



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




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Coleccion de memorias historias. Contine esta obra; Memoria, de la vida de Chr Tohn Moore con detalles historicos aurea de las varias casa paries in que aquel tomo parte y una narvacion arcuntamiada de la Batalla de la Cortua en 1809. Aventuras pressonales y viajes durante 4 ha anos un los Estados unidos de America Por Mr. Tohon Davis Lon Historia de la revolucion de Portugal en clavo de 1640, o'illacion de un levantomiento cotra España colocacion de la cosona en la cabera de D. Tuande Bragauxa Padre de D. Pedro y de Catalina Reina vileda de Guplationa Continuondo desde aquella fecha hasta musty stias. Fraduciola del francies Luches 1813 Vida de Eduardo, Lord Herbert de Cherbury. Escrita por el mismo. Loudry - 1817 Memoria, de la Marquera de la Roche Taquelein, du mute la guerra de la Vinde Escritas por ella mission. Fraduciolas del prantes. Loudry 1816 Memorias del Casitan Jorge Carleton oficial might Contienen varias arrecdotas de la guerra de España bajo el mando del Conde de Peter borough; l'interna tes noticias acerca de las costunibres de los españoles al principio del uttino siglo. Escritas por el una. Louothe - 1811. 2008 Ministerio de Cultura



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MEMOIRS

OF THE LIFE OF



SIR JOHN MOORE,

WITH HISTORICAL DETAILS

OF THE

VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED,

AND A CIRCUMSTANTIAL NARRATIVE OF

THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA.

Being the Seventh Part of the First Volume of Biographical and Historical Memoirs.

1884 Hondon: Pechico Braniel

PUBLISHED BY J. DAVIS, MILITARY CHRONICLE AND MILITARY CLASSICS OFFICE, 14, CHARLOTTE-STREET, BLOOMSBURY, AND SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS.

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SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE ROYAL MILITARY CHRONICLE.

APRIL, 1811.

LIFE OF SIR JOHN MOORE.

STANTEM NE PRORUAS COLUMNAM.

In the Anthologia, or collection of Greek epigrams, there is one so peculiarly fine, at once so condensed in its meaning, and so compacted in its expression, that it is a real matter of regret to the writer of this, that he has it not in his power verbally to quote it. The substance of it, however, is briefly as follows:—

"Here lies Cleomenes the Spartan; a soldier and a PROPHET, who therefore knew what fate awaited him in the field of battle; yet, in obedience to the command of his country, he went, fought, and fell!—Stranger, this is his tomb."

This translation is made from memory; the book is not before the writer of this, nor, in his present situation, accessible. The above epigram, however, speaks for itself; it has that commanding energy, in which the Greek writers abound, and that intrinsic majesty of thought, that it needs not any peculiar dress to recommend it. Nothing is so near to my wishes as to infuse a love of solid and elegant literature into the army. No condition of life affords so much leisure, and in no condition of life would such learning be more useful. You would soon find the fruit of it, not only in a new fund of occupation, which only springs anew as you exhaust it; but in that added dignity of mind, that increased self-estimation, which are the best roots of all that is good and great. True heroism is a principle and not an impulse.

To return, however, to our subject. It must be unnecessary to enforce the application of the above epigram to Sir John Moore. His opinions are as well known as his illustrious fate. He remained in Spain a willing and knowing victim to a stern sense of his public duty. Not only the ministers of the day, but unfortunately even the whole English nation, were in total ignorance of the

real state of Spain. Under this ignorance, added to the enthusiasm natural to a free people, England not only hoped, but with certainty expected, the entire deliverance of the Spanish people, and the total expulsion of the French. Even this English minister at Madrid caught this unhappy contagion. Such were the circumstances under which Sir John Moore acted; such were those to which he fell a victim; and such, happily indeed in a diminished degree, still obscure somewhat of the lustre of his glory. Time, however, which destroys every thing else, only strengthens and confirms a just reputation. Such a reputation is raised upon truth and nature, and the superstructure, therefore, is as eternal as the basis.

Sir John Moore was born on that private floor to which society has so often owed its best ornaments. He was educated with the example of industry and of its success before his eyes.

His grandfather, the Rev. Charles Moore, was a clergyman of the church of Scotland. He was one of the ministers of the church of Stirling about the year 1730; at a time when the income of that office was about 100l. per annum. Upon this income Mr. Moore contrived not only to live respectably, but to give a good education to his son, Dr. John Moore, the father of Sir John.

On the death of the Rev. Charles Moore, about the year 1795, John Moore, afterwards Dr. Moore, then a boy about five years old, was removed by his mother to Glasgow, to the neighbourhood of which her family belonged, and where she had a small patrimony. This lady, the grandmother of Sir John, was the daughter of John Anderson, esq. of Dowhill, in the neighbourhood of If family tradition may be trusted, she was a worthy and rather remarkable woman. In a brief memoir of the family, written, I believe, by one of the members of it, and from which some of these particulars are taken, she is thus mentioned :-"This lady (Mrs. Moore) was eminently distinguished by her understanding, which enabled her to conduct her own affairs, and to superintend the education of her son with becoming propriety; she was at the same time eminent for her piety, which she very early infused into the mind of her only child, as well as for the benevolence of her heart, that enabled her to cherish a love of hu-

manity in others, whilst she herself exhibited a living example of its effects."

It is pleasing thus to trace to the source some of those excellent qualities which so eminently characterised Sir John Moore. They thus seemed to have passed from the mother to her child, and from the father to his son. How enviable must be the family in which virtue itself is the inheritance! Yet such is the certain fruit of parental example and care. I think it is Horace that says, and says it with as much true poetry as nature, "Were it given me again to go behind the curtain of the world, and chuse the father who should bring me into life, yea, verily, it should be that honest man, that freeman of Arpinum, who was my father." I have fortunately a Horace at hand, and therefore may at once justify my memory and translation. The passage is as follows: it speaks at once to the heart and the head, and therefore I shall give it at length.

"Nunc ad me redeo libertino patre natum:

Quem rodunt omnes libertino patre natum——

Si purus et insons,

(Ut me collaudem) si et vivo carus amicis:

Causa fuit pater his—

Ipse mihi custos incorruptissimus omnes

Circum doctores aderat. Quid multa? pudicum

(Qui primus virtutis honos) servavit ab omni

Non solum facto, verum opprobrio quoq; turpi;—

Nil me pæniteat sanum patris hujus:—

Nam si natura juberet

May it be permitted to the writer of this to mention, that in indulging in the above long extract, descriptive of an excellent parent, he has yet another object in his "mind's eye" than the father of Sir John Moore. The writer of this is himself yet smarting under the green-wound of the loss of his father;—and of such a father! Will the reader have the goodness to pardon his egotism;—let those who would not imitate it, throw the first stone.

Mr. Moore, the father of Sir John, was educated in the University of Glasgow; and knowing that he had nothing to look to but to his talents and knowledge, cultivated them with a careful attention. He selected for himself the profession of physic. His mother placed him under the tuition of Dr. Gordon, a physician of much eminence. Mr. Moore, however, was likewise a constant attendant on Drs. Hamilton and Cullen; the latter of whom, we believe, was the founder of a new school of physic and chemistry.

Mr. Moore, however, had too much activity of mind to remain satisfied with the ordinary medical education. He shortly obtained an appointment of much advantage. The Duke of Cumberland was about to leave England to take the command of the allied army in Flanders, and Mr. Moore, being introduced to his notice by one of the Argyle family, he was immediately appointed one of the surgeons or physicians to the expedition. He accordingly embarked upon this service about the year 1747. He here went through a long course of surgical experience. His first quarters were at Maestrecht, where he acted as mate. From Maestrecht he was moved to Flushing, in consequence of the recommendation of Mr. Middleton, the director-general of the military hospitals. He obtained by the same recommendation the patronage of the Earl of Albermarle, Shortly afterwards, he was detached to the assistance of the Coldstream regiment of guards, which was at that time under the command of General Braddock.

From Flushing he accompanied the Coldstream regiment to Breda, and peace being shortly afterwards concluded he returned to England.

In the memoir of the life of Dr. Moore, to which we have above referred, it is mentioned, that during the greater part of the above service abroad, Mr. Moore was between his 17th and 19th year of age. He acted as assistant-surgeon to the Coldstream when he was only in his 17th year. Upon his return to London he attended the anatomical lectures of Dr. Hunter for two years; after which, accompanied by Mr. Fordyce, afterwards Sir William, he set out for Paris, in order to superadd the knowledge of the French medical school to that of the English and Scotch. Very fortunately for Mr. Moore, Lord Albermarle, the colonel of the Coldstream,

to which Mr. Moore had been assistant-surgeon, was at that time ambassador in France. Lord Albermarle immediately recognised and adopted his young countryman. He appointed him surgeon to his household, which was of itself an introduction to company and notice. Mr. Moore, from early life, was an observer of men and manners, and no situation could certainly be more favourable to administer food to this curiosity. Mr. Moore, however, was not so seduced by the pleasures of company, and by the splendour and luxuries of an ambassador's table, as to forget the main point,—his improvement in medical knowledge. He had accordingly the strength of mind to forego all these pleasures when they interfered with his more serious purposes. Accordingly, leaving the hotel de Mirepoix, he selected some lodgings nearer to the hospitals. Here he gave himself up entirely to his medical pursuits.

He remained at Paris two years; after which he returned to Scotland upon an invitation from Dr. Gordon, his former tutor. The doctor invited him now to become his partner; and Mr. Moore, by the advice of his friends, immediately accepted an invitation as lucrative as it was liberal. Mr. Moore was now established; his reputation had been previously fixed, and the means of opulence were now in his power.

Mr. Moore was thus fixed at Glasgow as a surgeon and physician. Seeing himself sufficiently established, he married Miss Simson, the daughter of the Rev. Mr. Simson, professor of divinity in the University of Glasgow. By this lady he had one daughter and five sons; the eldest of whom was John Moore, afterwards Sir John.

Sir John Moore was born at Glasgow in the year 1760. This town, as we have above mentioned, was the seat of his mother's family, as likewise that of his grandfather. Sir John, therefore, always considered it as peculiarly his own town. No life, perhaps, was more migratory than that of Sir John Moore. After he had entered the army, he was scarcely, perhaps, two years in one situation; a kind of life which is supposed to divest the mind of any strength of local attachment. Sir John, however, always fondly

remembered the town of Glasgow, where he received his birth and the first rudiments of his education.

Sir John Moore had attained the eighteenth year of his age, when a circumstance occurred which opened new prospects to his family. The young Duke of Hamilton, a nobleman of great promise, being afflicted with a consumptive complaint, was attended by Dr. Moore. This young man's malady, however, baffled all the efforts of medicine; and, after a lingering illness, he died in the fifteenth year of his age. Dr. Moore is said to have written a very pathetic eulogy on this youth; a circumstance which led to a more intimate connexion with the family. The late Duke of Hamilton, being like his brother, of a sickly constitution, his mother, the Duchess of Argyle, determined that he should travel in company with some gentleman, who, to a knowledge of medicine, added an acquaintance with the continent. Both of these qualities were united in the person of Dr. Moore, who, by this time, had obtained the degree of M. D. from the University of Glasgow.

They accordingly set out together, and they spent a period of no less than five years abroad: during which they visited France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. On this occasion, John, the eldest son of Dr. Moore, accompanied his father: and thus, besides the advantages of paternal instruction, had a most excellent opportunity of obtaining a facility in the languages. The same early introduction into the world, and into the variety of foreign manners, tended, no doubt, to give to his own manners that polish and refinement which so eminently characterised him. With such a preceptor as Dr. Moore by his side, there was no apprehension but that travel would produce its proper effect. Accordingly, with respect to mere manners, those of Sir John Moore had the ease and grace, without the levity and frivolity, of those usually formed by travelling.

Sir John Moore very early obtained a commission in the army. The Hamilton and Argyle families exerted themselves in assisting him upwards; and accordingly he became a lieutenant-colonel in the 52d regiment, almost as soon as the forms of office, more relaxed than they are at present, could allow.

If military instruction were more a system than it at present is, there might be a reason for an interval of two or three years between a subaltern and field officer; but there is certainly nothing in the course of regimental duty which would reasonably require more than a month. The regulations of the French war office are more liberal in this respect.

The war of the French revolution no sooner commenced, than all officers, of a due zeal in their profession, eagerly embraced this occasion of active service. The first service of Lieutenant-colonel Moore was on an occasion of equal praise and brilliancy.

General Paoli having taken refuge in England, after his unsuccessful attempts to maintain the liberty of his country, had still contrived to keep up a correspondence with his friends in Corsica; and about this time (1795) he intimated to the English government, that if a suitable force was landed in Corsica, the island would immediately submit.

The English government deemed this proposal worthy of serious attention. Accordingly, Lieutenant-colonel Moore and Major Kachler were commissioned to land secretly in the island, and to make all due inquiries as to the alleged dispositions of the Corsicans. This inquiry was fully satisfactory. Admiral Lord Hood was immediately ordered to embark a body of troops at Nice upon this service. Those orders were immediately obeyed, and the admiral, having taken on board a body of troops under Lieutenant-general Dundas, sailed from Hieres on the 24th of January, 1795; and on the 27th reached the island of Corsica.

The expedition anchored in Martella Bay, so called from Martella Tower; a name now well known amongst us, inasmuch as the tower above mentioned has given its name to the Martella towers with which our coast is now encircled. The land forces, consisting of the second battalion of the royals, the eleventh, twenty-fifth, thirtieth, fiftieth, fifty-first, and sixty-ninth regiments, amounting in all to about fourteen hundred men, were landed under Lieutenant-general Dundas, and were immediately led on to the attack of the town,

The brave and obstinate defence, which a garrison of thirty-five

been above said, the introduction of similar forts amongst ourselves. It is, in consequence, unnecessary to give any detailed description of Martella fort; suffice it to say, that the Martella tower, in its original form, is a cylindrical tower, built in a circular ditch, and overtopping the ditch about two or three feet. The ditch is usually of such a breadth as to afford a circuit of ten or twelve feet between the wall of the tower and the sides of the ditch. The walls are of a great thickness, and two eighteen-pounders are mounted on the summit of the tower. A bomb proof casemate, capacious enough to shelter an hundred men, defended a well, which at once supplied water for drinking, and also for extinguishing any fire occasioned by any attack on the part of the enemy. The rotundity and narrow diameter of the fort rendered it a mark extremely difficult to be hit; and even when struck, as the balls generally took it in an oblique direction, the damage was inconsiderable, and the garrison, never exceeding forty men, were exposed to little or no danger.

Such was the fort against which General Dundas and Lord Hood made a combined attack by sea and land: and so excellent was its construction, that for a considerable time it was enabled to withstand them both. The Fortitude and Juno frigates anchored abreast of it, whilst the land forces took the most convenient position which presented itself. The Juno and Fortitude, however, after an attack of two hours and a half, found it necessary to withdraw; the guns of the ships having made no impression on the fort, whilst those of the fort had very nearly set the ships on fire. It should have been mentioned in the above description of the fort, that the part of the fort, which overtopped the ditch, was covered and defended by a parapet of the same height on the further side of the ditch, the top of which sloped off into the field. This pasapet was composed of rammed clay, and throughout the whole of its slope, from the top to the field, was of sufficient thickness to be cannon-proof. Though apartuol mode of ils of pastanoms ameni

The assault was now changed to an attack in form: and thus (an eminent instance of the utility of engineering in war) a garrison of thirty-five men had the honour of holding at bay, for some days, a regular force of fourteen hundred men, and a squadron of

ships. The land forces at length found an eminence which commanded it, and immediately erected a battery on it. Even this, however, had very little effect, as the top of the tower was bombproof. The garrison, however, not so much from any necessity, as from a panic at the superior force of their enemy, at length surrendered. Had the garrison been more determined, and had, the heights, by which they were commanded, been occupied by a similar tower, the island, most certainly, would not have been taken.

Whilst this siege, for such it was, was carrying on, Lieutenantcolonel Moore was detached with two regiments, a small howitzer,
and a six-pounder, for the purpose of making an attack on a fort,
named Convention Fort, a main defence of the town of Fornelli,
and of the whole island.

After a very difficult march of some miles, over a rugged and mountainous country, it was discovered, upon making the reconneitre, that the place was infinitely too strong for a coup de main. The fort was garrisoned by troops of the line, and commanded by a French officer, who had too much courage and experience to surrender to mere superiority of numbers. Lieutenant-colonel Moore accordingly reported, that the fort and town could not be taken without a regular attack; but that if heavy artillery could be brought up, there would be a prospect of success.

This was no sooner communicated to Lord Hood, and by him to the officers and seamen of the navy, than (we believe without any direct command) they undertook to accomplish this arduous work. Some heavy artillery was accordingly put on shore from the ships, and after the incessant labour of four days, (from Feb. 12th to the 16th), four eighteen-pounders, one large howitzer, and a ten inch mortar, were carried up to the appointed spot, an eminence elevated no less than seven hundred feet above the level of the sea.

One of these pieces was immediately directed against two French frigates in the bay, and so successfully played against them as to compel them to retire. The other pieces were brought to bear against Convention Fort, being distributed into two batteries, one of which enfiladed the fort, whilst the other took it in reverse.

The French commander was now summoned, but refused to

capitulate. It was in consequence resolved to make an immediate assault. Accordingly, on the evening of the 17th of February, Lieutenant-colonel Moore headed a column, "with which he advanced against the nearest part of this formidable redoubt, whilst Lieutenant-colonel Wauchope and Captain Stewart extended themselves on the centre and on the left." The attack was completely successful. Lieutenant-colonel Moore fought amongst the thickest of the enemy, and at the head of his men. With his own hand he cut down a French grenadier, who was fighting by the side of his commander. The French commander likewise fighting most bravely at the head of his men. The enemy were shortly afterwards forced down a steep hill in their rear, and the victory and full success remained with the English.

The result of the operations was, that the English became masters of the town and bay, and of the best part of the island.

Lord Hood requested Major-general Dundas to prosecute his success to its complete issue, and to lay siege to Bastia; but the Majorgeneral, deeming his forces insufficient, considered it as his duty to decline compliance. It should be added, that he momentarily expected a reinforcement.

The navy, however, from a spirit of emulation with the army, and which, in combined attacks, is, perhaps, sometimes carried too far, were not satisfied with these reasons, and resolved to make the attempt on Bastia with their own marines alone. Accordingly, Lieutenant-colonel Villetes of the marines, and Admiral Lord Nelson, at that time Captain Nelson, were immediately landed, with a body of men, upon this service. The batteries were immediately opened, and the place summoned. It held out for thirty-three days, and then surrendered. It would be invidious not to give the navy and marines their deserved praise.

There now only remained Calvi to complete the conquest of the island. Accordingly, on the 9th of June, 1795, the land forces having received a very considerable reinforcement, under Lieut.—general Stewart, both the general and the admiral commenced the siege in form; the land forces taking up a very strong position, called the Serra del Capucine, three miles distant from Calvi.

Nothing could be more difficult, indeed almost insurmountable,

than the approaches by land. The land and sea forces again worked in concert to overcome these obstacles. The seamen and soldiers were employed in constructing roads, bringing up artillery, ordnance stores, and provisions. The nature of the ground, and the necessary operations, were such, that the scene resembled rather the making a new settlement, than a military attack. The body of the place was defended by two detached forts, Mollinochesio and Mozello, and it was necessary to carry these before an assault could be made upon the town. The fort of Mollinochesio was situated upon an eminence, but a position was taken whence it was commanded with effect. It accordingly, after some interval, capitulated.

Mozello, however, built in the form of a star-work, was a fort of so much strength, that the engineers reported it as their opinion, that it must be attacked by works raised within seven hundred yards of its walls; and that in order to execute this scheme of attack, it was necessary to put the whole army in motion, and, by a sudden and general movement, bring it to the precise spot of ground previously marked out. This movement was accordingly executed, and a breach very shortly effected.

The enemy were now again summoned, but refused to surrender. It was accordingly resolved to storm the work; and Lieutenant-colonel Moore, having so bravely distinguished himself in the assault of Convention Fort, was appointed to conduct the whole. Day-break, on the following morning, was appointed for the execution. Late on the preceding night the troops were distributed amongst the myrtle bushes, with which the neighbouring rocks were covered, and thus brought so near to the breach as to be upon the spot at the required moment. Lieutenant-colonel Moore had his station in the midst of them, in anxious expectation of the first dawn of the morning.

General Stewart, however, being unusually solicitous, rode from his head-quarters before day-light: a few moments conversation took place between Lieutenant-colonel Moore and that general; and it was agreed between them that the attack should be immediately made. Lieutenant-colonel Moore, supported by Major Brereton, immediately advanced with unloaded arms, and in a

They were seen, however, from the ramparts whilst in their mid career, and immediately saluted with a volley of grape-shot; but which, in consequence of the indistinct view, arising from the want of light, did but little execution. This discharge had no other effect on the assailants than to provoke their courage to greater efforts. They immediately rushed forwards with redoubled pace, and, regardless of the fire of musketry, the roaring of cannon, and the bursting of shells, scrambled up the rubbish of the breach. Lieutenant-colonel Wemys, with the royal regiment of artillery, and two pieces of cannon, the latter under the direction of Lieutenant Lemoine of the artillery, attacked and carried the battery on the left. This attack on the left, and the assault at the breach, were preceeding at the same time.

The enemy opposed a most gallant resistance, fighting most desperately, even in the mouth of the breach. The captain of the royals was most grievously wounded at the side of Lieutenantcolonel Moore, who was himself likewise wounded in the head by the same shell. Though the effect of this wound was such as to stun the Lieutenant-colonel, and though he bled profusely, it did not prevent him from entering the breach with the grenadiers, who had no sooner gained the summit, than rushing forwards, they became masters of the whole work. Those of the enemy who were not killed or taken prisoners fled into the town. When General Stewart, who had posted himself upon a neighbouring eminence, whence he witnessed the whole proceedings of his gallant detachment, perceived the grenadiers ascending, he applied the spurs to his horse, and rode to the bottom of the hill upon which the fort stood; upon reaching which he quitted his saddle, and mounted directly to the breach. Finding the troops in possession of the place, he threw himself, with a true military ardour, into the arms of Lieutenant-colonel Moore; the surrounding soldiers, who witnessed the scene, shouting with joy. In the memoir, from whence we have taken this account, the writer very justly observes, that to Lieutenant-colonel Moore this moment was worth years of common life. The same writer (the father of Sir John Moore, the late Dr. Moore), in some observations upon this gal-

lant exploit, so simply marks out the lineaments of the character of his son, that we cannot do better, perhaps, than give them in his own words:—

" It does not fall to the share of many officers, even during a long military career, to conduct an assault, or even to assist in taking a fortress by storm. Such dangerous services seldom occurred formerly, as the garrison generally capitulated immediately after a breach was made. It has been the fate of this young officer (Lieutenant-colonel Moore) to conduct two, and to prevesuccessful in both. All military operations being suspended by the taking of Calvi, the adjutant-general of the forces returned to England, and at the recommendation of Lieutenant-general Stewart, Lieutenant-colonel Moore was appointed to succeed him. General Stewart, however, soon after left the island, to the warm regret, not only of the British troops, by whom his military talents were greatly admired, but also of the native Corsicans, whose affections he had conciliated in a wonderful degree. And no person had more cause to lament his departure than the adjutant-general (Lieutenant-colonel Moore). Highly esteemed by his brother officers, beloved by the soldiers, and enjoying the confidence of the general whom he had succeeded in the military command, he had the misfortune not to please the viceroy. In consequence of a representation from whom, to the surprise of every body, and of none more than the commander of the troops, he was recalled from his situation in Corsica. This seemed the more extraordinary, because, independent of the cool intrepidity, zeal for theservice, and the profession and talents he had so eminently displayed; he is of a modest unassuming character, humane, of scrupulous integrity, incapable of adulation, and more solicitous to deserve than to receive praise. To the Corsicans, who had a high admiration of military talents, and are, perhaps, not such good judges of those as of a politician, this removal seemed peculiarly inexplicable; because they had been witnesses to the successful exertions of the officers, and even unable to comprehend the merit of the person at whose request he was recalled."

The above extract is made from a memoir of the siege of Calvi, by the father of Sir John. How peculiarly gratifying must it have

been to the filial feelings of the son, that the father was thus a spectator of his gallantry!

General Stewart had thus made a compleat conquest of the isle of Corsica. He now began the arrangements of its civil concerns. The general consulta were convoked at Corte, the most central in the whole island; at which the venerable Paoli acted as president. The representatives chosen from the various provinces or districts then voted, with one unanimous voice, that Corsica should be united for ever to the British crown. Sir Gilbert Elliot, now Lord Minto, who had been sent as commissioner to Toulon, and who acted as viceroy, accepted this offer in the name of his Majesty; and a constitution, perhaps but little suitable to the genius of these rude islanders, yet assuredly friendly in no common degree to their national and civil liberties, was immediately tendered. But it was the opinion of General Stewart, that another mode of conduct ought to have been adopted; and, if we are to judge from events, he appears to have estimated the character and situation of those new subjects with the eye of a statesman, as well as that of a soldier. After reviewing the whole of the island, and examining the means of defence, he represented to the English cabinet, that the best mode of proceeding would be to occupy the forts and harbours, and leave the civil government in the hands of the natives: in short, that they should be allowed to retain that independence, in which they had always prided themselves; while even they, on the other hand, would thus avoid a supremacy equally burthensome and expensive. But a different mode was adopted. Incomes were assigned and pensions granted to the chiefs, while it was naturally expected that something should be contributed by this newly emancipated people in return. But they were unacquainted with fiscal regulations; they spurned at the idea of taxation, and content with their flocks, their streams, and their chesnuts, they almost set the acts of the exchequer at defiance. In the mean time, the commander-in-chief left the island, to the great regret of the inhabitants, whose friendship he had obtained. Before his departure, he recommended Lieutenant-colonel Moore, now invested with the rank of adjutant-general, as a proper person to succeed him. This officer also enjoyed the confidence of the

natives, and the esteem of the troops; but he was recalled, as has been said, at the instigation of a person invested with high authority. General Paoli also appears to have given umbrage, as it was found necessary for him to retire, first at Leghorn, and afterwards to England; happy at escaping from the scenes that ensued, and at being exempt from the sorrow and danger of beholding the place of his nativity once more in possession of the French.

The next service of Sir John Moore was in the West Indies. The affairs in that part of the world had assumed a very unpleasing aspect after the return of Sir Charles Grey. The French were exerting themselves to make their fortune abroad, and keep some pace with their brilliant success at home. Accordingly, under the vigour and ability of Victor Hughes they repossessed themselves of Guadaloupe and St. Lucia, effected their landing on the island of Martinique, and hoisted the tri-coloured flag on several forts in the islands of St. Vincent, Grenada, and Marie Galante.

In this state of things, government resolved to send out an expedition, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie.

He accordingly repaired to Southampton on the 30th of August, 1795, and took charge of the troops appointed for this service. Sir Ralph Abercromby was unfortunitely detained in that district so long beyond the expected period of his departure, that after the troops had assembled, and were embarked, the equinox set in, and several transports were lost in endervouring to clear the Channel. Notwithstanding this disaster, and a spite of the season, every exertion was made, and the general, vith his staff, &c. made the best of his way to the West Indies.

On his arrival, no time was lost in feming a plan for the operation of the army; and as soon as the season permitted, the troops moved in every quarter. On the 24th of March, 1796, a detachment, under the orders of Brigadier-general Nichols, composed of the 8th and 63d regiments, with a part of the Buffs, landed on the island of Grenada, attacked Port Royal, and, after an obstinate dispute with the enemy, carried it. Irigadier-general Campbell led the assault with the Buffs and 63d regiments, and this was done in the most determined manner; he soldiers of both regiments rushing into the fort, through the embrasures. Captain

Clary, of the 29th, was the officer who first entered in this manner. The success of this enterprise was immediately followed by the enemy evacuating Pilot-hill.

This advantage was not obtained without some loss. Major Edwards, of the Buffs, was killed, and Lieutenant-colonel Dawson, of the 8th, was severely wounded; several other brave officers were killed and wounded. The general found no difficulty in obtaining possession of the settlements of Demerara and Essequibo, in the province of Surinam, in South America. He dispatched Major-general Whyte with the 39th, 93d, and 99th regiments, on the 15th of April, in the ships which Admiral Sir John Leforey had provided for the purpose; and on the 21st the squadron arrived on the coast of Demerara. The next day the governor and council were summoned to surrender the colony to his Britannic Majesty, which they did upon conditions agreed on. The Major-general, according to the orders he had received, proceeded to take postession of the island of Essequibo, and Lieutenant-colonel Hislop was left commandant of both islands.

The commander-in-chief had made the necessary arrangements with the admiral for conveying the troops destined for an attack upon the island of St. Lucia, when Sir Hugh Christian arrived, upon whom the command of the fleet devolved. This change, however, did not in the least retard the projected design; both commanders were equally will disposed, and of perfect accord. The squadron had sailed from Carlisle bay the 22d April, and anchored on the evening of the 23d in Martin bay, Martinico, the day previous to Sir Hugh Christian taking upon him the command of the naval force. The amament sailed again on the 26th for St. Lucia, and the previous disposition for landing was strictly followed. Major-general Campbell was to disembark with 1,700 men, at Longueville's lay, which he effected with no other opposition than a few shots rom Pigeon island. The centre division of the army disembark d near the village of Choc. When the enemy perceived the headof the first column advancing, they retired to Morne Chabot, on of the strongest mornes on the island, except Morne Fortune and which it was necessary to take before this last could be ompletely invested. But Brigadier-general

Moore and Brigadier-general Hope, attacking it on opposite sides, it was carried after considerable resistance. The next day Brigadier-general Hope occupied Morne Duchasseaux, in the rear of Morne Fortune. Major-general Morshead invested Morne Fortune on the south side. The enemy had a garrison of nearly 2000 well disciplined black troops, some hundred whites, and a number of black people who had taken refuge in the fortress. In carrying the battery of Seche, within a short distance of the works of Morne Fortune, Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm was killed, and the difficulties of approach were found greater than expected, from many circumstances, but especially from the intricate nature of the country. The general was obliged to undertake a laborious communication from Choc bay to that of Morne, by means of a new road, capable of allowing the transportation of heavy cannon. These difficulties, with numerous other impediments which the enemy threw in the way of the army, the general fully overcame. On the 16th of May, a battery of eighteen pieces of ordnance was opened, after the manner of a first parallel; a second and third followed; and on the morning of the 24th, the 27th regiment lodged themselves upon two different points, the nearest of which was not above five hundred yards from the fort. The enemy made a vigorous effort to dislodge them, but the commander had inspired so much ardour into the troops, that they were repulsed with considerable loss. Upon the evening of the 24th, the enemy desired a suspension of arms till noon the next day: it was granted only till eight in the morning. A capitulation for the whole island ensued; and on the 26th, the garrison, to the amount of 2000 men, marched out, laid down their arms, and became prisoners of war. Pidgeon island fell of course into the possession of the British commander. The return of ordnance, ammunition, and stores, captured on the island and its dependency, Pigeon island, as given in by Brigadier-general Lloyd, colonel of artillery, and the officer of engineers, was uncommonly great.

Brigadier-general Moore being left in quiet possession of the captured island, the general hastened the embarkation of the artillery and troops destined to act in St. Vincent's and Grenada; but as the weather was unfavourable, this work took up some days:

the whole was, however, ready to sail on the 3d of June. Vincent's division was ordered to rendezvous at Kingston bay, and that for Grenada at Curaçou, one of the Grenadines. Major-general Nicholls met the commander-in-chief at the latter place, where the operations for Grenada were settled. The next day (the 7th) his excellency returned to St. Vincent's; and on the 8th the troops disembarked. The following day (the 9th) they marched in one column, by the right, as far as Stubbs, about eight miles from Kingston. Each division halted for that evening opposite to their respective points of attack. On the 10th the enemy's flank was turned, and two 12-pounders, two 6-pounders, with two howitzers, were advanced within 600 yards of the enemy's works. These batteries were well served, but the enemy maintained themselves from seven in the morning till two in the afternoon. During this time Major-general Morshead, from the apparent little effect of the artillery toward reducing the redoubt, handsomely offered to carry it by storm; but the general being willing to spare the lives of the troops, and observing that the part of the line which he commanded laboured under disadvantages, deferred the assault till the decline of the day rendered it absolutely necessary. Major-general Hunter's divison on the right, with a part of Lowenstein's corps, and two companies of the 42d regiment, lodged themselves within a short distance of the fort. Soon after the two remaining companies of that regiment and the Buffs, supported by the York rangers, were ordered to advance to the attack. The enemy, unable to withstand the ardour, retired from their first, second, and third redoubts, but rallied round their new Vigie, their principal post. As Brigadier-general Knox had cut off the enemy's communication with the Caribs, and the latter were driven into the country, with the loss of their post, the enemy was within the power of the British assailants. He desired to capitulate, and was allowed to do so.

The number of prisoners was 700. Near 200 of the insurgents escaped with the Caribs into the woods. Lieutenant-colonel Spencer, with 600 men, was immediately detached to Mount Young, and Lieutenant-colonel Gower, with 300 men, to Owia, which he would have reached by sea, but the surf being high and

dangerous, he resolved to make his way through the Carib country.

Thus every part of the valuable island of St. Vincent's was wrest-

ed out of the hands of the aspiring enemy.

The fortunate issue of this business enabled the commander-inchief to visit Grenada, where his presence may be supposed to have contributed, not a little, to effectuate the projected work already in forwardness by the exertions of Major-general Nicholls. But Fedon, the noted chief at the head of the insurgents, was not easily overcome; his native courage and acquired talents, added to a fierceness of disposition, had drawn about him a mass of force, partly voluntarily, partly constrained. Major-general Nicholls was ordered to straiten him in his retreat as much as possible, and to grant him no terms short of unconditional submission.

The troops were successful every where, and nearly at the same hour, on the morning of the 19th of June, being in full possession

of every post on the island.

The general, having thus effected every thing which could have rationally been undertaken against the French, directed his attention to the Spanish island of Trinidad. The arrival of part of a new convoy from England enabled him to undertake this expedition with confidence of success. The precision with which the fleet of ships of war and transports had been assembled prevented a moment from being lost when the season for operation commenced.

On the 16th of February, 1797, the fleet passed through the Bocas, or entrance into the Gulf of Paria, where the Spanish admiral, with four sail of the line, and a frigate, were found at anchor under cover of the island of Gaspar Grande, which was fortified.

The British squadron worked up, and came to an anchor opposite, and nearly within gun-shot of the Spanish ships. The frigates and transports anchored up higher in the bay. The disposition was made for landing at day-light next morning, and for a general attack upon the town and ships of war. At two o'clock in the morning (the 17th), the Spanish squadron was perceived to be on fire; the ships, except one line of battle, were all consumed, and that ship escaped the conflagration, and was taken

possession of by the boats of the British fleet. The enemy at the same time evacuated that quarter of the island.

The general's whole attention was now paid to the town. As soon, therefore, as the troops were landed, about 500 advanced to the westward of it, meeting but little opposition; and before night they were masters of the town of Port d'Espagne, and of the whole neighbourhood, two small forts excepted. The next morning, the governor, Don Chalon, capitulated with the conqueror, and the whole colony passed under the dominion of his Britannic Majesty. All this, strange as it may appear, was obtained at the trifling expense of one officer, the gallant Lieutenant Villeneuve, of the 8th regiment, who acted as Brigade-major to Brigadier-general Hompesch, and who died of his wounds in a few days.

An unsuccessful attempt upon the Spanish island of Porto Rico concluded this campaign of 1797, in the West Indies,

After the reduction of Trinidad, the force destined for this new and last expedition assembled; but waiting for the arrival of Capt, Woolley, of his Majesty's ship the Arethusa, who had been sent to Tortola and St. Thomas's to procure pilots and guides, a delay of some days was occasioned. However, on Monday, the 17th of April, the armament made the island of Porto Rico, and came to an anchor off Congrejos Point. The whole of the north side of the island being bounded by a reef, it was difficult to discover the narrow channel to the eastward of the town, through which the Beaver and Fury sloops, with the lighter vessels, might pass for the landing of the troops. This circumstance gave the Spaniards time for preparation; still the troops were disembarked with no other opposition than from about a hundred of the enemy, who had concealed themselves in the bushes; and they took a position which might be considered strong for their number. The artillery too was carried up without loss of time; but as the Moro Castle commands the passage into the harbour, the enemy was enabled to keep open their communication with the southern and western part of the island, which interfered greatly with the design first formed. The only point, therefore, on which an attack on the town could be made, was on the eastern side, where it was defends

ed by the lines and castle of St. Christopher's, to approach which it was necessary to force a way over the lagoon, or lake, which forms' that side of the island. This passage, however, was powerfully defended by redoubts and gun-boats, and the enemy had destroyed a bridge which connects, in the narrowest channel, the island with the main land. The general, finding the troops which he had with him inadequate to force this passage, and that any act of vigour on their part, or combined operation between the land and sea service, was not likely to avail, determined to withdraw, and re-embark the troops. This was accordingly done on the night of the 30th of April, with the greatest order, without even leaving a sick or wounded soldier behind. If nothing, therefore, was gained to the country by this expedition, no loss of reputation in the military was sustained by its failure. Indeed, the manner in which the officers were received on their return to Europe testified the value in which their military talents had been held.

Major-general Moore returned to Europe at the same time with General Abercrombie; and the latter general, being soon after appointed to the command of the expedition to Holland, Major-general Moore, for he now received this promotion, was selected to accompany him.

The first division, consisting chiefly of the British guards, and forming in the whole an advance force of nearly 12,000 men, under the command of General Abercrombie, sailed from the Downs on the 14th of August, 1799, and effected their landing at the Helder on the 27th of the same month. Sir Ralph Abercrombie gave immediate orders for two brigades, under Major-generals Moore and Burrard, to attack the Helder; but the enemy deemed it prudent to evacuate it as they approached.

The enemy, however, a short time afterwards, Sept. 10th, madea desperate attack on the British cantonments; in the course of which Major-gen. Moore, who commanded on the right, received a slight wound. The result of this commencement was so satisfactory to the British arms, that his Royal Highness the Duke of York now embarked with the second division of the army, and on his arrival at head-quarters (Sept. 15th), immediately assumed the command

of the allied army of English and Russians. The Russian force consisted of 7000 men, under General Hermann; the number of the English was about 25,000.

The allied army, on the following day, Sept. 17th, moved forwards in four columns; but as the country was rough, and every where intersected with hedges and ditches, their progress was necessarily slow. In this manner they advanced toward the position of the enemy, who were posted in front of Alkmaar and Bergen, being between the two armies.

On the 18th, the army marched forwards in order of battle. The Russian troops were distributed between the right wing, and headed the column that was supported by the English and the centre, amongst whom they were intermingled. The right column, commanded by the Russian general Hermann (an old officer of distinguished merit) was stationed in immediate opposition to the ground occupied by the French troops, under General Vandamme; the centre of the Dutch army being under the command of Dumonceau, and their right was commanded by General Daendels. The Duke of York, with the hereditary prince of Orange, was at the head of the columns which formed the centre and the left wing of his army.

On the preceding day, the 17th, his royal highness had detached a body, consisting of 7000 men, under the command of General Abercrombie, to take a circuitous march, and thereby obtain possession of Hoorn; and at the same time to get behind the right of the Dutch, with a view of surrounding it, at the moment when the Russians, by a vigorous attack, should have routed the left wing of the French. General Abercrombie accordingly reached Hoorn on the 18th, and was allowed to take possession of it without opposition.

The following day, the 19th of September, the army also again moved forwards towards the enemy, who waited in their position to receive them. The left of the enemy, consisting of French troops, was under the command of General Vandamme; the centre under the command of Dumonceau, and the right under that of General Daendels.

At five o'clock in the morning, with the dawn of the day, the whole line became briskly engaged. General Hermann, at the head of a

considerable body of Russians, followed by a division of English troops, drove in the out-posts belonging to the French, which had been stationed at Hamp and Groot. Having succeeded in this attempt, he pushed forward in order to surround the division commanded by General Vandamme. The latter, being deprived of all assistance from the left, was obliged to fall back. The Russians took possession of Schoort-demm, and soon after they entered Bergen, belonging to the Prince of Nassau; which is a considerable village, surrounded by a quantity of fine wood. Hither the French retired, or rather concentrated their forces, after having given way to the furious attack that was made upon them by General Hermann, who was within half a league of Alkmaar. It was then that the rear of General Brune's line of battle found itself already pressed by the Russians, whilst its front was attacked by a strong division of British forces, to which some Russians were attached.

Thus situated, General Brune, by means of a bridge of communication, which he had erected some days before over the canal which leads to Zyp, ordered the rear guard of General Dumonceau's division to march towards Bergen; at the same time directing the division under General Daendels to join the centre, which had been considerably weakened by this disposition. The Russian column, which had been pushed too forward, soon found itself attacked on both flanks by Vandamme's division, and a detachment from General Dumouceau, and was thus suddenly cut off from all communication with the centre of the English.

General Vandamme, having completely surrounded the village of Bergen, by advancing his left wing from the side of the sand-hills, and his right from that which led to Alkmaar, ordered his whole line to charge. Bergen was retaken by this bold manœuvre. Every inch of ground was, however, obstinately disputed by the Russians, who fought the more desperately, because they were in momentary expectation of being succoured by the English. They continued in action, though broken and dispersed, and defended themselves in the church and houses of the village, until the whole column was either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. The French general Govion gave signal proofs of courage and ability

on this occasion. The retreat was cut off at that strongest point of the Russian column which was under the immediate command of General Hermann, and which was thereby almost entirely destroyed, and lost all its artillery. General Hermann himself was taken prisoner, and General Essen, who was second in command, received a dangerous wound.

General Dumonceau, who had likewise been wounded at the commencement of the action, either maintained his first position, or gained the ground that had been lost during the engagement. His division, however, suffered considerably; having to sustain the whole force of the centre of the British army, and to prevent it from joining its right.

On the other hand, General Daendels's division, which had taken up its ground at Oud Karspel, and formed, as we have already remarked, the right of the Dutch army, was attacked by the British with as much boldness and intrepidity, as the left had been by the Russians. After having stood the repeated assaults of the enemy until two o'clock, the whole of it was obliged to give way; losing a considerable number of men, and several pieces of artillery. This division, however, which had been greatly diminished in effective force by a detachment sent to the relief of the centre, and whose ranks had been broken by the blowing up of an ammunition waggon, recovered from its disorder, and took an active part in the battle towards the close of the day. General Daendels made a vigorous attack against Brock, which he retook, together with all the batteries that had fallen into the hands of the British, when they forced his position at Oud Karspel.

Finding that a very serious impression had been thus made upon the right wing, the Duke of York was necessarily obliged to draw in the left, which had been too far extended. General Abercrombie received orders to evacute Hoorn in the night of the 20th; and the whole allied army retired behind their entreuchments at Zyp. General Brune took possession of all the different positions which he had occupied before the engagement.

Major-general Moore was wounded in this action: the whole failure of which was, doubtless, imputable to the Russiaus, who, in taking possession of Bergen, and afterwards quitting it in such

confusion, conducted themselves with more courage than with skill and discipline.

From the 19th of Sept. until the 1st of October following, nothing of any moment occurred between the two armies. On the 2d of October the Duke of York gave orders that a general attack should be made with the whole of his forces.

On the morning of the 2d of October, by half past six o'clock, the column, under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Ralph. Abercrombie, composed of 13 battalions, 8 squadrons and a half of cavalry, and one half troop of horse artillery, with some field-pieces, formed on the dyke and beach, which connect the sand hills of Petten to those of Camperdown. The infantry stood in column of companies; the artillery on their right, and the cavalry on the right of the whole in column of troops.

At seven o'clock, General Coote's, General Hutchinson's, Colornel Macdonald's, and General Moore's brigades moved. The first, turned at Camper, immediately to the left, and proceeded on the road to Schoreldam. The second moved on the ridge of the sand hills which commanded that road. The third entered and marched in the centre of the sand hills, inclining to the left.

General Moore's brigade formed the more immediate advanced guard to the column, by penetrating into the sand hills directly, and keeping continually his right flank on the hills, which rose from the beach. The French, although in possession of Camperdown hill, which is an elevation of upwards of 300 feet, did not make any resistance to this first movement of the army. They merely fired a signal gun, and retired skirmishing. When the advanced brigades had got possession of the entrance into the sand hills, the main column proceeded forward in the same order; but it was occasionally obliged, after the termination of the dyke, to reduce its front, according to the space of the beach, which became very narrow, on account of the tide not having subsided. The right flank of the cavalry was continually in the water. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, the column proceeded without interruption the first six or seven miles. The troops, however, were much harassed and fatigued, in consequence of the heaviness of

the soil, which yielded every step up to the soldier's ancle. But the French here having lined some high sand hills with a body of tiralleurs or riflemen, began to keep up a very smart fire upon the British. In a short time, they were considerably reinforced, and they galled our troops from almost every eminence and outlet of a multiplicity of surrounding sand hills. In spite of the tediousness of the march, and this formidable resistance, our forces advanced with that ardour and perseverance which so peculiarly distinguish British soldiers. Though perfectly unacquainted with the system of sharp-shooting, (and it is impossible to lament the want of that species of warfare in our army) though galled on all sides by offensive weapons that did their mischief, partly unseen, and always at a distance; though momentarily deprived of the encouraging presence of numbers of their officers by the wounds they received; and although they themselves were neither equipped for light service, nor had the advantage of an advanced body for that purpose; notwithstanding this combination of unfavourable circumstances, our brave countrymen persevered and fought their way forward for four miles. We should be unjust, were we to omit, on this occasion, the honourable testimony which has been given from every quarter, of the personal courage and good example of their leaders.

To form an idea of the sand hills, the reader must conceive in his mind the unequal billows of a tempestuous short sea. A very loose light sand forms the soil and hills by frequently running in parallel lines, afforded most excellent positions to the enemy. It was a country, of all others, the most favourable to the French system of making war, and gave them decided advantages over an invading enemy. If we except their grenadiers, the troops employed in this service were under the size of our rear rank battalion men. Our system, on the contrary, and indeed our favourite weapon, were of little use. The movement of solid lines, and the imposing aspect of a charge of bayonets, could not be injurious to troops, who were scattered over an immense surface, frequently acting in small detached bodies that alternately occupied and abandoned unequal eminences, and almost always protected by the long and mischievous shots of dispersed and lurking riflemen. The princi-

ple, indeed, of the latter was only to fire, hide, or run, as self-preservation, assisted by skill and experience, dictated.

General Moore's brigade having suffered prodigiously, both in men and officers, regiments from the main column were continually thrown into the hills; which measure became the more indispensable, as the forces of the enemy hourly increased upon us. Only the 92d regiment and some of the guards remained with the cavalry and artillery on the beach. The French, taking advantage of a very strong post, which commanded the hills in advance, and consequently overlooked the beach, kept up a very galling fire. Two guns, brought from Egmont-op-Zee, were advantageously planted; and not only cannonaded the column on the beach, but particularly annoyed the cavalry likewise: the latter suffered considerably through the scattered fire which was kept up from the sand hills. A strong body of the French also appeared on the heights above Bergen. This was a most critical moment. The British on the sand hills were exhausted by fatigue, want of water, and were every minute weakened by the loss of men. In vain did they attempt to storm the enemy's position; they were beaten back. Notwithstanding these disheartening circumstances, their innate intrepidity seemed to rise in proportion as the resistance they met became formidable and destructive. They repeated the attack with unabated fury; and although their ranks were thinned by the incessant fire which was kept up by the French, no symptoms of fear or disorder appeared amongst them. The 79th regiment had nearly lost all its men, without the least impression appearing to have been made by their bold and unprecedented valour. Things being reduced to this very critical juncture, the remainder of the column was at last ordered to charge. The whole instantly pushed forward against the post, which formed towards the beach an amphitheatre of hills, the tops of which were defended by a very considerable body of the enemy. Our troops rushed through a most tremendous fire of musquetry, gained possession of the heights, and drove the enemy to a considerable distance. By this time, the brigade, under the command of Colonel Macdonald, had arrived, and became instantly engaged on the left. About half past four o'clock the enemy gave way, and retired on all sides; but as Ber-

gen was not taken, and the British were considerably advanced, Sir Ralph Abercrombie determined to take up his position for the night, and not push forward to Egmont-op-Zee till the day following. Orders were consequently given to this effect; but the firing did not cease entirely until near five o'clock.

Our guns had necessarily been advanced to check the French artillery, and two troops of the 15th regiment of light dragoons were detached to guard the cannon. Lord Paget, who commanded the cavalry, ordered them to remain concealed in the first gap of the sand hills, with the view of taking the enemy by surprise, should any attempt be made to take possession of our guns. Vandamme, the French general, having received intelligence respecting the retreat of his infantry, and imagining that our artillery was unprotected, determined to take them, and to retrieve the day, by getting in the rear of our right. Five hundred of the French cavalry were ordered to charge our cannon; they were then at the distance of about half a mile. The guns fired, but without effect, and the enemy soon reached their station, and got possession of the pieces. Whilst they were actually engaged with the artillery men, and cutting them down, the two troops of the 15th arrived; they dashed into the thickest of the enemy and drove them from the guns. The French did not attempt to resist this manœuvre, but fled in all directions.

The cavalry, having thus effectually secured their object, desisted from the pursuit, and returned to the artillery to prevent their being cut off. Recovered, however, from the first shock, the French rallied at last, and advanced again, ashamed of being defeated by such a handful of men. They had arrived within forty yards of the 15th, when the third troop of that regiment, which had been ordered to advance, came up, charged the French, and drove them half a mile. The whole of the British cavalry had now reached the scene of action; but it was too dark to attempt any thing further. When the last charge was made, it was near six o'clock in the evening.

The British cavalry remained all night on the beach; forming a line with the infantry on the sand hills. Neither horses nor men could get any water. When day broke, it was expected the column would move forwards. The troops, however, were so worn out:

from the want food, that it was determined not to advance till they had been refreshed. But the road was so bad, that neither the bread, nor the waggons for the wounded, could arrive before four o'clock in the afternoon. An order had just been issued for the regiments to send for their rations, when a report was made that the French were retiring from Egmont-op-Zee. Not a moment was to be lost. The troops were ordered to arms. They instantly marched forwards without expressing a murmur, leaving their provisions on the beach. The French, however, had retired two hours, and Egmont-op-Zee was consequently abandoned, and not one Frenchman was overtaken in a pursuit of three miles. After the posts in front had been occupied, the infantry went into cantonments, consisting of barns and huts. The cavalry lay again all night on the beach, and were again without water. Altogether, the horses were fifty hours without hay or drink, -some, indeed, were sixty. The whole army suffered as much as human nature could support.

The English entered Alkmaar on the 3d of October, and pushed their advanced posts forward, so as to stand in a parallel direction with those of the Gallo-Batavian army. General Brune, having sent a part of his baggage to Haerlem, took immediate steps to strengthen and secure himself in this advantageous position. He likewise received considerable reinforcements of French troops on the 3d and 4th.

During the whole of the 4th and 5th, the two armies rested on their arms. But on the 6th, in the morning, a general order was given by the Duke of York, to make an attack upon the entire front of the enemy's line. If he had good ground to expect, that by a sudden and vigorous impression this solid position of the enemy might be forced, he was certainly right in using every effort to prevent General Brune from securing himself where he lay. For, in proportion as the right of the Gallo-Batavian army was rendered unassailable by the inundations, it became essentially necessary to drive the body of the enemy that was entrenching itself at Beverwick, beyond Haerlem.

In the beginning of this second and important attack, the Anglo-Russians made several successful impressions against the enemy,

They took possession of Ackerslot, and advanced to Castricum. But the action becoming general, the fortune of the day suddenly changed. Whilst his troops were engaging the British, and pushing forward in their turn, General Brune availed himself of a favourable opening to advance at the head of his cavalry: he broke the Anglo-Russian line, and prevented them from rallying, so as to maintain the ground they had lately occupied. They were driven beyond Bakkum, after having sustained a considerable loss. It is evident, that the success of the day was entirely owing to the spirited charge which General Brune made with his cavalry. He had two horses shot under him.

The engagement lasted till night, when the Gallo-Batavian army returned to its original position at Beverwick. The issue of this second battle (which appeared by no means decisive, although it had cost much bloodshed on both sides) was certainly in favour of the Dutch. To have rendered abortive a well meditated and a desperate attack, on the success of which depended not only the means of accomplishing a most arduous enterprise, but from which the army itself was to be subsisted (as no provisions could be procured in the country it occupied, but every thing was to be received from the shipping), was in fact to have conquered and obtained the object of resistance.

Those military men who have not thought it beneath their talents to reflect upon the important and difficult details which constitute the feeding of a large army, that must be daily supplied; who have experienced the wonderful resources which are required on this occasion, and have felt how much the foresight of a general is called for, will find a memorable instance in this expedition, and a serious lesson to peruse. They will be enabled to judge properly of the motives which induced the Duke of York to call a council of war; whose unanimous opinion (to use the expression of this prince in his official report) was, that the army could not maintain itself any longer in this advanced position; that it must retire behind the Zyp, and wait for further instructions from his Britannic Majesty.

Although the Anglo-Russian army, in its new position, did not lie above six or seven leagues from the original point of debarka-

tion, its line of communication, and its conveyance of stores, &c, were rendered impracticable by the continual rains that had fallen, the breaking up of the roads, and the overflowing of the dykes and smaller canals.

The immediate evacuation of North Holland became apparent, and the ultimate determination of the British cabinet was hourly looked for. It was impossible to alter the plan of operations, nor could any effectual or powerful diversion be attempted, without endangering the main body of the army; the season was, moreover, too far advanced, and, on account of the dangerous navigation along the shores of the Texel, it was deemed highly imprudent to lengthen the distribution of the necessary convoys. The enormous sacrifices, in a word, which it would be necessary to make in the prosecution of this enterprise, could not be repaid by the most fortunate issue that might be looked for.

After the action of the 6th. General Brune readily perceived a disposition in the movements of the Duke of York to retreat towards his original position. On the 3th, the left and centre divisions of the Gallo-Batavian army entered Alkmaar, and retook all the positions which they had occupied before the 2d of October. Their right, commanded by General Daendels, advanced to Hoorn, which place it entered on the 9th.

The Anglo-Russians successively evacuated Enkhuisen and Medemblick, after having either totally destroyed, or greatly damaged, the timber and dock-yards, some ships belonging to the East India company, and almost all the public stores. Although the British retreated in good order, the Duke of York was obliged to leave his wounded behind, from a want of the proper means to convey them off the ground.

Whilst the Anglo-Russians were collecting their forces and entrenching themselves behind the Zyp, the division under General Daendels pressed upon their left, attacked their rear-guards, and took possession of the different posts which they were obliged to abandon on account of their vast extent of line. Among these were Oponeer, Erswarde and Winkel.

On the 11th Oct. the division of Gen. Dumonceau re-established

a line of communication with the column under Daendels, by taking possession of the villages of Dirkshoorn and Harinkarspeel. The latter advanced as far as Luthwinkel, and posted itself at the sluice of Zeedyk, where the British had already cut upwards of 19 feet for the purpose of inundating the country; a measure of defence that was certainly both formidable and destructive.

On the 12th and 13th the Gallo-Bavatian army occupied the ground that was nearest to the Zyp. The right was before Petten; the centre at Warmenhuyzen and Dirkshoorn; and the right in front of Winkel.

The Duke of York, under these relative circumstances of the two armies, sent a flag of truce to General Brune, and proposed a species of capitulation on the basis of an armistice, and upon conditions that his troops should be allowed to re-embark without molestation. General Knox on the side of the British, and Rosatollant, general of brigade and chief of the Gallo-Batavian staff, were separately entrusted with powers to negociate and settle the terms of capitulation; which was concluded at Alkmaar on the 18th of October 1799.

The principal clauses in this memorable capitulation consisted of the following articles: that hostilities should be suspended; that all means of attack and defence should be dropped; that the allied army should successively re-embark and leave the Dutch territory by the 1st of November; that the works which had been destroyed at the Helder should be restored; that the fortifications and entrenchments executed by the Anglo-Russians should remain; that 8000 prisoners, belonging to the two republics, French and Dutch, should be given up.

The next service of General Moore was in the expedition against Egypt. A brighter star summoned Buonaparte to the hope of the imperial throne of France. Having achieved, therefore, in great part, the conquest of Egypt, he obeyed the invitation of his fortune; and leaving his army under the command of General Kleber, he returned to France. Kleber, for a time, maintained the thread of success unbroken, but was at length assassinated by the hands of a fanatic. This event threw the French army into some confusion;

and the English government deemed it a suitable opportunity to make an attempt to recover a country, the possession of which by the French was thought to endanger our settlements in the east.

A very respectable force, under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, was already in the Mediterranean. At the suggestion of Lord Melville (to whom we wish the public to do justice), General Abercrombie was ordered to prepare for this expedition. The General accordingly embarked his forces on board the fleet and transports under Lord Keith, which proceeded immediately for the bay of Marmorice, where the troops were landed and refreshed.

In the mean time, the English government had spared no efforts. to animate the Turks to a co-operation in a cause so peculiarly their own. The Turks, however, were not so easily awakened from their indolence. The Grand Vizier and Captain Pacha had indeed been ordered to assemble a powerful fleet and army, but there was, as yet, no appearance of their obedience. Day after day our fleet and forces were laying at Marmorice in vain expectation of the arrival of their allies. To investigate the cause of this backwardness, it became necessary to detach an officer of rank, and Major-general Moore was accordingly chosen for that purpose. On his arrival at the Vizier's camp, at Joppa, he found all the doubts, that had been hitherto entertained, but too amply verified. He there beheld an army, if it may be so denominated, chiefly composed of Asiatics, raised according to the barbarous principles of the feudal system, equally destitute of discipline and subordination. Afraid to muster his troops lest a mutiny should ensue, equally exposed to the ravages of the plague, the musketry of his own followers, and the intrigues of the seraglio, during his absence, his highness could afford nothing but expectation, while as little reliance was to be placed on the naval succours to be afforded by the Captain Pacha.

At length, on the 20th of February, 1801, the British fleet sailed with an army of between 15 and 16,000; but whose effective force was said not to have exceeded 12,000. According to Sir Robert Wilson, the forces were not so well supplied as might have been wished. The greatest inconvenience, however, was the total want of all information with respect to the coast. Not a map

existed which could be of any service either to the ships or to the commander-in-chief. Sir Sidney Smith was the only officer who had any local knowledge of the shore. There was no one, however, who had been in the interior of the country.

The only report of any use was that of Captain Boyle, who having been sent to reconnoitre the disposition of the enemy, had certainly performed this difficult duty with much address; but his intelligence, as may, indeed, be supposed, was very deficient in all material points.

Under these circumstances, so compleat was the want of intelligence on the part of General Abercrombie, that he knew not whether the amount of the enemy, which he was preparing to attack, consisted of 15 or 30,000 men.

At length, March the 7th, 1801, the squadron of men of war and transports, amounting to two hundred sail, arrived in Aboukir bay, and anchored near the spot were Lord Nelson had fought the battle of the Nile. The first division of the army, amounting to near six thousand men, having embarked in the boats, a rocket was fired at three o'clock in the morning, as a signal to proceed to the place of rendezvous; and at nine they advanced towards the beach, steering directly towards that part of the shore, where the enemy appeared most formidable.

The French occupied an admirable military position, consisting of a steep sand hill, receding toward the centre, in form of an amphitheatre; which, together with the castle of Aboukir, poured down a most terrible and continued discharge of shot, shell, and grape, so as to furrow up the waves on all sides of the approaching flotilla. Notwithstanding this, Major-general Moore, having leaped on shore with the reserve, the 23d regiment, and the four flank companies of the 40th, belonging to his brigade, rushed up the eminence, and charged with fixed bayonets. The effect produced by this gallant movement was such as might have been expected. Another body of troops was thus enabled to get on shore; and the enemy, instead of fighting with their usual obstinacy, retreated to Alexandria, while the invaders encamped with their right to the sea, and their left to the lake Maudie.

During the action of the 13th of March, the reserve, under

Major-general Moore, was kept in columns for a considerable time, with a view to assail one of the flanks of the enemy, and thus finish the campaign by a signal victory; but after some hesitation it was deemed prudent to encamp with the right to the sea, and the left to the canal of Alexandria.

The conduct of General Moore, on this occasion, was mentioned with great distinction by the commander-in-chief. It was a part of the character of the lamented Abercrombie to do ample justice to all the officers employed under him; and no officer is so frequently and so warmly mentioned in his dispatches as Sir John Moore. The justice of the general seems, in these respects, to have been invigorated by the feelings of the friend. General Abercrombie received the reward of this generosity of feeling, for no commander was ever better served.

In the memorable battle of the 21st of March, Major-general Moore led on the reserve with his usual gallantry, and was again wounded at the head of his men. It was amongst the last acts of General Abercrombie to instruct Major-general Hutchinson to testify his acknowledgments to Major-general Moore. In the general order issued on the 24th of March, the name of General Moore is united to the mention of the 28th and 42d regiments; two regiments, whose noble conduct on that illustrious day have not only immortalised their own name, but added new lustre to their country.

Major-general Moore continued to be actively employed during the remainder of the Egyptian campaign. He was employed at the siege of Cairo; and designated, after its surrender, to escort the French troops to the place of embarkation.

Nothing now remaining but the capture of Alexandria to complete the entire conquest of Egypt, this was at length attempted by General Hutchinson; and while Major-general Coote invested the strong castle of Marabout, two other attacks were made by Generals Moore and Craddock.

The enemy being now briskly pressed on all sides, and despairing of any assistance on the part of Admiral Gantheaume, consented to a negotiation; and Alexandria having surrendered, August the 30th, 1801, possession was taken of the entrenched samp,

and the heights above Pompey's pillar, together with Fort Triangular. Soon after which the French were sent home, and the English remained the undoubted masters of Egypt.

The mention which Lord Hutchinson made of Major-general Moore, in his dispatches on this occasion, were equally honourable to his Lordship, and to the memory of Sir John.

"Major-general Craddock," says General Hutchinson, "having been confined at Cairo by illness, I intrusted the command of the troops to Major-general Moore; who, during a long march of a very severe and critical nature, displayed much judgment, and conducted himself in a most able and judicious manner. Not-withstanding the mixture of Turks, British, and French, the utmost regularity was preserved, and no one disagreeable circumstance even took place." And again, in a following dispatch, dated a few days afterwards, Lieutenant-general Hutchinson thus expresses himself: "Two attacks were made on the east part of the town (Alexandria), in order to get possession of some heights in front of the entrenched position of the enemy. I intrusted the conduct of the attack against the right to Major-general Moore; he perfectly executed my intentions, and performed the service committed to his care with much precision and ability.

Upon the return of General Moore and the Egyptian army to England, the Duke of York, as commander-in-chief, issued a general order of peculiar energy, in which he particularised, with the most honourable distinction, the services of Sir John Moore, of the reserve. This general order, indeed, is so peculiarly valuable, that even our feelings induce us to give it:—

"GENERAL ORDER.

- "His royal highness the commander-in-chief has received his Majesty's instructions, &c.
- "His royal highness cannot omit this occasion of recapitulating the leading features of a series of operations so honourable to the British arms.
- "The boldness of the approach (says his royal highness), in defiance of a powerful and well-directed artillery; the orderly formation upon the beach, under the heaviest fire of grape and musketry; the reception and repulse of the enemy's cavalry and in-

fantry; the subsequent charge of our troops, which decided the victory, and established a footing on the shores of Egypt, are circumstances of glory never surpassed in the military annals of the world.

"Upon the 21st of March the united force of the French in Egypt attacked the position of the British army. An attack begun an hour before day-light could derive no advantage over the vigilance of an army ever ready to receive it. The enemy's most vigorous and repeated efforts were directed against the right and centre. Our infantry fought in the plain, greatly inferior in the number of their artillery, and unaided by cavalry. They relied upon their discipline and courage. The desperate attacks of a veteran cavalry, joined to those of a numerous infantry, which had vainly stiled itself invincible, were every where repulsed: and a conflict the most severe terminated in one of the most signal victories which ever adorned the annals of the British nation."

The next public service of Sir John Moore was the conducting of an auxiliary force to the assistance of Sweden. It may very easily be imagined, why a writer of suitable feeling should feel some reluctance, even in the mention of this subject. The unfortunate Gustavus possessed a courage and ardour somewhat above his means. Sweden was no longer the same kingdom as under Gustavus Adolphus.

This army, consisting of about ten thousand men, under the command of Sir John Moore, reached Gottenburg, in May 1808. To the astonisment of the general they were not allowed to land. Sir John hastened to Stockholm to inquire into the cause of this delay. To his further astonisment he was informed, by the Swedish ministry, that it was the intention of his Majesty to lead his forces to the conquest of the island of Zealand, and that his Majesty expected the co-operation of the British forces in that attempt. It was in vain that Sir John Moore reminded the ministers, that the island of Zealand, besides containing several strong fortresses, was filled with a far superior regular force to any that could be assembled; and also that the island of Funen was full of French and Spanish troops, which could not be hindered from crossing over in small bodies. The only answer was, that it

was the King's wish and purpose. The extravagant absurdity, however, at length induced his Majesty to lay it aside; but it was only on condition that the British should make a landing in Russian Finland, and endeavour to make a conquest of it. Sir John, however, deemed it his duty again to remonstrate. The King issued a most extraordinary order for his arrest, which Sir John had the good fortune to elude, and bring back his army to England.

We now arrive at that period of the life of Sir John Moore, in which he was seen on a stage worthy of his talents.

Immediately upon his return from Sweden, he was sent with a body of troops, as third in command, to Portugal. This army did not arrive till after the battle of Vimiera, and the convention of Cintra. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Hugh Dalrymple, and Sir Harry Burrard, were all called to England in consequence of this business, and the command-in-chief consequently remained with Sir John Moore. Government had now resolved to send an expedition into Spain; and the command of it, by dispatches received October the 6th, 1808, was conferred upon Sir John Moore. The substance of these dispatches was, that the total of the army to be sent upon this purpose should amount to 30,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry; that Sir David Baird, with 15,000 men, was ordered to Corunna, where he was to await the orders of Sir John Moore; that Sir John was to send the cavalry by land, but that it was left to his discretion to move the infantry and artillery either by sea or land. The hard bedome tools mich sid to he

Sir John no sooner received these orders than he applied himself with his usual zeal and assiduity to its due execution. The service from its very commencement had great difficulties. The first question was, whether the infantry and artillery, according to the discretion given to Sir John Moore, should move by sea or land. This was immediately determined in favour of the former. The means of equipment at Corunna were scarcely adequate to the necessities of Sir David Baird. Sir John Moore, moreover, in common with all military commanders, had a decided aversion to a sea conveyance. It was decided, therefore, that the army should move by land. The next question was as to its divisions and rout, whether they should proceed in a northerly direction through Portugal to

Almeida, or should take the great eastern road to Elvas, and thence murch to Estremadura. It was immediately found that neither of these roads could subsist the whole of the army, and more particularly that cannon could not be transported over the mountains, which form the northern boundary between Spain and Portugal. The result, therefore, was that it was, necessary to divide the army.

These resolutions being taken, the army was distributed into four divisions: Lieutenant-general Hope, with five brigades of artillery and four regiments of infantry, was ordered to accompany the cavalry, and directed to march by Elvas, on the Madrid road, to Badajoz and Espina, and thence to Salamanca. Major-general Paget, with two brigades, was ordered to move by the same road as far as Elvas, and thence northerly to Alcantara, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca; Major-general Beresford, with two brigades, was to move by Coimbra and Almeida; and General Fraser, with three brigades, by Abrantes and Almeida.

The army, accordingly, immediately moved off by these routs; and by the 27th of October was all clear of Lisbon. Whilst the army is on its march, we shall throw a cursory view over the affairs of Spain, and the general state of things, which awaited Sir John Moore on his arrival at Salamanca.

The French general Dupont had been defeated in the beginning of the summer. The French in consequence withdrew from Madrid, and repassed the Ebro. Their force in this quarter consisted of about 45,000 men, concentrated in Navarre and Biseay; their right at Bilboa, and their left at Aybar. It may somewhat illustrate this position to add, that Spain, from north to south, is crossed by six rivers; the courses of all of which are nearly from due east to due west. The first of their rivers, supposing a traveller to be coming from Bayonne, along the French and Spanish great road to Madrid, is the Ebro. The next, about eighty miles distant, and nearly parallel, is the Deuro. The third, about the same distance, is the Tagus; on a branch of which, the Manzanares, is situated the city of Madrid. Supposing the traveller to continue the same course, viz. from the north to the south of Spain, the next river is the Guadiana, and about ninety miles distant is the Guadalquivir. The Freuch army, therefore, on the defeat of Du-

pont, had withdrawn behind the Ebro, as above stated, and taken a station in Navarre and Biscay, the provinces immediately adjoining to France.

The French in Spain at this period were 45,000 strong, and were daily receiving reinforcements. To oppose this force there were two Spanish armies; the one under Castanos, hanging on the left flank of the French at Aybar; the other under Blake in Leon. Nothing could be more wretchedly equipped than both of these armies. They were totally destitute of every thing; and together with the slowness, imbecility, and false confidence of the Junta, gave very bad hopes of any fortunate issue. If, indeed, the Spanish armies were so incapable of encountering the remains of the French, what was to be expected of them, when the successive reinforcements from France should again bring a formidable army into the field. General Blake's army in Leon, called the army of the left, from its position with respect to Madrid, did not exceed 18,000 men; and the army under Castanos, consisting of the united armies of the centre and right, did not exceed 40,000. In a council of war, composed of the principal Spanish generals, which was held at Tudela, on the 5th of November, it was given, as the unanimous opinion, "That though the army of the left, under General Blake, was in a state of extreme peril, it was yet impossible to send it any assistance from the army of the centre; the latter being destitute of all necessary means."

Such was the state of Spain at this period. No effective army whatever, and a government hoping every thing and doing nothing; deceiving themselves, and deluding the people; exaggerating every petty skirmish of outposts into a complete victory; and most absurdly imagining that the French did not attack them, because they had given up the cause as hopeless. So complete, indeed, was this self-deception, that it had even been a matter of doubt with the Junta, whether they should accept an English army or not. Accordingly, the first application was for arms and money; and it was only the more temperate wisdom of Count Florida Blanca which induced them, at length, to accept of it. Such was the state of things which awaited Sir John on his arrival in Spain.

Sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca with his advanced guard

on the 13th of November; and the first piece of intelligence, which he here received, was that of the destruction of a Spanish corps of 12,000 men, under the Count Belvidere, who had absurdly advanced to Burgos, an open town in front of the French army. The French had immediately followed him, attacked him with a superior force, and completely routed him.

There were two important points in this intelligence. In the first place, that the French were at Burgos, 120 English miles to the north of Salamanca, and about 40 miles from the east of the line of march, by which Sir David Baird was advancing from Coruuna to the point of junction at Salamanca. The second point was the kind of stuff of which our allies were made.

Half-way between Salamanca and Burgos was the strong town of Valladolid, being only 70 English miles from Salamanca. Two days after the intelligence of the capture of Burgos, that is, on the night of the 15th, Sir John, in the night, was awakened by an express from General Pignatelli, the governor of the province, to inform him that the French army had advanced, and taken possession of the city of Valladolid.

Such was the situation of Sir John Moore on his first arrival at Salamanca. The French within 60 miles of him, and not more than 2000 of his own force, and not a single gun, as yet come up with him; the Spanish armies having scarcely sufficient strength to keep themselves together.

It did not add a little to the inauspicious features of this state of affairs, that the people, and even the magistracy of Salamanca and its neighbourhood, seemed, at once, ignorant and indifferent to all occurrences. The capture of Valladolid, though only so short a distance, was first communicated to them by Sir John Moore, and they received the intelligence as a matter of no importance whatever. This apathy, however, did not arise from any disaffection to the cause. It was imputable only to the government. The people, from former habits, threw themselves entirely upon their governors. And from some cause or other, let the truth be spoken, all the former magnanimity of the Spanish nobility is gone. Those who have been at the court of Madrid will confirm this assertion; they are dwarfish both in lody and mind. The

best of them, at this period, seemed to sleep; some of the others were caballing amongst themselves upon points totally unconnected with the defence of the country; and others, to make use of a colloquial expression, seemed half and half between patriotism and a compromise with the enemy. The latter party, indeed, were more numerous than any, and ultimately proved fatal to Spain.

Sir John Moore, upon receiving this intelligence of the capture of Valladolid, assembled the Junta of Salamanca, and informed them of the event; adding, that he might, perhaps, find it necessary to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo. The Junta received this intimation with great indifference. General Moore then sent orders to General Baird, who had reached Corunna on the 13th of October, and after experiencing great delay from the apathy of the people, and the imbecility of the Junta, had advanced on his march, to hasten with all speed to Salamanca, but to be particularly on his guard.

On November the 16th, another very unpleasant piece of intelligence was received,—the defeat of General Blake. Two armies had thus been destroyed since the arrival of Sir John at Salamanca; that is, the Estremaduran army at Burgos, and Blake's army in Leon. The French force was thus completely between the Spanish armies and Sir John Moore; the Spanish army being drawn backwards upon St. Ander, and the French advanced to within forty miles of Sir John Moore, and twenty miles of the flank of the line of march by which Sir David was moving from Corunna to Salamanca. Corunna is about 250 miles to the north-east of Salamanca. Astorga is about half way between them; the neighbourhood of which Sir David had reached at this date. The French outposts were at Majorga, about 20 miles on his flank.

One more Spanish army still remained, that of Castanos, called the army of the centre and right. Let us see what was the state of this. It was posted, at this period, in the neighbourhood of Tudela, but on the opposite or north side of the Ebro, about three hundred miles to the north-east of Salamanca. The relative situation of Sir John Moore, upon his arrival at Salamanca, with respect to the Spanish armies, was very extraordinary; he was at the vertex of a triangle; the base of which, at the distance of between 250 and 300 miles, was the position of the French; the

points at the extremities of the base, that is, the French flanks, were the positions of the Spanish armies. That of Blake had been routed, as has been above mentioned. On the 21st of November the French advanced on Castanos, and he deemed it prudent to withdraw the same night to Tudela. The French followed him. Immediately behind Tudela is a small ridge of hills, which the commissioner sent by the Junta and the captain-general of Arragon deemed a good position. Castanos was of an opinion totally opposite. The commissioner and the captain-general, however, insisted. The result was, that Castanos was compelled to give battle. He accordingly made the best possible disposition of his army; drawing up his main body, as a centre, behind the ridge, out of sight of the enemy, and advanced his two flanks on some hills near the town. In this position he awaited the attack.

The enemy did not suffer him to await it long. They immediately fell upon the advanced flanks, and Castanos supported them from his centre in reserve. The French were pushed back on the left. The left thought that every thing was now concluded; but the French, according to their custom, made a rally, and again rushed on the left, and drove all before them. The Spaniards were not a kind of troops who could imitate the French in a similar rallying; accordingly, being once broken, they fled in confusion, and hastened, as so many individuals, to their several homes.

Such, therefore, was the general situation in which Sir John Moore found himself, on the 24th of November, 1808; at which time the three divisions of infantry, which had marched under Generals Fraser, Paget, and Beresford, had all joined him at Salamanca. Sir David was somewhat advanced beyond Astorga, and Lieutenant-general Hope was nearly at the same distance from him (about 100 miles), in the vicinity of Madrid.

In this state of things, Sir John deemed it necessary, on the 28th of November (the day on which he received intelligence of Castanos's defeat), to send immediate orders to Sir David Baird and Lieutenant-general Hope. The substance of these orders was, that as the three Spanish armies were all destroyed, as the French in Spain exceeded 70,000 men, and a reinforcement of 30,000 was hourly expected; the French, moreover, being at Burgos, and

thereby endangering the march of Sir David Baird; it being, moreover, a matter of doubt, whether the junction could even be effected with either Baird or Hope; that under all these circumstances, Sir John had resolved to fall back upon Portugal; and upon the receipt of these orders, Sir David Baird was instructed to commence his retreat to Corunna. Lieutenant-general Hope was ordered to push forward to Salamanca or Ciudad Rodrigo, according to his discretion. The campaign had thus reached its first crisis. Sir John had been thirteen days only at Salamanca, when he found it necessary to issue these orders for falling back into Portugal. The defeat of the Spanish armies entirely exposed the British force whilst marching up in divisions. Sir David Baird was coming from the north; Lieut.-general Hope from the south; so that had Sir John moved from Salamanca, which was at an equal distance between them, towards one of them, he necessarily withdrew in the same position from the other.

Sir John now only continued at Salamanca till General Hope was out of danger. This general, when within sixty miles of Salamanca, was compelled to make a sweep, in order to avoid the enemy. This communication was no sooner made to Mr. Frere, his Majesty's minister at Madrid, than he remonstrated against it, in a manner which excited some unpleasant feelings between Sir John and himself. It is not our purpose to stir up an ember, which we hope to be nearly extinguished; but it is necessary to add, in justice to the memory of Sir John, that the insinuated imputation was most certainly harsh, and that Mr. Frere all along acted with somewhat of an unfriendly reserve towards him. No situation could possibly be more cruel: there was, indeed, infinitely more courage in the retreat than in the advance. Sir John, in falling back upon Portugal, shewed that he had no feelings but for his country, and that he looked to posterity and his self-satisfaction to compensate him for the intermediate injustice of his contemporaries.

The Junta likewise urged Sir John Moore to reconsider his purpose. The president of the Junta, and the acting war minister, was Don Morla; the man who afterwards so basely submitted to Buonaparte. It hence became a matter of suspicion, that Don

Morla, in his solicitations to Sir John to move nearer to Madrid, was acting as the instrument of Buonaparte; endeavouring to lure the British army into the centre of Spain, and by that means throw them into the hands of the French. Upon a review, however, of the whole transaction, we do not think this supposition was well founded. Morla appears to us to have been a cold selfish man; one who had no objection to resist, as long as he thought resistance had a fair prospect; but as soon as things had taken an adverse turn, resolved to compromise, and take his chance with the victors. Madrid, and the virtue and patriotism of Don Morla, were taken at the same time.

On the 5th of December, Sir John received a message from the Junta at Madrid, announcing, that the French were advancing towards the capital; but that as they had 60,000 men to oppose to them, they had no apprehension for the event. They intreated him, however, to march with the British force to their assistance. Before Sir John had made any decision upon this letter, he received another of the same purport, and on the same day, from Mr. Frere. It was therein stated, that nothing could exceed the popular enthusiasm of Madrid; and Mr. Erere concludes a most cold, formal, and reserved letter, by insinuating, that there was no reason whatever for the retreat of the British; that such a retreat would be tantamount to the desertion and abandonment of our allies: "for such is the spirit and character of this country, that even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success." This letter is dated December the 3d, from Talavera, about 80 miles from Madrid; for neither Mr. Frere or the Junta had thought proper to intrust themselves to the enthusiasm of the capital. Talavera, moreover, was only their resting place, for they were hastening with all convenient speed to Badajoz.

Sir John gave these representations the attention which was due to the persons from whom they proceeded. Mr. Frere's letter was brought by Colonel Charmilly, who, in person, confirmed the substance of its contents. He had just left Madrid. The whole inhabitants of the city were in arms, and had united with the troops; the streets were barricaded; batteries were erecting all round;

the peasants were flocking to the capital; and, in fine, the enthusiasm was unexampled.

These official statements determined Sir John Moore. He could not for a moment suspect that they were decidedly false. He could not suspect that persons of the rank of the Junta would deceive him in a matter of mere fact. Colonel Charmilly, moreover, had seen it, and asserted what has since appeared to have been a downright direct falsehood on his veracity. Was it possible, moreover, that Mr. Frere could be so egregiously deceived? These considerations decided the general. He sent an immediate order to Sir David Baird to stop his retreat. The caution and foresight of the general were admirably shewn in this order: " The city of Madrid have taken up arms, have refused to capitulate to the French, are barricading their streets, and say they are determined to suffer every thing rather than submit. This arrests the French, and people who are sanguine entertain great hopes from it. I own, myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying; and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, as Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, you will suspend your march until you hear from me again. Let all your preparations, as far as provisions, &c., go, continue to be made for a retreat, in case that should again become necessary. Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two further back; to which let salt meat, biscuit, rum or wines, forage, &c., be brought up from Corunna. Send to me to Zamara two regiments of cavalry, and one brigade of horse artillery; keeping one regiment of cavalry, and one brigade of horse artillery with yourself; and send on your troops by brigades to Benevento. The enemy have nothing at present in that direction; we must take advantage of it, and by working double tides make up for lost time. By means of the cavalry patroles, you will discover any movements immediately near you; and I take for granted you have got other channels of information; and both you and me, although we may look big, and determined to get every thing forward, yet we must never lose sight of

this, that at any moment affairs may take that turn that will render it necessary to retreat."

These letters of Mr. Frere's and the Junta had been brought by Colonel Charmilly, December the 5th; and on December the 4th, Madrid, after a negotiation conducted by Morla, had surrendered. This certainly constitutes a strong presumption of treachery on the part of Morla, as he must have been meditating this negotiation in the very moment in which he had sent the letter, soliciting the advance of Sir John. Our opinion, however, is, that he was not so much guilty of any concerted treachery as of a base selfishness; he was willing to be prepared for all events, and perfectly careless how far he risked the English, as long as he answered his own purposes.

Sir David Baird was at this period at Villa Franca, about two marches from Astorga towards Corunna. General Hope was in the immediate neighbourhood of Salamanca. Sir John therefore was now secure of his junction with both of them; and therefore in a better situation than he had hitherto been since in Spain.

Sir John immediately wrote (December the 6th,) to Romana, expressing his altered purpose; and requesting Romana, who was stated to have been at the head of about 14,000 men, the fugitives from the defeated armies, to appoint some place of union, that thence the combined armies might move on Madrid. very unpleasant circumstance occurred the same day to render wider the unhappy distance that already prevailed between Mr. Frere and Sir John Moore. Colonel Charmilly arrived at head quarters with a letter from Mr. Frere; in which Mr. Frere expressed his earnest request, that if Sir John Moore continued in his purpose of falling back upon Portugal, he would previously allow Colonel Charmilly to be examined in a council of war. Surely this was nothing more than appealing from the general to his council. A most indelicate proposal, and which Mr. Frere's long experience in the decorums of official intercourse should have taught him to avoid. Sir John replied to this proposal in a letter of singular dignity: "I shall abstain," says he, " from any remark upon the two letters from you, delivered to me last night and this morning by Colonel Charmilly, or on the message which

accompanied them. I certainly at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again."

On the following day (December 7th,) Sir John received an address from the Junta of Toledo, announcing the resolution of devoting themselves to the sacred cause of their country, and of dying rather than submitting. Sir John made a suitable reply. On the following day, however, the French approached the town of Toledo, and these worthy patriots, having given the matter a second consideration, submitted without fring a shot.

Sir John had now learned the surrender of Madrid, and the approach of the French army. Marshal Bessieres was chasing the central army on the road to Valencia; the Duke of Bellune had entered Toledo; and the Duke of Dantzic, with a strong division, was marching to Badajos, with the design of either seizing upon Lisbon or Cadiz; the Duke of Truro was proceeding against Saragossa; the Duke of Dalmatia was preparing to enter Leon; and Bonaparte from Madrid was ready to support all these movements, and complete the subjugation of Spain. The total of this force was estimated at 150,000 men. Sir John Moore's force did not exceed 18,630, exclusive of 10,720 with Sir David Baird; making altogether an army of 26,900 infantry, and 2,450 cavalry. The artillery was numerous, but of too small a calibre, including a brigade of useless three-pounders. It amounted to 50 guns.

On the 8th of December, Sir John received a letter from Colonel Graham, who had been sent by him to Madrid; the letter was dated Talavera, December the 7th. The substance of it was, that Morla had made some sort of agreement with the French, who on the 2d of December had thereby got possession of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid; that he was suspected of treason in this proceeding, having refused to admit the troops of St. Juan and Hereida, who were at the gates, and whose presence would have enabled the citizens to have defended the town; that Castellar the Captain-general, and all the military officers of rank, had refused to ratify the agreement; had left the town, and brought away 16

guns; that the inhabitants, however, had refused to deliver up their arms; and that the French force, being about 25,000, had thereby sufficient occupation to keep them at Madrid; that the army of Castanos was at Guadalaxara, and was stated to amount to 30,000 men; that the remains of the army of Generals St. Juan and Hereida (about 12,000,) were going to occupy the bridge of Almairaz, a bridge over the Tagus, about 40 miles from Talavera in the road to Badajos; that the army of Romana in Leon was said to exceed 30,000 men; that La Pena had succeeded Castanos; and that the chief force of the French was at Saragossa and Madrid.

Sir John Moore, however, resolved to give the Spaniards all possible assistance; and accordingly, on the following day, (Dec. 13th) commenced his march from Salamanca. The reserve and General Beresford's brigade were marched to Toro; there to unite with the cavalry under Lord Paget, who had reached that place from Astorga. The general moved with the remaining divisions towards Aleajos and Tordisellas. At this last place the whole were intended to unite, whence he proposed to proceed to Valladolid. Sir David Baird's corps were not yet all collected; but he was directed, by an express, to push on his brigades to Benevento to support or join him.

The intention of this movement was to threaten the communication between Madrid and France. His purpose was to draw the principal attention of the French to the united armies of himself and Romana; and by means of this diversion give breathing time to the levies in the south. In the orders sent to Sir D. Baird to hasten to Benevento, he informed him that he should reach Valladolid on the 16th.

On the same day he dispatched a messenger to Mr. Frere, informing him that he had been joined by 1500 cavalry, making a part of the forces of Sir David Baird; that Sir David was assembling his force at Astorga and Benevento, the latter town being about 50 miles in the rear of Sir John in his line of march to Valladolid. The distance between Salamanca and Valladolid is 60 miles. Romana was at Leon, about 60 miles further northerly of Valladolid. A straight line, almost due north, from Salamanca to Leon would be the base of a triangle, which, having

Valladolid for its vertex, would be nearly an isosceles; the lines, from Salamanca to Valladolid, and from Leon to Valladolid, being equal. Benevento is situated half way between Salamanca and Leon on the above mentioned base. In the dispatch above mentioned, Sir John thus states the purport of his movements. "The object of my movement is to threaten the French communications, and attract their attention from Madrid and Saragossa, and favour any movement which might be projected by the armies forming to the south of the Tagus. If no advantage is taken of it, if no efforts are made, and if every one continues quiet, as they did when Madrid was attacked, the French will have their option to turn against me what portion of their force they please: it will of course not be one inferior in number; and I need not state to you what is likely to be the consequence."

On the 14th, the head-quarters were transferred to Aleajos, about 40 miles in the line of march to Valladolid. Here Sir John received a letter from the Marquis Romana; the substance of which was a mere approbation of Sir John's movements. On the same day, some most important dispatches were intercepted from Buonaparte to Marshal Soult at Saldana. It appeared from these documents, that Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, had with him two divisions at Saldana, besides one under the Duke d'Abrantes, which were collecting at Burgos, and another under the Duc de Treviso, which had received orders to march on to Saragossa, but which, of course, might be recalled. Madrid had submitted, and was quiet; and the French from thence were marching upon Badajos. Their advanced guard was at Talavera and Lahreina on the 10th instant.

In consequence of the serious discoveries made by this circumstance, Sir John, instead of continuing in the line of his march to Valladolid, made a march to his right upon Toro, so as to approach Sir David Baird; Toro being in the road to Benevento about 30 miles from it, and Zamora being half way between the two places. By this movement the British forces were becoming more concentrated, Sir David being at this time collecting his forces at Benevento. The French force at the same time began to assume a most formidable appearance. Three corps, commanded by three marshals, gradually approaching from the north

on the British army, whilst Buonaparte with the reserve was hastening up to Madrid, and Marshal Bessiers with a fifth corps was hunting the remains of the Spanish armies in the south.

General Moore's immediate object was to allure forward Marshal Soult from Saldana, which place is about 80 miles northerly of Toro. With this purpose, as well as that of uniting himself with Sir David Baird, he had made his march upon Toro, which place he reached on the 16th. Here he received a report from Lieutenant-colonel Simms, who had been sent by Sir David Baird to ascertain the strength of Romana's army at Leon. The substance of his report was, that at Orbego, 12 miles from Leon, he had come up with the first division of that force; that he found it to consist of 4000 men under General Tregader. It was distributed into five regiments, three of the line and two of militia. The equipment and appearance of these troops were miserable in the extreme. The springs and locks of the muskets did not correspond; either the main spring was too weak for the feather spring, or the feather spring too weak to produce fire from the hammer; the ammunition pouches were not proof against the rain; the clothing of the soldiers was motley, and some were naked. The men were stout, without order or discipline, but in no degree turbulent or ferocious. The report proceeded, that the army with the Marquis Romana at Lon might amount to 10,000; that they had no suitable notion of military movements; their movements from column into line were confusedly performed; the officers were still inferior to the men, and there was only one brigade of artillery for the whole army. The report then concludes in the following words:

"On the whole, from what I have been able to observe, since I came here, and from the tenor of my conversations with the Marquis, I am really disposed to doubt his inclination of moving in a forward direction to join Sir John Moore. I suspect that he rather looks to secure his retreat into Galicia. Even if he were to join Sir John, I doubt whether his aid would be of any use.—My reason for the first conclusion is,—If the Marquis meant to advance, why send his artillery and troops into the rear; and why not fix some day for his movement? My reason for doubting the efficiency of his aid is founded on the discipline of his army, and even the arms of his men. It is really merally impossible, that they can stand before a line of French

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Life of Sir John Moore.

A portion of at least one third of the muskets will not explode, and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire his twice. Men, however brave, cannot stand against such odds. And as to charging with the bayonet, if their arms were fit for the purpose, the men, though individually as gallant as possible, have no collective confidence to carry them on; they will therefore disperse, probably on the first fire, and can never be rallied, until they voluntarily return to the general's standard; as in the case of the Marquis Romana's present army, almost wholly composed of fugitives from the battles of the north. The marquis himself informed me, that the Spaniards did not lose above a thousand men in their late actions with the French; a proof, not of the weakness of the French, but of the incapacity of the Spaniards to resist them. In fact, the French light troops decided the contest; the Spaniards fled before a desultory fire: They sayed themselves, and now claim a merit for having escaped. By a repetition of such flights, and such reassemblings, the Spaniards may, in the end, become soldiers, and greatly harass the enemy; but as we cannot follow this mode of warfare, they cannot be of much use to us in the day of battle, when we must either conquer or be destroyed. I do not mean to undervalue the spirit or patriotism of the Spaniards, which I highly respect, and which in the end may effect their deliverance, but they are not now, nor can they for a long time be, sufficiently improved in the art of war, to be coadjutors with us in a general action. We must, therefore, stand or fall by our own means."

This report was dated Leon, December 14th, and was received by Sir John, as we above stated at Toro, on the 16th; Leon being about 90 English miles to the north of Toro.

On the same day (the 16th), whilst at Toro, Sir John received a dispatch from the Marquis Romana; the purport of which was to give him information on two important points; the strength of the Marquis's army, and the plan by which he intended to proceed. With respect to his army, he stated it to amount to 20,000 men; but that at least two thirds of them were in want of clothing from head to foot, and that the whole army were without haver-sacks, cartouch-boxes, and shoes. With respect to his plan, he stated that he wanted to unite himself with the British; but that, according to the best information, there was a division of the enemy, from about 8 to 10,000 men, under Marshal Soult, at Sahagun, which place was between Leon and Toro; that until he was riden of these, he could only remain where he was; that the position of this division was along the little river Cea, and occupied the village of Sahagon, which strengthened its left; its

principal corps was at Saldana, and its advanced post at Cea and Almanza. The dispatch concluded with expressing his solicitude, that Sir John would rid him of this force by attacking it.

The project here proposed was, in fact, the immediate purport of Sir John. Toro was five marches from Sahagon, and Sir John had been previously informed that Marshal Soult had been there stationed, and had, for some time, kept a steady eye upon it. He foresaw that this might not only lead to an important event in itself, but would necessarily draw upon him the whole French force in Spain, and thereby create a diversion which would give time to the defeated armies to rally and recover themselves in the south.

Sir John remained at Toro the 16th and 17th; and on the following day (the 18th), moved forward to Castro Novo. Sir David Baird had arrived at the same time at Benevento, on the road to join them. Benevento is about 40 miles to the north-east of Castro Novo. Here he had sent off a dispatch in answer to that received from the Marquis Romana at Toro, on the 16th. Six John here stated in substance, that he had some time before received information of Marshal Soult being stationed at Saldana and Sahagon; and that, therefore, he had judged it expedient to make an oblique march towards that position; that by this means he was about to effect his junction with Sir David Baird, in which case he should immediately march upon Sahagon.

On the following day Sir John continued his march forwards on Villa Pando and Vandaras; and on the day following (December the 20th) marched to Majorga, where he was joined by Sir David with the guards.

Sir John Moore had now, at least, effected one purpose, that of the union of his army. Its total amount is stated to have been 23,000 infantry, and 2,500 cavalry. The cavalry andhorse artillery were advanced to within 12 miles of Sahagen.

A very brave action was here achieved by Lord Paget and his cavalry. It was understood that 700 of the enemy's cavalry were posted in Safagen. Lord Paget resolved upon an attempt to cut off this detachment. The ground was covered with deep snow, and the weather was extremely cold. His Lordship, however,

with the 10th hussars, along the Cea, to enter the town; while he proceeded towards it in another direction with the 15th dragoons and horse artillery. His Lordship approached the town at dawn, and surprised a picquet; but two or three men escaped and gave the alarm. He pushed forward and discovered the enemy formed not far from the town. The two corps manœuvred for some time, each endeavouring to gain the flank of its opponent.

At first the ground was unfavourable to Lord Paget, particularly from the situation of a hollow. But by superior skill his Lordship surmounted this difficulty; passed the hollow; completely out-manœuvred the enemy, and charged them at a favourable moment; for the French having wheeled into line, very injudiciously halted to receive the shock. But this they were unequal to; they were overthrown in a moment, and dispersed in every direction. Many of the French were killed, and the prisoners amounted to 157, including two lieutenant-colonels. The loss of the British was trifling. The 15th regiment of hussars, about 400 strong, encountered in this action near 700 French, and surpassed them both in skill and intrepidity.

On the following day (December 21st) the army moved to Sahagon, and as the men had suffered much from their previous marches,
Sir John halted a day to enable them to recover. On the same
day he received a dispatch from the Marquis Romana, dated Leon,
December 19th. The Marquis states his wish to co-operate with
him in his attack upon Sayagon; but the most extraordinary circumstance in this letter is, that the writer of it, as well as the
Junta, appeared to have been totally ignorant that Madrid had
surrendered to the enemy twenty days before.

Sir J. Moore here likewise received information, that Buonaparte had reviewed, in person, the French army at Madrid; and that it consisted of 60,000 men, with 150 pieces of artillery; and that this was independent of two large corps under the Dukes Bellune and Dantzic at Toledo and Salamanca, and others in the neighbourhood.

On the following morning (December 22d), the army still remaining at Sahagon, Sir John sent off a dispatch to the Marquis

Romana, informing him that Soult had concentrated himself at Saldana, 12 miles from Sahagon, and that he should march against him on the following morning. On the evening of t his day (22d), Sir John received another dispatch from the Marquis Romana, in which the Marquis informed him, that the force : at Saldana did not exceed 9000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, wit he about eight or ten pieces of artillery; that it would be of the greatest importance to surround this corps, and to destroy it before its junction with any other; and that if Sir John had determined upon this enterprise, the Marquis would select from his army 9 or 10,000 of his best men, and march forward to co-operate with him.

This letter arrived late in the night of the 22d. Very early in the morning of the 23d, Sir John dispatched a messenger to the Marquis with a reply to it. In this letter, dated Sahagon the 23d, Sir John informs him, that he intended to march the same night to Carrion, where he had reason to believe some of the enemy had collected. "To-morrow (the 24th) I shall march on Saldana. If your Excellency would march from Mansilla, either direct on Saldana, or pass the river a little above it, whilst I march on from Carrion, I think it would distract the attention of the enemy, and considerably aid my attack. My march from Carrion will probably be in the night. Any information of your movement I she all thank you to address to me at Carrion, where I shall be at day-light to-morrow."

Every thing, therefore, was now in preparation for a march upon Carrion during the night, and for an attack upon the enemy at Saldana on the following day.

The British army, now collected at Sahagon, co asisted of 25,400 men.

The Duke of Dalmatia, after the defeat of h' is cavalry at Salagun, had withdrawn a detachment from Guards, and concentrated his troops, to the amount of 18,000, behind the river Carrion. Seven thousand were posted at Saldana, and f ive thousand at the town of Carrion; and detachments were place d to guard the fords and bridges. It was also known that the head columns of Junot's corps (the 8th) were between Vittoria and B argos.

The disposition for the attack, however, was scarcely given out, and the generals had scarcely received their instructions, before alarming messages and reports were brought from all quarters. Information was received from one messenger, that a strong reinforcement had arrived at Carrion from Palentia; and that a large quantity of provisions and forage were preparing in the village in front of that town. A courier next arrived from Los Santas, bringing information that the French corps, which was marching to the south, had been halted at Salamanca; and several other messengers arrived, bringing reports that the enemy were advancing from Madrid.

This intelligence was further confirmed in the evening, about an hour before the intended march to Carrion, by the arrival of thefollowing express from the Marquis Romana:—

" TO SIR JOHN MOORE:

" Leon, December 22, 1808.

Deuro, has written to me, on the 18th instant, that he is assured that the enemy, posted at the Escurial, are moving in this direction. He adds, that if the person who gave him this intelligence should not arrive the same day, he would go himself to Villacastin, 12 leagues from Madrid, to watch the two roads; the one of which leads to Zamora, and the other to Segovia. I hasten to give this information to your Excellency, that you may judge what measures are requisite to be taken. I have the honour, &c.

" THE MARQUIS of ROMANA."

This intelligence determined Sir John. The march for Carrion was counterordered, and immediate preparations were made for retreat.

"Exact information," says his brother, in his published account of the campaign, "of this plan of Buonaparte to entrap the English army has been since obtained through Major Napier, of the 50th regiment." This officer, at the battle of Corunna, was stabbed in the body by a bayonet, and wounded in the head by a sword, yet he defended his life till quarter was promised him. When a prisoner he was treated most handsomely by the Duke of Dalmatia. He dined with Marshal Ney frequently, who, as well as La Borde,

the chief of l'etat major, and other officers of rank, frankly told him the design and sentiments of the Emperor. When Buonaparte received intelligence that the British were moving to the Deuro, he said, "Moore is the only general fit to contend with me; I shall advance against him in person." Orders were then sent to the Duke of Dalmatia to give way if attacked, and to decoy the British to Burgos, or as far eastward as possible; and at the same time, to push on a corps towards Leon on their left flank. And should they attempt to retreat, he was ordered to impede this by every means in his power. The corps on the road to Badajos was stopt and ordered to proceed towards Salamanca; while he himself moved rapidly with all the disposable force at Madrid, and the Escurial, directly to Benevento. Neither Buonaparte or any of his generals had the least doubt of surrounding the British, with between 60 and 70,000 men, before they could reach Gallacia.

The following day (December 24th), was wholly occupied in making preparations for his retreat; a matter of infinite difficulty in the relative positions of the English and French armies. The British army, in fact, were almost girded by the French troops.

Marshal Soult received strong reinforcements from the 22d to the 24th; so that his army alone was much superior to the British. It was posted behind the river Carrion, between Carrion and Saldana.

The Duke of Abrantes had advanced from Burgos to Palentia, and threatened the right flank of the British.

Buonaparte pushed on the corps at the Escurial, and marched from Madrid on the 18th in person, with an army consisting of 32,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. The advanced guard of this cavalry passed through Tordesillas on the 24th, the same day the van of the British left Sahagun, and both moved to the same point,—Benevento.

There was another corps on the road to Badajos commanded by the Duke of Dantzic; this had advanced to Talavera de la Reyna, and had pushed on as far as Arzobispo, in pursuit of the Spanish general Galuyos. This was likewise counter-marched, and "was directed towards Salamanca. Even the division under the Duke of Treviso, which was proceeding to Saragossa, was stopped.

In fine," says his brother, in the account to which we have above referred, "the whole disposable force of the French army, forming an irregular crescent, was marching in radii with rapid steps to environ the British. To accomplish this favourite object, Buonaparte stopped his victorious career to the south, where there was nothing capable of resisting him. Lisbon and Cadiz would have yielded as easily as Madrid; and those must be sanguine, indeed, who can believe that any further resistance would have been made by Spain."

Sir John, however, had not as yet determined the full extent of his retreat. He knew that the enemy were too strong to allow him to wait in his present position; but he still wished and hoped to

defend Gallicia.

His first object was to pass the river Eslar, without interruption. There are three routes across this river; the first is by Mansilla, where there is a good bridge; the second is by Valentia, where there is only a ferry; and the third is by Castro Gonsolo, where there is also a bridge; this last road leads to Benevento. It was impossible to go by Mansilla, as the Marquis Remana's troops were there, and the country was completely exhausted by them; there were great objections to the whole army attempting a passage by the ferry at Valentia, for the intelligence received was, that the river was rapidly increasing, so that the ford would be probably too deep, and the boats were few. It was still, however, necessary to secure Valentia, in order to stop the enemy. Sir David Baird, therefore, was directed to take that route, and it was determined that the rest of the army should proceed by Castro Gonsolo.

According to this disposition, therefore, Major-general Fraser, followed by Major-general Hope, commenced their march with their divisions in the evening of the 24th Dec. to Valderas and Majorga; and Sir David Baird proceeded with his to Valentia. To conceal this movement, Lord Paget was ordered to push on strong patroles of cavalry close to the advanced posts of the enemy. The reserve, with two light corps, did not retire from Sahagun till the morning of the 25th; they followed General Hope. Lord Paget was ordered to remain with the cavalry until the evening, and then follow the reserve. Sir John accompanied these last corps.

On the 26th of December Sir David Baird reached the Eslar, and passed the ferry with less difficulty than was expected; he took post according to his orders at Valentia.

On the 24th of December, the advanced guard of Buonaparte's army marched from Tordesillas, which is 120 miles from Madrid, and 50 from Benevento; and strong detachments of cavalry had been pushed forward to Villal Pando and Majorga. A detachment of Lord Paget's horse fell in with one of these bodies on the 26th at Majorga. The French drew up on the left of a hill, and waited to receive the English charge. Colonel Leigh did not suffer them to wait long; he galloped up the hill, charged them, routed them, and took about 100 prisoners.

The cavalry, the horse artillery, and a light corps remained, on the night of the 26th, at Castro Gonsolo; and the divisions under Generals Hope and Fraser marched to Benevento. On the 27th the rear guard crossed the Eslar, and followed the same route, after completely blowing up the bridge. The army began now to exhibit that appearance of turbulence and indicipline, which too frequently characterise a retreat. It became necessary, therefore, to issue a general order of some severity in point of its language. The general lamented, with deep sorrow, that the army should have forfeited its former praise for exemplary conduct and good discipline. The misbehaviour of the troops, which marched by Valdaras to Benevento, exceeded what he could have believed of British soldiers. It was disgraceful likewise to the officers, as it strongly marked their negligence and inattention. He could feel no mercy towards officers, who, in times of peril and difficulties, neglected their essential duties; nor towards soldiers who injured the country they were sent to protect. The situation of the army was such as to call for exertion of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body. These were not bravery alone, but patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship; obedience to command, and sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every situation in which they might be placed. It was only by the display of such qualities, that the army could deserve the name of soldiers; that they could be able to withstand the foces opposed to them, or to fulfil the expectations of their country.

On the same day, December 27th, Sir John sent off a dispatch

to the Marquis Romana, dated from Benevento. The general herein informed his Excellency, that the enemy were advancing upon them, and that their main body had reached Valladolid, three marches, or 60 miles in his rear, the preceding day. The march to Sahagun had answered, he hoped, some effectual pur-That a little more good fortune would have enabled him to cut up Soult corps; but that he had at least succeeded in withdrawing the attention of the enemy from the Spanish armies in the south. "I shall continue," proceeds Sir John, " my movement on Astorga. It is there, or behind it, we should fight a battle, if at all. If the enemy follows so far, he will leave himself more open to the efforts of the south. My opinion is, that a battle is the game of Buonaparte, not ours. We should, if followed, take defensive positions in the mountains, where his cavalry can be of no use to him; and there either engage him on an unequal contest with us, oblige him to employ a considerable corps to watch us, or to retire upon Madrid; in which last case we should again come forth into the plain. In this manner we give time for the arrival of reinforcements from England; your army to be formed and equipped, and that of the south to come forth. In short, the game of Spain and of England, which must always be the same, is to procrastinate and to gain time; and not, if it can be helped, to place the whole stake upon the hazard of a battle,"

Whilst the army was on its march to Benevento, a Spanish messenger came up with a general, who informed him that he had passed Buonaparte and his army, who were making forced marches to overtake the British. The general, however, was still unwilling to give himself entirely into the purpose of abandoning the defence of Spain: he looked anxiously around him on all sides to see, if the people, or their armies, were making any exertion; but on all sides was a perfect blank. The French were in full pursuit of the British, and the Spaniards were every where as quiet as if they were neutral spectators.

The general, therefore, found it necessary to continue his retreat. There were two roads to Vigo; the one by Orense, the other by Astorga. The road by Orense was impracticable, both for the artillery and waggons; the army, therefore, were compelled

to take that by Astorga. Orders were accordingly sent from Benevente to Sir David Baird, who was still at Valencia, to direct his march on Astorga.

On the following day, Generals Hope and Fraser proceeded with their divisions to Le Benessa.

On the 29th, at day-break, after nearly two days' rest, Sir John Moore followed with the reserve, and Lord Paget, as before, was ordered to bring up the rear with the cavalry.

But at nine o'clock in the morning, before his lordship had moved, some of the enemy's cavalry were seen trying a ford near the bridge, which had been blown up; and presently between 5 and 600 of the imperial guards of Buonaparte plunged into the river, and crossed over. They were immediately opposed by the British picquets, who had been much divided to watch the different fords; but were quickly assembled by Colonel Otway. When united, they amounted only to 220 men. They retired slowly before such superior numbers, bravely disputing every inch of ground with the enemy. The front squadrons repeatedly charged each other; and upon the picquets being reinforced by a small party of the 3d dragoons, they charged with so much fury, that the front squadron broke through, and was for a short time surrounded by the enemy's rear squadron wheeling up. But they extricated themselves, by charging back again through the enemy. They then quickly rallied, and formed with the rest of the picquets. Lord Paget soon reached the field; and Brigadier-general Stewart, at the head of the picquets, was sharply engaged, the squadrons on both sides sometimes intermixing. His lordship was desirous of drawing on the enemy farther from the ford, till the 10th hussars, who were forming at some distance, were ready. This regiment soon arrived, and Lord Paget immediately wheeled it into line, in the rear of the picquets. The latter then charged the enemy, supported by the 10th hussars. But before they could close, the French wheeled round, fled to the ford, and plunged into the river. They were closely pursued, and left on the field 55 killed and wounded, and 70 prisoners; among whom was General Le Febvre, the commander of the imperial guard. As soon as the snemy reached the opposite side of the river, they formed on the

bank, but a few rounds from the horse artillery, who arrived at that moment, quickly drove the French up the hill in the greatest The imperial guard had shewn themselves much superior to any cavalry which the British had before engaged. They fought very gallantly, and killed and wounded near 50 of our dragoons. Major Bagwell, who commanded some of the picquets, was wounded. It was learnt from the prisoners, that Buonaparte slept the night before (on the 28th,) at Villal Pando, which is four leagues from Benevento. He had commanded General Le Febvre to pass the Eslar if possible, but not to commit himself; and it was expected that he would have been joined on the march by a Polish regiment, which however did not come up in time. Le Febvre owned to Sir John Moore, that when he saw nothing but the cavalry picquets, he concluded that all the rest of the army had left Benevento. This induced him to cross the river, and when once over, he could not, he said, without fighting, retreat, with such a corps as he commanded, with men who had put to flight 30,000 Russians at Austerlitz.

Towards the evening the enemy brought up some field pieces, and cannonaded the picquets from the heights on the opposite side of the river, but without the least effect. Lord Paget drew off the cavalry at night and followed the reserve to Le Benessa.

General Craufurd was here detached with 3000 men to take the road for Vigo through Orense. It was found difficult to support the whole of the army on one road. The rest of the army proceeded to Astorga, when Sir David Baird's column, coming from Valencia, again united with Sir John on the evening of this day, the 29th. Sir John, however, had the mortification to find here (at Astorga), the Marquis Romana and his army. They had retreated from Leon, of which the French had possessed themselves. The soldiers of Sir David Baird had brought the camp equipage from Corunna to Astorga; there was now no means of removing it, and it was necessarily ordered to be burned.

It had been a part of the plan of Buonaparte to have reached Benevento as soon as the English, and Marshal Soult had indulged the hope, that they would have been so much retarded by Buonaparte's attacks, that he might by forced marches through Leon

proceed thence to Astorga. Had either been in time, the British But Buonaparte was here happily would have been surrounded. anticipated, and whilst a part of his cavalry was repulsed by Lord Paget, the van of the British army, under General Fraser, entered and secured Astorga. The advanced guard, and the main body of the British army, on the 30th of December, moved on to Villa Franca; and Sir John Moore, with General Paget and the reserve, followed on the 31st. They marched to Comberos that evening; and the cavalry followed at night. The picquets on the road from La Benessa, who were posted to watch Buonaparte's cavalry, and those at the bridge at Orbego to attend to Soult, retired as the enemy advanced. The cavalry reached Comberos at midnight; when immediately the reserve proceeded and arrived next morning (January 1st,) at Bombibre, precisely as the preceding divisions were marching off to Villa Franca. The French were now so close up, that their patroles during the night fell in with our cavalry picquets.

Buonaparte was joined at Astorga by Marshal Soult. The French army now assembled in this town amounted to near 70,000 men, independent of other divisions which were hastening up. The emperor here reviewed this force, and detaching three marshals of France to follow the British, he himself halted to watch the event.

It must not be denied, that the sufferings of the army, from the haste of the retreat and the inclemency of the weather, were great in the extreme; and, in such circumstances, some murmurs and some discontent were natural and pardonable. The ground was covered with snow; the roads were nearly impassable; and after a day of the most severe marching, neither food nor shelter were to be procured at night. There were no means of transporting the baggage but by the Spanish mules and bullocks, and these would only obey the voice of the native drivers, who seized every opportunity of escaping and running away. The consequence was, that the greater part of the baggage was necessarily left behind, and the weak, the sick, and the wounded, under the same cruel necessity, were left to the mercy of the enemy.

The most unhappy circumstance of the retreat, however, was

the number of stragglers, some of whom from necessity, but a far greater number in search of plunder, followed up in a long line the march of the enemy. These unhappy wretches were most mercilessly hacked, cut, and slashed, by the French cavalry, now close up to the rear of the English. For three, four and five miles, the French dragoons galloped up the road through the midst of them, cutting and slashing them on each side; the poor wretches from liquor, fatigue, or sickness, being unable to move out of their way.

On the following day, the 2d of January, the army moved to Villa Franca. Some squadrons of the French cavalry compelled the detacament which brought up the rear under Colonel Ross to retire, and pursued them for some miles, till Major-general Paget checked them with the reserve. On the morning of the 3d, whilst the army was about to proceed on its march, a party of about 5000 cavalry were seen advancing within a league of Cocabelos, a small town where the reserve had halted; the cavalry occupying Villa Franca. The 95th, and a detachment of British cavalry, occupied a hill, about half a league in front of the town, through which a shallow river ran; on the opposite side was the reserve at Villa Franca. Sir John Moore ordered the 95th to withdraw and come through the town over the bridge. They obeyed; but while the two rear companies were passing, the cavalry picquet retired precipitately through them, and were so closely pursued by the enemy, that from the narrowness of the passage some prisoners were made by the enemy. The enemy's dismounted chasseurs, thinking that they had thrown our rear into confusion, immediately advanced rapidly with great spirit, and crossing the river, attacked the 95th; their cavalry joining them in the onset. The 95th were immediately directed to retreat up some hills, amongst some vineyards, which they accordingly did, with the most admirable coolness and order, every now and then fronting and giving a well-aimed fire. The French cavalry, taking a moment to recover themselves, gave the charge up the road, but were again repulsed, and their commander, General Colbert, slain. The 95th established its name upon this day.

On the night of this day the army marched to Hereiras, the cavalry being sent on before to Lugo. The army did not reach Hereiras till midnight.

On the following day, (January 4th,) the reports were received from the engineers sent to examine the respective facilities of Vigo and Corunna; and the general, upon a comparison of them, determined upon Corunna, and sent off an express to Rear-admiral Sir S. Hood to request that he would send round the transports to that place.

The reserve moved this day for Nogales. They met on the road between 30 and 40 waggons, with stores from England for the army of the Marquis Romana. These stores were now useless; some of the stores, and such things as could be used, were distributed to the troops as they passed, and the remainder were destroyed.

On the morning of the 5th of January, the reserve moved forwards from Nogales for Constantino and Lugo. On this day's march, two waggons, with dollars to the amount of 25,000l. fell behind. This money belonged to Sir David Baird's division, and had been brought by it from Corunna. The waggons could not proceed farther; every effort, therefore, being tried in vain to save it, the casks were at length rolled down a precipice, on the side of the road, a fortunate treasure for some happy peasant.

The troops had to pass down a very steep hill on the bridge and town of Constantino. Sir John, fearing that they would be much harassed by the enemy in their descent, halted the rifle corps and horse artillery at the top, and remained with them to cover the rest whilst they passed. The enemy had the pradence to respect this position. They halted likewise at the foot of the hill, and suffered, not only the main body to pass unmolested, but even the rifle and artillery who had so well covered them.

The enemy, however, very soon recovered themselves, and were soon seen pouring down the hill and directing their course on the bridge. General Paget was immediately ordered to the defence of the bridge, whilst Sir John, with the 20th, 5th, and 91st regiments, took a strong position on a hill on the flank. The

enemy made a spirited attack, and endeavoured to force the bridge, but the force of the artillery drove them rapidly back. They repeated their charge, however, and continued fighting as long as the light continued; but General Paget succeeded in keeping the bridge. At eleven o'clock at night, he was ordered to retire to Lugo; the reserve going under arms to protect him.

The reserve, having been extremely harassed, remained quiet at Lugo on the 6th. The enemy appeared about noon, but both parties seemed equally in want of breathing-time. The general reconnoitered the ground about Lugo, and having found it suited to his wishes, resolved to await the enemy, and give him battle.

On the following day, the 7th of January, the French having planted four pieces of artillery, cannonaded the English. The English returned the fire, and dismounted one of their guns. As the enemy approached, the French made an attack on the guards, who were posted on the right. Whilst Sir John was observing this action, he suddenly perceived the enemy to be moving, as if secretly, five pieces of cannon, and about to direct an attack towards his left. He immediately rode in full speed to that part of his line. The attack commenced; and under the encouragement of their general, the troops most gallantly repelled it. Seeing one of his regiments giving way before a greatly superior column of the enemy, he rode to its head, and rallied it in person.

Sir John was fully persuaded that the enemy would attack him on the following day, and indeed considered the preceding attack as having been made for the purpose of reconnoitering. He occupied the evening, therefore, in preparing for the expected battle next morning. He issued a general order, in which he expressed his full confidence in the valour of his troops, and promised them that the ensuing day would give them the long-desired opportunity of giving battle to the enemy.

On the morning of the following day, the 8th of January, the army, in order of battle, offered battle to the enemy; and such an instantaneous effect had the hope of fighting upon the men, that order, regularity, discipline, and a perfect military organization, all re-appeared in an instant, and the army seemed again the

same body as that assembled at Salamanca. The general rode along the ranks, and reminded the officers and men of what their country expected of them.

Marshal Soult, however, remained at his post, evidently declining the offered battle, as indeed it was his manifest part so to do. Infinitely more was to be gained by attacks on a retreating army, than on an army united in battle. Delay, moreover, brought up hourly reinforcements.

The same reasons compelled Sir John to continue his retreat, when he saw that the enemy was too wary to give up his advantage. The different brigades were accordingly directed to quit the ground at 10 o'clock at night, leaving fires burning to deceive the enemy.

On the 9th, the reserve marched forwards for Betanzos, a distance of 30 miles. The march on this day was unusually irregular; the guards, and artillery, and reserve, however, are stated to have distinguished themselves by their patience and discipline. The situation was certainly very melancholy and trying: the enemy were close up, and in great force; the road was covered with the hacked and mangled bodies of the stragglers; the dead bodies of the mules and horses, and the quantity of baggage thrown away, were some impediment to the pursuit.

The French did not discover the retreat from Lugo till nine o'clock in the morning of the 9th; the army had thus some hours in advance, but the French came up about the evening. General Paget, with the reserve, was ordered to take up a position, for the protection of the stragglers, some miles from Belanzos, and he remained in this post all night.

On the 10th, the army halted at Betanzos, the general compassionating their fatigue.

On the 11th, the army marched from Betanzos, on its last march for Corunna. General Moore went forward, with the main body, in order to examine the ground in the neighbourhood. He is stated to have addressed the commanding officer of every regiment as he passed them, and to have intreated, them not only upon that but upon every future occasion, to attend most strictly to their order in march.

The army, upon the conclusion of its march of this day, was etationed as follows:—The guards and General Fraser's brigade, were quartered in the town; General Hope's division in the suburbs; and General Paget, with the reserve, at El Burgo, near the bridge of the Mero, and in the villages on the St. Jago road. The transports were not arrived.

On the following morning, January 12th, the enemy were seen moving in force on the opposite side of the river Mero. They took up a position near the river Perillo, on the left flank, and occupied the houses along the river.

On the following day, the 13th of January, Sir David Baird marched out of Corunna with his division, to take up his position on some high grounds.

Sir John had now fixed upon the position in which he resolved to receive the enemy. There were two ranges of heights in the front of Corunna; the higher and more distant range, about four miles off, was undoubtedly the best military position, had our force been sufficient to maintain it; but the occupation of it by inferior numbers, would only have exposed the army to have been turned on one or the other of its flanks. It became necessary, therefore, to abandon all thoughts of it, and to occupy the second and nearer range, the heights of which were much inferior. The army was accordingly posted here as follows :--- General Hope, with one division, occupied the hill on the left, which commanded the road to Belanzos, but the height of which decreased gradually towards the village of Elvina, taking a curved direc-Sir David Baird's division commenced at this village, and bending to the right, the whole formed nearly a semicircle. The rifle corps, on the right of Sir David Baird, formed a chain across a valley, and communicated with General Fraser's division, which was drawn up near the road to Vigo, and about half a mile from Corunna. The reserve, under Major-general Paget, occupied a village on the Belanzos road, about half a mile in the rear of General Hope. months government and beservable even of finites at

Sir John Moore was occupied the whole morning, from day, break till near noon, in making these dispositions. Having completed them, he returned to his quarters, and writing his last

dispatch, ordered Brigadier-general Stewart to proceed with it immediately to England. Brigadier-general Stewart was chosen, on this occasion on account of his relationship to the war minister; he had been an eye witness to all the sufferings and efforts of Sir John Moore, and therefore best suited to do him justice.

On the following day, the 14th, the enemy commenced a brisk cannonade on the left; the British artillery returned this fire with great effect, and at last compelled the enemy to draw off their guns.

In the evening the transports from Vigo hove in sight.

On the following day, January the 15th, the enemy advanced to a height immediately opposite to the position of the British, and the 95th had a spirited skirmish with them. Colonel McKenzie, of the 5th, perceived two of the enemy's cannon not far distant; he rushed gallantly forward with a part of his regiment to seize them, but was shot whilst in full course.

The morning of the 16th now broke. The French were very strongly posted on the hills, and seemed unusually quiet, not even a gun being fired. Sir John availed himself of this cessation to put every thing in order for the embarkation, which he intended to commence at four o'clock in the afternoon. This tranquillity, and these preparations, continued undisturbed till after one o'clock. The general then mounted his horse, and rode off to visit his out-posts. He had not proceeded far on his road, when he received a report from General Hope, that the enemy's lines were getting under arms. He immediately spurred his horse, and flew to the field. He found the picquets already engaged, and the enemy pouring rapidly down the hill on the right wing of the British. He immediately dispatched the necessary orders to the generals commanding at the different points. General Fraser, whose brigade was on the rear, was commanded to move up and take a disposition on the right; and General Paget was ordered to advance with the reserve to support Lord William Bentinck.

The enemy now commenced a most heavy cannonade from some weighty guns, most advantageously placed on the heights, and under cover of this fire made their approach. They advanced from their position in four columns. The first of these columns

advanced from a wood; the second skirted its edge, and both were directed towards the right wing, which was the weakest point. A third column approached the centre; and the fourth was advancing slowly upon the left along the road from El Burgo. Besides these there was a fifth corps, which remained half way down the hill towards the left.

The battle, therefore, commenced on the British right; which post of honour and danger was occupied by Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of the 4th, 42d and the 50th. Sir John Moore rode to the spot as soon as he saw the direction of the enemy's movement. The guards were in the rear of Lord William's brigade, and Sir John dispatched one of his staff to desire General Paget to hasten up with the reserve, and take a position on the right of Lord William, so as to prevent its being turned.

The following account of the immediate proceedings of Sir John in the battle is from the published work of Mr. James Moore, the brother of Sir John; and a brother every way worthy of that excellent man.

"The French and English were separated from each other by stone-walls and hedges, which intersected the ground; but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British; and a body of the enemy were observed moving up the valley to turn it; Sir John instantly gave an order. that the half of the 4th regiment, which formed this flank, should fall back, refusing their right, and making an obtuse angle with the other half. This was executed, and in this position they commenced a heavy flanking fire; and the general, watching the manœuvre, called out to them, 'That was exactly what I wanted to be done.' He then rode up to the 50th regiment, commanded by Majors Napier and Stanhope; who got over an inclosure in their front, and charged most gallantly. The general, ever an admirer of valour, exclaimed, 'Well done the 50th, well done my majors.' They drove the enemy out of the village of Elvira, with great slaughter. In this conflict Major Napier advancing too far was wounded in several places, and taken prisoner; and Major Stanhope unfortunately received a mortal wound. Sir John Moore

proceeded to the 42d, addressing them in these words. 'Highlanders, remember Egypt.' They rushed on, driving the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall. Sir John accompanied them in this charge, and told the soldiers that he was well pleased with their conduct. He sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the Highlanders; upon which, the officer commanding the light company concurred, that as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieved by the guards, and began to fall back; but Sir John discovering the mistake, said to them, 'My brave 42d, join your comrades; ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets.' They instantly obeyed, and all moved forward. Captain Hardinge now returned to report that the guards were advancing. While he was repeating and pointing out the situation of the battalion, a hot fire was kept up, and the enemy's artillery played incessantly on the spot. Sir John Moore was too conspicuous: a cannon ball struck his left shoulder, and beat him to the ground. He raised himself and sat up with an unaltered countenance, looking intently at the Highlanders, who were warmly engaged. Captain Hardinge threw himself from his horse, and took him by the hand; then observing his anxiety, he told him the 42d were advancing; upon which his countenance immediately brightened. His friend, Colonel Graham, now dismounted to assist him; and from the composure of his features, entertained hopes that he was not even wounded; but observing the horrible laceration and effusion of blood, he rode off for surgeons. The general was carried from the field on a blanket, by a serjeant of the 42d, and some soldiers. On the way he ordered Captain Hardinge to report his wound to General Hope, who assumed the command."

The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed, but by the most determined bravery, not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged. The enemy finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it. A judicious and well-timed movement, which was made by Major-ge-

neral Paget, with the reserve, which corps had moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army, by a vigorous attack, defeated the intention.

The major-general, having pushed forward the 95th rifle corps, and first battalion of the 52d regiment, drove the enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the enemy's position. This circumstance, with the position of Lieutenant-general Fraser's division, (calculated to give still further security to the right of the line,) induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter. They were, however, directed more forcibly towards the centre, when they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under Major-general Manningham, forming the left of the division, and a part of that under Major-general Leigh, forming the right of the division. Upon the left the enemy at first contented himself with an attack upon our picquets, which, however, in general, maintained the ground. Finding, however, his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack upon the left more serious, and succeeded in obtaining possession of the village, through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front in that part of the line. From this post, however, he was soon expelled, with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2d battalion of the 14th regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Nicholls. Before five in the evening, he had not only successfully repelled every attack made upon the position, but had gained ground in almost all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action; whilst the enemy confined its operations to a cannonade, and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps. At six the firing entirely ceased. The different brigades were re-assembled on the ground they occupied in the morning, and the picquets and advanced posts resumed their original stations.

General Hope taking all the circumstances of his situation into his consideration; well knowing that his position was untenable, and that the French reinforcements were at hand, saw that no way of proceeding remained but to follow up the plan of Sir John Moore, and to embark with all possible speed.

Accordingly, at ten o'clock the same night (the 16th), he ordered the troops to move off from the field by brigades, and march down to Corunna. Major-general Beresford was posted, in command of the rear guard, to watch the enemy, and to cover the embarkation, and Major-general Hill was posted on an eminence he hind the town to assist him.

These preparations having been made, the greater part of the army embarked during the night, and the reserve and rear guard were embarked under the cover of the citadel on the following day.

Thus terminated this expedition, and the life of the lamented general, by whom it was commanded. He was interred on the rampart of the citadel of Corunna; and Spain, grateful for his services, and proud of his name, has reared a monument to his memory.

The following particulars of the death of Sir John Moore are by Captain Hardinge and Colonel Anderson, extracted from the published work of Mr. James Moore:—

"The circumstances which took place immediately after the fatal blow which deprived the army of its gallant commander, Sir John Moore, are of too interesting a nature not to be made public, for the admiration of his countrymen. But I trust that the instances of fortitude and heroism, of which I was a witness, may also have another effect, that of affording some consolation to his relatives and friends.

"With this feeling, I have great satisfaction in committing to paper, according to your desire, the following relation.

battalion of the guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the general the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching, at the very moment that a cannon-shot from the enemy's battery carried away his left shoulder and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh.

"The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse, on his

back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain.

"I dismounted, and, taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes very anxiously towards the 42d regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction when I informed him that the regiment was advancing.

"Assisted by a soldier of the 42d, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall.

"Colonel Graham Balgowan and Captain Woodford about this time came up; and, perceiving the state of Sir John's wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon.

"The blood flowed fast; but the attempt to stop it with my sash was useless, from the size of the wound.

"Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword, hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, 'It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me.'

"Here I feel that it would be improper for my pen to venture to express the admiration with which I am penetrated in thus faithfully recording this instance of the invincible fortitude, and military delicacy, of this great man.

"He was borne by six soldiers of the 42d and guards, my sash supporting him in an easy posture.

"Observing the resolution and composure of his features, I caught at the hope that I might be mistaken in my fears of the wound being mortal; and remarked, that I trusted when the surgeons dressed the wound, that he would be spared to us, and recover. He then turned his head round, and, looking stedfastly at the wound for a few seconds, said, 'No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.'

"I wished to accompany him to the rear, when he said, 'You need not go with me. Report to General Hope that I am wounded, and carried to the rear.'

"A serjeant of the 42d, and two spare files, in case of accident, were ordered to conduct their brave general to Corunna; and I hastened to report to General Hope.

" I have honour to be, &c. &c.

" H. HARDINGE."

"The tidings of this disaster were brought to Sir David Baird when the surgeons were dressing his shattered arm. He instantly commanded them to desist, and ran to attend on Sir John Moore. When they arrived, and offered their assistance, he said to them, You can be of no service to me, go to the soldiers, to whom you may be useful.'

"As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them turn him round frequently, to view the field of battle, and to listen to the firing; and was well pleased when the sound grew

fainter.

"A spring waggon bearing Colonel Wynch wounded from the battle came up. The colonel asked, 'Who was in the blanket?' and being told it was Sir J. Moore, he wished him to be placed in the waggon. The general asked one of the Highlanders, whether he thought the waggon or the blanket best; who answered, the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep the step, and carry him easy. Sir John said 'I think so too.' So they proceeded with him to his lodgings in Corunna, the soldiers shedding tears as they went.

"In carrying him through the passage of the house he saw his faithful servant François, who was stunned at the spectacle. Sir

John said to him, smiling, 'My friend, this is nothing."

"Colonel Anderson, for one-and-twenty years the friend and companion in arms of Sir John Moore, wrote, the morning following, this account, while the circumstances were fresh in his memory:

"I met the general, in the evening of the 16th, bringing in a blanket and sashes. He knew me immediately, though it was almost dark, squeezed me by the hand, and said, 'Anderson,

don't leave me.'

"He spoke to the surgeons on their examining his wound, but was in such pain he could say little.

"After some time, he seemed very anxious to speak to me, and and at intervals got out as follows: 'Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.' He then asked, 'Are the French beaten?' which he repeated to every one he knew, as they came in. 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied!—I hope my country will do me justice!'—'Anderson,—you will see my friends as soon as you can.—Tell them—every thing.—Say to my mother—.'—Here his voice quite failed, and he was excessively agitated,—'Hope—Hope—I have much to say to him,—but—cannot get it out—Are Colonel Graham—and all my aides—ducamp well?' (a private sign was made by Colonel Anderson not to inform him that Captain Burrard*, one of his aides—ducamp, was wounded in the action).—'I have made my will, and have remembered my servants.—Colborne has my will,—and all my papers.'

"Major Colborne then came into the room. He spoke most kindly to him, and then said to me, 'Anderson, remember you go to—, and tell him it is my request, and that I expect he will give Major Colborne a lieutenant-colonelcy.—He has been long with me,—and I know him most worthy of it.' He then asked Major Colborne, 'if the French were beaten?' And, on being told they were on every point, he said, 'It's a great satisfaction for me to know we have beaten the French.—Is Paget in the room?' On my telling, no; he said, 'Remember me to him.—It's General Paget I mean—he is a fine fellow.—I feel myself so strong—I fear I shall be long dying.—It is great uneasiness—It is great pain.—Every thing François says—is right.—I have the greatest confidence in him.'

"He thanked the surgeons for their trouble. Captains Percy and Stanhope, two of his aides-du-camp, then came into the room. He spoke kindly to both, and asked Percy†, 'if all his aides-du-camp were well?'

^{*} Son of Sir Harry Burrard, a promising young officer, who died two

[†] The Honourable Captain Percy, son of Lord Beverley.

"After some interval he said, 'Stanhope*—remember me to your sister.' He pressed my hand close to his body, and in a few minutes died without a struggle.

"This was every syllable he uttered, as far as I can recollect, except asking occasionally to be placed in an easier posture.

"P. ANDERSON, Lieut.-colonel."

" GENERAL ORDERS.

"The benefits derived to an army from the example of a distinguished commander do not terminate at his death; his virtues live in the recollection of his associates, and his fame remains the strongest incentive to great and glorious actions.

"In this view, the commander-in-chief, amidst the deep and universal regret which the death of Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore has occasioned, recalls to the troops the military career of that illustrious officer for their instruction and imitation.

"Sir John Moore, from his youth, embraced the profession with the feelings and sentiments of a soldier; he felt, that a perfect knowledge, and an exact performance of the humble, but important duties of a subaltern officer, are the best foundations for subsequent military fame; and his ardent mind, while it looked forward to those brilliant achievements for which it was formed, applied itself with energy and exemplary assiduity to the duties of that station.

"In the school of regimental duty, he obtained that correct knowledge of his profession so essential to the proper direction of the gallant spirit of the soldier; and he was enabled to establish a characteristic order and regularity of conduct, because the troops found in their leader a striking example of the discipline which he enforced on others.

"Having risen to command, he signalized his name in the West Indies, in Holland, and in Egypt . The unremitting at-

^{*} The Honourable Captain Stanhope, third son to Earl Stanhope, and nephew to the late Mr. Pitt.

[†] In enumerating the scenes where Sir John Moore conspicuously dissinguished himself, Corsica and Ireland have been forgotten.

tention with which he devoted himself to the duties of every branch of his profession obtained him the confidence of Sir Ralph. Abercrombie; and he became the companion in arms of that illustrious officer, who fell at the head of his victorious troops, in an action which maintained our national superiority over the arms of France.

"Thus Sir John Moore at an earlier period obtained, with the general approbation, that conspicuous station in which he glo-

riously terminated his useful and honourable life.

- "In a military character, obtained amidst the dangers of climate, the privations incident to service, and the sufferings of repeated wounds, it is difficult to select any one point as a preferable subject for praise: it exhibits, however, one feature so particularly characteristic of the man, and so important to the best interests of the service, that the commander-in-chief is pleased to mark it with his peculiar approbation.
 - "The life of Sir John Moore was spent among the troops.
- "During the season of repose, his time was devoted to the care and instruction of the officer and soldier; in war, he courted service in every quarter of the globe. Regardless of personal considerations, he esteemed that to which his country called him the post of honour; and by his undaunted spirit, and unconquerable perseverance, he pointed the way to victory.
- "His country, the object of his latest solicitude, will rear a monument to his lamented memory; and the commander-in-chief feels he is paying the best tribute to his fame, by thus holding him forth as an example to the army.
 - " By order of his royal highness the commander-in-chief,

"HARRY CALVERT, Adj.-gen.

enforced on ethers.

" Horse Guards, Feb. 1, 1809."

In Corsica he stormed the Convention Fort, and the outworks of Calvi, which was followed by the conquest of the island.

In Ireland he gained the battle of Wexford, which was the prelude to the suppression of the rebellion.

The following letter arrived too late to be inserted in its pro-

o continua a der-in-

Sir,—Observing in your last number of the Military Chronicle, that you intend giving on, the 1st of April, a supplementary number, containing the life and campaigns of Sir John Moore; I do myself the pleasure of annexing a general order, which was issued at St. Lucia; and at the same time to inform you, that I was an eye-witness of the gallant conduct of the subject of your memoir, being a member of that brave corps, (the Inniskillen infantry,) who acted with him on that day. The insertion of the general order in the life of Sir John Moore would not only be doing justice to him, and the corps who acted with him, but would also correct (I suppose) a typographical error in your last number, in the biography of Sir Eyre Coote, at page 329, lines 22 and 23, for Martinique, it should have been St. Lucia.

AN OLD INNISKILLENER.

Abstract of general orders issued by Lieutenant-general Ralph Abercrombie, commanding the forces in the island of St. Lucia, 26th of May, 1796.

PAROLE, INNISKILLEN.

Countersign, -Gillman,

The 27th regiment, under the command of Brigadier-general Moore, will this day at 12 o'clock, take possession of Fort Charlotte (Morne Fortunee), the present garrison, having first marched out, and laid down their arms, (on the glacis,) to that regiment, Brigadier-general Moore will then plant the colours of the 27th regiment on that fort.

The commander-in-chief is proud to say, that the services which have been performed by Brigadier-general Moore have been conspicuous, that it is unnecessary for him to detail them. His conduct in particular, on the 25st of May, could not but attract the attention of the whole army; and the behaviour of the Inniskillen regiment of infantry, who acted on that day with him, were so

worthy of praise, that it deserves the commander-in-chief's highest approbation. To Lieutenant-colonels Gillman and Drummond, Major Malcolm, the officers and men of that regiment, he returns his best thanks; and he regrets, severely, the loss of Major Wilson, of the Inniskillen infantry, who fell exerting himself in the service of his country.

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PERSONAL ADVENTURES

AND

TRAVELS

OF

FOUR YEARS AND A HALF

IN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

By MR. JOHN DAVIS.

BEING TRAVELS IN SEARCH OF INDEPENDENCE AND SETTLEMENT.

Inveni Portum.

LONDON:

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AND TO BE HAD OF THE BOOKSELLERS.

1817.

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
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
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
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