12		84
18		36
22		30
8		75
7 howitzer		40
6		46
4		182
		<u>775</u>

Total number of rounds . . . 17,747

Musquet Cartridges . . . No. 548,000

Gunpowder . . . cwt. 782

Between the 24th of October and the 25th of December, 1836.

No. XI.

STATE of the BRASS and IRON ORDNANCE belonging to, and within the City of Bilbao and its Dependencies, 10th November, 1837.

	Mortars.		Howitzers.		Brass and Iron Ordnance.										
	Inch.		Inch.		Pounds.										
	13	6½	6½	5	36	32	24	22	18	16	12	8	6	4	3
In the Arenal (<i>Parque</i> *) ..	1	1	2	1	2
At the Morro, Fort.....	1	1	1	1	1	..
Morillo, do.	1	1	1	1	..
Miravilla, do.	0	1	1	1	1	..
Circus, battery....	1	1	1	..	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mallons, do.	0	..	1	1	3	1
Solocoche, do.	1	9	1	..
Larrinaga, do.	1	..	1	1	..	1	..	1	1	1	..
San Anton, tower of.	1	..
San Francisco, do.	1	..
Total in the Town†...	1	5	6	..	1	4	2	2	..	6	8	2	9	3	..
Convent of San Mamés‡	1	1	3	..	1	..	1	..
Blockhouse of Banderas	1
Convent of Bursena.....	2	..
Convent of Desierto.....	2	2
Town of Portugalete	1	2	1	3	2	..	6
Total.....	1	6	7	..	1	2	7	2	2	1	12	13	3	17	4
Taken by the Enemy	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	..
Captured § from the Be- } siegiers on the 24 Dec. }	1	6	6	..	1	2	6	2	2	1	9	12	2	13	3
	6	1	4	..	6	4	2	2	..
Total on the 1st Jan. 1838	1	6	6	..	1	2	13	3	6	1	15	16	4	17	3

* As the *Parque* was in the Arenal, all the guns stationed at the Theatre Battery, those of the *Cujas* and *Zendeja* are considered as being in the *Parque*.

† This was the stationing of the guns on the 10th November; various alterations were made afterwards. Mallona, at the end of the siege, contained eleven pieces of all calibres.

‡ One of the pieces at San Mamés was a twelve-pounder carronade, borrowed from H. M. S. *Saracen*.

§ The guns taken from the enemy were very much injured; several of them were nearly unserviceable. The best was a long twenty-four-pounder, made of wrought iron, a beautiful piece of ordnance.

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